G.R. No.

2869            March 25, 1907

MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.

Coudert Brothers for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

Mateo Cariño, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of
Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together
with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as
follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa Cariño,
H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters with the
land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of 115 meters
and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982 meters and 20
decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cariño and Mayengmeng.

By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente
Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a
small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.

The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of
land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or
through any title of egresion from the State.

After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered its
judgment in these terms:

Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively
and adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed the
house now there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cariño held possession
for some years afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions
are dismissed and the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions,
p. 15.)

The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the
following:

From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cariño erected and utilized as a
domicile a house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question,
property which, according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be
property belonging to Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said house to
one Cristobal Ramos, who in turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on
the adjoining property, which appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps
Whitmarsh, a place where the father and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega
and Minse, had lived . . ..
 In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the
property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house
thereon in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is
indicated on the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of
the property now claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)

1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial
extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such
extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence
accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof
consists of a possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day of
the same month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein
described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of
Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or
running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the
other side of the said road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the possessory
information mentioned.

2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said
possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the
petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for
pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.

3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin, presumptively
belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate acquisition of
such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass from the State.
And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of the Spanish
Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by composicion or under
agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title to property authorized in
substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894, this being the last law or
legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present subject-matter of common lands:
First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not covered nor does it come within any one of
the three conditions required by article 19 of the said royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in
an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period of six years last past; or that the same has been
possessed without interruption during a period of twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation
up to the date of the information and during the three years immediately preceding such information;
or that such land had been possessed openly without interruption during a period of thirty or more
years, notwithstanding the land had not been cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony
given by the two witnesses to the possessory information for the following reason: Second, because
the possessory information authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish
Government, as title or for the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of
adjustment with the Spanish Government and required and necessary at all times until the
publication of said royal decree was limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which
is as follows: " A period of one year, not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory
informations which are referred to in articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right
of the cultivators and persons in possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land
together with full possession reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the
said possessors and cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general
title of average in the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following
the cancellation. The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the
ownership and title to unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law."
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be certain that
he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the Government
or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately following for example,
if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any other person, as
appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such event, his possession
as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance with common law, go to
show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from the expiration of twenty
years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the provisions of article 393 of
the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.

6. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say, civil law — remains at
all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force when
pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination thereof is
reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for the
purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which could
at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal decree of
February 13, 1894.

7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands and
particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common lands
then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of which was
reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of Congress of July 1,
1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by the Philippine
Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648,2 herein
mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law upon
which the petition herein is founded.

8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in Act
No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the period
of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and use
thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the purpose
of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in extent." (Sec.
6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into consideration his
petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information, the only thing that
can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition herein and now
appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.

9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same,
according to the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not
determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the trial of
this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be declared in
favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose sight of the fact that, considering the
intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo Cariño and his
children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of which is shown
in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts of land that could
only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the assistance of these new
laws.

By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:

1. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed
and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;
 2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the
contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court from
whence it came for proper action. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

G.R. No. 103727 December 18, 1996

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN, represented by
its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) AURELIO OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN,
TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. 106496 December 18, 1996

ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE PANTALEON,

ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO
NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the
late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government
itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000 hectares or "214,047 quiniones," 1 on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de
Propriedad Numero 4136" dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of
Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig
and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area
between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south.2

Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles and
rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in
the Supreme Court,   in connection therewith.
3
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA
1183 [1968]; Antonio, et al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA
88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA
360 [1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318 [1986]; Republic v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; and Director of lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336
[1994]   terminated the controversy as to ownership of lands covered by Spanish Land Titles, for it is
4

the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of the land, has spoken, there the matter must
rest:

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must
end, Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone,
and the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further
ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the
part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the
conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but,
it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy
demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's
dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality.   [Cited cases omitted]
5

It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government that we render judgment herein
writing finis to these controversies by laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of the estate's
claim of ownership over this vast expanse of real property.

The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-out cases:

G.R. NO. 103727

G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint   for recovery of possession and/or
6

damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its decision   dated July 7, 1989,
7

the dispositive portion   of which reads:

8

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the

defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering
plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with damages
and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as
heir-judicial administrator of the "Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban" against
Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz,
Gaudencio R Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain,
Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment
& Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the
aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to
portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-
951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from
Original Certificate of Title No. 614   and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both
9
derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to
acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions of the subject estate in their names
through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614
and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in
relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the
Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April
23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity
and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate
had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct
Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 312-B.  10

Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo,
MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung
Tiu. 
11

On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for
improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of
action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El
Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.  12

Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the following
grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land
covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad
No. 4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban"
specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have already been legally and validly
titled under the Torrens System by private persons shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo
Propriedad No. 4136.  13

The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied,   and so, the petitioner estate interposed an
14

appeal with the Court of Appeals. On January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed   for being
15

unmeritorious and the lower court's decision was affirmed with costs against the petitioner estate.
The appellate court ratiocinated:

(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a genuine copy thereof was presented
in the proceeding below;

(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in court was not registered under the
Torrens system hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land ownership;

(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in its favor expressly excluded from
the Titulo titled lands of private individuals;

(4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela
Cruz as correctly ruled by the lower court;

(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614 from which titles of Ocampo,
Buhain and Dela Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence, the lower court did
 not err in not declaring the same as null and
void.  16

Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner estate, on March 16, 1992, filed
the present petition  7 docketed as G.R. No. 103727.
1

G.R. NO. 106496

G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a

petition   for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
18

Esteban which eventually resulted to an Order   dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo
19

de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect.

The dispositive portion   of the said Order reads:

20

WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:

1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is reconsidered and set aside.

2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and of no legal force and
effect and that therefore no rights could be derived therefrom.

3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances, donations or any other transactions
involving the lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are declared
invalidated, void and of no force and effect.

4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the
late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing or exercising any
acts of possession or ownership or from disposing in any manner portions of all the
lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 and to immediately vacate the
same.

6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co-administrators submit in Court

within twenty days their final accounting and inventory of all real and personal
properties of the estate which had come into their possession or knowledge under
oath.

7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow movants-intervenors to continue with the

presentation of their evidence in order to rest their case.

The consideration and approval of the administrator's final accounting and inventory
of the presentation of movants-intervenors' evidence as well as the consideration of
all other incidents are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a.m.

The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban was filed on December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as
administrator and co-administrator, respectively.

On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established, evidence for the petitioners
was received by the lower court without any opposition.  21

On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an Order appointing Engracio San
Pedro as Administrator of the subject estate. 22

On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor of Engracio San Pedro upon
posting of a bond in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).  23

On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered to furnish copies of the letters
of administration and other pertinent orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of the
estate to the following entities:

(a) The Commanding General

Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City

(b) The Solicitor General

Manila

(c) The Government Corporate Counsel

A. Mabini St., Manila

(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan

(e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan

(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and Caloocan

(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan and Rizal

(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City

(i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City

(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various municipalities in which properties of the
estate are located; and

(k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon City and Camp Aguinaldo,
Quezon City.  24

The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from any confusion brought about
by various persons who had been misrepresenting themselves as having been legally authorized to
act for the subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.

