b.
Presumption of Knowledge of Law
a. Effectivity of Laws
CASE DIGEST ON TAÑADA v. TUVERA [136 SCRA 27 (1985)]
Nature: Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the
President.
Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The
respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since
the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel
public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further
contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates.
Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable
requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc.
where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
Held: Yes. It is the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern
& corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law (§6 AIV, 1973 Constitution).
Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise
effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its date of effectivity
does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important
legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances “of public nature” or
“of general applicability” is a requirement of due process. Before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.
Judgment: Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall
have no binding force and effect.
Impt Point: It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man—
Marcos—are in fact laws of gen’l application & provide for penalties. The
constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers.
The generality of law (CC A14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The
ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary
constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse.
Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.
CASE DIGEST ON TAÑADA v. TUVERA [136 SCRA 27 (1985)]
263scra 420 Publication – Administrative Orders
FACTS: PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under
which applications to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of
China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of
Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing
products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the
requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition
for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial
court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The
court contends further authority to process and approve applications for
imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has
already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the
PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order;
nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New
Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues
including those of local application and private laws shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one
of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is
punitive in character.
D.M. Consunji vs. CA and Juego
TITLE: D.M. Consunji Inc. v Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego
CITATION: GR No. 137873, April 20, 2001 | 357 SCRA 249
FACTS:
Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of
D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He
was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending
physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around
2:15PM.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their
work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to
death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which
was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform
but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy
and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a
complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a
favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to
P644,000.
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
2. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a
right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the
worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the
employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions,
RULING:
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself)
is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie
negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute
for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of
res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption
or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other
evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to
the incident.
2. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their
employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to
the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing
the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants
are deemed to have waived their known  right of the remedies provided by
other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came
under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s
negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of
a better remedy than that of which she already had.
Case Digest on Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee GR No.18081 March 3, 1922
FACTS:
GR. No. 18081 March 3, 1922 Mora Adong, petitioner and appellant vs.
Cheong Seng Gee, opponent and appellant Agpalo’s Statutory Construction
quoted this case to wit: “The policy of the law, once ascertained should be
given effect by the judiciary. One way of accomplishing this mandate is to
give a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote
public policy.” FACTS: Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga,
Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000
which is now being claimed by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who
alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriag contracted by Cheong Boo
with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had
been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands
and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The
conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were ventilated in the lower court
that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese
marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit
married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to
the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate
as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her
daughters, the trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between
Adong and Cheong Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws
of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus
the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The lower
court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine
Island’s laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic
laws.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is
valid Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and
Mora Adong is valid RULING: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese
marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a
natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and
to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children
Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law.
RULING: 
(FOR STATCON) The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction
is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
HELD:
The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in the nature of a
curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages.
Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard
acts intended to invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can
properly incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will
most effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which
will best carry legislative intention into effect. (FOR PERSONS) Sec. IV of
the Marriage law provides that “all marriages contracted outside the islands,
which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were
contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage
pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the
courts ofthe Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and
it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital
life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband
through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, “save upon proof so clear, strong
and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such
impediment.” A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven
mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the
Philippines.
i. Law on Succession (art 16)
Aznar vs Christensen Garcia
Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, thoughborn in New York, migrated to
Californiawhere he resided and consequently wasconsidered a California
Citizen for a periodof nine years to 1913. He came to thePhilippines where he
