The Political Economy

of

Lee Kuan Yew

as applied to the Marcos Regime

submitted by: Sharmaine Maila Pacson

PSC41
Introduction

Lee's great insight was to recognize that Singapore, after being kicked out of the

Malaysian Federation in 1965, needed to look beyond its then-hostile neighborhood and

export higher-end goods to the advanced economies of the West and Japan. Along with

the other so-called Asian Tigers, Singapore concentrated on getting the economic

fundamentals right -- encouraging savings and investment, keeping inflation and taxes

low and currencies stable, and emphasizing high-quality education.

Political liberty, in Lee's view, could afford to wait -- and that's the disturbing part of his

legacy. His contention that "Asian values" underpinned the region's stunning economic

turnaround had less to do with facts than with his own political convictions. He believed

that in a well-ordered society, elites should rule and the masses remain docile.

Lee did more than anyone to spread the idea that Western-style democracy was ill-

suited to developing nations -- that other countries could emulate Singapore's economic

success only under the tutelage of a wise, if occasionally repressive, state. The

Singapore that Lee created -- a nanny state that continues to curb free expression and

put political opponents at a disadvantage -- has hardly begun to grapple with that

challenge. Efforts to instill creativity in schools and society have been stilted and

ineffective. Inequality is growing, as is public discontent with the ruling People's Action

Party. It won barely 60 percent of the popular vote in the last elections -- by its own

standards, a poor performance.

On the other hand, Philippines under martial law, Marcos suspended then revamped the

constitution, silenced the media, and used violence and oppression against political
opposition. He nationalized and monopolized increasing portions of industry and further

increased spending on patronage. Throughout this time, the US and international

organizations such as the World Bank and IMF generously supported the Marcos

regime with aid and loans. Marcos was able to exchange solid commitment to the

Philippine-US alliance with significant US aid, due to US Cold War interests of having

military bases strategically located in the Philippines. It is often argued that a great

proportion Marcos’ patronage was funded by US aid. The World Bank and IMF

regarded Marcos as emulating tactics of Lee Kwan Yew’s successful authoritarian

regime in Singapore, making the Philippines a “special focus” area to target funding.

Different views may be extended to both Marcos and Lee Kuan Yew, however they both

resorted to one strategy- Political and Economic Authoritarianism.

 I. Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore

Lee Kuan Yew, the founder and patriarch of modern Singapore who has died at the age

of 91, was one of postwar Asia’s most revered and controversial politicians and one of

its last remaining independence leaders.

His greatest achievement was to promote the concept of good governance in Southeast

Asia, a region long plagued by corrupt, inefficient governments.

As Singapore’s prime minister for more than 30 years, he built his small island republic

into one of the world’s economic success stories. Average per capita income just after

independence in 1965 was a mere US$511. By the time Lee resigned as prime minister

it had topped $50,000. Singapore is one of Asia’s largest financial centres, and is the

world’s biggest ship bunkering port.

Lee was the embodiment of a new Asian dynamism: smart, tough and pragmatic and

displaying unshakeable self-confidence.

His style of leadership had many foreign admirers and he was credited with being a

pioneer of “authoritarian capitalism”, which has influenced other countries including

China, Russia and the Gulf states. Richard Nixon once described Lee as a big man on a

small stage who, “in other times and other places, might have attained the world stature

of a Churchill, a Disraeli or a Gladstone”.

Perhaps at times Lee yearned to put his talents to work outside the narrow confines of

Singapore but he was pleased to be acknowledged as a leading spokesman for Asia.

Few other leaders have stamped their personalities so firmly on a country. His

perfectionism, farsightedness, elitism, authoritarianism and intolerance, along with his

obsessions with security, cleanliness and order, are reflected in nearly every aspect of

modern Singaporean life. The sale of chewing gum is still banned — a nannyish rule he

instigated that is arguably the most-recognised fact about Singapore abroad.

“What is required is a rugged, resolute, highly trained, highly disciplined community,”

Lee once said, believing that Singapore’s multi-ethnic population and the political

instability of Southeast Asia represented a constant threat to his creation.

