TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
THE TORTFEASOR/S Insurance paid Columbia the amount of P1.8M as
Both natural and juridical persons may be held
liable for quasi-delict.
With respect to juridical persons, the liability
is always imputed because artificial beings
act only through their officers, employees’
agents.
Even the State and its political subdivisions
may be subject to civil liability.
CONCURRENT NEGLIGENCE
JOINT TORTFEASORS
ARTICLE 2194. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
Loadmaster Custom Services, Inc. v. Glodel
Brokerage Corp. G.R. No. 179446 (2011)
FACTS:
R&B Insurance issued a Marine Policy in favor of
Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of
electric copper cathodes against All Risks. The cargoes
were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from
Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They
arrived on the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the
release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier
and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants.
Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters
for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the
cargoes to Columbia's warehouses/plants in Bulacan
and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board 12 trucks owned by
Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and
accompanied by its employed truck helpers. 6
truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to
Bulacan, while the other 6 truckloads were destined for
Valenzuela City. The cargoes in 6 truckloads for
Valenzuela City were duly delivered in Columbia's
warehouses there. Of the 6 trucks en route to Bulacan,
however, only 5 reached the destination. 1 truck
loaded with copper cathodes failed to deliver its cargo.
The said truck was later recovered but without the
copper cathodes. Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a
claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1.9M.
After the requisite investigation and adjustment, R&B
insurance indemnity. 
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for
damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before
the RTC, seeking reimbursement for the amount it had
paid Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo.
RTC RULING: held Glodel liable for damages for the
loss of the subject cargo; dismissed Loadmasters'
counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees against
R&B Insurance
 
CA RULING: Loadmasters, as an agent of Glodel, is
likewise held liable to Glodel in the amount of P1.8M
representing the insurance indemnity Glodel has been
held liable to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation.
ISSUE:
Who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to
pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the indemnity it
paid Columbia?
RULING:
At the outset, it is well to resolve the issue of whether
Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to
determine their liability for the loss of the subject
cargo. Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common
carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passenger or goods, or both by land, water or air for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a
common carrier because it is engaged in the business
of transporting goods by land, through its trucking
service. There is no indication that the undertaking in
the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was
private in character. There is no showing that
Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services
to Glodel. In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a
common carrier.
In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a common
carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its
Memorandum, it states that it "is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines and is engaged in the business of
customs brokering." A customs broker is also regarded
as a common carrier, the transportation of goods being
an integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers,
are mandated from the nature of their business and for
Page 1 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported
by them according to all the circumstances of such
case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code.
When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is
that extreme measure of care and caution which
persons of unusual prudence and circumspection
observe for securing and preserving their own property
or rights. Thus, in case of loss of the goods, the
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently. This presumption of fault or
negligence, however, may be rebutted by proof that
the common carrier has observed extraordinary
diligence over the goods.
Premises considered, the Court is of the view that
both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and
severally liable to R&B Insurance for the loss of the
subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil
Code, "the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary."  that Loadmasters be liable for any and all claims that it
Loadmasters' claim that it was never privy to the
contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee
Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a
valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual
relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under
the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while
in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck
driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or
robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters
should be made answerable for the damages caused
by its employees who acted within the scope of their
assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the
warehouse.
To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its
employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
In this regard, Loadmasters failed.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that
Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking
to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated
destination. It should have been more prudent in
entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking
precautionary measures, such as providing escorts to
accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Glodel
should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its
defense of force majeure is unavailing.
What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of
Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable
for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance.
Where there are several causes for the resulting
damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even
partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a
party is an efficient cause without which the damage
would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of
the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would
not have resulted from his negligence alone,
without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent tortfeasor.
In this case, however, Glodel cannot succeed in
seeking judicial sanction against Loadmasters because
the records disclose that it did not properly interpose a
cross-claim against the latter. Glodel did not even pray
may be adjudged liable in favor of R&B Insurance.
Under the Rules, a compulsory counterclaim, or a
cross-claim, not set up shall be barred. Thus, a cross-
claim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal.
Who can be considered joint tortfeasors?
Joint tortfeasors are all persons who:
command,
countenance,
cooperate in,
instigate,
promote,
encourage,
advise,
aid or abet the commission of a tort, or
who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit.
They are each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act themselves.
Joint Tortfeasor by Cooperation
Defendants may be considered joint tortfeasors if
they cooperated in bringing about a result.
Such cooperation may be by virtue of a written
agreement. (Chan v. INC)
Page 2 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
Part of Causal Set
Defendants may likewise be considered joint
tortfeasors if each of their acts or omissions are
part of a causal set that is sufficient to cause
damage to the plaintiff.
They may have acted with prior agreement or
independently but the totality of their acts or
omissions collectively caused the damage or
injury.
Ex. PUV passenger injured in an accident
involving another vehicle. The drivers of both
vehicles may be held liable if their respective
negligence are the proximate causes of the
injury.
Separate Causal Sets
Persons may be considered joint tortfeasors if
they acted separately or independently and even
without prior connection with the other.
REIMBURSEMENT AND APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY
The joint tortfeasors owe solidary liability to the
injured party.
One of the tortfeasors cannot claim that his
contribution is smaller than the contribution
of the other joint tortfeasors.
No apportionment can be made because one
tortfeasor may be held liable for the entire
obligation.
A joint tortfeasor who paid the entire amount
has the right to claim reimbursement.
ARTICLE 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary
debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more
solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose
which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-
debtors only the share which corresponds to each, with
the interest for the payment already made. If the
payment is made before the debt is due, no interest
for the intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of
his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor
paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all
his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each.
Comparative Negligence Rule Among
Defendants
As between two persons who are responsible, it
can be established that the extent of
participation of one party in causing the loss may
be greater than the participation of another party.
A 60:40 ratio was used with respect to the
liability of banks for forged signatures in
checks. If the indorser’s signature is forged
and the drawee bank cleared the check
containing the forged indorsement, the
drawer will have the right to claim the
amount debited from his account by the
drawee bank. Generally, it is the collecting
bank that must bear the loss because of its
warranty of the genuineness of the signature
of the indorser, except if the drawee bank
was likewise negligent.
MOTOR VEHICLE MISHAPS
ARTICLE 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in
the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Solidary liability is imposed on the owner of the
vehicle not because of his imputed liability but
because his own omission is a concurring
proximate cause of injury.
The test to be applied is whether or not the
owner had reasonable opportunity to prevent
the misfortune.
Still on a case-to-case basis. The test of
negligence is the omission to do that which the
evidence of his own senses tell him he should
do in order to avoid the accident.
Page 3 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
The basis of liability is the relationship of pater
familias.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
GENERAL CONCEPTS
There is vicarious liability where a person is not
only liable for torts committed by himself, but
also for torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible.
This doctrine is also called the doctrine of
“imputed negligence.”
Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
The employer is liable not because of his act or
omission but because of the act or omission of
the employee.
What is material is not whether the employer
exercised due care but the conduct of the
employee.
The employer cannot escape liability by
claiming that he exercised due diligence in
the selection or supervision of his employee.
GR: Vicarious liability is generally not governed
by the doctrine of respondeat superior.
EXCEPTION: Subsidiary civil liability of other
persons. — The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of
their duties. (Art. 103, RPC)
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
New Civil Code
ARTICLE 2180.  The obligation imposed by Art. 2176
(on quasi-delict) is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors
or incapacitated persons who are under their authority
and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in
which the latter are employed or on the occasion of
their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts
through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art.
2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
ARTICLE 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused
by his dependents or employees may recover from the
latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of
the claim.
ARTICLE 2182.  If the minor or insane person causing
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or
insane person shall be answerable with his own
property in an action against him where a guardian ad
litem shall be appointed.
Child and Youth Welfare Code
ARTICLE 58.  Torts. – Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under
their parental authority in accordance with the Civil
Code.
Page 4 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE

ARTICLE 201.  Civil Liability of Youthful Offenders. –
The civil liability for acts committed by a youthful
offender shall devolve upon the offender’s father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother, or
in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian.
Civil liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a
relative or family friend of the youthful offender.
Family Code
ARTICLE 219. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
by removing the alternative qualification of the
liability of the father and the mother.
Art. 201 of the CYFC should also have been
modified by Art. 221 of the FC by removing the
alternative qualification.
Parents are liable without preference to the
father.
Schools are liable
The liability of teachers and heads of institutions
under Art. 2180 are likewise modified under Art.
221 of the FC by making the school itself liable.
The liability extends to acts committed even
outside the school so long as it is an official
activity of the school.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the

Revised Penal Code
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that
they exercised the proper diligence required under the
ARTICLE 101. Rules Regarding Civil Liability in Certain
particular circumstances.
Cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding
and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not
articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
Code on quasi-delicts.
enforced subject to the following rules:

ARTICLE 221. Parents and other persons exercising

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12,
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
insane person, and by a person under nine years of
unemancipated children living in their company and
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of
under their parental authority subject to the
age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve
appropriate defenses provided by law. 
upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
ARTICLE 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental
fault or negligence on their part.
authority over the person and property of the child
who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
Should there be no person having such insane,
of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing
imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
laws in special cases.
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent,
said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their
Contracting marriage shall require parental consent
own property, excepting property exempt from
until the age of twenty-one.
execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article
from the duty or responsibility of parents and
11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been
guardians for children and wards below twenty-one
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
years of age mentioned in the second and third
benefit which they may have received.
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion,

No Alternative Qualifications for Parents the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
The provisions with respect to parents in the 2nd liable.
par. of Art. 2180 is modified by Art. 221 of the FC

