1
[A.C. No. 5645. July 2, 2002
ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA DE ROSALES, complainant,
vs. ATTY. MARIO G. RAMOS, respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This complaint for disbarment was filed in behalf of complainant
Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) against respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos for violation
of Act No. 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Ch.
11, otherwise know as the Notarial Law, particularly Secs. 245 and 246
thereof.
In September 1990 Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of complainant
Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales, borrowed from Rosalinda the
Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 194464 covering Lot No. 1-B-4-H
in her name. The lot measures 112 square meters and is located at the
back of Manuel's house on Fabie Street, Paco, Metro Manila. On 25
November 1990 Rosalinda sold this lot to one Alfredo P. Castro. When
she asked her brother Manuel to return her title he refused.
On 22 October 1990 Rosalinda executed an Affidavit of Loss of her title
and presented the affidavit to the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds informed Rosalinda that her
title to the property was already transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale she purportedly executed in favor of Manuel on 5
September 1990. The document was notarized by respondent Atty. Mario
G. Ramos on 1 October 1990 and entered in his Notarial Register as
Doc. No. 388, Page No. 718, Book No. 10, Series of 1990. Rosalinda
however denied having signed any deed of sale over her property in favor
of Manuel.
On 3 September 1991 Rosalinda filed with the NBI a complaint for
falsification of public document against her brother Manuel. The NBI
invited respondent Atty. Ramos for questioning. The complaint alleged
among others that on 12 September 1991 Atty. Mario G. Ramos
executed an affidavit before the NBI admitting that when Manuel
presented the purported Deed of Absolute Sale to him for notarization, he
(Atty. Ramos) found some defects in the document and that complainant
Rosalinda was not around. The NBI Questioned Documents Division also
compared Rosalinda's signature appearing in the Deed of Absolute
Sale with samples of her genuine signature, and found that the signature
in the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and her genuine signatures were
not written by one and the same person.
On 5 October 1992 the NBI transmitted its findings to the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila with the recommendation that Manuel and Atty.
Ramos be prosecuted for Falsification of Public Document under Art. 172
in relation to Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and that Atty. Ramos
be additionally charged with violation of the Notarial Law.
The NBI also transmitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) photocopies of the NBI investigation
report and its annexes, and a verified complaint[1 for disbarment signed
by Rosalinda. The CBD received the records on 5 October 1992. On the
same date, the CBD through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez directed
respondent to submit an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days
from notice.
Respondent admitted in his Answer[2 that he had affixed his signature on
the purported Deed of Absolute Sale but failed to enter the document in
his Notarial Registry Book. He also admitted executing before the NBI on
12 September 1991 an affidavit regarding the matter. Respondent prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint since according to him he only
inadvertently signed the purported Deed of Absolute Sale and/or that his
signature was procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or
excusable negligence, claiming that he simply relied on the assurances of
Manuel that the document would not be used for purposes other than a
loan between brother and sister, and that he affixed his signature thereon
with utmost good faith and without intending to obtain personal gain or to
cause damage or injury to another.
The CBD set the case for hearing on 3 March 2000, 28 April 2000, 16
June 2000 and 5 October 2000. Complainant never appeared. The
records show that the notices sent to her address at 1497 Fabie Street,
Paco, Manila, were returned unclaimed.[3
On 26 January 2002 the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and
recommendation of the CBD through Commissioner Fernandez that the
case against respondent be dismissed in view of complainant's failure to
prosecute and for lack of evidence on record to substantiate the
complaint.[4 The Investigating Commissioner found that the notices sent
to complainant were returned unclaimed with the annotation "moved out,"
and that she did not leave any forwarding address, and neither did she
come to the CBD to inquire about the status of her case. From these
actuations, he concluded that complainant had lost interest in the further
prosecution of this case,[5 and so recommended its dismissal.
We cannot wholly agree with the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. It is clear from the pleadings before us that
respondent violated the Notarial Law in failing to register in his notarial
book the deed of absolute sale he notarized, which fact respondent
readily admitted.
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary
public. It requires him to keep a notarial register where he shall record all
his official acts as notary,[6 and specifies what information with regard to
the notarized document should be entered therein.[7 Failure to perform
this duty results in the revocation of his commission as notary public.[8
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.[9 Notarization
converts a private document into a public document thus making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.
[10 A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able
to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.[11
For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.[12 Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would
be undermined.[13 Hence a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein.[14 The purpose of this requirement
is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of
the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's
free act and deed.[15
The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the
necessary information regarding the document or instrument notarized
and retain a copy of the document presented to him for acknowledgment
and certification especially when it is a contract.[16 The notarial registry is
a record of the notary public's official acts. Acknowledged documents and
instruments recorded in it are considered public documents. If the
document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there
is no copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or
instrument was not really notarized, so that it is not a public document
and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document. Considering
the evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure of the
notary public to record the document in his notarial registry is tantamount
to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when in fact
it was not.
We take note of respondent's admission in his Answer that he had affixed
his signature in the purported Deed of Absolute Sale but he did not enter
it in his notarial registry. This is clearly in violation of the Notarial Law for
which he must be disciplined.
Respondent alleges that he merely signed the Deed of Absolute
Sale inadvertently and that his signature was procured through mistake,
fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence as he relied on the
assurances of Manuel A. Bernardo, a kababayan from Pampanga, that
the document would not be used for any illegal purpose.
We cannot honor, much less give credit to this allegation. That
respondent notarized the document out of sympathy for his kababayan is
not a legitimate excuse. It is appalling that respondent did away with the
basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of
a friend and client. In doing so, he displayed a decided lack of respect for
the solemnity of an oath in a notarial document. He also exhibited his
clear ignorance of the importance of the office of a notary public. Not only
did he violate the Notarial Law, he also did so without thinking of the
possible damage that might result from its non-observance.
The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents.
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the
document under his hand and seal he gives the document the force of
evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be
acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which
should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize
such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and
delivery.[17 Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is
placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.[18 Failing in this, he must
accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.
From his admissions we find that Atty. Mario G. Ramos failed to exercise
the due diligence required of him in the performance of the duties of
notary public. We do not agree however that his negligence should merit
disbarment, which is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.
Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the
lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of
the bar. Removal from the bar should not really be decreed when any
punishment less severe - reprimand, temporary suspension or fine -
would accomplish the end desired.[19 Under the circumstances,
imposing sanctions decreed under the Notarial Law and suspension from
the practice of law would suffice.
WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial
Law, the commission of respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos as Notary
Public, if still existing, is REVOKED and thereafter Atty. Ramos should be
DISQUALIFIED from reappointment to the office of Notary Public.
Respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos is also SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six (6) months effective immediately. He is
DIRECTED to report to this Court his receipt of this Decision to enable it
to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to immediately circularize
this Decision for the proper guidance of all concerned.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
 2
[A.C. No. 6294.  November 17, 2004] private document into a public document, making that document
ATTY. MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity thereof. A
ALEJANDRO P. ZABALA, respondent. notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
RESOLUTION
requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the
QUISUMBING, J.: confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would
In his Letter-Complaint for Disbarment filed before the Committee on be undermined.[12]
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Atty. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides,
Miniano B. Dela Cruz charged respondent, Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala, for
.  .  .
violating his oath as a notary public.
