The Paradox of Horror: Fear as a Positive Emotion

Author(s): KATERINA BANTINAKI

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , FALL 2012, Vol. 70, No. 4 (FALL
2012), pp. 383-392
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43496533

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 KATERINA BANTINAKI

The Paradox of Horror: Fear as a Positive Emotion

With its roots in the English gothic novel it

ofgenerates emotions that we avoid in real life?2
the eighteenth century and a body of work Noël
that Carroll, assuming a hedonic dimension to
this attraction, is asking, "How can horror audi-
spreads across different media, the horror genre
ences find pleasure in what by nature is distressful
has persisted in art for more than a century, gain-
ing gradual popularity among audiences. Its and suc-unpleasant?"3
cess has been particularly pronounced in cinema, In what follows, I attempt to provide a coher-
where horror films like The Exorcist , Jaws , Alien
ent ,answer to these questions. Taking fear as the
Silence of the Lambs , and numerous others rank paradigm horror emotion, I develop an integra-
among the major box office hits in cinematic tionist moderate hedonic account of the attraction
history. With success, however, comes reflection:of horror. Following Gary Iseminger's classifica-
what is the attraction of such harrowing fiction?
tion, the account is integrationist to the extent that
The many subgenres that arose in the develop-it traces the attraction of horror in the emotional
ment of horror and its many narrative common- experience it elicits: an experience, I argue, that is
alities with other genres, such as the sci-fi orpotentially
the both beneficial and rewarding, unlike
its real-life occurrences.4 It is a moderate hedonic
psychological thriller, make the project of defining
account in acknowledging that the experience is
horror a daunting task.1 Relying on a pretheoreti-
cal understanding of the genre, it is enough for enjoyable,
the but enjoyment here is understood as
purposes of this article to focus on its mark, that a welcoming stance that the subject has toward
is, the aim of generating fear and disgust inher theexperience rather than as positive affect. The
audience, in response to a supernatural or abnor- proposed account of the hedonic character of hor-
mal being that is perceived as threatening, such ror experience is further embedded in an account
as a monster, a psychopath, a zombie, a freak. of the nature of horror emotion that goes against
The formal features of horror- such as narrative traditional beliefs regarding its negative valence.
structure, camera viewpoint, editing, and musicalDrawing on Jesse Prinz's account of emotional va-
score- are conducive to and serve to heighten thislence, I argue that fear in response to horror can
emotional effect. be experienced as an overall positive emotion, that
The emotions on which the horror genre trades is, an emotion toward which the subject has a pos-
are identified in the emotion literature as negative itive stance and thus enjoys experiencing, leaving
emotions par excellence, regardless of the theory it open whether the emotional experience is also
of emotion endorsed. Although there is no similar affectively pleasurable or affectively painful.
consensus on what determines their negative va-
lence (that is, why they should be classified as neg-
ative emotions), fear and disgust are generally re- I. ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE ATTRACTION
garded as intrinsically unpleasant and, being such, OF HORROR
as emotions that we avoid experiencing in real life,
along with the situations that elicit them. The tra- The paradox of horror has attracted much disc
ditional conception of horror emotions, coupled sion in the philosophical literature. We need,
with the popularity of the genre, gives rise to a this point, to consider briefly some of the propo
paradox: why are audiences attracted to horror if accounts of the attraction of horror and highli
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70:4 Fall 2012
© 2012 The American Society for Aesthetics

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384 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

