EN BANC

G.R. No. 190529               April 29, 2010

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General

GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari1 and in the
motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated
December 9, 2009 denying PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these
resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

BACKGROUND

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act,
provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:

xxxx

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or 

fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 – the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System – which it
promulgated on June 25, 1996.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution
No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was
PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in
the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any national, regional
sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or through its authorized
representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the
admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List
System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:

(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already
registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file
with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its
desire to participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a
deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007

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 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding
election under the same conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;

(2) The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections – cannot apply in the instant
controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI’s; (b)
MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI and the 25
others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the requirement of
Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 179271 (Banat v. COMELEC)
and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the equal protection of the
laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to
prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with the
same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.2

The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A.
7941.3 The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organization
does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization or
coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment
would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.

Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in
2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly
gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have
been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution
8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC
when it moved to reconsider its delisting.

We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections (Minero);4 we said that no grave
abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:

Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all
in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the
two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.

PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI
claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence.
Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and
import of the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994.
It cited the following excerpts from the Records of the Senate:

Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section 5 – there are
actually two grounds it states: " Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its
failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the party-list system in either of
the last two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered"

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In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections. The
second is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in either of
the last two preceding elections, Mr. President,

Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.

Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.5 [Underscoring supplied.]

PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to
participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to
secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.

Considering PGBI’s arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the court’s docket.

THE ISSUES

We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether
PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

OUR RULING

We find the petition partly impressed with merit.

a. The Minero Ruling

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. 6 The word
"or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBI’s
cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-
participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold
party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate
in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a
confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language and the legislative
intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two
different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law – in
jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and
hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.8

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for
Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC9 (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2%
party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
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11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold
in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should therefore
be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering less than
2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.

We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a party-list group or
organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for
the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the application
of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list votes garnered
by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives, a
percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The disqualification should now
necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the
two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to
garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat
ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and
applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is,10 and as an exception to the application
of the principle of stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to
be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument.11 The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare
decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties
may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issue.12

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare
decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.13

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an
erroneous application of the law – an application that the principle of stability or predictability of
decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent
of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by

4|S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and strike it out from our
ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBI’s situation – a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a
prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election – is something
that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in
the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over
which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the
principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this
concern to the legislature’s notice.

b. The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not
violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No.
8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as
applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties
are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.14 We find it obvious under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution,
PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004
(MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the coming May 2010
elections.

DISSENTING OPINION

ABAD, J.:

This case stems from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc resolution removing petitioner
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) from the roster of registered party-list organizations
because of its failure to obtain at least 2% party-list votes in the May 2004 election and to participate
in the May 2007 election.

I agree with the view of Justice Arturo D. Brion that Republic Act (R.A.) 7941 provides for two separate
grounds for delisting a party-list organization, namely: a) failure to participate in the last two
preceding elections; or b) failure to garner at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

I also agree that because of the Court’s decision in BANAT,1 the needed minimum 2% of the votes cast
in the two preceding elections should now be understood to mean the actual percentage of the votes
garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of Representatives.
But this could not apply to PGBI because BANAT took effect only in the preceding May 2007 elections
and PGBI did not run in the same. It ran in the preceding May 2004 elections, when the BANAT ruling
did not yet exist, but failed to get at least 2% of the votes cast in those elections.

I must disagree with the ponencia’s view that the Court should reverse the Minero ruling 2 that invoked
Section 6(8) of R.A. 7941, which provides:

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. -- The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional, or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:

xxxx
5|S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections fails to obtain at least two per centum
(2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.

Since by its own admission, Minero failed to get at least 2% of the votes in the 2001 elections and did
not participate at all in the 2004 elections, the Court held that it necessarily failed to get at least 2% of
the votes cast in the two preceding elections. The COMELEC was thus justified in canceling its
registration.

The ponencia would allow PGBI to remain in the register of party-list organizations and avert
disqualifications because, according to it, PGBI cannot be said to have failed to get at least 2% of the
votes cast in the two preceding elections because it only ran in one of those two elections. It cannot
also be said to have failed to take part in the two preceding elections because it ran in one of them.
What is needed, the ponencia claims, are two strikes for the same ground in the two preceding
elections.