He achieved his goal at the expense of curbing some civil liberties, such as freedom of

the press. Lee was unapologetic about his means, dismissing the idea of western liberal

democracy as unsuitable to Asian societies.

His death comes as the city-state, whose economic and political model he oversaw, has

reached a crossroads. Singapore is straining to cope with a declining working-age

population, increasing reliance on foreign immigrants and unprecedented popular

pressure for a less authoritarian government.

Lee, who had been physically frail but mentally sharp in recent years, relinquished any

official government role after an election in 2011 in which the ruling People’s Action

party suffered its worst ever result.

But he felt sufficiently alarmed at his country’s declining birth rate to issue an appeal the

following year, carried on the front page of the Straits Times newspaper, calling for
Singaporeans to reproduce. Otherwise, “this place will fold up”, he said in his typically

brusque manner.

Lee was born in 1923 into a relatively affluent family that counted itself among

Singapore’s Chinese elite that closely identified with the British colonial rulers, the so-

called Straits Chinese. English was his first language and from the outset he was

brought up as a “little Englishman”.

Up to the late 1950s he was known as Harry Lee, instead of using his given Chinese

name Kuan Yew (“Shining Light”). His parents wanted their eldest son to enter the

professional classes or the colonial administration.

He appeared destined for great things in 1939 when he scored first in the senior

Cambridge exams among students in British Malaya (which included Singapore) and

planned to study law in the UK. But those plans were interrupted by the second world

war and the invasion of Singapore by the Japanese in 1942.

People realised that there was to be no return to the old, peaceful, stable and free-and-

easy Singapore

The Japanese occupation and its aftermath would have a profound effect on Lee. “The

three and a half years of Japanese occupation were the most important of my life,” he

said in his memoirs. “They gave me vivid insights into the behaviour of human beings

and human societies, their motivations and impulses . . . I saw a whole social system

crumble suddenly before an occupying army that was absolutely merciless.”

It destroyed Lee’s belief that the British would continue to rule Singapore in the future. It

also taught him about political control.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, Singapore also saw the rise of a militant leftwing

trade union movement among the Chinese-speaking working class that threatened to

dislodge Lee from his assumed place in society. “People realised that there was to be

no return to the old, peaceful, stable and free-and-easy Singapore,” he wrote in his

memoirs.

In the late 1940s Lee went to Cambridge, where he studied law, winning a double first.

He married Kwa Geok Choo, another first-class honours law graduate, who had

followed him to the UK, and he associated with other Malay and Singapore students,

many of whom would later become leading politicians.

Returning to Singapore, Lee and his wife set up a law firm and he entered politics by

campaigning for an end to British colonial rule. He gained political influence by advising

union leaders on legal matters and helped form the pro-independence People’s Action

party in 1954.

Lee shrewdly judged that as a member of the Straits Chinese elite he had little chance

of gaining power on his own but his ability to harness the grassroots support of the trade

unions might overcome that handicap. The PAP proved to be an uneasy alliance

between mildly socialist politicians such as Lee and its pro-communist elements. Lee

suggested in his memoirs that he co-operated closely with the British colonial Special

Branch in keeping the PAP’s militants under control.

When the UK gave Singapore self-government in 1959, Lee became prime minister at

the age of 35. He had always backed the idea of a Malaysian Federation linking the

island of Singapore with the Malay Peninsula. He argued that an independent

Singapore was a “political, economic and geographical absurdity”.

In 1963 he achieved his goal of a union with Malaysia but it was at the cost of a split

with the PAP’s leftwing, which opposed the move, and he was nearly toppled as prime

minister. The dissident PAP leaders were arrested in the appropriately named

Operation Cold Storage. For Lee it was always a case of the means justifying the ends

— a ruthlessness he was to display throughout his long career.

Lee appeared to be a young man in a hurry. Malaysia’s ethnic Malay rulers became

suspicious that he wanted to become the country’s prime minister, in violation of an

agreement that the Malay majority would retain political control. The bitter arguments

over power-sharing led to Singapore’s expulsion from Malaysia in 1965 and the tearful

announcement by Lee of his new country’s path as an independent nation.