their weaknesses with rorafiction

view to begetting
may indeed clearer
basic, but to the extent
about the aspects of horror experience
that they are instrumental that
to (that is, they aid and nee
to be accounted for. This guide)will
that emotional
pave engagement.
the way for th
account of the appeal of The horror
integrationist perspective
that Igains support
develop in
Section IV. from psychological research on horror films. In
If one accepts with tradition that the emotions a meta-analysis of such research, Cynthia Hoffner
experienced in response to horror are intrinsically and Kenneth Levine note "a significant positive
unpleasant, then one needs to trace the attraction correlation between enjoyment and negative af-
of horror not in the experience of such emotions fect during viewing."8 Although the correlation is
but in some other aspect of our overall encounter stronger for male viewers than for female viewers,
with the fictional work. For example, according still "negative affect [is] associated with greater
to Carroll, the pleasure derived from horror fic- enjoyment for both groups."9 The observed cor-
tion is cognitive. Carroll identifies the typical ob- relation takes us back to one of the questions with
jects of horror as monsters, that is, beings that lie which we began, that is, how can audiences enjoy
"outside our standing conceptual schemes."5 Be- experiencing negative affect in response to hor-
ing violations of our usual categories of thought, ror, even if there are additional hedonic dimen-
he argues, such beings are disturbing, distress- sions in our encounter with the fiction, such as
ing, and disgusting. For the same reason, how- those related to aspects of the narrative.10 More
ever, they attract our attention and elicit our cu- importantly, the positive correlation between the
riosity: we want to know more about the nature experience of negative affect and the enjoyment
and threatening behavior of those beings, to find of horror suggests an integrationist answer to this
out how their existence is unveiled in the fiction, question.
and, eventually, how or if they can be destroyed. Most philosophical discussions of the para-
Such curiosity is aided and properly guided by the dox of horror argue from an integrationist per-
narrative, which is "concerned to render the un- spective, that is, they assume that the attrac-
known known by processes of discovery, explana- tion of horror has its source in the negative
tion, proof, hypothesis, confirmation and so on."6 affect that it elicits. Such a perspective is put
The appeal of horror is thus for Carroll the plea-forth by Susan Feagin. Focusing on the feeling
sure of the disclosure of the horrific being: a cog- components of fear and disgust- "the adrenalin
nitive pleasure that supposedly is potent enough rush, the tingles and the queasiness"- Feagin ar-
to compensate for the negative emotional side ef- gues that one can come to enjoy these aspects
fects of our encounter with such a being. of the emotional experience and such enjoyment
Carroll's account of the appeal of horror has "can function to reinforce one's attraction to the
attracted the following objection: it is hard to pro- kinds of things which generate them," in this case
vide a convincing account of the ways in which horror fiction.11
cognitive pleasure can outweigh affective pain, es- Feagin's central insight is shared by Alex Neill
pecially in repeated viewings or readings where and John Morreall. Neill, on the one hand, ar-
the element of curiosity is lessened.7 Further, and gues that "the feelings and sensations that go
more importantly, it is doubtful whether audi- with emotions such as pity or fear or horror typ-
ences indeed derive mostly cognitive and thus dis- ically aren't painful or unpleasant" and traces in-
passionate pleasurable experiences in response to stead the source of unpleasantness of the relevant
horror fiction. Rather, the enjoyment that audi- emotions on the aversive situations in response
ences derive from horror seems to be bound up to which we experience them.12 Morreall, on the
with the emotional responses that it elicits, as au- other hand, argues that "the excitement that we
diences' own reports indicate. (We have, I take feel in fear"- an excitement produced by physi-
it, no prima facie reason to assume that audiences ological changes such as an increase in alertness
are massively in error regarding the source of their and muscle tension, an increased heartbeat, and
enjoyment.) The attraction of horror from this in- so on- "is what makes fear potentially enjoyable,
tegrationist perspective has its source in the emo- [especially for someone who leads a relatively
tional engagement with the fiction (and not just in dull life."13
one's cognitive engagement with it): the narrative Carroll raises an objection that seems to un-
processes that Carroll highlights as basic in hor- dermine all integrationist hedonic accounts of the

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 Bantinaki The Paradox of Horror 385

explain why that

appeal of horror: he argues we are willing
the to feeling
experience emo-com
tional responses to art
ponents of fear and, especially, that we shun in
disgust arereal life,
at lea
uncomfortable and can be
[it] does not outright painful
have a plausible answer for why we an
distressful.14 If that is the
want case,
to experience the
such relevant
emotions at all," given em
tions-rather than just the
that they situations that eli
are painful.18
them, as Neill proposes- I think,
are however, that Morreall does explain
intrinsically unplea
ant, so an account that why we traces the
want to experience the enjoyment
emotions that hor-
horror in the emotions it elicits would be doomed ror elicits. As I understand his account, the ele-
to failure.15 ment of control, increasing our tolerance over the
Morreall's appeal to perceived control over our negative physiological symptoms of horror emo-
own experiences can be seen to ease the force of tions, allows us to indulge in what is potentially
this objection and thus make room for the inte- enjoyable in these intense emotions: as noted ear-
grationist perspective that I want to endorse. In lier, the excitement that they produce, the thrill.
his account of the paradox, Morreall argues that For Morreall the attraction of horror is the in-
negative emotions, including their feeling compo- creased stimulation provided by the emotions it
nents, can be enjoyed "when we retain our overall elicits, which he considers as potentially pleasur-
control of our situation": that is, when we have able. Still, Morreall's account of the attraction of
the ability to start, stop, and direct the experience, horror may appear wanting from a theoretical per-
so that the discomfort it involves does not pass spective such as Carroll's that regards the physio-
a certain toleration threshold.16 Being in control logical symptoms of horror emotions as "unpleas-
of our experience allows us, Morreall argues, to ant intrinsically and at least not pleasurable."19 I
enjoy even unpleasant experiences (for instance, argue in Section II, against Carroll, that the physi-
watching a car crash at a race) or mild pain (as ological symptoms of horror emotions are not nec-
when we probe a sore spot in our mouth); or to be essarily or essentially unpleasant. Acknowledg-
less disturbed by stronger pains that cannot actu- ing, however, that symptoms such as queasiness
ally be enjoyed (as when we can notify our dentist or nausea are commonly unpleasant, I develop an
when to start and stop drilling). When we attend attitudinal account of the enjoyment of horror that
to horror fiction, we have control over our expe- is not open to Carroll's objection, although it en-
rience, that is, we can decide to shut our eyes, or dorses the integrationist insights of Feagin, Neill,
walk away, or put down the book when the narra- and Morreall.
tive gets too disturbing. For as long as we maintain First, however, I consider an alternative ac-
this control we are able, according to Morreall, to count that clearly brings out thorny issues in our
enjoy the negative emotions that the fiction elicits understanding of emotion that incite disagree-
in ways we would not be able to enjoy them in ment regarding the horror experience. Agreeing
response to real-life situations. with Carroll on the hedonic character of horror
Studies on the effects of perceived control over emotions, Aaron Smuts offers an explanation of
our responses to pain offer at least partial support the attraction of horror that is close in spirit to that
to Morreall's account: perceived control seems of Morreall. It differs, though, from Morreall's
to reduce the stress associated with aversive sit-
account in one significant respect: Smuts's account
uations, while it influences a subject's abilityistoa-hedonic; it takes pleasure out of the attraction
of horror and so bypasses Carroll's objection re-
cope with pain, increasing pain tolerance and en-
durance.17 But Morreall makes a stronger claim: garding the painfulness of horror emotions. Argu-
he argues that control allows us to enjoy the neg-
ing from the principle that we can find experiences
ative emotions that horror elicits and not justboth
to unpleasant and perfectly desirable, Smuts
tolerate their painful aspects. If what he meanstraces
is the attraction of horror (and all painful
that control somehow turns pain into pleasure, the
art) in the rich experience that it offers: he argues
claim is unfounded: there are no indications that that "one is seldom as fully engaged intellectu-
control makes pain pleasurable. In this case, and ally, perceptually and affectively as when experi-
encing painful emotional responses to art."20 The
if Carroll is right that the feeling aspects of fear
and disgust are distressing and painful, Morreall'srich experience that horror provides is, from this
resolution of the paradox is of limited value: ac- perspective, rewarding in itself and so desirable,
cording to Smuts, for instance, "although [it] caneven if it is not pleasurable. As to the difference

