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Introduction
In addition to the outstanding success of the Japanese industry, a number of
other Asian countries are emerging as the new power-houses of manufacturing.
Over the past ten years the South Korean industry has developed as a major
exporter of manufactured goods and has become the second most productive
manufacturing nation in Asia after Japan. In a number of markets the South
Koreans have threatened the Japanese, using labour-cost advantage to become
the cost leader[1]. South Korea’s economy attained unprecedented levels of
growth during the 1980s, through a policy of export-led industrialization
centred on fostering exports. By promoting infant industries such as cement,
fertilizer, steel, chemicals and consumer durables, South Korea has made its
exports both privately profitable and internationally competitive[2].
Today, the South Korean economy is dominated by the manufacturing sector.
Growth per capita income remained stable during the 1980s and was well in
excess of 7 per cent. In 1990, exports accounted for more than 30 per cent of
GNP with manufactured products constituting over 90 per cent of this total[2].
Since the early 1980s there has been considerable interest in studying the
South Korean manufacturing industry. Many of the previous studies have relied
on industry surveys and single company case studies (mentioned later).
Analysing the machine tools and textiles industries in a number of countries,
including South Korea, Young et al.[1] conclude that studying international
operations at the industry level is an approach which can yield information
quite different from what is expected. These researchers used data collected
from a postal questionnaire survey of the two industries. They further claim
that micro studies of individual firms are also needed to provide an in-depth
understanding and that the only way we can develop a proper global
perspective of operations is for researchers to visit plants throughout the world.
The purpose of this paper is to report on our direct observations of five of the
leading South Korean manufacturing organizations visited on two occasions in Benchmarking for Quality
1993 and 1994. These visits were made as part of Monash University’s annual Management & Technology,
Vol. 3 No. 2, 1996, pp. 15-30.
study tour of Asian countries to observe “best practices” in manufacturing. The MCB University Press, 1351-3036
BQM&T key objective of the paper is to illustrate how South Korea is emerging as an
3,2 industrial giant and describe the success of five of its leading companies.
In the next section a brief review of the changing economy and manufacturing
industry in South Korea is provided. This is followed by a brief reference to some
of the previous studies on South Korean manufacturing industry. The
observations from the five companies visited during 1993 and again in 1994 are
16 then presented.
South Korean exports were expected to total about $US90 billion in 1994, an
increase of 7.7 per cent compared with 4.8 per cent in 1993 and 2.9 per cent in
1992. Korea’s “big three” export industries – electronics, shipbuilding and
automobiles – all staged a strong recovery from the middle of 1993,
predominantly on the back of the Yen appreciation.
Corporate facility investment was expected to grow by 7.5 per cent in 1994,
compared with 1.2 per cent in 1993 and minus 0.8 per cent in 1992, according to
the Daewoo Research Institute, the think-tank of Daewoo, South Korea’s third
largest chaebol (the widely diversified and intricately interlinked conglomerates
that dominate the economy). This has been helped by the recent improvement
in investment conditions brought about by the new government which include
the increased investment fund under the new economic 100-day plan[4].
Unfortunately, the new democratically elected government appears to be just
as economically interventionist as the previous government. In early 1994, the
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy announced that the country’s top 30
chaebols would do as the government had asked and concentrate on their core
businesses[5].
South Korea no longer has cheap labour costs. The current (1994) average
wage is about A$14,000 per year which is much higher than the other emerging
industrialized countries in Asia. South Korea’s labour costs increased by 100
per cent from 1988 to 1991, much faster than the increase in Taiwan and Japan
(60.9 per cent and 17.5 per cent respectively).
The current industrial relations climate is still sensitive; however, many
companies are pursuing strategies to create a culture with a more humanistic
approach, in which the creativity and self-reliance of individual employees are
to be fully respected and encouraged. This has been observed in a number of the
companies visited (described later).
France 3,600
Britain 3,200 17
Italy 2,900
Canada 5,200
Holland 8,800
Belgium-Luxembourg 11,100
China 80
Taiwan 4,100
Singapore 26,300
Switzerland 9,200
Mexico 600
Sweden 5,800
Malaysia 2,500
Australia 2,500
140
120
100
80
Key
60 1983
40 1993
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Figure 2.
World steel production
Note: aEstimate by country (1983, 1993)
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute
BQM&T World production (metric tonnes)
800
3,2
775
750
725
20
700
675
650
Figure 3.
World steel production:
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1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1983-1993
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute
million). The three Korean car makers still rely on Japanese technology as they
all have production and technology agreements with Japanese companies (see
Table I). Figure 4 shows the domestic market share for Hyundai, Kia and
Daewoo.
Kia Motors
Kia Motors is the second largest automotive company in Korea and has an
interesting history as it almost went bankrupt in 1982. The owner decided to
give up his ownership and, for the sake of survival, delegated management of
the group to non-family members. The professional managers surmounted the
crisis successfully and the incident has become known as the “Korean Chrysler
story”. Now most of the group’s CEOs are professional managers and all Kia’s
employees (approximately 24,000 in total) believe they can climb to the top, if
they work hard enough.