Although Singapore was only the size of the Isle of Wight, with a population of 2.5m at

independence, it had several advantages. British colonial rule had already made

Singapore the richest country in Asia on a per-capita basis after Japan, and it boasted

good infrastructure, including one of the world’s largest ports. Lee also adopted the

British legacy of free trade and turned Singapore into a giant industrial park for

multinationals at a time when barriers to foreign investment were still strong in the rest

of Asia.
Lee’s authoritarian style of leadership and a highly trained bureaucracy guaranteed

political stability with little corruption, and billions of dollars of investment poured into

Singapore. It became one of Asia’s biggest electronics producers and oil refiners, and

has recently become Asia’s leading commodity trading hub. In spite of widespread

development, Singapore is among the world’s cleanest and greenest cities.

But there has also been a sinister side to the Singapore miracle. Politicians who

crossed Lee were relentlessly pursued, often through the courts. Foreign commentators

who dared to criticise were treated with contempt. “We have no time for asinine sneers

by passing aliens,” said Lee.

Although he handed over power as prime minister to Goh Chok Tong in 1990, he

continued to wield considerable influence behind the throne by holding the post of

senior minister and then “minister mentor” in the cabinet.

His policies were also carried on by his eldest son, Lee Hsien Loong, who became

prime minister in 2004. The elder Lee remained a powerful figure, if largely behind the

scenes, until after the general election of 2011, when the PAP won 81 of 87 elected

parliamentary seats and just over 60 per cent of the vote but was shaken by the best

opposition performance for decades.

Lee Hsien Loong read the result as a signal that Singaporeans were becoming unhappy

with the continuation of his father’s authoritarian style, and promised a more

consultative future in which government would be accountable to the voters between

elections, as well as on polling day.

Among many symbols of change that followed the election, Lee Kuan Yew resigned

from the cabinet, ending 57 years of consecutive ministerial office. A few months later

he quit the central committee of the PAP, breaking his last direct link with active politics,

although he remained an MP.

Suffering the ailments of advanced age, including a neurological condition that affected

his balance, Lee retained both his intellectual acuity and his robust manner.

No longer taking decisions, he continued to travel for meetings with prominent people

overseas, and appeared often at conferences and other public events, where he

cheerfully answered questions on global issues. Frequently, unwary questioners found

that his tongue remained as sharp as his faculties.

If any national leader can claim to have worked an economic miracle, it's Singapore's

Lee Kuan Yew. During his time as prime minister, from 1959 to 1990, the gross

domestic product of this tiny country grew more than tenfold -- from $8 billion (in 2010

inflation-adjusted dollars) to $98 billion. Today the number is pushing $400 billion. When

Lee took office, Singapore was poor; in 2015, it's one of the richest countries in the

world.

Lee was indisputably the architect of this astonishing transformation. He was also, it so

happens, learned and brilliant, and an articulate spokesman for what he saw as a

distinctively non-Western path of economic development. Deng Xiaoping admired him

and sought his advice. It isn't outlandish to say that Lee deserves some credit for

China's equally startling economic expansion starting in the 1970s -- a transformation

that will reshape the world.

Westerners think that prosperity and liberty go hand in hand. Lee and Deng believed

that order, more than liberty, is the handmaiden of growth. Their successors, and

leaders elsewhere who'd like to emulate them, agree. Lee thought a competent

meritocratic government should have the paramount role, not just in providing order but

also in guiding economic development. The success of "Asian capitalism" seems to

prove him correct.

Is this right? Well, bad government certainly isn't good for growth, in Asia or anywhere

else. The question is how you avoid it. One can be in awe of what Lee achieved in

Singapore without believing that Asia's answer to that question must be different from

the West's -- or that there are two different capitalisms, each best suited to regionally

distinctive values and culture.

Start with that second proposition, that there's such as thing as Asian capitalism. In fact,

East Asia's miracle economies achieved rapid growth in different ways. For instance, in

its years of fastest growth, Hong Kong's approach was close to laissez-faire; South

Korea relied heavily on state-directed investment; Taiwan and Singapore were

somewhere in between. Across the region, the role of industrial policy, state-owned

enterprises, business alliances and inward foreign investment all varied from country to

country, and still do. The same goes for legal codes and political systems.

