CONSTI 2

11/6/10

Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Vinuya v. Romulo

Facts: Comfort Women demanding reparations from Japanese government for the abuse suffered by
them during World War II.

Issues: WON the rights demanded by the comfort women has become jus cogens which thus obligates
the State to pursue it on an international level against the state of Japan

HELD:

While everyone is in agreement that sexual enslavement and abuse are morally wrong and demands the
protection of the state, said rights have not yet reached the status of erga omnes/jus cogens in
international law. Foreign relations is left to the discretion of the executive and the court is given little
room to meddle into such affairs lest it be detrimental to the international standing of the State. The
court cannot therefore compel the state to take up the cause of the women, it can merely urge or advise
them to do so.

The Court cannot order the executive to endorse the claims of the comfort women. It is the prerogative
of the State WON to pursue their claim taking into consideration the relations of the country with Japan.

PHAP v. Duque (Milk Code case)

Facts: DOH issues RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of EO 51 “Milk Code). Petitioners
claim that the DOH acted with GAD and in excess of its jurisdiction in applying the said AO since some of
provisions of the RIRR are contrary to the Milk Code. The DOH claims that in applying the WHA (World
Health Assembly) resolutions, they are merely adopting a generally accepted international principle of
law which is in accord with the constitution.

Issues: Whether pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law
of the land and may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR; if in the affirmative, whether the
RIRR is in accord with the international agreements.

WON RIRR provisions assailed by the petitioners are in accordance with the Milk Code.

Held:

Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary
international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.

2 means for international law to become domestic law – transformation or incorporation.

Transformation – (Sec 21 Article VII) International law transformed into local legislation (treaty, law etc)

Incorporation – Constitutional declaration (Sec 2 Article II) grants international law the force of domestic
law. Must be generally accepted principles of international law (renunciation of war, sovereign
immunity, bill of rights etc.

2 elements

1. Widespread practice on part of the states

2. Psychological element (opinion juris sive necessitates). Belief that the practice is rendered
obligatory by existence of a rule of law requiring it.

Bernas: Customary international law means a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of obligation. 2 elements: material (how state behaves) subjective (why they behave in the
way they do).

Opinion juris or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory is what makes a practice an
international rule. Without it the practice is not law.

WHA resolution and ICBMS are merely RECOMMENDATIONS not agreements nor conventions thus they
do not have the same force as the latter as stated in the WHA constitution. They are not legally binding
and needs an enactment by legislature for it to have the force of law, the MILK CODE.

Thus the DOH cannot implement rules and regulations that are repugnant to the Milk Code since their
authority merely emanates from the law and they cannot arrogate upon themselves what has not been
specifically granted to them within the said legislation.

Milk Code DOES not totally ban the advertising or promotion of breastmilk subs but are subject to the
scrutiny and approval of the IAC, DOH cannot therefore usurp the authority of the IAC nor amend the
provisions of the Milk Code to allow them to ban said advertising and promotions.

Though Milk Code was based on WHA recommendations and consequent WHA recommendations
support the total ban on advertisement and promotion of breastmilk subs, DOH can only implement
provisions of Milk Code and not WHA recommendations. Legislation is needed to amend or revise Milk
Code to adopt new WHA resolutions.

Petitioners contentions:

1. Milk Code not limited to infants 0-12 months old. Sec 3 of Milk Code is concerned not with the
age of the child but with the kind of product is being sold to the public.
2. RIRR recognizes breastmilk subs as proper in certain cases (when medically indicated and only
when necessary)
3. DOH granted power by the MC to control the content of any info on breastmilk subs. But power
to control is not absolute as it does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the
advertising, marketing and promotion of breastmilk subs. Thus the provisions prohibiting the
 advertising, promotion etc of breastmilk subs are not in accordance with the MC and must be
struck down.
4. No inconsistency between RIRR and MC in the dissemination of info to health pros.
5. RIRR’s prohibition on milk companies’ participation in any policymaking body in relation to
advancement of breastfeeding is in accord with the MC.
6. Donations are upon the request and with the approval of the DOH. Milk Code leaves to the
DOH’s discretion WON to accept donations from manufacturers or breastmilk subs.
7. DOH cannot impose penalties and sanctions not found within the MC. They can merely cause
the prosecution of the violators of the code.

Rep of Indonesia v. Vinson

Facts: Petitioners and Respondent Vinson entered into contract employing the latter’s services for the
care and maintenance of the former’s house among others subject to the cancellation of either parties
upon proper notification of the other.

In 1999 the petitioners decided to end the contract finding the latter’s work unsatisfactory. They also
claim that as representatives of the Indonesia, they are immune from suit within the Philippine territory.
The Respondent claimed that the cancellation was done in bad faith without informing him of the
former’s decision. He also claims that the petitioners have expressly waived their immunity as indicated
in the contract.

Issue: WON the petitioners have waiver their immunity from suit by using as basis the provision of the
Maintenance Agreement entered into by the parties.

HELD:

Granted.

Article II Section 2 adopts as part of law generally accepted principles of international law.

The Principle of Sovereign Immunity states that a state may not be sued without its consent, this is in
line with the equality and independence of states. One state cannot assert jurisdiction over another for
it would unduly vex the peace of the nations.

This rule however is not impervious to change. The restrictive view holds that immunity only applies to
public acts not with private acts. The question thus is WON the case at bar deals with a pursuit of
sovereign activity or a private one. Thus the provision in the contract in question is not necessarily a
waiver of sovereign immunity.

Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given
explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in this case.

Is the establishment of a diplomatic mission (embassy) a public act of the sovereign? Yes
Is the engagement of local services for the maintenance of the embassy a public act? Yes. The
establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep.

Minucher v. CA

Facts: Minucher was arrested in a by-bust operation as a drug trafficker by the PNP and with the aid of
defendant Scalzo who is a member of the US DEA. Upon appeal, the courts acquitted Minucher of all
charges, thereby Minucher filed an action for damages against Scalzo for moral and exemplary damages.

Scalzo raised the defense of diplomatic immunity claiming that he was part of the US Diplomatic convoy
that arrived in 1985. He also claims that as an agent of the DEA and duly recognized as a diplomatic
agent by his embassy, the suit should be dismissed.

Issue: WON Scalzo enjoyed diplomatic immunity

Held: DI only applies to heads of diplomatic missions and members of their staff. The main yardstick in
ascertaining WON a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of WON he performs
duties of a diplomatic nature.

Scalzo asserted that he was an assistant attaché to the US diplomatic mission. An attaché belongs to a
category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press,
administrative or financial affairs.

These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally
designated as having diplomatic rank.

Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the
government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 15 the Court has recognized that, in such matters,
the hands of the courts are virtually tied.

If however it is contended that Scalzo is being sued in the exercise of his duties as an agent of the State,
he may raise the defense of the State’s Immunity from suit. However, this defense cannot be used to
perpetrate injustice, such as when the defendant is accused of infringing on the personal and property
rights of the plaintiff. Unauthorized acts by its government officials or officers are not acts of the State.

In the case at bar however, the circumstances show that in the arrest of Minucher and in the actions of
Scalzo in the buy-bust operation the Philippine government has given its consent and imprimatur to the
latter’s actions. The court is thereby constrained to rule that Scalzo has acted within the delegated
duties by the US DEA and is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

Oposa v. Factoran

Facts: Petitioners who are all minors, represented by their parents, asserting their right to a balanced
and healthful ecology (Sec 16 Art II) seek the cancellation of Timber Licenses issued by the DENR.
RTC dismisses case citing the lack of a cause of action of the petitioners against the respondent, the
question is political and the cancellation of the licenses would violate the non-impairment clause of
contracts enshrined in the Constitution.

Issues:

- WON the lower court was correct in its decision dismissing the complaint
- WON the petitioners have a legally enforceable right that may be demanded against the
respondent DENR.

HELD:

- There is a clear and unmistakable cause of action for the petitioners against the respondents.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law (Sec 16 Art II).

