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Hydrogen Damage in C-½Mo Steel

This document describes the inspection of pipework and process vessels in an ammonia plant for hydrogen damage using non-destructive techniques. The inspection revealed substantial damage to pipework and two vessels. Laboratory testing was also conducted on samples removed from the plant. The inspection and testing aimed to detect hydrogen damage before failure occurred and inform assessments of equipment fitness for service.

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Rupam Baruah
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
119 views11 pages

Hydrogen Damage in C-½Mo Steel

This document describes the inspection of pipework and process vessels in an ammonia plant for hydrogen damage using non-destructive techniques. The inspection revealed substantial damage to pipework and two vessels. Laboratory testing was also conducted on samples removed from the plant. The inspection and testing aimed to detect hydrogen damage before failure occurred and inform assessments of equipment fitness for service.

Uploaded by

Rupam Baruah
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Detection of Hydrogen Damage in

Carbon-½Molybdenum Pipework and


Process Vessels
In line with the recent experience that C-½Mo steels should be assessed as carbon steels with respect
to hydrogen damage, a recent assessment identified areas of pipework and a number of process
vessels in an ammonia plant as being potentially at risk. Consequently, a program of inspection
involving development of suitable NDE inspection techniques was instituted to identify the presence
of hydrogen damage in these items of plant. This inspection revealed that a substantial amount of
pipework had indeed been damaged. In addition, two vessels had suffered damage at specific
locations. The paper describes the inspection and subsequent action that was undertaken and
categorizes the metallurgy of the material that suffered damage

C. Jones, D. Keen, C Thomas


MPT Solutions

A Dowrie
Incitec-Pivot

Introduction The factors that influence high temperature hydro-


gen damage are well known and are described in the

T his paper describes the evaluation of plant


susceptible to high temperature hydrogen
attack (HTHA). It includes examples of
damage detected using non-destructive
techniques based primarily on ultrasonic methodolo-
5th edition of API941 “Steels for Hydrogen Service at
Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Re-
fineries and Petrochemical Plants” [1]. The C-0.5Mo
safe working line has been removed from the Nelson
curves within this code. This now means there are po-
gies. Subsequent laboratory testing of material re- tentially many items in hot hydrogen environments,
moved from service is also described. These inspec- which may contain HTHA. The risk that items may
tions have been conducted on thirty eight vessels, contain such damage has been addressed by API581
twelve piping systems from five ammonia plants and Appendix I [2]. This RBI source document helps to
two oil refineries. In addition, 15,000 metres of water define risk and provides greater emphasis for concern
wall tube in coal fired power station boilers to com- (ie risk ranking is higher) for annealed material com-
pare and contrast with the form of the attack encoun- pared with normalised plant.
tered in chemical plant.. The combination of severe consequence and in-
creased potential for failure categorises many currently

