PR-2352 - Greater Birba Emergency Response Plan

Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.
Critical Sour South Emergency Response Plan
Document ID PR-2352
Document Type Procedure
Security Restricted
Discipline Engineering & Operations
Owner OSGO – Sour Operations Manager
Issue Date June 2023
Version 3.0
Keywords: Emergency Response

This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any
part of this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or
otherwise) without prior written consent of the owner.
Petroleum Development Oman LLC Revision: 03
Effective: June 2023
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Page | 2 Critical Sour South Emergency Response Plan

The controlled version of this CMF Document resides online in Livelink®. Printed copies are UNCONTROLLED.
i. Document Authorisation
Document Authorisation
Document Authority Document Custodian Document Controller
Sour Operation Manager GB DTL (OSGOH) GB Production Coordinator

(OSGO) Suleiman Al Riyami (OSGO1H)
Mubarak Maskari Saif Jahwari
Date:28/05/23 Date: 26/04/2023 Date:25/05/23
Document Signatory Document Custodian Document Controller
Corporate Emergency RHIP DTL (OSGOR) RHIP Production Coordinator

Response Coordinator (UIC4) Ahmed Ajmi (OSGO1R)
Sulieman Fraish Ahmed Ali Al Mandhari
Date: 25/04/2023 Date:26/05/23 Date:26/04/23

ii. Revision History

The following is a summary of the 4 most recent revisions to this document. Details of all
revisions prior to these are held on file by the issuing department.
VERSION
DATE AUTHOR SCOPE / REMARKS
NO.
Update of the document to include RHIP to
Lesley Tallentire form a consistent approach to ER and to
3.0 23/05/2023
(MSE47) take onboard specialist advice from Shell
SMEs.
2.0 04/11/2021 Lesley Tallentire Update of the document to take account of
(MSE47) the operational changes due to the
implementation of the IIOC Project –
Control Room Operators are remote from
site, and changes in the station manning.
Note: It is planned to incorporate RHIP in
the next revision once IOC is implemented.
1.0 16/07/2019 Ho Wan Jye Existing Contingency Plans for Birba
(MSE47) Gathering Station (PR-2047), Al Noor
Production Station (PR-2112) and Harweel
Karunakar Sandha Main Production Station (PR-2017) have
(UEFH7) been combined in order to standardise and
harmonise overall Greater Birba (GB)
Emergency Responses. This document
also reflects the outcome of the GB
Emergency Response Review workshops
conducted in 2018 & 2019.
Note: Rabab Harweel Integrated Project

Emergency Response procedure will be
incorporated in the next revision of this
procedure (after completion of P2A).
iii. Related Business Processes
CODE BUSINESS PROCESS (EPBM 4.0)

iv. Related Corporate Management Framework (CMF)

Documents
The related CMF Documents can be retrieved from the Corporate Business Control
Documentation Register CMF.
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REFERENCE

API Recommended Practice 55, Recommended
International Practice for Oil and Gas Producing and Gas
API RP 55
Standard Processing Plant Operations Involving Hydrogen
Sulfide Second Edition, March 2013
Code of
Emergency Response Document Part I CP-123
Practice
Guideline Emergency Response Part IV, ER Guidelines GU-288
Plan Well Control Contingency Plan GU-576
Policy Security and Emergency Response PL-10
Procedure Emergency Response Document part II, PR-1065
Emergency Response Document part III,

Procedure PR-1066
Contingency Plan, Vol. 3 Production Operations
E R. Document(s) Part III, Contingency Plan Vol. 4:
Procedure PR-1067
Main Oil Line
Emergency Response Document Part III,
Procedure PR-1275
Contingency Plan vol. 15, South Oman Gas Line
E R Document: Part III Contingency Plan: Vol. 2:
Procedure PR-1287
Well Engineering
Plan National Oil Spill contingency plan (NOSCP)

v. ABBREVIATIONS
GLOSSARY OF TERMS & ABBREVIATIONS

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable ISBL Inside Battery Limits
ANPS Al Noor Production Station IT Intervention Team
API American Petroleum Institute KPI Key Performance Indicator
BA Breathing Apparatus LCR Local Control Room
BASC Breathing Air Supplementary Cylinders LEL Lower Explosive Limit
BGS Birba Gathering Station LEO Local Emergency Operator
BGU Break Glass Unit LEBC Local Emergency Base Controller
CECC Corporate Emergency Coordination Centre LECC Local Emergency Control Centre
CCR Central Control Room LSR Life Saving Rules
CCTV Closed Circuit Television MAF Mina Al Fahal
CRO Control Room Operator MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation

CSS Critical Sour South MC Muster Checker
Critical Sour South Emergency Telephone
CSS ETO MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet
Operator
CSS Critical Sour South Local Emergency Base
OSBL Outside Battery Limits
LEBC Controller
DD Duty Director OSC On Scene Commander
EDF Early Development Facility PAGA Public Address & General Alarm
EPZ Emergency Planning Zone PA Public Announcement
EER Escape Evacuation & Rescue PDO Petroleum Development Oman
Escape Muster Evacuate Rescue
EMERA POB Persons On Board
Assessment
ER Emergency Response PIP Pre-Incident Plan
ERP Emergency Response Plan PPE Personal Protective Equipment
ERT Emergency Response Team ppm parts per million
ESD Emergency Shutdown PSD Process Shutdown
ETO Emergency Telephone Operator PtW Permit to Work
F&G Fire & Gas RGMS Remote Gathering Manifold Station
F&RS Fire & Rescue Service RHIP Rabab Harweel Integrated Plant
FC Forward Controller RHPP Rabab Harweel Power Plant
HEMP Hazards & Effects Management Process RIM Remote Injection Manifold
HSSE Health, Safety, Security Environment ROP Royal Oman Police
H2S Hydrogen Sulphide RPE Respiratory Protective Equipment
HCS Harweel Compression Station RT Rescue Team
HCLS Harweel Cluster Station SAR Search And Rescue