became a domiciliaryuntil the time of his death. However, duringthe entire
period of his residence in thiscountry, he had always considered himselfas a
citizen of California.In his will, executed on March 5,1951, he instituted an
acknowledgednatural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensenas his only heir but
left a legacy of somemoney in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a
decision rendered by the SupremeCourt had been declared as anacknowledged
natural daughter of his.Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16(2) of the
civil code, California law shouldbe applied, the matter is returned back tothe
law of domicile, that Philippine law isultimately applicable, that the share
ofHelen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate
childrenunder Philippine laws. On the other hand,counsel for daughter Maria ,
in as muchthat it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the MewCivil Code, the national
of the deceasedmust apply, our courts must apply internallaw of California on
the matter. UnderCalifornia law, there are no compulsoryheirs and
consequently a testator shoulddispose any property possessed by him
inabsolute dominion.
Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.
Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen
Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the
matter.
1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside theCalifornia,
and
2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in California.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code
States that “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is
governed by the law of the domicile.”Christensen being domiciled outside
California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the
lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine
law provides.
Miciano vs Brimo
TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme
of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo)
opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish
citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the
distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.
HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be
made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine
Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus,
national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial
administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the
legatees.
Bellis vs Bellis
Facts:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas and was a citizen of the State of Texas and of
the United States. Hehad two wives, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced and
had five legitimate children namely Edward,George,Henry, Alexander and
Anna, and Violet Kennedy who survived him and had three legitimatechildren
namely Edwin, Walter and Dorothy, and finally he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Jr.,Maria and Miriam. On August 5,1952, Amos executed a
will in the Philippines, in which he directed thatafter all taxes, obligations, and
expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate shouldbe
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner:
(a)$240,000 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b)P120,000 to his three illegitimate children or P40,000 each and
(c) after the foregoing two items havebeen satisfied the remainder shall go to
his seven surviving children by his first and second wives inequal shares.
On July 8,1958, Amos died. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of
First Instance of Manila on September 15,1958. The People’s Bank and Trust
Company, as the executor of the will,paid all the bequests therein released
from time to time according as the lower court approved andallowed the
various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial
advances on accountof their respective legacies. On January 17,1964, Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed theirrespective oppositions to
the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of theirlegitimes
as illegitimate children and therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. On
the other hand,Amos Bellis Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him.
Issue:
Which law will apply in executing the deceased’s will? Philippine Law or
Texas Law?
Held:
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
of Texas, U.S.A., and that there are no forced heirs or legitimes under the laws
of the state of Texas. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis. Ratio: Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,
render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found.
Albenson Ent. Corp. vs. CA
FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A
Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account
of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account
Closed.” Company traced source of check and later discovered that the
signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical
demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the
signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of
BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao
III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from
the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed
complaint for damages against Albenson.
ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.
RATIO:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to
cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what
was due to them.
There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP
22.
Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued
check based on ff inquiries:
a. SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
b. Bank said signature belonged to EB
c. EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and
the III.
There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenso there must be
proof that:
a. the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person and
b. that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:
1. There is a legal right or duty
2. Exercised in bad faith
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:
1. There is an act which is legal
2. But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3. It is done with intent to injure
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek
ways to compel the debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find
means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence
of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot
be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the
action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao.
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al vs Roberto Reyes
Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes
TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes
CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the
Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held
petitioner liable for damages to Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an
entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at
the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several
years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday
party at the penthouse for the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.
Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of
fruits, the latter’s gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was
ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s
Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by
the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati
policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart
ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in
the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people
including Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as
the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s group.
She wasn’t able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking
over the phone and doesn’t want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to
leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be
intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely
with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms.
Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered “very
close because we nearly kissed each other”. Considering the close proximity,
it was Ms. Lim’s intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was
Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to
leave the party.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes
to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the
part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr.
Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party.
Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is
experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners
will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code.

