Horror and Hedonic Ambivalence

Author(s): MATTHEW STROHL

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 70, No. 2 (SPRING 2012), pp.
203-212
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42635518
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 MATTHEW STROHL

Horror and Hedonic Ambivalence

Audience members at an effective horror film of- these feelings, they tend to complain afterward. I
ten appear to react in much the same way as they call this type of horror 'exploitation horror' and
would if they were confronted with a terrifyingthe phenomenon of enjoying something that one
and disgusting situation outside the theater. They finds painful 'hedonic ambivalence.'
grimace, cower, dig their nails into their armrests, Let us distinguish two types of hedonic
cover their eyes, and plead in vain for someone to ambivalence:
make it stop. When they leave the theater, how-
ever, many of them speak of the experience they Weak ambivalence: taking pleasure in an experience that
just had with great enthusiasm and perhaps ex- has painful aspects.
press eagerness to return for more of the same.Strong ambivalence: taking pleasure in an experience
Indeed, fans of the genre often claim that their partly in virtue of its painful aspects.
enjoyment of a horror film depends on its effec-
tiveness in inducing fear and disgust. This is puz- Weak ambivalence is not the least bit puzzling. I
zling, since fear and disgust are presumed to be might enjoy hiking even though I have a painful
painful emotions, and yet we find people seek-blister on my foot, or I might enjoy watching a fre-
ing them out for the sake of enjoyment. The ap-netic action film even while it gives me a headache.
pearance that horror audiences sometimes enjoy Strong ambivalence, on the other hand, is a curi-
the ostensibly painful emotions of fear and disgustous phenomenon.3 It seems to be very common:
generates the problem known as the paradox of some enjoy agonizingly spicy food; some are eager
horror.1 to scream in terror on a roller coaster; some de-
I am particularly interested in an aspect of this light at having their hair assertively pulled during
problem that I do not think has been properly ap- sex. In each case, the subject's enjoyment is aug-
preciated: audiences in many cases seem to enjoy mented by the experience of a painful feeling.4
the experience of watching a horror film partly in The relation between the subject's enjoyment and
virtue of the painful character of their emotional the painful feeling might be complex and indi-
response. Pain is something that we are averse to rect- masochists, for instance, are presumably at-
by its very nature, and yet in certain contexts we tracted to painful sensations ultimately because
seem to be attracted to painful emotions as such. they enjoy the thought that pain is being inflicted
This issue arises more clearly in the case of hor- on them- but in each case the painful feeling is
ror than other genres that characteristically evoke welcomed by the subject, and its painful character
painful emotions, such as tragedy, because many as such makes an indispensable contribution to the
horror films have little ambition beyond deliver- particular form of enjoyment experienced. These
ing cheap enjoyment.2 There are, of course, many cases have the same structure as the case of hor-
excellent horror movies that display a high level ror: one finds oneself in certain contexts attracted
of artistic refinement, but there are also many to a feeling that outside such contexts one is cate-
slapdash displays of cruelty and gore. Audiences gorically averse to. Having one's hair pulled hurts.
attend such spectacles because they want to be People normally hate it when someone pulls their
scared and disgusted, and if a movie fails to evoke hair. Being in the middle of sex does not change

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70:2 Spring 2012

© 2012 The American Society for Aesthetics

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204 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

I do not mean
the way it feels to have one's hair to suggest
pulled.that anyone writing
It puts
about the
this feeling in a special type ofparadox of horrorwhere
context reflectively it
endorses
is
welcomed, but it does not thisalter its
theory of intrinsic
pleasure. char-
I do think, however, that
acter. Similarly, the sensation this theory ofpermeates folk conceptions
capsaicin on of theplea-
tongue would not be welcome sure and often
if one seems were
to be bound
not up with
eat- the
ing a certain type of food very
in language
certainwe use to talk about it. It is the de-
circumstances,
and the sensation of falling fault wayfrom
of thinkinga about
great height
pleasure, readily dis-
would not be somethingmissed one were
upon attracted
reflection to ques-
but rarely explicitly if
one did not feel safe in a roller coaster's restraints. tioned. I argue that in thinking about the paradox
It is not obvious how it is conceptually possible of horror we should replace this theory, call it the
for painful feelings to be attractive as such. Plea- Folk Theory, with a more plausible one. This cre-
sure and pain would seem to be naturally opposed; ates the possibility of solving the problem with-
the former is attractive and motivates pursuit out denying that horror audiences sometimes ex-
while the latter is aversive and motivates avoid- perience strong ambivalence. I do not have the
ance. Many philosophers who have written about ambition of settling the question of what plea-
the paradox of horror have directly addressed this sure is in this article, but I suggest that we should
issue, but all of them have ultimately denied that prefer some version of adverbialism to the Folk
enjoyment of horror can involve strong ambiva- Theory, and that the theory of pleasure that Aris-
lence.5 They have either denied that the painful totle presents in Nicomachean Ethics X.4-5 is a
character of fear and disgust can augment the strong candidate. I give an account of strong am-
enjoyment that audiences experience in connec- bivalence within an Aristotelian framework that
tion with horror or they have denied that these turns on the possibility of a pain being embed-
emotions are painful in cases where they augment ded within a pleasure. Finally, I argue that this
enjoyment. None of these philosophers have ex- account of strong ambivalence yields a ready ex-
plicitly questioned what is meant by 'pleasure' planation of how it is possible for horror audiences
or 'pain.' I suggest a diagnosis of the presump- to be attracted to aversive emotions like fear and
tion against strong ambivalence: it is due to disgust. the
vestigial assumption of aspects of an obviously This article proceeds in three stages. In Section
false theory of pleasure that is often associated I, I discuss past attempts to solve the paradox of
(perhaps unfairly) with early modern philosophy. horror, and argue that they fall short, at least in-
J. C. B. Gosling gives a useful summary of this sofar way as they fail to account for the possibility of
of understanding pleasure: strong ambivalence. In Section II, I suggest that
it is crucial to approach the problem by first con-
'Pleasure', then, is a word used to refer to a certain sidering
sort what pleasure and pain are, and I argue
that Aristotle's theory provides a very good start-
of feeling, identified by the way it feels, not by context.
Learning the word, therefore, is a matter of learning ing
topoint. In Section III, I present an Aristotelian
account of strong ambivalence and apply it to the
identify this feeling and distinguish it from others. In this
case of horror.
it resembles butterflies in the stomach. Unless a person
has had such a feeling and observed its peculiar feel, he
is very likely to misapply this description.6
I. PAST APPROACHES TO THE PARADOX OF HORROR