But it is evident from Section 6(8) above that the legislature intended the two separate tests—failure
to take part in the last two preceding elections or failure to garner at least 2% of the votes cast in such
elections—to be complimentary. Their purpose is to put every party-list organization, which won the
right to be registered, to a two-election wringer, a voters’ preference test, for lack of a better term to
describe it.

This means that, to remain in the party-list register and enjoy the right to take part in the party-list
election, a party must prove by the results of the preceding two elections that it retains the required
level of voters’ preference. Failing in this, such party shall be dropped by the COMELEC, without
prejudice to its applying for new registration after a mandatory one-term rest.

If the ponencia’s views were to be followed, petitioner PGBI would be able to circumvent the voters’
preference test that it needs to pass to remain in the register of party-list organizations. It would
succeed in putting one over the parties that exerted efforts to get the required level of voters’
preference. The following example should illustrate the unfair result:

Election Year Party-List X Party-List Y PGBI Party

May 2004 Deficient votes Did not run Deficient votes

May 2007 Deficient votes Did not run Did not run

May 2010 Cancelled Cancelled Not cancelled

The register of party-list organizations cannot be allowed to grow infinitely. The system cannot tolerate
sectoral parties with low-levels of voters’ preference to remain on the ballot. For this reason, the
legislature established a mechanism for attrition, the enforcement of which is an important
responsibility of the COMELEC.

The Court must not abandon Minero. I vote to deny PGBI’s motion for reconsideration.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009.
6|S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 2
 Philippine Mine Safety & Environment Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 177548, May 10, 2007.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179271               April 21, 2009

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers), Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS), Intervenor.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179295               April 21, 2009

BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION AND
HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., and ABONO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
— in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s resolution in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting
as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo
(AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with
mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60
made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total
votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the
party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5 (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a
motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. 6

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On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by
the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he
Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the
[COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT
filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution
No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan
Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party
(Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak
Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-
Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total
of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the
Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May
2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers
reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven
hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical
data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) 102,430

from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo,
Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
Pagalungan, Maguindanao)

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two
percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two
(334,462) votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its
ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party,
organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be
determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty
four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
8|S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
COALITION RECEIVED

1 BUHAY 1,163,218

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730

3 CIBAC 760,260

4 GABRIELA 610,451

5 APEC 538,971

6 A TEACHER 476,036

7 AKBAYAN 470,872

8 ALAGAD 423,076

9 BUTIL 405,052

10 COOP-NATCO 390,029

11 BATAS 386,361

12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036

13 ARC 338,194

14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which
an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the
Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the
aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the
meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on
Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM,
subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating
under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC

9|S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA

5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC

6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through A TEACHER

Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms, Inc.

7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party AKBAYAN

8 Alagad ALAGAD

9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO

11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS

12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC

13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant
to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby

deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and
academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72,
which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s
interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers
proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent
(2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and
were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of
Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually
canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum
votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
10 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
   Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747

2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476

3 CIBAC 755,964

4 GABRIELA 621,718

5 APEC 622,489

6 A TEACHER 492,369

7 AKBAYAN 462,674

8 ALAGAD 423,190

9 BUTIL 409,298

10 COOP-NATCO 412,920

11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165

12 ARC 375,846

13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of
votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of
representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based
on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed in Veterans,
is:

Number of votes of first party

Proportion of votes of first
= party relative to total votes for
party-list system
Total votes for party-list system

11 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat

Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747

= 0.07248 or 7.2%

16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the
correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned party
No. of additional
Additional seats for
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
to first party
No. of votes of
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1

GABRIELA 1.05 1

APEC 1.05 1

A TEACHER 0.83 0

AKBAYAN 0.78 0

ALAGAD 0.71 0

BUTIL 0.69 0

COOP-NATCO 0.69 0

ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

12 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive
Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en
banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the
following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2

BAYAN MUNA 1

CIBAC 1

GABRIELA 1

APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to
entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1)
additional seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.9

Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as
follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his
comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following
reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that
13 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their
initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes
they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that
is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total
nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which
were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the
"ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A" of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June
1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-
list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the
procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be
followed.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the
Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the
Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results." 1awphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the
herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.10

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did
not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its
decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is
violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.11

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other
party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System:
Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An Waray.14 Per the
certification15 by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
14 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an
Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer
for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 16

