TOPIC: MODES OF DISCOVERY - RULE 23
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION
INGRID SALA SANTAMARIA and ASTRID SALA BOZA vs.
THOMAS CLEARY
G.R. No. 197122 | June 15, 2016 | LEONEN
Digested by: ESCUETA, DAVID ANTONIO A.
DOCTRINE:
- Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court gives utmost
freedom in the taking of depositions.
- The right to take statements and the right to use them in
court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost
freedom is allowed in taking depositions; restrictions are
imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the
widest possible opportunity for knowledge by both
parties of all the facts before the trial.
- That neither the presiding judge nor the parties will be
able to personally examine and observe the conduct of a
deponent does not justify denial of the right to take
deposition.
FACTS:
- Two (2) consolidated cases which stem from a motion for
court authorization to take deposition in Los Angeles by
respondent Thomas Cleary, an American citizen and Los
Angeles resident who filed a civil suit against petitioners
Ingrid Sala Santamaria, Astrid Sala Boza, and Kathryn
Go-Perez before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. This
authorization was granted by the CA upon a petition for
certiorari filed by Cleary.
- On January 10, 2002, Cleary, an American citizen with
office address in California, filed a Complaint for specific
performance and damages against Miranila Land
Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Ingrid Sala
Santamaria, Astrid Sala Boza, and Kathryn Go-Perez
before the RTC of Cebu. The Complaint involved shares
of stock of Miranila Land Development Corporation, for
which Cleary paid US$191,250.00.
- Cleary sued in accordance with the Stock Purchase and
Put Agreement, more specifically paragraph 9.02 of the
Agreement provides: Any suit, action or proceeding with
respect to this Agreement may be brought in (a) the
courts of the State of California, (b) the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, or
(c) the courts of the country of Corporation’s
incorporation, as Cleary may elect in his sole discretion,
and the Parties hereby submit to any such suit, action
proceeding or judgment and waives any other
preferential jurisdiction by reason of domicile. Cleary
elected to file the case in Cebu.
- On January 22, 2009, Cleary moved for court
authorization to take deposition. He prayed that his
deposition be taken before the Consulate-General of the
Philippines in Los Angeles and be used as his direct
testimony.
- Petitioners opposed this motion, stating in effect that: (a)
the right to take deposition is not absolute; (b) Cleary
chose the Philippine system to file his suit, and yet he
deprived the court and the parties the opportunity to
observe his demeanor and directly propound questions on
him; (c) the oral deposition was not intended for
- discovery purposes if and Cleary deposed himself as
plaintiff; and (d) such deposition is oppressive because it
would need to incur costs to attend.
- The RTC denied Cleary’s Motion for Court
Authorization to Take Deposition and held that
depositions are not meant to be a substitute for actual
testimony in open court. It also cited Sec.1, Rule 132 of
the ROC which provides “As the supposed deponent is
the plaintiff himself who is not suffering from any
impairment, physical or otherwise, it would be best for
him to appear in court and testify under oath.”
- Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and held
that Rule 23, Section 1 of the ROC allows the taking of
depositions, and that it is immaterial that Cleary is the
plaintiff himself.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the limitations for the taking of deposition under
Rule 23, Section 16 of the Rules of Court apply in this
case. NO
(2) W/N the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Section 4(c)
(2) of the Rules of Court applies to a non-resident
foreigner plaintiff’s direct testimony. YES
HELD:
(1)
Utmost freedom governs the taking of depositions to allow the
widest scope in the gathering of information by and for all parties
in relation to their pending case.
As regards the taking of depositions, Rule 23, Section 1 is clear that
the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories at the instance of any party.
San Luis vs Rojas explained that this provision "does not make any
distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition." Thus,
this Court found it immaterial that the plaintiff was a non-resident
foreign corporation and that all its witnesses were Americans
residing in the United States.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have
been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking
depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result,
there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge by
both parties of all the facts before the trial.
That neither the presiding judge nor the parties will be able to
personally examine and observe the conduct of a deponent does not
justify denial of the right to take deposition. This objection is
common to all depositions. Allowing this reason will render
nugatory the provisions in the Rules of Court that allow the taking
of depositions.
In sum, Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court gives utmost
freedom in the taking of depositions. Section 16, Rule 23 on
protection orders, which include an order that deposition not be
taken, may only be issued after notice and for good cause shown.
However, petitioners’ arguments in support of the trial court’s
Order denying the taking of deposition fails to convince as good
cause shown.
The civil suit was filed pursuant to an agreement that gave
respondent the option of filing the case before our courts or the
courts of California. It would have been even more costly, time-
consuming, and disadvantageous to petitioners had respondent filed
the case in the United States.
Further, it is of no moment that respondent was not suffering from
any impairment. Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court,
which was invoked by respondent, governs the use of depositions
taken. This allows the use of a deposition taken when a witness is
"out of the Philippines."
