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Anagement OF Hange: U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
Anagement OF Hange: U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
Bulletin
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
of the plugged piping. (When filled drums. The process established, but the rate of flow
normally injected, steam creates supervisor was aware of the was low.
passages in the tarry mass through seriousness of the previous
Opening the Vessel—Personnel
which cooling water can later flow. incident. He left instructions
expected a tarry mass to drain from
It also drives off remaining residual directing the night shift not to add
the drum. The supervisor and
volatile petroleum and sulfur any water, and instead to allow the
process operator directed that the
compounds from the coke.) drum and its contents to simply
drum be opened with a minimum
stand and cool overnight. On the
A process interruption in 1996 had number of people present. Because
following morning, he met with the
also resulted in a partially filled they were also concerned that the
operators to determine how to
drum. At that time, water was limited flow of steam might not
empty the partially filled drum. No
injected into the drum to cool the sufficiently strip all the toxic
engineers, who could have
material inside. However, when compounds from the tar inside the
provided technical support, were
the drum was opened, a torrent of vessel, they required that the
present at this meeting.
water, heavy oil, and coke spewed workers removing the bolts on the
out—which created a hazard and Preliminary Operations—The drum heads wear self-contained
required a major cleanup. An supervisor and operators observed breathing apparatus.
internal investigation team that the exposed part of the bottom
The top head was unbolted and
recommended that procedures be flange of the drum felt cool to the
lifted from the drum. The bottom
written for cooling/emptying touch. They also noted that
head was also unbolted and held
partially filled drums. However, temperature-sensing devices
in place by a hydraulic dolly. The
this task was not completed. located beneath the insulation on
operator then activated a release
the outside surface of the drum
On the day of the fire, neither the mechanism to lower the dolly.
indicated approximately 230
process supervisor nor the Witnesses reported hearing a
degrees Fahrenheit (°F), as
operators had any written whooshing sound and seeing a
compared to the 800°F of a
procedures for handling partially white cloud of vapor emanate from
typically full drum.
the bottom of the drum. The hot
One operator suggested adding 100 petroleum vapor burst into flames.
barrels of water to the drum. The process supervisor, an
CSB Safety Bulletins offer advisory However, the supervisor was operator, and the four contract
information on good practices for concerned about such a course of personnel assisting were caught in
managing chemical process hazards. action because of the previous the fire and did not survive
Actual CSB case histories provide
supporting information. Safety incident. Upon further discussion, (Figure 2).
Bulletins differ from CSB they decided—because part of the
After the incident, Equilon
Investigation Reports in that they do drum felt cool, and the
not comprehensively review all the relocated the controls for the
temperature-sensing devices read
causes of an incident. hydraulic dolly to allow workers to
only 230ºF—that it was not very
position themselves farther from a
hot inside and it was safe to open
drum when opening it.
the vessel as long as they first
injected some steam. Followup Analysis—The supervisor
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard and operators analyzed the
Investigation Board An operator connected a steam
situation and devised process
Office of Investigations and Safety hose to the oil inlet piping at the
Programs changes to empty the drum. The
bottom of the drum. Several
2175 K Street NW, Suite 400 relative coolness of the bottom
witnesses said that the steam
Washington, DC 20037 flange erroneously suggested to
202-261-7600 warmed the top of the piping, but
them that the temperature inside
http://www.chemsafety.gov the bottom remained cool. It is
the drum was also cool—when, in
likely that steam flow had been
3
Lessons Learned
From both a project and an
operational standpoint, the
incident at CONDEA Vista
emphasizes the importance of
systematically managing changes.
Post-incident investigations noted
that the density of the new catalyst
(powdered aluminum) was higher
than that of aluminum chloride.
The higher density material—
combined with problems related to
initial overfeeding of the
aluminum—overtaxed the mixing
capability of the agitator and
allowed aluminum to settle in the
bottom of the reactor, where it
plugged the lower nozzle and
have to be added quickly and
accumulated as sludge. l The higher density without interruption to avoid a
The plan devised by the chemist material—combined with significant heat release.
and the engineer for dissolving the problems related to l The temperature-sensing device
sludge posed hazards. Of
particular concern were the
initial overfeeding of the did not accurately indicate the
process temperature because it
following: aluminum—overtaxed was located in a stagnant
l Gases 2 that evolved during the the mixing capability of pipeline between the reactor and
bench-scale tests could vent the agitator and allowed another vessel. The chemist and
freely. However, the reactor— the engineer relied on misleading
though equipped with vent aluminum to settle in the temperature indications when
piping and a relief system— bottom of the reactor, they noted the stabilization of the
presented a much more reactor temperature before
where it plugged the leaving for the day.
contained environment. The
amount of reactive material lower nozzle and
A hazard analysis of the proposed
involved was much greater; the accumulated as sludge. procedure could have assisted in
scale-up factor was large.
the identification of potential safety
l The concept of absorbing the issues. Ideally, the extent of
quickly adding a surplus of a
energy of reaction by means of analysis undertaken should be
reactive substance (water) was
tailored to the degree of risk.
2 potentially hazardous.
At higher temperatures, water can react The CONDEA Vista incident also
with aluminum to form hydrogen. Water Although the concept was
can also react with aluminum chloride to feasible, it required precise highlights the importance of
produce hydrogen chloride, which—in execution. The water would preparing written procedures for
turn—can react with aluminum to
produce hydrogen.
7
Sanders, Roy E., 1999. Chemical Process Safety – Learning From Case
Histories, Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 215-247.
l Provide training in new
procedures commensurate with
their complexity.
l Conduct periodic audits to
determine if the program is
effective.
The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is an independent Federal agency whose mission is
to ensure the safety of workers and the public by preventing or minimizing the effects of chemical incidents. CSB is a
scientific investigative organization; it is not an enforcement or regulatory body. Established by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, CSB is responsible for determining the root and contributing causes of accidents, issuing safety
recommendations, studying chemical safety issues, and evaluating the effectiveness of other government agencies
involved in chemical safety. No part of the conclusions, findings, or recommendations of CSB relating to any
chemical incident may be admitted as evidence or used in any action or suit for damages arising out of any matter
mentioned in an investigation report (see 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(G)). CSB makes public its actions and decisions
through investigation reports, summary reports, safety bulletins, incident briefs, safety recommendations, special
technical publications, and statistical reviews. More information about CSB may be found on the World Wide Web at
http://www.chemsafety.gov.
Information about available publications may be obtained CSB investigation reports may be purchased from:
by contacting:
National Technical Information Service
U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 5285 Port Royal Road
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs Springfield, VA 22161
2175 K Street NW, Suite 400 (800) 553-NTIS OR (703) 487-4600
Washington, DC 20037 Email: info@ntis.fedworld.gov
(202) 261-7600 For international orders, see:
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