Republic of the Philippines The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition
SUPREME COURT follow:
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD
DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO
MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO
CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO
GONZALEZ, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R,
promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent
Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco
died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was
survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their
two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus
Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y
Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his
children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely,
Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco
Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes
and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and
residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late
Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the court of first instance
of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other
things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25
February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time
of his death; and that he left real and personal properties
in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu
court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10
April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the
heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite
publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of
general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and
cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13
March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be
heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu
court. On the same date, a third order was further issued
stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the
appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March
1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said
court, giving as reasons the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act
thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired
jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the
requisite publication of the notice of hearing
not yet having been complied with.
Moreover, copies of the petition have not
been served on all of the heirs specified in
the basic petition for the issuance of letters
of administration.2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a
week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein
petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with
the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for
the probate of the deceased's last will and
testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in
her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the
said last will and testament. The said proceeding was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu
court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said
Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss,
dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition
for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April
1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order
holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion
to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City shall have acted on the petition
for  probate of that document purporting to be the last will
and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to
the probate proceedings in the Quezon City court was
neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be
reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they
challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition
proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an
Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April
1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the
jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain
petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as
executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged
exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu
court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed
that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court
denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal
reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an
intestate proceeding."4 The said court further found in
said order that the residence of the late senator at the time
of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa
Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order
follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent,
paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to
dismiss reads as follows: "that since the
decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a
resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his
death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not
filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in
view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule
73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the
aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to
understand that the oppositors do not mean
to say that the decedent being a resident of
Cebu City when he died, the intestate
proceedings in Cebu City should prevail
over the probate proceedings in Quezon
City, because as stated above the probate of
the will should take precedence, but that the
probate proceedings should be filed in the
Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last
proposition is the desire of the oppositors as
understood by this Court, that could not also
be entertained as proper because paragraph 1
of the petition for the probate of the will
indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at
the time of his death was a resident of
Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A
(Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus
Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the
will shows that the decedent at the time
when he executed his Last Will clearly stated
that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta.
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the
City of Cebu. He made the former as his first
choice and the latter as his second choice of
residence." If a party has two residences, the
one will be deemed or presumed to his
domicile which he himself selects or
considers to be his home or which appears to
be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in
thus filing the instant petition before this
Court, follows the first choice of residence
of the decedent and once this court acquires
jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to
the exclusion of all others.5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration
of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964
asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court
was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for
reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April
1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the
decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but
notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors
appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00
a.m. with the hearing in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May
1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-
oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition
and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and
attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part
of the beneficiary or some other persons for
his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured
by fraud and/or that the testator acted by
mistake and did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the
time he affixed his signature thereto.6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite
publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly
complied with and that all the heirs had been duly
notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony
of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last
will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A.
Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public,
Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last
will, and the documentary evidence (such as the
decedent's residence certificates, income tax return,
diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that
the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon
City, as also affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon
City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to
probate the late senator's last will and testament as having
been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and
"with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-
widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following
the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said
order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special
civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as
case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from
proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and
against the herein petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in
proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person, covers both testate and
intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of
the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is
that court whose jurisdiction was first
invoked and which first attached. It is that
court which can properly and exclusively
pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether
the decedent left or did not leave a valid will,
and (2) whether or not the decedent was a
resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first
proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI
(Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that
the said court must exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the
petition for probate was filed by the
respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special
Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent
should assert her rights within the
framework of the proceeding in the Cebu
CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of
another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the
fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador
Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc.
2433-R, stated that the petition for
appointment of special administrator was
"not yet ready for the consideration of the
Court today. It would be premature for this
Court to act thereon, it not having yet
regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in
this connection that the said judge was
certainly not referring to the court's
jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction
itself which is acquired from the moment a
petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the
proceedings. At all events, jurisdiction is
conferred and determined by law and does
not depend on the pronouncements of a trial
judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's
judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition
will issue, commanding and directing the
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent
Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain
 perpetually from proceeding and taking any
action in Special Proceeding Q-7898
pending before the said respondent court. All
orders heretofore issued and actions
heretofore taken by said respondent court
and respondent Judge, therein and connected
therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of
injunction heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July
1965; hence the herein petition for review
on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore,
whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the
writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering
it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all
its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the decedent's last will and testament and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without
bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in his
testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to
the appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive
jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in
pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of
probate over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon
City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of
the document purporting to be the last will and testament
of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which
order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor
challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and
thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without
any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent
Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate
proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper
venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition and
to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as
to its due execution and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the
appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the deceased's last will and
testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's
express wish, for the following considerations: —
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers
original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over
"all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate
estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules
of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption
of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict
among the different courts which otherwise may properly
assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that
"the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons
settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether
a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
in the Province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of
a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of the province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction  to
the  exclusion  of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence, of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule
73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence  of the deceased
or the location of his estate is  not  an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of  venue.
This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran
in Sy Oa vs. Co Ho9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to
the effect that in probate cases the place of
residence of the deceased is regarded as a
question of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter. But we decline to follow this view
because of its mischievous consequences.
For instance, a probate case has been
submitted in good faith to the Court of First
Instance of a province where the deceased
had not resided. All the parties, however,
including all the creditors, have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court
and the case is therein completely finished
except for a claim of a creditor who also
voluntarily filed it with said court but on
appeal from an adverse decision raises for
the first time in this Court the question of
jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of
residence of the deceased in the province. If
we consider such question of residence as
one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial
court over the subject-matter, the effect shall
be that the  whole proceedings  including  all
decisions  on the different incidents which
have arisen in court will have to
be  annulled  and the  same case  will have to
be  commenced anew  before  another  court
of the  same rank  in another province. That
this is of  mischievous effect  in the  prompt
administration of justice  is too obvious to
require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy
Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December
31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act
No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled in the
province where he had last resided,
could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the
subject-matter, because such legal provision
is contained in a law of procedure dealing
merely with procedural matters, and, as we
have said time and again, procedure is one
thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter
is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila
Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56,
No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of
the deceased. Since, however, there are
many courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No.
190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. Thus, the
place of residence of the deceased is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter but merely of venue. And it is upon
this ground that in the new Rules of Court
the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled is properly called
"venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state
that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition
is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue
and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate
jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the
petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of
the settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition
for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented
in another court where the decedent obviously had his
conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow
and their minor children, and that the allegation of
the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take
cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it
in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which
has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's
alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-
widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes'
intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance
its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the
Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition
for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's
order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by
the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to
take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which
would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and
leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City
court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its
act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City
court to resolve the question between the parties whether
the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather
than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu
court thus indicated that it would decline to take
cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead
defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would
make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the
residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to
have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of
the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City
court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be
deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since
under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must  first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and
must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts,
which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is
undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and
the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over
the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and
deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court
should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule
73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents
submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to
probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot
be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted
without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's
will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to
the present case 13 is authority against respondent
appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence
of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this
wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding
intended to effect the distribution of the
estate of a deceased person, whether in
accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is
a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose.
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in
the course of intestate proceedings pending
before a court of first instance it is found
that the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter
should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that state an
administrator had already been appointed,
the latter being required to render final
account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently
appointed. This however, is understood to be
without prejudice that should the alleged
last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy.
As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate
of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of
the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court)
although opining that certain considerations therein
"would seem to support the view that [therein respondent]
should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros
Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate
special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding
No. 6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being
presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the
Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention
in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to
consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction
that wrong venue is merely
a waivable procedural defect, and, in the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the
instant case, we are of the opinion, and so
hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from
doing so by laches. It is enough to consider
in this connection that petitioner knew of the
existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte
y Goite since December 19, 1961 when
Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the
initial petition filed in Special Proceeding
No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served
with notice of the existence (presence) of the
alleged last will in the Philippines and of the
filing of the petition for its probate with the
Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344.
All these notwithstanding, it was only on
April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to
intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein
up to that date; thus enabling the Manila
Court not only to appoint an administrator
with the will annexed but also to admit said
will to probate more than five months
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31,
1962. To allow him now to assail the
exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of
the will by the Manila Court and the validity
of all the proceedings had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium
on his negligence. Moreover, it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower
court even if the latter was not the proper
 venue therefor, if the net result would be to
have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in
a case like the present where the objection
against said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's
estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate
by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was
the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his
conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference
in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original
case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule
73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be
properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the
Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the
record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu
court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and
assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the
residence of the late senator, the appellate court while
recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in
reliance on Borja vs. Tan  17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the
competence of whichever court is considered
to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this
case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as
held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note
that the question of the residence of the
deceased is a serious one, requiring both
factual and legal resolution on the basis of
ample evidence to be submitted in the
ordinary course of procedure in the first
instance, particularly in view of the fact that
the deceased was better known as the
Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to
be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City,
as his residence. We reiterate that this matter
requires airing in the proper court, as so
indicated in the leading and controlling case
of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al.,
G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to
take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it
and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the
Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City
court to determine the residence of the decedent and
whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which
would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings,
Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus
determined in effect for both courts — at the
behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu
court — that Quezon City was the actual residence of the
decedent who died testate and therefore the  proper venue,
the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It
would not serve the practical ends of justice to still
require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held
applicable and as indicated in the decision under review,
to determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent
(when the Quezon City court had already so determined
Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's
behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this
factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the
Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the
actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on
appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of
waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding
proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings
be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule
76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a
will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by
the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of
the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate
in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated
by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in
rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the
allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the
court is binding upon everybody, even against the
State. The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction
thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and
validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within
its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that
Quezon City was not the proper venue notwithstanding
the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in
admitting the decedent's last will to probate and naming
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon
city court's action should not be set aside by a writ of
prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the
appellate court's appealed decision, and should instead be
sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in
dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila
court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and
distributing the estate in accordance therewith in
the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered
that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings
regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not
the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to
have the same proceedings repeated in some other court
of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice
Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the
administration of justice" of considering the question
of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court
and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over
again the same proceedings before another court of the
same rank in another province "is too obvious to require
comment."
8. If the question of  jurisdiction  were to be made to
depend only on who of the decedent's relatives
gets  first  to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's
estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court
that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of  venue  in
order to preclude different courts which may properly
assume  jurisdiction  from doing so and creating conflicts
between them to the detriment of the administration of
justice, and that venue is  waivable, would be set at
naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not
see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to
who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her
choice regardless of whether the decedent is still
in  cuerpo presente  and in disregard of the decedent's
actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and
testament and the right of his surviving widow named as
executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly
not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance
with public policy and the orderly administration of
justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that
petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules
of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where
respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition
in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March
1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner
had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the
decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the
decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary
and is admittedly entitled to preference in the
administration of her husband's estate, 20 would be
compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all
the way to Cebu and submit anew the decedent's will
there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking
that the intestate proceedings be converted into
a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the
proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts
of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City
court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-
widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the
one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's
last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and
a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the
law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more
time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to
the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of
the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is
considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since
petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of
her husband, their community property and conjugal
estate have to be administered and liquidated in the
estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the
appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides
in Quezon City, and the proper venue of
the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the
Quezon City court properly took cognizance and
exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in
comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper
exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner
would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon
City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal
estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record
that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor
with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take
cognizance of the intestate petition and
instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a
week later by petitioner as surviving widow and
designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the
record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to
dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in
the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a
will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged
by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's
order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate
proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving
the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of
deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the
decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City
court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with
grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will
to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in
accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light
of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73,
section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of
jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the
Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the
will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix
thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to
issue said order, the said order of probate has long since with preliminary injunction originally filed by
become final and can not be overturned in a special civic respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
action of prohibition. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and
exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior Esguerra, JJ., concur.
courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the
case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.
and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that
the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and
consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of
his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-
widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the
decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken
in the testate proceedings before it be approved and
authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings
regularly had and to repeat and duplicate the same
proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once
more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find
that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the
Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible
documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the
conjugal residence of the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing

the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition
SECOND DIVISION proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334,
entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina
G.R. No. 124715. January 24, 2000 Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".

RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner, v. COURT OF Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance

APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc.,
SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are
DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING corporations formed, organized and existing under
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered
INC. Respondents. under the Torrens system.

DECISION On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein

BUENA, J.:
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper
subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of
a deceased person?
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition
for review on certiorari, the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP
No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated
04 July 19952, 12 September 19953 and 15 September
19954 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
93, sitting as a probate court.
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the
late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate
petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented by
her nephew George Luy, filed on 17 March 1995, a joint
petition5 for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y.
Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were
included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim,
then filed a motion6 for the lifting of lis pendens and
motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the
estate of the decedent.
In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court,
granted the private respondents twin motions, in this
wise:
 "Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City Speed Distributing Inc. 910 Barrio Niog,
is hereby ordered to lift, expunge or delete the
Aguinaldo Highway,
annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and Bacoor, Cavite.
5182 and it is hereby further ordered that the
properties covered by the same titles as well as XXXX
those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and 263236 are Auto Truck TBA Corp. 2251 Roosevelt Avenue,
excluded from these proceedings.
Quezon City.
SO ORDERED." XXXX

Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended Active Distributors, Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
petition9 which contained the following averments:
Homes, Paraaque,
"3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his
lifetime the following business entities, to wit: Metro Manila.

Business Entity Address: XXXX

XXXX Action Company 100 20th Avenue

Alliance Marketing ,Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca Murphy, Quezon City

BF Homes, or

Paraaque, 92-D Mc-Arthur Highway

Metro Manila. Valenzuela Bulacan.