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an
Complainant alleged that respondent notarized with unknown witnesses,
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
a fake deed of sale allegedly executed by two dead people, in gross
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.  The notary
violation of his oath as a Commissioned Notary Public in Quezon City.[1]
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
Complainant averred that he was retained by a certain Demetrio C. person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and
Marero last December 21, 1996, to finance and undertake the filing of a that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the
Petition for the Issuance of a Second Duplicate Original of the Owner’s same is his free act and deed.  The certificate shall be made under his
copy of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 4153, in the names of Sps. official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
Pedro Sumulong and Cirila Tapales before the Regional Trial Court of certificate shall so state.  [Emphasis ours.]
Antipolo City, Branch 72.  The court issued an Order approving the said
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
petition on March 10, 1997.[2]
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
On May 20, 1997, complainant purchased the said property from Marero personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of
and had the title transferred to him and his wife. OCT No. 4153 was then what are stated therein.  These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated
cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 330000. because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge
[3] of and are personally sworn to.  Otherwise, their representative’s names
The next day, complainant requested a certain Mrs. Adoracion Losloso should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the
and Mr. Nestor Aguirre to register the title in the former’s name at the same.[13]
Assessor’s Office of Antipolo City.  However, they were unable to do so The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any
because the property was already registered in the name of Antipolo illegal or immoral arrangements.[14] By affixing his notarial seal on the
Properties, Inc., under TCT No. N-107359.[4] instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private
On May 27, 1997, respondent notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale over the document into a public document.  In doing so, respondent, in effect,
land covered by OCT No. 4153, executed by Cirila Tapales and Pedro proclaimed to the world that (1) all the parties therein personally
Sumulong in favor of the complainant and his wife.[5] appeared before him; (2) they are all personally known to him; (3) they
On December 9, 1997, Mr. Marero filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of were the same persons who executed the instruments; (4) he inquired
Title of the land, subject of the Deed of Sale which was notarized by into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (5) they
respondent, with damages against the complainant and his wife.  The acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely
Deed of Sale was the same document Marero used when he filed a executed the same.[15] As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public,
complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document docketed as respondent is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful
I.S. No. 98-16357 before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and in a observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
disbarment case docketed as Adm. Case No. 4963 against complainant. acknowledgment or jurat.[16]  Simply put, such responsibility is
[6] incumbent upon him, he must now accept the commensurate
consequences of his professional indiscretion.  His act of certifying under
REPORT THIS AD oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining the identities
Purportedly, to clear his name, complainant filed this complaint for of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the
disbarment against respondent.  According to complainant, respondent performance of duty as a notary public.
notarized an irregular document where one of the parties to the WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Atty. Alejandro P. Zabala
transaction was already dead, grossly violating his oath as a notary GUILTY of gross negligence in his conduct as a notary public. His
public.[7] notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED and he is
The IBP then required the respondent to file his answer to the said DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period
allegations. of two (2) years.  He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this
Respondent, in his Answer alleged that as a notary, he did not have to Resolution to the Court within five (5) days from such receipt. Further, he
go beyond the documents presented to him for notarization.  In notarial is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be subject to disciplinary
law, he explains, the minimum requirements to notarize a document are action as a member of the Bar.
the presence of the parties and their presentation of their community tax Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land as
certificate.  As long as these requirements are met, the documents may well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
be notarized.  Furthermore, he adds, when he notarized the Deed of Confidant.  Let this Resolution be also made of record in the personal
Sale, he had no way of knowing whether the persons who appeared files of the respondent.
before him were the real owners of the land or were merely poseurs.[8] SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, the parties were ordered to appear before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline on July 31, 2001 and August 21, 2001,
and required to submit their position papers.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, in its Report dated September
29, 2003, recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violating
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[9] The allegations
with respect to the prayer for disbarment were recommended for
dismissal for insufficiency of evidence.  The Commissioner held that
complainant failed to establish by convincing proof that respondent had to
be disbarred because of his notarial negligence.  The alleged failures of
respondent did not indicate a clear intent to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, according to the Commission’s
Report.
Noteworthy, however, respondent did not deny that he notarized the cited
Deed of Sale under the circumstances alleged by complainant.  It
appears that there was negligence on respondent’s part which, in our
view, is quite serious.  Thus, we cannot conclude that he did not violate
the Notarial Law,[10] and our rules regarding Notarial Practice.[11] Nor
could we agree that, as recommended by the IBP, he should only be
reprimanded.  At least his commission as Notary Public should be
revoked and for two years he should be disqualified from being
commissioned as such.
The IBP noted that on its face, the Deed of Sale was not executed by the
purported vendee and that only Pedro Sumulong appeared and executed
the deed even though the property was co-owned by Pedro Sumulong
and Cirila Tapales.  In addition, a copy of the title was not attached to the
said Deed of Sale when it was presented for notarization. The
aforementioned circumstances should have alerted respondent.  Given
the ease with which community tax certificates are obtained these days,
respondent should have been more vigilant in ascertaining the identity of
the persons who appeared before him.
We have empathically stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless routinary act.  It is invested with substantive public interest. 
It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a

A.C. No. 5281             February 12, 2008
MANUEL L. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee
charged respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the
Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent
Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the
spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and
Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to
his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to
Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent
on June 30, 1965. 1 Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence
certificate2 of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was
dated January 5, 1962. 3 Furthermore, the signature of the testator was
not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of donation 4 (containing
his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the
signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation
were "in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic) one
another in all angle[s]."5
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence
certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that
their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their
respective voters’ affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on
file in the archives division of the Records Management and Archives
Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In
this connection, the certification of the chief of the archives division dated
September 19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an
AFFIDAVIT executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30,
1965 and is available in this Office[’s] files.6
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the
complaint against him contained false allegations: (1) that complainant
was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in
question was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was "not a
legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and testament was
validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit 7 of
Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by
the joint affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee
and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx."9
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass
him because the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the
Office of the Ombudsman "did not prosper."
Respondent did not dispute complainant’s contention that no copy of the
will was on file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no
copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of
action against him as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the
declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.10
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of
violation of pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the
Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of
legal ethics, particularly Canon 1 11 and Rule 1.0112 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).13 Thus, the investigating
commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended
the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated
May 26, 2006, resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondent’s failure to comply with the laws in the
discharge of his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B.
Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one
year and Respondent’s notarial commission is Revoked and
Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two (2)
years.14
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death. 15 A will may either be notarial or
holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the
execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.16
3
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should
be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another. 17
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and
Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered
void.18 This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the
provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when
the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. 19 The importance of this
requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the
other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and
separate provision.20
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually
declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and
deed.21 The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1)
to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure
that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question
shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor
substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence
of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the
testator’s old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a
clear breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the
will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was
required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of
notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:22
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of
notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to
every document acknowledged before him had presented the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of
such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering
the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized
documents.23 A notary public, especially a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly
observe these elementary requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence
certificate upon notarization of a document or instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula]
residence tax. – Every contract, deed, or other document
acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified
thereon that the parties thereto have presented their proper
[cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula]
residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public
as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and
date of each [cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid. 25
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the
Residence Tax Act26 which stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act
acknowledges any document before a notary public xxx it shall
be the duty of such person xxx with whom such transaction is
had or business done, to require the exhibition of the residence
certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such
person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the
true and correct identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the
payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed
decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to
comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the
Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the
exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to
furnish a copy of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806
provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witness. The notary public shall
not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another
with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a
copy of the notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary
action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the
necessary entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old
Notarial Law required the entry of the following matters in the notarial
register, in chronological order:
1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him;
2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the
instrument;
3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;
4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the
instrument;
5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;
 4
6. give each entry a consecutive number; and has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public
7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
substance of the instrument.27 reappointment as a notary public.