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 386 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

question- that is, why we that arewillmore

cause him physical pain
willing to or destructi
expe-
rience negative emotionsfalling on the grenade-
in response to and artone that will
than in ca
real life- Smuts argues, him
and I want to
psychological pain agree, that,
or destruction- watch
his friends
first, art provides a degree of die. In the case of
safety the cinematic
not presenthorror in
real-life situations that experience,
couldonarouse the other hand,intense neg-
we freely choose
ative emotions and, second, the
to see a horror film control that
rather than one that would we
usually enjoy in our encounter with
elicit positive affect, fiction
and we do so in our does
spare
not let the pain involvedtime in
(whensuch
we usuallyemotions
do things that we pass
enjoy), as a
certain threshold of tolerance.21
a means of entertainment (which certainly carries
The distinctive and crucial element in Smuts's hedonic connotations), and we invite our friends
account is the hypothesis that the horror experi- (for whom we care) to share in the experience. Al-
ence is desirable but basically unpleasant. As thisthough the circumstances in which we encounter
hypothesis goes against audiences' own reports on horror do not single out pleasure as the sole pos-
their experience, however, it merits scrutiny. Fur-sible motivation for this encounter, they make it
ther, it is unclear how an occurrent emotion can seem to be a very good candidate- even if it is
be rewarding for the subject and still be a negativenot the type of pleasure that is "accompanied by
emotion or, at least, negative in the sense that itsgrinning faces."24
real-life (unrewarding) occurrence is. More gen- Smuts's reason for taking pleasure out of the
erally, it is perhaps clear from this short review ofattraction of horror is the hypothesis that horror
the philosophical literature on horror that muchemotions are intrinsically unpleasant to the extent
of the disagreement between theorists hangs onthat their physiological symptoms can be outright
contrasting conceptions about pain, pleasure, andpainful- the hypothesis that Carroll used to under-
their relation to emotion or aspects of it. Do emo-mine integrationist solutions to the paradox. But
tions have a definite hedonic tone? Is this traced in what is the strength of this hypothesis? The first
their component feelings? Is the positive or neg- thing to note is that, strictly speaking, the physi-
ative character (or valence) of an emotion deter- cal manifestations of horror emotions are not all
mined by the hedonic tone of such feelings? These painful. The adrenalin rush, the skin conductance,
are questions that we need to address in a com- the increased heartbeat may be divergences from
prehensive account of the attraction of horror. I the normal physical state of equilibrium, but they
shall undertake this task in what follows. are not, literally, pains. In certain contexts, these
signs of arousal are not even unpleasant and, as
Feagin argues, might even be enjoyed, as for in-
II. ON PLEASURE stance when they occur in the sight of the person
with whom one is madly in love or when they occur
Smuts denies motivational hedonism, that is,
during the
play.
theory that the sole source of motivation is Second,
plea-with regard to those physiological
sure: "Anyone," he writes, "who was motivated
symptoms such as queasiness or nausea that are
exclusively by the pursuit of pleasure classified
would as be pains, we should accept that they are
a pathetic creature indeed."22 I think we can allwith any type of pleasure only if un-
incompatible
agree to that: in various adverse circumstances
pleasantnessweis essentially an aspect of pain. This,
seem to pursue what we value or what however,we think is not the case. Instances of reactive dis-
is right at the expense of our pleasure, or sociation
despite (where the unpleasantness of pain has
beenpursuit
the pain that it may inflict. Is, however, the removed as an effect of a pathological con-
of horror one type of occasion where thedition, or a surgical procedure, or drugs), and the
prospect
of pleasure is not among the motivating factors?
fact that we do not seem to mind (and thus feel as
Contrast the horror experience to the case, cited
unpleasant) some types of pain when our attention
by Smuts, of the unfortunate soldier who is directed
throws elsewhere, and, more controversially
himself on a grenade to save his friends.23 perhaps,
The masochism
sol- all indicate that pain experi-
ences areand,
dier most likely did not choose to be in battle, normally unpleasant but not essentially
although he may have a choice on what so.25course
Although our encounter with horror fiction is
of action he should follow in seeing the notgrenade
an occasion where, for instance, something like
coming, it is a choice between a course reactive
of actiondissociation is taking place, the control