2004 273 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL


operating C-0.5Mo plant as high risk. Clearly, the in- Detection of HTHA
tention of inspection is to detect and remove damaged
material before failure occurs. Relevant codes such as Ultrasonic examination for HTHA
API941 [1] and API581 [2] deal primarily with detec-
tion and susceptibility to hydrogen attack and there is The latest, 5th Edition of API941 [1] lists four ge-
no detailed accepted approach to determine fitness for neric types of ultrasonic testing that are often applied
service. In addition to describing inspection tech- for the detection of HTHA:
niques, this paper also attempts to comment on aspects
of fitness for service. • Backscatter techniques (amplitude based, pat-
tern recognition and directional dependent
methods) [1];
HTHA Mechanism • Velocity methods [7, 8, 9];
• Attenuation [10]; and
The damage mechanism that leads to HTHA is: • Spectral Analysis [11, 12].
• Dissolution of hydrogen from the process en- Backscatter ultrasonic testing involves irradiating
vironment. the test material with moderately high frequency ultra-
• Decarburisation caused by the reaction be- sound and detecting the backscatter noise that is re-
tween carbon (as carbide) and dissolved hy- flected back from HTHA. This can be used to detect
drogen to form methane. HTHA and also to provide an estimate of the concen-
• Fissuring and cracking caused by internal tration and through thickness extent of damage.
methane pressure. Velocity methods make use of the fact that the al-
tered microstructure from HTHA produces material
The mechanism of hydrogen damage that occurs in with different shear wave ultrasound velocity than the
waterwall tubes in conventional fossil fuelled power unaffected material, whereas low frequency compres-
plant is similar except the hydrogen for methane for- sion wave ultrasound velocity is relatively unaffected.
mation originates from an under deposit corrosion The difference between the compression and shear
mechanism [3]. Failure of the water wall tube is char- wave velocity can be obtained by simultaneous high
acterised by a thick lip fracture surface. The tube un- accuracy thickness measurement. The velocity ratio
zips along the hydrogen damaged zone for a typical technique may provide information about the concen-
distance of ~300 mm on the fire side (Figure 1). The tration of hydrogen damage through thickness [8, 11].
damage occurs at tube metal temperatures of approxi- It is our experience that ultrasonic velocity ratio tech-
mately 350°C. nique seems less useful in materials that are slightly
The growth of methane bubbles is assisted by damaged. This is consistent with results reported by
creep cavitation [4,5]. High operating hydrogen par- Wang [11].
tial pressures, high temperatures, primary and secon- Attenuation methods are recorded as successful in
dary stresses increase the rate of damage [6]. the specific examples encountered by Maggard [10].
However more recently this method has lost popularity
due to the difficulties associated with its practical ap-
plication [12]. We have successfully used this tech-
nique however, by using a multiple frequency ap-
proach. It has been found that the classification of
hydrogen attack damage using attenuation methods is
frequency dependent. Multiple measurements with 5,
7.5 and 10 MHz narrow band ultrasound has allowed
reliable detection. By sweeping across this range of
frequencies with individual lowly damped transducers,
it is found the sensitivity is increased for frequency
dependant interaction of ultrasound with HTHA dam-
age.
Figure 1: Boiler tube hydrogen failure

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 274 2004


The application of procedures, which seek the debonded non-metallic inclusions may contain fine
least attenuative spot in a limited controlled test area cracks extending slightly from the original non-
reduces any surface and probe coupling problems and metallic inclusion site. There is generally no evidence
avoids problems inherent with spot attenuation testing. of internally decarburised microstructure. Charpy im-
Spectral analysis techniques require fast Fourier pact testing of examples of material containing such
transform output of ultrasonic backscatter signals. damage indicate degradation of mechanical properties
Spectral analysis applied to backscattered signals and is minimal compared with concentrated fissures or
backwall echoes [11, 12] requires output of these in blisters (Table 1). This form of damage is not included
the frequency domain to determine frequencies of ul- in our A to D classification. This is simply classified
trasound that are more or less attenuated or reflected as “inclusion debonding” and is treated as being in-
by the presence of fissures or blisters. nocuous but in need of monitoring.
Spectral analysis methods are made sensitive with
specially designed transducers with broad bandwidth
transmitters and narrow bandwidth receivers. Spectral
analysis methods form part of the advanced ultrasonic
backscatter technique (AUBT) that is reported as an
ideal method for inspections for HTHA [2].
Our approach, which has been used to detect the
damage described below, are based on the use of mul-
tiple techniques. Primarily, backscatter techniques are
used to provide initial indications of damage. Once the
areas determined to be damaged are identified, multi-
ple frequency attenuation techniques is used to catego-
rize or quantify the damage. Velocity ratio and back-
scatter techniques are used to further categorize
damage in some situations. The combination of back- Figure 2: Hydrogen debonded non-metallic inclu-
scatter and multiple attenuation techniques have been sion.
highly successful. Based on this experience, we would
question the API581 Appendix I [2] statement that at- Concentrated blistering –In this form of damage
tenuation techniques are “poorly effective”. a high concentration of non-metallic inclusion sites are
opened by internal methane pressure (Figure 3, 4 and
Damage morphologies detected 5). The damage is associated with internal decarburi-
sation and often poor impact properties are the result
This section describes various forms of damage (Refer to Category A, B and C specimens Table 1).
that have been detected during surveys of five ammo- Concentrated blistering is detectable by ultrasonics
nia plant and two oil refineries. In the course of this with backscatter methods. Once detected, attenuation
work, we have described the damage detected by use methods are then used to differentiate between the
of a grading system ranging from Category A (se- various levels of severity. The effect on the tensile
verely damaged) to Category D (no detectable dam- and yield strength can be relatively mild even for
age). moderate levels of optically visible damage. The ef-
fect on impact toughness and fracture appearance tran-
Surface decarburisation – is a benign form of sition temperature can be significant for similar mod-
damage involving a few grains deep of decarburised erate levels of damage compared to the expected virgin
(ie pure ferrite) microstructure. This damage is not de- material properties. The size and depth of penetration
tected using ultrasonic techniques. In examination of the damage has limited influence on the Charpy im-
work we would classify this as “Category D” damage. pact toughness for examples studied in our metallurgi-
cal testing (Refer to Category A, B and C in Table 1).
Debonded non-metallic inclusions – In this form This damage has been categorized as A to C depending
of damage the steel matrix debonds from non-metallic on the extent of damage as detected by ultrasonic
inclusions (Figure 2). During backscatter testing, the techniques. Table 2 provides a definition of these cate-
item displays significant ultrasonic reflectivity. The gories for damage detected in 22 mm thick plate.