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN
and RUBY LIM,
petitioners,vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA,"
respondent.
Facts:
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under
the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code.
Respondent Reyes’ Version: Mrs. Filart invited and assured that she can
vouched for him in the birthday party of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu at
the penthouse. When the buffet dinner was ready, Reyes lined up but, to his
great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by Lim (Exec. Sec. of
Nikko Hotel), and in a loud voice w/in the presence and hearing of the other
guests, told him to leave the party. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited
by Dr. Filart, but the latter completely ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation. Not long after, policemen approached him and asked him to step
out of the hotel. He now claims P1M for actual damages, P1M moral and/or
exemplary damages and P200k for atty’s fees.
Lim’s version: At the party she noticed Reyes at the bar counter ordering a
drink. Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, she
approached the captain waiter to inquire as to the presence of Reyes who was
uninvited. The waiter said that he saw Reyes came in w/ the group of Dr.
Filart. Lim inquired Dr Filart’s sister about Reyes and the sister said the latter
was not invited by Dr. Filart. Lim requested the sister to tell Reyes to leave
but the latter just lingered. The same happened when one Capt. Batung asked
Reyes to leave. When Lim spotted Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to
speak to him herself as there were no guests in the immediate vicinity.
However, as Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to
wait. When Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Lim approached him
and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho
kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po
umalisna kayo." She then turned around trusting that Reyes would show
enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making
a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.
Dr. Filart’s version: According to her, it was Reyes who volunteered to carry
the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant a she was likewise going to take
the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they reached the
penthouse, she reminded Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed
and was not invited. All the while, she thought that Reyes already left the
place. Then there was a commotion and she saw Reyes shouting. She ignored
Reyes. She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she
invited him.
RTC Ruling: After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,
giving more credence to the testimony of Ms.Lim that she was discreet in
asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratio cinated that
Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited.
CA Ruling: On appeal, CA reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found
more commanding of belief the testimony of Reyes that Lim ordered him to
leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests. It likewise
ruled that the actuation of Lim in approaching several people to inquire into
the presence of Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as
she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have
talked to Reyes in private. Consequently, CA imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Lim
and Dr. Filart the solidary obligation to pay Reyes (1) exemplary damages in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages
in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s
fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000). On motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the
argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in
the decision sought to be reconsidered.
Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred
in not applying the Doctrine of Volenti Non FitInjuria considering that by its
own findings, Reyes was a great crasher.
Issue and Ruling:
1. Won the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria is applicable in the case at bar?
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and
humiliated in theprocess) as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury" ) refers to self-inflictedinjury or to the consent to
injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing
so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the
risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of
the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not
to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
2. Won Lim acted abusively in asking Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave
the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming
liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code?
No. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate
Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she
would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the
hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to
be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does
not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in
observing that – Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when
the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly
kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there
could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It
was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests
aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as
requested, there was no need for the police to take himout. Moreover, another
problem with Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic
rule in civil cases thathe who alleges proves. Reyes, however, had not
presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses – DannyRodinas,
Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who
invited him to the party.
Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which
he was not invited, cannot be made liable topay for damages under Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko,
be held liableas its liability springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all humanhurts and social grievances. Art.
19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rightsbut also in the
performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with
justice, give everyone his due andobserve honesty and good faith.
Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing orinjuring another. When Article 19 is
violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil
Code. Article20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which
does not obtain herein as Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes
to leave.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Lim asked Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under thecircumstances. In this regard, we cannot put
our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Lim’s act of
personallyapproaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Filart if indeed
she invited. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action"predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only
protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity." Without proof of any
ill-motive on her part, Lim’s act of by-passing Filart cannot amount to abusive
conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who
told her that Filart did not invite Reyes. If at all,Lim is guilty only of bad
judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith. Not
being liable for bothactual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim
and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damagesespecially for
the reason stated by the CA.