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 Bantinaki The Paradox of Horror 387

that we enjoy, as noted valence. Inearlier,

particular, I argue that can still have
the welcoming
similar effect; that is,stance
it toward
can whatallow
one is experiencing
us affects
to the experien
valence of the occurrent emotion:
pain but not mind it, especially if the that the fear, for
experience
instance, that we experience
otherwise rewarding. Knowing, in response
for to horror
instance, th
I can leave the theater when
fiction, I want,
unlike its real-life I can
occurrences, is (or can tole
ate the queasiness thatbe) a I
positive
feel emotion. And so I turn to valence,
watching the oozi
focusing on fear
slime on-screen, especially ifas aIparadigm horror emotion. the who
welcome
state of alertness of my body.
These considerations suggest that the physi
ological symptoms of horror
III. ON VALENCE emotions are n
necessarily or essentially unpleasant, so the re
evant argument against (hedonic)
The paradox integrationi
of horror relies on a traditional
accounts of the paradoxception of emotions
loses its according
force.toBut which th
neg
offer no support eitheremotions
for the are intrinsically
claim that unpleasant
the to sym
the ex
that they contain
toms are potentially pleasant, whichunpleasant
thusphysiological
needss
be further corroborated toms. It (the case
is assumed, of
that is, thatmasochis
the hedonic qu
is an exception, but it of is, as I said,
physiological symptoms controversi
is what determine
Although pleasure understood as positive
valence of an emotion- as positive or affe
negativ
is not decisively out of well the as its overall hedonic
picture, it is tone. Now firm
not if we acc
in it either. Perhaps there as Carrollisdoes, that fear of
a kind is an "rough"
emotion with in
a
fective pleasure that one antly unpleasant
can feel physiological
toward symptoms
what (b
intense or uncomfortable eting the
orreservations mentioned above),
even painful, say w d
to endorphin release forced that accompanies
to conclude physic
that fear is necessarily a n
or psychological stress. tive But
and thus to an argue
overall unpleasant emotion
persuasive
for such a pleasure we would
enjoyment need
of fear in ourto provide
encounter with h
account of the nature of and relation between fiction is then paradoxical.
different types of affective pleasure and pain, However, the traditional view is not accurat
which, even if space allowed, I am not equipped
isto
not the hedonic quality of bodily symptoms
provide. determines an emotion's valence. Increased heart
Affective pleasure, however, is not the only acceleration followed by constrained breathing,
type of pleasure there is: we can also enjoy or take for instance, are signs of arousal, but they are bod-
attitudinal pleasure in what we experience, even if ily responses that, as noted above, can occur in
what we experience involves negative affective el- both negative and positive emotions, for example,
ements.26 For instance, I can enjoy a heated discus- at the sight of a snake and the sight of a loved
sion among friends for its intensity and argumen- one. Even symptoms that are commonly acknowl-
tative ingenuity, although I may not experience edged as pains- for example, queasiness- can oc-
any positive bodily symptoms in the course of it cur in euphoric conditions, as, for instance, when
and despite the fact that I may experience some one is having an orgasm.27 Besides, as Prinz notes,
negative ones (for example, agitation over a sar- different positive and different negative emotions
castic remark thrown at me). A positive attitudi- feel quite different, that is, they do not seem to
nal hedonic state is related to our goals and desires have a phenomenological common denominator
and signifies an approving or welcoming stance to- that could sort them neatly into the positive or
ward an experience or a state of affairs (a stance, negative category.28 So it seems that neither the
note, that is lacking from the unfortunate soldier valence nor the overall hedonic tone of an emo-
discussed above). In what follows, I argue that the tion is determined by the hedonic quality of its
emotions experienced in response to horror, being physiological symptoms, positive or negative as
potentially beneficial and rewarding, are attitudi- these might be.
nali pleasurable or enjoyable, even if they are ac- Can we then assume that emotion valence is
companied by some negative physiological symp- determined by the evaluation of its object that
toms. This insight is furthermore embedded in an the emotion contains, as cognitivist accounts of
account of the nature of horror emotion that goes emotion suggest? We have reasons to doubt that
against traditional beliefs regarding its negative emotions inherit their valence from the valence