It is hard to see how this theory of pleasure could

allow for strong ambivalence. Pleasure is taken Past
to attempts to solve the paradox of horror
be a phenomenally characterized feeling or typebe of divided into two categories: those that see
negative emotions we experience when we e
feeling that we like; pain is taken to be a phenom-
enally characterized feeling or type of feeling that
gage with works of horror as a price we have
we do not like. It may be that we experience suchpay in order to reap other hedonic rewards a
feelings at the same time, or that the experiencethose that see these negative emotions as enj
of pain sometimes plays a causal role in comingable
to in their own right and try to cash out t
experience pleasure, but it does not even seem co-
sense in which they are negative such that it d
herent on this theory to say that one can enjoynotan imply that they are painful. Both approac
deny strong ambivalence: the former denies t
experience partly in virtue of its painful aspects.

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 Strohl Horror and Hedonic Ambivalence 205

negative emotions sense of how

are the emotion can be while
pleasant in a sense both the l
denies that they are pleasant
painful.and unpleasant, so that there is no need
Noël Carroll is in the former
to resort to the sweeping camp. He ar
and dubious empirical
that the claim that
hedonic
appeal ofhorror
the audiences
horror are alwaysgenre
making an li
in the experience of the relevant
introspective negative
error when they purport to enjoy the
tion (which he calls 'art-horror'),
emotions of fear and disgust.but rather
I now turn to views
gagement with the narrative that seek to explain
structure of howmy
negative emotionsfascination
and revelation, particularly can be pleasant rather than
with
ror monsters.7 Our painful negativein aesthetic contexts.
emotional These views mani- res
is collateral damage fest causedthe influenceby of thethe very
Folk Theory aspe
of pleasure
the monsters that fascinate in their assumptionus; that such
it experiences
makes mustno
tive hedonic contribution. Carroll's view has some be either pleasant or painful and in their neglect
explanatory power, but does not seem apt for ex- of strong ambivalence as an alternative possibil-
ploitation horror, particularly mindless, formulaic ity. Neill suggests that while fear and disgust are
slasher movies (for example, the Friday the 13th se- in some sense "negative" emotions, this does not
ries). These movies evoke no sense of mystery, justentail that they are painful for the person who ex-
some form of delight at seeing a familiar menace periences them.13 They are negative in the sense
slaughter a familiar set of teens in frightful and dis-that they involve the evaluation of an object of
gusting ways. It seems very clear that in such casesexperience as having some negative aspect, which
horror audiences welcome fear and disgust (thisdoes not entail that experiencing them is in itself
is certainly how they see it), rather than treatingnegative for the subject. The horror fan may pity
these emotions as drawbacks of their experience.8characters for the pain they are experiencing, but
Susan Feagin, Berys Gaut, and Alex Neill havethis does not entail that the experience of such pity
objected to Carroll along similar lines.9 All threeis painful for the horror fan, and so there is noth-
emphasize that there are strong empirical reasons ing problematic about enjoying it. Gaut points out
for thinking that audiences find the experience of that Neill's position cannot adequately distinguish
negative emotion in response to horror attractive sadism from pity: both involve a representation of
in its own right. Carroll attempts to defend hisanother's pain.14 Pity must be unpleasant or neg-
view by emphasizing that there seems to be some-ative in some way or other for the subject experi-
thing intrinsically unpleasant about the emotionencing it; it must involve the subject in some sense
of art-horror and by offering an error theory offeeling bad about, rather than delighting in, the
horror audiences' claims of enjoying it.10 He sug- suffering of another.
gests that when audiences claim not to enjoy a In his 1993 article "The Paradox of Horror,"
horror movie because it is not scary enough, theyGaut attempts to rehabilitate the basic style of
are making an introspective mistake and are in factview defended by Neill by adopting a holis-
disappointed with the movie because the monster tic, cognitivist theory of emotion.15 Whether one
is not fascinating enough.11 Similarly, when audi-counts as experiencing a given emotion depends
ences purport to enjoy the experience of fear andon whether one has a certain type of evaluative be-
disgust, they are mistaken; what they in fact enjoy lief. For example, one experiences fear when one
is fascination with the monster, and they incor-has the belief that something bad may happen.
rectly associate their enjoyment with the fear and One will undergo various physiological processes
disgust the monster evokes.12 Carroll's story mayand corresponding feelings in association with this
correctly describe some cases, but it is unaccept-belief, but they may vary a great deal from case
able as a universal account of our enjoyment of to case. The physiological responses and feelings
horror, insofar as it is an unfalsifiable (in any case,associated with the belief that one is in danger
untested) empirical hypothesis. Carroll motivates of falling from a great height will be very dif-
it as the alternative to the supposedly untenable ferent from those associated with the belief that
position of accepting both that art-horror is un-an extremist political candidate may be elected,
pleasant and that it is pleasant. It is only obvious but both experiences are recognizable as fear.16
that this position is untenable, however, if the Folk For a given emotion, there is a range of physi-
Theory of pleasure is assumed. My aim is to show ological responses and ways of feeling that tend
that an Aristotelian theory of pleasure can maketo accompany the relevant evaluative belief. For