On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the Petition was filed by the
Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
 4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated February 16, 1976, Spanish titles
like the TITULO is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as proof of ownership in
court proceedings, except where the holder thereof applies for land registration under
Act 496, which is not true in the proceedings at bar;

5. That no less than the Supreme Court had declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO.
4136 as invalid;

6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed
heirs have lost whatever rights of ownership they might have had to the so-called
Estate on the ground of inaction, laches and/or prescription;

7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property to be administered for purposes of

inventory, settlement or distribution in accordance with law, and all the inventories so
far submitted, insofar as they embraced lands within the TITULO, are deemed
ineffective and cannot be legally considered; and

8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal interest in the land subject matter
of the petition considering that, except such portions thereof had been (sic) already
the subject of valid adjudication or disposition in accordance with law, the same
belong in State ownership. 25

On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend

Proceedings.  26

On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for Letters of Administration was
dismissed by means of the following Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:

WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine the legal issues raised, the Court
hereby DISMISSES the "Opposition" dated August 30, 1976, filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General; likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings
dated February 15, 1977, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.

The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the Co-administrator Justino Z. Benito
are ordered to furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies of inventories
already filed in Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof.  7
2

On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the

Republic. 28

On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-
page decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April 29, 1984, in the name of
the deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total area of
approximately 214,047 quiniones or 173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of
Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and Caloocan City;
 (b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa
Pantaleon, Vicente Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San Pedro, Rodrigo
San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the
deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and entitled to inherit the intestate
estate left by the said deceased, consisting of the above-mentioned tract of private
land covered and described by said above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding therefrom: (a) all lands which have
already been legally and validly titled under the Torrens System, by private persons,
or the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or agencies; (b) all
lands declared by the government as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all
lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all portions thereof which had been
sold, quitclaimed and/or previously excluded by the Administrator and duly approved
by a final order of the Court, except those which may hereafter be set aside, after
due consideration on a case to case basis, of various motions to set aside the said
Court order which approved the said sales, quit-claims, and/or exclusions;

(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as co- administrator, is hereby revoked
to take effect immediately, to obviate any confusion in the administration of the
Estate, and to fix the responsibilities of administration to the co-heir Administrator,
Engracio San Pedro, whose appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The said co-
administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby ordered to render his final accounting of his
co-administration of the Estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of copy hereof;

(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San Pedro is hereby ordered to amass,

collate, consolidate and take possession of all the net estate of the deceased Don
Marino San Pedro y Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits lawfully belonging
to the estate and/or to take appropriate legal action to recover the same in the proper
Courts of Justice, government offices or any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes
or charges due from the estate to the Government, and all indebtedness of the
estate, and thereafter, to submit a project of partition of the estate among the lawful
heirs as herein recognized and declared.

It is, however, strongly recommended to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E.

Marcos that, to avoid the concentration of too much land to a few persons and in line
with the projected urban land reform program of the government, corollary to the
agricultural land reform program of the New Society, the above intestate estate of the
late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should be expropriated or purchased by
negotiated sale by the government to be used in its human settlements and low cost
housing projects.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.  29

On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the above decision.  30

On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a Manifestation and Petition for the
Inhibition of the then newly appointed Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12, 1978, after the
Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez denied the said petition. 
31

After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez
issued the aforestated Order   dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge
32
Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void
and of no legal force and effect, thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.

The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban appealed to the Court of Appeals and
alleged that the lower court did not act with impartiality when it granted the Republic's motion for
reconsideration which was merely pro forma, thereby overturning a prior declaration by the same
court of the existence, genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of
the deceased Mariano San Pedro.  33

On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners-heirs.  In affirming
34

the assailed Order dated November 17, 1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on
the issue of whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de Priopriedad No. 4136 null and
void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-heirs failed to controvert the Republic's claim that
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the original of
the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat copies of the said title; and (c) non-registration of
the subject Spanish title under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential
Decree No. 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use of
Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings).

The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision by invoking
certain cases wherein the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized.
The Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit. 
35

Hence, the herein petition,   docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed on September 18, 1992.
36

After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, this Court
resolved to consolidate both cases on September 15,
1994.   7
3

While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed separate motions for intervention
which we denied on different occasions for lack of merit.

In G.R No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition are as follows:

I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104
was denied due process of law due to gross negligence of lawyer, which respondent
court grossly failed to take cognizance of.

II. That the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and in affirming the lower court's null
and void judgment. 38

In G.R No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following assignment of errors, to wit:

First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed order which resolved a
question of title or ownership over which the lower court as an intestate court has no
jurisdiction and over the vigorous and repeated objections of the petitioners.  39
 Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the order of Judge
Fernandez setting aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and Bagasao; Judge
Fernandez thereby acted as an appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or
setting aside the order and decision of Judges of equal rank.  40

Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge
Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the order of Judge Puno and the
decision of Judge Bagasao, both of which were already final.  41

Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was unmindful of the fact that Judge
Fernandez was appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge Bagasao,
regardless of the evidence, thereby unmindful that petitioners were denied the cold
neutrality of an impartial tribunal.
42

Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the evidence presented
before Judges Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted the order of Judge
Fernandez who never received a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the 1906
Guide title over Hacienda Angono in Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated
therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, and the November 1991 en
banc decision of the Supreme Court upholding the Guido title.  43

Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the probative value of the petitioners'
Spanish title in these cases is the propriety of the lower court's resolution of the question of
ownership of the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus, before we
address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners' Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null
and void and of no legal force and effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower
court, acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of administration, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate
covered by Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.

Petitioners-heirs, in G.R No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that the lower court, then CFI,
Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an "intestate court"   to resolve the question of title or
44

ownership raised by the public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.  45

The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign capacity as parens patriae, argues
that petitioners' contention is misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the
existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower court became duty-bound to rule
on the genuineness and validity of Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said
estate, otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be mistakenly dealing with
properties that are proven to be part of the State's patrimony or improperly included as belonging to
the estate of the deceased.  46

A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares
are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the
validity of wills. We held in the case of Maniñgat v. Castillo,   7 that "the main function of a probate
4

court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the
process of administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes the examination of the properties,
rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on whether or not the inventory of the estate
properly included them for purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased to
the lawful heirs.
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals,   we stated, thus:
48

. . . questions of title to any property apparently still belonging to estate of the

deceased maybe passed upon in the Probate Court, with the consent of all the
parties, without prejudice to third persons . . .

Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima facie of whether certain

properties ought to be included or excluded from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject
of a petition for letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of the late
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate court. In this light, we echo our
pronouncement in the case of Garcia v. Garcia   that:
49

. . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person
through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over
the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the
inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties,
rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory.
In compliance with this duty, the court has also inherent power to determine what
properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from
the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased
person duly call the court's attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or
credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court's duty to hear the
observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or
not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no
such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said
properties.   [Emphasis Supplied]
50

In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court did not commit any reversible
error when it issued the Order dated November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao's decision
dated April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void, consequently
excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban.

A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as regards the assailed Order of
November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of Judge Fernandez' act of granting the motion for
reconsideration filed by the public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not personally
hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a "reviewing judge." By setting aside the
Decision dated April 25, 1978 of his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely,
Judge Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively, Judge Fernandez, acting as a
"reviewing judge," proceeded without authority and/or jurisdiction. 51

There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the decision arrived at is fair and
just, a newly appointed judge who did not try the case can decide the same as long as the record
and the evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken into consideration and
thoroughly studied. The "reviewing judge" argument of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on
considering that "the fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear a certain case in its
entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and conclusion inasmuch as the full record
was available to him for his perusal."   In the case at bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated
52

November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a knowledgeable and analytical discussion of
the rationale for reconsidering and setting aside Judge Bagasao's Decision dated April 25, 1978.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness of Judge Fernandez'
disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the lower court of the assailed Order of November 17,
1978, we now focus on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R No. 106496
committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground
that the said title is null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is the issue of
whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R. Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not
recognizing Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the Late Mariano San
Pedro of the lands covered thereby.

It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took effect on February 16, 1976, the
system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the Land
Registration Act   within six (6) months from the date of effectivity of the said Decree or until August
53

16, 1976.   Otherwise, non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their

54

lands.   Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of land ownership. 
55 56

Section 1 of the said Decree provides:

Sec. 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued,
and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens title
shall be considered as unregistered lands.

All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under
Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months
from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens
system.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act. 3344.

The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying policies for its passage, to wit:

WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of large

tracts of public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers appear to have
been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles
or grants of dubious origin;

WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in conflicting claims

and litigations between legitimate title holders, bona fide occupants or applicants of
public lands, on the one hand, and the holders of, or person claiming rights under the
said Spanish titles or grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in
property ownership and threatening the peace and order renditions in the areas
affected;

WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration Commission show that recording in

the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is practically nil and that
this system has become obsolete;
 WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the
operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now ineffective to
prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual possession;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the System of registration

under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles as evidence in
registration proceedings under the Torrens system;

In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et al.,  7 we took cognizance of this
5

Decree and thus held that caution and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of
Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have been discovered after their
supposed reconstitution subsequent to World War II.

In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was
brought under the operation of P.D. 892 despite their allegation that they did so on August 13,
1976.   Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the party who
58

alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.   Proof of compliance with P.D. 892 should be the
59

Certificate of Title covering the land registered.

In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the part of Judge Bagasao who
rendered the reconsidered Decision dated April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence,
genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the deceased Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D. No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside
Judge Bagasao's decision, emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is
inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the special proceedings case. He
made the following observations as regards the Titulo, to wit:

The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire consequences of recognizing the

nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership underscored the fact that during the
pendency of this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had inveigled innocent
parties into buying portions of the so-called estate with considerations running into
millions of pesos.

Some, under the guise of being benign heroes even feigned donations to charitable
and religious organizations, including veterans' organizations as smoke screen to the
gargantuan fraud they have committed and to hood wink further other gullible and
unsuspecting victims.  60

In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic observation that the then heir-judicial
administrator Engracio San Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or
reconveyance with damages in G.R No. 103727 on August 15, 1988 invoked Judge Bagasao's
Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the Titulo's validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the
said Decision had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez' Order of November 17, 1978. We
are in accord with the appellate courts' holding in G.R No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since
the Titulo was not registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, said
Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.

This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of the Titulo under the Torrens
system is the lack of the necessary documents to be presented in order to comply with the
provisions of P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in question is not
genuine, especially since its genuineness and due execution have not been proven. In both cases,
the petitioners heirs were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 nor a
genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the petitioners-heirs failed to produce the
Titulo despite a subpoena duces tecum (Exh. "Q-RP") to produce it as requested by the Republic
from the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito,
and the other interested parties. As an alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate estate,
the petitioners referred to a document known as "hypoteca" (the Spanish term is 'hipoteca') allegedly
appended to the Titulo. However, the said hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as
evidence. Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance with damages, the
petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible
copy of the Titulo was presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-19").

The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the Rules of Court is stated in
unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule read:

Sec. 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence

of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original
writing itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

xxx xxx xxx

Sections 3 and 4 of the same Rule further read:

Sec 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed — When the original
writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection
of witnesses.

Sec. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in adverse party's custody. — If the

writing be in the custody of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to
produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the writing, the contents thereof may be proved as in the case of its loss. But
the notice to produce it is not necessary where the writing is itself a notice, or where
it has been wrongfully obtained or withheld by the adverse party.

Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely substitutionary in its nature,
such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear
showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court,
the photocopy submitted, in lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any
probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence.  61

Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by competent proof the existence and
due execution of the Titulo. Their explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be
produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which should have resolved the issue
as to the exact extent of the subject intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not
distinctly proved. In the case of Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals,   we pointed out that:
62
 Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent
must establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary
in the discretion of the court. 
63

In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in
his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a
report dated January 28, 1963 denominated as "Questioned Documents Report No. 230-163"; (2) a
photostat copy of the original of the Titulo duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Manila; and (3) the hipoteca Registered in the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on December 4, 1894.

Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge Bagasao's April 1978
decision correctly clarified that the NBI report aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the
two signatures of Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last page of the
Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence
and due execution of the Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:

x x x           x x x          x x x

ATTY. BRINGAS:

With the testimony of this witness, I would like to call the

distinguished counsel for the government whether he admits that
there is actually a titulo propiedad 4136.

COURT:

Would you comment on that Solicitor Agcaoili?

ATTY. AGCAOILI:

We are precisely impugning the titulo and I think the question of

counsel is already answered by witness. The parties have not yet
established the due existence of the titulo.

ATTY. BRINGAS:

We are constrained to ask this matter in order to be candid about the

question. The witness is a witness for the government, so with the
testimony of this witness for the government to the effect that there is
actually in existence titulo propiedad 4136; we are asking the
question candidly to the government counsel whether he is prepared
to state that there is really in existence such titulo propiedad 4136.

ATTY. AGCAOILI:

We are now stating before this court that there was such a document
examined by the NBI insofar as the signatures of Alejandro Garcia
 and Manuel Lopez Delgado are concerned and they are found to be
authentic. 
64

The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend credence to our pronouncement
that the Titulo is of dubious validity:

. . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report No. 448-977 dated September 2,
1977 (Exhibit "O-RP") concluded that the document contained material alterations as
follows:

a) On line 15 of "p, 1, Title" and on line 5 of "p. 2, Title," the word "Pinagcamaligan"
was written after "Pulo;"

b) On line 16, "p. 1, Title," "un" was converted to "mil;"

c) On Line 18, "p. 1, Title," "mil" was written at the end of "tres" in "tres mil;"

d) On line 19 of "p. 1, Title," a semblance of "mil" was written after "setentay tres;"

e) On line 6, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to a semblance of "uni;" and

f) On line 8, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to "mil."

