G.R. No.

193993

VIVENNE K. TAN, Petitioner

vs.

VINCENT "BINGBONG" CRISOLOGO, Respondent

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Vivenne K. Tan (Tan) assailing the 20
April 2010 Decision2 and the 1 October 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
112815. The CA found that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon City (RTC), exercised grave abuse
of discretion when it reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 37, Quezon City
(MeTC), to exclude Tan from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.

THE FACTS

On 19 January 1993, Tan, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized citizen of the United States of
America (US.A.).4

On 26 October 2009, Tan applied to be registered as a voter in Quezon City.5 She indicated that she was
a Filipino .Citizen by birth. Her application was approved by the Election Registration Board (ERB) on 16
November 2009 making her a registered voter of Precinct 0853-A, Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.6

On 30 November 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before a notary
public in Makati City.7
The following day, or on 1 December 2009, she filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) for
the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship.8 She stated in her petition that she lost her Philippine
citizenship when she became a naturalized American citizen. However, Tan executed a sworn
declaration renouncing her allegiance to the U.S.A.9 Thereafter, the BI confirmed her reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.10

On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2010 National Elections to run as
congresswoman for the First District of Quezon City.11

On 28 December 2009, respondent Vincent "Bing bong" Crisologo (Crisologo) filed a petition before the
MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 37- 09-1292, seeking the exclusion of Tan from the voter's list because
(1) she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter; and (2) she failed to meet the residency
requirement of the law.12

In her answer, Tan countered that she is a natural-born citizen having been born to Filipino parents on 1
April 1968. Although she became a naturalized American citizen on 19 January 1993, Tan claimed that
since 1996 she had effectively renounced her American citizenship as she had been continuously
residing in the Philippines. She had also found employment within the country and even set up a school
somewhere in Greenhills.13

The Ruling of the Me TC

On 14 January 2010, the MeTC rendered a decision excluding Tan from the voter's list.14 It held that she
was not a Filipino citizen at the time that she registered as a voter, viz:

Through her acts and deeds, [Tan] clearly manifested and unequivocally admitted that she was not a
Filipino citizen at the time of her application as a registered voter. If indeed she was a Filipino citizen as
she claimed and represented, she would not have gone to the extent of re-affirming her Filipino
citizenship, by her act of applying for the same. If indeed she was a Filipino citizen on October 26, 2009,
the day she registered as a voter, she would not have been allowed to apply for Filipino citizenship as
she was already a Filipino citizen. There is the act of [Tan] which would clearly manifest her lack of
Philippine citizenship upon her registration. Said act is her taking an Oath of Allegiance on December 1,
2009. A Filipino citizen would not be required to perform an Oath of Allegiance to affirm his or her
Filipino citizenship, because affirmation is no longer necessary because the citizenship has always been
in her possession.

When' she took her oath of allegiance on December 1, 2009, she renounced any and all allegiance to the
Government of the United States of America. This act is again a clear showing that she was an American
and not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter on October 26, 2009.

xxxx

The foregoing manifest that [Tan], through her subsequent acts and deeds, through the authoritative
permission given to her by governmental agencies, 'and through her application for, and taking of an
Oath of Allegiance for Filipino citizenship, could not be considered as a Filipino citizen at the time that
she registered as a Philippine voter.

In view thereof, the petition for her to be excluded as a voter is GRANTED. [Tan] is hereby to be
excluded from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.15

The Ruling of the RTC

Aggrieved, Tan appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC, where it was reversed and Crisologo's petition
was dismissed for lack of merit. The RTC's position was that Tan's questioned citizenship was cured, to
wit:

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that [Tan] upon registration as voter in the First District of Quezon
City was still a naturalized American Citizen. But her questioned citizenship was cured when [Tan] made
the following acts:

1) She took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on November 30, 2009;
2) She filed a Petition for Reacquisition and/or Retention of Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 before the [BI];

3) On December 1, 2009, the [BI] has issued an Order granting the petition and ordering the issuance of
a Certificate of Retention/Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship in favor of [Tan]; and

4) Lastly, [Tan] executed a Sworn Declaration that she make a formal renunciation of her United States
nationality; that she absolutely and entirely renounce her United States nationality together with all
rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity there unto pertaining before a notary
public on December 1, 2009.

With these acts of [Tan], she is deemed to have never lost her Filipino citizenship.

xxxx

Clearly, the court a quo erred in concluding that [Tan], through her subsequent acts and deeds, through
the authoritative permission given to her by government agencies, and through her application for, and
taking an Oath of Allegiance for Filipino citizenship, could not be considered as a Filipino citizen at the
time she registered as a Philippine voter. [citation omitted]

[Tan] having re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, she is deemed not to have
lost her Filipino citizenship and is, therefore, a valid registered voter. In short, whatever defects [Tan]
had in her nationality when she registered as a voter should now be deemed cured by her re-acquisition
of her Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 14, 2010 of the [Me TC] is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one is rendered dismissing the Petition For Exclusion Of A Voter From The List for lack of merit.16

Since the RTC decision became final and executory pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8189, otherwise
known as the Voter's Registration Act of 1996,17 Crisologo filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.18
He argued that Tan should have been excluded from the list of registered voters for failure to meet the
citizenship and residency requirement to be registered as a voter.

The Assailed CA Decision

After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the CA came up with a decision finding that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in reversing the
decision of the MeTC. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed disposition is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The MeTC
decision dated January 14, 2010 excluding Vivenne K. Tan from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A of
Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City, is REINSTATED. Costs against the Private Respondent.19

In coming up with its conclusion, the CA gave the following reasons:

(1) The taking of the Oath of Allegiance is a condition sine qua non for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen who became a naturalized citizen of a foreign
country;

(2) Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225,20 cannot be relied upon to declare that Tan never lost her Philippine
citizenship or that her reacquisition of such cured the invalidity of her registration because the provision
applies only to citizens of the Philippines at the time of the passage of R.A. No. 9225;

(3) R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards natural-
born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said law;
and

(4) Tan must have first taken her Oath of Allegiance before she can be validly registered as a voter
because R.A. No. 9225 itself says that individuals with dual citizenships must comply with existing laws
for them to enjoy full civil and political rights.
Arguing on pure questions of law, Tan filed the present petition before this Court.