In any case, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court still allows for
objections to admissibility during trial. The difference between
admissibility of evidence and weight of evidence has long been laid
down in jurisprudence. These two are not to be equated.
Admissibility considers factors such as competence and relevance
of submitted evidence. On the other hand, weight is concerned with
the persuasive tendency of admitted evidence.
PETITION IS DENIED.
TOPIC: MODES OF DISCOVERY – RULE 23 – liberal treatment. Utmost freedom is allowed in taking
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION
RENATO S. MARTINEZ vs. JOSE MARIA V. ONGSIAKO
G.R. No. 209057 | MARCH 15, 2017 | SERENO
DOCTRINE:
Depositions previously taken are only admissible in evidence
against an adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine
the witness.
FACTS:
- On 17 May 2010, respondent filed a Petition before the
RTC of Makati seeking permission to perpetuate his
testimony under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
He alleged that the taking of his deposition was
necessary, because (a) he expected to be a party to certain
actions involving properties in which he had an interest;
(b) his health continued to deteriorate; and (d) he needed
to preserve his testimony on certain material facts in
anticipation of future suits. He also identified the areas to
be covered by his proposed testimony.
- Petitioner objected to the proceedings on the ground that
estate proceedings over the properties which respondent
was a party thereof, were then pending before Branch 58
of the RTC Makati.
- The RTC granted the Petition. It noted that all the
requirements under Rule 24 of the ROC had been
satisfied, and ordered his deposition to be taken. After
considering the contentions of the motion for
reconsideration of all the parties, the RTC thereafter
denied the motions in open court. The hearing then
proceeded with the parties agreeing that the direct
testimony of respondent would be taken through a
judicial affidavit to be submitted on or before 4 June
2010, while the cross-examination by adverse parties
would be on 7 July 2010. The RTC eventually reset the
hearing scheduled for 7 July 2010 to 13 July 2010.
- The RTC thereafter scheduled the cross-examination of
the expected adverse parties on 21 July, 4 August, and 11
August 2010.
- On 18 August 2010, the cross-examination of respondent
finally proceeded. Juan Miguel's new counsel requested
for a continuance to have more time to prepare for the
cross-examination, but the RTC denied his request upon
noting that he had already been given sufficient time to
do so. It likewise observed that the proceedings had
already suffered many delays. BPI's counsel then
proceeded to cross-examine respondent; Juan Miguel's
counsel, on the other hand, persisted in his refusal to
participate in the proceedings.
- Towards the end of the proceedings on 18 August 2010,
the RTC issued an Order declaring that petitioner and
Juan Miguel had waived their right to cross-examine
respondent. The RTC also noted that petitioner and his
counsel failed to attend the hearing on 11 August 2010
despite due notice, and that their absence caused them to
miss the announcement of the resetting.
- Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision and held
that since depositions consist merely in the taking down
of statements of witnesses for discovery purposes, the
rules governing the procedure are accorded a broad and
depositions and restrictions are imposed upon their use.
No limitations other than relevancy and privilege have
been placed on the taking of depositions.
ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly affirmed the RTC ruling that
declared petitioner to have waived his right to cross-examine
respondent’s deposition. NO
HELD: We grant the Petition.
The right to cross-examine opposing witnesses has long been
considered a fundamental element of due process in both civil and
criminal proceedings. In proceedings for the perpetuation of
testimony, the right to cross-examine a deponent is an even more
vital part of the procedure. In fact, the Revised Rules on Evidence
provide that depositions previously taken are only admissible in
evidence against an adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. Because depositions are an exception to the
general rule on the inadmissibility of hearsay testimony, the process
of cross-examination is an important safeguard against false
statements.
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or
in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. Such
right may be waived expressly or impliedly.
In this case, we find that the conduct of petitioner cannot be
construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine respondent.
ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS
PROMPTLY NOTIFIED OF THE 18 AUGUST 2010 HEARING
An examination of the records of the RTC reveals that petitioner
and his counsel had not been properly notified of the hearing to be
held on 18 August 2010. Consequently, their failure to attend the
hearing must be considered an excusable circumstance, and not a
waiver of the right to cross-examine respondent. It is therefore
evident that the CA committed a reversible error when it sustained
the pronouncement of the RTC depriving petitioner of his right to
cross-examine respondent.

While the RTC ordered that Notices of Hearing be sent to both

petitioner and his counsel, they did not receive these processes in
time for the hearing through no fault of their own.

With respect to the Notice of Hearing sent to petitioner himself, the

registry receipt attached to the records of the RTC indicates that the
letter was only received on 14 September 2010. The reason for the
delay in the delivery of the notice is unclear.

On the other hand, the Notice of Hearing sent to petitioner's

counsel never reached the intended recipient because of the
incorrect address indicated on the registered envelope containing
the letter.

Taking all factors into account, it would be unfair and unjust to

consider the failure of petitioner to attend the hearing on 18 August
2010 as signifying his intention to waive the right to cross-examine
respondent.

PETITION IS GRANTED. CASE REMANDED TO THE

RTC.