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206 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

aspects (for example,

negative emotions, these feelings are exhilarating
typically suspense)
un- to be
outright
pleasant.17 This secures a pleasant, and so connection
conceptual experience weak ambiva-
lence. All
between, for example, grief and I am distress.
claiming is that, If
other
athings
cul- being
equal, we shouldthey
ture reported that the emotion prefer a solution that allows for
experience
in connection with the death of a loved one and the possibility of strong ambivalence, especially
given that in many cases horror fans' enjoyment
other forms of loss is typically very pleasant, then
we would not consider this emotion grief.18 Butappears to be directly proportionate to the extent
this does not entail that grief is never pleasant.to which they display aversion behavior. Gaut's
There may be exceptional cases where a personview may account for a wide range of cases, but it
has the relevant evaluative beliefs but for what- would be better to adopt a solution that can also
ever reason has an unusual affective reaction and account for the possibility of strong ambivalence.
feels pleasure instead of distress. Gaut's solution The only motivation I can see for denying this and
to the paradox of horror turns on this idea. The preferring a view like Gaut's is the assumption of
concepts of fear and disgust do not require that aspects of the Folk Theory that preclude strong
these emotions are always painful, just that they ambivalence.
are typically painful. Aesthetic contexts provide
the atypical background conditions under which
it is possible to pair the relevant evaluative beliefs
II. AN ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF PLEASURE AND PAIN

with atypical, pleasant ways of feeling. He wisely

leaves the task of explaining how and why these The Folk Theory of pleasure takes it to b
pleasant feelings arise in these cases to empirical nomenally characterized feeling or type of
psychology. The basis of the Folk Theory's intuitive
Gaut's story is in many ways compelling, but he seems to be the systematic confusion of
goes too far in claiming that it fully dissolves the with that which is pleasant. Feelings such
puzzle. It is not plausible to say that horror fans associated with an adrenaline rush or org
always experience straightforwardly enjoyable af- postworkout flood of endorphins are con
fective reactions in connection with fear and dis-by the Folk Theory to be pleasure. Reflecti
gust in cases where these emotions augment their ily reveals that these feelings are pleasant-
enjoyment. In many such cases, they display aver- they are paradigmatic examples of pleasa
ings-but they are not pleasure. Consider
sion behavior that strongly suggests that their af-
of cases that seem like uncontroversial instances
fective reactions are in some respects painful (for
example, covering one's eyes, tightly squeezing of a subject experiencing pleasure. In case 1, a
the hand of one's companion, grimacing, recoil- subject goes swimming on a hot afternoon and
enjoys the sensation of cool water. In case 2, a
ing, and so on).19 Indeed, horror fans often report
enjoying films that manage to induce such reac- subject enjoys a well-executed massage. In case 3,
tions more than otherwise comparable films that a subject gets up early in the morning, well rested
do not. The outward appearance is that audiences and highly focused, and proceeds to sit down and
sometimes experience strong ambivalence in their enjoy solving a difficult and engaging math prob-
emotional response to horror. Granting that there lem. In case 4, a subject raises a large amount of
is no necessary connection between fear and pain money for charity and enjoys the recognition of
having benefited others. In thinking about these
has the consequence that in principle it is possible
cases, it seems wildly implausible to suggest that
to experience fear without feeling pain, but it does
not help to explain the possibility of strong am- there is some one feeling or phenomenally similar
bivalence. I am not claiming that subjects always set of feelings that the subject experiences in all of
experience strong ambivalence when enjoying ex- them in virtue of which she counts as experienc-
ploitation horror. It may be that many hardened ing pleasure. Even just taking cases 1 and 2, which
genre fans are so desensitized that they do not
are both cases where what is enjoyed is a tactile
experience fear or disgust at horrific images, but sensation, it does not seem necessary that there
rather the unproblematic pleasure of connoisseur- be any phenomenal similarity at all between the
subjects' experiences.
ship. It may also be that less avid fans tend to find
aspects of the experience (for example, disgust at I question whether cases 3 and 4 need in-
gore) to be outright painful while finding other volve a feeling at all, let alone a feeling that is