OUR RULING

The pivotal question in this case is whether Tan can be considered a Philippine citizen at the time she
registered as a voter.

A natural-born Filipino citizen who

renounces his or her Philippine

citizenship, effectively becomes a

foreigner in the Philippines with no

political right to participate in

Philippine politics and governance.

The right to vote is reserved for Filipino citizens. The Constitution is clear on this matter:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of
suffrage.21 (emphasis ours)

This constitutional provision is reflected in R.A. No. 8189 this way: "[a]ll citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18) years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6)
months immediately preceding the election, may register as a voter."22 Although the Voter's
Registration Act of 1996 does not contain a similar provision like R.A. No. 918923 that disqualifies non-
Filipino citizens from voting, it does, however, provide that the ERB shall deactivate the registration and
remove the registration records of any person who has lost his or her Filipino citizenship.24
Without any doubt, only Filipino citizens are qualified to vote and may be included in the permanent list
of voters.25 Thus, to be registered a voter in the Philippines, the registrant must be a citizen at the time
he or she .filed the application.

In the present case, it is undisputed that Tan filed her voter's registration application on 26 October
2009, and that she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30 November
2009, or more than a month after the ERB approved her application.

Tan argues that (1) her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 has a retroactive
effect, such that a natural-born Filipino citizen is deemed never to have lost his or her Filipino
citizenship,26 and that (2) the reacquisition cured any and all defects, assuming any are existing,
attendant during her registration as a voter.27

R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens, who lost their Philippine citizenship
through naturalization in a foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship.28 Under
the procedure currently in place under R.A. No. 9225, the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship requires
only the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Congress declared as a state policy that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions laid out by the law.29
The full implications of the effects of R.A. No. 9225 can be fully appreciated in Section 3, which reads:

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed hereby to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

I _________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines, and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (emphasis ours)

Based on this provision alone, it would seem that the law makes a distinction between Filipino citizens
who lost their Philippine citizenship prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9225 and reacquired their
citizenship under the same law from those who lost their Philippine citizenship after R.A. No. 9225 was
enacted and retained their citizenship.30 On this point, Tan contends that this distinction does not
substantially affect her citizenship status because reacquiring or retaining Filipino citizenship has the
same effect.31 Moreover, she points out that the framers of the law did not distinguish the difference;
hence, using the words "reacquire" and "retain" interchangeably.32

In the light of factual circumstances of this case and considering the plain meaning of the words
"reacquire" and "retain," we find it fitting to address the seeming confusion brought about by Section 2
of R.A. No. 9225. In other words, by declaring "deemed to have not lost their Philippine citizenship,"
does this mean that once Philippine citizenship is reacquired after taking the Oath of Allegiance required
in R.A. No. 9225, the effect on the citizenship status retroacts to the period before taking said oath. We
rule in the negative.

Borrowing the words of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes A. Serreno, "[t]he renunciation of foreign citizenship
is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all
civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship."33 The tenor of
these words in Maquiling v. Comelec paved the way for the Court to rule that Amado, the mayoral
candidate who garnered the most number of votes during the May 2010 Elections, was disqualified from
running for any local elective position.34 In that case, the Court found that Amado effectively recanted
his oath of renunciation because he used his U.S. passport after taking the oath.35

While the facts and issue in the case at bar do not involve the same matters discussed in Maquiling and
in Arnado, the Court's position on renunciation and its effect lead us to conclude that once Philippine
citizenship is renounced because of naturalization in a foreign country, we cannot consider one a Filipino
citizen unless and until his or her allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is reaffirmed. Simply
stated, right after a Filipino renounces allegiance to our country, he or she is to be considered a
foreigner.
Note that Tan's act of acquiring U.S. citizenship had been a conscious and voluntary decision on her part.
While studying and working in the U.S.A., Tan chose to undergo the U.S. naturalization process to
acquire U.S. citizenship. This naturalization process required her to renounce her allegiance to the
Philippine Republic and her Philippine citizenship. This is clear from the Oath of Allegiance she took to
become a U.S. citizen, to wit:

I, hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity
to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a
subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of
America against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;
that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform
noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will
perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take
this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.36
(emphasis and italics ours)

Renunciation or the relinquishment of one's citizenship requires a voluntary act for it to produce any
legal effect. This willingness to disassociate from a political community is manifested by swearing to an
oath. If we were to consider the words in the Oath of Allegiance as meaningless, the process laid out
under the law to effect naturalization would be irrelevant and useless. Thus, to give effect to the legal
implications of taking an Oath of Allegiance, we must honor the meaning of the words which the person
declaring the oath has sworn to freely, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the U.S.A. on 19 January 1993, prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9225
on 29 August 2003. If we were to effect as retroactive Tan's Philippine citizenship to the date she lost
her Philippine citizenship, then the different use of the words "reacquire" and "retain" in R.A. No. 9225
would effectively be futile.

An interpretation giving R.A. No. 9225 a retroactive effect to those who have lost their Philippine
citizenship through naturalization by a foreign country prior to R.A. No. 9225 would cause confusion to
what is stated in Section 3: "natural-born citizens by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic." To go beyond what the law says and interpret it in its ordinary and plain
meaning would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
The plain meaning rule or verba legis is the most basic of all statutory construction principles. When the
words or language of a statute is clear, there may be no need to interpret it in a manner different from
what the word plainly implies.37 This rule is premised on the presumption that the legislature know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such
words as are found in the statute.38

Corollary to this rule is the holistic approach. There is no conflict between the plain meaning rule and
this approach as the latter does not espouse going outside the parameters of the statute. It merely
adopts a broader approach towards the body of the law. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Urgello,39 we pronounced:

The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. It
is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must
be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.40

To harmonize, given the distinction between citizens who have "reacquired" from those who "retained"
Philippine citizenship,41 coupled with the legal effects of renunciation of citizenship, Section 2 of R.A.
No. 9225 cannot be used as basis for giving a retroactive application of the law. R.A. No. 9225 contains
no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became
naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to the effectivity of the said law. In fact, correlating
Sections 2 and 3 of the law would readily reveal that only those falling under the second paragraph of
R.A. No. 9225, i.e., natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country after the
effectivity of the said law, shall be considered as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.

Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship retroacts to the date it was lost
would result in an absurd scenario where a Filipino would still be considered a Philippine citizen when in
fact he had already renounced his citizenship. We are not about to give a statute a meaning that would
lead to absurdity as it is our duty to construe statutes in such a way to avoid such consequences. If the
words of a statute are susceptible [to] more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one
construction is a strong argument against its adoption and in favor of such sensible interpretation as
would avoid such result.42
Finally, it is a well-settled rule that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation,
unless the legislature intended to give them a retroactive effect.43 We must bear in mind that a law is a
rule established to guide our actions without no binding effect until it is enacted.44 It has no application
to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future only and
has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal
provisions.45

During the time Tan lost her Philippine citizenship, R.A. No. 9225 was not yet enacted and the applicable
law was still Commonwealth Act No. 63.1âwphi1 Under this law, both the renunciation of Philippine
citizenship and the acquisition of a new citizenship in a foreign country through naturalization are
grounds to lose Philippine citizenship:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. - A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

xxxx

Since the foregoing law was still effective when Tan became an American citizen, the loss of her
Philippine citizenship is but a necessary consequence. As the applicable law at that time, Tan was
presumed to know the legal effects of her choice to become a naturalized U.S. citizen. The loss of Tan's
Philippine citizenship is reinforced by the fact that she voluntarily renounced her Philippine citizenship
as a requirement to acquire U.S. citizenship.

All said, absent any legal basis for the retroactive application of R.A. No. 9225, we agree with the CA that
Tan was not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter and her inclusion to the permanent
voter's list is highly irregular.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the 20 April 2010
Decision and the 1 October 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112815 is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED

---

G.R. No. 226727, April 25, 2018

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST AND DR. ESTER GARCIA, Petitioners, v. VERONICA M. MASANGKAY AND
GERTRUDO R. REGONDOLA, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the February 19, 2016 Decision1 and August 26, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132774, entitled "Veronica M. Masangkay and Gertrudo R. Regondola v.
University of the East, Dr. Ester Garcia and The National Labor Relations Commission. "

Respondents Veronica M. Masangkay (Masangkay) and Gertrudo R. Regondola (Regondola) were regular
faculty members, Associate Professors, and Associate Deans of petitioner University of the East (UE) –
Caloocan Campus, prior to their dismissal on November 26, 2007.

While holding said positions at UE, respondents submitted three (3) manuals, namely: Mechanics,
Statics, and Dynamics, requesting said manuals' temporary adoption as instructional materials.
Respondents represented themselves to be the rightful authors thereof, together with their co-author, a
certain Adelia F. Rocamora (Rocamora). Accompanying said requests are certifications under oath,
signed by respondents, declaring under pain of perjury, and openly certifying that the manuals are
entirely original and free from plagiarism. Said certification reads:

We hereby certify that the contents of the manual MECHANICS FOR ECE AND COE by Gertrudo R.
Regondola, et al. to be used in the subjects ECE 311N are entirely original and free from plagiarism.

(SGD.)

Gertrudo R. Regondola

(SGD.)

Veronica Masangkay2

After review, UE approved the requests for use of said manuals by students of the College of
Engineering.

Thereafter, petitioners received two (2) complaint-letters via electronic mail (e-mail) from a certain
Harry H. Chenoweth and Lucy Singer Block. Chenoweth and Block's father are authors, respectively, of
three books, namely: Applied Engineering Mechanics, Engineering Mechanics, 2nd Edition, 1954, and
Engineering Mechanics: Statics & Dynamics, 3rd Edition, 1975. They categorically denied giving
respondents permission to copy, reproduce, imitate, or alter said books, and asked for assistance from
UE to stop the alleged unlawful acts and deal with this academic dishonesty.

Prompted by the seriousness of the allegations, UE investigated the matter. After a thorough evaluation
of the alleged plagiarized portions, petitioner conducted an investigation in which respondents actively
participated and filed their Answer. Eventually, UE's Board of Trustees issued Resolution No. 2007-11-84
dismissing respondents. Notices of Dismissal effective November 26, 2007 were sent to respondents and
Rocamora via registered mail.
Unlike herein respondents, Rocamora sought reconsideration of the decision to the Board of Trustees.
Respondents, however, did not appeal the decision terminating them and instead opted to claim their
benefits due them, which consisted of leave credits, sick leave, holiday pay, bonuses, shares in tuition
fee increase, COLA, and RATA. For her part, respondent Masangkay requested that a portion of her
benefits be applied to her existing car loan. For the amounts that they received, they signed vouchers
and pay slips. These were duly acted upon by UE.

Rocamora's case

It appears that after the Board of Trustees denied reconsideration of Rocamora's dismissal, the latter
filed a case against UE for illegal dismissal. Eventually reaching this Court, the illegality of her dismissal
was upheld by the Court through a resolution in University of the East and Dr. Ester Garcia v. Adelia
Rocamora, G.R. No. 199959, February 6, 2012.

Meanwhile, almost three years after having been dismissed from service and after collecting their
accrued benefits, respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on July 20, 2010, docketed as
NLRC NCR No. 07-09924-10, entitled "Veronica M. Masangkay and Gertrudo R. Regondola v. University
of the East (UE), President Ester Garcia."