Page 5 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
When the respective shares can not be equitably
determined, even approximately, or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of
the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damage has been caused with the
consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of
article 12, the persons using violence or causing the
fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if
there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their
property exempt from execution.
ARTICLE 102. Subsidiary Civil Liability of Innkeepers,
Tavernkeepers and Proprietors of Establishments. — In
default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers,
tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution
of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses
from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the
directions which such innkeeper or his representative
may have given them with respect to the care of and
vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s
employees.
ARTICLE 103. Subsidiary Civil Liability of Other
Persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any
kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees
in the discharge of their duties.
PARENTS AND OTHER PERSONS EXERCISING
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF MINORS IN CIVIL
LAW
Basis of Liability
The basis of liability of parents for the acts or
omissions of their minor children is the parental
authority that they exercise over them.
It imposes upon them the duty of supporting
their children, keeping them in their company
and educating them in proportion to their
means.
They have the right to correct and punish their
children in moderation.
Fuellas v. Cadano G.R. No. L-14409 (1961)
FACTS:
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-
appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old. 
They were classmates at St. Mary's High School. One
afternoon while Pepito was studying his lessons in the
classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto
Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket
of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the
pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act
which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and
pushed him to the floor. A teacher separated the two
and ordered  them to go home. 
When Pepito had just gone down from the
schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry
mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to
shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico.
Instead of accepting the proffer to shake hands, Rico
held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito
out of balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito
fell on his right side with his right arm under his body,
whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was
in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out "My arm is
broken." Rico then got up and went away. That same
evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General
Hospital for treatment. An X-Ray taken showed that
there was a complete fracture of the radius and ulna of
the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting. 
For serious physical injuries sustained by Pepito
Cadano, son of plaintiff-appellee Elpidio Cadano, two
separate actions were instituted, Civil Case No. 583 for
damages against Agapito Fuellas, father of the minor
Rico Fuellas, who caused the injuries, and Criminal
Case No. 1765, against Rico Fuellas, for serious
physical injuries. They were tried jointly.
RTC RULING: A judgment of conviction in the criminal
case was rendered, finding Rico Fuellas guilty of the
Page 6 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
offense charged. No pronouncement as to his civil
liability was made, the trial judge having ruled that the
same "shall be determined in Civil Case No. 583. The
same court rendered judgment in the civil case  liable
under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code for damages.  that the civil liability of the minor son of the defendant
CA RULING: The petitioner-appellant was ordered to
pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his
son; that the said court held the petitioner liable
pursuant to par. 2, of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in
connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code.
FUELLAS’ DEFENSE: The minor-Fuellas having been
convicted of serious physical injuries at the age of 13,
the provisions of par. 3 of Art. 12, Revised Penal Code,
could have been applied, but having acted with
discernment, Art. 101 of the same Code can not
include him.  In cases of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of
Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an
imbecile or insane person and by a person under nine
years of age or by one over nine but under fifteen
years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall
devolve upon those having such person under their
legal authority or control, unless it appears that there
was no fault or negligence on their part", the appellant
concluded that this provision covers only a situation
where a minor under 15 but over 9 years old commits a
criminal act "without discernment.”
ISSUE:
Whether Agapito Fuellas (father of the minor
defendant) can be held liable for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. — YES.
RULING:
In the case of Araneta vs. Arreglado, the Court applied
the same principle. In this case, the parents of Dario  because it only covers obligations which arise from
Arreglado who was indicted by frustrated homicide,
was sentenced to pay damages and attorney’s fees.
The decision was predicated upon the fact that
Arreglado's father had acted negligently in allowing his
son to have access to the pistol used to injure the
victim. And this was the logical consequence of the
case, considering the fact that the civil law liability
under Article 2180 is not respondeat superior but the
relationship of pater familias which bases the liability of
the father ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his minor son, and that if an injury is caused by
the fault or negligence of his minor son, the law
presumes that there was negligence on the part of his
father.  on the evidence submitted therein by both parties,
In the Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, the
defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo
Balce, below 18 years of age who was living with him.
Gumersindo was found guilty of homicide for having
killed Carlos Salen, minor son of plaintiffs. The trial
court rendered judgment dismissing the case, stating
arising from his criminal liability must be determined
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and
not under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. The SC
reversed the decision of the trial court on the
following grounds:
“It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal
Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts
committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile,
an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15
years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it
appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part.
This is because a son who commits the act under any
of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal
liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised
Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely
unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the
person who has the delinquent minor under his legal
authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts
with discernment is not exempt from criminal
liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the
subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand
convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the
general law which is our Civil Code.” 
The particular law that governs this case is Article
2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: 'The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for damages caused by the
minor children who lived in their company.' To hold
that this provision does not apply to the instant case
quasi delicts and not obligations which arise from
criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that
while for an act where mere negligence intervenes
the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable
for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability
would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the
Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular
provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from
some recent decisions of this Court which cover
equal or identical cases.
The case at bar was also decided by the CA based
independently of the criminal case. And as
responsibility for fault or negligence under Article
2176 upon which the action in the present case was
Page 7 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability, arising from fault or negligence under
the Penal Code (Art. 2177).
Persons Liable
Liability based on parental authority is not limited
to parents; the same is also imposed on those
exercising substitute parental authority, like the
adopter and a court-appointed guardian.
It should be noted that parents have the
natural right and duty over the person and
property of their unemancipated children.
Rodriguez-Luna v. IAC G.R. No. L-62988 (1985)
FACTS:
On January 18, 1970, a go-kart driven by Roberto
Luna, a business executive and a go-kart driven by Luis
Dela Rosa, a minor who had no license, collided at the
go-kart practice area in Greenhills. Roberto Luna was
killed in the collision. 
The heirs of Luna filed a suit for damages against Luis
Dela Rosa and his father Jose Dela Rosa with the CFI of
Manila. 
RTC RULING: The trial court ordered the defendants
to pay the heirs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned
net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, and P60,000.00 for the loss of
his companionship, with legal interest from the date of
this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of
P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. 
CA RULING: The defendants appealed to the CA
which affirmed the decision of the trial court but
ordered the defendants to pay within thirty (30) days
from notice the following amounts adjudged against
them: P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the
deceased; (P12,000.00 as compensatory damages;
P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship with legal
interest from July 3, 1973; and P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees. Both parties appealed for review of the
appellate court’s decision.
Jose and Luis Dela Rosa failed to pay the amounts and
said they had no cash money when required to
explain.  years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
The Supreme Court directed the trial court to issue a
writ of execution but the attempt of the special sheriff
to enter the respondent's premises so that he could
make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted
by guards and this Court had to direct the Chief of the
Philippine Constabulary to assist in enforcing the writ
of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal
amount. 
In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married
with two children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an
uncle but only casually employed. It is said: "His
compensation is hardly enough to support his family.
He has no assets of his own as yet. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Dela Rosa’s liability as the father
of Luis should only be subsidiary in the light of Luis
being of legal age and married. — NO.
RULING:
Respondents invoke the ruling in Elcano vs. Hill where
it was held that Art. 2180 applied to Atty. Marvin Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald Hill his son but since Reginald had attained
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had
become merely subsidiary to that of his son. 
Respondent Jose dela Rosa argues that since Luis dela
Rosa, is now married and of legal age, as a matter of
equity the liability as father should be subsidiary only.
The SC is unwilling to apply equity instead of strict
law in this case because to do so will not serve the
ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond
the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does
not have any property either in the Philippines or
elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to
support his family. 
Effect of Absence of Parents
ARTICLE 216. In default of parents or a judicially
appointed guardian, the following person shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child in
the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one
years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child’s actual custodian, over twenty-one
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over
the property of the child becomes necessary, the same
order of preference shall be observed.
Page 8 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
Scope of Liability
Their liability for the acts of their children extends
to both negligent acts and intentional acts.
Nature of Liability
Both parents are primarily liable for the damages
caused by their child.
Libi v. IAC G.R. No. 70890 (1992)
FACTS:
For more than 2 years before their deaths, Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
December 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell
after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
During the first and second weeks of January 1979,
Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for
reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal,
prompting the former to resort to threats against her.
In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of
her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria
Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from
January 7 to 13, 1978.
 