XXXX
"3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged
in business with the public as corporations, all their capital,
assets and equity were however, personally owned by the
late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and
officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation
of the above business entities were mere dummies of Pastor
Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes of
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
"4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current
Deposits with the following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace
Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly Producers
Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and in other
banks whose identities are yet to be determined.
"5. That the following real properties, although registered in
the name of the above entities, were actually acquired by
Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with petitioner, to wit:
Corporation Title Location
XXXX
k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo
TBA Corporation Cainta, Rizal
q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance,
Metro Manila
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title
and/or Tax Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C"
to "W".
XXXX
"7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left
by the late Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having
been acquired by him during the existence of his marriage
with petitioner.
"8. There are other real and personal properties owned by
Pastor Y. Lim which petitioner could not as yet identify.
Petitioner, however will submit to this Honorable Court the
identities thereof and the necessary documents covering the
same as soon as possible."
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on
petitioners motion issued an order10, thus:
"Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is
hereby set aside and the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the
annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation
had already been deleted and/or cancelled said
TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and
51282.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT
Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256 and 236237 by
 virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant
petition.
SO ORDERED."
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed
Rufina Lim as special administrator11 and Miguel Lim
and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of
the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of
administration were accordingly issued.
In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court
denied anew private respondents motion for exclusion, in
this wise:
"The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her
petition is whether the corporations are the mere
alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim,
Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the
piercing of the corporate veil, a matter that is
clearly within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court and not the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court
of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue
decided by the regular court was whether the
corporation involved therein was the mere
extension of the decedent. After finding in the
affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the
corporation are also assets of the estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by
oppositors, shows that the SECs exclusive (sic)
applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is
simply a suit to settle the intestate estate of a
deceased person who, during his lifetime, acquired
several properties and put up corporations as his
instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED."
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex
parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an order13 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, the parties and the following banks
concerned herein under enumerated are hereby
ordered to comply strictly with this order and to
produce and submit to the special administrators ,
through this Honorable Court within (5) five days
from receipt of this order their respective records of
the savings/current accounts/time deposits and
other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or
corporations above-mentioned, showing all the
transactions made or done concerning savings
/current accounts from January 1994 up to their
receipt of this court order.
XXX XXX XXX
 SO ORDERED."
Private respondent filed a special civil action
for certiorari14, with an urgent prayer for a restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court
of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial
Court, sitting as a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor
of herein private respondents, rendered the assailed
decision15, the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore, premises considered, the instant
special civil action for certiorari is hereby
granted, The impugned orders issued by
respondent court on July 4,1995 and September 12,
1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The
impugned order issued by respondent on
September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as
petitioner corporations" bank accounts and records
are concerned.
SO ORDERED."
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now comes before us
with a lone assignment of error16:
"The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
orders of the lower court which merely allowed the
preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private
respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic)
Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals
arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to
ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84
and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the
petitioner, from performing her duty as special
administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the
said Rules."
Petitioners contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we
affirm the orders issued by the probate court which were
subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review
of the rules on jurisdiction over probate proceedings is
indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 769117, which introduced
amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate,
where the gross value of the estate exceeds One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in
Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended
to read as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases.-Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand
Pesos(P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate or amount of the demand does
not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000),
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which
must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys, litigation expenses
and costs shall be included in the determination of the
filing fees, Provided further, that where there are several
claims or causes of actions between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions;
xxx xxx xxx"
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises
jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the
gross value of the estate of the decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court,
petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a probate
court may pass upon title to certain
properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which
the court may extend its probing arms in the
determination of the question of title in probate
proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS,18 held:
"X X X As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title."
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS19:
"X X X The function of resolving whether or not a certain
property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator is one
clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the courts determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action which may be instituted by
the parties."
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF
20 21
CAVITE  citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE , We made
an exposition on the probate courts limited jurisdiction:
"It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong
to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so."
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22, We had occasion to
elucidate, through Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa23:
"Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises
but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,
unless the claimant and all other parties having legal
interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to
the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not
thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being
that the question of whether or not a particular matter
should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a
special court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in
reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural
one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
xxx
x x x. These considerations assume greater cogency
where, as here, the Torrens title is not in the decedents
name but in others, a situation on which this Court has
already had occasion to rule x x x."(emphasis Ours)
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of
land covered under the Torrens system and registered in
the name of private respondent corporations should be
included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent
Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by
the probate court of whether these properties should be
included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not
conclusive and subject to a final determination in a
separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once
and for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels
of land are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY
vs., ALCID24 is of great essence and finds applicability,
thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has
evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership,
for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in
their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does
not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. x x x"
"x x x. In regard to such incident of inclusion or
exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens
title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such
title should be given due weight, and in the absence of
strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder
thereof should be considered as the owner of the property
in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the
case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title. x x x"
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong
compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to
bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased
Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as, " The Property Registration Decree",
proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
"xxx xxx xxx
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
- A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the
case at bar, the property subject of the controversy was
duly registered under the Torrens system, We
categorically stated:
"x x x Having been apprised of the fact that the property
in question was in the possession of third parties and
more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title
issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from
the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no
authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
and ownership of the property. x x x"
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory
of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the
possession of and are registered in the name of private
respondent corporations, which under the law possess a
personality separate and distinct from their stockholders,
and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of
corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of
said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying
private respondents motion for exclusion. While it may
be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted
capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate
court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or
exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the
estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit,
provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no
less true that such authority conferred upon by law and
reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised
judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar
circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly
registered under the Torrens system in the name of
private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the
presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court
obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and
still proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate
court in effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption
of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents.
Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act
transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed
settled jurisprudence on this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of
private respondent corporations are properly part of the
decedents estate but also the private respondent
corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention,
petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his
lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five
corporations, which are the private respondents in the
instant case.25 Petitioner thus attached as Annexes
"F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for review affidavits
executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which
among others, contained averments that the incorporators
of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no
actual participation in the organization and incorporation
of the said corporation. The affiants added that the
persons whose names appeared on the articles of
incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as
incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since they have
not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock
of the corporation and have been merely asked by the late
Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality
separate and distinct from that of the persons composing
it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the
persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the
personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the
entities connected with it.28cräläwvirtualibräry
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by
law with a personality distinct and separate from its
stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation
by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a
protective mantle and imbued by law with a character
alien to the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible.
Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL
BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS29, We enunciated:
"x x x When the fiction is urged as a means of
perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the
evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of
statutes, the achievement or perfection of a monopoly or
generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil
with which the law covers and isolates the corporation
from the members or stockholders who compose it will
be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an
aggregation of individuals. x x x"
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to
see through the protective shroud which exempts its
stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be
subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing
corporate fiction.30cräläwvirtualibräry
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil
may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter
ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges
of fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated;
where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the
corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come
to naught.31cräläwvirtualibräry
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as
follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock
control, but complete domination, not only of finances
but of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this
transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or
existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been
used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to
perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive
legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and
breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or
unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these
elements prevent "piercing the corporate
32
veil". cräläwvirtualibräry
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for
disregarding the fiction of separate corporate
personalities.33cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality
of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and
convincingly established. It cannot be
34
presumed. cräläwvirtualibräry
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this
case was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a
probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce
competent evidence that would have justified the court to
impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance
reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed by Teresa
Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that
the aforementioned documents possess no weighty
probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is
imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are
inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were
not at all presented during the course of the proceedings
in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to
uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to
relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule of
evidence in a manner consistent with the law and
jurisprudence.
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:

"Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they

are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another
who uses his own language in writing the affiants
statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-
examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon."

As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September

1995, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without
jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had
no authority to demand the production of bank accounts
in the name of the private respondent corporations.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions,