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In its February 28, 2011 ruling,3 the labor arbiter held that respondents were illegally dismissed and
ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and full backwages
inclusive of allowances until actual reinstatement. UE was directed to pay a total of P4,623,873.34
representing both respondents' backwages, allowances, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary
damages. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainants to have been
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. Respondents are ordered to immediately reinstate complainants to their position
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and full backwages inclusive of allowances until actual
reinstatement. Respondent University of the East is directed to pay complainants the following:

VERONICA M. MASANGKAY
1. BACKWAGES:

11/1/07 - 2/28/11

50,000 x 39.93 =

P1,996,500.00

13th MO. PAY:

P1,996,500/12 =

P 166,375.00

ALLOWANCE: 41741

P3,000.00 x 39.93 =

P 119,790.00

P2,282,665.00

2. 13th MO. PAY

7/20/2007 - 10/31/2007

P50,000 x 3.40 / 12 =

P 14,166.67

3. MORAL DAMAGES

P 50,000.00

4. EXEMPLARY DAMAGE

P 25,000.00

TOTAL:

P2,371,831.67
GERTRUDO R. REGONDOLA

5. BACKWAGES: November 1, 2007 -February 28, 2011

50,000.00 x 39.93 =

P1,996,500.00

13th MO. PAY:

P1,996,500/12

P 166,375.00

ALLOWANCE:

P3,000.00 x 39.93

P2,162,875.00

6. 13th MO. PAY

July 20, 2007 - October 31, 2007

P50,000 x 3.40 / 12 =

P 14,166.67

7. MORAL DAMAGES

P 50,000.00

8. EXEMPLARY DAMAGE

P 25,000.00

TOTAL:

P 2,252,041.67
 10% Attorney's Fees

462,287.33

GRAND TOTAL:

P4,623,873.34

SO ORDERED.4

NLRC Decision

The case reached the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), where the Commission reversed the
labor arbiter's ruling and disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondents is GRANTED and the labor arbiter's Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.5

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,6 respondents elevated the case to the CA.

CA Ruling

The appellate court reinstated the labor arbiter's ruling that petitioners failed to prove that indeed a just
cause for respondents' dismissal exists. Too, it emphasized, among others, that the instant petition is
bound by this Court's Decision in the Rocamora case, calling for the application of the doctrine of stare
decisis. The CA thus disposed of the case in this manner:

IN VIEW OF ALL THESE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 29, 2012 and
Resolution dated September 17, 2013 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 28, 2011 of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA denied reconsideration of the questioned Decision in the assailed Resolution of August 26, 2016,
prompting petitioners to file the instant petition, raising the following issues, to wit:

1) Whether or not respondents' misrepresentation, dishonesty, plagiarism and/or copyright

infringement which is considered academic dishonesty tantamount to serious misconduct is a just and
valid cause for their dismissal.

2) Whether or not the CA erroneously applied the principle of stare decisis.

3) Whether or not respondents are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages, and other monetary
awards despite the fact that they were dismissed for valid cause under the Labor Code.

4) Whether or not the award of damages and attorney's fees have factual and legal basis.

Petitioners argue, among others, that the instant case cannot be bound by the Rocamora case via
application of the doctrine of stare decisis because of substantial differences in Rocamora's situation
and in that of respondents, as noted by the NLRC. Too, petitioners maintain that plagiarism, a form of
academic dishonesty, is a serious misconduct that justly warrants herein respondents' dismissal.

This Court's Ruling

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principle of stare decisis requires that once a case has been decided one way, the rule is settled that
any other case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner.7 It
simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.8

Applying said principle, the CA held that Our ruling in University of the East v. Adelia Rocamora9 is a
precedent to the case at bar, involving, as it does, herein respondents' co-author and tackling the same
violation—the alleged plagiarism of the very same materials subject of the instant case.

In this petition, UE, however, asserts that the case of respondents substantially varies from Rocamora so
as not to warrant the application of said rule.

Indeed, the CA erred when it relied on Our ruling in University of the East v. Adelia Rocamora in
resolving the present dispute. Our decision in Rocamora, rendered via a Minute Resolution, is not a
precedent to the case at bar even though it tackles the same violation—the alleged plagiarism of the
very same materials subject of the instant case, which was initiated by respondents' co-author. This is so
since respondents are simply not similarly situated with Rocamora so as to warrant the application of
the doctrine of stare decisis.

A legal precedent is a principle or rule established in a previous case that is either binding on or
persuasive for a court or other tribunal when deciding subsequent cases with similar issues or facts.

Here, We find that the Rocamora case is not on all fours with the present dispute, thereby removing it
from the application of the principle of stare decisis. First, herein respondents categorically represented
to UE under oath that the Manuals were free from plagiarism—an act in which their co-author
Rocamora did not participate. Second, respondents benefited financially from the sale of the Manuals
while Rocamora did not. Third, respondents acquiesced to UE's decision to terminate their services and
even requested the release of and thereafter claimed the benefits due them.

Aside from these, respondents executed a Certification categorically stating under oath and declaring
under pain of perjury that the manuals are entirely original and free from plagiarism. To reiterate:

We hereby certify that the contents of the manual MECHANICS FOR ECE AND COE by Gertrude R.
Regondola, et al. to be used in the subjects ECE 311N are entirely original and free from plagiarism.

(SGD.)

Gertrudo R. Regondola

(SGD.)

Veronica Masangkay10

As correctly noted by the NLRC in its September 17, 2013 Resolution,11 Rocamora made no such
undertaking with respect to the subject materials. This Certification is crucial in determining the guilt of
herein respondents and cannot simply be disregarded.

By expressly guaranteeing to UE that their Manuals were entirely original, coupled by their omission to
attribute the copied portions to the original authors thereof, as per the Memorandum submitted by
Chancellor Celso D. Benologa, it is apparent that respondents represented said copied portions as their
own.

More importantly, We find that the CA erred in disregarding the evidence presented by petitioner as
regards the issue of plagiarism.
In the assailed ruling, the CA held that petitioner UE failed to prove that respondents were indeed guilty
of the charge of misconduct or dishonesty through plagiarism—a form of academic dishonesty. It found
that the evidence does not show that respondents were motivated with wrongful intent in publishing
the manuals.12 In ruling thus, the appellate court heavily relied on the approval of the manual by the
Textbook Evaluation and Publishing Office (TEPO) and the Board of Trustees m exculpating respondents
from liability.