In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule, Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the
respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as
instead the will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of well as made part of the personal records of respondent.
his notarial register. To reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a SO ORDERED.
certification28 stating that the archives division had no copy of the affidavit
of Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it
is shown that the original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove
the existence and cause of the unavailability of the original, 29 otherwise,
the evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus, the photocopy of
respondent’s notarial register was not admissible as evidence of the entry
of the execution of the will because it failed to comply with the
requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondent’s attempt to controvert the certification
dated September 21, 199930 must fail. Not only did he present a mere
photocopy of the certification dated March 15, 2000; 31 its contents did not
squarely prove the fact of entry of the contested will in his notarial
register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care32 and utmost fidelity the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be
undermined.33
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the
entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the
importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and
the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the
instrument and to confirm its contents. 34 Accordingly, respondent must be
held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously
compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty.35
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. — The following
derelictions of duty on the part of a notary public shall, in the
discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient
ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx       xxx       xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries
in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law.
xxx       xxx       xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation
regarding cedula certificates.36
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for
violation of his oath as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section
20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court37 and Canon 138 and Rule 1.0139 of
the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land.40 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a
profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and
the dispensation of justice.41
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an
obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities
well beyond the basic requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of
the law, a lawyer should moreover make himself an example for others to
emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he is supposed to be a model in the
community in so far as respect for the law is concerned.43
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 44 A breach of
these conditions justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A
disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or
acknowledgment that he has engaged in professional
misconduct.45 These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers include
disbarment, suspension and reprimand.
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. 46 We have
held in a number of cases that the power to disbar must be exercised
with great caution47 and should not be decreed if any punishment less
severe – such as reprimand, suspension, or fine – will accomplish the
end desired.48 The rule then is that disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.49
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the
elementary duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he "exercised
his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the
provision of existing law and had complied with the elementary formalities
in the performance of his duties xxx," we find that he acted very
irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness
warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of
law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his
commission50 and his perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a
notary public.51
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found
guilty of professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyer’s Oath; (2)
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the
provisions of the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one year and his notarial commission REVOKED. Because he
 5
A.C. No. 7781             September 12, 2008 instrument has acknowledged and presented before the notaries public
DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE, NARCISA L. the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
FAUSTINO, JORGE V. LEGASPI, and JUANITO V. certificate) and to enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of
LEGASPI, complainants, certification.4 Rule II, Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice5 now
vs. requires a party to the instrument to present competent evidence of
ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR., respondent. identity. Sec. 12 provides:
DECISION Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.-The phrase
"competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of
VELASCO, JR., J.:
an individual based on:
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R.
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an
Dimaano, Jr., Dolores L. Dela Cruz, Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L.
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
Faustino, Jorge V. Legaspi, and Juanito V. Legaspi alleged that on July
individual, such as but not limited to, passport, driver’s license,
16, 2004, respondent notarized a document denominated as Extrajudicial
Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of
Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of Rights purportedly executed by
Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter’s ID,
them and their sister, Zenaida V.L. Navarro. Complainants further alleged
Barangay certification, Government Service Insurance System
that: (1) their signatures in this document were forged; (2) they did not
(GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth
appear and acknowledge the document on July 16, 2004 before
card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare
respondent, as notarizing officer; and (3) their purported community tax
Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman’s book, alien
certificates indicated in the document were not theirs.
certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
According to complainants, respondent had made untruthful statements government office ID, certificate from the National Council for
in the acknowledgment portion of the notarized document when he made the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of
it appear, among other things, that complainants "personally came and Social Welfare and Development certification [as amended by
appeared before him" and that they affixed their signatures on the A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008]; or
document in his presence. In the process, complainants added,
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to
respondent effectively enabled their sister, Navarro, to assume full
the instrument, document or transaction who is personally
ownership of their deceased parents’ property in Tibagan, San Miguel,
known to the notary public and who personally knows the
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-303936 and sell
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy
the same to the Department of Public Works and Highways.
to the instrument, document or transaction who each
In his answer, respondent admitted having a hand in the preparation of personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
the document in question, but admitted having indeed notarized it. He documentary identification.
explained that "he notarized [the] document in good faith relying on the
One last note. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to
representation and assurance of Zenaida Navarro that the signatures and
discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being
the community tax certificates appearing in the document were true and
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest. It must be
correct." Navarro would not, according to respondent, lie to him having
remembered that notarization is not a routinary, meaningless act, for
known, and being neighbors of, each other for 30 years. Finally,
notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it
respondent disclaimed liability for any damage or injury considering that
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
the falsified document had been revoked and canceled.
authenticity and due execution. 6 A notarized document is by law entitled
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner of to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must
the Office of the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the
Philippines (IBP), found the following as established: (1) the questioned confidence of the public on notorized documents will be eroded.
document bore the signatures and community tax certificates of, and
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law, the notarial commission of
purports to have been executed by, complainants and Navarro; (2)
respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano, Jr., if still existing, is REVOKED. He
respondent indeed notarized the questioned document on July 16, 2004;
is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary public for a period
(3) complainants did not appear and acknowledge the document before
of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
respondent on July 16, 2004; (4) respondent notarized the questioned
one (1) year, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision,
document only on Navarro’s representation that the signatures appearing
with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act shall be dealt
and community tax certificates were true and correct; and (5) respondent
with more severely.
did not ascertain if the purported signatures of each of the complainants
appearing in the document belonged to them. Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as
the IBP and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision
The Commission concluded that with respondent’s admission of having
and be it entered into respondent’s personal record.
notarized the document in question against the factual backdrop as thus
established, a clear case of falsification and violation of the Notarial Law SO ORDERED.
had been committed when he stated in the Acknowledgment that:
Before me, on this 16th day of July 16, 2004 at Manila,
personally came and appeared the above-named persons with
their respective Community Tax Certificates as follows:
xxxx
who are known to me to be the same persons who executed
the foregoing instrument and they acknowledge to me that the
same is their own free act and deed. x x x
For the stated infraction, the Commission recommended, conformably
with the Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Ramos,1 that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year; that his notarial
commission, if still existing, be revoked; and that he be disqualified for
reappointment as notary public for two (2) years. On September 28,
2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
147, adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the
Commission.
We agree with the recommendation of the Commission and the premises
holding it together. It bears reiterating that notaries public should refrain
from affixing their signature and notarial seal on a document unless the
persons who signed it are the same individuals who executed and
personally appeared before the notaries public to attest to the truth of
what are stated therein, for under Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 or the
Notarial Law, an instrument or document shall be considered authentic if
the acknowledgment is made in accordance with the following
requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public
or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking
the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him
and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.2
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the
document in question, notaries public would be unable to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain
that the document is the party’s free act or deed. 3 Furthermore, notaries
public are required by the Notarial Law to certify that the party to the

G.R. No. L-46892 September 30, 1981
HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
AURORA O. SANTOS, JOVITA SANTOS GONZALES, ARNULFO O.
SANTOS, ARCHIMEDES O. SANTOS, ERMELINA SANTOS RAVIDA,
and ANDRES O. SANTOS, JR., defendants-appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:
The Court of Appeals, 1 in accordance with Section 31 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, certified to Us the appeal docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 56674-R entitled "Amparo del Rosario, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Spouses
Andres Santos and Aurora Santos, defendants-appellants," as only
questions of law are involved.