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 388 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

of component evaluations. On
it alerts us to the that
the possibility one hand,
in certain cir- as
Robert Solomon notes, cumstances, the same fear may emotion
not be an overallcan negative be
associated with many emotion, evaluations, some
despite the fact that of
it contains which
negative
will be positive and some physiological
of which symptoms or will a negative
beevaluation
negativ
anger, for instance, contains of its object, and
a so on. This is a possibility
negative that
evaluation
of the offender or of her we need to explore. And foract,
offending this purpose
but it seems
it also
contains a positive evaluation reasonable to turn
ofour theattention to the aspect
self.29 On of th
other hand, some emotions emotional experience
seem that to is, have
at bottom, both
the most pos
itive and negative instances contingenteven
(that is, that
if varies
the most depending
componen
evaluation or evaluations remain fixed. Consider on the circumstances) while having strong moti-
the case of nostalgia: whether nostalgia contains vational force. That aspect is how the emotional
only a positive evaluation of past circumstances experience, with its positive or negative aspects,
or, additionally, a negative evaluation of present matters to the agent. In his account of emotion va-
circumstances, it is undoubtedly true that some- lence, Prinz (among others) focuses on just this
times it is experienced as a negative, disruptive aspect of emotional experience, so I here follow
emotion, while at other times as a positive, warm his line of thought with a view to getting clearer
emotion. Surprise provides another example. about If the experience of horror emotion.
the valence of some emotions can thus vary at dif-Relying on extensive empirical and theoretical
ferent times although their evaluative aspect re- research on valence, Prinz argues that all emo-
mains fixed, then it seems emotions do not inherit tions contain valence markers that signal a de-
their valence from the valence of the component mand for either the cessation or continuation of
evaluations. But if neither component physiolog- the emotional experience. "Negative emotions,"
ical symptoms nor component evaluations deter- he explains, "are emotions that contain a compo-
mine an emotion's valence, then what aspect of nent that serves as an inner punishment- a kind
emotional experience can possibly have this role? of signal that says 'Less of this!' Positive emotions
At this point we need to pause. Recent reviews are those that contain a component that serves
of the different uses of the notion of valence in the as an inner reward- a signal that says, 'More of
emotion literature make this question seem to be this!'"32 Emotions are thus self-appraising in the
a nonstarter.30 Not only are there about a dozen sense that the valence marker signals something
different views on what determines the valence of about the emotion itself, that is, whether the emo-
emotion, but also, as Giovanna Colombetti notes, tion (rather than our relation to the world, for
there is instance) is rewarding or not; it signals how the
internal state matters to us. However, this self-
a problematic tendency to switch back and forth between referential appraisal is not cognitive; it is not a
the valence sign of an emotion tout court, and the valence judgment. The punishment and reward markers
sign of different aspects of emotion. Such conflations . . . are rather inner states, psychological mechanisms,
induce excessive simplifications and overlook many fa- that are not necessarily consciously felt, but exert
miliar cases of emotion; because an emotion feels good, an influence on behavior (as Prinz notes, "emo-
it does not follow that it is also itself positive, or that tions without valence would have no punch").33
it involves positive behavior, positive facial expressions, A negative marker will thus encourage us to with-
positive evaluations, and so on.31 draw from the situation that elicits it, while a pos-
itive marker will encourage us to seek out the sit-
The idea that emotions and their aspects can uation that elicits it.
be strictly dichotomized into mutually exclusive From this perspective, negative emotions are
poles, positive or negative, thus seems to exclude disagreeable at least in the sense and to the extent
the possibility of mixtures (that one can feel, for that we want to get rid of them, while positive emo-
instance, sweet sadness or tormenting love) and tions are agreeable at least in the sense and to the
overlooks the complexity and richness of daily extent that we want their continuation. The overall
lived emotions. hedonic character of an emotion, that is, is attitudi-
Acknowledging such complexity, however, fa-nal; it signals a welcoming or disapproving stance
cilitates rather than impedes our understandingtoward what one is undergoing. What is impor-
of emotional experience in response to horror:tant to note is that, although emotions that contain

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 Bantinaki The Paradox of Horror 389