GLOSSARY OF TERMS & ABBREVIATIONS

HMPS Harweel Main Production Station SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
HR Human Resources SHOC Safe Handling of Chemicals Card
IAP Immediate Action Plan SL Site Liaison
I&R Intervention & Rescue TSR Temporary Safe Refuge
IIOC Interim Integrated Operational Control UIC Corporate Security & ER Manager
IP Injured Party WETF Well Engineering Task Force

vi. Common Terminology in Critical Sour South

A list of Common terminology has been applied to Critical Sour South (CSS) Emergency
Response Strategy. It should be noted that Emergency Response Terms shall be used
immediately after imitating any emergency.
Table 1-1: Common Terminology in Great Birba

COMMON TERMINOLOGY DESCRIPTION
Emergency Response Team will manage the process area

Emergency Response Team
emergency. They are familiar with Critical Sour facilities.
(ERT)
ERT is led by Critical Sour On Scene Commander (OSC).
The Critical Sour OSC will be at the respective Mustering Area 1
(control room) during an emergency and will manage the Emergency
Critical Sour On Scene Response Team. The Critical Sour On Scene Commander receives
Commander (OSC)
special training to manage emergencies at the Critical Sour
Facilities.
Local Emergency Operator Local emergency response role, which is typically taken by the Senior
(LEO) CROs. They are located in the Control Room or IIOC.
Local Emergency Control Centre - this team supports the OSC,

CSS LECC
located at Harweel camp, led by the LEBC.
This is the initial assembly area where personnel shall go upon the
Mustering Area
alarm sounding.
Secondary Assembly Area This is an assembly area outside of the EPZ.
ISBL (Inside Battery Limit)

and OSBL (Outside Battery Also known as On-plot or Off-Plot.
Limit)
Intervention Team (IT) Team who are tasked with site rescue.
Plan/ checklist used by the LEBC and the OSC for emergency
Immediate Action Plan (IAP)
response.
Pre-Incident Plan (PIP) Plan used by the Fire & Rescue Team
Previously Contingency Plan or Emergency Response Procedure.

Emergency Response Plan
This document.
Inside any fenced area (Production Stations (including hydrocarbon
and non-hydrocarbon area), Remote Gathering Manifold Station
Process Area
(RGMS), Remote Injection Manifold (RIM) wellheads and Block Valve
Stations and all pipelines.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction........................................................................... 15
1.1 Facilities Overview .......................................................................... 15
2. Purpose ................................................................................. 17
3. Document Ownership and Maintenance............................. 18
3.1 Document Custodians and Signatories ........................................... 18
3.2 Document Authority ........................................................................ 18
3.3 Distribution and Target Audience .................................................... 18
3.4 Review and Improvement ............................................................... 18
3.5 Step-out and Approval .................................................................... 19
3.6 Hierarchy of Control ........................................................................ 19
4. Reference To PDO Associated Documents........................ 21
5. Response Priorities .............................................................. 22
6. Levels of Emergency and Transfer of Command .............. 23
6.1 Transfer of Command from LECC ................................................... 23
6.1.1 Extended Incident - Transfer of Command ................................................ 23
7. Emergency Response Team Mobilisation Protocol .......... 24
7.1 HMPS Emergency Response Boundaries ....................................... 24
7.2 BGS Emergency Response Boundaries ......................................... 24
7.3 ANPS Emergency Response Boundaries ....................................... 25
7.4 RHIP Emergency response Boundaries .......................................... 26
8. Emergency Team Structure ................................................. 27
8.1 Site Structure - Emergency Response Team (ERT) ........................ 27
8.2 LECC .............................................................................................. 28
8.3 CECC ............................................................................................. 28
8.4 Allocation of emergency duty roles ................................................. 29
8.4.1 HMPS......................................................................................................... 30
8.4.2 BGS and ANPS ......................................................................................... 30
8.4.3 RHIP .......................................................................................................... 31
9. Roles, Responsibilities and Minimum Requirements ....... 32
9.1 Critical Sour South Local Emergency Control Centre (CSS LECC) . 32
9.1.1 Critical Sour South Local Emergency Base Controller (LEBC) ................. 32
9.1.2 ERT Team.................................................................................................. 32
9.2 Role Minimum Competencies ......................................................... 36
9.2.1 OSC ........................................................................................................... 36
9.2.2 LEO1/ LEO2 .............................................................................................. 36
9.2.3 SL ............................................................................................................... 36
9.2.4 FC .............................................................................................................. 36
9.2.5 IT ................................................................................................................ 36
9.2.6 Muster Checker ......................................................................................... 36

9.2.7 Scribe ......................................................................................................... 36

10. ERP Incident Management Processes ................................ 37
10.1 Mitigation Actions Required When Exceeding Manning Levels (POB)
37
11. Communications Plan .......................................................... 38
12. Emergency Alarms, Muster Arrangements and Facility
Evacuation ........................................................................... 39
12.1 Emergency Alarms.......................................................................... 39
12.2 Muster Arrangements ..................................................................... 39
12.2.1 HMPS......................................................................................................... 39
12.2.2 BGS ........................................................................................................... 43
12.2.3 ANPS ......................................................................................................... 45
12.2.4 RHIP .......................................................................................................... 47
12.2.5 RHPP ......................................................................................................... 48
12.2.6 Facility Evacuation details ......................................................................... 48
12.2.7 Facility evacuation when the Shelter In Place (LCR) is compromised ...... 48
12.2.8 Camp ......................................................................................................... 49
12.3 Access Control during an Incident................................................... 49
12.4 Manage Local Community .............................................................. 49
12.5 Evacuation - Tiered Approach ......................................................... 50
13. MAH and Credible Scenarios............................................... 51
13.1 The Major Accident Hazards ........................................................... 51
13.2 Driving Emergencies ....................................................................... 51
13.3 Security Emergencies ..................................................................... 51
13.4 Summary Credible Scenarios ......................................................... 52
13.5 Scenarios not addressed within this ERP ........................................ 53
13.5.1 Missing Persons ........................................................................................ 53
13.5.2 Radiation Incidents .................................................................................... 53
13.5.3 Specialised Rescue ................................................................................... 53
13.5.4 Spill Management ...................................................................................... 53
14. General Response to Incident ............................................. 54
14.1 General Response to Incident ......................................................... 54
14.2 Guidance for IT access to the facilities ............................................ 54
14.3 Local Community / Nearby Community ........................................... 54
14.3.1 HMPS......................................................................................................... 54
14.3.2 BGS ........................................................................................................... 54
14.3.3 ANPS ......................................................................................................... 55
14.3.4 RHIP .......................................................................................................... 55
14.4 Medical Support .............................................................................. 55
14.4.1 First Aiders ................................................................................................. 55
14.4.2 Mobilising Ambulance ................................................................................ 56
14.4.3 Medical Equipment .................................................................................... 56
14.4.4 Treatment Facilities ................................................................................... 56