On January 14, 1974, Amparo del Rosario filed a complaint against the
spouses Andres F. Santos and Aurora O. Santos, for specific
performance and damages allegedly for failure of the latter to execute the
Deed of Confirmation of Sale of an undivided 20,000 square meters of
land, part of Lot 1, Psu-206650, located at Barrio Sampaloc, Tanay,
Rizal, in malicious breach of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit A or 1) dated
September 28, 1964.
Amparo del Rosario died on Sept. 21, 1980 so that she is now substituted
by the heirs named in her will still undergoing probate proceedings.
Andres F. Santos also died, on Sept. 5, 1980, and he is substituted by
the following heirs: Jovita Santos Gonzales, Arnulfo O. Santos,
Archimedes O. Santos, Germelina Santos Ravida, and Andres O.
Santos, Jr.
The Deed of Sale (Exh. A or 1) is herein reproduced below:
DEED OF SALE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, ANDRES F. SANTOS, of legal age, married to
Aurora 0. Santos, Filipino and resident cf San
Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, Philippines, for and in
consideration of the sum of TWO THOUSAND (P
2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, the receipt
whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby SELLS,
CONVEYS, and TRANSFERS (sic) unto Amparo del
Rosario, of legal age, married to Fidel del Rosario
but with legal separation, Filipino and resident of San
Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, Philippines that certain
20,000 square meters to be segregated from Lot 1 of
plan Psu-206650 along the southeastern portion of
said lot, which property is more particularly described
as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 1 as shown
on plan Psu-206650, situated in
the Barrio of Sampaloc,
Municipality of Tanay, Province
of Rizal. Bounded on the SW.,
along lines 1-2-3, by Lot 80 of
Tanay Public Land Subdivision,
Pls-39; on the NW., along lines
3-4-5, by Lot 2; and along lines
5-6-7-8-9-10-11, by Lot 6; on the
NE., along lines 11-12-13, by Lot
3: and along lines 13-1415, by
Lot 4, all of plan Psu-206650;
and on the SE., along line 15-1,
by Lot 5 of plan Psu- 206650 ... ;
containing an area of ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
TWENTY (181,420) SQUARE
METERS. All points referred to
are indicated on the plan and
are marked on the ground as
follows: ...
of which above-described property, I own one-half
(1/2) interest thereof being my attorney's fee, and the
said 20,000 square meters will be transferred unto
the VENDEE as soon as the title thereof has been
released by the proper authority or authorities
concerned:
That the parties hereto hereby agree that the
VENDOR shall execute a Deed of Confirmation of
Deed of Sale in favor of the herein VENDEE as soon
as the title has been released and the subdivision
plan of said Lot 1 has been approved by the Land
Registration Commissioner.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand this 28th day of September, 1964, in the City of
Manila, Philippines.
s/ ANDRES F. SANTOS t/ ANDRES F. SANTOS
With My Marital Consent:
s/ Aurora O. Santos (Wife) t/ Aurora O. Santos (Wife)
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF: s/ Felicitas C.
Moro s/ Corona C. Venal
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES) ) SS.
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in Rizal,
Philippines, personally appeared Andres F. Santos,
6
with Res. Cert. No. 4500027 issued at Paranaque,
Rizal, on Jan. 9, 1964, B-0935184 issued at
Paranaque, Rizal on April 15, 1964, and Aurora 0.
Santos, with Res. Cert. No. A-4500028 issued at
Paranaque, Rizal, on Jan. 9, 1964, giving her marital
consent to this instrument, both of whom are known
to me and to me known to be the same persons who
executed the foregoing instruments and they
acknowledged to me that the same is their free act
and voluntary deed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed
this instrument and affixed my notarial seal this lst
day of October, 1964, in Pasig, Rizal, Philippines.
Doc. No. 1792; Page No. 85; Book No. 19; Series of
1964.
s/ FLORENCIO LANDRITO t/ FLORENCIO
LANDRITO
NOTARY PUBLIC Until December 31, 1965 2
Plaintiff claimed fulfillment of the conditions for the execution of the Deed
of Confirmation of Sale, namely: the release of the title of the lot and the
approval of the subdivision plan of said lot by the Land Registration
Commission. She even enumerated the titles with their corresponding
land areas derived by defendants from the aforesaid lot, to wit:
(a) TCT 203580 — 30,205 sq. meters
(b) TCT 203581 — 19, 790 sq. meters
(c) TCT 167568 — 40,775 sq. meters
In a motion to dismiss, defendants pleaded, inter alia, the defenses of
lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo over the subject of the action and
lack of cause of action allegedly because there was no allegation as to
the date of the approval of the subdivision plan, no specific statement that
the titles therein mentioned were curved out of Lot I and no clear showing
when the demands were made on the defendants. They likewise set up
the defense of prescription allegedly because the deed of sale was dated
September 28, 1964 and supposedly ratified October 1, 1964 but the
complaint was filed only on January 14, 1974, a lapse of more than nine
years when it should have been filed within five years from 1964 in
accordance with Article 1149, New Civil Code.
Defendant also claimed that the demand set forth in the complaint has
been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished. It is alleged that the
deed of sale was "only an accommodation graciously extended, out of
close friendship between the defendants and the plaintiff and her casual
business partner in the buy and sell of real estate, one Erlinda
Cortez;" 3 that in order to allay the fears of plaintiff over the non-collection
of the debt of Erlinda Cortez to plaintiff in various sums exceeding P
2,000.00, defendants, who were in turn indebted to Erlinda Cortez in the
amount of P 2,000.00, voluntarily offered to transfer to plaintiff their
inexistent but expectant right over the lot in question, the same to be
considered as part payment of Erlinda Cortez' indebtedness; that as
Erlinda Cortez later on paid her creditor what was then due, the deed of
sale had in effect been extinguished. Defendants thereby characterized
the said deed of sale as a mere tentative agreement which was never
intended nor meant to be ratified by and acknowledged before a notary
public. In fact, they claimed that they never appeared before Notary
Public Florencio Landrito.
Finally, defendants alleged that the claim on which the action or suit is
founded is unenforceable under the statute of frauds and that the cause
or object of the contract did not exist at the time of the transaction.
After an opposition and a reply were filed by the respective parties, the
Court a quo resolved to deny the motion to dismiss of defendants.
Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim interposing more or less
the same defenses but expounding on them further. In addition, they
claimed that the titles allegedly derived by them from Lot 1 of Annex A or
I were cancelled and/or different from said Lot I and that the deed of sale
was simulated and fictitious, plaintiff having paid no amount to
defendants; and that the deed was entrusted to plaintiff's care and
custody on the condition that the latter; (a) would secure the written
consent of Erlinda Cortez to Annex A or I as part payment of what she
owed to plaintiff; (b) would render to defendants true accounting of
collections made from Erlinda showing in particular the consideration of
2,000.00 of Annex A or I duly credited to Erlinda's account. 4
Plaintiff filed a reply and answer to counterclaim and thereafter a motion
for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that the defenses of defendants fail to tender an issue or the same do not
present issues that are serious enough to deserve a trial on the
merits, 5 submitting on a later date the affidavit of merits. Defendants filed
their corresponding opposition to the motion for summary judgment
and/or judgment on the pleadings. Not content with the pleadings already
submitted to the Court, plaintiff filed a reply while defendants filed a
supplemental opposition.