tion,
painful bodily symptoms which more
are explains ourlikely
attraction toto
horror.
beFor neg-
atively valenced and pleasant bodily
this assumption to gain symptoms
credibility, however, it has
to be shown
positively valenced, this will both that
not there are benefits and re-
necessarily be
the case: there is, as noted earlier, no straight-
wards to be gained from the experience of fear in
forward relationship between the
response to fictionalized hedonic
horror qual-
and that they out-
weigh the risks. Theand
ity of physiological symptoms second requirement
the valence- is easy
and thus the overall hedonic tone- of an emo- to accommodate to the extent that the context in
tion. It is therefore possible that an emotionwhich
is fear is experienced poses no threat to the
individual, so the risk factor is controlled. Be that
positively valenced although it contains (at least
some) unpleasant physiological symptoms. Couldas it may, the success of this hypothesis hangs on
whether
this mean, against traditional belief, that fear is there are any benefits and rewards to be
not necessarily a negative emotion? We should gained from the experience of fear in response to
not rush to a conclusion. fictionalized horror. I believe that there are.
Prinz's account allows that some emotions Before we proceed to our encounter with hor-
(such as sorrow) are necessarily negative,ror,
someconsider the more familiar case of children's
necessarily positive (for example, joy), whileplay,
some which, I take it, involves positive occurrences
of fear and can be instructive for our purposes.
may have both positive and negative instances
Anyone
(for example, surprise).34 He argues, however, that who has been close to children knows
fear is necessarily a negative emotion, thatthat
is, from
an a very early age, they naturally seek and
emotion that has only negative instances:oftenuweprefer exciting forms of play that involve a
would gain little benefit from an evolved risk
[dan-of physical injury: either physical risk-taking
activities
ger] detector if that detector were not prewired to such as climbing or hanging from heights
or activities that test their physical strength, such
be held in negative regard."35 If fear were neces-
as wrestling or fencing with sticks, and so on.
sarily a negative and thus a disagreeable emotion,
we would be at a loss to explain how certain There
indi- are important short- and long-term ben-
viduals are attracted to horror. But I want toefits
denyto this behavior: through risk play, children
the antecedent: fear, I argue, can be a positive
unconsciously test possibilities and boundaries for
emotion. action, develop a sound sense of risk, and learn
how to master risk situations.37 As Ellen Sandseter
notes in her review of the long literature on risk
IV. FEAR AS A POSITIVE EMOTION play, "there are indications that through such play
children gain habituating experiences with stimuli
Following Prinz, I have explained valence that
as anprovoke
in- innate fears and phobias, which in a
ner state that has a reinforcement function. Some longitudinal perspective can have antiphobic ef-
reinforcement states are genetically determined fects on adult fears and phobias."38 Still, she adds,
and some are learned. This leaves some scope for children are not overtly aware of the potential
the possibility, according to Prinz, that "fear, for benefits of their actions; from a phenomenologi-
example, can become a positive emotion through cal, descriptive perspective it seems that their pri-
learning and experience. Perhaps people discovermary motivation in engaging in risk play is the urge
that certain dangerous situations have benefits to experience the exciting feeling of heightened
that outweigh the risks. This discovery could trans- arousal and the accompanying emotions: fear or
form fear into a positive emotion under certainanxiety. Mastering their feelings of fear and con-
circumstances, which would explain some thrill- fronting a task they did not think they would dare
seeking behavior."36 Although Prinz does not em- to do creates a feeling of strong exhilaration that
brace this possibility, I want to do so, admittingchildren sometimes seek repetitively. Such posi-
that fear can, on occasion, be a positive emotion, in tive reinforcement, however, seems to blend into
particular, in those circumstances where the ben- sheer- negative- fear and to lead to withdrawal
efits and rewards that the subject gains from the from the activity where children experience a lack
overall experience surpass the risks. of control or a degree of unpredictability.
Our encounter with horror fiction is, I believe, Now, our encounter with horror is not a risk-
one type of occasion when fear is (or can be) expe- taking activity. Still, it is parallel to forms of play
rienced as a positive and thus an enjoyable emo- to the extent that the subject is voluntarily exposed

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390 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

of children's
to a stressful situation that risk
elicits fear play:
and as M
anxiet
for no practical end (so the
the thrill
element of of
fear is inhere
play rewar
ulation.are,
here as well). And there Fear makes
to us feel
a alive: our senses are
certain extent
alert; our notable
parallel benefits. The most heart is bouncing; our attention isrelate
benefits highly
to the management offocused.
our The own
increased arousal of horror-induced
reactions to fear
of our bodily responses,fearour
is invigorating
thoughts, and can be experienced
and our as a be
reward, especially
havioral expressions. Through ourif oneencounter
wants to break the emo-
with
tional routine
horror fiction we are given without risking
a chance one's life (which, or
to confront
learn to cope with fearwein can aassume,
safe depends on temperament andwe
environment:
personal
learn to control our fear circumstances).
feelings As Smuts
and nicely putsmas
display it,
"whatfrightening
tery over our reactions to we desire from [painful] art is to have expe-
stimuli; to di
rect our thoughts- oftenriences on the cheap,
aided by[that is] experiences
the narrative- of strong t
aspects of the situationemotional
that reactions."43
counter Note that
thethe strength
fear of (fo
instance, to the weak traits ofexperience
the emotional the "monster"
that one may find re- or t
warding is a function
the resources that a protagonist has notto
only confront
of its intensity, but
it);
or when the challenge isalso of its depth: commonly targeting
overwhelming, toourmanag
primal
it by seeking comfort fears, horror often goesThe
in peers.39 deep in our psyche to un-
experience,
that is, affords us a chance
veil what to understand
in real and
life we repress.44 Further, lear
as the
emotional
to master our responses to experience
fear and is guidedeven
by the narrative
to tes
and the formal
the limits of our endurance to features of horror works,stimul
frightening it has a
structure, a our
it can thus alter or reinforce progression, and a focus that it
perception of rarely
self
efficacy and make us morehas in real
fit life,
inwhich only adds towith
coping its appeal.45 The
fear in
rewards
real-life risky situations. that inhere in
Perhaps the experiencewhat
(against of horror-th
modern culture of fearinduced fear have a reinforcement
instructs) we need function,
thethat cha
lenges that fear-eliciting situations
is, they provide,
lead us to seek out horror for the strongespe-
ex-
perience that wethem
cially when we can experience expect it toinelicit.small,
But here, as con
in
trollable doses, so as toriskbecome more
play, the experience of fear able to dea
can be rewarding
with fear when it mattersonly tomost.40
the extent that one is in control of one's ex-
Further, albeit more perience;
controversially, exposure
when the emotion gets too strong, for in-
to frightening stimuli stance,
may we lose
havecontrol a
of our bodies, our thoughts,
desensitization
effect (as exposure to andmedia
our reactionsviolence has,
and feel a pressing need towewith-ar
often warned); familiarization with
draw from the experience- the
to close object
the book, to
of our fears, whetherleave through actual
the theater, or simply to shut contact
our eyes. i
a safe context or through I have so far focused imagining,
guided on fear as a paradigm ha
long been regarded by horror emotion, but I believe
cognitive that the experience
psychologists a
a means to overcome fears and
of disgust, also phobias.
associated Our
with the horror genre,ex-
posure to the objects of can our
be beneficial
fears and rewarding
on-screen,in the same waysespe
cially where horror is as fear. Through voluntary
combined with encounters
humor, with gross
can
stimuli (that
similarly ease the negative children that
hold again compulsively
such pursue),
object
have on us in real life. we
This,
can learn however,
to manage our reactions is tonot al-
disgust, or
ways the case, as some (through
horror desensitization)
narratives increase our tolerance
have the
opposite effect; that is,over they
such stimuli, or just easenew
instill the negative
fears hold o
reinforce existing ones.41
that theyIt will
have on us inbe perhaps
real life. more
Further, the expe-
rience of exposure
accurate to say, then, that disgust can be as intense as that of fear can
to horror
and so equally
alter or reinforce our fear beliefrewarding if one craves excitement.
systems, and th
benefit in this case inheresThe potential
in the benefits that inhere in the expe-of
development
more sound sense of riskrienceprovided
of fear (or disgust)that
in a safe the
context viewer
and the
rewards
remains critically active that it provides
vis-à-vis theto those who crave the
horrors she
views on-screen 42 excitement of an intense emotion allow us to as-
Besides the benefits (of which
sume that we
horror-induced may
fear or
(or disgust) may
is orean
not be overtly aware), be there
a positive emotion,
are an emotion toward which re-
motivating
wards in the experiencetheof
subject has a positive
horror stance and thus
parallel to enjoys
thos