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.

Because of such existing right as enshrined in the constitution, there is no need for a
legislative enactment for it to become legally demandable and for the courts to compel
government agencies to take action. For it is the responsibility of EVERY citizen to the future
generations to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology. It being a collective individual
responsibility, it is primarily the State who has to enforce and enact such and can thereby be
compelled by the court to fulfill its responsibility as being the embodiment of the Filipino
people’s collective will.

The Primary agency for the enforcement of this right and the protection of the environment has
been entrusted to the DENR as promulgated in EO 192 and in the charter of the DENR itself.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.

- The question is not political as it is covered by the second paragraph of Article VIII Sec 1
- Timber Licenses are not contracts thus their cancellation is not a violation of the non-
impairment clause. Licenses are mere grant of privileges that may be revoked at any time by the
granting power.

MMDA v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay

Facts: Petitioners assail the decision of the lower court in compelling the MMDA and other government
agencies to take action in the rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
The MMDA claims that Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 (Environment Code) that they are required to
clean up Manila Bay only in instances of accidental spills. They also claim that cleanup of Manila Bay is
purely a discretionary action which cannot be compelled upon them by mandamus.

Issues: WON MMDA may be compelled by Mandamus to take action for the rehabilitation of Manila Bay
(Ministerial or Discretionary?)

WON Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in
general, not just specific pollution incidents

HELD:

- Sections 17 and 20 does not not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the
absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a degree
where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be
necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to
upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Sec 62(g) in fact does not delimit the scope in which the MMDA must act, on the contrary it
expands the scope of Sec 20 to include accidental spills etc.

- Cleanup and Rehab of Manila Bay can be compelled by mandamus. The cleanup of Manila Bay is
a Ministerial Duty, meaning it does not require the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
The respondents are correct in arguing that the MMDA has no discretion to choose which
bodies of water to clean up or which discharge to contain for it is their ministerial duty to attend
to such services.
It is their obligation to perform such duties as defined by law. How they carry out their duty is an
entirely different matter.
- A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws
would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory
obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from
choosing not to perform these duties.
- RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides
that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to
clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear
as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.
11-13-10

Police Power

Police Power does not require that there is just compensation (unlike eminent domain). It is the widest
and most far reaching power of the state which could include almost anything so long as it promotes
public interest. The legislature can promote or enact laws exercising police power.

Basis: Implied (Preamble)

Limitations of Police Power

1. Article 3, Section 1 – Due Process. Since what is involved is an encroachment into individual
rights, all means must be exhausted by the State to accord the individual the due process of law.
The end sought must not be oppressive, capricious nor unfair

2. Equal protection – The act must be fair and does not unjustly discriminate nor target a particular
class or individual. To treat equals equally, and those in similar situations with similarly.

Edu v. Ericta (Reflector Law)

 Facts: Petitioner Edu, Commissioner of Land Transportation, files seeks issuance of certiorari on
respondent Judge Ericta’s decision, declaring unconstitutional the “Reflector Law” as violative
of due process and AO 2 as an undue delegation of legislative power

 Issue: WON Reflector Law is unconstitutional

 HELD: Reflector Law is a valid exercise of the state’s police power.

 Consider the Subject and the Means:

 Subject – to be deemed lawful the measure must be within the scope of police power; the
activity or property sought to be regulated affects the public welfare. Here the purpose of the
statute is to promote the motorist’s safety especially during the night time and to prevent
vehicular accidents by requiring that there be reflectors on every vehicle to forewarn incoming
motorists.

 Means – the act must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, unlawful, oppressive or unfair. An act is
arbitrary when there is no due process (one is not fully informed, there is no standard, when
details are unknown to those concerned); it is oppressive when the penalties imposed are
excessive or harsh; it is unreasonable when there is no connection between the means and the
purpose.
  The Reflector Law can withstand any of these tests. The penalty imposed is reasonable, it is
directly related to the purpose. Requiring that there be a reflector on every vehicle is a valid
means of achieving the general purpose of public safety.

 The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It
is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate response, to a felt public need. It can stand the test of
the most unsympathetic appraisal.

 Clearly the law was intended to promote the safety of the people. In Calalang vs. Williams, the
Court defined police power as “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.”

 Persons and property could thus “be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burden in order to
secure the general of the people.

 Social justice is what is followed in the Philippines: for equitable: for those who have less in life
shall have more in law. It shall fill in what this disadvantage group lacks. In the end all of them
are equal. This is a valid exercise of power.

Ermita v. Manila (Reg Form in Motels)

 Facts: Petitioners assail City Ordinance 4760 regulating the management of Motels in Metro
Manila, requiring, among others, guests to fill up an information sheet, limiting the number of
room rentals per day and imposing fines for violations thereof. Petitioners claim that the statute
is unconstitutional for infringing on the rights to privacy, liberty and due process, detrimental to
the Hotel and Motel industries and void for being vague.

 Issues: WON Ordinance is constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power

 HELD: Police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such it is immune
from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power
which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers extending as it does "to all the great public needs."

 The test for determining WON a statute deprives an individual of due process is that of being
unreasonable or arbitrary. Here we have a situation where there exists to an undeniable
existence of an undesirable situation and a legislative attempt at correction. The city council is
thus not merely acting out of capricious or tyrannical whim but with the public health, morals
and welfare in mind.

 In this case the right of the owners to manage and operate their inns, motels and hotels are
subjected to regulation due to a valid concern by the local government of the growing cases of
prostitution and other illegal activity within the said establishments. In this sense, the local
 government is merely making sure that prostitution would be abated and the values of the
family are protected.

 A local government unit (council) has delegated authority from the legislative (local government
code) to exercise police power over those within their jurisdiction.

 Registration – ensure no minors

 12 hour minimum – discourage use of rooms for sexual purposes

 License fees – there is a valid cost for regulation

Phil Assn. of Service Exporters v. Torres (DH Abuse)

 Facts: Petitioners assail DOLE and POEA circulars suspending the employment of Domestic
Helpers in Hong Kong as beyond the jurisdiction of the said agencies to implement and being
unreasonable and oppressive. Said AOs were implemented in light of the increasing instances of
abuse suffered by Filipino DHs in Hong Kong.

 Issue: WON circulars issued by DOLE and POEA are constitutional for being valid exercises of
their quasi-legislative and police powers

 HELD: The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a
grant of police power.

 Purpose: to protect the welfare of Domestic Helpers in Hong Kong by establishing mechanism. Is
this valid? Yes since recruitment agencies are primarily motivated by income thus the welfare of
those seeking employment abroad falls squarely upon the government through its agencies
(DOLE, POEA)

 Method: Temporary suspension and prohibition for recruitment agencies from sending DHs to
HK. Is this valid? Yes since it is not a blanket suspension of licenses since they can still recruit
workers for other areas except HK. It is not unreasonable since it is the only way to achieve the
purpose by monitoring the placement of the DHs. It is not arbitrary as it applies to all
recruitment agencies sending DHs to HK.

 It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful
reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the
"administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the
respondents

 (The circulars are however invalid for lack of publication)

 Standards – implied from tenor of the law. May be as broad as public interest.
  Objective – protection of welfare of OFWs.

 Lawful subject – ensure welfare by establishing mechanism for protecting OFWs.

 Means -

JMM Promotion v. CA (Japayuki)

 Facts: Following the increasing number of abuses of overseas entertainers in Japan and the
much publicized death of Maricris Sioson, the POEA created the EIAC which was charged with
the training and processing of applications of entertainers who sought employment abroad.
Among the additional requirements imposed by said agency was the hurdling of a test, training
and the issuance of an Artist’s Record Book (ARB) which was a necessary requisite for processing
any contract of employment by the POEA.

 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the required ARB and the regulations by the POEA and
EIAC for being an invalid exercise of police power and for infringing on the property right of the
entertainers for pursuing employment abroad.