American capitalism is different from German capitalism, and China's is different from

Singapore's. It's easy to exaggerate the family resemblances.

The main thing East Asian economies had in common was reliance on export-led

growth. Ways of promoting trade differed from case to case, but the goal was to
succeed in global markets. Some countries relied more heavily on import barriers and

state-directed investment, but success in export markets guided their interventions. This

forced their producers to compete with more efficient producers, made their policies

more transparent and helped guard against persisting with planning that didn't work.

If Asian capitalism means anything, it's "embrace globalization." Lee's Singapore

embodied that principle to the maximum. In their zeal to succeed in global markets, East

Asia's most successful economies certainly differed from many other poor nations,

which turned inward -- but not from the rich West. The West was already global.

Put the debate about economic policy, and the respective roles of state and market, to

one side. Lee's critics would argue that he stood for the simpler proposition that

authoritarianism works, and that this is why China's leaders, especially, look at

Singapore with admiration and interest. Singapore is a democracy, but not a liberal one.

The government is paternalistic and stern. The ruling People's Action Party, led by Lee's

son, Lee Hsien Loong, is clean, competent, and undeniably popular -- but intolerant of

critics and seemingly immovable.

The idea that "Asian values" incline people of the region to a preference for authority

over liberty is implausible. There's no need to invoke any such innate cultural

preference. Experience of disorder, especially violent disorder, is what inclines people

that way, regardless of where they're from.

Culture, on the other hand, is malleable, as Lee himself often observed. He was, among

other things, a shaper of culture. (One example: English is the main language of

instruction in Singapore's schools. Singaporeans are expected to master the language

of global communication and technology, and the country's other official tongues, Malay,

Mandarin and Tamil, are taught as second languages.)

Liberal Western politics can be turbulent. It involves fruitless politicking, too-frequent

changes of government, populist incompetence and excessive attention to the short

term. But these are side-effects of the checks and balances that keep politicians

accountable. In an imperfect world, full of imperfect leaders, effective opposition isn't

unpatriotic; it's indispensable.

Lee was right that Western democracy is flawed, and that an enlightened and

meritocratic authoritarian can govern well: The first is self-evident and he proved the

second. But a system of government cannot be good if it stakes everything on the

emergence, somehow, of a uniquely gifted individual, or on the possibility that an

excellent leader will continue to be excellent. Just as companies must be forced to test

themselves against others and compete, so must political leaders and political parties.

For every Lee, there's a crowd of cynical, incompetent or exhausted candidates for high

office. Constitutions must be designed for the world as it is.

It's odd that Lee failed to see this. He often said he was a pragmatist, interested only in

what works. The constitutional pragmatist, Asian or otherwise, chooses the turbulence

of liberal democracy.
 II. Ferdinand Marcos and Philippines

Ferdinand Emmanuel Edralín Marcos (September 11, 1917 – September 28, 1989) was

President of the Philippines from 1965 to 1986. He was a lawyer, member of the

Philippine House of Representatives (1949-1959) and a member of the Philippine

Senate (1959-1965). As Philippine president and strongman, Marcos led his country in

its post-war reconstruction. Initially, his intentions were laudable, to improve the

economy and to increase agricultural productivity and to dismantle the oligarchy that

had dominated the nation. His greatest achievements were in the areas of infrastructure

development, safeguarding the country against communism, and international

diplomacy. However, his administration was marred by massive government corruption,

despotism, nepotism, political repression and human rights violations. In 1986 he was

removed from power by massive popular demonstrations, which began as a reaction to

the political assassination of his opponent Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. the previous

year.

Marcos initially had laudable intentions: to improve the economy, to increase agricultural

productivity, and to dismantle the oligarchy that had dominated the nation. However, he

became corrupted by power, and measures set in place to curb student protest and the

challenge from communism became permanent. In the end, he replaced one privileged

class with another and gained enormous personal wealth while his nation's economy,

originally strong under his leadership, went into serious decline. His overthrow in 1989

is witness to the resilience and determination of a people to take control of the political

process, despite years of oppression. Like Sukarno in Indonesia, Marcos set out to

safeguard democracy—and in the first decade of his rule he arguably did just that—but
in the end he quashed it. Yet he could not totally crush the spirit of the Filipino people,

who in the end reclaimed democracy for themselves. Economic performance during the

Marcos era was strong at times, but when looked at over his whole regime, it was not

characterized by strong economic growth. Penn World Tables report real growth in GDP

per capita averaged 3.5% from 1951 to 1965, while under the Marcos regime (1966 to

1986), annual average growth was only 1.4%. To help finance a number of economic

development projects, such as infrastructure, the Marcos government engaged in

borrowing money. Foreign capital was invited to invest in certain industrial projects.

They were offered incentives including tax exemption privileges and the privilege of

bringing out their profits in foreign currencies. One of the most important economic

programs in the 1980s was the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (Movement for

Livelihood and Progress). This program was started in September 1981. Its aim was to

promote the economic development of the barangays by encouraging the barangay

residents to engage in their own livelihood projects. The government's efforts resulted in

the increase of the nation's economic growth rate to an average of six percent to seven

percent from 1970 to 1980.Economic growth was largely financed, however, by U.S.

economic aid and several loans made by the Marcos government. The country's foreign

debts were less than US$1billion when Marcos assumed the presidency in 1965, and

more than US$28billion when he left office in 1986. A sizable amount of these moneys

went to Marcos family and friends in the form of behest loans. These loans were

assumed by the government and still being serviced by taxpayers. Today, more than

half of the country's revenues are outlayed for the payments on the interests of loans

alone. Another major source of economic growth was the remittances of overseas
Filipino workers. Thousands of Filipino workers, unable to find jobs locally, sought and

found employment in the Middle East, Singapore and Hong Kong. These overseas

Filipino workers not only helped ease the country's unemployment problem but also

earned much-needed foreign exchange for the Philippines. The Philippine economy

suffered a great decline after the Aquino assassination by Fidel Ramos' assassination

squad in August 1983. The wave of anti-Marcos demonstrations in the country that

followed scared off tourists. The political troubles also hindered the entry of foreign

investments, and foreign banks stopped granting loans to the Philippine government. In

an attempt to launch a national economic recovery program, Marcos negotiated with

foreign creditors including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,

World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for a restructuring of the

country's foreign debts – to give the Philippines more time to pay the loans. Marcos

ordered a cut in government expenditures and used a portion of the savings to finance

the Sariling Sikap (Self-Reliance), a livelihood program he established in 1984. From

1984 the economy began to decline, and continued to do so despite the government's

recovery efforts. This failure was caused by civil unrest, rampant graft and corruption

within the government and by Marcos' lack of credibility. Marcos himself diverted large

sums of government money to his party's campaign funds. The unemployment rate

ballooned from 6.30% in 1972 to 12.55% in 1985.

President Marcos's official Malacañang Palace portrait since 1986; the portrait he had

selected for himself was lost during the People Power Revolution Prior to Marcos,

Philippine presidents had followed the path of "traditional politics" by using their position

to help along friends and allies before stepping down for the next "player." Marcos
essentially destroyed this setup through military rule, which allowed him to rewrite the

rules of the game so they favored the Marcoses and their allies.

His practice of using the politics of patronage in his desire to be the "amo" or godfather

of not just the people, but the judiciary, legislature and administrative branches of the

government ensured his downfall, no matter how Marcos justified it according to his own

philosophy of the "politics of achievement." This practice entailed bribery, racketeering,

and embezzlement to gain the support of the aforementioned sectors. The 14 years of

his dictatorship, according to critics, have warped the legislative, judiciary and the

military.

Another allegation was that his family and cronies looted so much wealth from the

country that to this day investigators have difficulty determining precisely how many

billions of dollars have been salted away. The Swiss government has also returned

US$684 million in allegedly ill-gotten Marcos wealth.

His apologists claim Marcos was "a good president gone bad," that he was a man of

rare gifts - a brilliant lawyer, a shrewd politician and keen legal analyst with a ruthless

streak and a flair for leadership. In power for more than 20 years, Marcos also had the

very rare opportunity to lead the Philippines toward prosperity, with massive

infrastructure he put in place as well as an economy on the rise.