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as
said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the
"First Party" violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the "First Party"
and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those
required under RA 7941;

C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as provided for
under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to
15 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans
Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved
herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941,
and are of transcendental importance to our nation. 17

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined
the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?18

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable
parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term "proportional
representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list
organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.
16 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.

xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives shall
be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to
modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives. 1avvphi1.zw+

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the
total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the
number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats
available to legislative
districts Number of seats available to
x .20 = party-list representatives

.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives
whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220
x .20
55
=
.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom
of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List
System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least
two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A.
No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party
Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula21 as an
alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list
representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which
provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:
17 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of
votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list
system. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list
representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section
12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House
of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996.
Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List
Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total
party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats
(Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the
immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those
seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not
secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941.23

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941.
BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by
each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. 24

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes
received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the votes of a
party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats." 25 Thirty-four (34)
party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6 formula
and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim
that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan
Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the
qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of
18 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total
party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to
using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all
the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or
remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of
this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up. 26

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
garnered during the elections.27

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386

3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424

5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327

6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220

10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717

12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012

14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522

17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691

30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

19 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255

32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781

35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744

37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916

38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161

42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445

43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each." This
clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for
illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of
votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes
for the party-list.28

Votes Garnered over Total

Rank Party Votes Garnered Guaranteed Seat
Votes for Party-List, in %

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1

29
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1

20 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1

  Total     17

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list
candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we
distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is where
petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in
proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation
is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds
50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a
guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a
seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast
to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives."30

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

21 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
"additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table
3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates.

There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation.

First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The
whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s
share in the remaining available seats.

Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply
the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Votes
Garnered Additional (B) plus
Applying the
over Guaranteed Seat Seats (C), in
Votes three seat
Rank Party Total Votes (First Round) (Second whole
Garnered cap
for Party List, (B) Round) integers
(E)
in % (C) (D)
(A)

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

COOP-
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

ANG
31 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives
from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats
allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in
the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We
are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one
of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can
sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question
is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can
they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating
under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in
the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral
candidates.

23 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the
farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer.
Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority
political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are
also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are
represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate
the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.
Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan
natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta
and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running
under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO
may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to
seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should
not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be
transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this
will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be
attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for
us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically
transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and
the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the
parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of
mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in
Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a
transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party.
But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at
all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each
other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a
24 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It
installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the
majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become
actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political
parties.

x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of
R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations
of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in
the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles
and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for
public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at
least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their
sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share
similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list
elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list
system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate
in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted
down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a
sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list
elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political
engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political
parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes.
There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the
Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus
organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish
a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

25 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is

a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of
the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years
of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot
be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-
list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-
list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used
in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major
political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the
formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3

August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare
unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of
additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this
Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

20
 Id. at 446-451. We quote below the discussion in Veterans explaining the First Party Rule:

Formula for Determining

Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given
by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second
party, it should be entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore,
for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes = Proportion of votes of first party relative to

of first party total votes for party-list system

26 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 Total votes for
party-list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled
to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a
rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party
shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent,
then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the
highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to
which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in
the House of Representatives.

xxx

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats
the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the
other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene
the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of
the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to
two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a
significantly higher amount of votes — say, twenty percent — to grant it the same number of
seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation,
since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives
as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a
total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of
the first party.

Formula for Additional

Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:

Additional seats = No. of votes of x No. of additional

for concerned party concerned party seats allocated
to the first party

Total No. of votes

of party-list system

No. of votes
of first party

Total No. of votes

27 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
 of party-list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned party
No. of additional
Additional seats
= x seats allocated to
for concerned party
the first party
No. of votes
of first party

xxx

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of
votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be
zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact
whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole
numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may
result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore,
obtaining absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a
maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional
representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional
representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to
work within such extant parameter.

21
 Id. at 475-481.

 The second vote cast by a registered voter is for the party-list candidates as provided in Section 10 of
22

R.A. No. 7941.

23
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 47.

24
 Id. at 48.

25
 Id. at 1076.

26
 Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 66-81.

 Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-974; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-803. Party-List Canvass
27

Report No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.

28
 Id.

29
 Proclamation deferred by COMELEC.

30
 Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.