Kia was founded in 1944 when it started to manufacture bicycles, moving
into motorcycle production in 1961 and three-wheel cargo trucks in 1962. Its
first car rolled off the assembly line in 1974 and exports of cars began the
following year. Kia’s Sohari plant, which was constructed in 1974, produces the
Pride/Festiva car and the Besta van, and the new Asan Bay plant produces the
Sephia and Sportage cars. The 1993 output included 320,000 cars, 30,000 vans,
and exports of approximately 150,000 units to over 30 countries.
Kia spends about 5 per cent of its sales revenue on R&D and operates several
R&D centres employing around 10 per cent of the total Kia workforce. The
Central Technology Research Institute is responsible for new product
development while the Technology Centre investigates leading edge automotive
technologies and co-ordinates the exchange of advanced technologies and
product research with R&D centres in Tokyo, Los Angeles and Detroit. Kia is
the only private South Korean company to have installed a CRAY
supercomputer which it uses for R&D and design work.
Currently, Kia is investigating both electric and solar-powered cars. In a bid
for greater technological self-sufficiency, Kia has developed international
associations with Bosch of Germany, ITT of the USA and Hitachi of Japan, to
BQM&T
Contract
3,2 Japanese Products period Approval
Korean companies companies (years) date
(a) Vehicle sales (’000s) (b) Market share (excluding commercial vehicles)
5,000
Other and imports
4,000 3 per cent
3,000 Daewoo
Exports
24 per cent
2,000
Hyundai
46 per cent
1,000 Domestic sales Kia
27 per cent
Projection
0
19 3
19 5
19 7
19 9
19 1
1993
19 4
96
20 8
2000
01
Figure 4.
8
8
8
8
9
9
19
19
produce more of its own components such as air-bags and anti-lock braking
systems[17].
Kia is quite clear about its long-term vision and direction. By 1995, it aims to
be recognized as the number one company in Korea for customer satisfaction
and to be number ten in the world by the year 2000. Quality, safety and features
are considered to be Kia’s competitive advantage in the marketplace.
To realize its long-term vision, Kia has clearly defined short-, medium- and
long-term targets and all employees strive to meet these. The company is very
much focused on its activities. All its affiliates are directly associated with the
automotive industry, machine-tool manufacturing, robotics, steel, dies,
automotive parts such as transmissions, axles, brake systems and plastic parts.
Kia is experiencing both technology and management revolutions. The rate
of automation including computer-integrated manufacturing and integrated
BQM&T networks with suppliers has been rapid in recent years. Much of the Sohari
3,2 plant, however, still uses 1970s’ technology. Much manual welding is involved
in the body assembly weld-lines; this is only occasionally supported by robots.
As a result, Kia’s productivity is much lower than other automotive plants. For
example, it takes around 40 hours to produce a car in the Sohari plant, as
against approximately 16 hours in Japan.
24 With regard to quality, Kia maintained that some of their models were
number one for quality in Korea. Programmes such as QM21 (Better Quality
Start With Me – 21st Century) and TPM (total productive maintenance) are
being pursued vigorously. During 1993 all Kia’s 24,000 employees were put
through a three-day training programme on customer satisfaction.
Kia anticipated receiving their ISO 9000 certification by December 1994.
This is to help their marketing efforts in Europe. The Ford Motor Company has
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The body shop is totally automated where the various pressings are welded
together by robots to produce the car body. The robots were made by a Hyundai
subsidiary, NACHI. At the end of the body line an electronic measuring station
measures the positioning of the welded pressings as well as the number of
welds. The handling of the welded bodies is also fully automated.
The final assembly line is a U-shaped arrangement, the line speed being
about double that of Kia Motors. The painted bodies on the line have protective
coverings on the side panels to avoid damage. The assembly instructions are
excellent and very visual, usually at head level.
The attachment of the windscreens is impressive, as a walking beam
arrangement is used. Reattachment of the car doors is carried out via an
external slide on each side of the line; a robotic arm on each slide quickly
attaches the doors.
The assembly line is automated to about 3 per cent of the potential: the
leading Japanese plants are approaching 20 per cent. The information board at
the assembly area indicates the cycle time through the trim and assembly line.
This was one hour in February 1994. The total manufacturing time was about
15 hours for the Elantra, a medium-sized car with a 1.5-litre engine, but this did
not cover the pressing content. This figure indicates that HMC is close to world-
class performance which is about 16 hours for the best US and Japanese plants.
HMC operates an order-launching and delivery-sequencing system to
provide for uninterrupted synchronized daily production operations. The
prerequisites for the success of such a system include:
• a highly reliable network of co-operative suppliers;
• a smooth and stable monthly sales and production plans and weekly
assembly schedules; and
• a highly reliable information system connecting the various sub-systems
in operation throughout the company.
HMC is an impressive operation with its own design capability and is
approaching world-class status; indeed, it should be close to it by the mid to late
1990s.
Hyundai MIPO Dockyard (HMD) An analysis of
This is the largest ship-repair dockyard in the world. Even so, it has only 5 per South Korean
cent of the world market! The operational throughput is about 400 ships per industries
year, of which about 80 per cent are foreign-owned, and provides about $A300
million sales turnover. Currently, about 70 per cent of the ships handled are
bulk-carriers.
HMD has processed more than 4,000 ships since the company’s inception in 27
1975. The site’s capacity includes four dry-docks each capable of handling up to
400,000dwt (dead-weight tonnage) and 380-metre long ships supported by up to
80-ton jib cranes and three kilometres of quay repair docks which are supported
by up to 30-ton jib cranes. The site is in the inner port of Ulsan and is superbly
positioned for the Far-Eastern shipping trade.
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The site employs about 2,700 employees, which includes about 200 engineers
and about 100 managers. The employees join the company at age 23/24 and the
average age is about 39 years, the retirement age being 55. The employee
benefits include:
• housing and children’s education including first-year university entrance
fees;
• access to a swimming pool and a gymnasium;
• employees can buy shares in the company;
• company provides land with a 50 per cent loan for house building.
The business is cost-driven in a very competitive market and this means that
HMD has to keep improving its methods all the time. The average wage is about
$A23,000 per year. There is one union , but it would appear that industrial
relations have not improved since a major strike in 1988. The workers are
encouraged to contribute to the suggestion scheme; in fact, each worker is
required to submit two suggestions per month or about 5,000 suggestions per
month for the site. From this large amount about 2,000 are selected for further
evaluation and usually about 20-25 rewards are made per month to the
successful workers.
A ship conversion can take up to 80,000 labour hours or up to 25 days.
Obviously, the company’s project management skills are of a high order. The
dry-dock operations are usually scheduled to give optimum performance and
generally the dry-dock activities can take up to five days. The work is done in
teams of three employees. This was changed from teams of five by request from
the workers.
It would appear that HMD has some significant potential threats looming on
the horizon as its major Singaporean competitor, Keppel Corporation, is having
negotiations with the Vietnamese government to take over and convert to
commercial use the shipyards being vacated by the Russian navy at Camranh
Bay, thus taking advantage of a ready-made facility and very low labour costs.
A further threat is seen in Keppel’s plan to take over what was the US naval
BQM&T base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Keppel Corporation is said to be a front-
3,2 runner in the race to land both projects[21].
billion. This operation has benefited from the high value of the Yen. HHI’s R&D
annual expenditure amounts to about 3.5 per cent of sales revenue.
The yearly building capacity is four million dwt and the unitary maximum
capacity is one million dwt. The production facilities include seven large docks
with a capacity of between 20,000 and one million dwt.
HHI has the engineering and manufacturing skills to make the high value-
added and technologically complex Moss-type LNG (liquidized natural gas)
carriers (which can cost up to A$300 million) and double-bottom ships, thus
indicating that the company has caught up with the Japanese shipbuilders.
HHI manufactures ships on a sequential production line basis where the
major components are fabricated as far as possible in the yard factories before
final assembly in the huge docks. HHI has the total manufacturing capability
from design, R&D, steel preparation, fabrication, subassembly, final assembly
and finishing to testing and trials. As a guide, the time to both design and build
a ship is about ten months – about five months for design and five for building
and tests.
HHI already works to ISO 9000 quality standards and also follows Lloyds of
London design requirements. HHI’s future competition could come from China
(PRC) as they are closing the gap with both Japan and South Korea and are close
to overtaking Taiwan as Asia’s third largest shipbuilder. PRC capacity is being
expanded to build medium-to-large ships to secure a bigger share of the world
market by increasing shipbuilding capacity to 1.2 million dwt by 1995[23].
Conclusions
The new democratically elected South Korean government is still very
interventionist in that it wants to control or command the country’s industry.
This is made easy by the country’s industry structure which is based on
chaebols. Recently, the interventionist approach was manifested when the
country’s top 30 chaebols were told that they would have to concentrate on their
core businesses, the ten largest being told that each would be allowed to operate
in three sectors! Also, Samsung, a major chaebol, was planning to enter the
automotive industry on a large scale, but was told by the government that
South Korea already had enough car-makers[24]. The government’s reasoning An analysis of
behind this approach is to encourage competition and foster small business South Korean
activity; to wrest power from the old industrial dynasties and hand over to industries
professional managers; and to stem the growth of the chaebols into unrelated
areas.
The Korean companies visited are on a world scale and followed very
ambitious targets. Two of the sites visited were the world’s biggest, i.e. Hyundai 29
ship-repair and shipbuilding. The steel plant visited (POSCO) was third in the
world based on steel output. The Korean automotive industry is already the
world’s fifth biggest. These plants have been in existence only for a generation!
In July 1994, Hyundai stunned Korea’s existing steel producers with the
announcement that it plans to build a 9.3-million-tonne integrated steel plant on
an island off Pusan[25]. Obviously, the chaebols want to go their own way
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