However, he put these talents to work by building a regime that he apparently intended

to perpetuate as a dynasty. Among the many documents he left behind in the Palace,

after he fled in 1986, was one appointing his wife as his successor.
Opponents state that the evidence suggests that he used the communist threat as a

pretext for seizing power. However, the communist insurgency was at its peak during

the late 1960s to early 1970s when it was found out that the People's Republic of China

was shipping arms to support the communist cause in the Philippines after the

interception of a vessel containing loads of firearms. After he was overthrown, former

Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile stated that certain incidents had been contrived to

justify the imposition of Martial Law, such as Enrile's ambush.

The Martial Law dictatorship may have helped boost the communist insurgency's

strength and numbers, but not to the point that could have led to the overthrow of the

elected government. Marcos' regime was crucial in the United States' fight against

communism and its influences, with Marcos himself being a staunch anti-communist.

Marcos however had an ironically mild streak to his "strongman" image, and as much as

possible avoided bloodshed and confrontation.

His most ardent supporters claim Marcos was serious about Martial Law and had

genuine concern for reforming the society as evidenced by his actions during the period,

up until his cronies, whom he entirely trusted, had firmly entrenched themselves in the

government. By then, they say he was too ill and too dependent on them to do

something about it. The same has been said about his relationship with his wife Imelda,

who became the government's main public figure in light of his illness, by then wielding

perhaps more power than Marcos himself.

It is important to note that many laws written by Marcos are still in force and in effect.

Out of thousands of proclamations, decrees and executive orders, only a few were
repealed, revoked, modified or amended. Few credit Marcos for promoting Filipino

culture and nationalism. His 21 years in power with the help of U.S. massive economic

aid and foreign loans enabled Marcos to build more schools, hospitals and infrastructure

than any of his predecessors combined Due to his iron rule, he was able to impose

order and reduce crime by strict implementation of the law. The relative economic

success that the Philippines enjoyed during the initial part of his presidency is hard to

dispel. Many of Marcos' accomplishments were overlooked after the so-called "People

Power" EDSA Revolution, but the Marcos era definitely had accomplishments in its own

right.

A journalist said that "The Marcoses were the best of us, and they were the worst of us.

That's why we say we hate them so much.” On the other hand, many despise his

regime, his silencing the free press, his curtailing of civil liberties such as the right to

peaceably assemble, his dictatorial control, the imprisonment, torture, murder and

disappearance of thousands of his oppositionists, and his supposed shameless plunder

of the nation's treasury. It is quite evident that the EDSA Revolution left the Philippine

society polarized. Nostalgia remains high in parts of the populace for the Marcos era

due to the downward spiral the Philippines fell into after his departure. It can be said

that his public image has been significantly rehabilitated after worsening political and

economic problems that have hounded his successors. The irony is that these

economic troubles are largely due to the country's massive debts incurred during his

administration. The Marcos Era's legacy, polarizing as it is, remains deeply embedded

in the Philippines today.

COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION

Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew (1959-90) and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines (1965

-1986) coexisted under similar geo-political pressures and espoiused similar socio-

political philosophies. Yet, Lee Kuan Yew’s rule derived credibility from a reputation for

corruption-free governance, sobriety and growth while Ferdinand Marcos’ regime

became famous for grand scale larceny, and stealing foreign aid for personal profit and

gain. Lee established critical and durable limits that channeled government behavior

into activities compatible with economic development thereby surpassing any of his

regional rivials in competent public policy. It seemed implausible that after separating

from Malaya in 1964, Singapore, an island of 214 square miles and 1.8 million

inhabitants could become a self-sufficient, truly independent nation. Lee, himself worked

to keep Singapore and Malaya together believing that, “we had said that an

independent Singapore was simply not viable.” He argued, “It is the hinterland which

produces the rubber and tin that keep our shop-window economy going. It is the base

that made Singapore the capital city. Without this economic base, Singapore would not

survive. Without merger, without a reunification of our two governments and an

integration of our two economies, our economic position will slowly and steadily get

worse”. Yet, today Singapore is now one of the richest nations in East Asia. This