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died,
each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the
same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in
the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the
residence of private respondents.
 
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the
circumstances surrounding the death of both minors,
their parents posited respective theories drawn from
their interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available
reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
 
Private respondents submitted that Wendell caused
her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firearm
and thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit
suicide. Petitioners rejected the imputation and
contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell
may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his
work as a narcotics informer of CANU, must have
caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to
eliminate any witness.
 
As a result of the tragedy, spouses Gotiong filed a case
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages
arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Art.
2180, CC with CFI Cebu.
 
CFI RULING: Dismissed the case for insufficiency of
evidence.
IAC RULING: On appeal, the IAC set aside the lower
court’s judgment and ruled in favor of spouses
Gotiong.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 2180, CC was correctly interpreted
by IAC to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
— YES.
RULING:
Petitioners claim that they had exercised due diligence
of a good father of a family, hence, they should not be
civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor
son. However, such defense is not borne out by the
evidence on record.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell,
testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun
which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer
in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key
to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is always in
her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell.
They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using
the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful
night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.
The Court, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious
doubts that petitioner spouses had really been
exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by
safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not
have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the
safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or
he had free access to the bag of his mother where the
other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by
law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a
large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the
child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as
parents in not diligently supervising the activities of
their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much
so that it was only at the time of Wendell's death that
they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent
and that Cresencio's gun was missing from the safety
deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their
duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the
activities of their children who, for all they know, may
be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug
informers, or even drug users. Neither was a plausible
explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with
a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back
thereof, holding upright what clearly appears as a
Page 9 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
revolver and on how or why he was in possession of
that firearm.
The Court agreed with the conclusion of IAC that
petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability
based on what appears from all indications was a crime
committed by their minor son. However, it clarified the
portion of its decision where it cited Fuellas v. Cadano,
which held that the liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children under Art. 2180, CC as
being subsidiary and not primary in nature. This stems
from the Court’s concern that if liability of parents for
crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is
subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be
absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted
with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability is
imputed to parents is considered direct and primary,
that diligence would constitute as a valid and
substantial defense.
The Court held that under the civil liability of
parents under Art. 2180, CC is primary and not
subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Art. 2194 which
provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the
persons responsible for the act or omission, in this
case the minor and the father and, in case of his
death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and
not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Art.
2180 provides that "the responsibility treated of in
this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages.”
Also, the liability of the parents for felonies
committed by their minor children is likewise
primary, not subsidiary. Art. 101, RPC provides: “…
the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person
under nine years of age, or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such
person under their legal authority or control, unless
it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part.”
Accordingly, just like the rule in Art. 2180, CC under
the foregoing provision the civil liability of the
parents for crimes committed by their minor
children is likewise direct and primary, and also
subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence
on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of
a good father of a family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents
primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by
the corresponding provisions in both codes that the
minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond
with his own property only in the absence or in case of
insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi
delicto of minors, Art. 2182, CC states that "if the
minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the
minor…shall be answerable with his own property in an
action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be
appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an
equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of
Art. 101, RPC, to wit: "Should there be no person
having such…minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent,
said…minor shall respond with (his) own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with civil law.”
On the issue of civil liability of parents for crimes
committed by their minor children (a) over 9 but under
15 years of age, who acted with discernment, (b) and
those 15 years of age or over, since these situations are
not covered by Art. 101, RPC, both instances should
be resolved in accordance with Art. 2180, CC. To hold
that the civil liability under Art. 2180 would apply only
to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would
result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere
negligence the parents would be liable but not where
the damage is caused with criminal intent.
NOTE: On IAC’s reliance on Fuellas case - it was not
exactly accurate to say Fuellas provided for subsidiary
liability of the parents therein. What the respondent
court quoted verbatim was the syllabus on the law
report of said case which spoke of subsidiary liability.
However, such categorization does not specifically
appear in the text of the decision.
Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we
hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their
legal authority or control, or who live in their company,
unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Art. 101, RPC with respect to damages ex
delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or
under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted
without discernment; and, with regard to their children
over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with
discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of
Page 10 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Under said Art. 2180, the enforcement of such liability
shall be effected against the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by
the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that
the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of
her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the
liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative
or family friend of the youthful offender. However,
under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without
such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over
the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-
delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply
in accordance with Art. 2180 and 2182, as so modified.
Other Requirements
Under existing laws, there is no longer any
instance when a minor may be emancipated
before he reaches the age of majority (18 years
old).
The liability of parents and other persons
exercising parental authority is present only if
the child is living in their company.
LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF CHILDREN OF
MAJORITY AGE
Parents or guardians can still be held liable even
if the minor is already emancipated by reaching
the age of 18 provided that he is below 21 years
of age.
Parents are still being made liable because
they are persons who are financially capable of
satisfying any judgment obligation.
The fact that they no longer exercise parental
authority, the age of the actor and his level of
maturity are circumstances that should be
considered in determining the degree of
diligence required of the parents.
CIVIL LIABILITY OF PARENTS EX DELICTO
Children 15 years and below
Persons exercising parental authority are liable for
the civil liability of minors who are 15 years and
under without need to determine if the minors
who are over 9 but under 15 acted with
discernment.
All minors who are 15 years and below are
conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment. (Sec. 6, RA 9344)
Art. 101 RPC therefore applies in relation to
Art. 221 FC without need to determine if the
offender acted with discernment.
Children over 15 years but below 18
Persons who are exercising legal authority are
primarily liable for acts of their children who are
over 15 years but under 18 who acted with
discernment.
“Children in Conflict with the Law”
If the minor who is over 15 did not act with
discernment, the liability can also be imposed
under Art. 221 FC.
Children below 21
Parents and guardians are likewise primarily liable
for acts of their children who are above 15 but
under 21 years of age under Art. 2180 CC.
Defense of Exercise of Due Diligence
Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority can escape liability by proving that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
Their fault or negligence is presumed from that
which accompanied the causative act or
omission although the presumption is merely
prima facie.
Cuadra v. Monfort G.R. No. L-24101 (1970)
FACTS:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort,
13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini
Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962
their teacher assigned them, together with three other
classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises.
While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a
plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly
worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said
aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently
to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At
Page 11 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
that precise moment the latter turned around to face
her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting
from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated
it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye
became swollen and it was then that the girl related
the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to
a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical
operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4,
1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-
three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum
of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however,
Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her
right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents
in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso
Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant
was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
ISSUE:
Whether Morfort’s father is liable under Arts. 2176 and
2180. — NO.
RULING:
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.    attributed to her parents.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article
2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act
or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to
cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is
that of one person for whom another is responsible,
the latter then becomes himself liable under Article
2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such
as that of the father or the mother under the
circumstances above quoted. The basis of this
vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article
2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that
which accompanied the causative act or omission. The
presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore
be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that
may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180,
which states "that the responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of
defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the
defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence
contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in
connection with a particular act or omission of a minor
child, especially when it takes place in his absence or
outside his immediate company? Obviously there can
be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and
when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a
good father of the family to prevent damage," it
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances
in every individual case, to determine whether or not
by the exercise of such diligence the damage could
have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it
may be inferred that the defendant could have
prevented the damage by the observance of due
care, or that he was in any way remiss in the
exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On
the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his
duty to send her and where she was, as he had the
right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which
caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent
prank not unusual among children at play and which no
parent, however careful, would have any special reason
to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal
any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the
child's character which would reflect unfavorably on
her upbringing and for which the blame could be
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration
and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the
defendant is at all obligated to compensate her
suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction
enforceable in court, but only the moral compulsion of
good conscience.
LIABILITY OF GUARDIANS OF INCAPACITATED
ADULTS
Guardian — a person in whom the law has
entrusted the custody and control of the person
or estate or both of infant, insane, or other
persons incapable of managing his own affair.
The word incompetent includes the following:
1. persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction;
2. hospitalized lepers;
3. prodigals;
Page 12 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
4. deaf and dumb who are unable to read
and write;
5. those who are of unsound mind, even
though they have lucid intervals;
6. persons not being of sound mind, but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind; and
7. other similar cause who cannot, without
aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy
prey for deceit and exploitation. (Sec. 2
Rule 92, ROC)
ARTICLE 38.  Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state
of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction
are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not
exempt the incapacitated person from certain
obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements.
ARTICLE 39.  The following circumstances, among
others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. x x x
NOTE: Not all guardians of incompetents are
vicariously liable.
In Art. 101 RPC, liability is imposed only on
guardians of imbecile and insane persons.
Art. 2180 CC limits the liability of guardians to
acts of incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and who live in their company.
SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, AND
ADMINISTRATORS
VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE FAMILY
CODE
ARTICLE 218. The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child are shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child while
under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution.
Persons Liable
The persons liable under the FC are the school,
administrators, teachers or the individual, entity
or institution engaged in child care.
This is without distinction if it is a non-academic
or academic school.
Administrators include the principal and other
persons who are involved in the supervision of
the child.
Ex. day-care centers, establishments found in
shopping malls that charge on a per hour basis
for taking care of children
If the school is being sued together with
administrators and teachers, the liability is joint
and solidary.
St. Joseph’s College v. Miranda G.R. No. 182353
(2010)
FACTS:
On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the
afternoon inside St. Joseph College's (SJC) premises,
the class to which respondent Jayson Val Miranda
belonged was conducting a science experiment about
fusion of sulphur powder and iron filings under the
tutelage of petitioner Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the
subject teacher and employee of petitioner SJC. The
adviser of Jayson's class is Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment
without having adequately secured it from any
untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the
experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of
one of the class groups, checked the result of the
experiment by looking into the test tube with
magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one
of his group mates who moved it close and towards
the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in
the test tube spurted out and several particles of which
hit Jayson's eye and the different parts of the bodies of
some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson's
eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye,
for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend
for his medication.
Jayson and his parents suffered sleepless nights,
mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his
injury due to petitioners’ fault and failure to exercise
the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each
one of them. Also, Jayson sent a demand letter to
petitioners for the payment of his medical expenses as
Page 13 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the
latter failed to heed. Hence, Jayson was constrained to
file the complaint for damages. Petitioners, therefore,
should likewise compensate Jayson for litigation
expenses, including attorney’s fees.
RTC RULING: The RTC ruled in favor of Jason,
prompting petitioners to file an appeal to the CA.
CA RULING: The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that
Jayson’s injury was his own doing. — NO.
RULING:
In this case, petitioners failed to show that the
negligence of Jayson was the proximate cause of the
latter's injury. We find that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of Jayson when he
curiously looked into the test tube when the chemicals
suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the
sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals
independent of any intervening cause. Petitioners