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 Strohl Horror and Hedonic Ambivalence 207

phenomenally similaris tempting

to the to think of pleasure as reducing
feelings to
experien
attraction
in the first two cases. In case or noninstrumental
3, it seems desire.21 Reducing
plausible
suggest that the pleasure the
pleasure to desire is ansubject experien
unpromising strategy, be-
is simply an aspect of cause
her enjoyment does not seem
activity ofto depend on de-
thought. T
Folk Theory would say sire. One that
might loathethe
the smell subject
of durian fruit and expe
ences pleasure in virtue of the
wish desperately fact
never to taste it, but that
eat some on her
tivity of thought givesa dare and thoroughly
rise toenjoy it. Reducing
some pleasure of n
sort
feeling. This may be tothe attraction would seem
case into get
some the order instanc
of ex-
but when this happens, planation
the reversed:
subjectwe are attracted
is not to pleasant
enjoy
thinking , but rather experiences
a feeling because they
that are pleasant.
thinkingThere is gi
somethingan
rise to. I do not find this about apt
the character of a pleasant expe-
phenomenology
rience as such that Pleasant
the enjoyment of thinking. attracts us. The question should
activities
thought often involvebea what all pleasant
very experiences
high have in common
level of conc
tration and focus, and in their
it ownseemsright that grounds
that thistheir
attraction. pleas
character is bound up withCarolyn Korsmeyer,
this in her work on disgust as
concentration a
focus, not with somean peripheral
aesthetic response, has alsofeeling
recognized that ad- that
experiences at the same verbialism
time.about pleasure allows for a more nu-
Whether they have anced and plausible understanding
reflectively of our attrac-
endorsed it o
not, many philosophers tion to negative
have emotions
been in aesthetic contexts.22
heavily inf
enced by the Folk TheoryShe adopts the ofidea that enjoying something
pleasure. is a
Bentha
matter of being absorbed,
hedonic calculus, for instance, dependsfascinated, oron drawnthe i
in by it. We
that pleasure is a feeling withcan be absorbed
a certainby painful emo- degre
intensity that we can tional experiences, andby
multiply so the its
paradoxduration
of horror
is readily dissolved.
determine its quantitative While I am The
value. broadly sympa-
Folk T
thetic with
ory was not the subject of Korsmeyer's
much approach, I do not think exa
explicit
nation or criticism in the modern era until it was that the version of adverbialism she favors is plau-
attacked by Gilbert Ryle in the 1950s.20 Ryle re- sible as an analysis of pleasure. We can be ab-
jects the Folk Theory and suggests that enjoyment sorbed by experiences that we do not enjoy (for
is a species of attention. I do not think that thisexample, watching a Holocaust documentary, at-
tending a funeral) and we can enjoy experiences
is a very attractive account, since it seems that we
frequently experience peripheral or background that do not absorb us (for example, the peripheral
pleasures (such as the enjoyment of mild weather pleasures and pleasures of relaxation mentioned
while attending to a football game with great fo- above). The difference between ordinary experi-
cus), and also pleasures of relaxation, where our ences of fear and disgust that we are categorically
very lack of attention is pleasant. Ryle's work on averse to and experiences of these emotions in aes-
pleasure, however, is illuminating insofar as he re- thetic contexts that we are attracted to does not
places the question of what sort of discrete mental seem to lie primarily in the extent to which we are
phenomenon pleasure is with the question of what absorbed by them. We can be absorbed in either
it means to enjoy something or to do something type of experience, but our absorption has a posi-
with pleasure. This way of framing the issue leaves tive character in the aesthetic cases. It is in virtue
open the possibility that pleasure is an integral of this positive character, not in virtue of our ab-
feature or aspect of our experiences rather than sorption, that these experiences count as pleasant.
a separate feeling that they give rise to. Call the A satisfactory adverbial analysis of pleasure needs
view that the question of what pleasure is reduces to account for the positive character of pleasant
to the question of what it is to do something with experiences.
pleasure adverbialism about pleasure. I propose that the best attempt at an adverbial
It is a tall order to give an adverbial analysis analysis of pleasure that has been offered to date is
of pleasure that is sufficiently broad, but not vac- found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. We find
uous. Pleasure is a profoundly multifarious phe- in this text two long and highly nuanced discus-
nomenon. At first blush, the only thing that all sions of pleasure, at VII.11-14 and X.l-5. In X.4,
cases of pleasure have in common is that, other Aristotle presents his account of what pleasure
things being equal, we are attracted to them. It itself actually is.23 He writes:

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208 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Every perceptual capacity dition. In such cases,

is active in there is also a fit
relation to between
its per
subject andactive
ceptible object, and perfectly object, and the
whenfit is analogous
it is to the goo
in
fit between
condition in relation to the finest subject
of and object
its in the paradigm ob-
perceptual
jects. For this above all case.
seems to be the character o
When there
perfect activity, and it doesn't is a fit between
matter if thewe
condition of a
ascribe it t
the capacity or to the subject that
capacity and has
the object it.
it is Hence
active in relation for
to, the each
capacity the best activity resulting
is the activity is perfect,of
activity and therefore pleas-
the subject i
the best condition in relation to
ant. Aristotle the illustrates
famously best object of th
the relationship
between
capacity. This activity will be pleasure and activity
the most with a simile:and the
perfect
most pleasant.24 (1174bl4-20)
Pleasure perfects the activity- not, however, as the state
When a capacity for thought or
does, by being present perception
in (the activity), but as a sort of is i
a good condition and is activated
supervenient in relation
perfection [epiginomenon ti telos], like the to
fine object, the resulting
bloom onactivity
those in the primeis perfect.
of youth. (1174b31-33) Say-
ing that an activity is "perfect" means that it full
and optimally exercises The bloom
the is therelevant
character of sexual attractiveness
capacity so
as to actualize its nature in
that people the
in the prime finest
of youth have inway virtue of pos-
sible. For Aristotle, tobeing
engage
in the prime ofin an
youth. activity
It is not merely the set wit
pleasure is to do so perfectly. There
of features that makes is attractive,
such people a normativ nor
dimension to this account, butirreducible
is it an emergent, Aristotle "glow" that does
comes no
mean to say that only such normatively
along with being sanctione
in the prime of youth. Rather, it is
the overall Such
activities can be pleasant. attractivenessactivities
that arises from the co-are th
paradigm cases of pleasures alescence ofand
the relevant
the features.
best Pleasure,
and then, most
worthwhile pleasures for human
is the overall perfectionbeings,
that arises when but
there is Aris
totle means for his account to extend to a wide the right kind of fit between the condition of the
range of inferior activities by analogy. He writes: capacity being activated and the object that it is
active in relation to. Aristotle does not offer an
For we should not suppose if things are pleasant to peo-explicit theory of pain in NE X.l-5, but one might
ple in a bad condition that they are pleasant, except toreasonably infer that just as pleasure is the charac-
these people, just as if things are healthy or sweet orter an activity has when there is a good fit between
capacity and object, pain is the character an activ-
bitter to sick people we should not suppose that they are
healthy, sweet or bitter except to them. (1173b22-24) ity has when there is a poor fit between capacity
and object.25
If someone is overheated, for instance, water I take this account of pleasure to be consider-
that would normally be unpleasantly cold may be ably more plausible and consistent with the phe-
pleasant to swim in. In such cases, a capacity in nomena
a than the Folk Theory. A rigorous defense
deficient condition is active in relation to an anal- of an Aristotelian theory of pleasure would re-
ogously deficient object. As in the paradigm case, quire adapting the notion of "fit" to our more
where a capacity in a good condition is active insophisticated contemporary understanding of the
relation to a fine object, there is a "fit" between mental and giving a nonmetaphorical account of
object and subject. The subject's capacity is in what a it amounts to. I cannot attempt anything so
condition such that the object at hand is apt to ambitious in this context, but I can offer grounds
fully activate it. For instance, a paradigmatic casefor thinking that Aristotle's theory has a great deal
of perfect activity may result when one is clearof intuitive appeal, especially insofar as it manages
headed and focused and engages with an elegantto be suitably broad but also nonvacuous. Return-
math problem. The math problem is well suiteding to the four cases introduced above, Aristo-
to fully activate one's capacity for thought in an tle's view is able to account for what unites them
optimal condition. If one is tired and a bit foggy,as instances where a subject experiences pleasure
however, one may not be in a condition to ap-without implausibly holding them to involve phe-
propriately engage with the problem. An easiernomenally similar feelings. In case 1, the swim-
crossword puzzle may be well suited to activatemer's pleasure is the character her activity of touch
has in virtue of the fit between her overheated
one's capacity for thought given its deficient con-