14.4.5 Hospitals and Specialised Medical Treatment ........................................... 56

14.4.6 Triage For Mass Casualties ....................................................................... 57
14.5 Fire & Rescue Services................................................................... 57
14.6 Holding Points for Ambulances, Fire & Rescue Services and other
responders ...................................................................................... 57
14.7 Technical Support and Contractors ................................................. 58
14.8 Notification and Activation ............................................................... 59
14.9 Fire & Rescue Response Strategy .................................................. 59
14.10 External Support Arrangements and Resources ............................. 59
15. Recovery ............................................................................... 60
16. Emergency Response Assurance ....................................... 61
16.1 ERT Training and Competency Requirements ................................ 61
16.2 Competency Maintenance .............................................................. 61
16.3 Emergency Plan Validation ............................................................. 61
16.4 Annual Skills Maintenance and Exercise Plan................................. 61
16.5 ER KPIs .......................................................................................... 61
16.5.1 Emergency Response Team ..................................................................... 61
16.5.2 Muster ........................................................................................................ 61
16.5.3 FC/IT .......................................................................................................... 61
16.6 Debriefs & Lessons Learned ........................................................... 61
16.7 ERP Review.................................................................................... 61
17. References ............................................................................ 62
APPENDIX 1 Communications .................................................................. 63
APPENDIX 2 CSS ER Training Requirements .......................................... 65
APPENDIX 3 Immediate Action Plans ....................................................... 67
A 3.0. List Of Immediate Action Plans ........................................... 69
A 3.1. ISBL - H2S Smell / Single Personal H2S detected............... 70
A 3.2. ISBL - Single H2S detection or multiple single from
different zones ..................................................................... 71
A 3.3. ISBL - Confirmed H2S detection .......................................... 73
A 3.4. ISBL - Confirmed H2S detection – ISBL is unattended –
Entry Required ..................................................................... 75
A 3.5. ISBL Fire Alarm Activation- controlled from Appropriate
Control Room ...................................................................... 77
A 3.6. ISBL - Fire Alarm Activation- not controlled from CR ....... 79
A 3.7. ISBL - Facility Buildings Fire - Excludes Control Room &
BA Buildings for HMPS/RHIP ............................................. 81
A 3.8. ISBL - Flare Flame Out ......................................................... 83
A 3.9. ISBL - Sweet Hydrocarbon LOPC (Fuel gas / export gas /
seal) ...................................................................................... 85
A 3.10. ISBL - Sweet Hydrocarbon LOPC – liquid .......................... 87
A 3.11. Chemicals LOPC – For all types of chemicals - ................. 89
A 3.12. OSBL - Confirmed H2S/Fire Alarm activation – daytime ... 91
A 3.13. OSBL - Confirmed H2S / Fire Alarm activation - night-time
93
A 3.14. Non-Process Related Fire in industrial and non-industrial

areas ..................................................................................... 95
A 3.15. Medical Emergencies (A & B) .............................................. 97
A 3.16. Severe Weather..................................................................... 99
A 3.17. Road Traffic Accident ........................................................ 100
A 3.18. Communication Failure ...................................................... 102
A 3.19. Un-availability of Personnel – Pandemics, weather, mass
food poisoning etc. ........................................................... 104
A 3.20. H2S / Fire Alarm Activation (ISBL; Controlled by Third
Party) .................................................................................. 105
A 3.21. H2S / Fire Alarm Activation (OSBL) – Wellhead, where well
goes over third-party facility ............................................ 106
A 3.22. RHPP Fire ............................................................................ 108
A 3.23. IAP For Re-Entry ................................................................. 110
A 3.24. Second party well and exploration directorates .............. 112
APPENDIX 4 CHEMICAL HAZARD LIST & SPILL KITS .......................... 114
APPENDIX 5 GENERAL / SNATCH RESCUE TECHNIQUE .................... 125
APPENDIX 6 TIME-OUT AGENDA TEMPLATE ....................................... 127
APPENDIX 7 IT PRESSURE MONITORING PROTOCOL ........................ 128
APPENDIX 8 FORWARD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST............................ 129
APPENDIX 9 MASS CASUALTY TRIAGE ................................................ 130
APPENDIX 10 IT HAZARD AREA ENTRY LIMITS ................................. 131
APPENDIX 11 TAYSEER ERP ................................................................ 132
APPENDIX 12 Severe Weather Checklist.............................................. 133
APPENDIX 13 Safety Equipment Layout- HMPS .................................. 142
APPENDIX 14 Safety Equipment Layout- BGS .................................... 149
APPENDIX 15 Safety Equipment Layout- ANPS .................................. 152
APPENDIX 16 Safety Equipment Layout- RHIP .................................... 156