the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which
nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated
04 July 1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE
SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, *
PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge
of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA,
respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of
what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special
administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court
of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over
by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C,
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court."
At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment
as special administratrix over the estate. On even date,
May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was
issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition
for letters of administration has been served upon all
persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or
cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of
a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado
G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a
special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of
the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,
therefore, prayed that she be appointed special
administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule,
and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution
before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29,
1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground
raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973
that her appointment was obtained through erroneous,
misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that
Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate;
and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for
letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was
published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan,
a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a
"Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This
supplemental petition modified the original petition in
four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as
Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna
and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna;
(2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and
Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3)
the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed
as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced
her preferential right to the administration of the estate in
favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of
this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B.
Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to
confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the
beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition
to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of
administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue,
lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado
G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on
August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession
of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of
third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion,
calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar
on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to
making an inventory of the personal and real properties
making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already
issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on
July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia
to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting
the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to
dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the
petition or over the parties in interest has not been
acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and
(3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not
entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a
supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G.
Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-
blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of
Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G.
Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special
administratrix from taking possession of properties in the
hands of third persons which have not been determined as
belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and
against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in
behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the
petition for want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and
improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the
pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the
motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving
the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers
of the special administratrix are those provided for in
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to
the previous qualification made by the court that the
administration of the properties subject of the marketing
agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with
the latter; and that the special administratrix had already
been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to
take custody and possession of all papers and certificates
of title and personal effects of the decedent with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,
was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all
certificates of title in her name without any qualifying
words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that
the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the
order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule
and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of
Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for
letters of administration in the place of residence of the
decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar
further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections
thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing
order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order
limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the
making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for
the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for
lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of
Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to
substitute and remove the special administratrix was
likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two
separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix, and the second, holding that the power
allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct
and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for
reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28,
1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or
failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal
standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue;
(c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and
removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the
special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in
the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first
questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for
reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974,
Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders:
one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to
furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy
of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar
pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding
amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B.
Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles
presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing
Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of
title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia,
whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to
Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case
(Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule
presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia
showing that his residence at the time of his death was
Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented
the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing
that three months before his death his residence was in
Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado
G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of
his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B.
Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or
prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily
to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in
the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of
that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their
motion for reconsideration of the order denying their
motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions
on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three
others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of
certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia
G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo
A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31,
1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to
Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as
G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the
decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had
already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738,
over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved
for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate.
Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond
of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed
the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B.
Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp.
Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings
therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She
manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp.
Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of
Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of
First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not
yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension
of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B.
Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case
pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December
11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special
Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction"
reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special
appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that
the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed
to this Court; that the parties had already filed their
respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before
the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who
succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa
B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of
the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the
validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R.
No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary
restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño
from further acting in the case. A restraining order was
issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the
petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons
and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules
of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make
the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need
be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the
right of the person who seeks administration, as next of
kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of
death of the intestate and his last residence within the
country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the
time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75,
Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the
caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not
have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is contained
in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural
matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the
court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed
before procedure in a given cause began." That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which
simply directs the manner in which the power or authority
shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though
that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that
the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or
that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for
lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance
of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon
Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased.
Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First
Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however,
purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case
shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is
merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason
that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the
term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence
or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We
lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides"
connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence,"
is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules
— Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat . In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must
be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule
and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original
petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule
measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court ."
Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying
of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile
or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say
that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also
resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non
sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that,
as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia
G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11
Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule
categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place
of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to
prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G.
Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that
his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three
months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and
Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over
the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8,
1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of
land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's
last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for
Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is
that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver.
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
"When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to
dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the
Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her
objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed
of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert
her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's
appointment as special administratrix is another issue of
perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the
appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80
provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will,
the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and executors
or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the
appointment of a special administrator was only proper
when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under
appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for
appointment and such appointment is now allowed when
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to
appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate
court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes
prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment.
Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason,
equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why
the same fundamental and legal principles governing the
choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into
account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16
Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of
preference in the appointment of a regular administrator
in appointing a special administrator. After all, the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the
beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the
decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if
not more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits
than the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa
B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia.
With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that
Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado
G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the
latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this
point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie
entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It
needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only
until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the
appointing court does not determine who are entitled to
share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to
the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings
of the court on the relationship of the parties in the
administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The
preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason.
In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased
Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina
B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for
the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention
for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1,
1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla
as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the
presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down
in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was
properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and
that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of
special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved
and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna
be disauthorized from continuing with the case and
instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the
continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of
December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R.
No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to
deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of
P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations
is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of
petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and
in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH
QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant
to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily
assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005,
and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in
toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of
Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon
(Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon
(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was
joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and
Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
(Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas
City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957,
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having
been conceived and born at the time when her parents
were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on
the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the
decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for
Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live
Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition,
it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth
₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo
and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought
her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s
estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly
laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and
Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas,
Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death .
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue,
the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s
estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed
the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the
venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City,
thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners
that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as
hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no
showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve
as administrator, let letters of administration over the
estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be
issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the
approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of
₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed
in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In
validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals
held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes
lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5,
Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals
upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the
decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution 11 dated 7 August
2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court
of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following
grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS
PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON
WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO
QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE;
AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE
FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN
ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS
OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of a
decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. –
If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province
in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis
supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes
and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. 17 Venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings
have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place
of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the
RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of
Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident
from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at
No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of
his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the
petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate
that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his
estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof,
however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living
with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This
finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo
filed an action for judicial partition of properties against
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on
the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his
marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final
days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It
disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission
that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous
appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings
of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court,
must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the
Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to
Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though
no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source
of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be
questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law
in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code,
making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog 23 applicable four-
square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even
after the death of either party but voidable marriages can
be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the
action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no
marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of
rights, such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription,
which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise,
whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of
such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it
as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of
action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of
either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine
whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void
for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac
and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San
Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage
certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no
information relative to the said marriage exists does not
diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We
take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility
that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the
National Archive, given the interval of time, is not
completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the
time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the
petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays
down the preferred persons who are entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing
to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a
petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.
— A petition for letters of administration must be filed by
an interested person and must show, so far as known to
the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the
names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of
the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of
administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance
of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one
who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers
to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that
they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands
to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her
filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of
interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is
just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the
findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of
Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo
is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her
legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the
purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7
August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV,
JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and HIGINIO
URIARTE, respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.
Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.
 