The CA also found that their act of allegedly plagiarizing the books of Chenoweth and Singer was not
duly proven since the two (2) e-mails from Chenoweth and Block were not verified such that, therefore,
such e-mails afford no assurance of their authenticity and reliability.13 The CA went on to state that
"[h]aving issues on their authenticity and reliability, the allegations in the e-mails are mere speculations
that, therefore, such fact renders such e-mails inadmissible in evidence against petitioners."14

The CA, in its Resolution, thereafter ruled that the evidence charging respondents with plagiarism was
inadmissible, viz:

Be that as it may, We reiterate that private respondents failed to sufficiently prove that petitioners were
guilty of plagiarism that would warrant the latter's dismissal from service. In order to prove petitioners'
act of plagiarizing the books of Chenoweth and Ferdinand Singer, private respondents only presented
the following: unauthenticated and unverified e-mails from Chenoweth and Block and the Lecture
Guides/Manuals. The e-mails from Chenoweth and Block, being unauthenticated, are, therefore,
inadmissible in evidence against petitioners. Private respondents cannot merely rely on the Lecture
Guides/Manuals in order to show that petitioners were guilty of plagiarism. The reason is that such
Lecture Guides/Manuals were duly scrutinized and evaluated by the TEPO, through its Board of
Textbooks Review, and were eventually approved by the UE Board of Trustees. It would be absurd for
private respondents to declare the Lecture Guides/Manuals as plagiarized documents when in the first
place, private respondents, through TEPO and the UE Board of Trustees, had initially scrutinized and
approved the same.15

In labor cases, the deciding authority should use every reasonable means to ascertain speedily and
objectively the facts, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure. Technical rules of evidence
are not strictly binding in labor cases such as the instant one.16 Thus, it was error on the part of the CA
to disregard the evidence presented by petitioners to establish the act of plagiarism committed by
respondents.
It is worthy to note that the CA failed to examine the actual text written in the manual and compare the
same with the work claimed to have been plagiarized. However, after a thorough review of the records
of the case, the Court finds that respondents, indeed, plagiarized the works of Chenoweth and Singer. It
is glaring from a comparison of the subject text that respondents heavily lifted portions of the said
books, as reported in the Memorandum submitted by Chancellor Celso F. Bebologa,17 thus:

FINDINGS:

1.

In his Memorandum dated March 15, 2007, Dean Constantino T. Yap verified Mr. Chenoweth's claim
that he is one of the authors of the textbook "Applied Engineering Mechanics". (EXHIBIT "1")

2.

At least three (3) books containing the names of Masangkay, Rocamora, Regondola, and Tolentino were
copied verbatim or with slight modifications from the following original engineering books:

Engineering Mechanics, Second Edition, by Ferdinand L. Singer

Applied Engineering Mechanics, Metric Edition, by Alfred Jensen, Harry H. Chenoweth, adapted by David
N. Watkins
Another author, Hibbeler, is also mentioned as a source of the "reproduction" but the specific book is
not identified (EXHIBITS "2," "3," "4," & "5")

Tolentino's name appeared only in one of the three books copied from the original (EXHIBITS "6" TO "6-
B," "7" TO "7-B" & "8" TO "8- B").

3.

No publisher is indicated in the "copied" volumes which are made of low quality paper.

OTHER INFORMATION

"Reproduced" copies are sold to students. Copies bought by students are retrieved by professors at the
end of the school term. Records of students who failed to return the "reproduced" copies bought by
them are marked LFR and/or NC.

Students interested to buy the "reproduced" book are referred to specific bookstores. A bookstore –
Special & Journal – with address at No. 76 Samson Road, Caloocan City is selling the "reproduced"
books.
-

Some professors reportedly own or operate printing press facilities. Others are holding personal review
classes or having their own review centers.

There are pending lapsed applications for removal of LFR at the Engineering Department. Professors
alleged their class records were lost when required to present them to support the applications.

In a letter requiring respondents to provide the basis of their appeal of their dismissal, Dr. Ester A Garcia
quoted the findings of the Faculty Disciplinary Board:

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1.

From the books of Singer, 558 sentences/figures were plagiarized and used in the manuals of
Respondents, either verbatim or with modification; while from the book of Jensen-Chenoweth, 52
sentences and figures were likewise taken and used in Respondents' manuals.
2.

Respondents did not mention, as required in Section 184 of the Intellectual Property Law, the sources
and the names of the authors of the textbooks from where they lifted passages, illustrations, and tables
used in their manuals.

3.

In their request to TEPO for temporary adoption of the manuals, Respondents certified under oath that
the manuals are all original and free from plagiarism. Other investigation, however, shows otherwise.
(emphasis ours)

To this Court, the bulk of the copied text vis-a-vis the said Certification clearly shows wrongful intent on
the part of respondents. We cannot subscribe to the CA ruling that respondents were in good faith
since, being the principal authors thereof, they had full knowledge as to what they were including in
their written work. In other words, they knew which portions were truly original and which were not.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that there is sufficient basis for dismissing respondents from service,
considering the highest integrity and morality which the profession requires from its teachers.
Respondents plagiarized the works of Chenoweth and Singer by lifting large portions of the text of the
works of said writers without properly attributing the copied text, and, to make matters worse, they
represented under oath that no portion of the Manuals were plagiarized when, in truth and in fact, huge
portions thereof were improperly lifted from other materials.

Lastly, it is well to emphasize that Rocamora strongly opposed her dismissal from service as contained in
her December 3, 2007 Letter,18 where she invoked denial of due process in her termination, denied
having committed plagiarism or benefiting from the printing of the materials in question, and "sincerely
hop[ing] that the [Board of Trustees] x x x, will see the injustice [she] got which ought to be reversed and
reconsidered."19

Such, however, is not so for herein respondents. It is well to emphasize that in her June 2, 2008
Letter,20 respondent Masangkay requested the recomputation of the amounts due in her favor after
said termination, as well as the application of said amounts to her car loan balance. She was even
cooperative with the procedure, asking the management to advise her should there be a need for her to
prepare and accomplish her time records for purposes of recomputing her salary.
As to Regondola, aside from the cash and check vouchers21 that he signed after receiving the amounts
due him after said termination, it does not appear that he made any similar letter request or appeal,
unlike Masangkay or Rocamora, respectively.