List of Figures
Figure 1-1 Critical Sour South Emergency Planning Zone (2023) ........................................... 15
Figure 4-1 Corporate ER Document Structure ......................................................................... 21
Figure 7-1: GB Emergency Response Boundary Map for Harweel – Marmul ......................... 24
Figure 7-2: GB Emergency Response Boundary Map for Birba- Marmul ................................ 24
Figure 7-3: GB Emergency Response Boundary Map for Al Noor- Nimr................................. 25
Figure 7-4: RHIP Emergency Response Boundary Map for RHIP (current 2023) ................... 26
Figure 8-1 Site ERT Structure .................................................................................................. 27
Figure 8-2 Interior LECC Team Structure ................................................................................ 28
Figure 8-3 ERT & LECC Coordination ..................................................................................... 28
Figure 8-4 CECC Team Structure ............................................................................................ 28
Figure 12-1: HMPS – Mustering Areas .................................................................................... 39
Figure 12-2: Routes from Industrial area to Alternative Mustering Area / Alpha (Mustering Area
4) .............................................................................................................................................. 40
Figure 12-3: Evacuation routes from HMPS ............................................................................ 40
Figure 12-4: Assembly area at Harweel Camp (Secondary Assembly Area for HMPS & RHIP)
.................................................................................................................................................. 41
Figure 12-5: Escape Route for Harweel Compression Station (HCS) personnel .................... 41
Figure 12-6: Escape Route for building fire at Harweel Compression Station (HCS) ..... 42
Figure 12-7: Birba Gathering Station (BGS) – Mustering Areas .............................................. 43
Figure 12-8: Evacuation routes for BGS Gathering Station (BGS) .......................................... 44
Figure 12-9: Assembly areas at Marmul camp (Secondary Assembly Area for BGS) ............ 44
Figure 12-10: Al Noor Production Station (ANPS) – Mustering Areas ..................................... 45
Figure 12-11: Evacuation routes for Al Noor Production Station (ANPS) ................................ 46
Figure 12-12: Assembly Areas at Amal camp (Secondary assembly area for Al Noor) .......... 46
Figure 12-13: Assembly Areas at RHIP ................................................................................... 47
Figure 12-14: Evacuation routes from RHIP ............................................................................ 48
Figure 12-15 Assembly Areas at Harweel Camp ..................................................................... 49
Figure 14-1 General Response to Incident .............................................................................. 54
Figure 14-2 HMPS and RHIP Emergency Services Holding Point .......................................... 57
Figure 14-3 Birba Emergency Services Holding Point ............................................................. 58
Figure 14-4 ANPS Emergency Services Holding Point............................................................ 58

List of Tables
Table 1-1: Common Terminology in Great Birba ....................................................................... 8

Table 8-1: Baseline Manning for HMPS ERT ........................................................................... 30
Table 8-2: Baseline Manning for BGS & ANPS ERT ............................................................... 30
Table 8-3: Baseline Manning for RHIP ERT ............................................................................ 31
Table 12-1 Drill Mustering Locations ........................................................................................ 50
Table 13-1 Credible Scenarios ................................................................................................. 52
Table 14-1 Minimum numbers of First Aiders .......................................................................... 55
Table 14-2 Ambulance Transfer Times .................................................................................... 56
Table 14-3: Medical Support at CSS ........................................................................................ 56
Table 14-4: Fire Support at CSS .............................................................................................. 57

1. INTRODUCTION
This document forms the Critical Sour South Emergency Response Plan (ERP); it serves:
• Harweel Main Production Station (HMPS),

• Birba Gathering Station (BGS),
• Al-Noor Production Station (ANPS) and.
• Rabab Harweel Integrated Plant (RHIP).
The plan focuses on emergency response including Escape, Evacuation and Rescue (EER)
requirements for the facilities during emergency situations and aligns with API RP 55 (Ref 1) in
terms of purpose and content. To note, the document reflects the high-level requirements of Part
III (Ref 2) and Part IV (Ref 3) of the PDO Corporate Emergency Response procedures, but in
particular builds on the expected, immediate site-specific response to credible emergency
scenarios.
This document assumes transition to IIOC.
1.1 Facilities Overview
All Critical Sour South (CSS) facilities create an EPZ (Figure 1-1). The latest can be found on
PDO Earth.
Figure 1-1 Critical Sour South Emergency Planning Zone (2023)
An Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is a geographical area that surrounds a well, pipeline, or
facility containing hazardous product that requires specific emergency response planning. It
defines the extent of the H2S hazard to 100 ppm in air, assuming a worst-case release. EPZs are
measured typically in kilometers.

The EPZ for sour gas wells, pipelines, or facilities is determined through dispersion modelling and
calculations in the ERCBH2S tool, using worst-release scenarios with average dispersion
conditions for a major release of sour gas. The CSS EPZ consists of the following areas and can
be found as a ‘Administrative Layer’ in PDO Earth:
• Harweel (including RHIP) EPZ

• Dhahaban EPZ
• Birba EPZ
• Budour EPZ
• Al Noor EPZ
• Tayseer EPZ
• Harweel Birba pipeline EPZ
• Birba Al Noor Pipeline EPZ
The presence of the public population within EPZ is understood and managed by Community
Relations officers. Contact details of those non-associated persons within the EPZ to be sought &
maintained by Community Relation (EVC) department - Community Development Coordinator –
South (EVCS).

2. PURPOSE
This Emergency Response Plan details credible Major Accident Hazards (MAH) for the Critical
Sour South Facilities and outlines the Immediate Action Plans (IAP) for each of the credible
scenarios identified during the HEMP process for the facilities. Major Accident Hazards discussed
in this document are taken from the Operations HSE Cases, and additional IAPs included as
identified at the CSS ERP Workshop and drills held at the sites in September 2022.
This plan outlines the key information and actions to effectively manage any credible emergency
situation on the CSS facilities including defining emergency roles and responsibilities and details
specific response actions to be implemented.
The objectives of this plan are to:
• Ensure safety of people, minimise impact to the environment, protect assets and
facilitate a safe return to normal operations.
• Create an organisational framework to deliver a swift and effective response in an
emergency.
• Coordinate decision making and effective use of available personnel and
resources during an emergency.
• Provide an integrated clear action plan during emergencies.
• Establish clear lines of authority and communication both internally and with
external agencies during an emergency.
• Identify the required coordination of emergency operations with external
responding agencies.
• Define assurance processes to maintain emergency team capability to manage
emergencies effectively.
The response elements of this plan will be enacted for any emergency situation that is unable to
be controlled safely with the implementation of CSS facilities normal standing operational
procedures.

3. DOCUMENT OWNERSHIP AND MAINTENANCE

3.1 Document Custodians and Signatories
The custodians of this Contingency Plan are the Delivery Team Leaders, OSGOH for Greater Bibra
and OSGOR for RHIP aspects. They shall:
• Approve the document following review and revision.
• Ensure that the document is ‘Fit for Purpose’, defines the organisation and identifies
resources to enable PDO to adequately respond to the identified scenarios.
The signatory of this Emergency Response Plan is the Corporate Emergency Response
Coordinator UIC4.
3.2 Document Authority
The Document Authority is the Sour Operation Manager (OSGO) who shall:
• Ensure that this plan is reviewed and revised every 4 years and whenever there are
significant changes to the asset risks, and
• Ensure that a current version is available on ‘CMS’ and hard copy versions of this
document are maintained and distributed.
3.3 Distribution and Target Audience
This document is intended for use by personnel who are involved in the emergency response for
the CSS Facilities and the PDO emergency response organisation.
This document will be used as a prompt for all future ER training for the CSS Facilities for all existing
and new personnel, including contractors. It is the responsibility of all personnel involved in the
operation of the CSS Facilities to be familiar with its contents.
This document, including the AIPs in APPENDIX 3,is available on CMS with hard copies provided
to:
• CECC
• Greater Birba LECC
• Corporate Emergency Response (UIC/4)
• ERT at HMPS/ BGS/ ANPS and RHIP
• IIOC at Harweel Camp
• IOC at Mina Al Fahal (when completed)
• PDO Fire & Rescue Service
3.4 Review and Improvement
This ERP is a ‘live document’ and shall be updated periodically, every 4 years or specifically in the
following circumstances:
• As part of any significant changes to the facilities, operations or surrounding