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X.
VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
On August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for
September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of
honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with but
two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply
left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother
opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day,
the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable.
Held:
No it is not, but this case is not a mere breach of promise to marry. He must
be held answerable for the damages in accordance with Art. 21.
The SC maintained that though breach of promise to marry is not actionable,
the defendant’s act is still punishable under Article 21 of the Civil Code which
states that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.” In this case, plaintiff already arranged
everything for the wedding, like the wedding gowns, invitations, matrimonial
bed, etc. The SC held that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to
marry – A wedding has been formally set and all the preparations have been
made, only for the groom to walk out 2 days before. This is contrary to good
customs, since defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive manner.
Rosa Yap – Paras vs. Justo Paras
Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in
Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely: Raoul
(deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29)
years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her
marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil
Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated
toexercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following
circumstances: (a) he dissipated her business assets andforged her signature in
one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with
her; (c) he did not give financialsupport to his children; and (d) he has been
remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. She met Justo in 1961
in Bindoy.She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He
courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in1964,
convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was
considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in
1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her
family who paid for her medication. Also,in 1984, their son Raoul was
electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did
not heed her earlier advice tobring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the
habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the
entirefamily went to the United States. However, after three months, Justo
abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return tothe
Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy
in debt and he disposed without her consent aconjugal piece of land. At other
times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas
station free of charge.His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an
illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case.
Shefound that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with
Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a babygirl, Cyndee
Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy
Rose Paras.
He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He
maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal propertyand that he and Rosa
personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the bank’s
authorized employee. He did not abandonhis family in the United States. For
his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of
Bindoy, thus, heimmediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his
children’s education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just
starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than
enough to provide for their needs. He admitted thoughthat there were times he
failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What
caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him
during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the
guests. Whenconfronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his
birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was
furtheraggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle
broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. As tothe charge of
concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary
in his Law Office. She was impregnated byher boyfriend, a certain Grelle
Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.
After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding
the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justodid not abandon the
conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates
of their house; (b) the conjugalassets were sufficient to support the family
needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; and (c)
the chargeof infidelity is unsubstantiated. The RTC observed that the
relationship between the parties started well, negating the existence of
psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be acollusion between
them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of
falsifying Rosa’s signature in bank documents,immorality, and abandonment
of his family. He was suspended from the practice of law, thus: the respondent
is suspended from thepractice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of
falsifying his wife’s signature in bank documents and other related
loaninstruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the
charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, thepenalties to be
served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondent’s
record as an attorney, and notice of thesame served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all the courtsconcerned. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the
plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity
of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were
sufficiently explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Court’s
factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 fordisbarment are conclusive on the present
case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual
findings. Also,she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in
May, 1993.
Issue:
1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive
on the present case?
2) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony
on the root cause of Justo’s alleged psychologicalincapacity is necessary? and
3) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity
on the part of Justo?
Rulings:
1) A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason
to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court evenassumed that her charges
"are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to
support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are
true,such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal
husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds areinsufficient to
declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These
grounds, we must emphasize, do notmanifest that he was truly in cognitive of
the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married
person. Whilethey may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological
incapacity, they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while hisacts
violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such
acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which
prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)sufficiently proven by
experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacitymust be psychological -- not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince thecourt that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known
theobligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of suchincapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, neverthelesssuch root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may begiven by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply withthe essential marital
obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after itssolemnization. psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
Landicho vs Relova
Facts:
This is an original petition in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction.Rolando Landicho was married to Elvira
Makatangay when he contracted a secondmarriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia. He
was charged with the offense of bigamy for the fact statedabove. Pasia
eventually filed an action before the Court of First Instance seeking to declare
her marriage null and void ab initio because there was force, threats and
intimidation and because itwas bigamous in character. Landicho then filed a
third party complaint against Makatangayseeking the declaration of their
marriage as null and void due to force, threat and intimidation beings what
compelled him to marry Makatnagay. He then moved to suspend the
proceedings of the criminal case claiming that it raises a prejudicial question
due to the pending annulment casefiled by him against Makatangay. The
lower court denied the motion.
Issue:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy should be suspended while a civil
action for the annulment of marriage is pending because the latter raises a
prejudicial question?
Rulings:
The court ruled in the negative. It agreed with the decision of the lower court
due to some points. One is that annulment cases do not always raise a
prejudicial question that would render it a hindrance to a criminal proceeding.
Also, an annulment of marriage is not for the parties todecide but should be
left to the determination of the competent courts. A subsequent
marriagecannot be contracted before a judicial declaration of the nullity of the
previous marriage isshown. Otherwise, the party contracting a subsequent
marriage is at risk of being charged of bigamy. This means that Landicho can
still be tried for bigamy because the subsequent marriagewas contracted
despite the fact that there was no declaration that the previous marriage is
alreadynull and void
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declara¬tion of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
PRESUMPTION OF SIMULTANEOUS DEATH
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death
of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of
rights from one to the other.
Tolentino: Application of Article.-- This article applies only when the
question of survivorship involves persons "who are called to succeed each
other." Hence, it cannot apply to other cases w/c do not involve succession.
When the persons involved would succeed each other, however, then this
article applies, whether the death be actual or merely presumed from absence
or other circumstances.
Are Rules of Court Repealed?-- There is every indication that the Code
Commission intended to repeal the presumptions on survivorship under the
Rules of Court, because the presumptions laid down therein are sometimes
absurd and mere guesswork. [I Tolentino 176]
Compare with Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj), (kk)
PRESUMPTION OF PRIORITY OF DEATH (Survivorship Agreement)
Rule 131, Sec. 5 (jj). That except for purposes of succession, when two
persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration,
and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances
from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the
following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have
survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have
survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to
have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is
deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the
latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to
succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death
of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they
shall be considered to have died at the same time. (Rules of Court.)

