BGA-HSSE-SAF-ST-1526 Safety Case Rev 02

BG Standard
Safety Engineering
Safety Case Standard
BGA-HSSE-SAF-ST-1526
Value Assurance Framework (VAF)

Value Assurance Framework (VAF) BG Standard
DOCUMENT INFORMATION SHEET

Title:
Purpose and Scope:

This document is provided to outline the requirements for each operated asset within BG to produce and
maintain a Safety Case.
Operational facilities which have the potential of a major accident due to storage, handling, processing or
transport of hazardous or toxic materials or other activities carried out on the site are classed as Major
Hazard Facilities. Safe operation of all Major Hazard Facilities operated by BG Group shall be demonstrated
through a Safety Case developed specifically for the unique operations and situation. The Safety Case shall
also be the means for ensuring continuous improvement in safety.
Document Verification:
Responsible: Author
Signature: Position: Principal Safety Engineer
Name: Rebecca Walters Date: 8th October 2009
Approval: Head of Function
Signature: Position: Head of Asset Integrity
Name: Mark Nishapati Date:
Consulted:
Name: Position:
Peter Bamforth Principal Safety Engineer
Douglas Eastaugh HSSE Assurance Manager
Informed:
Name: Position:
Don Lloyd GM HSSE
BGA-HSSE-SAF-ST-1526, Issue 02 2 of 27
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Approval and Issue record:
Issue Description Author Approved

Date
No. (see Revision Record for details) (name) (name)
01 Nov 2007 Issued for Use D. Eastaugh Mark Nishapati
02 Oct 2009 Re-issued for Use R. Walters Mark Nishapati
Revision Record:
Issue No. Description of Revision
Revised to incorporate specific requirements for Quantitative Risk Assessment and the
02
requirement to develop a Design Safety Case.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 5
1.1 Purpose and Scope 5
1.2 Definitions 6
1.3 Abbreviations 7
2.0 REQUIREMENTS 8
2.1 Safety Case for Major Hazard Facilities 8
2.2 Safety Case Content 8
2.3 Risk Assessment 9
2.4 Maintenance of the Safety Case 9
2.5 Conformance 9
2.6 Consultation and Communication 9
2.7 Management 10
2.8 Audit 10
3.0 FEEDBACK 10
APPENDIX A - LIST OF REFERENCED / ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS 12
APPENDIX B – PARTICULARS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SAFETY CASE 13
APPENDIX C – QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 17
APPENDIX D – BG GROUP RISK TOLERABILITY CRITERIA 23
APPENDIX E - FEEDBACK FORM 27
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This Standard should be read in conjunction with the Purpose, Development and Application of BG
Standards and Guidelines Standard (BGA-BGA-GEN-OS-0001).
It is essential that everyone is aware that compliance with this, or any other Company Standard, is
mandatory and failure to comply may constitute serious misconduct and disciplinary action may be taken
against the employee(s). Failure to comply with the Standard by a secondee or contractor may result in the
termination of their secondment or engagement and or any other appropriate action being taken.
Although BG Standards are mandatory, dispensations may be granted in exceptional cases by the relevant
GTA/Head of Function. The Dispensations against BG Standards (BGA-BGA-GEN-OS-004) sets out the
procedure in full. Please note that dispensations need to be granted before any BG Standard is deviated
from.
In all instances, legally required National codes and standards of the country where the equipment is to be
operated shall be complied with, together with any other applicable legal requirements.
Where BG Standards are more stringent, then the BG requirements shall take precedence. Where a BG
Standard appears to be less stringent, then the applicable legal requirements shall be followed and it shall
be brought to the attention of the appropriate BG Group Technical Authority.
All applicable International Codes and Standards shall be complied with.
If you are reading a hard copy of this Standard, you should consider it out of date and refer instead
to the version currently on the Portal.
1.1 Purpose and Scope
This Standard provides for safe operation of Major Hazard Facilities through the mechanism of a Safety
Case prepared and implemented by the facility operators. The Safety Case is the means of both ensuring
and demonstrating that suitable and sufficient measures are in place to prevent a major accident and to
reduce the effects of a major accident should one occur. The process of developing the Safety Case will
improve safe operation by ensuring a systematic review of the major accident hazards and adequacy of
the risk control measures that are implemented, both during initial development of the Safety Case, and
subsequently in a process of continuous improvement. The process of developing and maintaining the
Safety Case shall apply throughout the life cycle of a major hazard facility.
The range of Business segments and Value Funnel lifecycle stages to which this Standard applies are
identified below:
Business
Upstream T&D Power LNG
Segment :
X X X X
Stage : Create Assess Select Define Execute Operate Decommission

(a) (a) X X X X
Note: Assess includes Feasibility studies, Select includes Option assessments, Define includes both Pre-FEED Definition
and FEED studies, Execute includes Detail Design, procurement, Construction and Commissioning.
(a) The Safety Case is a deliverable from a process which amongst other things should demonstrate that effective risk
management has been applied throughout the life cycle. This process should start during Assess and be continuously
developed throughout the subsequent stages into operation.
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1.2 Definitions
In this document, the following definitions apply:

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable; the concept of “reasonably practicable”
involves weighing a risk against the cost in terms of time, investment and
resource needed to eliminate or further reduce it. Thus, ALARP does not
represent a fixed risk value, but describes the level to which we expect to see
workplace risks controlled.
APPROVED For this Standard, Approved means the document has been subjected to a
formal process of review, acceptance and signatures prior to use. This may also
include external review for some countries that BG operate in.
BARRIER A functional grouping of safeguards and controls selected to prevent, or limit the
effect of, a Major Accident or Environmental Event. Each barrier typically
includes a mix of: facilities (equipment), processes (documented and ‘custom
and practice’) and people (personal skills and their application). The selected
combination of these ensures the barrier should be suitable, sufficient and
available to deliver its expected risk reduction.
The BARRIER is the high level functional group (e.g. Fire Suppression) and can
be divided into separate CRITICAL SYSTEMS (e.g. Deluge System), and further
sub-divided into the CRITICAL ELEMENTS (which will generally be the tagged
items representing the lowest level to which the BARRIER can be sensibly sub-
divided).
COMPANY BG Group or a wholly owned subsidiary company or other client organisation
as may be defined by the contract.
CONTRACTOR The person, firm or company undertaking to supply services plant, or

equipment to which his document applies.
ENVIRONMENTAL An event with the potential to cause severe, widespread, long term or even
EVENT permanent damage to ecosystems; or to impact on the business in terms of legal
or regulatory compliance or reputation.
GAS A connected network of pipes used for the conveyance of gas from a gas
DISTRIBUTION processing facility, a storage facility or an interconnector including any
NETWORK odourisation facilities. Includes gas gathering stations which co-mingle gas from
a series of well heads to become a common feed for a plant
GROUP The GTA is the person invested with BG Group authority, who has the
TECHNICAL responsibility and accountability to establish, approve and maintain technical
AUTHORITY requirements and processes of a specific function or discipline. (As defined in
BGA-BGA-GEN-OS-0001)
GROSS If a risk reducing measure is practicable and it cannot be shown that the cost of
DISPROPORTION the measure is grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained, then the measure
is considered reasonably practicable and should be implemented.
MAJOR ACCIDENT A fire, explosion or release of a dangerous substance resulting in multiple deaths
or serious injuries or any other event connected with operation of the facility
involving multiple fatalities to the workforce or surrounding populations
For company installations this also includes:
 any event involving major damage to the structure of the installation or
plant affixed thereto or any loss in the stability of the installation;
 the collision of an aircraft or marine vessel with the installation;
 the failure of life support systems for diving operations in connection with
the installation, the detachment of a diving bell used for such operations
or the trapping of a diver in a diving bell or other subsea chamber used
for such operations
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MAJOR Operational facilities which have the potential to cause a major accident due to
HAZARD storage, handling , processing or transport of hazardous or toxic materials or
FACILITY other activities carried out on the site including but not limited to:
 offshore installations;
 onshore (oil, gas, LNG, LPG) terminals or storage installations;
 large power generation plants;
 high pressure transmission pipelines conveying flammable or hazardous
materials;
 gas gathering or distribution networks;
 LNG ships
PERFORMANCE A measurable description, usually in qualitative and quantitative terms, of the

STANDARDS performance required of a Barrier, Critical System, or Critical Element and which
may apply to facilities, processes or people
SAFETY Document which demonstrates and provides evidence for a specific major
CASE hazard facility to show that suitable and sufficient measures are in place to
prevent a major accident, to reduce the effects of a major accident should one
occur. This is typically done through demonstration of compliance with relevant
statutory provisions and BG Group policies and standards, especially relating to
risk management.
SAFETY Means that equipment on or part of a facility and its plant (including software)
CRITICAL whose purpose is to prevent or limit the effect of a Major Accident, or any part of
ELEMENT the facility and its plant whose failure could cause or contribute substantially to a
Major Accident. Safety Critical Elements can be grouped into BARRIERs.
SHALL A mandatory term - no dispensation is permitted without written approval using
the formal dispensation procedure
1.3 Abbreviations
AGM Asset General Manager

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CMMS Computerised Maintenance Management System
DSC Design Safety Case
EMERA Evacuation, Muster, Escape and Rescue Analysis
ESD Emergency Shutdown
F&G Fire & Gas
FSA Formal Safety Assessment
GA General Arrangement
IR Individual Risk
MAH Major Accident Hazard
MS Management System
OSC Operational Safety Case
PFD Process Flow Diagram
PLL Potential Loss of Life
PoB Personnel on Board
PS Performance Standard
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
SCE Safety Critical Element
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
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2.0 REQUIREMENTS
2.1 Safety Case for Major Hazard Facilities
Each operated Asset shall produce and maintain a Safety Case for the design, operation and
abandonment phase of all Major Hazard Facilities. The Safety Case shall contain the particulars detailed in
Section 2.2 and Appendix B. The Process Flowchart (see Figure 1) highlights the key steps in the
development of a Safety Case.
A Design Safety Case (DSC) shall be prepared during Define, and shall be part of the decision support
package presented at RR5. It shall be issued by the project manager and be reviewed as part of the
readiness review process. For new projects the Design Safety Case shall be a newly developed document
complete with all supporting documentation as detailed in this standard. For projects which are modifying
an existing asset, the Design Safety Case presented at the end of FEED shall be an update to all relevant
existing asset documentation.
The Operational Safety Case shall be finalised and approved (e.g. by the AGM) prior to commencement of
operation of the facility.
In those countries where there is a Safety Case regime the local requirements shall take precedence, as
long as they exceed the BG minimum requirements as specified in this Standard.
Safety Cases shall address all periods of non-normal operation which:
 create new Major Accident Hazards or Environmental Events;

 invalidate any of the key assumptions, or exceed the limit of applicability, of the existing asset
Safety Case (e.g. by exceeding the maximum permitted PoB on an offshore installation);
 involve construction activity on, or adjacent to, operating facilities beyond any normal
maintenance activity that is covered by the existing Safety Case, and where the persons
undertaking the activity will be exposed to risk from the operating facility;
 involve combined operations between more than one offshore installation or vessel (e.g.
drilling or workover using a drilling rig over a production platform, or use of a flotel adjacent to
a production platform);
 are assessed as having the potential to increase the level of risk predicted in the Safety Case
for the highest risk worker group on the facility.
For such activities a Safety Case addendum shall be prepared (or the existing Safety Case updated), and
approved prior to commencement of the activity.
Assets may decide to develop a Safety Case for other activities based on their assessment of significant
hazard and risk.
2.2 Safety Case Content
The Safety Case shall provide documentary evidence to demonstrate that:
 The arrangements within the Management System (MS) for the facility are adequate to ensure
that the BG Group HSE Policy, BG Technical Standards and statutory requirements are
complied with in relation to the facility and any activity connected with it;
 All hazards which could give rise to a Major Accident or the need for evacuation, escape or
rescue have been identified and their risks to persons (workforce and/or members of the
public) and the environment evaluated;
 Measures have been, or will be, taken to reduce the risks to persons and the environment
(refer to Ref. [6]) affected by those hazards to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP –
refer to Appendix D);
 Appropriate Performance Standards have been established for the Barriers required (refer to
Ref. [3]) to manage the identified Major Accident hazards and Environmental Events, and
appropriate schemes are in place for verification of these.
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2.2.1 Structure of Safety Case
Except where local regulations dictate otherwise, the minimum content of the Safety Case shall include
the following, together with the particulars in Appendix B and the Safety Case Guideline, Refer to Ref.
[2]:
 Executive Summary;
 Introduction;
 Facility / Asset Description;
 Safety Management System;
 Control of Major Accident Hazards;
 Justification for Continued Safe Operation.
2.3 Risk Assessment
Risk assessment shall be used to support the Safety Case by predicting facility risk to allow comparison
with Corporate Risk Tolerability Criteria. The techniques to be used, and the complexity of the risk
assessment undertaken, shall be based on guidance given in Appendix C.
For a Summary of the BG Group Risk Tolerability Criteria and Risk Matrix to be used in risk
assessments, refer to Appendix D.
2.4 Maintenance of the Safety Case
The Safety Case shall be a living document and shall be maintained and updated throughout the life
cycle of the facility.
The Safety Case shall be revised in the event of a material change in circumstances including but not
limited to major modifications to the facility, management systems, organisation, operations, activities or
the environment. Due account shall also be taken of technological advances that may present improved
techniques for risk reduction or render current techniques obsolete.
The Safety Case shall be expanded, or an addendum to the Case prepared, to address periods of
Simultaneous or Combined Operations.
The Operator shall thoroughly review and re-issue an operational safety case at least once every five
years.
2.5 Conformance
Each operated Asset shall ensure that the procedures and arrangements described in the safety case
are followed, and shall develop suitable KPIs to monitor conformance.
2.6 Consultation and Communication
Each operated Asset shall consult with the workforce (and in particular health and safety representatives,
if appointed) during the preparation, revision or review of the Safety Case and supporting studies. In all
cases this consultation must be documented and demonstrated within the Safety Case.
Each operated Asset shall provide the employees and contractors with appropriate information,
instruction and training in relation to:
 all major accidents that could occur at the major hazard facility;
 all hazards that could cause, or contribute to causing, those major accidents;
 the Barriers that are in place, their Performance Standards and the means for verification of
the ongoing suitability of the Barriers throughout the facility life cycle;
 the content and operation of the Management System;
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 the content of the Safety Case including any revision to the Safety Case.
Each operated Asset shall ensure that the Management System, the Safety Case and the emergency
plan, or copies of these documents, are readily accessible to the facility’s employees and contractors.
2.7 Management
Company personnel shall manage and own the preparation, workforce involvement and maintenance of
the Safety Case. This does not preclude individual studies, on which the Safety Case may be based,
from being performed by consultants or contractors.
2.8 Audit
A Major Hazards Review shall be conducted annually. This shall include review of:
 the applicable hazards;

 the validity of the Safety Case assumptions and supporting documentation, including QRA
(Appendix C) and EMERA [ref. 4]; and,
 a review of the suitability of the Barriers and their Performance Standards (refer to the Asset
Integrity Standard, [ref. 3]).
3.0 FEEDBACK
Where inaccuracies, errors, omissions or other general areas for quality or performance improvement are
identified in this document the Feedback Form, provided in Appendix E shall be completed and returned to
the Group Technical Authority (Document Custodian) identified in the Document Information Sheet.
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Figure 1 – Safety Case Process Flowchart
Examples of making the

Identify & Document Safety Case a ‘LIVING ’
MAH’s for facility document
In design it would be
Supporting Analyse Impact normal to employ the
Studies hierarchy of risk
Of
QRA
management and try to
Identified MAH’s eliminate, substitute
EMERA etc. the hazards
FERA These Studies and
Etc. Assess Criteria (Ref. 5) must be
IR and PLL associated reviewed during any
change deemed Safety
with MAH & compare with Critical on the asset, as
Corporate Risk Criteria key assumptions may
Corporate Risk be impacted e.g. PoB
Criteria
These measures may be
Identify risk Engineered safeguards, or
reduction measures may be processes that
to satisfy ALARP become part of the Asset’s
SOPs.
List all Barriers

The Asset identified
required to manage the Barriers are then prioritised
Major Accident Hazards within the Work Management
System.
’
Develop Performance The Barriers Performance
Criteria are then fundamental
Standards for all to the maintenance, inspection,
Barriers testing and assurance activities
within the Asset’s WMS
The Safety Case is then used on
a frequent basis in operational
Write the Asset decision making; and as a key
input to projects, etc.
Safety Case
The Safety Case is reviewed to
Maintain through ensure that assumptions remain
annual review valid, and that risk reduction
measures remain effective
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APPENDIX A - LIST OF REFERENCED / ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
BG Standards / Guidelines:
[1] BG Group Functional Process, Risk Management, BGA-HSSE-FP-0200.
[2] Safety Case Guideline BGA-HSSE-SAF-GL-1526.
[3] Asset Integrity Standard, BGA-BGA-GEN-OS-011.
[4] Evacuation, Muster, Escape and Rescue Guideline, BGA-HSSE-SAF-GL-1532.
[5] Reducing Risks, protecting people, The UK HSE’s decision making process, ISBN 0 7176 2151 0.
[6] BG Standard for Best Available Techniques for Environmental Controls, BGA-HSSE-SAF-ST-1516
[7] UK Health & Safety Executive, Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 Regulation 12
Demonstrating Compliance with the relevant statutory provisions, Offshore information sheet No.
2/2006
[8] UK Health & Safety Executive, Guidance on Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations, Offshore
Information Sheet No. 3/2006
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APPENDIX B – PARTICULARS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SAFETY CASE

This Appendix describes the contents of both the Design Safety Case (DSC) and the Operational Safety
Case (OSC). In general the level of detail in the Safety Cases will be relevant to the project stage. The
content of Sections 1 – 3 would be the same for the DSC and the OSC, but with greater detail in the OSC.
The level of detail shall be sufficient to enable users of the Safety Case to acquire an accurate
understanding of the safe operation of the installation and in particular design specifications, operating
limits, operations & maintenance procedures, major hazard potential and risk control. Sufficient detail should
be included to demonstrate the adequacy of:
a) the facility's health, safety and environmental management arrangements;

b) measures to control major accident hazards and environmental events for the operation of the
facility;
c) the arrangements for emergency response (including evacuation, muster, escape and rescue).
The sections of the Safety Case shall contain, as a minimum, the following information with documentary
evidence where appropriate:
1. Executive Summary;
This shall summarise the Safety Case content, and highlight any aspects of the demonstration for
continued Safe Operation or recommended actions to be implemented.
2. Introduction;
o The Safety Case and Approval process, and support for the ALARP principle;
o Summary of the scope and assets / specific operations covered;
o Where to find information in the Safety Case;
o Reason for the submission (e.g. regulatory, significant change, revision period);
o Details of the Owner including contact details, and accountable persons.
3. Facility / Asset Description;
This section shall contain a description of the installation and the operations carried out on it including:
o Environmental conditions and design criteria;

o Hazardous substances and inventories;
o Manning philosophy;
o An overview of the process, using a PFD for reference;
o The Barriers defined for the installation and its operation (e.g. as identified by the
Control of Major Accident Hazards section) and include such systems as F&G, ESD,
Ignition Prevention, Emergency Lighting, Active and Passive Fire Protection etc.) Refer
to the BG Asset Integrity Standard Ref. [3];
o Emergency response arrangements;
o Logistic and other operations.
Within the description particular focus shall be provided on:
o Inherent safety aspects of the design and construction including the adoption of good
engineering practice;
o Arrangements for the protection of personnel from the effects of fires and explosions
including facilities for Temporary Refuge;
o Arrangements for the evacuation, escape and rescue of personnel.
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The use of diagrams and any visual aids are encouraged, to aid the ease of use of the document.
Typical diagrams that are useful include, PFD’s, ESD hierarchy, Asset GA diagrams (including
elevations for offshore platforms), F&G detector lay out plot plans, Safety Equipment Layouts, Major
Accident Hazard consequence diagrams or Risk Contour plots, etc.
All supporting studies and other reference material shall be referenced within the appropriate section of
the Safety Case.
4. Safety Management System;
For the DSC this section shall focus on the management of risk during the project design stage, with
details of the requirements of the management systems that will be put in place for the operating stage.
For the OSC, this section shall contain greater detail of the management systems to be implemented
during operation, including a concise description of the systems and arrangements in place to manage
the safety of people working on the facility and to protect the environment. This description shall
explain how the Company Safety and Environmental Management System is implemented for the
Project, Installation, Operation and Decommissioning lifecycle phases addressed by the Safety Case.
Area to be addressed shall include as a minimum the following:
o Company Policies, Processes and Standards;

o Organisation;
o Control;
o Co-operation;
o Communication;
o Training & Competence;
o Planning and Implementation;
o Planning;
o Safe Working Practices and Procedures;
o Operations, Engineering and Contractor Support;
o Emergency Response;
o Performance Measurement;
o Active & Reactive Monitoring;
o Audit and Review;
o Assurance & Verification;
o Management of Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) (i.e. the management of two or
more activities occurring on the same facility)
o Management of Combined Operations (COMOPS) (Offshore Installations only – see
below)
It shall also contain a succinct description of the generic systems and arrangements in place to
manage combined operations between two offshore installations, e.g. a fixed production installation
and a mobile drilling rig or flotel. Particulars of any combined operations which may involve the
installation, include:
o The arrangements for co-ordinating the management systems;
o The arrangements for a joint review of the safety aspects of any combined operation by
the Operator and owner/operator of the other facilities which shall include the
identification of hazards with the potential to cause a major accident and the
assessment of risks which may arise during any combined operation;
o The plant likely to be used during any combined operation; and
o The likely impact any combined operation may have on the installations involved.
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5. Control of Major Accident Hazards
The Safety Case shall demonstrate that an effective risk management process has been applied to
identify all potential major accident hazards, assess the risks and that controls to manage / reduce the
risks to ALARP have been implemented.
It shall contain as a minimum the following information:
o Introduction, outline the process and goals for the risk management process;
o Identification of all Major Accident Hazards, including justification as to why any have
been dismissed;
o Evaluation of the extent and severity of the consequences of identified major accidents;
o Description and assessment of the effectiveness of all Emergency Response

arrangements identified;
o The Risk Management provisions, including the system used to identify prevention,
detection, control, and mitigation measures (Barriers); develop their Performance
Standards; and conduct verification of their design, fabrication, installation,
commissioning and ongoing suitability throughout the Facility life cycle. The Barriers
shall be clearly linked to the hazards by suitable matrices, or by the use of, Bowtie
diagrams shall also be generated for each of the identified major accident hazards;
o Assessment of the risks against the BG Risk Tolerability Criteria. Risk estimates may
be based on relevant industry experience or estimated using appropriate tools, such as
QRA;
o Demonstrate that the design (Greenfield & Brownfield), risk management and
emergency response arrangements have reduced the risk levels to ALARP by
consideration of further risk management measures beyond the base design and
standard design codes/requirements, and an assessment of the practicality, cost and
impact of their implementation.
The Safety Case shall ensure that there is a transparent link between the identified Major Accident
Hazards, the Barriers whose purpose is to prevent or limit the effects of the Major Accidents or
Environmental Events, and their Performance Standards.
6. Justification for Continued Safe Operation
For the DSC this section shall demonstrate that a design can be achieved that is capable of delivering
tolerable risk, and shall focus on the design safety processes to be implemented in Execute. For the
DSC this section should therefore be considered as the justification for the project to obtain sanction to
continue into Execute.
For the OSC, the emphasis shall be on continuing safe operation, and this section shall contain as a
minimum the following information:
o A summary description of the major accident hazards identified including potential

development scenarios;
o A summary of the key assumptions on which the Safety Case justification is based;
o A summary description of the Barriers in place and/or proposed to manage each

hazard, and the means by which their ongoing suitability will be verified throughout the
facility life cycle.
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o A summary of risk prevention and mitigation measures (hardware, software or

procedural) which have been considered over and above the existing or base design
and normal design codes and standards. This shall be coupled with a summary of the
assessment completed to evaluate whether each measure was considered to be
practical and if it is proposed to be or has been implemented or not.
o From the above the description shall show that all appropriate remedial measures and
controls are in place to reduce the associated risks to a level that is As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP);
o A statement of justification for bringing the facility into operation, or continuing in

operation, or abandonment including a high level summary of the key safety features of
the installation and its operations, highlighting features included through the ALARP
consideration, and the overall assessed risks to people;
o An agreed Action Plan which lists improvements to be implemented to management

systems and facilities to reduce the risks from major accidents and their consequences
further. This shall include any temporary mitigation measures deemed necessary to
manage the interim risk until a permanent solution has been implemented, or during
non-standard operations such as construction on existing facilities (i.e. SIMOPs).
7. Supporting Information
Every effort shall be made to avoid excessive detail in the Safety Case, in particular, the following
supporting information should be referenced rather than included:
o Information whose purpose is solely to support the facts stated, for example
engineering design documents, study reports, controlled drawings;
o Safety assessments and other studies that support the risk assessments reported in the
Safety Case;
o Performance Standard documents and verification schemes for Barriers;
o Procedures and work instructions that form part of the Management System.
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APPENDIX C – QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

1.0 Determining the Need for Quantitative Risk Assessment
Every BG operated Major Hazard Facility is required to produce and maintain a Safety Case to demonstrate
that the risk associated with the operation of the facility has been evaluated and reduced to As Low As
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
The QRA technique represents one approach that may be used to evaluate risk, assess the benefit of risk
management measures, and to assist the demonstration of ALARP. However, the chosen approach shall, in
every case, be consistent with the complexity of the facility and the magnitude of the associated major
hazard risk
Appropriate risk assessment shall also be performed as part of the due diligence that is required for the
acquisition of new assets, and where existing assets have not yet undertaken suitable risk assessment to
support the Safety Case.
For all QRA studies, the BG Asset team shall use selected relevant information from the QRA guidelines
contained within the Safety Case guideline (Ref. [2]) to establish the QRA methodology with the aim of
achieving consistent and comparable QRA studies across all BG Group Assets.
Where a QRA is required it shall support the Safety Case by allowing comparison of risk estimates with BG
Group Risk Tolerability Criteria (see Appendix D below), assisting the identification and selection of risk
management measures and demonstrating that residual risk is ALARP.
For less complex, lower risk, facilities (e.g. a power plant with standard design units) it may be suitable to
estimate quantitative risk by using standard industry data (i.e. historical statistics from similar operating
facilities, at a unit or system level) rather than developing fully detailed parts counts and using failure data at
a component level. For lower risk facilities, the screening and assessment of risk management measures
may be undertaken using qualitative or semi-quantitative methods (e.g. the BG 5x5 Risk Assessment Matrix,
shown in as Figure 3 below)
For complex, bespoke facilities where significant major hazard risk exists (i.e. where a preliminary
assessment of risk using the BG 5x5 matrix identifies risk in the “Intolerable” or “Tolerable if ALARP” regions)
a fully quantitative approach to risk assessment shall be undertaken.
In general, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) shall be used in all cases where qualitative risk
assessments and consequence analysis alone cannot suitably demonstrate adequate management of major
hazard risk.
2.0 Scope
2.1 Level of Detail in the QRA
The approach to be adopted for the QRA shall be determined based on the perceived magnitude of the risk
associated with the facility, as discussed above.
Where a fully quantitative approach is to be followed, coarse QRA studies shall initially be performed at the
Assess/Select project stages to assist comparison of concepts and the selection of lowest risk options.
Progressively more detailed QRA studies shall be performed during the subsequent project stages (i.e.
Define and Execute), with a final fully detailed QRA undertaken to support the Safety Case during detail
design.
Coarse QRA studies may adopt a relatively simple approach (in accordance with the lack of design definition
that is available at this project stage). An appropriate degree of conservatism shall be incorporated into all
coarse QRA studies to ensure that the outputs give a conservative view of the risks associated with the
facility at this stage of the project.
As the design definition improves in the Define and Execute stages, the assumptions used in the QRA shall
be refined to reduce conservatism. The less-conservative assumptions shall be fully justified and, together
with credit taken for risk reduction measures implemented during the design, should ensure that the risk
12/10/2009
levels estimated by late-design stage QRA studies are driven down by comparison to the coarse QRA
studies.
For the QRA studies at every project stage, the required rigour and level of detail of the QRA shall be
determined in advance by the BG Asset team, clearly defined in the QRA scope of work, and further
discussed and agreed with the contractor at the kick-off meeting.
2.2 Coarse QRA
A coarse QRA shall be performed during the Assess/Select stages of the project lifecycle to assist in the
selection of preferred concepts.
Coarse QRA shall be based on the assessment of fatality risk 1 .
Coarse QRA undertaken at the Assess or Select stages shall focus on the operating stage risks, compare
the risk implications of the various possible concepts, and verify that the risk profile of the chosen option has
the potential to be tolerable and ALARP. A record of the concepts that were assessed and the reasons for
the selection of lowest risk concept shall be documented in the ALARP demonstration for the facility.
At the Assess / Select stages the design is still flexible enough to be influenced substantially by the QRA
conclusions and so QRA studies during these stages shall identify and assess all suitable risk management
measures for consideration during the subsequent design stages.
2.3 Detailed QRA
A detailed QRA shall be performed during the Define stage, appropriate to the availability and detail of the
input data required. The detailed QRA shall be further refined during the Execute stage with the aim of
providing a realistic, yet conservative, estimation of the facility risk profile in order to support the Safety Case.
The minimum objectives of a fully detailed QRA shall include:
 estimating the risk of fatality to persons (generally the workforce but any potentially affected members
of the public shall also be included);
 identifying risk reduction measures and assessing the effectiveness of such measures;
 establishing risk-based design accidental loads (DALs) where required (refer to Section 3.4);
 assisting in the development of Performance Standards for the identified major hazard Barriers;
 assisting cost benefit assessment of possible safety expenditure;
 assessing the tolerability of residual risk against BG Group Risk Tolerability Criteria.
2.4 Study Boundaries
The boundaries of the QRA study shall be clearly defined in the scope of work, including the physical
boundaries of the facility and the operations/activities to be addressed. The QRA study shall include all
initiating events with the potential to result in a Major Accident.
The minimum requirements shall include:
 Facilities related (usually hydrocarbon processing) hazards during normal operation of the facility;
 Transport related hazards;
 Occupational hazards;
 Periods of non-normal operational activities which create new Major Accident Hazards, or which
have the potential to significantly increase the risks associated with existing Major Accident Hazards.
Such activities shall include periods of combined or simultaneous operations (e.g. major construction
activity adjacent to operating facilities, drilling or workover using a drilling rig at an offshore
installation).
1
Concepts can also be compared by estimating the risk of impairment of safety functions. This simplified approach assumes
that the lowest risk concepts will have the lowest risk of impairment of these functions (which shall include evacuation routes,
mustering facilities, escape systems and critical support structures as a minimum). However, this approach is only valid
where broadly similar concepts are to be compared and can fail to highlight the differences in fatality risk that could exist
between significantly different concepts such as NUIs, bridge-linked platforms, sub-sea tie-backs, etc.
12/10/2009
For offshore installations the QRA shall include;

 Accidents involving attendant vessels, such as supply and stand-by vessels;
 Accidents involving passing merchant ships;
 Accidents involving crew boats.
In addition the following issues shall be considered for inclusion within a detailed QRA study:
 Accidents involving connected pipelines or subsea facilities;
 Accidents involving adjacent facilities, i.e. the risk impact of the neighbours on the facility being
studied.
3.0 Performing the QRA
Figure 2, below, indicates the general approach that shall be applied in the identification of hazards and the
management of risk.
Define study boundaries

& familiarisation
Carry out Hazard

Identification (HAZID) and
failure case selection
Evaluate frequency of Evaluate consequence of

Major Accidents Major Accidents
Risk summation and

analysis
Risk reduction measures Has risk been Risk reduction measures

to decrease frequency reduced to ALARP? to reduce severity of
consequence
(Note 1)
Prepare formal ALARP

demonstration
Results report
Figure 2: Outline QRA Methodology
Note 1. For a qualitative assessment the “Risk Summation and Analysis” and the determination of ALARP could be
conducted using the BG Risk Assessment Matrix, whereas in a fully quantitative assessment this step would require
comparison of numerical QRA results against the BG Group Risk Tolerability Criteria.
3.1 Define study boundaries & familiarisation
Although the QRA is likely to be carried out by an external consultancy the project/asset is responsible for
ensuring that the specific objectives of the study are met. A detailed scope of work shall be prepared for the
study which shall be done in accordance with the QRA guidelines incorporated within the Safety Case
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guideline (Ref [2]). Selection of the QRA contractor shall be carried out in consultation with the BG Safety
Engineering Group Technical Authority (GTA).
Prior to commencement of the study, rule sets & assumptions on which the study will be based should be
identified. These assumptions shall be demonstrably realistic yet conservative.
3.2 Hazard Identification & Failure Case selection
Hazard Identification (through process such as formal HAZID’s) shall be undertaken to identify all relevant
hazards and potential accident scenarios associated with the facility.
From the hazards identified a set of representative failure cases shall be developed by breaking down the
system/s under study into a larger number of sub-systems, or by plant sectionalisation. It must be ensured
that these cases represent the full hazard potential of the facility.
The QRA team shall demonstrate in the QRA report that the selected failure cases selected adequately
represent the full hazard potential of the facility.
3.3 Frequency Analysis
3.3.1 Failure Rates
The QRA shall estimate the frequency of occurrence (the failure rate) of each of the selected failure cases,
based on an analysis of suitable historical data where available (e.g. for hydrocarbon releases), or based on
theoretical modelling for specific failure cases (e.g. for marine vessel collision).
All data sources used shall be fully referenced and interpreted within the QRA.
All bespoke models or other detailed studies (e.g. fault tree analysis) used to derive failure rates shall be fully
reported within the QRA.
3.3.2 Consequence Modelling
Consequence modelling shall evaluate the effects of the accident scenarios on personnel, equipment or
structures, etc. (depending on the defined scope of the QRA study).
The consequence modelling approach and the specific analysis models used shall be clearly described
within the QRA Report. Each stage of the consequence modelling (e.g. discharge, dispersion, toxic effects,
fire or explosion, etc.) shall be clearly reported, including discussion of the results, modelling limitations and
sensitivities.
The accident scenarios that are defined for consequence modelling shall represent all of the potential
outcomes of the selected failure cases and shall also take account of potential escalation events. The QRA
shall clearly describe the approach used to generate accident scenarios and demonstrate that this will
provide full coverage of the potential major accidents at the facility.
3.4 Design Accidental Loads
QRA shall be used to determine, or confirm, Design Accidental Loads (DALs) (e.g. in relation to fire,
explosion and collision loads) for selected major accident hazard Barriers.
4.0 Reporting the Results
4.1 Presentation of Fatality Risk Results
The methodology for estimating fatality risk shall be clearly described within the QRA Report, including
discussion of any limitations or uncertainties.
Risk results shall be presented to clearly show the most significant contributors to total risk to assist in the
identification of potential risk reduction measures. The significant risk contributions shall be presented in
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several forms to show, as clearly as is practicable, the risk associated with:

 Specific sources (i.e. specific systems or specific items of equipment);
 Specific initiating events or failure cases (e.g. vessel collision, corrosion of hydrocarbon lines,
dropped objects);
 Specific accident scenario, or consequence, types (e.g. toxic effects, flash fire).
Intermediate results (such as leak rates for hydrocarbon systems, ignition rate or fire frequency for the
facility) shall be provided to assist in bench-marking facilities against each other, against other sources of
historical accident data and against incident reporting data collected within BG Group.
Risk to personnel shall be presented using the following measures:
 Potential Loss of Life (PLL), expressed per year for each worker group and for the overall facility;
 Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) for each worker group;
 Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) contour plots for onshore facilities (to as low as the 10-8/yr
contour) for use in the assessment of risk to the public;
 Group Risk, represented on an f-N curve (a log-log scaled graph of cumulative frequency per annum,
f, vs. the number of fatalities, N).
For offshore installations the frequency of impairment of evacuation, muster and escape systems (including
Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency, TRIF) shall also be assessed and presented in the QRA Report
(refer to the QRA Guidelines within the Safety Case Guideline, (Ref. [2]).
4.2 Estimating Total Fatality Risk
The total estimated fatality risk to workers shall include, and clearly show, the contributions to total IR arising from:
 Major Accident hazards (hydrocarbon processing, etc.);

 Occupational hazards;
 Transport related hazards (as part of company-arranged travel to/from remote work sites or installations);
 Hazards associated with evacuation or escape (e.g. from offshore installations);
 Any other category of hazard which exposes workers to significant risk.
Transport related and occupational risk shall be estimated based on suitable historical data sources with
additional interpretation and modelling as required. It shall be ensured that the occupational risk data
selected does not contain contributions from transport related or major accident related events.
For workers visiting Normally Unattended Installations (NUIs) due account shall be taken of the risk exposure
of the workers throughout a typical working year (i.e. their IRPA shall take account of all of the facilities that
they visit and all other activities that they undertake during a typical year) and an appropriate assessment
shall be conducted to derive an estimate of the risk that arises from visiting each installation.
4.3 Asset and Business Risk
Assessment of risk to the asset (including business interruption and loss of revenue) shall be undertaken
where it is required for the purposes of:
 Detailed Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA);
 Assessment of escalation risk, where worker risk is not a suitable indicator (e.g. in onshore plant
where personnel will have escaped from the initial incident and are very unlikely to become
casualties in an escalating event).
4.4 Uncertainty in Results
The results of QRA are imprecise and it must be recognised that QRA is only a tool to assist decision making
and not a substitute for suitably experienced and competent engineering input. The results of QRA are only
representative of the potential risks which may exist to the extent that the input data, assumptions and rule
sets are representative of reality. The uncertainties in QRA inputs, and therefore in the results, are
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significant, and the conclusions of QRA are sensitive to variations in the inputs or modelling assumptions.
This is an unavoidable limitation of the technique.
QRA studies shall have an acknowledged degree of conservatism built in (via the data sets, assumptions
and rule sets), in order to ensure that they do not under-predict risk. The degree of conservatism shall be
appropriate to the project stage and study detail (i.e. more conservatism in a coarse QRA, reducing as
definition improves).
4.5 Assessing Risk Tolerability
Risk tolerability shall be based on an assessment of the total estimated risk (for the worker group with the
highest estimated IRPA) against the BG Group Risk Tolerability Criteria and requirements given in Appendix
D below.
4.6 Assessment and Selection of Risk Management Measures
Where risk reduction is required risk management measures to reduce the frequency of an event, the
consequence of an event, or the potential for the event to escalate, shall all be assessed.
Risk management measures shall be selected for implementation where the cost, time or trouble required is
not grossly disproportionate to the risk reduction which they provide.
ALARP demonstration shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements described in Appendix D.
The demonstration of ALARP shall be comprehensive and shall include the selection of lowest risk concepts,
elimination or reduction of hazards where practicable, and the implementation of risk management measures
meeting the ALARP criteria.
5.0 Review
As part of the annual Major Hazard Review (section 2.8) the QRA shall be reviewed in order to confirm that
the key assumptions are still valid and that risks remain tolerable and ALARP. Review of the QRA shall be
conducted when modifications to process plant or equipment are proposed, or there are significant changes
to the Facility operating parameters, environmental conditions or manning levels. Such review shall be
managed in accordance with the Management of Change process.
Reviews shall be carried out by the BG Asset team in consultation with the operations and maintenance
workers on the facility. Assistance shall be requested from BG Safety Engineering as required.
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APPENDIX D – BG GROUP RISK TOLERABILITY CRITERIA
1. Risk Tolerability
Tolerability does not mean acceptability. Tolerability refers to a willingness to live with a risk in order to
secure certain benefits and in the confidence that the risk is being properly controlled. To tolerate a
risk implies that it is not regarded as negligible or something that is to be ignored but rather as
something that needs to be kept under review and reduced still further if and when possible.
Risks are never acceptable when the benefits of an activity are not perceived to be larger than the
risks. Also, a risk is never considered acceptable while there are effective, and practicable,
alternatives to lower the risk. If there are no further practicable alternatives it may be necessary to
“tolerate" the risk.
2. Risk Screening Matrix

Risk is interpreted as the combination of consequence and likelihood. A risk matrix enables this
combination to be represented graphically. It is a reasonably quick and easy method to represent risk
and consequently is commonly used during or after hazard identification studies to screen the hazards
or to conduct a simple risk analysis. This can be used in cases where there is sufficient scenario
related data to enable a quick judgement to be made in terms of likelihood of an event. The main
advantage of the matrix is its easy representation of different risk levels and the avoidance of more time
consuming quantitative analysis.
However a quantitative assessment (QRA) is necessary depending on the complexity of the problem
and / or where the risk is in the ALARP or bordering on the intolerable region. Refer to Ref. [8].
See Figure 3 below for the Standard BG Group Risk Matrix.
3. Individual Risk:
Individual risk shall be specific to an individual worker or group of workers carrying out similar tasks
with similar work patterns. All risk contributors shall be included, including transport, (when provided by
the company, e.g. helicopter transport to an offshore facility) and occupational risk, as well as process
related major accident hazards. Assessments shall take account of people exposed to exceptional
risks, i.e. critical groups exposed to risks significantly higher than the average for the facility or activity
when evaluating the tolerability of risks.
“The following criteria shall apply when judging the tolerability of risk to persons for BG Group
facilities, sites, combined operations or activities.
o Individual risk to any worker above 10-3 per annum shall be considered intolerable and
fundamental risk reduction improvements are required;
o Individual risk below 10-3 but above 10-6 per annum for any worker shall be considered
tolerable if it can be demonstrated that the risks are as low as reasonably practicable;
o Individual risk below 10-6 per annum for any worker shall be considered as broadly
acceptable and no further improvements are considered necessary provided
documented control measures are in place and maintained.”
Demonstration of ALARP should strive for continuous improvement and further risk reduction thus:
“For new facilities and activities BG Group shall strive to achieve lower process related major
accident risks compared with that typical for existing facilities, down at least to an individual risk to
any worker of 10-4 per annum, by the appropriate use of best practice including technology and
management techniques.”
12/10/2009
4. General Public
Individual risk to any member of the general public as a result of BG Group activities shall be
considered as intolerable if greater than 10-4 per annum, broadly acceptable if less than 10-6 per annum
and shall be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable between these limits.”
For new facilities these criteria should be reduced by an order of magnitude for planning purposes with
the aim of continuous improvement and enhanced reputation.
5. Group Risk Criteria

Societal concern due to the potential occurrence of multiple fatalities in a single event is known as
societal risk and is usually defined in the context of members of the public. For offshore activities,
where the workers are isolated and members of the public are unlikely to be affected, the term "group
risk" is often used. Group risk can be measured as PLL or, more informatively, on an FN curve.
Potential Loss of Life

The overall risk to a given population is measured by the Potential Loss of Life (PLL). This is the long-
term totalled potential number of fatalities for a particular installation, site or activity and can be
expressed per year or over specific time periods (eg life of field or duration of activity). Unlike the
Individual Risk values, PLL takes account of the number of people at risk.
PLL is not in itself a specific criterion for making judgements regarding levels of risk. However it is a
valuable measure when considering alternative options for risk reduction for a given facility and is used
in cost benefit analysis.
Note that PLL for a specific group of people with similar work patterns is directly linked to their
individual risk (PLL = total number of people in group (all shifts/rotations) x individual risk).
FN curves
FN curves compare the number of people (N) assessed to be at risk from each Major Accident Hazard
scenario or type with the frequency (F) with which hazards are estimated to occur.
Data for those scenarios identified within the QRA with the potential for multiple fatalities shall be
provided to Group HSSE in the form of FN data presented in the Safety Case Control of Major Accident
Hazard Section, so that comparison can be made against applicable criteria.
Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency (TRIF)

For offshore installations, the frequency with which accidental events will result in Temporary Refuge
(TR) impairment, within the endurance period stated in the Safety Case, shall not exceed 1 in 1000 per
year and shall be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). This can be considered as a measure of
societal risk.
The impairment criteria for TR integrity are as follows:
 Structural support – Impairment occurs if the supporting structure, or if the TR structure
or exterior fabric is breached or collapses;
 Life support – Impairment values shall be agreed for smoke ingress, oxygen depletion
and heat stress;
 Command – Impairment occurs if platform communications, emergency power and
lighting, control and monitoring are not available or not working when required;
 Events for which it may not be practicable to design a TR system, e.g. capsize of a semi
submersible, high energy collision by a merchant vessel etc. need not be included in the
TRIF. However, they are to be included in the overall calculation of worker fatality risk.
12/10/2009
6. Demonstrating ALARP
Determination of risk reduction to as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP) shall involve an

assessment of the risk to be avoided against the sacrifice (in money, time and trouble) involved in
taking measures to avoid that risk.
Any risk sits on a spectrum from very low (where it is very unlikely that it would be possible to reduce
the risk further) through to the levels of risk that are so high that the risk assessment (and
implementation of risk reduction measures) must be rigorous, exhaustive and transparent. The greater
the initial level of risk under consideration, the greater the degree of the rigour required to demonstrate
that risks have been reduced so far is reasonably practicable.
Choosing between options may be needed at any stage in any project or asset, not least at the design
stage, which will involve making a choice between differing design concepts under consideration as a
whole. In making choices it is good practice to consider the risks involved in the whole life cycle.
However it is expected that any new installation would not give rise to a residual level of risk greater
than that achieved by the best examples of existing good practice for comparable functions. The
reasonable practicability of any further risk reduction should be measured against this baseline.
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is the numerical assessment technique, that enables the costs of
implementing a design or modification and the likely improvement in safety that this would be expected
to achieve. Whilst no amount of money can compensate for injury or harm, the ALARP principle
acknowledges that an investment aimed at reducing injury or harm will not be made without regard to
the size of that investment.
The fundamental principle of cost benefit analysis is that all ‘life cycle’ costs and benefits should be
included. The entire range of costs (financial and resources) and benefits (risks to persons) that accrue
throughout the design, construction and installation phases and subsequent operational life of the
facility therefore need to be considered.
The effectiveness of risk reduction measures can be expressed in terms of a numerical value. The
Options Decision Tool presented below allows this value to be calculated:
Net cost of measure

ODT 
Reduction in assessed impact
Where risk based decision making and use of CBA is required, the UK HSE benchmark value and
guidance is recommended, Refer to Ref. [5]. However case law indicates that costs should be grossly
disproportionate and therefore costs in excess of the benchmark figure are used where appropriate (i.e.
offshore). In reality of course there is no simple cut-off and a whole range of factors, including
uncertainty need to be taken account in the decision making process. Contact Group HSSE for further
guidance.
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LIKELIHOOD
1 2 3 4 5
Between once per Between once per Between once per
Less than once Greater than
1000000 and once 10000 and once 1000 and once per
per 1000000 years once per year
per 10000 years per 1000 years year
-6
< 10 10-6<X<10-4 10-4<X<10-3 10-3<X<1 >1
People Assets Environment Reputation per year per year per year per year per year
Extreemly
Very Unlikely Unlikely Improbable Probable
Unlikely
Catastrophic
Extensive damage Massive effect
Multiple fatalities (5 or International impact,
(>GBP£ 10M and (widespread chronic
5 more). Numerous site
substantial operation effects / constant high
adverse media
injuries coverage
loss exceedance)
Major effect (severe ,

Major damage (GBP£ National impact
Major
Single or few fatalities damage resulting in
4 (<5). Many injuries
1.0–10M and partial
permanent effect /
(extensive adverse
IMPACT (On & Offsite)
operation loss media)

exceedance)
Localised damage Moderate effect
Severe
Considerable impact
Single or few serious
3 injuries
(GBP£ 0.1–1.0M and (recoverable (region / state / public
part shutdown environmental loss) / media)
Significant
Minor damage (GBP£ Minor or Localised
Limited impact (local
2 Loss time incident 10–100k and brief effect (temporary
public / media)
disruption) containment)
Slight damage (GBP£
Minor
Slight effect (within Slight impact (public
1 Minor injury 10k and no operational
fence, no exceedance) awareness)
disruption)
Key: Risk Category Required Response
HIGH - Intolerable Risk reduction is mandatory
ALARP shall be demonstrated and

Tolerable if ALARP
documented
Maintain systematic controls and

Tolerable
aim to continuously improve
Maintain systematic controls and

Low
monitor
12/10/2009
APPENDIX E - FEEDBACK FORM
FEEDBACK FORM
This form should be used to notify comment or suggestions for improvement, relating to any aspect of the document
identified below. Please return the completed form by Email, to the Technical Authority/Document Custodian identified in
the associated Document Information Sheet.
Document title: Document No:
Technical Standard / Operating Standard BGA-
Issue No:
Issue Date:
Comments by: Date: …………………………
Name: ……………………………………………….. Email address / Contact Tel.No: …………………………
Position: ………………………………………….. Project / Business Unit: …………………………..
Page / Section No: Comment
12/10/2009

BGA-HSSE-SAF-ST-1526 Safety Case Rev 02

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BG Standard

Value Assurance Framework (VAF)

DOCUMENT INFORMATION SHEET

Purpose and Scope:

Signature: Position: Principal Safety Engineer

Name: Rebecca Walters Date: 8th October 2009

Approval: Head of Function

Signature: Position: Head of Asset Integrity

Name: Mark Nishapati Date:

Approval and Issue record:

Issue Description Author Approved

Issue No. Description of Revision

1.1 Purpose and Scope

Stage : Create Assess Select Define Execute Operate Decommission

In this document, the following definitions apply:

CONTRACTOR The person, firm or company undertaking to supply services plant, or

PERFORMANCE A measurable description, usually in qualitative and quantitative terms, of the

AGM Asset General Manager

2.1 Safety Case for Major Hazard Facilities

Safety Cases shall address all periods of non-normal operation which:

 create new Major Accident Hazards or Environmental Events;

2.2 Safety Case Content

The Safety Case shall provide documentary evidence to demonstrate that:

2.2.1 Structure of Safety Case

2.3 Risk Assessment

2.4 Maintenance of the Safety Case

2.6 Consultation and Communication

 the applicable hazards;

Figure 1 – Safety Case Process Flowchart

Examples of making the

List all Barriers

APPENDIX A - LIST OF REFERENCED / ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

APPENDIX B – PARTICULARS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SAFETY CASE

a) the facility's health, safety and environmental management arrangements;

3. Facility / Asset Description;

o Environmental conditions and design criteria;

Within the description particular focus shall be provided on:

4. Safety Management System;

o Company Policies, Processes and Standards;

o The arrangements for co-ordinating the management systems;

o The plant likely to be used during any combined operation; and

5. Control of Major Accident Hazards

It shall contain as a minimum the following information:

o Description and assessment of the effectiveness of all Emergency Response

6. Justification for Continued Safe Operation

o A summary description of the major accident hazards identified including potential

o A summary description of the Barriers in place and/or proposed to manage each

o A summary of risk prevention and mitigation measures (hardware, software or

o A statement of justification for bringing the facility into operation, or continuing in

o An agreed Action Plan which lists improvements to be implemented to management

APPENDIX C – QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

2.1 Level of Detail in the QRA

2.2 Coarse QRA

2.3 Detailed QRA

2.4 Study Boundaries

For offshore installations the QRA shall include;

3.0 Performing the QRA

Define study boundaries

Carry out Hazard

Evaluate frequency of Evaluate consequence of

Risk summation and

Risk reduction measures Has risk been Risk reduction measures

Prepare formal ALARP

Figure 2: Outline QRA Methodology