The plain and evident purpose was definitely to enlarge the area of the titulo.
According to Mr. Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still "pieces of black ashes around
the rings of the portions which are indications of burnings". The burnings were made
on the very portions where there were previous erasures, alterations and
intercalations. Understandably, the burnings were done to erase traces of the
criminal act. 65

In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et a1.   Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
66

Herrera, in reinstating the trial court's judgment therein, sustained the finding that:

. . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost original) of the Spanish title in the name of
Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and intercalations in an attempt to
vastly increase the area and change the location of the land described in the original
title . . .

Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the Titulo, we sustain the lower court's
analysis, as affirmed by the appellate court, viz:

To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in
Court. Upon request of the Government, a subpoena duces tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP")
was issued to the two administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as well
as to other interested parties to produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136. But no one produced the titulo. What the parties did was to pass the buck to
one another.

Without any plausible explanation at all on as to why the original could not be
produced, the Court cannot take cognizance of any secondary evidence.
 It was explained that the titulo after changing hands, finally fell into the hands of a
certain Moon Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that his present
whereabouts could not be known.

Strangely enough, despite the significance of the titulo, no serious efforts on the part
of the claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this document of vital importance
despite the Court order to produce it in order to determine its authenticity.

It would not be enough to simply say that Moon Park's whereabouts are unknown or
that there are not enough funds to locate him. The only logical conclusion would be
that the original would be adverse if
produced.  7
6

As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds of the subject intestate
estate, the petitioners-heirs have not established the conditions required by law for their admissibility
as secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document designated as Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no probative value.  68

At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel
M. Muñoz, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al.   is enlightening. In
69

said case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corporation, Inc.,

(PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000 hectares of land located in the municipalities of
Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban,
province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied on Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated
April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining that the Titulo is of doubtful validity,   Justice Conrado V. Sanchez,
70

speaking for the Court, stated that:

But an important moiety here is the deeply disturbing intertwine of two undisputed
facts. First. The Title embraces land "located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal,
Quezon, and Quezon City." Second. The title was signed only by the provincial
officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The
situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.

To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership

of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear
identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v.
Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13
Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil. 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371.
This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the
land must be concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos
ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree
of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly
suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.

Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's
"Rejoinder to Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified
that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p.
36). In its "Opposition" of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as
containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but accentuates the
nebulous identity of Piadeco's land, Piadeco's ownership thereof then equally suffers
from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner
appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under
Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the
basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for
adjustment — showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for — were
to be filed with the Direccion General de Administration Civil, which then ordered
the classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party or
his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).

The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for
adjustment at one year from the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de
Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July
15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he
should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of
November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000
hectares of arids lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable
lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98
Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area
that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%.
Ponce, op cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that
Piadeco's Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.

But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law (Royal Decree of February 13,
1894), published in the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p. 26;
Venture, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a second petition for adjustment within
six months from publication, for those who had not yet secured their titles at the time
of the publication of the law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the provincial boards for
the adjustment of lands established by Royal Decree of December 26, 1884, and
confirmed by Royal Decree of August 31, 1888, which boards were directed to
deliver to their successors, the provincial boards established by Decree on Municipal
Organization issued on May 19, 1893, all records and documents which they may
hold in their possession (Ramirez v. Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).

Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we come to consider that title was
either dated April 29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the publication of
the Maura Law.

Let us now take a look, as near as the record allows, at how Piadeco exactly
acquired its rights under the Titulo. The original owner appearing thereon was Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. From Piadeco's explanation — not its
evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we cull the following: On December 3,
1894, Don Mariano mortgaged the land under pacto de retro, redeemable within 10
years, for P8,000.00 to one Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to have
been registered or inscribed on December 4, 1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died, his
daughter, Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated the land to herself. At
about the same time, Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of registration was
issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later, Maria
Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed
the land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator, Trinidad B. Estrada, in
consideration of a certain amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B. Estrada
assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo,
appearing as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of the land. Castillo also
 executed an affidavit of adjudication to himself over the same land, and then sold the
same to Piadeco. Consideration therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the
registration of the land under Act 496.

The question may well be asked: Why was full payment of the consideration to
Fabian Castillo made to depend on the registration of the land under the Torrens
system, if Piadeco was sure of the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and
other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds of doubt that hang most
conspicuously over Piadeco's title.

Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,   we categorically
71

enunciated that the alleged Spanish title, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any
probative value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained in our Resolution
dated February 6, 1985 in a related case entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R
No. 69343. On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment was made respecting G.R. No. 69343.

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior declarations by this Court relating to the
issue of the validity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In
the Muñoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulo's validity. In the WIDORA case, the Titulo's
nullification was definitive. In both cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en banc of Calalang v. Register of
Deeds of Quezon City,   the Court explained the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, viz:
72

. . . conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was in issue in

a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the
parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be
again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same
court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different
cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has
been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies, it is
essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular
point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]).
Identity of cause of action is not required by merely identity of issues.

The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or not, must now be laid to rest.
The Titulo cannot be relied upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of
ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the inventory submitted before the
probate court consisted solely of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net
estate" to speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from the intestate proceedings of the estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro.

In G.R No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles of private respondents
Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT No. 372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh.
"2" — De Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. "2" — Dela Cruz).   Under the Torrens system of
73

registration, the titles of private respondents became indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from
its final decree.   More importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued under the
74

Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of validity.   As a last hurrah to champion their
75
claim to the vast estate covered by the subject Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud and
bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the private respondents as regards their Torrens
titles and accused their own counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper
witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-heirs' claim that OCT No. 614
from which private respondents were derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that
the negligence of counsel binds the client.   The records show that the petitioners-heirs were not at
76

all prejudiced by the non-presentation of evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering
that their ownership itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the case of Villa Rhecar
Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al.,  7 we held:
7

It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his
client. This negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that
as it may, such mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a
client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA
13 [1980] Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious
injustice should an exception thereto be called for. Under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the petitioner has been
satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the
petitioner bad been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an
explanation to that effect.

Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention that the petitioners-heirs were
denied due process on account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ of certiorari is
unavailing.

It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are not
without recourse. Presidential Decree No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish
Titles the right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the
Land Registration Act, within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however,
any Spanish Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as evidence of ownership in
any land registration proceedings under the Torrens system.

All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may be
recorded under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.

In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor General to be more vigilant in
handling land registration cases and intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It
is not too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the Torrens titles of those
who have acquired ownership of such portions of land that rightfully belong to the State.