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 Strohl Horror and Hedonic Ambivalence 209

condition and the cool

remark, water. Inandcase
cynicism about politics 2, the
naively optimistic
between the subject's tense muscles and the
editorial).
performed massage. Unlike the Folk Theory,
totle's account of pleasure I suggest that the keydoesto explaining notthe phe- implau
entail phenomenal similarity nomenon of strong ambivalence is between
to allow for the thi
and case 1. The condition of
possibility that a pain the
structure subject's
can be embedded
of touch is very different in both
within a pleasure structure. I am not claimingcases,
that as i
object that it is active Aristotle
in himself would endorse this to,
relation idea; I amand so
lows naturally that proposing the a way perfect characters
that Aristotle's theory can readily o
resultant activities of touch would be dissimilar. be expanded to account for strong ambivalence.
In case 3, the fit is between the subject's sharp It is important to distinguish atomic experi-
mental condition and the difficulty of the math ences from complex experiences, that is, expe-
problem. Her enjoyment lies in the character her riences with internal structure. Individual sen-
activity of thinking has in virtue of her being in sations, such as smelling a particular scent, are
optimal condition for thinking and the aptness of atomic experiences. Watching a movie is a com-
the problem to engage her abilities in such a con- plex experience. It consists of a variety of activities
dition. If the problem were easier or she were of thought and perception, both atomic and com-
groggy or distracted, she would not enjoy her ac- plex in their own right. Atomic experiences can
tivity of thinking to the same extent. Aristotle's be pleasant or painful, and so can complex experi-
account does not entail that the subject's enjoy- ences. Take a case where someone is sitting outside
ment reside in a feeling that arises in addition in to the sun, listening to music, and sipping a drink.
her activity of thinking. This is an attractive re- The atomic sensations of the sun's warmth and
sult, as it seems that in cases where a subject is the taste of the drink may both be pleasant, and
intensely focused on something, her enjoyment is so may the subject's cumulative experience. The
not a separate feeling- this would seem likely activities
to that compose the cumulative experience
distract one's attention rather than increase one's interrelate and synergize; for example, the music
keeps the subject's mind off business and enables
focus- but rather is an integral aspect of the activ-
ity she is engaged in. In case 4, the fit is betweenher instead to attend to the way the warmth of the
the subject's virtuous character and the beneficialsun feels, while the drink relaxes her and puts her
result yielded by her efforts. Given her compas- in the mood to focus on the music, and so on. In
sion and sense of duty to others, she enjoys theAristotelian terms, each activity puts the subject's
awareness of having benefited people in need. It capacities for performing the other two in a better
seems that Aristotle's theory is well equipped to condition and thereby makes them more pleasant.
account for a wide range of cases where we wouldThe result is an overall pleasant experience with
say that a subject experiences pleasure. complex internal structure.
For atomic experiences, the fit is between the
condition of a particular capacity and the object
III. ARISTOTELIAN STRONG AMBIVALENCE AND THE
PARADOX OF HORROR
it is active in relation to. For experiences with in-
ternal structure, the fit is between one's condition
more generally and the range of objects that one
For Aristotle, pleasure is a structural feature of
is engaged with:
activities of thought and perception. Let us intro-
duce two definitions:
Pleasure structure for complex experiences: fit between
a composite condition and a set of objects of experience.
Pleasure structure: fit between the capacity being acti-
vated and the object that it is active in relation to (for Pain structure for complex experiences: misfit between
example, parched throat and cool drink, romantic mood a composite condition and a set of objects of experience.
and spectacular sunset, curiosity about wolverines and
informative book about wolverines). We are now in a position to account for strong
ambivalence:
Pain structure: misfit between the capacity being acti-
vated and the object that it is active in relation to (for Strong ambivalence: a complex experience has the
example, soft skin and sharp needle, grief and insensitive pleasure structure partly in virtue of one or more

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210 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