With all these pleadings filed by the parties in support of their respective
positions, the Court a quo still held in abeyance plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings pending the pre-trial of
the case. At the pre-trial, defendants offered by way of compromise to
pay plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00, the consideration stated in the deed of
sale. But the latter rejected the bid and insisted on the delivery of the land
to her. Thus, the pre-trial proceeded with the presentation by plaintiff of
Exhibits A to Q which defendants practically admitted, adopted as their
own and marked as Exhibits 1 to 17. In addition, the latter offered Exhibit
18, which was their reply to plaintiff's letter of demand dated December
21, 1973.
 7
From the various pleadings filed in this case by plaintiff, together with the
annexes and affidavits as well as the exhibits offered in evidence at the meters
pre-trial, the Court a quo found the following facts as having been duly
established since defendant failed to meet them with countervailing Lot 4 40,775 square
evidence: meters
In February, 1964, Teofilo Custodia owner of a
parcel of unregistered land with an area of Lot 5 50,000 square
approximately 220,000 square meters in Barrio meters
Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal, hired Attorney Andres F.
Santos "to cause the survey of the above-mentioned
Road Lot 6 5,303 square
property, to file registration proceedings in court, to
meters
appear and represent him in all government office
relative thereto, to advance all expenses for surveys,
taxes to the government, court fees, registration fees TOTAL 206,853 square
... up to the issuance of title in the name" of meters
Custodia. They agreed that after the registration of
the title in Custodio's name, and "after deducting all On June 22, 1966, the consolidation-subdivision plan
expenses from the total area of the property," (LRC) Pcs-5273 (Exh. E or 5) was approved by the
Custodio would assign and deliver to Santos "one- Land Registration Commission and by the Court of
half (1/2) share of the whole property as appearing in First Instance of Rizal in an order dated July 2, 1966
the certificate of title so issued." Exh. B or 2). (Entry No. 61037 T-167561, Exh. Q). Upon its
registration, Custodio's O.C.T. No. 5134 (Exh. Q)
On March 22, 1964, Custodio's land was surveyed
was cancelled and TCT Nos. 167561, 167562,
under plan Psu-226650 (Exh. D or 4). It was divided
167563, 167564 (Exh. G), 167565 (Exh. H and
into six (6) lots, one of which was a road lot. The total
167566 were issued for the six lots in the name of
area of the property as surveyed was 211,083
Custodio (Entry No. 61035, Exh. Q).
square meters. The respective areas of the lots were
as follows: On June 23, 1966, Custodio conveyed to Santos
Lots 4 and 5, Pcs-5273 with a total area of 90,775
Lot 1 181,420 square square meters (Exh. B or 2) described in Custodio's
meters TCT No. 167564 (Exh. G or 7) and TCT No. 167565
(Exh. H or 8), plus a one-half interest in the Road Lot
No. 6, as payment of Santos' attorney's fees and
Lot 2 7,238 square
advances for the registration of Custodio's land.
meters
Upon registration of the deed of conveyance on July
5, 1966, Custodio's TCT Nos. 167564 and 167565
Lot 3 7,305 square (Exhs. G and H) were cancelled. TCT No. 167568
meters (Exh. I or 9) for Lot 4 and TCT No. 167585 (Exh. J or
10) for Lot 5 were issued to Santos.
Lot 4 5,655 square On September 2, 1967, Santos' Lot 5, with an area of
meters 50,000 square meters was subdivided into two (2)
lots, designated as Lots 5-A and 5-B in the plan Psd-
Lot 5 5,235 square 78008 (Exh. F or 6), with the following areas:
meters
Lot 30,205
5-A square
Road Lot 6 4,230 square meters
meters
Lot 19,795 squ
TOTAL 211,083 square 5-B are meters
meters

xxx xxx xxx TOT 50,000

On December 27, 1965, a decree of registration No. AL square
N-108022 was issued in Land Registration Case No. meters
N-5023, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, LRC Upon registration of Psd-78008 on October 3, 1967,
Record No. N-27513, in favor of Teofilo Custodia Santos' TCT No. 167585 (Exh. J) was cancelled and
married to Miguela Perrando resident of Tanay, TCT No. 203578 for Lot 5- A and TCT No. 203579
Rizal. On March 23, 1966, Original Certificate of Title for Lot 5-B were supposed to have been issued to
No. 5134 (Exh. Q or 17) was issued to Custodio for Santos (See Entry 6311 in Exh. J or 10). Actually,
Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Psu- 206650, with a total area TCT No. 203580 was issued for Lot 5-A (Exh. K or 1
of 206,853 square meters. The areas of the five (5) 1), and TCT No. 203581 for Lot 5-B (Exh. L or 12),
lots were as follows: both in the name of Andres F. Santos.
Lot 1 181,420 square Out of Custodio's original Lot 1, Psu-206650, with an
meters area of 181,420 square meters, Santos was given a
total of 90,775 square meters, registered in his name
as of October 3, 1967 under three (3) titles, namely:
Lot 2 7,238 square
meters    
TCT No. 167585
Lot 3 7,305 square for
meters
Lot 4 Pcs-5273 40,775 sq. m.
Lot 4 5,655 square
meters
(Exh. J or 10)  

Lot 5 5,235 square

TCT No. 203580  
meters
for
In April to May, 1966, a consolidation-subdivision
survey (LRC) Pcs-5273 (Exh. E or 5) was made on Lot 5-A Psd-78008 30,205 sq. m.
the above lots converting them into six (6) new lots
as follows:
(Exh. K or 11)  
xxx xxx xxx

Lot 1 20,000 square TCT No. 203581  

meters for

Lot 2 40,775 square Lot 5-B Psd-78008 19,795 sq. m.

meters
(Exh. L or 12)  
Lot 3 50,000 square

  90,775 sq.m.
plus one-half of the road lot, Lot 6, PCS-5273, with
an area of 5,303 square meters, which is registered
jointly in the name of Santos and Custodio (Exh. B &
E) 6
The court a quo thereupon concluded that there are no serious factual
issues involved so the motion for summary judgment may be properly
granted. Thereafter, it proceeded to dispose of the legal issues raised by
defendants and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive
portion of the decision states as follows:
WHEREFORE, defendants Andres F. Santos and
Aurora Santos are ordered to execute and convey to
plaintiff Amparo del Rosario, within ten (10) days
from the finality of this decision, 20,000 square
meters of land to be taken from the southeastern
portion of either Lot 4, Pcs-5273, which has an area
of 40,775 square meters, described in TCT No.
167568 (Exh. I or 9) of from their LOL 5-A. with an
area of 30,205 square meters, described in TCI No.
203; O (Exh. K or 11). The expenses of segregating
the 20,000 square meters portion shall be borne
fqually by the parties. rhe expenses for the execution
and registration of the sale shall be borne by the
defendants (Art. 1487, Civil Code). Since the
defendants compelled the plaintiff to litigate and they
failed to heed plainliff's just demand, they are further
ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees and the costs of this action.
SO ORDERED. 7
Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the defendant's filed all appeal to
the Court of Appeals submitting for resolution seven assignments of
errors, to wit:
I. The lower court erred in depriving the appellants of
their right to the procedural due process.
II. The lower court erred in holding that the appellee's
claim has not been extinguished.
III. The lower court erred in sustaining appellee's
contention that there are no other unwritten
conditions between the appellants and the appellee
except those express in Exh. "1" or "A", and that
Erlinda Cortez' conformity is not required to validate
the appellants' obligation.
IV. The lower court erred in holding that Exh. "l" or
"A" is not infirmed and expressed the true intent of
the parties.
V. The lower court erred in declaring that the
appellants are co-owners of the lone registered
owner Teofilo Custodia.
