I6O JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 1 JANUARY i 9 9 9

m o d e r n perspective," seemingly impossible (4-5), the practical value of the Stranger's

political theory depends on his claim that the regimes which do exist can 'imitate' this
ideal ( 3 o o e 1 1 - 3 o l a 3 ) . But how? Even the second-best regimes are characterized by
strict adherence to laws based on n o t h i n g more than persuasion, e x p e r i m e n t and
majority consensus ( 3 o o b i - 6 ) , while in the ideal regime a knowledgeable statesman
creates laws only as "memoranda" which he is entitled to revise or revoke at any time.
According to Lane there is nevertheless one similarity that allows the second-best
regimes to be called "second-order imitations" (see 1o 9 - 1 1 1 ) of the ideal: both will not
change laws without expert advice (158-9). This assumes that the second-best regimes
acknowledge the authority of a political expert to change the laws, should one appear,
an assumption that Lane reiterates t h r o u g h o u t the book (1 l, 111, 114, 139, 147 ).
Yet it is precisely this assumption that appears to be refuted by the thought-
e x p e r i m e n t at 2 9 8 a - 2 9 9 e. T h e Stranger describes a city in which the practice of medi-
cine, navigation and the other technai must adhere strictly to laws enacted by an Assembly
of i g n o r a n t laymen. Such a city, far from welcoming an expert in these technai, would
b r a n d as a sophist a n d even execute anyone who so m u c h as dared to investigate their sub-
ject matter. Lane argues that this passage does not describe the law-ruled regimes later
classified by the Stranger since they are never said to b a n inquiry into the subjects of the
technai (161). However, the t h o u g h t - e x p e r i m e n t uses technai such as medicine only as an
analogy (eikon) for the political techne (297e8-13) a n d clearly aims to illustrate how states
characterized by strict adherence to the laws will necessarily and absurdly oppose any in-
vestigation into those moral and political issues about which the laws are supposed to
speak authoritatively. This means that these states will execute precisely the person who
has the potential to become a g e n u i n e statesman: thus the allusion to Socrates' trial. Lane
not only misses the importance of this allusion, but even argues that it is "substantively
flawed" because Athens had no laws against the moral investigation which Socrates pur-
sued (154, n. 37). But the point is that the absolute authority of allof the laws is incompati-
ble with this kind of investigation. Lane's attempt to salvage some possibility of mediation
a n d meaningful imitation between the second-best regimes and the ideal thus fails.
If there indeed remain these serious difficulties in both the Stranger's method and
politics, was Plato aware of them? Did he even seek to draw our attention to them? And
if so, to what end? Unfortunately, Lane refuses even to ask such questions: "I take the
liberty of identifying the Eleatic Stranger's arguments with P l a t o ' s . . . " (8). But does
any interpreter have the "liberty" of taking for granted something which is not necessi-
tated by the text a n d moreover has been seriously challenged by others?
FRANCISCO J . GONZALEZ
Skidmore College

Lucas Siorvanes. Proclus: Neo-PlatonicPhilosophy and Science. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1996. Pp. xv+ 34 o. Cloth, $35.oo.

This book will be welcomed by scholars of Proclus and by readers unfamiliar with
Proclus alike. T h e r e are not m a n y introductory books on Proclus. A n d Siorvanes pres-
ents in an interesting way the latest developments in scholarship.
 BOOK REVIEWS 161