 Issue: WON the ARB requirement and others are unconstitutional

 HELD: "The police power of the State," one court has said . . . 'is a power coexistensive with self-
protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society." Carried onward by the current of legislature. the
judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the
purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public
welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."

 As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests
upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly its ARB requirement, does not
enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.

 No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state
particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental
functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.

 In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider. 14 To pretend that licensing or
accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice,
under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or
professions.

Chavez v. Romulo (bear arms)

  Purpose: To avert rising criminal incidents.

 Method: Implementation of a nationwide gun ban in all public places. Revocation by the PNP of
all PTCFOR (Permit To Carry Firearms Outside of Residence)

 Does PNP chief have the authority to issue assailed guidelines (gun ban and PTCFOR
revocation)? Yes, under old law regulation of firearms was exercised by Chief of Constabulary.
PNP has absorbed Constabulary and with it the authority of the CC to the PNP Chief.

 Is the right to bear arms a constitutional right? No, it is merely a privilege granted by the State
through statute. Therefore it is subject to the regulation.

 Is the revocation of the license a violation of petitioner’s property rights? No, a license does not
grant a right. It is merely a privilege granted by the State to do what would otherwise be illegal.
It is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.

National Dev Company v. Phil Veterans Bank (Agrix)

 Purpose: Marcos issued PD give assistance to Agrix.

 Method: PD decreed among others that it extinguished all standing debts of Agrix, all unsecured
obligations shall bear no interests and that all accrued interests shall not be recognized.

 NOT a valid exercise of police power. NOT in the interest of the public in general but of a
particular class. Means employed are arbitrary, unjust and oppressive. No consideration is paid
for the extinction of the mortgage rights. The accrued interests and other charges are simply
rejected by the decree. The right to property is dissolved by legislative fiat without regard to the
private interest violated and, worse, in favor of another private interest.

 It also discriminates against secured creditors by lumping them all together as unsecured
creditors. It thusly violates the equal protection clause for treating classes situated differently
similarly disregarding the principle that there should only be equality among equals.

MMDA v. Garin (Driver’s License)

 Is a driver’s license a right or a privilege? Privilege that the State may grant, withhold or restrict
at its discretion in the exercise of its police power.

 Does the MMDA exercise Police Power? No. Only the Legislature and to those whom Police
Power is delegated can exercise Police Power (LGUs). The MMDA Charter is merely involved
with administrative functions over the Metro Manila area.

 Can the MMDA enact ordinances? No, only implement rules in accordance with duly enacted
legislation.
  Can the MMDA confiscate licenses? If there is a validly enacted traffic law by the legislature or a
delegated authority (City of Manila) then MMDA is duty bound to enforce such rules and
thereby confiscate, revoke or suspend a driver’s license. Absent such legislation the MMDA
cannot.

NCR is an administrative region. MMDA has no quasi legislative authority hence no police power.

Beltran v. Secretary of Health (Bloodbank)

 Purpose: To promote public health by implementing measures to ensure that the national
supply of blood is free from disease.

 Method: Phasing out of Commercial Blood Banks and promotion of voluntary blood donations
and health awareness programs by government agencies such as the DOH

 Valid? YES. RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act of 1994) was enacted to promote public health
and welfare following the study conducted by an internationally acclaimed medical group that
found 70% of the Phil blood supply come from commercial blood banks. Being engaged in a
business rather than a service to the public, these blood banks usually do not undertake
measures to make sure that the blood they collect is free from diseases.

 Is it not excessive? The phasing out of commercial blood banks was not an unjust exercise of
police power since it was necessary to effectuate the purposes of the said law by encouraging
voluntary blood donations and discouraging the unscrupulous retail of blood for a quick buck.
Although such an action may affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of
commercial blood banks their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of
the public.

White Light Corp v. Manila (short time)

 Purpose: to promote public health, welfare and morality and prevent the rise of prostitution,
drug use etc in the motels, inns and hotels of Metro Manila.

 Method: an ordinance that prohibits “washup rates” and the use of a room more than twice a
day

 Valid? No. Studying the ordinance through procedural and substantive due process

 Procedural due process – proper steps as instituted in the law are undertaken by the governing
power.

 Substantive due process – sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty or
property.
  From such analysis what is under consideration is not merely the deprivation of the rights of the
petitioners to engage in their businesses but of the patrons who would be deprived of availing
short time access or washup rates to the lodging establishments in question.

 Not only will the ordinance curtail the prostitutes and their patrons but the legitimate married
couples or consenting individuals as well. It also constitutes an invasion of the right to privacy.
Government powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its citizens.

 The purpose and the method must have a reasonable relation. It must be proven that there are
no other alternatives for the accomplishment of the purpose that would be less intrusive of
private rights. In fact the actions sought to be prevented are already outlawed in our nation and
would be better addressed by applying existing laws rather than enacting new ones.

Eminent Domain

Note: How to attack Police Power, Eminent Domain or Taxation: Due process and equal protection.

Police Power is almost everything the Legislature does, Eminent Domain and Tax could be construed as
implements of Police Power for the lawful subject of social welfare.

Movement towards social justice had become increasingly pervasive of individual rights. It is now a
matter of balancing the good of the many to the detriment of a few.

Recently however (2010) Government seems to be contracting Police Power to encourage business and
investments.

Inherent power of the state to expropriate property for public use upon the payment of just
compensation. Unlike Police power, there is an actual taking of property.

 Taking – actual entry into the land by the taking authority even without eviction of inhabitants,
using the property for means other than its intended purposes and material impairment of the
value of the property.

REQUIREMENTS:

 Public Use – intended for the benefit of the people in general. Not necessarily all the people but
a particular class of people is enough to qualify requirement of public interest. Public interest is
subject to standards as indicated by the law (squatters relocation, airport etc)

 Just compensation – payment by the expropriating power of the amount in cash equivalent to
the current market value of the land to be determined by the courts.

Assoc of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform (CARP)

Petitioners: No due process, there was no judicial proceeding. What the state did was to legislate and
confiscated lands redistributed to farmers. There was neither a substantial distinction of the
classifications for the lands to be confiscated, no considerations were given to the individual situations
of the landowners.

SC: petition has no merit. This is a revolutionary form of expropriation geared towards social justice.

Government implementation of CARP imposed retention limits over property of land (police power) and
expropriation of the lands exceeding the set limit (eminent domain).

 Taking? Lands in excess of the retention limits are to be redistributed by the government to the
landless farmers. Since there is a standard set by the law itself, the statute does not suffer from
arbitrariness nor are the subjects and means unlawful. The existence of a system of
compensation qualifies it as a state exercise of eminent domain.

 Public Use? It is undisputed that the lands to be expropriated shall redound to the benefit of the
landless farmers thus making it sufficient to fulfill the criterion. Public interest is not limited to
public use, it is everything that will redound to social justice. When government expropriates, if
you cannot prove expropriation is for private use then it is presumably for public interest. If a
private corp/entity is authorized by law to expropriate if for public use then it is valid.

 Just compensation? Normally the mode of payment should be money and ownership over the
property is only transferred upon just compensation. The constitution did not nor did the
constitutional commission indicate a method of payment, therefore it can be presumed that
they intended a more realistic and practical ways of compensation. It was presumed that they
foresaw the difficulties to be encountered for such a revolutionary agrarian reform program.
Here the SC ruled on practicality since it is obvious that the land bank cannot pay the actual
amount in cash for all the lands to be expropriated; thus it allowed payment by bonds,
scholarships and other government benefits.

Reyes v. NHA (housing project turned subdivision)

 Does the expropriating authority lose its right over the property taken if it does not promptly
use said property for the purpose claimed to be undertaken? No.

 So long as when the land was deemed necessary for expropriation, public use was the main
consideration. Here the NHA expropriated the land for relocation of squatters but later used it
for a low cost housing project. There is still the public use in mind although the means may be
different.