2004 275 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL


Fissuring
Hydrogen fissures in clean steels ie in the absence
of non-metallic inclusions may nucleate on grain
boundaries without prior blistering and form randomly
oriented fissures [8, 10, 13]. We have detected this
form of damage in boiler waterwall tubes (Figure 6).
The treatment of this form of damage should be similar
to concentrated blistering.
The ultrasonic results obtained for each of the
categories of damage using as an example 7.5 MHz
frequency attenuation of the backwall echo compres-
sion wave signal is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 3: Shows concentrated hydrogen blisters near
to the inner surface regions of a pipe sample.

Figure 6: Hydrogen fissuring detected in coal fired


Figure 4: Shows intergranular cracks extending from boiler tube.
blister defects near to the inner surface regions of pipe
specimen A.

Figure 5: Shows concentrated hydrogen blisters near


to the inner surface regions of pipe specimen A.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 276 2004


Table 1: Hydrogen damage description versus mechanical property data.
Item Material Damage Charpy at Yield Tensile
room temp. Strength Strength
Elbow A335- Isolated blistering (2- 45 Joules - -
P1 3mm length) at the cen-
treline
Category A A335- Severe heavily concen- Notch aligned - -
Longitudinal P1 trated blistering and in- transverse the
ternal decarburisation pipe
10 Joules
Category B A335- Moderate concentrated Notch aligned - -
Longitudinal P1 blistering and internal transverse the
decarburisation pipe
55 Joules
Category C A335- Mild and slightly con- Notch aligned - -
Longitudinal P1 centrated blis- transverse the
ters/fissures pipe -
169 Joules
Methanator A204- Debonded non-metallic 45 Joules - -
shell Grade B inclusions
HT Shift shell A204- Surface decarburisation 41 Joulesa - -
Grade B
Methanator A204- Debonded non-metallic 97 Joules - -
Shell Grade B inclusions
HT Shift A204- Debonded non-metallic 23 Joules - -
Shell Grade B inclusions
Methanator A335- Moderate concentrated 12 Joules - -
waste heat P1 blistering
boiler
Category A A335- Severe heavily concen- Notch aligned 234 MPa 434 MPa
Transverse P1 trated blistering and in- with the pipe
ternal decarburisation axis –
6 Joulesb
Category B A335- Moderate concentrated Notch aligned 233 MPa 434 MPa
Transverse P1 blistering and internal with the pipe
decarburisation axis –
5 Joulesc
Category C A335- Mild and slightly con- Notch aligned 231 MPa 400 MPa
Transverse P1 centrated blis- with the pipe
ters/fissures axis 10 Joulesd
a) The impact properties were raised to 54 J by heat treating at 710°C – then air cool. b) 27 Joule transition tempera-
ture = 55°C. c) 27 Joule transition temperature = 62°C. d) 27 Joule transition temperature = 35°C.

Table 2: Concentrated Blistering Damage Classified by Backscatter Reflectivity and Size.