Indeed, rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right to be recognized by law.22 Within the context
of a termination dispute, waivers are generally looked upon with disfavor and are commonly frowned
upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a worker's legal rights.
If (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (b) the
terms of the settlement are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims must be struck
down as invalid or illegal.23

Thus, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its
face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid
and binding undertaking.24

In the case at bar, We find no reason to rule that respondents did not waive their right to contest UE's
decision. Based on their actuations subsequent to their termination, it is clear that they were amenable
to UE's decision of terminating their services on the ground of academic dishonesty. Nowhere can we
find any indication of unwillingness or lack of cooperation on respondents' part with regard to the
events that transpired so as to convince Us that they were indeed constrained to forego their right to
question the management's decision. Neither do we find any sign of coercion nor intimidation, subtle or
otherwise, which could have forced them to simply accept said decision. In fact, based on their
qualifications, this Court cannot say that respondents and UE do not stand on equal footing so as to
force respondents to simply yield to UE's decision. Furthermore, there is no showing that respondents
did not receive or received less than what is legally due them in said termination.

In sum, We are of the view that their acceptance of UE's decision is voluntary and with full
understanding thereof, tantamount to a waiver of their right to question the management's decision to
terminate their services for academic dishonesty. It is as though they have waived any and all claims
against UE when they knowingly and willingly acquiesced to their dismissal and opted to receive the
benefits due them instead.

We also find that they genuinely accepted petitioner University's decision at that time and that their
filing of the complaint almost three (3) years later was a mere afterthought and, in their own words,
inspired by their colleague's victory.25

In the light of the foregoing, the Rocamora case cannot be used as a precedent to the case at bar. In
view of the substantial evidence presented by petitioner UE that respondents committed plagiarism,
then the complaint for illegal dismissal must, therefore, be dismissed for utter lack of basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 19, 2016 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 132774 and its August 26, 2016 Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

----

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.

MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,

vs.

EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.

Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.

J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.

Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No.
37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis
(who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter
S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis,
or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to
his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the
amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling
P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released
from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions
filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor —
pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and
second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to
the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by
the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the
national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by
this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not
disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law
of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law,
but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex
rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi
would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of
proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even
mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity
to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing
without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It
must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be
governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate
and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine
will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision
in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law
and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

----
G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,

vs.

EMMA M. ROSQUETA, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right committed by a superior public
officer in preventing a subordinate from doing her assigned task and being officially recognized for it.

The Facts and the Case

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection
and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from
that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five
months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure
and that she had resigned against her will on orders of her superior.1

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosqueta’s
position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and
injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of Customs, the
Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court2 (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539.
On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the
Finance Secretary3 from implementing Valera’s appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court
superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction.4
Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining
the implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA
eventually dismissed the petition before it.

On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force,
petitioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the
powers and functions of the Deputy Commissioner.

During the Bureau’s celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special Panorama
magazine edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The
souvenir program, authorized by the Bureau’s Steering Committee headed by petitioner Villanueva to be
issued on the occasion, had a space where Rosqueta’s picture was supposed to be but it instead stated
that her position was "under litigation." Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard displayed at the
Bureau’s main gate included Valera’s picture but not Rosqueta’s.

On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint5 for damages before the RTC of Quezon
City against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter maliciously excluded
her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented her from
performing her duties as Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave
applications. Thus, she asked the RTC to award her ₱1,000,000.00 in moral damages, ₱500,000.00 in
exemplary damages, and ₱300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

But the RTC dismissed6 respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva committed
no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had
validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the Bureau’s centennial
anniversary.

But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision,7 holding instead that petitioner Villanueva’s refusal to comply
with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to
recover moral damages from him.8 Citing the abuse of right principle, the RTC said that Villanueva acted
maliciously when he prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of salaries and
leaves, and denied her official recognition as Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial
anniversary memorabilia. Thus, the appellate court ordered Villanueva to pay ₱500,000.00 in moral
damages, ₱200,000.00 in exemplary damages and ₱100,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses. With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Villanueva filed this petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable
in damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in
the quo warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy
Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.

The Court’s Ruling

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,9 a person must, in the exercise of
his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 2010 and 2111 of the Civil Code which
grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.12

Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
when he allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held
the position merely in a temporary capacity and since she lacked the Career Executive Service eligibility
required for the job.

But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a
government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law
had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not
yet been properly resolved.

That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who
remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial
anniversary memorabilia was not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary
and prevented her from assuming the duties of the position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses
Gutierrez,13 a party’s refusal to abide by a court order enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise
lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.1avvphi1
That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy Commissioner for another division of the Bureau
is immaterial. While such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo warranto case moot and
academic, it did not have the effect of wiping out the injuries she suffered on account of petitioner
Villanueva’s treatment of her. The damage suit is an independent action.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded
when the defendant’s transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiff’s anguish14 in the cases
specified in Article 221915 of the Civil Code.16

Here, respondent Rosqueta’s colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on
account of the speculation over her employment status.17 She had to endure being referred to as a
"squatter" in her workplace. She had to face inquiries from family and friends about her exclusion from
the Bureau’s centennial anniversary memorabilia. She did not have to endure all these affronts and the
angst and depression they produced had Villanueva abided in good faith by the court’s order in her
favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.

The Court, however, finds the award of ₱500,000.00 excessive. As it held in Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Alejandro,18 moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the
defendant’s grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably approximate the extent of hurt
caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here, that would be ₱200,000.00.

The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good
but, in line with the same reasoning, reduces it to ₱50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the award of
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses but reduces it to ₱50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV 85931 with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED
to pay respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the sum of ₱200,000.00 in moral damages, ₱50,000.00 in
exemplary damages, and ₱50,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.
----

G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,

vs.

SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court are the Court of
Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
80309. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the assailed resolution denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez).

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in
Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department Store
(Robinson’s) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided to
purchase the black jeans worth ₱2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a
receipt5 issued by the store.6

While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug Store (Mercury)
where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the
item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in her
favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of
the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon.8
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation
in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans.9 They
supposedly even searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another
argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air
narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the same
took place while respondent was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to
be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive it.12 Respondent
also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter and
the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling respondent’s Robinson’s credit
card. Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging letter.13 With the
above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.14 She
thus filed the Complaint for Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc.
(California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez. She
demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.16

In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of
payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it
was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication
between the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked
Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed to mean that the item
has already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and
when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not
payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that
they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to the agreed venue
where they talked to respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that
respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment.20 They emphasized that they were gentle and
polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions.21 As
counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.22

On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim of the
parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other
defendants believed in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no motive
to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that when they demanded
payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest belief that no payment was
made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation took place in
front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that situation by
choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not
take it against the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass or
humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the
Guess employees to warrant the award of damages.23

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants
Michelle Ybañez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G.
Quiñones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and
attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.24

While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when they confronted
respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found
preponderance of evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to
respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s possession of both the official receipt and the subject
black jeans as evidence of payment.25 Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter
addressed to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s employer not merely to ask for assistance
for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury
such that she would be pressured to pay.26 Considering that Guess already started its investigation on
the incident, there was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s employer who was
not privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not
only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade
payment.27 The appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling
respondent to collect moral damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made
liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its employees; while
Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent to respondent’s employer. In
view of Hawayon and Villagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were exonerated from liability.28
Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in the
assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.

Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC
OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S
FEES.30

The petition is without merit.

Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided for
in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly
embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their
shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of
the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed
made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not
without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing
damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code. The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio v.
Valmonte31 is noteworthy:

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or
injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal
moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental
precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x x32 The elements of abuse
of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.33

In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the
invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the
mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the
black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make such
payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or not
and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right was exercised in
good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of
legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another.35 Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The
Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started
well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the
RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on
their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item purchased
from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot
insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been
proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.

It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard and tried to force
respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners
even sent a demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously
imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt
of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also
accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when she was asked about the
circumstances of payment, thus:

x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x

When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told me, "I
can’t remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and
1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such denomination in our
cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she received change from the
cashier, she then answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these simple questions, I am very certain
that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our boutique to
clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying that she’s in a hurry and very busy.37

Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did
she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it
and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the issuance
of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that
respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, respondent was not in a
rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have
a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed non-payment.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer,
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondent’s reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial
evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A
person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens
himself to liability.38

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must
not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil Code
which read:40

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s fees.
Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous
to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given
to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of
hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.42 They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but
to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by
the CA is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to
protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of of₱20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

----

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.

Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to
the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on
November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry
who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry
confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week
forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the
office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to
take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and
initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A")
clearing private respondent of participation in the anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G.
Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report
however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from
work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second
laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and
initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not
those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the
report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City
Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to
just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for
estafa through Falsification of commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised
Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these
complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to
the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed
four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who,
however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his
employment has been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on
petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the
Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said
office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the
latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However,
petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious,
oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the
hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered
judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's
fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand,
Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated
August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right
to dismiss private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify
him for the damage that he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles
that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the
effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which
were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which
were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through
society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of
justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A
right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they
were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave
private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should
"vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-
27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test
which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual
circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186
(1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28,
1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries,
Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21,
1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and
considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that
they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and
told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week
vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his
keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not
dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies
to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than
civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be
justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to
go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such
employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And
this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on
November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by
Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first
report made by the police investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the
statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the
pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to
dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to
the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974,
58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18
SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed
by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January,
1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to
protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him
to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail.
Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the
various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as
Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias'
personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in
October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of
the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained
unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must
likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however,
contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the kind of employee
the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that
"it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any
threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And this includes warning one's brethren of the
possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and
integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming
obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the time Tobias was
dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be
"penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints
against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the
perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition,
p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the
courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239
(1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith
[Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric
Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints
should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a
clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA,
G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for
actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence,
filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October
30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for
malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The
mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for
malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad
faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the
criminal complaints against Tobias, observing that:

xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five
(5) of which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290
of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed
for insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry
of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of
these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a
presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.

xxx

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief
Document Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement
in the fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which
defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-
up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," defendants
hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification
of commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that
as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal
de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident.
Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent Tobias," there can be
no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass,
oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

xxx

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal
complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against
petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier
noted. But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed
against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the number of
anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied
by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would
be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang like
the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal
complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case
against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the
two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE
MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion
than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against
Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against
petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual
damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos
(P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The
trial court, after making a computation of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8;
Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages;
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be
underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the
abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and
the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as the
scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible
employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the damage
wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages
awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum
absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent
herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which
was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17;
Rollo, p. 18].

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a
violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207,
September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of
Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application
in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss
Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in
connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other
quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in
Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision
of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in
Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to
Tobias.

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil
Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January
8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more
reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad
faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by
petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
09055 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

---

[G.R. No. 57227. May 14, 1992.]

AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by the former, his
mother and natural guardian, Petitioners, v. IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.

Roberto M. Sarenas, for Petitioners.

Bienvenido D. Carriaga for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURT OF APPEALS; DUTY THEREOF IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS APPELLATE
JURISDICTION. — It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a
persuasive and not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of the trial court and
rectify the errors it committed as may have been properly assigned and as could be established by a re-
examination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the
trial court, that as a rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Court (Hermon v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]).