 Without a contrary stipulation such as a certain period or condition that may revert the property
to its original owner, the expropriating power would have absolute authority over the property.
The former owner retains no right over the property and the expropriator may use the land for
whatever purpose.
  Finally, although the right to enter upon the expropriated property prior to the payment of just
compensation, transfer of the title to the property shall only pass from one to the other upon
full payment.

Mandaluyong v. Aguilar (Abalos Condos)

 Resolution was enacted by Sanggunian of Mandaluyong authorizing Mayor Abalos to

expropriate lands of respondents.

 Although the National Legislature may delegate the power of eminent domain to others such as
the LGUs, the standard it has set must be followed and the determination of WON those
standards were followed may be scrutinized by the courts.

 RA 7729 authorizes local government units to identify and dispose of lands for the benefit of the
urban homeless etc. Modes of land acquisition and priorities for expropriation were set. These
were apparently not followed by the city council and mayor thus making their exercise invalid.

Lagcao v. Labra (Sneaky Mayor Garcia)

 City council and Mayor of Cebu enacted ordinance authorizing the expropriation of petitioners
land to provide socialized housing for the city’s homeless and low-income residents. Petitioner
contends however that the ordinance was tainted with bad faith as it was enacted merely to
safeguard the Mayor’s electoral aspiration as the squatters living in the premises are a big
source of votes.

 There records have not shown that the local government of Cebu has strictly complied with the
priority and modes of acquisition as define by RA 7729. The ordinance does not justify why the
petitioner’s land was singled out as necessary for expropriation and neither was there a showing
of any effort by the local government to extend an offer to buy the land prior to the
expropriation proceeding. Clearly the ordinance was enacted with unnecessary haste amounting
to an arbitrary and capricious violation of the petitioner’s right to due process.

Taxation

Requirement: uniform, equitable and progressive.

Uniformity – tax is applied equally to all similarly situated

Equity – those who have and earn less pay less taxes

Progressive – higher tax base, higher tax rate

Sison v. Ancheta (professional tax)

  Does Batas Pambansa blg. 135 violate the principle of uniformity and equitability in taxation
when it distinguished between: Professional or self-employed tax (gross income taxation) and
compensation income tax (gross compensation) and higher tax rates for pros than employed?

o Pros – taxed from gross income, treated as a business (lawyers will have to account for
their expenses which they have never done nor want to do)

o Employees – gross compensation, since he has no expenses

 Basis for distinction: For self-employed or professionals it is not immediately determinable what
amount of their income would be spent for the maintenance of their establishments and other
such necessary measures for the sustenance of their callings, thus there is first the need to
deduct these expenses from the gross which would be the net. For the common employees
their income can be immediately taxable since they are free from such burdens.

 Is this rule uniform? Yes, people belonging to the same class (pro or employee) would be taxed
similarly with those belonging to the same class.

 Is it equitable? Those who have less in life shall have more in law. Designed to tax those who
have more higher than those who have less.

JBL Reyes v. Almanzor

 The Reyeses were prevented from making a profit from their property due to PD20 which
prohibited the increase of rentals on certain properties and from ejecting the tenants therein.

 City assessor of Manila reassessed tax on the Reyes property based on schedule of market
values disregarding the fact that the property was constrained in its profit-making by PD20.

 The tax therefore was unduly oppressive to Reyes since he was not making money out of his
property because the law itself prevented him from doing so. Now the government wants to
impose a tax utterly disproportionate from what the Reyeses has earned from it and would likely
result into forfeiture. In a way, Reyes was already taxed by providing subsidy to those who
cannot afford higher rents.

 Taxes should be applied equitably upon all persons situated similarly, clearly in this case the
Reyeses were in a situation different from their neighboring land owners who had free control
over their property and were thusly assessed in accordance with the market value of their
property.

CIR v. Solidbank

 A percentage tax is a national tax measured by a certain percentage of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of goods sold, bartered or imported; or of the gross receipts or earnings
derived by any person engaged in the sale of services. It is not subject to withholding.
  An income tax, on the other hand, is a national tax imposed on the net or the gross income
realized in a taxable year. 23 It is subject to withholding.

 There is no double taxation.

 Two taxes refer to different subject matters. FWT is a tax on passive income based on interest
on deposits etc (as investor that earns income) while GRT is a tax for the privilege of engaging in
banking.

 Different taxing periods. FWT is deducted and withheld as soon as income is received after every
calendar quarter in which it is earned. GRT is neither deducted nor withheld, but is paid after
every taxable quarter it is earned.

 Two taxes are of different characters. The FWT is an income tax subject to withholding while
GRT is a percentage tax not subject to withholding.

Tax Exemptions

Constitution grants exemption (charitable, health, etc)

Congress has power to exempt. Tax exemptions are to be concurred by majority of Congress because
taxes are the lifeblood of the state.

Lung Center v. QC

Article VI sec 28

3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,

non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

Exempt: a. charitable institutions b. structures of religious nature c. non-profit cemeteries (public) d. real
property with proviso

Religious institutions? NO, only church structure itself.

Case: lung center was leasing medical offices, orchids. It’s not a tax on category 1 but falls under 4 th
category.

Used – allows for division of property to determine which is tax exempt and which is not.

Exclusively – not for anything else. If not exclusive, already taxable.

Determine which part is USED for charitable purposes and those that are not.

How to construe: tax is construed liberally in favor of the one taxed. Tax exemption is strictly construed
against one granted exemption.
NAPOCOR v. Cabanatuan

 Do GOCCs that were granted exempted prior to the enactment of the LGC retain such
exemption? No.

 Ordinarily general law cannot repeal special law unless expressly especially when there is a
vested right. However, what has been granted to NAPOCOR is not a vested right, it is a mere
privilege (tax exemption) and may be withdrawn anytime.

 Although NPC was previously granted tax exemption, it was the intent of the framers of the LGC
to removes such when it did not include it among those that cannot be taxed by the LGC,
expression unius est exclusion alterius.

 Precisely the goal of the LGC is to strengthen the autonomy of LGUs and for the devolution of
power from central government. In order to attain such a goal, it is necessary for LGUs to enjoy
a certain amount of fiscal autonomy and the most expedient means of accumulating revenue is
the imposition of taxes upon those within their local jurisdiction.

 Rationale: revenue acquired by GOCCs within a city, municipality etc should be subject to the tax
of those directly within the immediate jurisdiction (local gov) instead of passing the revenue to
the national gov which would be contrary to the LGC’s goal of devolution of power and
promotion of autonomy.

 Double taxation? No, since NPC is being taxed by 2 separate entities. Local governments are
separate and distinct from National Government. National Government does not tax franchise
for NAPOCOR which local government seeks to tax. Different subject, no double taxation.

Due Process

Article III Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Rubi v. Prov. Of Mindoro (Liberty of Mangyans)

Deprived – liberty (mangyans segregated into 1 community)

Petitioners challenge Constitutionality of statute segregating “non-christians” into separate communities

form “Christians”

There are only three reasons when a person can be deprived of liberty:

1. commission of a crime
2. violent insanity
3. infectious/contagious deadly disease
The Mangyans are not suffering from any of the requirements when a person can be deprived of liberty.

Malcolm: Liberty is not absolute, it is liberty with regulations. Rights must yield to the greater interest of
the majority. Compared strategy of segregation of Indians by the US with the Mangyans.

Legal framework: There is substantial distinction between civilized and non-civilized (established
inequality) thus there was a need to implement law that would protect them.

Subject – protection of the Mangyans from exploitation, slavery or prostitution by “civilized

people”. Is this valid? Definitely

Means – segregation in a camp that they cannot leave. Valid? Yes, has already been done to US
Indians and it has been upheld by the US SC.

“Christians” “Non-christians” – not based on religion but on level of civilization. This is a valid
classification since they are differently situated.

Mangyans are deprived of liberty for valid reasons: to protect civilized people from Mangyans since they
do not know concepts such as crime, property etc and at the same time to protect Mangyans from
slavery and exploitation by the civilized ones.