could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a
higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The court
a quo correctly ruled that:
"All of the petitioners are equally at fault and are liable
for negligence because all of them are responsible for
exercising the required reasonable care, prudence,
caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the
students. The individual petitioners are persons
charged with the teaching and vigilance over their
students as well as the supervision and ensuring of
their well-being. Based on the facts presented before
this Court, these petitioners were remiss in their
responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance
expected of them. Petitioner subject teacher Rosalinda
Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class
undertook the science experiment although Jayson
insisted that said petitioner left the classroom. No
evidence, however, was presented to establish that
petitioner Tabugo was inside the classroom for the
whole duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in
the ordinary course of events that Jayson was brought
to the school clinic for immediate treatment not by
petitioner subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by
somebody else. The Court was inclined to believe that
petitioner subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the
classroom at the time the accident happened. The
Court is also perplexed why none of the other students
(who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in
Court to corroborate the story of the petitioners. The
Court, however, understands that these other students
cannot testify for Jayson because Jayson is no longer
enrolled in said school and testifying for Jayson would
incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is
equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in
charge because she exercised control and supervision
over [petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves.
It was her obligation to insure that nothing would go
wrong and that the science experiment would be
conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the
students. Petitioner Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise
culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility
because the other individual petitioners were under
her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts
of the other individual petitioners were done within the
scope of their assigned tasks.
Petitioners' negligence and failure to exercise the
requisite degree of care and caution is demonstrated
by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to
avert damage and injury to its students although it
had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments conducted by the students
during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to
protect the students who conduct experiments in
class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears
and devices, specifically goggles, to shield
students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the
whole time her class conducted the experiment,
specifically, when the accident involving Jayson
occurred. In any event, the size of the class--fifty
(50) students-- conducting the experiment is
difficult to monitor.
Subsidiary Liability of Parents
The parents are only subsidiary liable because
persons exercising special parental authority
replace the primary authority of the parents when
the minor is under their custody.
Although parental authority remains, the parent
is not supposed to interfere with the discipline
of the school nor with the authority and
supervision of the teacher while the child is
under instruction.
Page 14 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
Supervision, Instruction, or Custody
The responsibility and authority of the school and
other persons exercising special parental
authority shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution.
Amadora v. CA G.R. No. L-47745 (1988)
FACTS:
On April 13, 1972 while they were in the auditorium of
their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes,
Alfredo Amadora was shot by a classmate, Pablito
Daffon, with a gun that mortally hit him. The victim was
only seventeen years old. Daffon was convicted of
homicide thru reckless imprudence.  institution of learning. — YES.
Petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action
for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector,
the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other
students, through their respective parents. The
complaint against the students was later dropped.  1. The provision in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
The petitioners contend that their son was in the
school to finish his physics experiment as a prerequisite
to his graduation on April 16, 1972; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private respondents. The
private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had
gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting
his physics report and that he was no longer in their
custody because the semester had already ended.
It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7,
1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys,
confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol
but later returned it to him without making a report to
the principal or taking any further action. The
petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that
had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son
would not have been killed if it had not been returned
by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that there
is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that
killed Alfredo.
CFI RULING: held the remaining defendants liable to
the plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing
death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of
litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees.  enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
CA RULING: reversed the decision and all the
defendants were absolved. CA found that Article 2180
was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. It also held that the
students were not in the custody of the school at the
time of the incident as the semester had already
ended, that there was no clear identification of the fatal
gun, and that in any event the defendants had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the
injury.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code
covers even establishments which are technically
not school of arts and trades but an academic
2. Whether or not Alfredo Amadora was within the
school’s custody even if the semester had already
ended. — YES.
3. Whether or not the remaining respondents are
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. — NO.
RULING:
should apply to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility
for the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge of such student, following the
first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In
other words, teachers in general shall be liable for
the acts of their students except where the school
is technical in nature, in which case it is the head
thereof who shall be answerable. There is really no
substantial distinction between the academic and
the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The
same vigilance is expected from the teacher over
the students under his control and supervision,
whatever the nature of the school where he is
teaching.
2. The student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has
already ended. As long as it can be shown that the
student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment
of a legitimate student right, and even in the
responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. 
Page 15 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
3. The rector, the high school principal and the dean
of boys cannot be held liable because none of
them was the teacher-in-charge as previously
defined. Each of them was exercising only a
general authority over the student body and not
the direct control and influence exerted by the
teacher placed in charge of particular classes or
sections and thus immediately involved in its
discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending
student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora
had gone to school that day in connection with his
physics report did not necessarily make the physics
teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-
in-charge of Alfredo's killer. On the contrary, the
private respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence, through the enforcement
of the school regulations, in maintaining that
discipline. The dean of boys cannot be linked to
the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown
that the confiscated and returned pistol was the
gun that killed the petitioners' son.   him but he was not revived, so he was immediately
In any event, it should be noted that the liability
imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly
on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades and not on the school itself. The teacher is
held answerable by the law for the act of the
student under him regardless of the student's age.
If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be
held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of
the head thereof under the general principle of
respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate
itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. Such defense is,
of course, also available to the teacher or the head
of the school of arts and trades directly held to
answer for the tort committed by the student. As
long as the defendant can show that he had taken
the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, he can exonerate himself from the
liability imposed by Article 2180.
Palisoc v. Brillantes G.R. No. L-29025 (1971)
FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their 16-year old son,
Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive
mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute, Manila,
had filed on an action for damages arising from the
death of their son at the hands of a fellow student,
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of
the said Institute. Defendants are: "Brillantes, at the
time when the incident which gave rise to his action
occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of
the institute; Valenton, the president; Quibulue,
instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged;
and Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased.
The foregoing is the substance of the testimony of
Desiderio Cruz, the lone witness to the incident: The
deceased Palisoc and the defendant Daffon were
classmates. They, together with another classmate,
Cruz, were in the laboratory room during recess. Cruz
and Daffon were working on a machine while Palisoc
was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark
to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman.
Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon
on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong
flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist
blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to
avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both
exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine
block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc
became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to
taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness;
finally he died. 
The postmortem findings of Dr. Singian of the Manila
Police Department who performed the autopsy re
"Cause of death: shock due to traumatic fracture of
theribs (6th and 7th, left, contusion of the pancreas
and stomach with intra-gastric hemorrhage and slight
subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his
testimony incfers that these internal injuries of the
deceased were caused "probably by strong fist blows.”
CFI RULING: found defendant Daffon liable for the
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code;
however, absolved from liability the three other
defendant officials of the Manila Technical Institute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in absolving
defendants-school officials instead of holding them
jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors with defendant
Daffon, for the damages awarded as a result of son’s
death. — YES.
RULING:
The case at bar was instituted directly against the
school officials and squarely raises the issue of liability
of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180,
Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and
students against fellow students on the school
premises. 
Page 16 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and
students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that
they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and
students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
"exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles
349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. In the law of
torts, the governing principle is that the protective
custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of
the school itself to provide proper supervision of
the students' activities during the whole time that
they are at attendance in the school, including
recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody
from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be
anticipated, including injuries that some student
themselves may inflict willfully or through
negligence on their fellow students.
As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his
dissenting opinion in Exconde vs. Capuno, "the basis
of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now
2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the
exercise of their authority" and "where the parent
places the child under the effective authority of the
teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the
one answerable for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason that the parent is not
supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school
nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher
while the child is under instruction." The school itself,
likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of
its school head and teachers under the same cited
article.
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving
defendants-school officials on the ground that they
could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code,
only if the student who inflicted the fatal fist blows on
his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendants officials of the school."
The phrase used in the cited article is — "so long as
(the students) remain in their custody"- means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and
its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time. There is nothing in the
law that requires that for such liability to attach the
pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live
and board in the school, as erroneously held by the
lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in
Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to
have been set aside by the present decision.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE NEW CIVIL
CODE
Rules Under Article 2180
Teachers and heads are liable for acts of
students and apprentices whether the latter are
minors or not.
The teacher-in-charge is liable for the acts of
his students. The school and administrators are
not liable.
By way of exception. it is only the head of the
school, not the teacher, who is held liable
where the injury is caused in a school of arts
and trade.
The liability of the teacher subsists whether the
school is academic or non-academic.
Liability is imposed only if the pupil is already
in the custody of the teacher or head. The
student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control
and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet
begun or has already ended.
Pasco v. CFI G.R. No. L-54357 (1988)
FACTS:
On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, petitioner, together with two companions,
while walking inside the campus of the private
respondent Araneta University, after attending classes
in said university, was accosted and mauled by a group
of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias
"Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of the
Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently
stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was
hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU)
Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his life.
On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father
Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against
Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private respondent
Gregorio Araneta University which was docketed as
Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as
a party defendant based on the aforementioned
provision of the Civil Code.
Page 17 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
Respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
following grounds:
1. The penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code under which it was sued applies
only to vocational schools and not to academic
institutions;
2. That every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code. Hence, the civil liability in this case
arises from a criminal action which the defendant
university has not committed;
3. Since this is a civil case, a demand should have
been made by the plaintiff, hence, it would be
premature to bring an action for damages against
defendant University.
CFI RULING: issued an Order granting said Motion to
Dismiss. Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of
Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on the
ground that there is no sufficient justification to disturb
its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition for certiorari
under Republic Act No. 5440, praying that judgment
be rendered setting aside the questioned order of May
12, 1980 dismissing the complaint as against
respondent school and the order of July 17, 1980
denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of
dismissal, with costs against respondent school.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the university or school is liable under
Art. 2180. — NO.
RULING:
We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of
the Article to educational institutions (which are not
schools of arts and trades) for the issue in this petition
is actually whether or not, under the article, the school
or the university itself (as distinguished from the
teachers or heads) is liable. We find the answer in the
negative, for surely the provision concerned speaks
only of "teachers or heads."
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed
as the basis for the liability of the school as the
employer for the failure of its teachers or school heads
to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute
parents. Herrera, J. concurring (Amadora et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-47745, citing
Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages, 1978 ed.,
p. 201).
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent.
As stated by him, my view is that while the educational
institution is not directly liable, yet the school, as the
employer, may be held liable for the failure of its
teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory
legal duties as substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil
Code). The school, however, may exculpate itself from
liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence
of a good father of the family.
Salvosa v. IAC G.R. No. 70458 (1988)
FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an
academic institution. Within the premises of the BCF is
an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation
Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is
under the full control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The ROTC Unit, by way of accomodation
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), pursuant
to Department Order No. 14, Series of 1975 of the
Department of Education and Culture, is provided by
the BCF an office and an armory located at the
basement of its main building. 
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had
Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy B. Abon received his
appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of
the BCF, he also received his salary from the AFP, as
well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the
Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation
ROTC Unit, concurrent Commandant of other ROTC
units in Baguio and an employee (officer) of the AFP.
Jimmy B . Abon was also a commerce student of the
BCF. 
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking
space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a
student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed
firearm which the former took from the armory of the
ROTC Unit of the BCF.11 As a result, Napoleon Castro
died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and
convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP.12 Subsequently, the heirs of
Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy
B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant),
Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the
Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President
of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of
Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the
Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc. as party defendants
RTC RULING: The Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin
Page 18 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly
and severally.
CA RULING: On appeal by petitioners, the respondent
Court affirmed with modification with regard to the
monetary award  the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not  petitioners can be held solidarity liable
with Jimmy B.Abon for damages under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of
Jimmy B. Abon. — NO.
RULING:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades are liable for “damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.” The rationale of such liability
is that so long as the student remains in the custody of
a teacher, the latter “stands, to a certain extent, in loco
parentis [as to the student] and is called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of
the student.” Likewise, “the phrase used in [Art. 2180
—‘so long as (the students) remain in their custody’
means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the
pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not “at
attendance in the school” cannot be in “recess”
thereat. A “recess,” as the concept is embraced in the
phrase “at attendance in the school,” contemplates a
situation of temporary adjournment of school activities
where the student still remains within call of his mentor
and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or
the area within which the school activity is conducted.
Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in
the premises of a school without more does not
constitute “attending school” or being in the
“protective and supervisory custody” of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that
Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been “at
attendance in the school,” or in the custody of BCF,
when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore,
petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be
held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages
resulting from his acts.
Besides, the record shows that before the shooting
incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant,
AFP, had instructed Jimmy B. Abon “not to leave the
office and to keep the armory well guarded.” Apart
from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under
the custody of the school when he committed the act
for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable,
this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was
supposed to be working in the armory with definite
instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant,
when he shot Napoleon Castro.
OTHER BASES OF LIABILITY OF SCHOOLS
Liability of schools include:
1. Liability for quasi-delict under Art. 2176 CC;
2. Vicarious liability as the entity exercising
special parental authority under Art. 2180 CC
and Art. 219 FC;
3. Vicarious liability as employer under Art. 2180
CC;
4. Liability based on contract under the CC;
5. Liability for abuse of right and acts contra
bonus mores under Arts. 19 and 21 CC; and
6. Vicarious liability under Art. 101 RPC.
Liability of School as Employer
The school can escape liability if it can establish
that it exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees (including
teachers) under Art. 2180 CC.
Liability of Schools Based on Contract
The school, as a contracting party, may be held
liable even if a non-student inflicted the injury.
In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding
right of relief.
Part of the obligation of the school is to
provide a safe campus and there is prima facie
proof of breach of contract if an outsider injures
the student.
Page 19 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE
Soliman v. Hon. Tuazon G.R. No. 66207 (1992)
FACTS:
Soliman, the petitioner, was in the campus grounds
and premises of Republic Central Colleges as he was
still a regular enrolled student taking his classes, while
Solomon, the defendant, was also on the said premises
performing his duties as a security guard under the
employment and supervision of R.L. Security Agency,
Inc., headed by Mr. Serrano attacked, assaulted, struck
and shot Soliman in the abdomen with a .38 Caliber
Revolver. Soliman was rushed and treated at Angeles
Medical Center, Angeles City . He was advised that he
will not be able to attend his classes and will be
incapacitated for a duration of 3-4 months before his
wounds be completely healed.
Soliman filed a civil complaint for damages against
Republic Central Colleges, R.L. Security Agency and
Solomon.
Colleges contends that they are free from any liability
for injuries sustained by Soliman for the reason that the
school was not the employer of Solomon. It added that
Art. 2180(7) of the Civil Code did not apply, since said
paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment
of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, while security
guard Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice
of the school.  student had been injured by one who was an
RTC RULING: Ruled in favor of Colleges and dismissed
the complaint on grounds that Solomon was not an
employee of the school which accordingly could not
be held liable for his acts or omissions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not colleges should be held liable under
Art. 1280 of the Civil Code. — NO.
RULING:
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to
respond for damage inflicted by one against another
by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act
or omission, but also for acts or omissions of a person
for whom one is by law responsible. Among the
persons held vicariously responsible for acts or
omissions of another person are the following:
1. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helper, acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
2. Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody. 
The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for
holding the Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful
acts of security guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman,
Jr., Colleges was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon.
The employer of Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency
Inc., while the school was the client or customer of the
R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is settled that where the
security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the
work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is
the employer of such guards or watchmen.  Liability for
illegal or harmful acts committed by the security
guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to
the clients or customers of such agency. 
Since there is no question that Solomon was not a
pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he
being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency
Inc., the other above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180
of the Civil Code is similarly not available for imposing
liability upon the Republic Central Colleges for the acts
or omissions of Solomon.
In the case of PSBA v. CA, the Court held that Article
2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a
outsider or by one over whom the school did not
exercise any custody or control or supervision. At
the same time, however, the court stressed that an
implied contract may be held to be established
between a school which accepts students for
enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who
are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract
results in obligations for both parties. However, in
the interest of justice, Soliman must be allowed to
prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of the Colleges.
Hence, the Court remand the case to the respondent
judge in order to avoid the possible substantial
miscarriage of justice.
Liability of School Based on Quasi-Delict
Even in the absence or presence of contract, the
school may still be liable as employer under Art.
2176.
The two basis of liability — contract and quasi-
delict — may even concur; in which case, the
injured student may choose to file an action for
Page 20 of 21
 TORTS MODULE 4 / PERSONS LIABLE

breach of contract or for quasi-delict subject

only to the proscription against double
recovery.

Liability in the Exercise of Special Parental

Authority
The school and other persons exercising special
parental authority may be liable for their failure to
exercise due diligence in the performance of the
duties that are concomitant with the exercise of
special parental authority.
There is a corresponding responsibility to take
care of the minor student with the diligence of
a good father of a family.
There is a duty of the school to provide the
students with adequate security and safe
facilities.
If due care is not exercised, damages may be
imposed under Arts. 19, 20, 21, and 2176 CC.

Liability of Teachers Under the Revised Penal

Code
Art. 103 provides that the subsidiary liability of
the employer under Art. 102 shall also apply to
teachers for felonies committed by their pupils.
Since the rule regarding employers shall apply,
the requirement of insolvency of the accused
as well as other elements is also applicable to
teachers.
Since there is no distinction, a teacher is liable
whether he is employed in an academic or non-
academic institution and whether the pupil is a
minor or not.

EMPLOYERS

OWNERS AND MANAGERS OF

ESTABLISHMENTS

STATE

Page 21 of 21