Damage Typical Reflectivity Maximum Typical size of Maximum size of
Category (dB) reflectivity blisters blisters
(dB) (mm) (mm)
A -8 -2 to +4 0.2 0.5-2.0
B -16 -8 0.1 0.2-1.0
C -22 -14 <0.1 <0.3
D <-22 - - -

2004 277 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL


Attenuation (7.5 MHz)

70
65
60
Gain Setting (dB)

55 A
50 B
45 C
40 Cal
35 D
30
25
20
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
Beam path length (mm)

Figure 7: Ultrasonic attenuation data for 7.5 MHz compression wave testing applied to category A, B and C reference
specimens. The graph also includes non-damaged material (D and Cal)

Weld area cracking and damage as high as 374 HV. It is recommended that HAZ hard-
ness not exceed 250 HV in hydrogen service [15].
Four different forms of weld area damage have
been encountered: The cracks are often embedded (Figure 10). Ex-
perience with this type of cracking, in four separate
• Heat affected zone macrocracks; examples, has been found associated with evidence of
• Heat affected zone intermittent cracks; poor post weld heat treatment practices. The damage is
• Weld metal damage; and more common in the more highly alloyed newer vessel
• Decarburisation along the bondline. designs, which employ 1.25Cr0.5Mo material primar-
Poor welding or insufficient post weld heat treat- ily used for their resistance to HTHA. This is because,
ment can impair the local resistance to HTHA at welds despite being more resistant to HTHA, they are more
[9,14]. This might be due to a range of mechanisms. susceptible to welding problems and specifically hard
Chiba et al [14] record the presence of cracks and as- HAZs.
sociated decarburisation along the bond line between We have also experienced examples of severe
weld metal and HAZ caused by hydrogen damage. HTHA cracking located in the throat of carbon steel
Examples of this without the presence of cracking has weld metal, when design called for 1.25Cr0.5Mo filler
also been encountered in our experience (Figure 8). metal. This is not unexpected given the incorrect ma-
We have also detected weld area cracks without terial selection.
evidence of localised decarburisation and HTHA.
These macrocracks often initiate from high hardness
HAZ sites (Figure 9). Examples measured have been

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 278 2004


multiple defects as a single defect for assess-
ment purposes;
• the material properties including both tensile
and fracture toughness.

Figure 8: Hydrogen damaged pipe at the weld loca-


tion. The weld is free of hydrogen damage. Mi-
croblisters extend to the weld heat affected zone. The
weld heat affected zone exhibits bond line decarburisa-
tion and grain boundary migration.
Figure 10: Shows a photograph of an imbedded hy-
drogen assisted crack.

In the case of hydrogen attack damaged compo-


nents, all three of these requirements are problematic.
In principle, the stress experienced by a vessel is
easily determined. However, any of the fitness for ser-
vice approaches require not only primary applied
stresses such as the hoop stress generated by internal
pressure to be considered. They also require a knowl-
edge of secondary stresses such as thermal and resid-
ual stresses to be taken into account. In the case of hy-
drogen attack damage, it is accepted that the damage
develops in the first place due to huge internal pressure
Figure 9: Gives an example of hydrogen assisted of methane present within the blisters/fissures created
cracking which occurred in a weld after less than 18 within the material. What is more difficult to quantify,
months following repair of the 1.25Cr0.5Mo vessel. is this contribution of methane pressure to final failure.
There have been attempts to assess the time to final
creep failure [18] due to the combination of internal
Fitness for Service void pressure and process gas pressure. These are how-
ever of limited practical use.
Fitness for Service documents such as API579 In hydrogen attack, the damage mechanism creates
[16] and BS7910 [17] are well established for assess- numerous small voids. The non-destructive examina-
ing components containing cracks in terms of estab- tion data obtained from such voids and micro-fissures
lishing the size of defect that will lead to failure either is not suited to allow definition of a “defect size” that
by brittle overload or plastic collapse. These codes re- can subsequently be used in a Fitness for Service as-
quire a definitive understanding of: sessment.
Material property information for hydrogen dam-
• the stress experienced by the component in the aged material is extremely rare. In the measurements
vicinity of the crack; we have obtained on samples removed from service,
• the size of the defect or crack. In the case of there appears to be little effect on room temperature
multiple defects, there are rules to determine tensile and Charpy impact data (Table 1). This is, at
crack interaction effects and re-categorize least in part, because “macro” tests do not necessarily