In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in favor of Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner
of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these cases. Firstly, Catalino
San Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases before us for review, hence, this Court in a
Resolution dated May 10, 1993,   denied Catalino's motion for leave to reopen and/or new trial. And,
78

secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included in the inventory of the subject estate
submitted by then administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R Nos. 103727 and 106496 are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Consequently, in G.R No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 20, 1992 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

In G.R No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights
could be derived therefrom;

(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;

(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.

(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of
possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any
portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby
ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them are in possession
thereof.

This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., took no part.

Vitug, J., is on leave.

March 26, 2014

G.R. No. 157485

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES

(ANCF) and DR. ELENITA R. ANDRADE, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION L. SIN, ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ,
FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S. YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON
L. SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA, Respondents.
 DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision  of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
1

65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of New
Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181, segregating from the Aklan National College
of Fisheries (ANCF) reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.

Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by ANCF and Dr. Elenita R.
Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of ANCF. Respondents claim that they are the lawful
heirs of the late Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, and more particularly described as follows:

A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan,
containing an approximate area of FIFTY[-]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square
meters, more or less, as per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the North
by Dumlog Creek; on the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and on the
West by Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin
(deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00. 2

On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan a complaint against
Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for
recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with damages. Respondent
heirs claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by
ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to
remove from the ANCF reservation.

The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents was the
subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551
hectares of land within the area, which included said portion of private respondents’ alleged
property, as civil reservation for educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent
furthermore averred that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of
private ownership.

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party defendant and Lucio
Arquisola, who retired from the service during the pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo
Andres, then the designated Officer-in-Charge of ANCF.

The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and Batan, Aklan, in view of the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).

Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they inherited a bigger parcel of land
from their mother, Maxima Sin, who died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan).
Maxima Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "B"), and then
developed the same by planting coconut trees, banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and
usufructing the produce of said land until her death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from Maxima Sin was occupied by
ANCF and converted into a fishpond for educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin
asserted that they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept of an owner.
The disputed area was a swampy land until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove
possession, respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the year
1945.

On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent heirs herein] the owner and
possessor of the land in question in this case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of the
same from the Civil Reservation of the Aklan National College of Fisheries, granted under
Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31, 1981.

It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs actual damages for the
unearned yearly income from nipa plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when
the same has been converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in the amount of Php3,500.00
yearly beginning the year 1988 until plaintiffs are fully restored to the possession of the land in
question.

It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs the sum of Php10,000.00
for attorney’s fees and costs of this suit.
3

According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner in his report (Exh. "LL") shows
that the disputed property is an alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the
land covered by Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074 was classified as timberland only on
December 22, 1960 (Exh. "4-D"). The MCTC observed that the phrase "Block II Alien or Disp. LC
2415" was printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under Proclamation No.
2074 (Exh. "6"), indicating that the disputed land is an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals  where it was pronounced that:
4

Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired. The claims of persons who have settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land
which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually
respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a proclamation reserving certain
lands, and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in
such lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase.
And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are
void. (Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)

Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring all persons to depart from the
reservation, the MCTC concluded that the reservation was subject to private rights if there are any.

The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the disputed land by virtue of their and
their predecessors’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an imperfect
title, which should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, where the case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.

On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC judgment with modification:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified absolving Appellant Ricardo
Andres from the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. All other details of the appealed decision
are affirmed in toto.
5

The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested rights acquired by private
individuals prior to its issuance on March 31, 1981.

The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be disturbed on appeal unless the
court below has overlooked some facts of substance that may alter the results of its findings. The
RTC, however, absolved the Superintendent of the ANCF from liability as there was no showing on
record that he acted with malice or in bad faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074. 6

Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as the
new Superintendent of the ANCF, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for
Review. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65244.

On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of
merit. In addition to the findings of the MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals held:

Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the subject land was likewise
declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands
adjoining to that of the private respondents, which are also within the reservation area, have been
issued original certificates of title, the same affirms the conclusion that the area of the subject land
was agricultural, and therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.

It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through purchase and sale, the subject
property from its previous owners spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15,
1932, or 28 years before the said landholding was declared a timberland on December 22, 1960.
Tacking, therefore, the possession of the previous owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the
disputed property, it does not tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property had been
privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was declared a timberland. This being the case,
the said possession has ripened into an ownership against the State, albeit an imperfect one.
Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this should come under the meaning of "private rights"
under Proclamation No. 2074 which are deemed segregated from the mass of civil reservation
granted to petitioner.  (Citation omitted.)
7

Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING

RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM TO SUPPOSED "PRIVATE RIGHTS" OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE
THE DENR CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND BEING CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF
PUBLIC DOMAIN AND AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM. 8

The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first paragraph of Proclamation No.
2074:

Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development, approved by the Minister of Natural
Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President
of the Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil Reservation for Aklan National College of Fisheries,
subject to private rights, if any there be, parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551
hectares, situated in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan, Philippines, designated
Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR-203, x x x [.] 9

The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that respondents retain private
rights to the disputed property, thus preventing the application of the above proclamation thereon.
The private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents supposedly acquired by
possession of the subject property, through their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was
declared as a timberland on December 22, 1960.

At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title under the Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the
courts a quo apparently treated respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title
and declaration of ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if respondents
complied with the requirements therefor.

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, as follows:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest
under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. 10

With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the disputed property was alienable
and disposable before 1960, citing petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject
land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on said year.  Petitioner
11

emphatically objects, alleging that under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.

After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this Court held in the fairly recent
case of Valiao v. Republic :
12

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application
(or claim) is alienable or disposable.

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.  To1âwphi1

prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that
the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable. (Citations omitted.)

This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap,  which presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the same province
13

of Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). On September
3, 1982, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued to implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondents-
claimants in said case filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, claiming
that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82 precluded them from filing an application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes. The respondents claim
that through their predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier since
time immemorial.

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the above case with this Court,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into
four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-
eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). Petitioner-
claimants and other landowners in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it infringed on their "prior vested
right" over portions of Boracay which they allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This
petition was consolidated with the petition for review concerning Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular 3- 82.

This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis-à-vis the right of the claimants to lands they claim to
have possessed since time immemorial, held:

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.  (Emphases in the original; citations omitted.)
14

Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show competent evidence that
the subject land was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not
lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the
contrary, the presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the
conclusion of this Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v.
Republic,  wherein we held:
15

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands are public
forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and
rendered open to disposition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied, citation deleted.)

The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, and the equivalent provision in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was
furthermore painstakingly debated upon by the members of this Court in

Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic.  In Malabanan, the members of this Court were in
16

disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be
subject to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement that there
must be a declaration to that effect.

In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive act of
the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged
possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen
into ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the
purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said proclamation to the subject
property. We are thus constrained to reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of
petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of
the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the
Aklan National College of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
New Washington and Batan, Aklan is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 167707              October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF
DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their
behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775              October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY
SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
secure titles over their occupied lands.

There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second
is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest
and agricultural land.