VI. The lower court erred in ordering the appellants
to execute and convey to the appellee 20,000 sq. m.
of land to be taken from the southeastern portion of
either their lot 4, Pcs-5273, which has an area of
40,775 sq.m., described in T.C.T. No. 167568 (Exh.
9 or 1), or from their lot No. 5-A, with an area of
30,205 sq.m. described in T.C.T. No. 203580 (Exh.
11 or K), the expenses of segregation to be borne
equally by the appellants and the appellee and the
expenses of execution and registration to be borne
by the appellants.
VII.
Thelowercourterredinorderingtheappellantstopayto
the appellee the sum of P2,000. 00 as attorney's fee
and costs. 8
The first four revolve on the issue of the propriety of the rendition of
summary judgment by the court a quo, which concededly is a question of
law. The last three assail the summary judgment itself. Accordingly, the
Court of Appeals, with whom the appeal was filed, certified the records of
the case to this Court for final determination.
For appellants herein, the rendition of summary judgment has deprived
them of their right to procedural due process. They claim that a trial on
the merits is indispensable in this case inasmuch as they have denied
under oath all the material allegations in appellee's complaint which is
based on a written instrument entitled "Deed of Sale", thereby putting in
issue the due execution of said deed.
Appellants in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings, however, do not deny the genuineness of
their signatures on the deed of sale.
(Par. 3 of said Motion, p. 101, Record on Appeal). They do not contest
the words and figures in said deed except in the acknowledgment portion
thereof where certain words were allegedly cancelled and changed
without their knowledge and consent and where, apparently, they
appeared before Notary Public Florencio Landrito when, in fact, they
claimed that they did not. In effect, there is an admission of the due
execution and genuineness of the document because by the admission of
the due execution of a document is meant that the party whose signature
it bears admits that voluntarily he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him and with his authority; and the admission of the
genuineness of the document is meant that the party whose signature it
bears admits that at the time it was signed it was in the words and figures
8
exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; and that any
formal requisites required by law, such as swearing and acknowledgment
or revenue stamps which it requires, are waived by him. 9
As correctly pointed out by the court a quo, the alleged false notarization
of the deed of sale is of no consequence. For a sale of real property or of
an interest therein to be enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, it is
enough that it be in writing. 10 It need not be notarized. But the vendee
may avail of the right under Article 1357 of the New Civil Code to compel
the vendor to observe the form required by law in order that the
instrument may be registered in the Registry of Deeds. 11 Hence, the due
execution and genuineness of the deed of sale are not really in issue in
this case. Accordingly, assigned error I is without merit.
What appellants really intended to prove through the alleged false
notarization of the deed of sale is the true import of the matter, which
according to them, is a mere tentative agreement with appellee. As such,
it was not intended to be notarized and was merely entrusted to
appellee's care and custody in order that: first, the latter may secure the
approval of one Erlinda Cortez to their (appellants') offer to pay a debt
owing to her in the amount of P2,000.00 to appellee instead of paying
directly to her as she was indebted to appellee in various amounts
exceeding P2,000.00; and second once the approval is secured, appellee
would render an accounting of collections made from Erlinda showing in
particular the consideration of P2,000.00 of the deed of sale duly credited
to Erlinda's account.
According to appellants, they intended to prove at a full dress trial the
material facts: (1) that the aforesaid conditions were not fulfilled; (2) that
Erlinda Cortez paid her total indebtedness to appellee in the amount of
P14,160.00, the P2,000.00 intended to be paid by appellant included; and
(3) that said Erlinda decided to forego, renounce and refrain from
collecting the P2,000.00 the appellants owed her as a countervance
reciprocity of the countless favors she also owes them.
Being conditions which alter and vary the terms of the deed of sale, such
conditions cannot, however, be proved by parol evidence in view of the
provision of Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which states as
follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence of written agreements when the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing,
it is to be considered as containing all such terms,
and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms
of the agreement other than the contents of the
writing, except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or
its failure to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in
issue by the pleadings;
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term "agreement" includes wills."
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the
terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or
before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally
agreed upon by the parties. 12
While it is true, as appellants argue, that Article 1306 of the New Civil
Code provides that "the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy" and that consequently, appellants and appellee
could freely enter into an agreement imposing as conditions thereof the
following: that appellee secure the written conformity of Erlinda Cortez
and that she render an accounting of all collections from her, said
conditions may not be proved as they are not embodied in the deed of
sale.
The only conditions imposed for the execution of the Deed of
Confirmation of Sale by appellants in favor of appellee are the release of
the title and the approval of the subdivision plan. Thus, appellants may
not now introduce other conditions allegedly agreed upon by them
because when they reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed
that "they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of
truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have
been waived and abandoned." 13
Neither can appellants invoke any of the exceptions to the parol evidence
rule, more particularly, the alleged failure of the writing to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. Such an exception obtains where the
written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual
intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the
instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the
contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and
circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the. contract
may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of
the instrumental. 14 In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale (Exh. A or 1) is
clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity
or doubt in the terms thereof. We, therefore, hold and rule that assigned
errors III and IV are untenable.
According to the court a quo, "(s)ince Santos, in his Opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment failed to meet the plaintiff's evidence with
countervailing evidence, a circumstance indicating that there are no
serious factual issues involved, the motion for summary judgment may
properly be granted." We affirm and sustain the action of the trial court.
Indeed, where a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
pleadings has been filed, as in this case, supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts
 9
as may be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify as to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in the
affidavitshalibeattachedtheretoorservedtherewith. 15
Examining the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in the records, We find
that appellants have not submitted any categorical proof that Erlinda
Cortez had paid the P2,000.00 to appellee, hence, appellants failed to
substantiate the claim that the cause of action of appellee has been
extinguished. And while it is true that appellants submitted a receipt for
P14,160.00 signed by appellee, appellants, however, have stated in their
answer with counterclaim that the P2,000.00 value of the property
covered by the Deed of Sale, instead of being credited to Erlinda Cortez,
was conspicuously excluded from the accounting or receipt signed by
appellee totalling P14,160.00. The aforesaid receipt is no proof that
Erlinda Cortez subsequently paid her P2,000.00 debt to appellee. As
correctly observed by the court a quo, it is improbable that Cortez would
still pay her debt to appellee since Santos had already paid it.
Appellants' claim that their P2,000.00 debt to Erlinda Cortez had been
waived or abandoned is not also supported by any affidavit, document or
writing submitted to the court. As to their allegation that the appellee's
claim is barred by prescription, the ruling of the trial court that only seven
years and six months of the ten-year prescription period provided under
Arts. 1144 and 155 in cases of actions for specific performance of the
written contract of sale had elapsed and that the action had not yet
prescribed, is in accordance with law and, therefore, We affirm the same.
The action of the court a quo in rendering a summary judgment has been
taken in faithful compliance and conformity with Rule 34, Section 3, Rules
of Court, which provides that "the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file together
with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. "
Resolving assignments of errors, V, VI, and VII which directly assail the
summary judgment, not the propriety of the rendition thereof which We
have already resolved to be proper and correct, it is Our considered
opinion that the judgment of the court a quo is but a logical consequence
of the failure of appellants to present any bona fide defense to appellee's
claim. Said judgment is simply the application of the law to the
undisputed facts of the case, one of which is the finding of the court a
quo, to which We agree, that appellants are owners of one-half (1/2)
interest of Lot I and, therefore, the fifth assignment of error of appellants
is without merit.