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an
original petition for certiorari — docketed as G.R. L-
21938 — against the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona,
Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of
Negros Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be
referred to hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila
Court, respectively — praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered
annulling the orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11
July 1963 (Annex 'I') of respondent Negros court
dismissing the first instituted Special Proceeding No.
6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of
respondent Manila court denying
petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to dismiss
the later-instituted Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra,
both special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of
the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently
annulling all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as all taken
without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending
these proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondents
Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte
from proceeding with Special Proceeding No.
51396, supra, until further orders of this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as
follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its
Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and failing to
declare itself 'the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan Uriarte
y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of
Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to
dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra,
notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted
and issued by this Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same
respondents a pleading entitled SUPPLEMENTAL
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this Court
as G.R. No. L-21939 — praying, for the reasons therein
stated, that judgment be rendered annulling the orders
issued by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and
February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record on
appeal and the second denying his motion for
reconsideration, and further commanding said court to
approve his record on appeal and to give due course to his
appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution deferring
action on this Supplemental Petition until the original
action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the
merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938
filed their answer traversing petitioner's contention that
the respondent courts had committed grave abuse of
discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition
for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with
the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the
estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite (Special
Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as
a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that,
during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his
compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon
petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed the
Philippine National Bank as special administrator on
November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date for
the hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite
notices be published in accordance with law. The record
discloses, however, that, for one reason or another, the
Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as
special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two
private respondents herein, filed an opposition to the
above-mentioned petition alleging that he was a nephew
of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed
a Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated
copy whereof has been requested and which shall be
submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt thereof,"
and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest
to commence the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other
private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No.
51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a
document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will,
there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate
proceedings, and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had
no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of
the decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of
the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss
contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan
Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the
Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His
motion for reconsideration of said order having been
denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his
notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the
purpose of appealing from said orders to this court on
questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed
appointed by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No.
51396 objected to the approval of the record on appeal,
and under date of December 7, 1963 the Negros Court
issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by
the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for
having been filed out of time and for being
incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record
on appeal was approved by this Court, the
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner,
vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et
al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this case squarely
before the Supreme Court on questions of law
which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his
appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the
certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the
petitioner is hereby disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the
supplemental petition for mandamus mentioned
heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus
Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the
Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for
the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the
proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion
was denied by said court in its order of July 1 of the same
year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in
Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court,
Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during the
lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to
obtain judgment for his compulsory acknowledgment as
his natural child. Clearly inferrable from this is that at the
time he filed the action, as well as when he commenced
the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been
acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up
to this time, no final judgment to that effect appears to
have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding
before the Negros Court has not gone farther than the
appointment of a special administrator in the person of
the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore,
failed to qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper
proceedings were had in Special Proceeding No. 51396,
the Manila Court admitted to probate the document
submitted to it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the
petition for probate appearing not to have been contested.
It appears further that, as stated heretofore, the order
issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963 denied
petitioner Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for
Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said
proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the
special proceeding pending before the Negros Court filed
by Higinio Uriarte were attached a copy of the alleged
last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed
with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear,
therefore, that almost from the start of Special Proceeding
No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente
Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will
and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for
certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros Court erred in
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644, on the one
hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court
similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No.
51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph
(e)], Courts of First Instance have original exclusive
jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons — whether they died testate or
intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject
matter is beyond question, the matter of  venue, or the
particular Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former
Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court , which provides
that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
shall be in the court of first instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and  if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance
of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly,
when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien
— like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of
First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any
property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his
estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First
Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts —
province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y
Goite left considerable properties. From this premise
petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken
cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of said decedent (Special Proceeding No.
6344), the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to
settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with
his alleged will, and that consequently, the first court
erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, while
the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to
effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It
is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings,
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in
the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court
of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a
last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in
his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved,
the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already
adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for
the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether
Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for
the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite with
the Negros Court — particularly in Special Proceeding
No. 6344 — or was entitled to commence the
corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the
Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record
would seem to support the view that he should have
submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either
in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending
Special Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in
accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive
administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply
litigation, especially if several courts would be involved.
This, in effect, was the result of the submission of the will
aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place, when
respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente
Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, he had already informed the Negros Court
that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in
Spain, of which a copy had been requested for
submission to said court; and when the other respondent,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss
Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the
Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the decedent,
from which fact it may be inferred that, like Higinio
Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate
with the Manila Court that there was already a special
proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the
settlement of the estate of the same deceased person. As
far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear
that in his opposition to petitioner's petition in Special
Proceeding No. 6344, he had expressly promised to
submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being
presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the
Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention
in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to
consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not
the  proper venue  therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue  is
merely a  waiveable  procedural defect, and, in the light of
the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of
the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the
right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so
by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by
Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when
Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition
filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner
likewise was served with notice of the existence
(presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and
of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila
Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was
only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court
in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion
asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and
annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that
date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint
an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit
said will to probate more than five months earlier, or
more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him
now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate
of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would
put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result
would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like
the present where the objection against said proceedings
is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the Negros
Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the
contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein
petitioner has instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for
compulsory acknowledgment by the decedent such action
justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If the
petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by
him in support of his contention, the proper thing for him
to do would be to intervene in the testate estate
proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in
the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of
maintaining an independent action, for indeed his
supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his
doubtful character pending the final decision of the action
for compulsory acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that
petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142
until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still
open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been
closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the
question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the
deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a
probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of
the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party
is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child
(II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs.
Abaya, 13 Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343;
Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs.
Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).

Coming now to the supplemental petition

for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions
heretofore stated, the same has become moot and
academic. If the said supplemental petition is successful,
it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give
due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from
the orders of said court dated December 7, 1963 and
February 26, 1964, the first being the order of said court
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second
being an order denying petitioner's motion for the
reconsideration of said order of dismissal. Said orders
being, as a result of what has been said heretofore beyond
petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be
other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful
purpose, or, worse still, would enable petitioner to
circumvent our ruling that he can no longer question the
validity of said orders.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,

judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for
and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R.
No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition
for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby
dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198680               July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY,
ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO
YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND
HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A.
"GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional
Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a
petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In
particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August
31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No.
T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their
cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint)
against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a.
"Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil
Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that
Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and
childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-
AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-
A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused
the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title,
leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under
TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of
petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son
of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live
Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c)
a certified true copy of his passport. 9 Further, by way of
affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have
no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to
state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted
by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that
the petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27,
2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to
state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that
while the plaintiffs therein had established their
relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special
proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration,12 this did not mean that they could already
be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite
the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact
that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory
heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted
which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between
Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of
Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a
passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration
which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to
the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the
Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the
issue of whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case
on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a
cause of action was proper.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which
a party violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that
the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint
is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting
what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for. 18Accordingly, if
the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred
by the defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were
among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the
lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed
that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by
Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer
certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be
cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to
be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for
in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in
an ordinary action for cancellation of title and
reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of
Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing
several other precedents, held that the determination of
who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the
proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of
who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court,
and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of
property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence
over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that
the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship
in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as
one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship
can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status
or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court
ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a
special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action.
This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes
Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating
to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in
the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that
the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an
heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the
recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate
special proceeding for the determination of heirship may
be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the
parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the
issue to the trial court and already presented their
evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had
consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a
special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-
opened.24
erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as
herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the
proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing
pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal
effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of
Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the
lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of

similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need
to institute the proper special proceeding in order to
determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately
resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in

determining whether the same fails to state a cause of
action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the
proper appreciation of the questions before it. 25 Thus,
concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a
determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary
action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether
proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC
 G.R. No. 128314      May 29, 2002
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio
Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and
1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of
stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1 Pending the appointment of a
regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special
administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was
receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any
accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased
parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
improper venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not
reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of
their deaths. The decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery.
As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed
in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City,
solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence
previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax
returns, voter’s affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real
estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City,
Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents
actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of
their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in
their death certificates that their last residence before they died was
at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4 Rodolfo himself even
supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their
mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said
document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information
regarding the decedents’ residence on the death certificates in good
faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as
reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late
years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory , in the same
way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to
Perico’s residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The
death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive
evidence of the decedents’ residence in light of the other
documents showing otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees
for the position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court
ordered that the petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be
revived.8 After the parties submitted the names of their respective
nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as
special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea
Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo
was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses
issued separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm
the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of
the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the
death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant,
Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document.
Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own representation by
taking an inconsistent position other than his own
admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this
court DENIES for lack of merit movant’s motion to
dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11,
1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of
discretion of the court a quo having been shown, the
petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in the assailed resolution dated February 17,
1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following
grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW
AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE
APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE
OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH
CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE
IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF
DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE
RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER
PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY
THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A
DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR
THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT
TO THE ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES
OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE
PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER
WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE
CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO
ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE
OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING
NO. Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement
proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their
permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed
before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be
settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court
located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of
his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v.
Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement
proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his
permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In
determining residence at the time of death, the following factors
must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place
chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently.15 While it
appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically
present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers
that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar.
The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the
process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in
Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was
advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence,
which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a
house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move
therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile ---
and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be
said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking,
his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have
transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed
to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly
parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they
died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that
they were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise.
Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late
mother’s death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows
that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased
mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed
to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a
year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in
evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be
correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate court’s
observation that since the death certificates were accomplished
even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at
the time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’
residence  at the time of death,  over the numerous documentary
evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents
presented by petitioner pertained  not to  residence at the time of
death,  as required by the Rules of Court, but to  permanent
residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we
held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence  rather
than  domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the
decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of their
deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to
be substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the
challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion,
the court below considered not only the decedents’ physical
presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the
decedents’ stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of
any substantial showing that the lower courts’ factual findings
stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence
presented, the same must be held to be conclusive and binding
upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions
found in Rule 4, Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73,
Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He
argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to
actual physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is
the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in
Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement
of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile
because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept
and where most of the decedents’ properties are located.
Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s
properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides.
Neither can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be found
mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be
that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he
keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and
business interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on
the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and
peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he
differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in
special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v.
Court of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.
As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals
correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents’
intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition

is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First
Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD
MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of
wills and to annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding
by Branch 20  of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be
entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district
court).
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of
Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27,
1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm
and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete)
and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel
Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage
which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco,
California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he
described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The
second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The
two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the
will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will
dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said: 
“I purposely have made no provision in this will for my
daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa
Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have
provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my
Philippine property.” (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine
Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No.
3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah.
Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of
15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified
of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate
petition  filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In
its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court
admitted to probate  the two wills and the codicil It was issued
upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and
between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm,
Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm
(first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts"
(Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two
children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita
Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the
second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in
Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding
the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B.
Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the
attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel,
Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel
would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of
Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that
Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved
for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes
in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated
the computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that
the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children
"shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel
and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total
of the net distributable estate and marital share. A supplemental
memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the
parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate
case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be
stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9,
1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers
Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch
20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No.
113024 for the settlement of his estate. She was named special
administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law
office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding
for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be
appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy
of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in
pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that
Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of
Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition
and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete,
appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done
pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The
court ignored the will already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority
and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979
the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the
deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp.
120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling
Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband,
Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate
case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and
Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others
193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed
and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by
Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his
order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the
decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four
children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was
made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two
children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their
lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of
partition. The court considered the motion moot considering that it
had already approved the declaration of heirs and project of
partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979
alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling
Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold:
that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex
Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the
lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant
Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was
stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and
penalties and that he interposed no objection to the transfer of the
estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the
certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five
months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate case. On
April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers,
filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be
partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be
closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara
law firm filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar
as counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It
should be recalled that the firm had previously appeared in the case
as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy
of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was then superseded by
lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559.
— On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law
firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the
lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills
(already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the
intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration
revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and
Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by
them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were
defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the
1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate
proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the
partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied
it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that
the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two
proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the
matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be
heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).

Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any

grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died

with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code;
sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74

Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7,
1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore,
the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this
judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she
considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for
the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case,
should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in
the testate case.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining

order is dissolved. No costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
G.R. No. 159507             April 19, 2006
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN
T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to
vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and
January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the
presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in
said case, except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground
of improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside
the appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the
American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers
Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic
Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said
court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner
Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the
House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein
respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the
Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other credit
facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE
Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other
defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of
respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other
court processes at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged
wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the
supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor
happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her
supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States
some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when
petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at
the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other
delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional
Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly
unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of
suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its
balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo
denied having received the corresponding statement of account.
Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in
June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary
cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience,
wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and
besmirched political and professional standing as a result of
respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad
faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus
prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and
severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in
the complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack
of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that
venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a
resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents
of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his
complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as
evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was
presented when he executed the complaint's verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To
buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner
Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a
lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to
Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on
Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner
Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative
Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation
refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and
unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone
district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged
the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a
member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications prescribed
by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district.
He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his
admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at
Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office
messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the
community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the
affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It found the
allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied
respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. It
reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the
complaint was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone
District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his
actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of the
province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As
such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual
residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in
Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the
plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that,
"residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is
synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home,
the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances, in
the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one
domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and
the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence. Venue could be at place of his residence. (Masa v.
Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo
denied the same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed
with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge
of the court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2,
2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate
court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order
which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision
granting respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that venue
was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set
aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and
enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further proceeding in the
case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner
Saludo against respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the
Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions basically
provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried where
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election
of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the
appellate court, because not one of the parties was a resident of
Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was
not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for
purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode,
which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v.
Court of Appeals5 where the Court distinguished the terms
"residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal
contemplation with the term residence, for it is [an] established
principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively
more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a
temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction
is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary
Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases
involving stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence
is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for
one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of
domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte, the appellate court referred to his community tax
certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay
City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax certificate, as
indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against respondents
Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the community
tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical
entity is located.8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law
office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in
Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances were considered by the
appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which
are conclusive upon him and no longer required proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as
incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte,
judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's
residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner
Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual
resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner
Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing
his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is
inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the
rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City,
or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option
of petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said
choice is not left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of
the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.9 Further,
fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for
bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to
attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by
taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e.,
to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the
courts of justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have
given due course to respondents' affirmative defense of improper
venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's
motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex
and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield influence
in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a powerful and
influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance
could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in
Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that
the filing of the civil action before the court in Pagadian City "was
a specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was
an influential person in the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003
of the appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the
challenged orders must be, as they hereby are, VACATED and
SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his
place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to desist from further
proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary
restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of
preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners
[herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this
decision, of a bond in the amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent
[herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such
injunction should the Court finally decide that petitioners are not
entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his
case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or
Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National
Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision
but the appellate court, in the Resolution dated August 14, 2003,
denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant
petition for review with the Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating
the afore-mentioned Decision and Resolution, has decided a
question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or
with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the
undisputed fact that herein petitioner is the incumbent congressman
of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence
(sic) of said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the
basis of improper venue due to the alleged judicial admission of
herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court; and1avvphil.net
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner
violated the rules on venue, and even speculated that herein
petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only
to vex the respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is
whether the appellate court committed reversible error in holding
that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No.
R-3172 because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo,
as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of
filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents
before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed
by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where
he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is
given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is
regulated by the Rules of Court.14 The rule on venue, like other
procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded
determination of every action and proceeding.15 The option of
plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the
place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where
plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that
place.16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file
his complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin City,
Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member
of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the
rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made
the finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern
Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said
finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community tax
certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and certification
of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law
office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as
negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that
petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time
of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue
was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation
Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento,17 the Court had the occasion to explain at
length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of venue,
thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as
employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the
courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as
distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil
actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience
possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the
maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is,
likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly
synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it
is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers
to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence
applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this
distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the
Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality
Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G.
4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous stand in Larena v.
Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that -
'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is
used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for
one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of
domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.'
(Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section
2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the
words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides,
at the election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are
fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of
domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested
intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from
government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages
against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no
moment since what is of paramount importance is where he
actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought
the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec.
2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh
v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1,
Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v.
Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon.
Ernani C. Paño, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on November
29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term
'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of
the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal
rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence'
as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This term
'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile'
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary."18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or
the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time
of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate
court admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that
private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower house."19
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo
was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the
requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a
resident of the district which he was representing, i.e., Southern
Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are
synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election law,
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for
purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with
the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term
"residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the term
"residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the
particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court
elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical
definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean
as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative
of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile)
therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws,
necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for
purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another
manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was
also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense.
This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals 25 is
misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the facts of the present case
are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed
with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by
plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon
City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement,
plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident
therein at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he
establish that he had his domicile therein because although he
manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element
of personal presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate,
domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, imports
"not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or
representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his
complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the
contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said
position, including that he was a resident therein. And following
the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law,
petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern
Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his
bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient
for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for
purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
(Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino).
Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The
important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been
established in one place, there be an intention to stay there
permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City,
he would have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house
for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in
connection with his business in the City of Manila, he would have
residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so
that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual,
personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he
stays there with intention to stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the
purpose of exercising his profession or doing business and also a
house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business
and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays
physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in
these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to
acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as
congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as
actually, personally and physically residing thereat, when such
residence is required by law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was
issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo
that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not
preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of
venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of
the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his
complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this
connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's
residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing,
could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted
for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law
in force in the Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of
judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so
commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to
require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable
among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of
'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the
country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be
known in the local community where the trial court
sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly
elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be
properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being
a matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could
likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is
bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the
qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of
Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he
shall be elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court
a quo cannot be characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or
capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is
precisely given this option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was
not properly verified by petitioner Saludo deserves scant
consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required
by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping states that he has "read the contents thereof [referring to
the petition] and the same are true and correct of my
own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records
at hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with
the above requirements of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution dated August 14,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10,
2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin
City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172
are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.