There is thus no violation of due process since what is being done is for the benefit of the public, this is a
valid exercise of police power.

Ynot v. IAC (Carabao Confiscation)

Deprived – property (carabao)

Police authorized to immediately confiscate. There is no notice no hearing no due process. Chairman of
the National Meat Inspection Commission authorize to redistribute up to his discretion. There is undue
delegation of power because there is no standard set by the legislative for the Executive to follow. This
is in violation of Separation of Powers.

Purpose of law is to preserve carabao due to epidemic. Law penalizes by confiscation those who
transport carabaos or carabeef between provinces.

Means are not germane to the purpose. Is it easier to kill a carabao in one province than another? No.

Also, immediate confiscation and donation by Meat Inspector is arbitrary. There is no due process since
property is immediately taken for reasons not germane to the purpose of preserving the carabao
species.

Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association

Deprived – property (right to work as pilots)

Acquiring the license has become a property right since the government already imposed strict
measures before granting such license. Upon such grant, government has already APPOINTED such
pilots for a definite period (up to 70 years of age) and it has thus become a right which cannot be
revoked without due process. Harbor pilot goes through the process with knowledge that government
would be obliged to grant them employment as pilots up to 70.

Automatic revocation of licenses of working pilots violates due process. Purpose of law is to ensure the
quality of service of pilots, cancelling licenses is not a valid means. A more appropriate method is to
issue regular exams or tests to measure qualifications. By yearly revoking licenses, there is a threat that
they will not be re-employed. This violates the property right to profession acquired by the harbor pilots
after hurdling difficult exams and years of training.

Tanada v. Tuvera

Due process requires that there is notice.

When should there be notice? Is it only when there is a case filed against the individual?

No. Previous notice must be issued to citizens before they can even be expected to follow new laws.
Notice may be actual or constructive, thus the requirement for publication. All laws that affect public
rights must be published, private ones not necessary.

Laws must be published in Official Gazette (Article 2 civil code) since no law was then yet existing that
provided otherwise. Now there is (EO 200)

Nunez v. Sandiganbayan

Petitioners assails constitutionality of Sandiganbayan for violating his right to due process and the equal
protection of the laws.

- Only given 1 chance to appeal (Sandiganbayan  SC) others (TC CASC)

- Only questions of law may be reviewed (SC) and no questions of fact

- Since up to the SC, it is merely a matter of discretion not of right

Is there a substantial basis for classification? (Public officers v. ordinary citizens)

YES.

Justice Laurel: "must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class."

Purpose of appeal is to grant accused another POV which may be impartial compared to that of a lower
court. In the Sandiganbayan, there are already 3 judges sitting and requiring a unanimous vote for
conviction. Failing such will increase judges to 5 and requiring majority vote. Even after that the SC may
review WON there has been a violation or mis-appreciation of a law. SC stressed that determining WON
the presumption of innocence has been sufficiently overcome is the primary consideration for granting a
review. Therefore, when SC grants review it in reality has already appreciated the facts. It is erroneous
therefore to conclude that the denial of appeals to CA is a denial of due process.

How is due process accorded to the accused in a criminal case?

“If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the
orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an
opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he
has had due process of law."

Ang Tibay v. CIR (Leather shoes)

Court of Industrial Relations rendered judgment between Ang Tibay and National Labor’s Union without
stating therein the factual basis to support a conclusion of law.

Requirements for administrative due process:

1. Notice and right to be heard (if they want to). Pleadings are enough.

2. Guarantee that evidences presented must be considered by tribunal

3. Decision must state basis based on substantial evidence

4. Decision-maker must be impartial. Must be independent of head of the agency not mere
subordinate

5. Parties must be duly informed of the basis and rationale of the decision arrived at.

In Administrative cases, what amount of evidence is required? Substantial Evidence

What is Substantial evidence? Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Based on statement
of complainant.

Thus parties must be given opportunity to present their cases and the tribunal (CIR) must consider the
weight of such evidence. The court SHOULD have stated the basis for their conclusion in order to satisfy
the right to due process by indicating that they have heard and considered the evidences presented by
both parties and such a consideration has led them to their decision. Absent such, it can be argued that
the judgment has no basis and is thus arbitrary and capricious.

Pollution Adjucation Board v. CA

PAB ordered Solar to cease and desist operations even before there was a trial or proceeding to hear
their case. Is this valid?

Yes. PAB had authority to issue ex parte cease and desist orders under its charter; said exercise over
Solar, after scientific evidence that it was indeed contaminating the water resources and below the
standards set by the PAB, is valid since there was an exercise of police power over the source of a
detriment.

Cease and desist, status quo, TRO are issued to prevent the harm. If allowed to continue hearing would
be futile because harm would already been done. So long as cease and desist order comes from
competent authority and based on substantial initial findings. Those aggrieved still has option of clearing
their name in a hearing which satisfies requirement of due process.

Cease and desist even before a trial or hearing? Yes, since to rule otherwise would allow Solar to
continue polluting the water source pending the resolution of the trial which could take years to the
detriment of the public welfare. Anyway, if after public hearing PAB finds that there is indeed a danger
to public health it may order permanent closure, or Solar may comply with standards by establishing
functioning waste treatment plants.

Non v. Dames

Requirement of Due process not limited to government or judicial acts but encompasses all
constitutionally guaranteed rights (e.g. education).

SC abandons Alcuaz v. PSBA doctrine. Enrollment is NOT a contract between student and university that
is terminated every semester. School cannot deny re-admission without any basis or without granting
him due process.

Basis for denial for admission: Academic deficiency, conduct

Academic Freedom:

(1) Who may teach,

(2) What may be taught,

(3) How it shall be taught, and

(4) Who may be admitted to study.

Due Process: Right to be notified of his sanctions, right to be heard, right to be informed of the evidence
against him, right to contradict such evidence and right to be judged based on substantial appreciation
of the facts.

Is protesting against increase in tuition fees a valid reason to deny admission? No.

Freedom of speech and assembly are constitutionally guaranteed rights that cannot be used against a
person to deprive him of another right (i.e. education).

Equal Protection

Does Equal protection mean absolutely no-discrimination or total equality? No, it is actually the
opposite, there is an inherent inequality that must be recognized and treated accordingly by law.

Central Bank v. BSP

Can a statute that has before been constitutional be declared otherwise upon the passage of
subsequent statutes?

Yes.

Initially, RA 7653 did not violate equal protection clause. There was a substantial distinction between
exempt and non-exempt employees. Legislature intended to address to lack of competitiveness of the
BSP in attracting more competent employees in higher posts, thus it gave incentives in the form of
increased compensation. The distinction was thus reasonable for the equal protection clause does not
require that all people are to be treated equally in the law. It merely requires that those similarly
situated are treated similarly and it allowed the legislature to create reasonable classifications based on
substantial distinctions.

Relative Constitutionality – initially constitutional but its application over time renders it
unconstitutional.

However, after the passage of subsequent laws exempting other government financial institutions from
the SSL, equal protection no longer applied, since rank and file employees from other GFIs were being
treated differently from the BSP employees. Those similarly situated are not being treated similarly.

3 tests of Equal Protection

1. Rational – deferential treatment since legislative acts are presumed constitutional. Acceptable
so long as there is a substantial basis for distinction and that it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. How to determine reasonability of classification

a. based on substantial distinction that makes for real differences

b. germane to the purposes of the law

c. not limited to existing conditions only; and

d. equally applicable to all members of the same class.

2. Intermediate - There exist classifications that are subjected to a higher or intermediate degree
of scrutiny than the deferential or traditional rational basis test. These classifications, however,
have not been deemed to involve suspect classes or fundamental rights; thus, they have not
been subjected to the strict scrutiny test. (gender, illegitimacy)

3. Strict Scrutiny – to be used by the courts when there is a violation of fundamental right.
Questions not only the means but the ends. For what purpose is the discrimination? Is the
purpose valid? Is the discrimination germane or necessary for the purpose? (e.g. Gender
discrimination - "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
 a. Suspect classes – race, religion, origin, language, political or social orientation etc. A
class saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.