2. ID.; ID.; AS A GENERAL RULE, ONLY ERRORS OF LAWS COMMITTED THEREOF ARE REVIEWABLE BY THE
SUPREME COURT. — This being a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court
will review only errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to
re-examine all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, Et Al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court
of Appeals, Et Al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).

3. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AS A GENERAL RULE, MERE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IS NOT BY ITSELF A BASIS
FOR RECOVERY; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — As regards Amelita’s claim for damages which is based on
Article 19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan’s promise of marriage, she surrendered
her virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself
a basis for recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony’s Restaurant, Amelita was already 28
years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction
to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she induced or deceived because of a
promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed
after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration
that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse
only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her
submit herself to Ivan.

DECISION

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision 1 dated April 30, 1981 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner’s complaint and set aside the resolution 2
dated October 21, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, 16th Judicial District, amending the
dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 and ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1)
to acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of
P300.00 to the minor child, (3) to pay complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual
and moral damages; and (4) to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.

It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was filed
with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint,
Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met Ivan
Mendez at Tony’s Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day
following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted;
that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think
about Ivan’s proposal; that at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home
to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his
hotel room and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter;
that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they repeated
their sexual contact in the months of September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a
result of which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita
had no sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at
the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her
work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of
P5,000 to P8,000.00. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the payment of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees plus costs.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony’s Cocktail Lounge but
denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of cause of action. By way of counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment of exemplary
damages and litigation expense including attorney’s fees for the filing of the malicious complaint.

On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint impleading
as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975. In its order dated
September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint reiterating his
previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.

After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive portion of which
reads, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita
Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum
of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages; and, the sum of P3,000.00, as and by way of
attorney’s fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan Mendez
anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by evidence. Amelita
Constantino, on the other hand, sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as
the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.

In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino’s motion for
reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to read as
follows, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita
Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and against defendant Ivan Mendez ordering the
latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and the
sum of P200.00 as and by way of payment of the hospital and medical bills incurred during the delivery
of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to recognize as his own illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor
Michael Constantino who shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining to a child
of such status; to give a permanent monthly support in favor of plaintiff Michael Constantino the
amount of P300.00; and the sum of P5,000.00, as and by way of attorney’s fees. The defendant shall pay
the costs of this suit.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and the complaint was
dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.

Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the complaint.

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings of the trial court and
in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed out that the appellate court committed
a misapprehension of facts when it concluded that Ivan did not have sexual access with Amelita during
the first or second week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time of the conception of the child.

It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a persuasive and not a
conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is the duty of the
Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of the trial court and rectify the errors it committed as
may have been properly assigned and as could be established by a re-examination of the evidence on
record. It is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not those of the trial court, that as a rule are
considered final and conclusive even on this Court (Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 155 SCRA 24
[1987]). This being a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review
only errors of law committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine
all over again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, Et Al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).

It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelita Constantino
has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son
Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence on record is controlling
on this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on record. Even the trial court initially
entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as the illegitimate son of Ivan only when
acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on October 21, 1976, its earlier decision
dated June 21, 1976. Amelita’s testimony on cross-examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in
Manila in the first or second week of November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent
with her response that she could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November,
1974 (Ibid, p. 106). Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is
the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she
had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad

Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as correctly pointed
out by private respondent’s counsel, citing medical science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth Ed., p. 198) to
the effect that "the mean duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of conception must be
close to 267 days", the conception of the child (Michael) must have taken place about 267 days before
August 3, 1375 or sometime in the second week of November, 1974. While Amelita testified that she
had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974, nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own
evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a
conference, prepared by her own counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the
attendant circumstances of her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is
four (4) months pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was
conceived on or about October 11, 1974.

Petitioner’s assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 65) is belied by
Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for her attachment
to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also confided that she had a
quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An order for recognition and support
may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. The
burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son.
Consequently, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the
complaint must be dismissed.

As regards Amelita’s claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the
theory that through Ivan’s promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but agree with
the Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages could
only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time
she met Ivan at Tony’s Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that she was
attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she
could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual
contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of
September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that
passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to
Ivan.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

----

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the
Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16
October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of
promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial
court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty
lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other
hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August
1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which
was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the
petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living
with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during
a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed
for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her
such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged
as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed
to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents
nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his
place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally,
no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim,
that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged
into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral
damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the
stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is
single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1,
1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October
1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter
damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos
as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue
who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her,
she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent
and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for
the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting
friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and
(g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to
the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her
claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the
private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend
before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage
to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on
which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers
and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because
plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry
their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the
few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they
continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine
at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a
result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to
abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to
marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod
City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still
convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to
marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by
looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the
case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing
the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the
trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court
made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the
time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower
court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic)
not have allowed

"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant
to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been
sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise,
she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and
tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he
usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at
(sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March
3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him
to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there
was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed
have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but
also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working
and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job
at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so
low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he
studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan
City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with
another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to
marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue
and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity
to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art.
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein
the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral
wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem,
he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to
marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4)
wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses
good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned
on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an
illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would
not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis,
it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also
raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to
the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity
to observe closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly
overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked
any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again
the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized
exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate
these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin
v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or
impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v.
People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.
Sosing,

L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30,
1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety
and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);

(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in
this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish
in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive
law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following
rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age.
Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and
her parents would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide
for specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American
or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible
for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176
of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law
on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished
under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25
this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of
age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed
to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the
court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had
been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's
memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction,
that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil.
595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the
woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56)
She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions
and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence
of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the
female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the
female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to
profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is
here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this
Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,

L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56
(sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be
the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was
criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way
around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of
the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was
seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual
act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but
the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury
which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court,
however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the
circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit
as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting
injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there
should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at
fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice
that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51,
January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.
Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be
his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life
of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed
such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have
been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress
not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience
about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in
equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded
that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original
wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by

fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the
other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the
fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent
and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this
Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in
the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.