The Antecedents

G.R. No. 167707

Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to
12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped island’s three barangays.5

On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the
National Reservation Survey of Boracay

Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7

On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring

Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President
Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10

Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not
place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as
amended.

The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-
82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD
No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.

During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut
trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years
ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12

The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation
No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They
decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
respective memoranda.13

The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1
and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the
name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262
filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on

August 7, 1933.16

RTC and CA Dispositions

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title
to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed
therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director
of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It
ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay
were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22

The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the
CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the
appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24

The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition
under Rule 45.

G.R. No. 173775

On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way
and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.

On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other

landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior
vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective
lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their
lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first
Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section
3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot
be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable
lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.

On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally
involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33

Issues

G.R. No. 167707

The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose
any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied
lands in Boracay Island.34

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

I.

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF

OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT
THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL
LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?

II.

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE

OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?

III.

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND

DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.

V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707
and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under
other pertinent laws.

Our Ruling

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then
President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
these laws and executive acts.

But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the
public domain.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for classification.42 Then
the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of
these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may
be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49

Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51

The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.52

The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and
the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession
of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section
393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly
inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of
twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the
date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the
State.58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or
special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by
purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>

The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion
of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64

x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis
Ours)

On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66

Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the
first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904
was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68

On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the

second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1,
1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and
privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71

Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However,
this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirty-
year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended
by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.74

The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity
of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be
governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages.79

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."82

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.86

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.87

Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to
the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919) 88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90

Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the
effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which
land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.

Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power
to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts
were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of
the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v.
Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.

xxxx

Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced.

These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.93

To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to
devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have
a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94

But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all
lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.

If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral
land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse,
would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.

The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under
the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.

In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in
the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural
uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this
Court stated:

In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that
whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The
mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to
declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent
and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it
is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof
must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees
upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today,
and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow.
And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided
upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or
the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts
have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts
to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No.
1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case,
whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests
have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself
what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)

Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each
case, except those that have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919
and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine
the classification of lands of the public domain.97

Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not
present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the property’s land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by
Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the
property’s land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v.
Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.103

Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent
issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of
agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as
an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.

Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso
facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.

A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of

Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 107-a ruled:

"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)

Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.

PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as
public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination
of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD
No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.

The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to
be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for
local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land.

Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the
island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as
public forest.

Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the
public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry 114 is particularly
instructive:

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any
rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its
physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to
alienable agricultural land.

Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However,
private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other
islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
private ownership.

Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as
alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably,
Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:

No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas
in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the
island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In
fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s authority to
declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development.

Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay
Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as
alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist
zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated efforts of the
public and private sectors in the development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for
ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at
administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’
alienability.119

More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas,
Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto
Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis
Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the
intent of the proclamation.

It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is
only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123

Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each
side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing
vested rights.

Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no
longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:

SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided
in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.

That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive
from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the
public domain despite PD No. 705.

In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, 124 the Court
stated that unclassified lands are public forests.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until
released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had
never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on
this point:

Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we
repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not]
into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code,
there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).

Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest
lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and
cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised
Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127

Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There
are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.128

As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902,
Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public
Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable.
This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129 Where the land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130

Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed
to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in
Boracay since June 12, 1945.

We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.

The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court
that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.

Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the
island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot
be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land
they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants
are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even
with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.

One Last Note

The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island,
making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a
number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court
commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously.
This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.

All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote
their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified
as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied
alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They
can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes
of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the
conditions imposed by law.

More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one
such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will
become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the
island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view
the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to
strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.

To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their promotion and protection are
not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as
destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. Munoz:134

The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be
followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and
quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development
and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on
our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property – crops, livestock, houses,
and highways – not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be
written down in a lumberman’s decalogue.135

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-8936             October 2, 1915

CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.

Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.

D.R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

From the record the following facts appear:

First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita
in the city of Manila.

Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots.
Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.

Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th
day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them
the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate
included the wall.

Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court
decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens
system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.

Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall
which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate
granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for
an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of
each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition
upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land,
they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the
adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.

Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?

The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot
of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all
parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had
not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even
though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and
granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his
predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory
to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the
same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be
permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured
the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to
watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion
of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme
and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to
quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which
were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That
being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the
registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep.,
482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world.
It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep.,
49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land
Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action.
All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and
there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all
the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of
giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and
they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity
of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under
the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have
a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate
of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows
exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct
proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered
title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding and not even by
a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.

For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles
under the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties
relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the
owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of
land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all
the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be
no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are
noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need
not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open,
and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by
prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons
must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.

The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been
presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has
been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been
settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page
823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly,
or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193;
Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R.,
152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can
be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that
the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be
rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the
"Australian torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his
"Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said:
"Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived
directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect
thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates
for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this
undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of
the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).

Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To
all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or
other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest.

It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened,
for any reason, in any court, except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If
then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct
proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by
including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We do not
believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of
land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of
the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to
two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry.
This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the
land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now
decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even
though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they
should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration
under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and
the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date
shall prevail.

In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He
says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the
predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was
seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application.
Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default
judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to
Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the
validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would
be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".

As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is
defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been
gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose
a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose
within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or
sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are
bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the
duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such
damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to
avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real
owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the
name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in
question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such
registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably
bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not
be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly
entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which
the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in
the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There
is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than
to him.

We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of
the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule
be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other
of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent
purchaser." The general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his
vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the
earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.

We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that
the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate
that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not.
Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale
of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land
wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an
"innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his
land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is
the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have
been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be
deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the
appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be
included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these
examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be
applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent
purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the
difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in
said sections.

May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be
regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original
certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public
registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world. All persons are
charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any
portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with
notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record
discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support
(Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710,
710 [a]).

When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents
and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286,
289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson,
27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)

Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record
affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by
the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have
disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the
very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot
be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must
take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute.
Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.

While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real
property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of
the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of
that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the
plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third parties were interested? May a purchaser of
land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such
ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded
mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May
there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the
existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public
record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that
no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the
presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule,
however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the
defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.

In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the
second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore
been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38,
55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent
purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent
purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule
should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the
original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion
of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record
contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent
purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor,
or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We
believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases
where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system.
When land is once brought under the torrens system, the record of the original certificate and all
subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded
as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We
think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens
system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very
strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip?
Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original
certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of
the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting
from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are
of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule
contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate,
and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like
the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no
negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest
secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and
complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate,
by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged
and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather
than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.

The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double
registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now
attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration
under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the
torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in
dealing with land registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the
torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of
the title to the land.

It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the
same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements
of the law should be protected.

In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby
revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the
premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original
certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate
certificates issued.

Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TRENT, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

In cases of double or overlapping registration, I am inclined to agree with the reasoning and authority
on which it is held in the majority opinion (first) that the original holder of the prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later certificate, where there has been no
transfer of title by either party to an innocent purchaser; both, as is shown in the majority opinion,
being at fault in permitting the double registration to take place; (second) that an innocent purchaser
claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the original holder of the later
certificate, and also as against innocent purchasers from the holder of the later certificate; the
innocent purchaser being in no wise at fault in connection with the issuance of the later certificate.

But I am of opinion that neither the authorities cited, nor the reasoning of the majority opinion
sustains the proposition that the original holder of the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against an innocent purchaser from the holder of the later certificate.

As to the text-book authorities cited in the majority opinion, it is sufficient to say that the rules laid
down by both Hogg and Niblack are mere general rules, admittedly subject to exception, and of
course of no binding force or authority where the reasoning upon which these rules are based is
applicable to the facts developed in a particular case.
In its last analysis the general rule laid down in the majority opinion rests upon the proposition set
forth in the last page of the opinion wherein it is said that "it would seem to be a just and equitable
rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who
acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected." The
rule, as applied to the matter in hand, may be stated as follows: It would seem to be a just and
equitable rule when two persons have acquired separate and independent registered titles to the
same land, under the Land Registration Act, to hold that the one who first acquired registered title
and who has complied with all the requirements of the law in that regard should be protected, in the
absence of any express statutory provision to the contrary.

Thus stated I have no quarrel with the doctrine as a statement of the general rule to be applied in
cases of double or overlapping registration under the Land Registration Act; for it is true as stated in
the majority opinion that in the adjudication and registration of titles by the Courts of Land
Registration "mistakes are bound to occur, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable;"
and that in the absence of statutory provisions covering such cases, "it is the duty of the courts to
adjust the rights of the parties, under such circumstances, so as to minimize such damages, taking
into consideration all of the conditions, and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them."

But like most such general rules, it has its exceptions and should not be applied in a case wherein
the reasons on which it is based do not exist, or in cases wherein still more forceful reasons demand
the application of a contrary rule.

The general rule relied upon in the majority opinion is a mere application of a well settled equity rule
that: "Where conflicting equities are otherwise equal in merit, that which first occurred will be given
the preference." But it is universally laid down by all the courts which have had occasion to apply this
equity rule that "it should be the last test resorted to," and that "it never prevails when any other
equitable ground for preference exists." (See 19 Cent. Dig., tit. Equity, par. 181; and may cases cited
in 16 Cyc., 139, note 57.) It follows that the general rules, that in cases of double or overlapping
registration the earlier certificate should be protected, ought not to prevail so as to deprive an
innocent purchaser under the later certificate of his title of the earlier certificate contributed to the
issuance of the later certificate. Hence the holder of the earlier certificate of title should not be heard
to invoke the "just and equitable rule" as laid down in the majority opinion, in order to have his own
title protected and the title of an innocent purchaser of a later certificate cancelled or annulled, in any
case wherein it appears that the holder of the later certificate was wholly without fault, while the
holder of the issuance of the later certificate, in that he might have prevented its issuance by merely
entering his appearance in court in response to lawful summons personally served upon him in the
course of the proceedings for the issuance of the second certificate, and pleading his superior rights
under the earlier certificate, instead of keeping silent and by his silence permitting a default judgment
to be entered against him adjudicating title in favor of the second applicant.

The majority opinion clearly recognizes the soundness of the principles I am contending for by
reasoning (with which I am inclined to agree) whereby it undertakes to demonstrate that as between
the original holders of the double or overlapping registration the general rule should
prevail, because both such original parties must held to have been fault and, their equities being
equal, preference should be given to the earlier title.

The majority opinion further recognizes the soundness of my contention by the reasoning whereby it
undertakes to sustain the application of the general rule in favor of the original holder of the earlier
certificate against purchasers from the original holder of the later certificate, by an attempt to
demonstrate that such purchasers can in no event be held to be innocent purchasers; because, as it
is said, negligence may and should always be imputed to such a purchaser, so that in no event can
he claim to be without fault when it appears that the lands purchased by him from the holder of a
duly registered certificate of title are included within the bounds of the lands described in a certificate
of title of an earlier date.

At considerable length the majority opinion (in reliance upon the general rule laid down under the
various systems of land registration, other than those based on the torrens system) insists that a
purchaser of land land duly registered in the Land Registration Court, is charged with notice of the
contents of each and every one of the thousands and tens of thousands of certificates of registry on
file in the land registry office, so that negligence may be imputed to him if he does not ascertain that
all or any part of the land purchased by him is included within the boundary lines of any one of the
thousands or tens of thousands of tracts of land whose original registry bears an earlier date than
the date of the original registry of the land purchased by him. It is contended that he cannot claim to
be without fault should he buy such land because, as it is said, it was possible for him to discover
that the land purchased by him had been made the subject of double or overlapping registration by a
comparison of the description and boundary lines of the thousands of tracts and parcels of land to be
found in the land registry office.

But such ruling goes far to defeat one of the principal objects sought to be attained by the
introduction and adoption of the so-called torrens system for the registration of land. The avowed
intent of that system of land registration is to relieve the purchase of registered lands from the
necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title of the vendor in order that he may rest secure
as to the validity of the title to the lands conveyed to him. And yet it is said in the majority opinion
that he is charged with notice of the contents of every other certificate of title in the office of the
registrar so that his failure to acquaint himself with its contents may be imputed to him as
negligence.

If the rule announced in the majority opinion is to prevail, the new system of land registration, instead
of making transfers of real estate simple, expenditious and secure, and instead of avoiding the
necessity for expensive and oftimes uncertain searches of the land record and registries, in order to
ascertain the true condition of the title before purchase, will, in many instances, add to the labor,
expense and uncertainty of any attempt by a purchaser to satisfy himself as to the validity of the title
to lands purchased by him.

As I have said before, one of the principal objects, if not the principal object, of the torrens system of
land registration upon which our Land Registration Act is avowedly modelled is to facilitate the
transfer of real estate. To that end the Legislature undertakes to relieve prospective purchasers and
all others dealing in registered lands from the necessity of looking farther than the certificate of title
to such lands furnished by the Court of Land Registration, and I cannot, therefore, give my consent
to a ruling which charges a purchaser or mortgage of registered lands with notice of the contents of
every other certificate of title in the land registry, so that negligence and fault may be imputed to him
should he be exposed to loss or damages as a result of the lack of such knowledge.