Carpio-Morales:

Equal Protection Standards

Rational Basis Strict Scrutiny Intermediate

Scrutiny

Applicable To Legislative Legislative Legislative

Classifications classifications classifications
in general, affecting based on
such as those fundamental gender or
pertaining to rights or illegitimacy
economic or suspect
social classes.
legislation,
which do not
affect
fundamental
rights or
suspect classes;
or is not based
on gender or
illegitimacy.

Legislative Must be Must be Must be

Purpose legitimate. compelling. important.

Relationship of Classification Classification Classification

Classification must be must be must be
to Purpose rationally necessary and substantially
related to the narrowly related to the
legislative tailored to legislative
purpose. achieve the purpose.
legislative
purpose.
CJ Puno: If the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial
scrutiny ought to be more strict.

CJ Panganiban: statute does not violate equal protection, it passes 3-tier scrutiny of equal protection
statutes. It is both a social and an economic measure rationally related to a governmental end that is not
prohibited. Since salary grade, class of position, and government employment are not fundamental or
constitutional rights, and non-exempt government employees or their financial need are not suspect
classes, the government is not at all required to show a compelling state interest to justify the
classification made.

Carpio-Morales: in so ruling, the ponencia has created a sub-class (GFI employees) that enjoys
exemption from the SSL without any apparent basis.

No basis to use double standards for analyzing constitutionality, deferential as between employees of
BSP and rank and file – strict as between rank and file of BSP and other GFI rank and file employees.

In strict scrutiny, a classification is “suspect”, thus the presumption of constitutionality is reversed and it
becomes incumbent upon the government to justify such classification.

Phil. Judges Asscn.v. Pardo

Franking privilege was denied from Judiciary and other government offices but not from Office of the
President, former presidents, widows of former presidents, legislature etc.

Argument of respondents: Frank mails coming from Judiciary amounts the highest, thus Phil Post
Services wanted revenue from it.

Court finds this argument ridiculous. For one, what is the purpose of such exemption if not to expedite
communication between government and the people? Then why grant this privilege to those who do
not need it (widows of former presidents) but deny it to those who actually do (judiciary)?

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege.

If the problem sought to be addressed by the Legislation is the increase in revenue, then the proper
remedy is to deny it altogether instead of recklessly discriminating between classes without substantial
distinction. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

Ichong v. Hernandez

Law was passed prohibiting aliens (either natural or juridical) from engaging in Retail business and
provides for inability of their heirs from continuing the business.
Petitioner argues that statute is racist, in violation of due process and the equal protection clause.

Court holds that citizenship is a valid basis for classification. An alien is different from a national, the
former is primarily motivated by profit and does not owe loyalty to the host nation. His profit goes back
to his native land instead of the host, he does not care of the welfare of his customers or the country in
which he sells his goods.

Because of such a lack of attachment, the alien had continued to use pernicious means to gain his profit
to the detriment of the native consumer. He has gotten an economic stranglehold over the retail
business which is vital to the life and prosperity of the nation and its citizens. Congress has therefore
seen fit to defend its citizens from such a practice by enacting the assailed legislation.

There is no violation of treaty with China since the Chinese are not singled out in the prohibition, all
aliens are prohibited thus the law applies to all situated in the same class – aliens.

Atty. Muyot -this was really about deriving profit from retail industry and prevention of monopolies
which happen to be the Chinese, but cannot classify based on nationality (because that would be
discriminatory). To justify, substantial distinction is based on those who keep books in chinese and those
who keep in English or Spanish. Remedy is to naturalize as Filipinos (which they did).

Essence of discrimination – singling out a particular class.

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union

Closed shop agreement – must be member of union to be employed and to stay employed.

Law is passed authorizing proprietors to negotiate with labor unions to be members thereof as a
prerequisite for employment. The said requirement however does not apply to members of religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization.

Respondent union interpreted statute as a ban on all members of such religious institutions (e.g. INC)
from joining labor unions, thus a violation of freedom of association.

They also argue that said legislation violates equal protection clause since it exempts from requirement
of membership said members of INC but allows them to enjoy all the benefits, concessions and other
emoluments that the union may secure from the employer.

SC: Union erroneously read statute; it does not ban members of such religious sects from membership
with labor unions. The law does not coerce nor prohibit such a member from joining labor unions.

What then is the purpose of such a provision? It is to insure the freedom of belief and religion, and to
promote general welfare by preventing discrimination against members of such religious sects and
thusly confirming their right to work.

And how is the purpose to be achieved? By exempting such members from coverage of union security
agreements.
Is this reasonable? Yes, religious freedom is one of the most zealously protected Constitutional rights.

Does the law unduly give an advantage to members of such religious sects over non-members thereby
violating the equal protection of laws?

Equal protection is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state.
It does not require that a statute must apply equally to every man, woman and child. It allows
classification of things that are different as long as there is a substantial distinction.

Is there a substantial distinction to warrant the classification between workers who may join and those
who may not due to their religious affiliation? Yes, workers should not be forced to choose between
their right to be employed and their right to religion.

Dumlao v. COMELEC

Law provides that:

“Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for
the same elective local office from which he has retired”

Is there a substantial basis to disqualify a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a
provincial, city or municipal office from running for the same office which he had retired?

Yes. The official had already retired perhaps due to his old age, thus prompting new blood to fill in the
void. The fact that the official has already retired from such a post admits this fact although due to a
prompt change of mind he would like to assume it again.

The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at
times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies

Atty Muyot: Better distinction – those retired in government service and those that are outside. Why?
Since they have already received benefits (pension) for the service in government.

Ang LADLAD v. COMELEC

LGBTs are discriminated against, they are marginalized and need representation, have valid interest.
Cannot be disqualified based on “morality” since there is no law nor legal basis that punishes or
prohibits homosexuality, COMELEC’s arguments are purely subjective and cannot be basis for violation
of equal protection.

Tatad v. Sec of Energy

Oil deregulation law – imposes 3% tariff on imported crude oil products and 7% on refined oil products.
At its face, law is neutral since it assumes that oil playing field is level. But it is not, so the law effectively
burdens new players and favors old oil companies since they have existing oil refineries and import
crude.

The statute also provides that full deregulation shall only be implemented “when prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and the time when the exchange rate of the peso
in relation to the US dollar is stable. The Chief Executive failed to abide by said standard when it
considered the extraneous factor of the depletion of OPSF fund.

Government: 4% tariff deferential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries.

4% - huge advantage to the oligopoly. Small tariff on them while 7% on the new players is also an
advantage to them and disadvantage for the latter. Said goal to have refineries set-up in the country is
putting the cart before the horse, how can you expect new players to setup refineries worth billions of
pesos when they are precisely the new entrees to the field?

In Equal protection, do not merely look at law. Look at application, history, religion, age, purpose etc.
Though law may appear neutral, its application may enforce inequality. Recognize differences and
legislate, apply laws accordingly. Do not treat unequals equally.

Merry Christmas 2010  hohohohoho

01/09/10

Search and Seizure

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 3.

1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

Discussion:

Due Process – must be followed before deprivation of life, liberty and property l Security
Search and Seizure – one may be deprived of liberty of property upon issuance of valid search or seize
warrant upon finding of probable cause that it constitutes as evidence for the commission of a crime.

Rule 126

Search warrant - an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described
therein and bring it before the court

Peace office - the same person who applied for the warrant shall be the one to make the search and
seizure – because of the need of knowing (personal knowledge) the background of the crime/case

Judge - personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted
- ask the facts of the crime because there is a need for the personal knowledge of the peace
officer
- ask the relationship between the place, the crime, and the things

Things – the specific objects and the relationship of these objects to the crime, and the reason of the
presence of these object in that particular place.