of its elements (complexwould

ornot be welcome onhaving
atomic) its own, but when
the onepain
structure.26 has the background belief that one is safe and
secure on a roller coaster, it may contribute to the
The Folk Theory precludes overall pleasant
this character
sort of one's
ofcomplex
move expe- be-
cause it holds pleasurerience. and The pain to be
painful sensation discrete
of capsaicin on the
feelings. Feelings can relate tongue, irritating
to each on its own,
other
may synergize
in well
vari-
ous ways, but they cannot with Indian
be flavors
embeddedand the anticipation
within of cold one
another in this manner. beer.
The Aristotelian theory is
able to allow for such embedding I propose that the paradox
becauseof horror can
it be iden-
tifies pleasure and pain solved
with
in a parallel
structural
way. In some cases when
features
one
of experience. Other forms ofmovie,
watches a horror adverbialism
one experiences emotionsthat
resemble the Aristotelian of fear theory
and disgust that I have
have sketched
the pain structure.
in this respect should They be would
able be outright
to make painful andthe
one wouldsame
allowance. be fully averse to them if one were outside of an
This account of strong ambivalence makes it aesthetic context. In an aesthetic context, how-
clear how it is possible for a painful emotion to ever, these emotions may fit well with one's more
general condition and make a vital contribution
be attractive in virtue of its painful character. Pain
can be attractive when it synergizes with other to the pleasant character of the complex expe-
elements of a complex experience to make that rience of engaging with an artwork. Again, it is
experience more pleasant. The attractiveness ofthe a domain of empirical psychology to explain
painful emotion as such is not due to its intrinsic the details of this fit, but it may have something
phenomenal character, but rather to the relation to do with the background belief that what one
that this character bears to other aspects of the sees is fiction, genre fandom, a sense of the film's
experience it is an element of. This account can place in the horror canon, a refined sense of the
readily make sense of the examples mentioned macabre,
at sympathy and camaraderie with other
the beginning of the article. Take, first, the case audience members in the grips of the same emo-
of having one's hair pulled during sex. The sensa- tions, desensitization to less extreme images, and
tion of having one's hair pulled has the pain struc-so on. There is probably no unified account of
what attracts horror fans to the experience of
ture. There is a misfit between one's sensitive scalp
and the tugging that it undergoes. But when this fear and disgust. Why should there be? Different
sensation is embedded in a sexual context, it can fit
people are attracted to different negative emo-
with the subject's overall condition so as to con- tional reactions to different works for different
tribute to the pleasantness of the subject's com- reasons. We should reappropriate philosophical
plex experience. Explaining what sort of condition attempts at giving such an account as potential
one would need to be in for this to occur is the ju-partial accounts, functioning as armchair contri-
risdiction of empirical psychology, but presumably butions (perhaps quite useful ones) to the body
it has something to do with various developmental of empirical psychology on the subject.27 While
factors and with background cultural and interper- many of these accounts, on my view, have been
sonal power dynamics. In such cases, having one's misguided in their presumption against strong am-
hair pulled feels phenomenally similar to the way bivalence, many of their insights can be assimi-
it does in cases where one is categorically averse lated to the Aristotelian picture I have suggested.
to it. It may prompt aversion behavior, such as Carroll's view, for instance, that the appeal of hor-
wincing, but unlike in cases outside of a sexual ror lies in narrative structures of mystery and rev-
context, one is not motivated to try to prevent it elation could be reworked so as to suggest that
from happening. The reason the subject is not ul- emotions of fear and disgust synergize with a sub-
timately averse to it in this context is not that itject's engagement with such narrative structures
feels different than it does in contexts where he to enhance enjoyment. Curiosity about a monster
would be ultimately averse to it, but rather that could become more acute, and thus more pleasant,
it is making an active contribution to the pleasant when it is paired with fear of the monster's reve-
character of the complex experience it is embed- lation. Such a picture would be very much in the
ded in. The sensation of plummeting from a great spirit of Carroll's view but would not implausibly
height may be painfully frightening, such that it entail that fear and disgust are necessary costs of

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 Strohl Horror and Hedonic Ambivalence 211

engaging with horror that

a painful feeling, never
but subjects augment
are not attracted to the painful
ences' enjoyment. feelings that are preconditions for pleasures of relief. I will
not attempt to resolve this issue, as it is orthogonal to my
If we can avoid doing so, we should not s
case. It would make a difference if the pleasure horror audi-
to deflate the appearance that
ences experience in connection withhorror
fear and disgust could fan
sometimes attractedplausibly
to bethe experience
taken exhaustively to consist in the reliefof of p
these feelings,
emotions as such. Our but this does not seem to of
enjoyment be the case. It is
exploi
not plausible
horror movies is very to maintain that horror
different in fanscharacter
only experience
enjoyment in connection with fear and disgust when these
our enjoyment of, for example, family com
emotions are being relieved. They often report enjoying a
Enjoying a good family
horror filmcomedy
the most in the momentsis
when easy
it is most ter- . The
tions that one experiences while
rifying. Also, many watching
popular exploitation horror films (for on
example, the Final
fully welcome. Watching an Destination movies) offer no relief
effective in the
exploit
course of their narratives. Everyone dies a horrible death;
horror movie, on the other hand, can be a
there is no silver lining.
a challenge even while5. Carolynbeing
Korsmeyer, in enjoyable.
Savoring Disgust: The Foul Se
someone evisceratedandby
the Fair a chainsaw
in Aesthetics (Oxford Universityprompts
Press, 2011), is
ror fans to react by an exception. She is not
looking directly concerned
away orwith the paradox
covering
of horror, however, but with the aesthetic functioning of the
eyes or wincing or squeezing the hand of the
emotion of disgust. I discuss her view in Section II below.
son sitting next to them. But the fact that
6. J. C. B. Gosling, Pleasure and Desire: The Case for
engage in such behavior
Hedonism Reviewed is (Oxford:
notClarendon, necessarily
1969), pp. 30-31.
that they want to leave the
7. Noël Carroll, theater.
The Philosophy of Horror: Or, It is of
Paradoxes of the Heart
sign that they are having a great(New York: Routledge,
time. 1990), Th
pp. 178-195.
age of chainsaw evisceration does not fit wel
8. Carroll responds to this point in "Enjoying Horror
the condition of their
Fictions: capacities, but
A Reply to Gaut," The British Journal the cha
of Aesthetics
that their experience gains
35 (1995): due
67-72, at p. 69. He suggeststo this
horror formulas are ill fit
fits with their broader condition so as to make an employed because they reliably inspire fascination (just as
mystery formulas do). I do not see this as a plausible sug-
indispensable contribution to their enjoyment of
gestion when it comes to long chains of highly repetitive
the artwork.28
sequels, such as the Friday the 13th movies mentioned.
9. Susan L. Feagin, "Monsters, Disgust, and Fascina-
MATTHEW STROHL tion," Philosophical Studies 65 (1992): 75-84, at pp. 79-82;
Department of Philosophy Berys Gaut, "The Paradox of Horror," The British Jour-
nal of Aesthetics 33 (1993): 333-345, at pp. 333-335; Alex
University of Montana
Neill, "On a Paradox of the Heart," Philosophical Studies
Missoula, Montana 59812 65 (1992): 53-65, at pp. 56-64.
10. Carroll, "Enjoying Horror Fictions: A Reply to
internet: matthew.strohl@mso.umt.edu
Gaut." See also Noël Carroll, "Disgust or Fascination: A
Response to Susan Feagin," Philosophical Studies 65 (1992):
85-90.