environment that may have a potential impact on the risk profile.
• Prior to any material changes to the organisational arrangements or increased levels
of personnel attendance (for example during major construction or turnarounds/
shutdowns).
• Following a major incident involving the operation, or from lateral learning from other
major incidents applicable to the facilities.
• As part of PSBR10 compliance, emergency response reviews shall be repeated every
6 years or whenever there is a substantial change to the risks covered by the previous
review. Emergency resources are verified to be adequate to manage the Incident
scenarios developed as part of the emergency response review. Note: PDO prefer to
update every 4 years for CSS.

3.5 Step-out and Approval
This procedure is mandatory and shall be complied with at all times during the operation of the
CSS Facilities (BGS, ANPS, HMPS and RHIP).
In the event that compliance with the procedure is not practicable, step out authorisation and
approval must be obtained in accordance with PR-1001e – Operations Procedure Temporary
Variance (Ref 5).
3.6 Hierarchy of Control
In emergency situations, there can be occasions where regular controls cannot be applied. In
this case an alternative process to manage safety risks during emergencies and to ensure
alternative barriers are in place can be established.
To ensure that the situation is managed the following hierarchy of control shall be applied:
Hierarchy
elements:
First: • Eliminate the risk and/or follow existing HSSE process (e.g., emergency
response vehicles complying with LSRs).
• Where regular HSSE controls do not impede the effectiveness of the
emergency response they should be observed.
Second: • Apply engineering controls to reduce risk (e.g., SCBA, portable gas
monitors, remote valves to isolate product pipelines, water fog systems).
Third: • Consider, in advance, and document situations where regular safety
controls may adversely affect the outcome of the emergency response
operation.
• Consider alternative controls that will ensure the safety of responders and
mitigate risk to ALARP and include these controls in the ERP (e.g. An
incident management system is in use adds additional controls where PtW
may not be required during an emergency, such as entering a confined
space without a PtW when using SCBA to protect against potential
environmental hazards)
Fourth: • As soon as practical (as immediately as possible), the LEBC/OSC must
identify an HSE Advisor (Scribe 2).
• The LEBC/OSC, in consultation with the HSE Advisor (Scribe 2), should
conduct a dynamic risk assessment to ensure awareness on risk and
application of alternative controls.
• The LEBC/OSC can make decisions to mitigate the consequences without
being restricted by controls that impact the effectiveness of the ER process
only in those times that the HSE Advisor (Scribe 2) agrees with the
decision.
• Document risk considerations and decisions to verify availability for after
action review.
The emergency event may be impacted if controls cannot be met and/or might restrict the ER
operation. This could cause delays in response and subsequently cause further harm to people,
environment, asset, and reputation. If the Dynamic Risk Assessment is not effective this could
result in harm to the emergency responders.
Example of a situation in which the LEBC/OSC and the HSE Advisor (Scribe 2) might make
alternative decisions:

• Temporarily relaxing the work/rest requirements for the rescue team during a
search of a missing person who has been located and is being rescued in a
potentially toxic environment.

4. REFERENCE TO PDO ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
This document is structured to provide details of the emergency response arrangements and
facilities available at CSS Facilities; HMPS, BGS, ANPS and RHIP. This document provides IAPs
for identified credible emergency scenarios.
The aim of the AIP is to provide structured guidance for use in emergency response incidents at
the facilities and the camp. This document supports GU 288 ER Part IV (Ref 3).
Figure 4-1 illustrates the Corporate Emergency Response document structure including this
Contingency Plan (in red). Critical
Sour South ERP
PR-2352
Figure 4-1 Corporate ER Document Structure
In principle, PDO shall provide emergency services within the concession areas for incidents
involving PDO personnel, contractors and where possible, assist third parties and cooperate with
external emergency services. Outside of the concession areas, PDO may be requested to provide
emergency support services to external emergency services or as part of Mutual Aid Agreement in
the event of an incident in the vicinity of its operations. However, PDO should not assume
responsibility or liability for failure to act or respond to an emergency outside of the concession
areas.

5. RESPONSE PRIORITIES
The prime objective of PDO in emergency response is to ensure that activities are carried out to
comply with the following order of priorities:
• Safeguard lives and avoiding injury to PEOPLE : (P)

• Protect the ENVIRONMENT : (E)
• Limiting Damage to ASSETS : (A)
• Preserving PDO’s REPUTATION : (R)
Personnel involved in dealing with an emergency shall apply these priorities when making decisions
and developing action plans. It is PDO’s Policy to manage emergencies in all its activities and
where possible, assist third parties and cooperate with external emergency services. This
document serves several objectives that relate to the operation of the CSS facilities, as follows:
• To outline the expected ER approach and to provide Immediate Action Plans (IAP) for
each of the credible emergency scenarios identified for the asset.
• To specify roles and responsibilities for the initial management of emergency
situations.
• To ensure a robust and consistent approach to ER in the CSS area.

6. LEVELS OF EMERGENCY AND TRANSFER OF COMMAND

6.1 Transfer of Command from LECC
Command will remain with the LEBC and LECC Team until either:
• Command from the impacted facility becomes untenable, in which case the LEBC will
formally transfer command to the CECC or
• The incident increases in size or complexity.
As part of the transfer process, the LEBC and the LECC team will request completion of a formal
transfer of command and appropriate incident response planning documentation to ensure
continuity of command. Documentation, as a minimum shall include:
• Copy of the incident log (electronic).
• Situation status summary.
• Current organisation structure.
6.1.1 Extended Incident - Transfer of Command

The same structure above applies and each role within the emergency command structure,
(LEBC, FC etc.) shall fully brief their replacement.

7. EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM MOBILISATION PROTOCOL

7.1 HMPS Emergency Response Boundaries
The agreed ER boundary between CSS LEBC and Marmul LEBC is the Wadi Arah T- junction. If
the emergency occurs North of intersection of Wadi Arah T- junction, it will be managed by Marmul
LEBC and supported by CSS LEBC (if required).
Figure 7-1 indicates location of the emergency boundary for Harweel and Marmul.
Figure 7-1: GB Emergency Response Boundary Map for Harweel – Marmul
7.2 BGS Emergency Response Boundaries
The agreed ER boundary between CSS LEBC and Marmul LEBC is NASIR-1 (located just South
of Birba EPZ signboard, about 13 KM from the main Marmul Nimr road. If an emergency occurs
South of Birba EPZ signboard (nearby NASIR-1, it will be managed by Marmul LEBC and supported
by CSS LEBC (if required).
Figure 7-2 indicates location of the emergency boundary for Birba and Marmul
Figure 7-2: GB Emergency Response Boundary Map for Birba- Marmul

7.3 ANPS Emergency Response Boundaries
The agreed ER boundaries between CSS LEBC and Nimr LEBC, is the Al Noor EPZ signboards
(Approximately 32.2 KM from the main road Al Noor T-junction between Al Noor and Nimr). If an
emergency occurs before Al Noor EPZ signboard, it will be managed by Nimr LEBC and supported
by CSS LEBC (if required).
Figure 7-3 indicates location of the emergency boundary for Al Noor and Nimr.
Figure 7-3: GB Emergency Response Boundary Map for Al Noor- Nimr

7.4 RHIP Emergency response Boundaries
RHIP ERT will attend any emergency from their facility and any associated OSBL infrastructure,
which is located around RHIP. The numbers of production and injection wells will change over
time, however the sketch below provides the 2023 situation.
Figure 7-4: RHIP Emergency Response Boundary Map for RHIP (current 2023)

8. EMERGENCY TEAM STRUCTURE

The existing PDO Corporate Emergency Response procedures are well defined. PDO has an
established chain of command with several Local Emergency Control Centre’s (LECC), which can
call on the CECC for further support if required.
The CSS facilities have established a command structure at site level; ERT, to ensure effective
emergency response due to the significant H2S hazards at the facilities. This section details the
structure of the ERT, LECC and the CECC.
8.1 Site Structure - Emergency Response Team (ERT)
In CSS, the Emergency Response Team consists of the following main emergency response roles.
• On Scene Commander (OSC) (Leading ERT)

• Local Emergency Operator (LEO1&2)
• Site Liaison (SL)
• Scribe
• Muster Checker (MC)
• Forward Controller (FC)
• Intervention team (IT)
Figure 8-1 Site ERT Structure

Note: The LEOs will support the ERT via communications link from the IIOC and are not present at the incident facility.
BGS and ANPS only have 1 LEO.
All ERT roles are known in advance, as a manual board is provided at the facilities and checked
daily.

8.2 LECC
The corporate LECC structure is followed for the CSS LECC (PR-1065).
Figure 8-2 Interior LECC Team Structure
The interfaces between the ERT and the LECC are managed as per Figure 8-3.
Figure 8-3 ERT & LECC Coordination

8.3 CECC
The team structure of the Corporate Emergency Coordination Centre (CECC) is shown below, as
per PR-1065:
Figure 8-4 CECC Team Structure

8.4 Allocation of emergency duty roles

To manage an emergency at the CSS facilities, there are minimum manning requirements for the
ERT. These manning levels take account of the CROs being located at the IIOC.
It should be noted that in some of the baseline situations for ANPS and BGS, the effectiveness of
the emergency response will be reduced by the requirement to merge several ERT roles into one
individual on seat.
If the numbers of personnel on site go below the threshold Baseline Manning Limits (noted
in Table 8-1, Table 8-2 and Table 8-3) the facility has no rescue capability and as such all external
activities within the facility are not allowed (e.g. no maintenance/project activity / operators rounds,
ISBL &OSBL activity).

8.4.1 HMPS
To respond effectively during an emergency, ERT team baseline manning is 11 personnel at site
and 2 in the IIOC, as per Table 2 below:
Table 8-1: Baseline Manning for HMPS ERT
NUMBER OF
ER ROLE JOB POSITION
PERSONNEL
LOCATED AT FACILITY
On Scene Commander (OSC) 1 Production Supervisor
Production Team /
Site Liaison (SL) 1
Maintenance Team
Production Team /
Scribe 1
Maintenance Team
Production Team /
Muster Checker (MC) 1
Maintenance Team
Production Team /
Forward Controller (FC) 1
Maintenance Team
Production Team /
Intervention Team (IT) 6
Maintenance Team
Total at Facility: 11
LOCATED AT THE IIOC
Control Room Operator (CRO 1) /
Local Emergency Operator (LEO 1) 1 GB Emergency Telephone Operator
(GB ETO)
Local Emergency Operator (LEO 2) 1 Control Room Operator (CRO 2)
TOTAL 13
8.4.2 BGS and ANPS
During manned operation, ERT Baseline Manning is 8 personnel at site and 1 in the IIOC, as per
Table 4 below.
Table 8-2: Baseline Manning for BGS & ANPS ERT
NUMBER OF
PERSONNEL
LOCATED AT FACILITY
On Scene Commander (OSC) 1 Production Supervisor*
Production Team /
Site Liaison (SL) & Scribe 1
Maintenance Team
Production Team /
Maintenance Team
Production Team /
Muster Checker (MC) 1
Maintenance Team
Production Team /
Intervention Team (IT) 4 Maintenance Team /
Contractors
Total at Facility: 8
LOCATED AT THE IIOC
Local Emergency Operator (LEO) 1 Control Room Operator (CRO)
TOTAL 9
* In the absence of the Production Supervisor an OSC trained operator shall always be available.