Owner of the place must be present, or family members or at least 2 witnesses

Stonehill v. Diokno

Items obtained in violation of Sec 2 and 3 of article III are inadmissible. This is to discourage government
from fishing expeditions and violating the law at the expense of this right. Otherwise provision would be
useless.

Third person cannot invoke violation of the right of another, complainant must be the one whose rights
were violated.

Constitution abhors general search warrants, must be as particular as possible and describe the specific
crimes committed, place to be searched and items to be seized.

What may be seized:

1. Subject of the crime

2. Stolen or embezzled goods
3. Tools to perpetrate crime

Burgos v. Chief of Staff

Search warrant cannot be used to shut down media enterprises in violation of freedom of the press.
Complainant must have personal knowledge of the circumstances and evidences that would lead to
assumption of probable cause to convince the judge to issue warrant. Mere hearsay or secondhand
knowledge does not suffice.

People v. Marti

Private individual who conducts warrantless search of another private individual without state
intervention does not fall under the prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures. Such
evidence obtained is admissible as evidence.

Said right is for protection of the individual against state intrusion, not against fellow private individuals.

NBI was there and investigated the contents, is this not state intrusion? No, Reyes already opened and
searched the box before NBI came, observing what is in plain sight is not an illegal search.

People v. Aruta

Warrantless searches allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search; 9
6. Stop and Frisk (founded on principle that there might be a crime committed and
because of the suspicious conduct of the suspect, the officer has a probable cause to believe
that he is involved and is attempting to evade arrest)
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances
8. Checkpoints
9. Immigrations
10. Health checks

In all of the above circumstances there must be probable cause to effect a warrantless search or arrest
(in flagrante delicto, hot pursuit, convict evading arrest etc).
Probable Cause is personal knowledge of the factual circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that a crime has been committed and a person has committed said
crime or that items, objects or articles connected or incidental to the crime are to be found in a certain
place or with a certain individual.

A lawful arrest warrants an otherwise warrantless arrest but the latter cannot be done first such that to
conduct a warrantless search and an arrest later. In such a case both arrest and search would be
unlawful.

In consented search, the consent must be express not merely implied or through silence to constitute
waiver of right. Officer must ask for permission to conduct search expressly and it must likewise be
expressly granted by person to be searched. There must be an actual intent to relinquish said right.

Valmonte v. De Villa

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.

Did not specify how rights have been violated, no particular checkpoint is being questioned. Court
cannot make general declaration on the invalidity of checkpoints.

Inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right
against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the
same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.

Note the circumstances surrounding the situations, 1989 post Martial Law. Coup d’états and NPA
insurgency was on the rise. It was an emergency situation that warranted the validity of checkpoints.

Aniag v. COMELEC

Checkpoints are allowed only during extraordinary times (Valmonte). There was no need for a
checkpoint to enforce gun ban during elections, there was no emergency (like today).

Furthermore, the guns confiscated cannot be admitted as evidence as it violates Sec 3(b) of Article III
since the guns were not in plain view and the driver did not give his consent for the vehicle to be
searched. Neither was he acting suspiciously as to trigger a probable cause for the officers to conduct a
warrantless search.

Caballes v. CA
Search of moving vehicle is not in violation of the constitution if it is limited to merely flashing a light
into the contents of the vehicle, a mere visual search or inspection, a routine check conducted in a fixed
area, driver or owner is not subject to a body search etc.

For a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, the officer conducting the search must have
probable cause to believe, PRIOR to the search, that the vehicle or owner thereof has committed a
crime.

A vehicle merely looking “suspicious” is not enough ground to establish probable cause and thereby
justify a warrantless search.

There was also no consent since officers merely told Caballes that they would be searching the vehicle
to which he agreed, it was under duress and intimidation.

Privacy of Communication

Ganaan v. CA

Wiretapping law – telephone extension not included in “other devices” described by the law. Law
penalizes the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording, private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section
1 of R.A. 4200

Ramirez v. CA

Does the prohibition in RA 4200 apply even to persons privy to the communications?

Yes. The law does not distinguish between third parties or those actually involved in the communication.
The law penalizes any person who records private conversations without the consent of all the parties.

Right to Privacy

The right to be left alone, to have no intrusion into the personal and private affairs of individuals.

Ople v. Torres

National ID system is unconstitutional due to it being an undue usurpation of power by the executive of
a legislative power. When a right (especially one that is guaranteed by the constitution) is limited or
infringed upon, there should be a law passed by Congress and such must be the subject of strict scrutiny
by the Courts. This was not done in the case at bar wherein there is an infringement of the right to
privacy by the Executive without a prior law authorizing it.

Also, there are no standards or safeguards set and the purposes are not clearly outlined. For one, the
Solgen admitted that the data gathered will not be limited to mere identification but for “development
planning” purposes. There is also no control over who has access over such data, this clearly present a
danger to the right to privacy when anyone may access your information and data without your
permission.

Comparing this to Morfe v. Mutuc (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), the subject of the Morfe case
was a Republic Act and not merely an AO, the law was also detailed while the AO was not narrowly
drawn enough to pass judicial scrutiny.

The court clarifies that a National ID system per se is unconstitutional or invalid for invading the right to
privacy. Said right may be properly the subject of future legislation so long as a law effecting such is
passed and clear standards are set with the purposes and safeguards properly outlined.

Ayer v. Capulong

Enrile invokes his right to privacy to enjoin petitioner Ayer Productions from producing movie on the
EDSA revolution.

By participating in the EDSA Revolution, Enrile has entered into the domain of a “public figure” thus
limiting his right to privacy in matters that are of public concern. The EDSA Revolution is definitely one of
national, even international, concern and thus Enrile can no longer exclude himself from informing the
public of his participation lest film depictions or other portrayals would suffer gross inaccuracy. Of
course what may be shown to the public is limited to the actual participation of the public figure in the
event and cannot encompass purely private or personal matters that have no bearing whatsoever to the
public interest.

SJS v. DDB

Random drug testing for aspiring public officials, constitutional? No, it provides an additional
requirement for office contrary to that provided by the constitution and other statutes.

In schools? Yes. Tests are done without suspicion and at random. The purpose is to discourage the use
of drugs by not giving warning to a student who is going to be tested.

(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2)
minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to
safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably
be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants
for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Test should be that of reasonableness:

 1. Nature of the privacy to be intruded. (privacy of employees and students are reduced in the
school and work setting)

2. Is there a compelling state interest warranting such intrusion? (proliferation of drugs)

3. Is such intrusion narrowly focused (are there well established limits and safeguards)?

Against accused? No.

This violates right against unlawful searches and seizure since the accused is compelled to produce
evidence that he is a drug user which incidentally incriminates him. It is made with suspicion and
definitely not at random.

Freedom of Speech

New York Times vs. Sullivan

The State accords protection to its citizen’s freedoms of speech. Charges of Libel by public officials are
insufficient if they cannot prove the existence of actual malice.

To justify repression of said right there must be the existence of clear and present danger to the public
interest if such speech, publication or other form of expression is allowed.

Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of
damages for false statements unless "actual malice" -- knowledge that statements are false or in
reckless disregard of the truth -- is alleged and proved.

SWS v. COMELEC

Any infringement on the right to press, speech and expression are presumed invalid. Such presumption
must be overcome by the authority seeking such repression.

How to determine constitutional validity of laws infringing right of speech, expression and press?

O’Brien Test:

[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;

[2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;

[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and

[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and
press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
COMELEC regulation violates 3rd and 4th test. The government interest is directly related to the
repression of a form of expression, survey results while allowing other kinds of election related opinions
to be aired on tv, radio etc.

Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the
fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful
acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils

To summarize then, we hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can
be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression.

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

Freedom of Speech does not protect all forms of utterances or expressions such as:

1. The lewd and obscene,

2. the profane,

3. the libelous,

4. insulting or 'fighting' words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.