By the terms of the Deed of Sale itself, which We find genuine and not
infirmed, appellants declared themselves to be owners of one-half (1/2)
interest thereof. But in order to avoid appellee's claim, they now contend
that Plan Psu-206650 where said Lot I appears is in the exclusive name
of Teofilo Custodio as the sole and exclusive owner thereof and that the
deed of assignment of one-half (1/2) interest thereof executed by said
Teofilo Custodio in their favor is strictly personal between them.
Notwithstanding the lack of any title to the said lot by appellants at the
time of the execution of the deed of sale in favor of appellee, the said
sale may be valid as there can be a sale of an expected thing, in
accordance with Art. 1461, New Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1461. Things having a potential existence may
be the object of the contract of sale.
 
The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or
expectancy is deemed subject to the condition that
the thing will come into existence.
The sale of a vain hope or expectancy is void.
In the case at bar, the expectant right came into existence or materialized
for the appellants actually derived titles from Lot I .
We further reject the contention of the appellants that the lower court
erred in ordering the appellants to execute and convey to the appellee
20,000 sq.m. of land to be taken from the southeastern portion of either
their Lot 4, Pcs-5273, which has an area of 40,775 sq.m., described in
T.C.T. No. 167568 (Exh. 9 or 1), or from their Lot No. 5-A, with an area of
30,205 sq.m. described in T.C.T. No. 203580 (Exh. 11 or K), the
expenses of segregation to be borne equally by the appellants and the
appellee and the expenses of execution and registration to be borne by
the appellants. Their argument that the southeastern portion of Lot 4 or
Lot 5-A is no longer the southeastern portion of the bigger Lot 1, the latter
portion belonging to the lone registered owner, Teofilo Custodia is not
impressed with merit. The subdivision of Lot I between the appellants and
Teofilo Custodio was made between themselves alone, without the
intervention, knowledge and consent of the appellee, and therefore, not
binding upon the latter. Appellants may not violate nor escape their
obligation under the Deed of Sale they have agreed and signed with the
appellee b3 simply subdividing Lot 1, bisecting the same and segregating
portions to change their sides in relation to the original Lot 1.
Finally, considering the trial court's finding that the appellants compelled
the appellee to litigate and they failed to heed appellee's just demand, the
order of the court awarding the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees is
just and lawful, and We affirm the same.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 140608             September 23, 2004
PERMANENT SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO VELARDE, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a complaint for sum of money filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 37), docketed as Civil Case No. 94-71639, petitioner
Permanent Savings and Loan Bank sought to recover from respondent
Mariano Velarde, the sum of ₱1,000,000.00 plus accrued interests and
penalties, based on a loan obtained by respondent from petitioner bank,
evidenced by the following: (1) promissory note dated September 28,
1983;1 (2) loan release sheet dated September 28, 1983; 2 and (3) loan
disclosure statement dated September 28, 1983. 3 Petitioner bank,
represented by its Deputy Liquidator after it was placed under liquidation,
sent a letter of demand to respondent on July 27, 1988, demanding full
payment of the loan. 4 Despite receipt of said demand letter, 5 respondent
failed to settle his account. Another letter of demand was sent on
February 22, 1994,6 and this time, respondent’s counsel replied, stating
that the obligation "is not actually existing but covered by
contemporaneous or subsequent agreement between the parties …"7
In his Answer, respondent disclaims any liability on the instrument, thus:
2. The allegations in par. 2, Complaint, on the existence of the
alleged loan of ₱1-Million, and the purported documents
evidencing the same, only the signature appearing at the back
of the promissory note, Annex "A" seems to be that of herein
defendant. However, as to any liability arising therefrom, the
receipt of the said amount of P1-Million shows that the amount
was received by another person, not the herein defendant.
Hence, no liability attaches and as further stated in the special
and affirmative defenses that, assuming the promissory note
exists, it does not bind much less is there the intention by the
parties to bind the herein defendant. In other words, the
documents relative to the loan do not express the true intention
of the parties.8
Respondent’s Answer also contained a denial under oath, which reads:
I, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, of age, am the defendant in this
case, that I caused the preparation of the complaint and that all
the allegations thereat are true and correct; that the promissory
note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine
signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and
that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as
stated in the defenses; …9
During pre-trial, the issues were defined as follows:
1. Whether or not the defendant has an outstanding loan
obligation granted by the plaintiff;
2. Whether or not the defendant is obligated to pay the loan
including interests and attorney’s fees;
3. Whether or not the defendant has really executed the
Promissory Note considering the doubt as to the genuineness
of the signature and as well as the non-receipt of the said
amount;
4. Whether or not the obligation has prescribed on account of
the lapse of time from date of execution and demand for
enforcement; and
5. Whether or not the defendant is entitled to his counterclaim
and other damages.10
On September 6, 1995, petitioner bank presented its sole witness,
Antonio Marquez, the Assistant Department Manager of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) and the designated Deputy
Liquidator for petitioner bank, who identified the Promissory Note 11 dated
September 28, 1983, the Loan Release Sheet 12 dated September 28,
1983, and the Disclosure Statement of Loan Credit Transaction. 13
After petitioner bank rested its case, respondent, instead of presenting
evidence, filed with leave of court his demurrer to evidence, alleging the
grounds that:
(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
(b) THE CAUSE OF ACTION, CONCLUDING ARGUENTI
THAT IT EXISTS, IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND/OR
LACHES.14
The trial court, in its Decision dated January 26, 1996, found merit in
respondent’s demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint including
respondent’s counterclaims, without pronouncement as to costs.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision 16 dated October 27,
1999.17 The appellate court found that petitioner failed to present any
evidence to prove the existence of respondent’s alleged loan obligations,
considering that respondent denied petitioner’s allegations in its
complaint. It also found that petitioner bank’s cause of action is already
barred by prescription.18
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules Court, with the following assignment of errors:
4.1
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GENUINENESS,
DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE SUBJECT
LOAN DOCUMENTS.
10
4.2
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER’S CAUSE OF ACTION IS ALREADY BARRED
BY PRESCRIPTION AND OR LACHES.19
Before going into the merits of the petition, the Court finds it necessary to
reiterate the well-settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
"the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts."20 It is not our function to
review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the
evidence presented.21
There are, however, exceptions to the rule, e.g., when the factual
inferences of the appellate court are manifestly mistaken; the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; or the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different legal conclusion. 22 This case falls under said exceptions.
The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Rule 8, Section 7
of the Rules of Court which provides that when the cause of action is
anchored on a document, the genuineness or due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant,
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be
the facts.
It was the trial court’s opinion that:
The mere presentation of supposed documents regarding the
loan, but absent the testimony of a competent witness to the
transaction and the documentary evidence, coupled with the
denial of liability by the defendant does not suffice to meet the
requisite preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The
documents, standing alone, unsupported by independent
evidence of their existence, have no legal basis to stand on.
They are not competent evidence. Such failure leaves this
Court without ample basis to sustain the plaintiff’s cause of
action and other reliefs prayed for. The loan document being
challenged. (sic) Plaintiff did not exert additional effort to
strengthen its case by the required preponderance of evidence.
