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A alone should be held liable for the death of G. The object of the
conspiracy of A. B, C, and D was to kill F only. Since B, C, and D did not
know of the stabbing of G by A, they cannot be held criminally therefor. E,
the driver, cannot be also held liable for the death of G since the former
was completely unaware of said killing.
Under the Revised Penal Code, it provides that the impossible crime
is committed if the person commits a crime against person or property but it
did not produce the result due to inadequacy of the means employed or
legal impossibility.
Under the Revised Penal Code, for the avoidance of greater evil to be
available as a defense it is necessary that the party did not commit unlawful
act. Also, for conspiracy to exist it is needed that the culprits have
community of design to kill the victim.
No, AA's defense will not prosper because obviously there was a
conspiracy among BB, CC and AA, such that the principle that when there
is a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, shall govern. The act of ST,
the victim's son, appears to be a legitimate defense of relatives; hence,
justified as a defense of his father against the unlawful aggression by BB
and CC. ST's act to defend his father's life, cannot be regarded as an evil
inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a lawful act. What AA did was to
stop a lawful defense, not greater evil, to allow BB and CC achieve their
criminal objective of stabbing FT.
Arturo, being one of the two who devised the plan to murder Joel,
thereby becomes a co-principal by direct conspiracy. What is needed only
is an overt act and both will incur criminal liability. Arturo's liability as a
conspirator arose from his participation in jointly devising the criminal plan
with Juan, to kill Jose. And it was pursuant to that conspiracy that Juan
killed Joel. The conspiracy here is actual, not by inference only. The overt
act was done pursuant to that conspiracy whereof Arturo is co-conspirator.
There being a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Arturo, therefore,
should be liable as a co-conspirator but the penalty on him may be that of
an accomplice only (People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1; People us. Medrano,
114 SCRA 335) because he was not able to actually participate in the
shooting of Joel, having been apprehended before reaching the place
where the crime was committed.
Arturo is not liable because he was not able to participate in the killing
of Joel. Conspiracy itself is not punishable unless expressly provided by
law and this is not true in the case of Murder. A co-conspirator must
perform an overt act pursuant to the conspiracy.