When is an utterance offensive? "The word 'offensive' is not to be defined in terms of what a particular
addressee thinks. . . . The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words
likely to cause an average addressee to fight.

Miller v. California

Obscene materials such as “hardcore” porn do not come under the purview of the protection of the
freedom of expression and is thus subject to state regulation.

Test to determine hardcore pornography from valid form of expression:

(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Kois v. Wisconsin, supra, at 408 U.
S. 230, quoting Roth v. United States, supra, at 354 U. S. 489;

(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and

(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Pita v. CA

When can there be a valid confiscation of “obscene” materials? Who determines what is or what is not
obscene? The court was unable to answer said question since even in American Jurisprudence, the test
of WON something is pornographic or not (thus can afford of the constitutional protection of
expression) has still been under debate. It however postulated the following in proceeding against
possessors of “smut” or porn.

1. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their
opinion, an obscenity rap is in order;

2. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are
"obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State
interference and action;

3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the question
is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound discretion.

4. If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant
prayed for;

5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code;

6. Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or not the
properties seized are indeed "obscene"

New York v. Ferber

New York enacted law prohibiting distribution of child pornography. The material did not have to be
legally obscene so long as it depicted even in parts juveniles engaged in sexual acts. Materials are legally
obscene when, taken as a whole, they can be considered offensive and lacking serious value of any type.

Obscenity as held in Roth is not under the protection of the freedom of expression.

(1) the legislative judgment that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to
the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child easily passes muster under the First
Amendment;

(2) the standard of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, for determining what is legally obscene is not a
satisfactory solution to the child pornography problem;

(3) the advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for, and are thus an
integral part of, the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation;

(4) the value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in
lewd exhibitions is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis; and
(5) recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material outside the First
Amendment's protection is not incompatible with this Court's decisions dealing with what speech is
unprotected. When a definable class of material, such as that covered by the New

In fine the court held that “child pornography” is a new category outside of the protection of the
freedom speech which did not have to strictly pass the standards set in Miller. In fine, the material did
not have to be legally obscene, A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the prurient
interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently
offensive manner.

Reno v. Civil Liberties Union

Law was passed seeking to protect minors from harmful material on the internet. The law criminalizes
the "knowing" transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient under 18 years of age
and prohibits the "knowin[g]" sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message "that, in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs."

Defense may however be raised by violators such as taking “good faith effective actions” to restrict
minors from accessing the websites and by requiring certain proofs of age (credit card number etc).

Held: the terms “patently offensive” and “indecent” contained in the law are too vague and overbroad
constituting a violation of the freedom of expression.

The law that does not allow parents to consent to their children's use of restricted materials; is not
limited to commercial transactions; fails to provide any definition of "indecent" and omits any
requirement that "patently offensive" material lack socially redeeming value.

Neither does the law define what it really is prohibiting such as acts that are “patently offensive” which
thus falls short of the second requirement announced in Miller which states:

b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and

Chavez v. Gonzales

At the eve of the “Hello Garci” scandal involving a wiretapped conversation between PGMA and a
COMELEC official, Secretary of Justice Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons
possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who
had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.
NTC reiterates same warning to wit: “that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or
willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies”

Freedom of Speech – it is the freedom to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter regarding public
interest without fear of censorship nor punishment. Holmes: “it is freedom for the thought that we hate,
no less for the thought that agrees with us.”

3 tests of Freedom of Speech

1. Clear and Present Danger test – requires that the speech sought to be repressed will most
likely cause an evil to which the government has a right to prevent. Danger must be
extremely serious and imminent. Mere apprehensions of an evil based on the judgment of
the censor is inadequate. This is the test adhered to by the Philippine Courts.

2. Dangerous Tendency Test – the speech sought to be repressed is rationally connected to

the danger sought to be prevented. Easiest to prove.

3. Balancing test – the courts will have to decide whether the danger sought to be prevented
by the government justifies the repression of the freedom of speech. Which interest
outweighs the other. This approach has been criticized as to leave up to the judges the sole
duty of determining what does and does not constitute as a valid repression of the freedom
of speech to which they have no authority to do so.

What constitutes the Freedom of the Press?

1. Freedom from prior restraint – generally refers to censorship. Any law or official that
requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an
infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts.

Some forms of prior restraint are however allowed, must determine WON

a. Content neutral – merely controlling time, place or manner under well defined
standards. Requires only proof of substantial government interest.

b. Content based – what it is you want to talk to talk about, how you are going to talk
about it etc. Subject to strict scrutiny and clear and present danger test.

2. Freedom from punishment subsequent publication -

3. Access to information

4. Freedom of circulation

How to attack cases against free speech:

(a) the test; - CPD, DTT, BT

 (b) the presumption; - consti or unconsti

(c) the burden of proof; - government or petitioner

(d) the party to discharge the burden; - government or petitioner

(e) the quantum of evidence necessary - substantial, compelling etc

Case at bar: There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.

Freedom of the Press

In re Emil Jurado

Though the Constitution recognizes the vital role the Press and the Media plays in a free society and
guarantees its protection from unwarranted curtailments such protection is not absolute. A journalist
cannot use the Freedom of the Press as a warrant for publishing unsubstantiated materials that sow
dishonor and intrigue against the persons of others (public officers, private individuals etc).

There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact," and "the erroneous statement of fact is not
worthy of constitutional protection (although) . . . nevertheless inevitable in free debate." "Neither the
intentional lie nor the careless error," it said, "materially advances society's interest in 'unhibited,
robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues.

It is the duty of a journalist to investigate and verify the truth of what he is about to publish before
doing so and should another contest or challenge what he has written he must provide such proof to
support or warrant what he has written. Absent this effort to verify the truth, a journalist may be held
liable for contempt and would be unable to avail himself of the constitutional protection.

Puno: - malice was not proven (New York v. Sullivan)

- Majority concluded the columns were false but did not show clear and present danger to
warrant forfeiture of constitutional protection.

Freedom of Assembly

Reyes v. Bagatsing

The right to peaceably assemble cannot be denied unless on the basis of a clear and present danger. The
mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice.

The use of a public place is a right for every citizen, the licensing authority may only regulate but cannot
prohibit without a valid basis. The regulation must be limited only to time, place and manner the
purpose of which is to ensure that the activity of the community in general will not be hampered by the
inconveniences the assembly may cause.
Malabanan v. Ramento

Students do not shed their constitutional rights once they enter the school ground. They may exercise
such rights subject to the same limitations guaranteed by the constitution. Based solely on the exercise
of such rights, they cannot be punished unless there has been serious transgressions resulting into the
detriment of others.

The students validly obtained a permit to peaceably assemble, regrettably they overstepped the bounds
of their permits by conducting their rally around the school premises causing a disturbance among other
classes. To such the school may impose punishments which must be fair and reasonable in proportion to
their transgression.

The 1 year suspension of the students is too excessive when a 1 week suspension would suffice.

Bayan Muna v. Ermita

Court upholds BP 880 as valid considering it as a codification of the Reyes v. Bagatsing ruling on the
permits to use a public area for peaceful assemblies. However, absent the concurrent creation of a
“freedom park” in the City of Manila wherein citizens may peacefully assemble without a permit, the
Court held that the no permit no rally cannot be enforced since to deny the right to have a place for
peaceful assembly is to deny the right in toto.

The CPR must be struck down as a darkness against civil liberties, for if it means the same thing as
“maximum tolerance” in BP 880 then there is no need for redundancy and if it means something else
then it is an illegal measure that has no place in society.

Process in obtaining permit:

1. State time, place and manner of assembly 5 days prior to the actual occasion thereof

2. Mayor or competent official involved has discretion to grant or deny but only based on clear
and present danger

3. Non issuance of permit within 5 days shall be deemed as an implied grant of the permit

4. Cities must establish freedom parks otherwise all public places will be deemed as freedom
parks which shall not require permits to rally.

Freedom of Religion