LANDICHO V. RELOVA [22 S 731 (1968)] - Where the first wife filed a
criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed
a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and
intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage
against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the
determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the
second marriage is not in issue. 
"The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by
accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the
criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown
that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At
the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage
ceremo¬nies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the
second spouse, not the peti¬tioner who filed the action for nullity on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner
as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against the first
spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on
the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was
null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be
material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he

Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio
Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita
became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally
married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she
decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on
October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became
pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter’s
daughter Lucida at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at
this time was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the
provincial board. He doesn’t have any idea nor given his consent on the
abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,
could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
HELD:
No, he cannot.  Award for death of a person does not cover unborn fetus
because it is still not vested with legal personality. According to Article 40,
birth determines personality.  In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a
personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus.  The child should be
born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages.
Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured.  There could be no action for such damages that
can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received
because it lacked juridical personality. Moral damages cannot also be
recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did
not further investigate on the causes of the abortionThe Supreme Court
believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person
does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality
which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find any basis for an award of moral
damages evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the previous abortions of
Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz,
he turned his wife’s indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for
damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the
beneficiaries. It shows that he’s after obtaining a large money payment since
he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that serves as
indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
RATIO:
Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. A husband of a
woman who voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover damages
from the physician who caused the same.
(1) Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal
injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an
unborn child. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf
of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that
lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as distinguished
from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur)
under Article 40 of the Civil Cod, because that same article
expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article." In the present case, there is no dispute that the
child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
(2)
(2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any
damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly
upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity.
Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services
from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the
spes hominis that was the fetus, i.e., on account of distress and
anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to exemplary
damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230,
CC). But in this case, there is no basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the husband's indifference to the
previous abortions clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with
the frustration of his parental hopes and affection.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time
it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had
an intrauterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. 
Tolentino: Separation from Mother.-- This is produced by the cutting of the
umbilical cord, whether the removal takes place naturally or by surgical
operation.
Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extra-uterine life is immaterial; for
acquisition of juridical personality, it is enough that the child lives even for an
instant. 
Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that independent life required for
juridical personality can be shown only by complete respiration. The cry of
the child, although it is not a necessary sign of life, is evidence that it has
acquired complete respiration. Another indication of complete respiration is
the floating of the lungs when placed in water; this means that air has
penetrated into the lungs by breathing.
Viability Not Required.-- Viability means that the child is capable of living,
and this is determined by the extent of the development of its organs.
Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the child does not live 24 hours completely
separated from the mother's womb, it does not acquire juridical personality.
This is an absolute requirement for feotuses w/c have an intrauterine life of
less than 7 mos. (Balane quoting Manresa and JBL.)
"The aborted creature does not reach the category of a natural person and
consequently is not born in the contemplation of law." (Geluz v. CA, supra.)
This is so, even if the child is killed before the period lapses and it can be
proved that it could have survived that period if it had not been prevented by
the willful act of another. On the other hand, juridical personality is acquired
even if the survival for 24 hours is caused only by medical or scientific means
w/o w/c the child would have died before the lapse of that period.
De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866
FACTS:
Antonia Loanco de Jesus, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier
in a barber shop owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza.
Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a
prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said
barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous
relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was
born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor.
On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the
child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was
out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to
eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant asks his friend Dr.
Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital
in Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in
Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When
Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and
he was married with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who
was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written
by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of
paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the
conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this
case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity
and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child
carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be
indubitable.
“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long
enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide
damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since
action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon
which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the
judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the
amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the
trial court that has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of
pension.
Republic vs. Orbecido III - Gr No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005
FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz
V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left
for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and
her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Par 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration
but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Art 26 of the FC.
HELD: In view of the foregoing, the SC states the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wife’s
naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974.
They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to
the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985
leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8
months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at
