SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 97239. May 12, 1993.]

INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1993 > May 1993 Decisions > G.R. No.
97239 May 12, 1993 - INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL.:

B. MICOSA, Respondents. , the Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz: chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"C. Conviction and Previous Separation.

‘1. . . .

‘2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving moral
turpitude may be dismissed from the service.’" 1

On February 6, 1987, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house
in Los Baños, Laguna.

On September 15, 1987 employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude is not of these justifiable causes. Neither may said ground be justified under
Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or willful breach by the employees
of the trust reposed in him by his employer or authorized representative under Article
282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the discharge of
his duty rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by
his position. It cannot bhis job at IRRI.

Jimenez & Associates for Petitioner.

Santos & Associates for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT; CONVICTION

OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE; NOT A JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE THEREOF. —
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may
terminate an or unjust.

5. ID.; HOMICIDE; WHEN CONSIDERED A CRIME AGAINST MORAL TURPITUDE. — This

is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree
of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction
involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. While . . . generally but not always, crimes mala in se
involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as
malum in se or as malun prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and
yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is
somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of juridical inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

6. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; WHEN DOES IT LIE. — There
is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the National Labor Relations
Commission in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa was
illegally dismissed. For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in
accordance with centuries of both civil and common traditions. The abuse of discretion
must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically.

DECISION

NOCON, J.:

Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of whether a

conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from
employment and corollarily, whether a conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral
turpitude.

International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized

by the Philippine government and accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally
granted to organizations of universal character. In 1977, it hired private respondent
Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI Employment Policy
and Regulations
On April 22, 1990, J.K. Pascual replied to Micosa’s letter insisting that the crime for
which he was convicted involves moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby
charged of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute’s Personnel Manual.

On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega
on February 6, 1987 arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression;
that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his
conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court
granted to him.