Suppose a prospective purchaser of lands registered under the Land Registration Act desires to
avoid the imputation of negligence in the event that, unknown to him, such lands have been made
the subject of double or overlapping registration, what course should he pursue? What measures
should he adopt in order to search out the information with notice of which he is charged? There are
no indexes to guide him nor is there anything in the record or the certificate of title of the land he
proposes to buy which necessarily or even with reasonable probability will furnish him a clue as to
the fact of the existence of such double or overlapping registration. Indeed the only course open to
him, if he desires to assure himself against the possibility of double or overlapping registration,
would even seem to be a careful, laborious and extensive comparison of the registered boundary
lines contained in the certificate of title of the tract of land he proposes to buy with those contained in
all the earlier certificates of title to be found in the land registry. Assuredly it was never the intention
of the author of the new Land Registration Act to impose such a burden on a purchaser of duly
registered real estate, under penalty that a lack of the knowledge which might thus be acquired may
be imputed to him by this court as negligence in ruling upon the respective equities of the holders of
lands which have been the subject of double or overlapping registration.

On the other hand, I think that negligence and fault may fairly be imputed to a holder of a registered
certificate of title who stood supinely by and let a default judgment be entered against him,
adjudicating all or any part of his registered lands to another applicant, if it appears that he was
served with notice or had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings in the Court of Land
Registration wherein such default judgment was entered.

The owner of land who enjoys the benefits secured to him by its registry in the Court of Land
Registration may reasonably be required to appear and defend his title when he has actual notice
that proceedings are pending in that court wherein another applicant, claiming the land as his own, is
seeking to secure its registry in his name. All that is necessary for him to do is to enter his
appearance in those proceedings, invite the court's attention to the certificate of title registered in his
name, and thus, at the cost of the applicant, avoid all the damage and inconvenience flowing from
the double or overlapping registration of the land in question. There is nothing in the new system of
land registration which seems to render it either expedient or necessary to relieve a holder of a
registered title of the duty of appearing and defending that title, when he has actual notice that it is
being attacked in a court of competent jurisdiction, and if, as a result of his neglect or failure so to
do, his lands become subject to double or overlapping registration, he should not be permitted to
subject an innocent purchaser, holding under the later certificate, to all the loss and damage
resulting from the double or overlapping registration, while he goes scot free and holds the land
under a manifest misapplication of the equitable rule that "where conflicting equities are otherwise
equal in merit, that which first accrued will be given the preference." It is only where both or neither
of the parties are at fault that the rule is properly applicable as between opposing claimants under an
earlier and a later certificate of registry to the same land.

Of course all that is said in the briefs of counsel and the majority opinion as to the right of the holder
of a certificate to rest secure in his registered title so that those dealing with registered lands can
confidently rely upon registry certificates thereto is equally forceful by way of argument in favor of the
holder of one or the other certificate in case of double or overlapping registration. The problem is to
determine which of the certificate holders is entitled to the land. The decision of that question in favor
of either one must necessarily have the effect of destroying the value of the registered title of the
other and to that extent shaking the public confidence in the value of the whole system for the
registration of lands. But, in the language of the majority opinion, "that mistakes are bound to occur
cannot be denied and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts
to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize the damages, taking
into consideration all the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them." lawphil.net

It will be observed that I limit the exception to the general equitable rule, as laid down in the majority
opinion, to case wherein the holder of the earlier certificate of title has actual notice of the pendency
of the proceedings in the course of which the latter certificate of title was issued, or to cases in which
he has received personal notice of the pendency of those proceedings. Unless he has actual notice
of the pendency of such proceedings I readily agree with the reasoning of the majority opinion so far
as it holds that negligence, culpable negligence, should not be imputed to him for failure to appear
and defend his title so as to defeat his right to the benefit of the equitable rule. It is true that the order
of publication in such cases having been duly complied with, all the world is charged with notice
thereof, but it does not necessarily follow that, in the absence of actual notice, culpable negligence in
permitting a default judgment to be entered against him may be imputed to the holder of the earlier
certificate so as to defeat his right to the land under the equitable rule favoring the earlier certificate.
Such a holding would have the effect (to quote the language of the majority opinion) of requiring the
holder of a certificate of title to wait indefinitely "in the portals of the court" and to sit in the "mirador
de su casa" in order to avoid the possibility of losing his lands; and I agree with the writer of the
majority opinion that to do so would place an unreasonable burden on the holders of such certificate,
which was not contemplated by the authors of the Land Registration Act. But no unreasonable
burden is placed upon the holder of a registered title by a rule which imputes culpable negligence to
him when he sits supinely by and lets a judgment in default be entered against him adjudicating title
to his lands in favor of another applicant, despite the fact that he has actual knowledge of the
pendency of the proceedings in which such judgment is entered and despite the fact that he has
been personally served with summons to appear and default his title.

"Taking into consideration all of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties," it seems
to me that there is no "equality in merit" between the conflicting equities set up by an innocent
purchaser who acquires title to the land under a registered certificate, and the holder of an earlier
certificate who permitted a default judgment to be entered against him, despite actual notice of the
pendency of the proceedings in the course of which the later certificate was issued.

I am convinced, furthermore, that aside from the superior equities of the innocent purchaser in cases
such as that now under discussion, there are strong reasons of convenience and public policy which
militate in favor of the recognition of his title rather than that of the holder of the earlier title.

One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown, unspecified
and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to additional cost,
annoyance and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands;
while the other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object
for which the land registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a
certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and specific
occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land
Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum by the
conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore,
judgment against the innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case
such as that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or
overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and
conclusively, to permit default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part
of their registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial
proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security
of thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of
appearance in the court in which their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that
their right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.

The cases wherein there is a practical possibility of double or overlapping registration without actual
notice to the holder of the earlier certificate must in the very nature of things to be so rare as to be
practically negligible. Double or overlapping registration almost invariably occurs in relation to lands
held by adjoining occupants or claimants. It is difficult to conceive of a case wherein double
registration can take place, in the absence of fraud, without personal service of notice of the
pendency of the proceedings upon the holder of the earlier certificate, the statute requiring such
notice to be served upon the owner or occupant of all lands adjoining those for which application for
registration is made; and the cases wherein an adjoining land owner can, even by the use of fraud,
conduct proceedings for the registration of his land to a successful conclusion without actual notice
to the adjoining property owners must be rare indeed.
In the case at bar the defendant purchased the land in question from the original holder of a
certificate of title issued by the Court of Land Registration, relying upon the records of the Court of
Land Registration with reference thereto and with no knowledge that any part of the land thus
purchased was included in an earlier certificate of title issued to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the holder
of the earlier certificate of title, negligently permitted a default judgment to be entered against him in
the Court of Land Registration, adjudicating part of the lands included in his own certificate of title in
favor of another applicant, from whom the defendant in this action acquired title, and this despite the
fact that he was an adjoining land owner, had actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings and
was personally served with summons to appear and defends his rights in the premises. It seems to
me that there can be no reason for doubt as to the respective merits of the equities of the parties,
and further that the judgment of the majority in favor of the plaintiff will inevitably tend to increase the
number of cases wherein registered land owners in the future will fail to appear and defend their
titles when challenged in other proceedings in the Courts of Land Registration, thereby enormously
increasing the possibility and probability of loss and damage to innocent third parties and dealers in
registered lands generally, arising out of erroneous, double or overlapping registration of lands by
the Courts of Land Registration.

Carson, J., concurs.