least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a
car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that
said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the
nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license.
They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed
that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his
marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source
of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
CASE DIGEST: GR No. 127263
Sy vs. Court of Appeals April 12, 2000
The case:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision
of the regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and
Fernando Sy.
The facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two
children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since
then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody
of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal
separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended
to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving
their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of
properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses.
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against
her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of
slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner
filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC
and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of
the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its
celebration.
The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in
their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of
the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their
marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.
The Issues:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is
void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the
ceremony?
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the
time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute
nullity?
Held:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage
void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning
of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage
ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also shows
that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet
neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the
documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year
after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly
applicable in this case, there being no claim of exceptional character
enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining
issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this
court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time heir marriage was solemnized.
Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between
petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared
void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.
FILIPINA SY VS. CAG.R. NO. 127263 (2000)
Facts:
P filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to D on
the groundof psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, Praised the issue of the lack of a marriage
license.
Issue:
Whether P can raise this issue for the first time on appeal
Held:
Yes. The general rule is that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal.However, the observance of this rule may be relaxed. Technicalities
are not ends in themselvesbut exist to protect and promote substantive rights
of litigants. The case at bar requires the Court to address the issue of the
validity of the marriage which P claims is void from thebeginning for lack of
marriage license. Parenthetically, the pertinent facts here are not disputedand
what is required is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119190
FACTS:
Chi MinTsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi were married for 10 months. But still their
marriage was not consummated because the husband refuses to have sexual
intercourse with his spouse. Even if she already made efforts, they still failed
to consummate their marriage by performing coitus. The spouses decided to
undergo a medical check up to see if there was something wrong with them.
The Doctor found out that there was nothing wrong with their organs and that
the man was not impotent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is psychological incapacity, which may be a
ground for annulment, in the light of Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD: The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically
incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a
review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten
months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any
physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate
his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to
the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals)
REASONING: If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign
of psychological incapacity.
Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the
respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year,
Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband
and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered
his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest
with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense
quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.
Roridel & Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San
Agustin Church. They had a son, Andre Molina. A year after the marriage,
Reynaldo started manifesting signs of immaturity and irresponsibility: (1)
spent more time with his friends (2) depended on his parents for aid &
assistance (3) not honest with the finances (4) relieved of his job making
Roridel the breadwinner of the family. Roridel went to live with his parents
and afterwards, Reynaldo abandoned her and the child. Roridel filed a case for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage by virtue of her husband’s
psychological incapacity. Reynaldo claims that Roridel’s strange behavior,
refusal to perform marital duties & failure to run the household & handle
finances caused their quarrels. Roridel on the other hand claims that her
husband is immature, irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant,
chronic liar & infidel. He now lives with a mistress with whom he has a child.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that
the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential
marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness.
Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such
characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The
evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot
get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by
Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility
which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity
laid set forth in this case:
a. burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
b. root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
c. such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
d. such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with
the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
e. such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and
225 of the Family Code
f. decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic
Church must be respected
g. court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act
on behalf of the state.
Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson MarcosG.R. No. 13649, Oct. 19, 2000
3rd Division
FACTS:
Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice
and hadfive children. After the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent
left the military service in1987. Consequently, due to the respondent’s failure
to engage in any gainful employment, theywould often quarrel and the
respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992they were
already living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage
assailingArt. 36 of the Family Code. The court a quo found the respondent to
be psychologicallyincapacitated to perform his marital obligations. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed thedecision of the RTC because psychological
incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos’ failure to find work to support
his familyand his violent attitude towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their
children constituted psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The court ruled the negative.
RATIONALE:
The totality of the respondent’s acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” werealready present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable. Article 36 of theFamily Code is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time thecauses therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a partyeven
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as todeprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is aboutto assume.
POLICY:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage,
may beestablished by the totality of evidence presented. There is no
requirement, however that therespondent should be examined by a physician
or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.
SECOND DIVISION. G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL
HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner. Siguion Reyna, Montecillo
and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage
(celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church
Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
(Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous
existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed
that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A.
Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-
trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the
first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties):
was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the
validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an
opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and
the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already
married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the
existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already
been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the
following Orders of therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to
submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to
present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by
force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the
marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80,
Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then
such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial
declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still
be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the
Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Terre vs Terre 211 SCRA 6
FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first
cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage
was void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that they are free to
contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he wrote single under
Dorothy’s status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned
them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in
1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy is null and void.
HELD:
Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is
her first cousin thereby against public policy. However, she did not file any
declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she contracted her marriage
with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states that the
absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Ratio:
Jordan Terre disbarred.
1. Jordan failed to rebut evidencepresented by Dorothy.
2. As a law student, he should haveknown that even if Dorothy’s firstmarriage
was void ab initio, she stillneeded a judicial declaration beforeshe can contract
another marriage.(GOMEZ V. LIPANA; FC ART. 40)
3. Jordan has displayed a deeply flawedmoral character. Dorothy supported
Domingo vs CA
226 SCRA 572
FACTS:
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not
know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in
1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of
bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during
her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with
another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is
administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was
void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity
of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis
for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed
for purposes of remarriage.
HELD:
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of
remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent
spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully
married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being
charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property
will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for
their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for
that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of
the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost
contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various
exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for
divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then
charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the
civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.
Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the
bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not
need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his
second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed.
GOMEZ vs. LIPANA
The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the
first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y
Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second marriage the first was still
subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by
purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of P3,000.00.
The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the
Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February 1, 1944, in the
name of “Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez.” On July 20, 1958 Isidra
Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the
nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of
her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the
husband’s share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is
placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code, the Spanish text of which
provides:
La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al ser
declarado nulo.
El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad, no tendra parte
en los bienes gananciales.
The society of joint property concludes after the marriage dissolves or on
having been declared void. The conjuge that for his bad faith will have been a
cause of the nullity, will not have part in the community properties.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that the
husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted
provision and declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor
of the estate of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the trial
court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second marriage
and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio; and (2) in holding that
Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.
ISSUE: WON a collateral attack on the validity on the second marriage in
holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio.
WON that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.
HELD:
Yes. The party who challenges the validity of the second marriage can be
challenged collaterally. There is no suggestion here that the defendant’s 1930
marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he
married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the
conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). the burden is on the party invoking
the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not
discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by
him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven
years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally
considered dead or was believed by him to be so.
On the second issue, the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage
was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial
declaration of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after dissolution
by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code
was no longer in force.
Even though the said provision was no longer in force it is still presumed,
with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage nor
the conjugal partnership ever existed, and hence such spouse has no right to
share in the conjugal properties; but this legal effect of such presumption
derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force, and in any event is
of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to the prejudice of
the right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the conjugal partnership
formed thereby, which includes properties acquired by the husband during its
existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the
right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
The decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint is dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.
Digest on ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES JR.(Voidable Marriage)
FACTS:
Lupo Atienza lived together with Yolanda de Castro withwhom he has two
children. He purchased a house in Bel-Air,Makati where his family stayed. He
stays there too wheneverhes in Manila. In Dec., 1991, he was surprised to
see ManilaMetropolitan Trial Court Judge Francisco Brillantes sleepingon his
bed. Their boy informed him that Brillantes had beencohabiting with de
Castro. Later on, Brillantes prevented himfrom visiting his children. He
claims that Brillantes is marriedto Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children. Atienzafiled a complaint for Gross Immorality & Appearance of
Impropriety against Brillantes.Brillantes claims that his marriage to Ongkiko
is not validbecause of lack of marriage license.
According to him, Ongkikoabandoned him 19 years ago leaving their children
with him.He claims that he believed that he was single when hemarried de
Castro because his first marriage was void.
ISSUE: WON Brillantes can contract a second marriagewithout a judicial
declaration of nullity?
HELD: No. Dismissed from service.
RATIO:1. FC Art. 40: judicial declaration of nullity of previousmarriage is
needed before one can enter into a secondmarriage. Rule has retroactive effect
thus applicable toBrillantes even if he got married under the Civil Code.2. Bad
faith and sinister motives of Brillantes proven by hismarriage to Ongkiko.
They underwent two ceremonieshowever he never got a license. Then, he
immorally andillegally cohabited with de Castro. Not fit for the judiciary.