immense turnaround can be attributed to Lee’s rule who upon reflecting on his success

in Singapore, boasted that he would have been able to create immense wealth for his

citizens if had he only had a larger, more resource-rich country to manage. By contrast,

the nearby Philippines, with a population of 26.6 million, was considered to be a much

more promising developing country at the time .During this period, as the world’s
second largest producer of gold, the Philippines was endowed with a relatively well-

educated population, a large resource base and, by standards of the time, a well-

developed infrastructure. With resources to pay back loans and an extremely articulate

leader, it became one of the largest recipients of World Bank assistance during the

tenure of Ferdinand Marcos. Yet the Philippines became the sick man of Asia, while

Singaporeans now enjoy the second highest per capita income in the region, after

Japan. Acute political intelligence enabled both Lee Kuan Yew and Ferdinand Marcos to

consolidate political authority at a time when national institutions were untested, political

parties were in their infancy, and political culture was still being formed. Each rewrote

his nation’s history in his own image to the extent that the personalities of Lee and

Marcos are inseparable from the countries of their rule. In a shared quest to find a non-

communist path to winning mass support, both Lee and Marcos professed a

commitment to building strong public institutions, protecting private property and

ensuring growth with equity. However, it was Lee who became the icon of “soft

authoritarianism” His ideas about the importance of effective governmental authority to

balance socialism and capitalism are well documented. “Lee deployed both the iron fist

and the velvet glove against the nascent dissent. The velvet glove was innovative and

took the form of government efforts to channel grievances in directions harmless to it.

These devices included the introduction of a government-appointed opposition to blunt

the widespread desire for an elected opposition and the creation of a ‘Feedback Unit,’

which enabled people to register their concerns about government actions without

having to resort to the ballot-box. The iron fist, on the other hand, was a more traditional

exercise of power.” Marcos also championed private sector-led growth with social
inclusiveness and strong governmental guidance stating that “the requirements of

survival and growth must rely upon a strong executive.” He continued, “Only with real

authority may [the leader] expect to lead an effective government...balancing strong

authority and the requirements of the public welfare.” Both leaders espoused social

equity. In Marcos’s words,“the credibility of government is determined by the jobs and

opportunities,such as education and social services, that it makes available to the poor.”

The reality of his leadership belied his words. Ferdinand Marcos impoverished his

country while acquiring wealth unsurpassed by his fellow citizens. “Has the alleged

greed of a certain individual acquired imperial dimensions?” one commentator asked.

By contrast, Lee Kuan Yew created great prosperity for the people of

Singapore while living solely on the chief executive’s salary. Understandably, admirers

of Lee Kuan Yew attribute Singapore’s success to his dedication, probity and patriotism.

He did not rule by military emergency, nor did he abolish elections in Singapore, as did

Marcos in the Philippines. However, although Lee Kuan Yew cannot be charged with

electoral fraud, constitutional tinkering, or the jailing and torturing of opponent, he has

been accused of censoring and harassing them. Lee allegedly deluged rivals with

lawsuits before and after elections, pursuing opposition politicians through the courts for

expressing viewpoints that are considered part of healthy democracies.His opponents

paid the price for their convictions through personal bankruptcy. Moreover, to gain the

support of the masses, Lee’s followers subtlety conveyed to voters that backing the

opposition would lead to the loss of benefits such as bus routes and government-

subsidized housing upgrades. Although a great political leader who excelled at public

policy, like Marcos, Lee possessed an absolute determination to retain

power.“ Marcos, once reelected, showed an unwillingness to surrender office at the end

of his constitutionally final term. He suspended the writ of habeus corpus, floated plans

to field his wife as a presidential candidate, manipulated the Constitutional Convention,

and threatened to declare martial law.” Both Lee and Marco were preeminent

representatives of an entire political class that shared tastes, predilections and culture.

Can we then assume that given the opportunity to rule the Philippines instead, Lee

would have governed it as well as he governed Singapore?

References:

Burton K. (2015) Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding father, retrieved from

http://www.ft.com/].

Root, H. (1997) Political Virtue and Economic Leadership of Lee Kuan Yew and Marcos,

retrieved from http://hiltonroot.gmu.edu