Siolvanes gives an account of Proclus's life and times, his position in the A t h e n i a n
Neoplatonic school, and his influence and offers a p an o r am i c view o f Proclus's philoso-
phy in the chapters: "General Metaphysics," "Knowledge and the levels of Being,"
"Physics and Metaphysics," and "Stars and Planets." H e presents not only Proclus's
views on physics and astronomy, but also his poetics (189).
Siorvanes deals competently with Proclus's metaphysics, analyzing it in its own right
and as the indispensable background o f his scientific views. His summaries are on the
whole adequate and instructive. But a scheme or outline of levels of the multi-layered
Proclean system o f Gods (Henads), such as that offered by H. D. Saffrey and L. G.
Westerink in Proclus, Thdotogie Platonicienne (Paris 1968 ) for example, would have facili-
tated understanding.
In an impressive description of Proclus's historical influence, Siorvanes establishes
connections between Proclus's ideas and m o d e r n views in metaphysics, mathematics,
physics, logic and astronomy. Yet a warning would be a p p r o p r i a t e in this context.
T h e r e is, for instance, the strikingly m o d e r n Proclean theory that planets have satel-
lites. Perhaps Siorvanes is too m u c h e n a m o u r e d with these modern Proclean theories.
T h o u g h he recognizes that the theory about the satellites is really a consequence of
Proclus's metaphysics (268-271), he fails to emphasize that Proclus's m o d e r n - s e e m i n g
theories are no less speculative than other ancient theories. N e i t h e r Proclus's metaphys-
ics n o r his mathematics can replace evidence as used in m o d e r n science. Thus, the
rather triumphal tones Sioravanes sounds in this regard are somewhat out of place.
T h e incidental similarities in theoretical structures and patterns that e m e r g e in the
course of history are interesting to note, but we should beware o f b e c o m i n g too enthusi-
astic about their significance. T h e so-called indirect influence may be due precisely to
the structure of problems and the (limited) range of possible solutions.
I would raise some objections to Siorvanes's m a n n e r o f translating and interpreting
the Greek word for "to be" (einai) or "Being" (on). As is often done, especially in the
Anglo-Saxon world, Siorvanes alternatively uses "being," "existence" and "reality,"
without being aware of the fact that in ancient philosophy the Greek words "on/ousia"
("Being") generally do not admit of the translation "existence." Such translations are
anachronistic and wrong. "Reality" is entirely inappropriate as a translation. As an
essentially medieval expression, the word "reality" (realitas) as such is nowhere to be
f o u n d in antiquity. W h e n Proclus presents his multi-level system o f Being, there are no
degrees of reality in the sense that one t r a n s c e n d e n t level is m o r e real than another.
T h e r e are only degrees of Being. T h e problematic nature of the issue stands out even
m o r e when one speaks about not being. "Being" i n t e r p r e t e d as "reality" suggests that
what is not being, has no reality. But that is n o t what Proclus m e a n t to say. T h e
translation "existence" is b o u n d to bring about similar misunderstandings. T h e notion
"existence" is seldom in the focus of the interest w h e n an ancient philosopher uses
"einai." Thus, an innocent r e a d e r of Siorvanes's book may despair w h e n he encounters
"real existence" as a translation for "ousia" (194). Do the levels of being o t h er than the
one called "ousia" exist or do they not exist? If they do not, Proclus's entire philosophy
would be incoherent, and our world would n o t even exist or possess "reality." But this is
not what Proclus or Siorvanes mean. T o avoid misunderstandings, we should use only
"Being" (mad "to be") as translations.
162 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 1 JANUARY 1 9 9 9

T h e r e are also problems with some aspects of Siorvanes's description of participa-

tion. I n picturing the connection of the entity that is participated (methekton), what is
given to the participant (metechomenon) and the participant (metechon), the terms "predica-
tion" a n d "term," should be avoided. These relations are descriptions of a transcendent
"world" (as Siorvanes himself also observes) a n d they must n o t be conceived in terms of
predication, for it is the structure of the intelligible that is at stake. I also would criticize
Siorvanes's views on "separable participables" (lo4, lO5), which he identifies with "the
substantiated self-actualised powers." O n my view the latter are n o t the so-called "pri-
mary qualities." Apart from the fact that it is not qualities that are the issue, but
t r a n s c e n d e n t entities (souls, as Siorvanes himself does not fail to mention), the term
"separable participable" is only infrequently used by Proclus.
These critical remarks should not be construed as a negative j u d g m e n t about the
book as a whole. It contains m a n y detailed, interesting interpretations. This is a valu-
able book, lucid in style a n d method of explanation. It is a fairly successful attempt to
familiarize the reader with an extremely difficult subject. However, it does not su-
percede L.J. Rosan's The Philosophy ofProclus (NewYork: Cosmos, 1949),which offers a
systematic description of the works of Proclus, a task not u n d e r t a k e n by Siorvanes.
P.A. MEIJER
University of Leiden

Lawrence C. Becker. A New Stoicism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. Pp. vii
+ 216. Cloth, $ 29-95-

As the title suggests, A New Stoicism is not primarily a work in the history of philosophy
but an appropriation for c u r r e n t purposes. Becket boldly identifies himself as a stoic
(sic) a n d seeks to "outline a contemporary version of stoic ethics" (6). While disdaining
much of the ancients' provocative rhetoric, Becker defends some of the most controver-
sial Stoic positions, including apatheia and what he calls "the Axiom of Futility." Indeed,
he apostasizes significantly only by s u r r e n d e r i n g teleology.
Historical inquiry is limited to commentaries that are a p p e n d e d to each chapter in
order to show "in detail how this work can justify calling itself stoic" (7). Here Becker
offers summaries of and references for central interpretive disputes, generally appends
his own views, and occasionally argues for them. These commentaries typically shed
more light on Becker's project than on the ancients, but they do suffice to justify calling
the project Stoic. A n d historically m i n d e d readers will still find much of value in this
book, especially by reflecting on Becker's appropriations a n d appreciations.
As a contribution to contemporary ethics, Becker's p r o g r a m - - " n e i t h e r a compre-
hensive ethical theory n o r a practical handbook" (7)--aims to follow the facts, espe-
cially of moral psychology. To Becker "every n o r m (as a fact about the world) is internal
to some agent's project" (77).' To show how h u m a n s have not just a hodge-podge of

'The rigorous individualism (e.g., 12-14, 47-48 ) and sensitivity to personal peculiarities
(e.g., 92, 118, 141) built into Becker's project recall the Panaetian personae theory which empha-