On this score, the suit must be dismissed.23
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court’s finding and affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint, viz.:
… The bank should have presented at least a single witness
qualified to testify on the existence and execution of the
documents it relied upon to prove the disputed loan obligations
of Velarde. … This falls short of the requirement that (B)efore
any private writing may be received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By
anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the
genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (c) By a
subscribing witness. (Rule 132, Sec. 21, Rules of Court) …
It is not true, as the Bank claims, that there is no need to prove
the loan and its supporting papers as Velarde has already
admitted these. Velarde had in fact denied these in his
responsive pleading. And consistent with his denial, he
objected to the presentation of Marquez as a witness to identify
the Exhibits of the Bank, and objected to their admission when
these were offered as evidence. Though these were grudgingly
admitted anyway, still admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. …24
A reading of respondent’s Answer, however, shows that
respondent did not specifically deny that he signed the loan
documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that the
signature appearing at the back of the promissory note seems
to be his. Respondent also denied any liability on the
promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount
stated therein, and the loan documents do not express the true
intention of the parties.25 Respondent reiterated these
allegations in his "denial under oath," stating that "the
promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears
the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not
bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of
the parties as stated in the defenses …"26
Respondent’s denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner,27 the Court
expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an
actionable document, viz.:
… This means that the defendant must declare under oath that
he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or
fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the
effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent
representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due
execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of
the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to
avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.
In fact, respondent’s allegations amount to an implied admission of the
due execution and genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of
the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document
or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time
it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the
pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered;
and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by
him.28 Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the
authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document
 11
was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one 24, 1950 a promissory note wherein he bound himself to pay to the
executed by the parties; or that the signatures appearing thereon were Namarco ₱12,000 in installments within the one-year period starting on
forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized. 29 June 24, 1951 and ending on June 25, 1952. After making partial
Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding payments on July 7, 1951 and February 23, 1952, Marquez defaulted.
that respondent specifically denied petitioner’s allegations regarding the His total obligation, including interest, as of October 31, 1964, amounted
loan documents, as respondent’s Answer shows that he failed to to ₱19,990.91. Written demands for the payment of the obligation were
specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the made upon Marquez and his surety on March 22, 1956, February 16,
promissory note and its concomitant documents. Therefore, respondent 1963, June 10, September 18 and October 13, 1964. Marquez did not
is deemed to have admitted the loan documents and acknowledged his make any further payment.
obligation with petitioner; and with respondent’s implied admission, it was The Namarco sued Marquez and his surety on December 16, 1964. They
not necessary for petitioner to present further evidence to establish the contended that the action had prescribed because the ten-year period for
due execution and authenticity of the loan documents sued upon. suing on the note expired on June 25, 1962. That contention was not
While Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that private sustained. It was held that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the
documents be proved of their due execution and authenticity before they written demands, copies of which were furnished the surety.
can be received in evidence, i.e., presentation and examination of Respondent’s obligation under the promissory note became due and
witnesses to testify on this fact; in the present case, there is no need for demandable on October 13, 1983. On July 27, 1988, petitioner’s counsel
proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan documents made a written demand for petitioner to settle his obligation. From the
because of respondent’s implied admission thereof. 30 time respondent’s obligation became due and demandable on October
Respondent claims that he did not receive the net proceeds in the 13, 1983, up to the time the demand was made, only 4 years, 9 months
amount of ₱988,333.00 as stated in the Loan Release Sheet dated and 14 days had elapsed. The prescriptive period then commenced anew
September 23, 1983.31 The document, however, bears respondent’s when respondent received the demand letter on August 5, 1988. 39 Thus,
signature as borrower. 32 Res ipsa loquitur. 33 The document speaks for when petitioner sent another demand letter on February 22, 1994, 40 the
itself. Respondent has already impliedly admitted the genuineness and action still had not yet prescribed as only 5 years, 6 months and 17 days
due execution of the loan documents. No further proof is necessary to had lapsed. While the records do not show when respondent received the
show that he undertook the obligation with petitioner. "A person cannot second demand letter, nevertheless, it is still apparent that petitioner had
accept and reject the same instrument."34 the right to institute the complaint on September 14, 1994, as it was filed
The Court also finds that petitioner’s claim is not barred by prescription. before the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period.
Petitioner’s action for collection of a sum of money was based on a Lastly, if a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of
written contract and prescribes after ten years from the time its right of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the
action arose.35 The prescriptive period is interrupted when there is a right to present evidence. 41 The movant who presents a demurrer to the
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors. 36 The interruption of the plaintiff’s evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the
prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the said trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on
period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand.37 appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the
dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own
Thus, in the case of The Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez,38 the
evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and
Court categorically stated that the correct meaning of interruption as
render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to
distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period is
discourage prolonged litigations. 42 Thus, respondent may no longer offer
that said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand.
proof to establish that he has no liability under the loan documents sued
In said case, the respondents Valenton and Juan, on February 16, 1966,
upon by petitioner.
obtained a credit accommodation from the Overseas Bank of Manila in
the amount of ₱150,000.00. Written extrajudicial demands dated The promissory note signed and admitted by respondent provides for the
February 9, March 1 and 27, 1968, November 13 and December 8, 1975 loan amount of ₱1,000,000.00, to mature on October 13, 1983, with
and February 7 and August 27, 1976 were made upon the respondents interest at the rate of 25% per annum. The note also provides for a
but they refused to pay. When the bank filed a case for the recovery of penalty charge of 24% per annum of the amount due and unpaid, and
said amount, the trial court dismissed the same on the ground of 25% attorney’s fees. Hence, respondent should be held liable for these
prescription as the bank's cause of action accrued on February 16, 1966 sums.
(the date of the manager's check for ₱150,000.00 issued by the plaintiff WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the Regional
bank to the Republic Bank) and the complaint was filed only on October Trial Court of Manila (Branch 37) dated January 26, 1996, and the Court
22, 1976. Reversing the ruling of the trial court, the Court ruled: of Appeals dated October 27, 1999 are SET ASIDE. Respondent is
An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten ordered to pay One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) plus 25% interest and
years from the time the right of action accrues (Art. 1144[1], 24% penalty charge per annum beginning October 13, 1983 until fully
Civil Code). "The prescription of actions is interrupted when paid, and 25% of the amount due as attorney’s fees.
they are filed before the court, when there is a written Costs against respondent.
extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor" (Art. 1155,
Ibid, applied in Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. City of Manila,
117 Phil. 985, 993; Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, L-
20086, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 645, 648; Harden vs. Harden,
L-22174, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 706, 711).
A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has
already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period. Giorgi
says: "Disruption differs from suspension because it erases the
time elapsed previously and forces the prescription to start
over" (9 Theoria of Obligations, 2nd Ed., p. 222).
"Disruption . . . it takes all effectiveness away from the past
time and opens the way to a whole new computer, which starts
from the last moment of the interruptive act, precisely, as if at
that time and not before the credit was born" (8 Giorgi, ibid pp.
390-2).
…
That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted
in Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil. 483, 488, where it ruled that
the interruption of the ten-year prescriptive period through a
judicial demand means that "the full period of prescription
commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the
suspension". "When prescription is interrupted by a judicial
demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned
from the cessation of the interruption" (Spring vs. Barr, 120 So.
256 cited in 54 C.J.S. 293, note 27). That rule was followed in
Nator and Talon vs. CIR, 114 Phil. 661, Sagucio vs. Bulos, 115
Phil. 786 and Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad
Company, L-24263, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 974, 981.
…
Interruption of the prescriptive period as meaning renewal of
the original term seems to be the basis of the ruling in Ramos
vs. Condez, L-22072, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1146, 1151.
In that case the cause of action accrued on June 25, 1952.
There was a written acknowledgment by the vendors on
November 10, 1956 of the validity of the deed of sale.
…
In National Marketing Corporation vs. Marquez, L-25553, January 31,
1969, 26 SCRA 722, it appears that Gabino Marquez executed on June