2004 279 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL


sample those areas where the damage is concentrated 2) Inspect for HTHA but once any form of un-
through a plate. Nor do such tests necessarily repro- usual defect is detected the item is replaced.
duce the final failure mechanism that would occur in
Component replacement is practiced because fit-
service.
ness for service documents do not include standard as-
Furthermore, hydrogen attack damage is progres-
sessment procedure for HTHA. API941 [1] and
sive. Any assessment technique must be able to ac-
API581 [2] both recommend ultrasonic testing as
count for the rate at which damage is accumulating and
methods for detection. However, there is no standard,
be able to predict the time before which the damage
widely available, method for sentencing pressure
becomes critical. The assessment methodology for
equipment with damage.
blisters in API 579 [16] specifically excludes HTHA.
Our experience associated with the assessment of
3) Damage is detected, diagnosed and an engi-
vessels and pipework potentially at risk of hydrogen
neering based defect assessment carried out to es-
attack damage is that while the classic form of HTHA
tablish if the vessel is fit for service.
is undoubtedly encountered, the more serious defects
are macro cracks usually encountered near welds and This is the ideal approach but as described above
HAZs. These defects are well suited to detection by ul- is highly problematic. At this stage, no reliable vali-
trasonic methods. However, a consequence of HTHA dated methodology for assessing fitness for service ex-
is always a strong attenuation of ultrasound when con- ists. In the absence of any clear methodology for the
centrated HTHA damage has developed. This then defect assessment the following generalised process
limits the ability for cracks to be detected. Our experi- can be used to establish fitness for service:
ence is that levels of HTHA damage (Category A and It is suggested that the methodology described be-
B) which are still relatively mild in comparison with low represents a reasonable approach to managing
recorded levels of damage at the time of failures re- items that have suffered hydrogen attack damage.
corded in literature [7, 13]attenuate shear wave ultra-
sound sufficiently to begin masking the detection of
more serious weld and HAZ cracking. It is therefore
suggested that two prime considerations are made in
assessing fitness for service;

1) whether or not the extent of damage compro-


mises our confidence in the ability to detect
macro-cracking; and
2) the reduction in the tolerable flaw size that
even mild levels of damage cause.

Potential ways of dealing with the risk of HTHA are:

1) Identify items theoretically at risk


The Nelson curves as described in API 941 [1]
provide a reliable means of identifying “at risk” plant
equipment assuming one assesses C-½Mo material as
though it were carbon steel. In some cases, the deci-
sion to replace items at this stage may be made on the
basis that the risk is simply unacceptable.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 280 2004


Has HTHA Been Detected?

Yes No

Does the damage exceed Debonded non No hydrogen


levels, which would restrict metallic inclusions damage is pre-
detection of macrocracks? are present. sent

Yes No

Does the component contain other damage Does item comply with
including cracks? manufacturing code?

Can the item be safely managed after No


quantifying existing damage and comparing
this against a critical crack size for the equip-
No ment using API579 or BS7910 procedures? Yes Yes

Vessel is not fit for service and should be Item is fit for service.
retired.

Discussion The significant issue that has arisen following the


detection of HTHA has been the decision as to whether
The backscatter and multiple frequency attenuation the damage is sufficiently severe to warrant replace-
techniques described above have been found to be very ment or repair. The treatment of blisters in API 579
effective in detecting HTHA. When present, the dam- Section 7 “Assessment of Blisters and Laminations”
age has been readily detectible and subsequent metal- [16] specifically excludes HTHA damage. The applica-
lographic examination has shown that the techniques tion of flaw assessment procedures using codes such as
work, even with mildly damaged material. Based on the API 579 Section 9 or BS7910 [17] are fraught with dif-
experience gained from numerous inspections over a ficulties and at this time, it is believed that Fitness for
number of years, the statement within API 581 Appen- Service assessment methodologies to assess the safety
dix I [2] that such techniques is “poorly effective” are of HTHA damaged plant do not exist.
considered inaccurate.