1. 'Paradox' would seem to be a misnomer. The prob- 11. Carroll, "Enjoying Horror Fictions: A Reply to
lem does not emerge from a seemingly true but internally Gaut," pp. 69-70.
contradictory statement or set of statements. There is noth-12. Carroll, "Enjoying Horror Fictions: A Reply to
Gaut," p. 72.
ing contradictory about the fact that people sometimes seem
to enjoy ostensibly disagreeable emotions. The issue is better13. Neill, "Paradoxes of the Heart," pp. 61-62.
described as a puzzle or even just as a curious phenomenon. 14. Gaut, "The Paradox of Horror," p. 339.
15. Gaut, "The Paradox of Horror," pp. 340-341.
With this caveat in place, I will sometimes use the traditional
name for the problem out of convenience. 16. This theory of emotion contrasts with a Humean
2. Aaron Smuts gives a useful survey of ways of theory, ac- according to which emotions are individuated by the
counting for the appeal of negative emotional experiences way they feel. Susan Feagin makes a similar case without
in aesthetic contexts in "Art and Negative Affect," Philos-assuming a particular theory of emotion in "Monsters, Dis-
ophy Compass 4 (2009): 39-55. He rightly emphasizes that gust, and Fascination," at pp. 81-82. She observes that it is
the appeal of such experiences need not be hedonic. I commonplace
am for some people to experience pleasure and
others to experience pain in connection with otherwise phe-
concerned in this article with cases where I take the appeal
to be clearly hedonic. nomenally similar feelings (e.g., dizziness). This observation
does not help explain the possibility of strong ambivalence,
3. For an illuminating recent discussion of ambivalence
and desire, see Derek Baker, "Ambivalent Desires and the however. See my response to Gaut.
Problem with Reduction," Philosophical Studies 150 (2010): 17. Gaut, "The Paradox of Horror," p. 343.
37-47. 18. Gaut, "The Paradox of Horror," p. 339.
4. Cases where one enjoys the relief of a painful feeling 19. Compare Carroll, "Disgust or Fascination: A Re-
are difficult to classify. In such cases enjoyment depends on sponse to Susan Feagin," at p. 89.

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 212 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

20. Gilbert Ryle, "Pleasure,"

anger may Proceedings of
be intensified by the object of one's the Aris-
anger rubbing
totelian Society, supp. vol. 28 (1954):
one's shoulders 135-146;
in a pleasant way Gilbert
in a misguided attempt at
consolation.
Ryle, "Pleasure," in Dilemmas Or, one may have University
(Cambridge a painful complex experi-Press
1956), pp. 54-67. ence of disgust with oneself while reading Lolita in virtue
21. For further discussion, see pleasant
of experiencing Gosling, Pleasure
sexual arousal at a description ofand
Desire , and David Perry, The
Humbert Concept
Humbert's pedophilia. of Pleasure (Th
Hague: Mouton, 1967). 27. For examples of illuminating contributions, see
22. Korsmeyer, Savoring Marcia
Disgust , pp.
Eaton, "A Strange Kind 114-119.
of Sadness," The Journal of
23. For the purposes of this
Aesthetics article,
and Art CriticismI41assume the
(1982): 51-64; Jerrold in-
Levin-
terpretation of this account that
son, "Music I defend
and Negative Emotion," in "Pleasure
in Music and Mean- a
Perfection: Nicomachean Ethics X.4-5,"
ing, ed. Jennifer Oxford
Robinson (Cornell Studies
University Press, 1997), i
Ancient Philosophy 41 (2011): 257-287.
pp. 215-241; John Morreall, "Enjoying Negative Emotions
24. Translations are based on Aristotle,
in Fiction," Nicomachean
Philosophy and Literature 9 (1985): 95-105; and
Ethics , trans. T. H. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), but
Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust.
have sometimes been modified. 28. I would like to specially thank Gabriel Love for
25. 1175bl3-24 corroborates this suggestion. his generous and extremely helpful comments on ear-
26. The inverse version of strong ambivalence (a com-lier versions of this article. I would also like to thank
plex experience having a pain structure partly in virtue of an Nicholas Stang, an audience at the University of Montana,
embedded pleasure structure) would also seem possible. Forand two anonymous referees for helpful commentary and
instance, one's painful complex experience of an episode ofdiscussion.

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