31
 The product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties ranked nine and below
is less than one.

32
 II Record, Constitutional Commission 256-257 (25 July 1986), 568 (1 August 1986).

28 | S e t 5 E : B O R : R i g h t s o f S u s p e c t ; R i g h t s o f A c c u s e d
  Id. at 584 (1 August 1986). Dissenting opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Ang Bagong Bayani- OFW
33

Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 350 (2001).

34
 Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 336 (2001).

35
 Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

PUNO, C.J.:

History has borne witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to find their voice, even as they are relegated
to the sidelines as genuine functional representation systemically evades them. It is by reason of this underlying
premise that the party-list system was espoused and embedded in the Constitution, and it is within this context
that I register my dissent to the entry of major political parties to the party-list system.

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec 1 with regard to the
computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for
the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of
Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties in the
election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence this dissent.

To revisit the crux of the controversy, the pertinent portion of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution reads:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through
a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from
the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector. 2

It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought the disqualification of the major political
parties on the ground that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented,
and not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Rising to the occasion, the
Court ruled through then Associate, later Chief Justice Panganiban, that while any duly registered political party,
organization or group may participate, the role of the Comelec is to ensure that only those who are marginalized
and underrepresented become members of Congress through the "Filipino-style" party-list elections.
Characterizing the party-list system as a social justice vehicle, the Court batted for the empowerment of the
masses, thus—

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only
genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific
concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of
the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for
genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past — the farm hands, the
fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement — to come out and participate, as indeed
many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate
them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.

Today, less than a decade after, there is an attempt to undo the democratic victory achieved by the marginalized
in the political arena in Ang Bagong Bayani. In permitting the major political parties to participate in the party-list
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system, Mr. Justice Carpio relies on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Allegedly, the said
deliberations indicate that the party-list system is open to all political parties, as long as they field candidates
who come from the different marginalized sectors.3 Buttressing his view, Mr. Justice Carpio notes that the major
political parties also fall within the term "political parties" in the Definition of Terms in Republic Act 7941,
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4 Likewise, he holds that the qualifications of a party-list nominee
as prescribed in Section 9 of the said law do not specify any financial status or educational requirement, hence,
it is not necessary for the party-list nominee to "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity." 5 It is then concluded
that major political parties may now participate in the party-list system.

With all due respect, I cannot join this submission. We stand on solid grounds when we interpret the Constitution
to give utmost deference to the democratic sympathies, ideals and aspirations of the people. More than the
deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, these are expressed in the text of the Constitution which the
people ratified. Indeed, it is the intent of the sovereign people that matters in interpreting the Constitution. In Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, we held:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention
in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when
other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did
not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face. 6

Everybody agrees that the best way to interpret the Constitution is to harmonize the whole instrument, its every
section and clause. 7 We should strive to make every word of the fundamental law operative and avoid rendering
some words idle and nugatory. 8 The harmonization of Article VI, Section 5 with related constitutional provisions
will better reveal the intent of the people as regards the party-list system. Thus, under Section 7 of the Transitory
Provisions,9 the President was permitted to fill by appointment the seats reserved for sectoral representation
under the party-list system from a list of nominees submitted by the respective sectors. This was the result of
historical precedents that saw how the elected Members of the interim Batasang Pambansa and the regular
Batasang Pambansa tried to torpedo sectoral representation and delay the seating of sectoral representatives
on the ground that they could not rise to the same levelled status of dignity as those elected by the people. 10  To1avvphi1

avoid this bias against sectoral representatives, the President was given all the leeway to "break new ground
and precisely plant the seeds for sectoral representation so that the sectoral representatives will take roots and
be part and parcel exactly of the process of drafting the law which will stipulate and provide for the concept of
sectoral representation."11 Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the major
political parties from participating in the election of their representatives is aligned with the constitutional
mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good"; 12 the right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making; 13 the right of
women to opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation;14 the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits in keeping with its role as a primary social economic force; 15 the right of teachers to
professional advancement;16 the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their cultures,
traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and policies, 17 and the indispensable role of the
private sector in the national economy.18

There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the
political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially
allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the
Constitutional Commission19 that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes:
of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties 20 made it to the top 50. These seven
parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36%
each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained
90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties 21 or 42.8% of the total number of the major
parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat
their members as party-list representatives. In contrast

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