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 Bantinaki The Paradox of Horror 391

experiencing. From this 13. perspective,

John Morreall, "Enjoying Negative the Emotions in
distinc
tive attraction of horrorFictions," Philosophy and Literature
inheres primarily 9 (1985): 95-103, at
in the
p. 96.
emotional experience it elicits, an experience that
14. Noël Carroll, "Disgust or Fascination: A Response
the subject welcomes for to Susan the benefits
Feagin," Philosophical and
Studies 65 (1992): 85-90; reward
that it provides "on the and Noëlcheap."
Carroll, "Enjoying HorrorThe Fictions: proposed
A Reply to ac
count of horror's appeal Gaut," The
is British Journal of Aesthetics
thus an 35integrationis
(1995): 67-72.
account. It is, further, a15.moderate
Note that since the feeling symptoms
hedonic of fear and dis- account
gust occur in our response to horror fiction as vividly and
as it is acknowledged that horror emotions can be
persistently as they occur in real life, the paradox of horror
pleasurable or enjoyable at
arises even least
if one accepts (as I doin an
not) that attitudina
the affective
(rather than an affective) sense
states that we experience in responseand
to horror aredespite
not gen- the
uine emotions since some
fact that they may involve they are not accompanied
negativeby beliefs in bodily
the existence of their objects. For a discussion of this view
symptoms. So, whatever accompanying pleasure
of emotions in response to fiction, see Kendall L. Walton,
the fiction may provide, we
"Fearing Fictions," seek
Journal of Philosophyhorror,
75 (1978): 5-27. I con
tend, primarily in the hope
For a response, of
see, for the intense,
instance, Richard Joyce, "Ratio- positiv
emotional experience itnal Fear of Monsters," The British
affords us. Journal of Aesthetics 40
(2000): 209-224; Peter Lamarque, "How Can We Fear and
Pity Fictions?" The British Journal of Aesthetics 21 (1981):
KATEŘINA BANTINAKI
291-304; and Morreall, "Enjoying Negative Emotions in
Department of Philosophy and Social Studies Fictions."
University of Crete 16. Morreall, "Enjoying Negative Emotions in Fictions,"
p. 97.
74100 Rethymnon
17. See, for instance, Matthew Feldner and Hamid Hek-
Crete, Greece mat, "Perceived Control over Anxiety-Related Events as a
Predictor of Pain Behaviors," Journal of Behavior Therapy
internet: bantinaki@fks.uoc.gr and Experimental Psychiatry 32 (2001): 191-202; and Tim
Salomons, Tom Johnstone, Misha-Miroslav Backonja, and
Richard J. Davidson, "Perceived Controllability Modulates
the Neural
1 . For a definition of the genre that has been the subject Response to Pain," The Journal of Neuroscience
of some controversy, see Noël Carroll, Horror: Or24Paradoxes
(2004): 7199-7203.
of the Heart (New York: Routledge, 1990). For discussion,18. Smuts, "Art and Negative Affect," p. 46.
see Aaron Smuts, "Horror," in Routledge Companion19.to Carroll,
Phi-"Enjoying Horror Fictions," p. 71.
20. Aaron Smuts, "The Paradox of Painful Art," Journal
losophy and Film , eds. Paisley Livingston and Carl Plantinga
(New York: Routledge, 2008). of Aesthetic Education 41 (2007): 59-76, at p. 72.
2. The same question can be raised for all genres 21.of Smuts,
fic- "The Paradox of Painful Art," p. 72.
22. Smuts, "Art and Negative Affect," p. 43.
tion that aim to generate negative emotions, for instance,
tragedy or melodrama. For the sake of simplicity,23.I Smuts, focus "Art and Negative Affect," p. 43.
only on horror and do not address the wider paradox 24. Marciaof Eaton, "Aesthetic Pleasure and Pain," The
painful art. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31 (1973): 481^485,
3. Carroll, Horror , p. 159. at p. 485.
4. Gary Iseminger, "How Strange a Sadness," The Jour- 25. See Murat Aydede, "Pain," The Stanford En-
nal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 42 (1983): 81-82. cyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition),
5. Carroll, Horror , p. 184. ed. Edward Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
6. Carroll, Horror , p. 185. spr201 0/entries/pain/.
7. For discussion, see Aaron Smuts, "Art and Negative 26. For an analysis of the distinction between affective
Affect," Philosophy Compass 4 (2009): 39-55. For criticism, and attitudinal pleasure, see Fred Feldman, "The Good Life:
see Susan L. Feagin, "Monsters, Disgust and Fascination," A Defense of Attitudinal Hedonism," Philosophy and Phe-
Philosophical Studies 65 (1992): 75-84; Alex Neill, "On a nomenological Research 65 (2002): 604-628.
Paradox of the Heart," Philosophical Studies 65 (1992): 27. For further discussion of affect valence, see Louis
53-65; Berys Gaut, "The Paradox of Horror," The British Charland, "Emotion Experience and the Indeterminacy of
Journal of Aesthetics 33 (1995): 333-345. Valence," in Emotion and Consciousness , eds. Lisa Feld-
8. Cynthia Hoffner and Kenneth Levine, "Enjoyment of man Barrett, Paula Niedenthal, and Piotr Winkielman (New
Mediated Fright and Violence: A Meta-Analysis," Media York: Guilford, 2005).
Psychology 1 (2005): 207-237, at p. 221. 28. Jesse Prinz, "For Valence," Emotion Review 2 (2010):
9. Hoffner and Levine, "Enjoyment of Mediated Fright 5-13, at p. 7.
and Violence," p. 221. 29. Robert C. Solomon, "Against Valence," in Not Pas-
10. See also Daniel Shaw on the pleasures of identifi- sion's Slave (Oxford University Press, 2001); as discussed in
cation with monsters: "Power, Horror and Ambivalence," Prinz, "For Valence," p. 9.
Film and Philosophy 6 (2001): 1-12. 30. Giovanna Colombetti, "Appraising Valence," Jour-
1 1 . Feagin, "Monsters, Disgust and Fascination, p. 81 . nal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2005): 103-126; Robert C.
12. Neill, "On a Paradox of the Heart," p. 62. Solomon and Lori D. Stone, "On 'Positive' and 'Negative'