2004 281 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL


During the various inspections that have been un- References
dertaken, weld area cracking has been detected in addi-
tion to the more classic forms of HTHA. The fact that [1] API Recommended Practice 941, “Steels for Hy-
higher alloy materials eg 1¼Cr½Mo and 2¼Cr1Mo are drogen Service at Elevated Temperature and Pres-
being used to reduce susceptibility to HTHA in newer sures in Petroleum Refineries and Petrochemical
plant has increased the risk of weld related problems Plants”, 5th Edition, January 1997.
through the increased risk of high hardness HAZs. The [2] API Risk Based Inspection Base Source API Pub-
use of higher alloy materials reduces the risk of dis- lication 581, 1st Edition, May 2000.
solved hydrogen reacting to form methane but it does
not reduce the solubility of hydrogen. These materials [3] E.P. Partridge, “Hydrogen Damage in Power Boil-
are therefore susceptible to hydrogen cracking problems ers” ASME Tech Paper No.63 PWR-9 ASME Na-
in the HAZ. Indeed, it is our experience that these tional Power conf. 23-26 Sept 1963 Cincinnati,
forms of damage are more prevalent than classic Ohio.
HTHA. It is therefore suggested that a prime considera- [4] P.G Shewmon, “Hydrogen attack of pressure-
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whether or not it is sufficiently severe to mask the de- Vol 1. January 1995. Pg 2-11.
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A relatively common problem we have encountered [5] M.W.D Van Der Burg and E. Van Der Giessen,
relates to damage of refractory lined transfer lines. The “A continuum damage relation for hydrogen at-
obvious reaction is to repair the refractory. However, if tack cavitaton”. Acta mater. Vol 45, No. 7,
HTHA has occurred during prolonged elevated tem- 1997. Pg. 3047-3057.
perature exposure, the refractory repair will reduce the [6] J.E. Cantwell, “High-Temperature Hydrogen At-
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may cause the item to operate at temperatures where 1994. Pg. 58-61.
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tion to repairing the refractory in such circumstances, ure of High Pressure Synthesis Pipe”,
the material should be assessed for HTHA. Plant/Operations Progress (Vol 5, No. 3), July
1986. Pg 155 – 159.
[8] T. Watanabe, Y Hasegawa and K. Kazumasa, “Ul-
Conclusions trasonic Velocity Ratio Method for Detecting and
Classic HTHA is detectable using ultrasonic meth- Evaluating Hydrogen Attack in Steels”. Non De-
ods. structive Testing and Electrochemical Methods.
Other forms of damage are detectable and can be ASTM STP 908, 1986. Pg 153-164.
readily differentiated from HTHA. [9] K. Kawano, A.S. Birring, “Hydrogen Damage De-
One form of damage that seems to be encountered, tection by a Non Destructive Testing Technique”.
particularly in newer vessels designed for resistance to Materials Performance. Vol. 28. August, 1989.
HTHA by the use of alloyed steels is the generation of Pg. 71-74.
macro cracks at heat affected zones. Other forms of
parent material damage other than classic HTHA are [10] M. G. Maggard, “Detecting Internal Hydrogen At-
typically benign. tack”. Oil and Gas. March. 10, 1980.
Engineering based critical assessments carried out [11] W.D Wang, “Inspection of Refinery Vessels for
in accordance with API579 [16] or BS7910 [17] are Hydrogen Attack Using Ultrasonic Methods”.
proposed valid for hydrogen damaged items as long as Review of Progress in Quantitative Nondestruc-
the damage levels do not restrict crack detection. This tive Evaluation. New York: Plenum Press, Vol
is a criteria for rejection of pressure equipment and is 12, 1992. Pg 1645-1652.
assessed with consideration of internal methane pres-
[12] S.E. Kruger, J.M.A Rebello, P.C. de Camargo,
sure stress contributions to the final fracture.
“Hydrogen damage detection by ultrasonic spec-
tral analysis”. NDT&E International. Vol 32.
1999. Pg 275-281.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL 282 2004


[13] G. Sorell and M.J Humpheries, “High Tempera-
ture Hydrogen Damage in Petroleum Refinery
Equipment”. Materials Performance. August,
1978.
[14] R. Chiba, K. Ohnishi, K. Ishii and K. Maeda, “Ef-
fect of Heat Treatment on the Resistance of C-0.5
Mo Steel Base Metal and Its Welds to Hydrogen
Attack”. Proc. API, 1985. 64:57.
[15] G.R. Prescott, Brian Shannon, “Process Equip-
ment Problems Cause by Interaction with Hydro-
gen – An Overview” 45th Annual Safety in Am-
monia Plants and Related Facilities Symposium
Tucson, Arizona USA September 11-14, 2000.
[16] API Recommended Practice 579, Fitness for Ser-
vice, January 2000.
[17] BS7910:1999. Guide on methods for assessing the
acceptability of flaws in metallic structures.
[18] (Van der Burg, M W D, Van der Griessen, E and
Brouwer, R C., Acta Metall., 1982, 30.

2004 283 AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

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