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed
an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent
was obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was dismissed
and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora’s counterclaim.
While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to
her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship
with a close relative of his. According to her, the non-divulgement to her of
such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed
for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-
marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman
was not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for
annulment and it is further excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity” shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud
and therefore would not warrant an annulment of marriage.
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
107 Phil 35
FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot
several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter
discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the
wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one
year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other
man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left
plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff
surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame.
He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation to which
defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in
a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in
1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the
confession of judgment disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD:
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed
adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession,
is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family
Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in
court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery
independent of the defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the
decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the
confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law
prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The
petition should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet
prescribed.
JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
THE FACTS:
Jose and Serafina were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They
begot several children . In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several
occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations
with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital relations
with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while
in the said city defendant was going out with several other men, aside from
Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished
studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified
his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant
manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for
legal separation.
On July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it
described their marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery
by Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson
Orzame. Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and
pursuant to Art. 101 of the Civil Code, directed the provincial fiscal to
investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties. The fiscal
examined the defendant under oath, and then reported to the Court that there
was no collusion. The plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of the
testimony of Vicente Medina, Ernesto de Ocampo, Cesar Enriquez, Mateo
Damo, Jose de Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat.
The court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding there was confession of judgment, plus condonation or
consent to the adultery and prescription.
THE ISSUE:
Whether or not there was condonation or consent to the adultery?
THE RULING:
None. The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like
also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful
prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she
indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the
dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against
collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the
agreement.
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.
. . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to
commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial
offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling
the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied
from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce. (Griffiths
vs. Griffiths, 69 N. J. Eq. 689 60 Atl. 1099; Sandoz vs. Sandoz, 107 Ore. 282,
214 Pas. 590.).
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it
appear that a matrimonial offense had been committedalthough it was not, or
if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the
absence of grounds therefor.
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the
evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the
Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband
requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at
such a personal risk. Collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the
guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to
procure evidence necessary to prove it and proof that the defendant desires the
divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself.
Plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the
latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her
adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him
after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with
other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her
home. Hers was the obligation to return.
We hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation
between these spouses.
Tuason vs CA - Gr 11607, April 10, 1996 Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation
Facts: of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria L. Tuason filed with the Regional
Trial Court, branch 149 of Makati a petition forannulment or declaration of
nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio Tuason. In her complaint Maria
alleged that she and Emiliowere married on June 3, 1972 and as a result begot
two children and at the time of the marriage Emilio Tuason was
alreadyPsychologically Incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligation which became manifest afterward and resulted in violentfights
between them. Maria also alleged that Emilio is a drug user and a womanizer
that in 1984 he left the conjugal home andcohabitated with three women in
succession. After he left the conjugal dwelling he gave minimal support to the
family and evenrefused to pay for the tuition of his children compelling Maria
to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and friends. Emiliolikewise
become spendrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership.

Issues:
1.) whether or not Maria’s claim that Emilio was already psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the marriage and becomesmanifest only after their
marriage is a valid ground for the nullity of their marriage?
2.) whether or not Emilio Tuason’s claim that he was deprived of due process
is correct?

Rulings:
1.) Yes. Emilio Tuason failed to present witnesses or evidences that would
prove his innocence that led to the courts’ decision todeclare their marriage
void under Article 36 of the Family Code based on the evidences presented by
Maria Tuason.

2.) No because his failure to inform or to notify the court about his
confinement and medical treatment therefrom is negligencewhich is not
excusable that led the court to deny his petition.

Bugayong vs. Ginez

GR No. 10033, December 28, 1956

FACTS:

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila

Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately
after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong in said municipality
before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez
would stay with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July
1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law and informed her husband by
letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on
moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.

Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s

sister-in-law) and some from anonymous writers, which were not produced at
the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. He
admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her.
All these communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice
of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to consult with the navy legal
department.

In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They
met in the house of the defendant’s godmother. They proceeded to the house
of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1 day and 1 night as
husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He
tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but
instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal
separation.

ISSUE: Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that
may serve as a ground for dismissal of the action.

HELD:

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for

legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the
parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and where the parties
live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation.