Manikad v. Tanodbayan
David
Case No. 162 G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984)
Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No.65
FACTS:
Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were charged with crimes of smuggling,
theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the
Respondent. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints
of this nature are lodged exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the
Respondent’s jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: “The EPZA in
the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones
shall have the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to
violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned and
administered by the Authority…”
ISSUE:
W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from
investigating complaints within the Export Processing Zone.
HELD:
No, the use of “sole” in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority.
Although the EPZA Police Force is the only police authority within the
Zone, it is not the only authority that may investigate complaints,
especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
LATIN MAXIM: 6c, 7a, 35
Endencia and Jugo v.
Case No. 98 G.R. No. L-6355-56 (August 31, 1953)
Chapter II, Page 56, Footnote No.33
FACTS:
RA 590 declares that no salary received by a public officer shall be
considered exempt from income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by law. While
Art. 8, Sec. 9 of the Constitution states that judges shall receive
compensation as fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Petitioners question the legality of RA 590.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 590 unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. Saying that the taxing of the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease in compensation is a clear interpretation of “Which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office”, by the Legislature.
Through the separation of powers, such a task must be done by the
Judiciary. Judicial officers are exempt from taxes on his salary not for his
own benefit but for the public, to secure and preserve his independence
of judicial thought and action.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 6c, 7a, 24a
Co v. CA
Case No. 65 G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993)
Chapter II, Page 69, Footnote No.91
FACTS:
Petitioner delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a
check drawn against the Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated November
30, 1983. The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored
two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being:
“CLOSED ACCOUNT.” A criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against Petitioner.
At the time of the issuance of the check, the delivery of a “rubber” or
“bouncing” check as a guarantee for an obligation was not considered a
punishable offense, an official promulgation made in a Circular of the
Ministry of Justice.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is criminally liable.
HELD:
No. According to them, Que v. People should not be applied
retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle of judicial
rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The decision in Que should not be
given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly
situated who relied on the opinion of the Secretary of Justice.
LATIN MAXIM: 1, 2a, 46a
Morales Jr. vs. Enrile
G.R. No. L-61016 – 121 SCRA 538 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Bill of Rights – Habeas Corpus – The Right to Bail
In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a
motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St, QC. They were charged in CFI Rizal for
rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that they were
arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights
were violated, among them the right to counsel, the right to remain
silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, and the right to bail.
Respondents countered that the group of Morales were already under
surveillance for some time before they were arrested and that the
warrantless arrest done is valid and at the same time the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE: Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
HELD: Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But
because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended
“”with respect to persons at present detained as well as other who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all
other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith,”” the
natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of
anyone of the said offenses is also suspended. To hold otherwise would
defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense
for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has
no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an
individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does
the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the
State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial
those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the
State’s very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective,
the right to bail must also be deemed suspended with respect to these
offenses. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive
imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such
charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason,
the detention becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his
right to freedom. Quite notable in this case however is that the
2nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what
they ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.
REPUBLIC V. CA
FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land,
which was approved and issued an original certificate of title. Both the
free patent and title specifically mandate that the land shall not be
alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date of the issuance of
the patent. The District Land Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had
encumbered the land and upon finding that the subject land is
submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a complaint for
cancellation of the title and reversion of the parcel of land to the public
domain. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition
prohibiting encumbering the land within the 5-year period?
2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?
HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides that…lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of approval of the application and for a term of 5
years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant…The
contracts of lease and mortgage executed by Morato constitute an
encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land Act
because such contracts impair the use of the property.
2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide. When the sea moved towards the estate
and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and
passed to the realm of the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the
Court annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings
when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case,
the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said
court had no jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or
entity. The subject land in this case, being foreshore land should therefor
be returned to the public domain.
PERFECTO VS. MEER
FACT
In April 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary
as member of the Court during the year 1946. After paying
the amount, he instituted an action in Manila Court of First
Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his
salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of
taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution. It provides in its Article VIII, Section 9 that the
members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior
courts “shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by
law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office.
ISSUE
Whether or not the imposition of an income tax upon this
salary  in 1946 amount to a diminution.
HELD
Yes, the imposition of the income tax upon the salary of
Justice Perfecto amount to a diminution thereof. The
prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and
appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for
one purpose or another. The fathers of the Constitution
intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as
otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the
judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that
could come from taxing their salaries. Thus, taxing the
salary of a judge as a part of his income is a violation of the
Constitution.
LAPID vs. COURT OF APPEALS
A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman charging petitioner Gov.
Manuel M. Lapid and 5 other government officials with alleged
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service for allegedly having conspired between and among
themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators
in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per
truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a duly
enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and
without issuing receipts for its collection.
The Ombudsman rendered a decision finding guilty the petitioner
for misconduct for which they are meted out the penalty of 1 year
suspension without pay pursuant to section 25 (2) of RA 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989).
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman.
Proceeding from the premise that the decision of Ombudsman
had not yet been become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of
prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG
for prematurely implementing the assailed decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing
upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay is immediately
executory pending appeal.
HELD:
NO. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order,
directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty
of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one
month’s salary shall be final and unappealable. It is clear from the above
provision that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension
without pay for one month, is not among those listed as final and Issue:
unappealable, hence, immediately executory. The clear import of these
statements taken together is impose penalties that are not enumerated Whether or not the LBP can refuse to pay the landowner of the value of
in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately just compensation
executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case,
will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. Held:

Once the Land Bank agrees with the appraisal of the DAR, which
Landbank vs. Court of Appeals
bears the approval of the landowner, it becomes its legal duty to
Facts:
finance the transaction. In the instant case, petitioner participated in
the valuation proceedings held in the office of the PARAD through its
P rivat e responde nt Jose Pasc ual owne d t hree parcels of
counsel, Atty. Eduard Javier. It did not appeal the decision of PARAD which
land locat ed in Gutt aran , Cagayan. Pursuant to the Land Reform
became final and executory. As a matt er of fact, peti ti oner even
Program of the Government under PD 27 and EO 228,the Department
stated in its Peti ti on that it is willing to pay the value
of Agrarian Reform placed these lands under its Operation Land
determined by the PARAD provided that the farmer beneficiaries
Transfer.
concur thereto. These facts sufficiently prove that petitioner LBP
agreed with the valuation of the land. The only thing that hindered it
After receiving notice of the decision of the PARAD regarding the value from paying the amount was the non-concurrence of the farmer-
of just compensation, private respondent accepted the valuation. beneficiary. But as we have already stated, there is no need for such
However, when the judgment became final and executory, concurrence. Without such obstacle, petitionercan now be compelled
petitioner LBP as the financing arm in the operation of PD 27 and EO to perform its legal duty through the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
228 refused to pay thus forcing private respondent to apply for a
Writ of Execution with the PARAD which the latter issued on 24
December 1992. Still, petitioner LBP declined to comply with the
order. Private respondent filed an action for Mandamus in the Court of
Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by the
PARAD which the appellate court granted.
Libanan vs Comelec Case Digest
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN vs. HRET
G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997

Facts: Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose

Ramirez were among the candidates for the lone congressional seat of
Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the
returns was made on 13 May 1995, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have
been duly elected Representative of the District. 

Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET claiming,

among other things, that the absence of the BEI Chairman’s signature
at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not
those issued to the voters during the elections thus, indicating that they
were spurious and invalid. He averred that the law would require the
Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot before issuing it
to the voter. 

Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairman’s signature

are valid. 

Held: A ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is valid and
not spurious, provided that it bears any one of these other
authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and (b) in
those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not
readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots.
What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down
by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long
as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the
COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of
the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC
watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of
these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious
and subject to rejection.