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130.192.108.107 on Tue, 18 Jul 2023 09:46:51 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 392 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

Emotions," Journal for thetion as coping mechanisms

Theory of Social in Deeper Behaviour
than Reason (Oxford 32
(2002): 417-435. University Press, 2005).
31. Colombetti, "Appraising40.Valence,"
For an argument p. along113.
these lines, see Gunnar
32. Prinz, "For Valence," p.Breivik,
10."Risk- A Plague or Joy? Some Reflections on the
33. Jesse Prinz, Gut Reactions: A inPerceptual
Nature of Risk Theory
Present Society," Safety of
Science Monitor
Emotion (Oxford University 15(2011):
Press, 1-8. 2004), p. 178. For a de-
fense of this account of valence 41.against
See, for instance, Joanne Cantor, "I'll Never
alternatives, see Have
Jessea
Prinz, "For Valence." Clown in My House: Why Movie Horror Lives On," Poetics
Today
34. Prinz, Gut Reactions , p. 164.25 (2004): 283-304.
35. Prinz, Gut Reactions , p. 42.
164.On the viewer's power of resistance, see Cynthia
Freeland,
36. Prinz, Gut Reactions , p. 175."Realist Horror," in Philosophy and Film , eds.
37. For a review of the literature on risk play, Cynthia Freeland and Thomas Wartenberg (New York:
see Ellen Beate Hansen Sandseter, "Children's Ex- Routledge, 1995).
pressions of Exhilaration and Fear in Risky Play,"
43. Smuts, "The Paradox of Painful Art," p. 74.
Contemporary Issues in Early Childhood 10 (2009):
44. The appeal of horror seems to be stronger in pro-
92-106. portion to its relevance to personal anxieties. See Glenn
38. Sandseter, "Children's Expressions of ExhilarationWalters, "Understanding the Popular Appeal of Horror,"
and Fear in Risky Play," p. 94. Journal of Media Psychology 9 (2004).
39. See, for instance, Jenefer Robinson's analysis of the 45. Morreall, "Enjoying Negative Emotions in Fictions,"
ways in which the formal devices of literary works can func-pp. 101-102.

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