8.4.3 RHIP
To respond effectively during an emergency, ERT team baseline manning is 13 personnel at site,
as per Table 2 below:
Table 8-3: Baseline Manning for RHIP ERT
NUMBER OF
PERSONNEL
On Scene Commander (OSC) 1 Production Supervisor
Site Liaison (SL) 1 Control Room Operator (CRO 5)
Scribe 1 Control Room Operator (CRO 3)
Muster Checker (MC) 1 Control Room Operator (CRO 4)
Production Team /
Maintenance Team
Production Team /
Intervention Team (IT) 6
Maintenance Team
TOTAL 13
Note: There is no IIOC Operation of RHIP.

9. ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

9.1 Critical Sour South Local Emergency Control Centre (CSS LECC)
CSS LECC Team supports the LEBC in managing the response to an emergency that occurs within
the cluster area (including the EPZs), by controlling the emergency response from its fully
provisioned control centre, which is located at the main office of the Harweel Camp.
Roles and responsibilities for the LECC members are addressed in PR-1065 (Emergency
Response Documents Part II: Company Procedure) and should be referred.
The following sections define responsibilities over and above those noted in PR-1065.
LECC responsibilities in responding to emergencies are within defined geographical boundaries.

For more details, the emergency boundaries can be found in Section 7 of this document.
9.1.1 Critical Sour South Local Emergency Base Controller (LEBC)
The LEBC is in overall command and control of the EPZ during an emergency and achieves this
by leading and coordinating the actions of the LECC Team. The LEBC role is to manage the actions
taken during the emergency to safeguard personnel, the environment and property.
LEBC’s responsibilities over and above PR-1065 are:
• Confirm LECC are present and prepared to respond.

• For process area emergency, confirm an OSC and the full ERT present at the facility.
• Confirm establishment and functionality of ERT.
• Approver for the tactical plan for IT Entry.
• Agree the arrangements for standing down from an emergency with the DD (if
involved), OSC, and LECC, and authorise the implementation of those arrangements.
• Ensure that the ERT and LECC minimise the use of acronyms and state full names of
locations.
9.1.2 ERT Team
In CSS, the Emergency Response Team (ERT) consists of the following main ER roles.
• Critical Sour On Scene Commander (OSC, Leading ERT)

• Local Emergency Operator (LEO 1) [IIOC]
• Local Emergency Operator (LEO 2) (HMPS & RHIP only) [IIOC]
• Site Liaison (SL)
• Forward Controller (FC)
• Intervention team (IT)
• Muster Checker (MC)
• Scribe
Note: For HMPS, BGS & ANPS the LEO1 (and LEO2 where appropriate), will support the ERT via
communications link from the IIOC, and are not present at the incident facility.
All ER roles are known in advance, as a board is provided at the facilities which is checked daily.
All ERT personnel are expected to respond to the incident in accordance with the agreed strategy
and tactics relevant to specific scenario.

All ERT shall minimise the use of abbreviations during an emergency, and always state full
names of locations to ensure the same location is understood between the ERT and the LECC.
9.1.2.1 Critical Sour On Scene Commander (OSC)
For all process area emergencies, the OSC will lead the ERT and is directly in charge of the site-
specific emergency response. The OSC has responsibility for the safety of the IT and all other
personnel at or near to the process incident site.
In addition to the responsibilities defined in PR-1065, the OSC’s shall:
• Initiate evacuation of the area as required, if not already underway.

• Ensure effective, efficient and prompt accounting of all personnel on the affected process
facility and utilise Immediate Action Plans (IAP) to manage the emergency.
• Lead ERT during process area emergency.
• Ensure that all emergency roles in ERT are filled by competent persons.
• Conduct a weekly check that the emergency vehicle & resources/ tools (e.g., BA, multi-gas
detector, stationary, emergency light, radio, Thuraya etc.) required for ERT are readily
available.
• Ensure that the IT are dispatched fully prepared based on the outcomes of the dynamic
risk assessment.
• Establish communication with LECC and update regularly.
• Assess the need for external resources (equipment and personnel) for the incident site and
advise the LECC.
• Ensure a record is kept of the incident, and the response actions taken, for future learning
purposes, via the scribe.
• Gives orders to evacuate the facility if necessary.
• Conducts critical debrief after all events and drills and seeks to identify learnings.
• Initiate time-out when required.
• Responsible for completing a recovery plan for the re-entry, incident standdown and facility
restart.
9.1.2.2 Local Emergency Operator 1 (LEO1) (Based at IIOC)
The CRO1 is the LEO1 and will take the ER roles of process control and is also the Emergency
Telephone Operator (ETO) for HMPS only.
The LEO1 is fully empowered to initiate an emergency shutdown of the facility if they consider
people and/or plant are at risk. In addition to the responsibilities defined in PR-1065, the LEO1
shall:
• Execute the actions as per the ERP/IAPs.

• On initiation of the alarm, where PA is available make the initial public announcement to
provide a warning and instruction to personnel.
• Ensure that the automatic emergency shutdown system has activated or initiate manually.
• Inform and update OSC of any changes in the emergency, (plant status and weather
monitoring).
9.1.2.3 Local Emergency Operator (LEO2) (does not apply for ANPS & BGS)
The CRO 2 is the LEO2 and will take the following responsibilities:
• CCTV monitoring (where available)

• Backup CSS ETO, as per corporate ERP.

• LEO2 is the assistant for the LEO1.
There is a LEO1 and LEO2 for HMPS, located at the IIOC, and for RHIP at the station LCR.
9.1.2.4 Site Liaison
The role of the Site Liaison is to provide a single dedicated line of communication for ERT during
emergencies.
Site Liaison is responsible to:

• Manage communication, and information transfer with all stakeholders as necessary (e.g.,
OSC, Medical team, Muster Checker and LEO).
• Provide Chemical SHOC information to the OSC.
• Provide details of Temporary Equipment (pressurised cylinder) Register.
• Attempt to establish the location of missing personnel.
• Remind/ notify OSC for time-out as needed based on the status of incident.
9.1.2.5 Forward Controller (FC)
The role of FC is to manage the IT. They are responsible for:

• Ensure that the IT are using correct emergency equipment and PPE.
• Lead the IT and conduct the 360° survey at the incident location.
• Provide a visual assessment of the incident from a safe distance to the OSC. Detail the
scale of the incident, likely escalation and whether the incident is or can be contained.
• Establish direct communications with the OSC, as soon as possible.
• Coordinate the actions of the IT, Medical and Fire & Rescue Service on scene in containing
and controlling the incident.
• Inform the OSC on regular basis of the need for additional response equipment and
personnel.
• Monitor air consumption of personnel when responding to an incident when under
breathing air and keep the muster checker informed.
• Monitor H2S, Hydrocarbon, LEL, Oxygen levels and responds accordingly. SO2 levels may
need to be checked
• Monitor the physical condition of the IT members.
• Pass the IT muster result to the OSC.
• Ensure IP are evacuated as required.
9.1.2.6 Intervention Team (IT)
In BGS and ANPS, the organisation of the rescue teams will be based on the knowledge of FC,
taking account of individuals strengths and weakness, rather than along company lines.
They are responsible for:

• Respond to the incident site as directed by the OSC.
• Inform the OSC of any information relevant to the incident situation and the emergency
response.
• Conduct the 360° survey at the incident location.
• Perform process isolation on scene with due regard to personal safety and the safety of
others, under command from OSC.
• Carry out the orders of the FC with due regard to personal safety and the safety of others.
• Carry out snatch and standard rescue activities in open ground area without specialised
rescue techniques.
• Upon return to the medical room perform basic first aid support to the affected personnel,
within the limits of their training.
9.1.2.7 Muster Checker
The Muster Checker is responsible for head counting for all ISBL evacuation.
The Muster Checker’s main responsibility is to attend the emergency at the designated area and is
responsible for:
• Perform head count for all Personnel on Board (POB) and subsequent evacuation when
instructed to do so by the OSC.
• Report the head count result to OSC.
• Manage mustering process at the designated area.
• Establish the number and names of missing personnel and advise the OSC.
• Attempt to establish the location of missing personnel.
• Mobilise additional stretcher parties and other assistance as requested by the OSC.
• Maintain the head count cards during emergency.
• Confirm head count after the IT returns.
• Guides personnel in case of further evacuation from any assembly point.
• Monitor the BA pressure, in conjunction with the FC.
• Further evacuate the IP as required.
9.1.2.8 Scribe
The Scribe shall maintain the record of the incident including the sequence of the events, and
critical information such as head count, command from OSC, etc.
The Scribe shall attend the emergency at designated area and is responsible for:
• Continuously record the incident status including the sequence of the events and critical
information.
• Provide status update during time out.

9.2 Role Minimum Competencies
This section defines the minimum competencies for those within the ER organisation. The
training requirements are defined in APPENDIX 2.
9.2.1 OSC
The minimum competencies shall be:
• Production Supervisor, acting Production Supervisor or OSC trained competent person.
• Minimum of 1 year experience in CSS.
9.2.2 LEO1/ LEO2

• Control Room Operator with minimum of 1yr experience in CSS.
• Station Operator with minimum of 1yr experience in CSS.
9.2.3 SL
• Communication skill and familiar with ER terms.
• Station operations / maintenance team with minimum of 1yr experience in CSS.
• Nominated by Production Supervisor.
9.2.4 FC
• Valid fitness test.
9.2.5 IT
• Station operations/ maintenance/ contractor team with minimum of 6 months experience in
CSS.
• Valid fitness test.
9.2.6 Muster Checker

• Communication skill and familiar with ER terminology.
• Station operations / maintenance team with minimum of 6 months experience in CSS.
9.2.7 Scribe
• Conversant with the ER board and ER terminology.

10. ERP INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
10.1 Mitigation Actions Required When Exceeding Manning Levels (POB)
This ERP is considered adequate up to Maximum POB as defined in Operations HSE Case.
If the maximum number of staff on site, also known as Personnel on Board (POB) is required to be
exceeded, an operation variance waiver shall be provided, accompanied by hazard identification
and risk assessment, permitting, to demonstrate that risks to the workforce are maintained at
ALARP levels. This is controlled by the PTW system and appropriate local supervision.
A baseline Escape, Muster, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EMERA) should be established
for the CSS facilities and reflected within the HSE Case POB. Any exceedance on POB for project
requirements shall require the project to conduct an update to the baseline EMERA study.
If the maximum POB is to be increased due to project personnel manning requirements, the impact
of such an increase shall be assessed by the project and approved by function. SIMOPS
requirements shall be agreed between the project, function and operations team, taking account of
the baseline EMERA and with mitigations (as below, if required), in place prior to the manning
increase. Pre-turnaround / shutdown activities shall comply with the requirements below, should
they increase the POB above the maximum limit.
Provision of increased supervision for both PDO and contractor for raising the POB to be discussed
in the ORA.
To exceed the maximum POB level the following mitigation measures are to be in place.
• Assess the need to prepare a project specific EMERA, and/or bridging document to
demonstrate effective emergency response.
• Increased supervison (PDO and Contractor) manning.
• Ensure all POB are equipped with the appropriate Working & Escape RPE.
• Adequately trained rescue personnel. Additional IT with rescue equipment should be
considered in the risk assessment.
• Appropriately located and prepared mustering area.
• Sufficient vehicles & seats for all POB to evacuate the area promptly.
• All personnel on site to undergo:
o Site induction.
o In-house escape set training /refresher if absent for >6 months.
• 1 successful drill shall be conducted 1 week after construction starts.
• Conduct monthly drills/ exercises for the increased POB at site.
• Consideration of enhanced engineering aspects, such as additional gas detection,
personnel tracking, safe refuges, limiting of personnel in specific areas etc.
Note: Max POB requirement is not applicable during turnaround / shutdown if the plant is
depressurised and purged, however if the flowlines are still pressurised, then the EPZ remains in
place.

11. COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

Refer to APPENDIX 1for the communications details required during an emergency.

12. EMERGENCY ALARMS, MUSTER ARRANGEMENTS AND FACILITY

EVACUATION
12.1 Emergency Alarms
There is only a single alarm for fire or gas events at all facilities. This alarm may be automatically
raised by the facility logic from the F&G system, or manually from the control room or the BGUs.
There is visual indication in areas of high noise.
12.2 Muster Arrangements
12.2.1 HMPS
In case of emergency at HMPS personnel evacuate to the nearest mustering area, as per the H2S
Training. The primary mustering area for HMPS is located at Assembly Building (Mustering Area
2).
The ERT will go to Mustering Area 1.
The IT, FC and MC will go to Mustering Area 2.
Mustering Area 3 is used if the Muster Area 1 /2 is on fire
Mustering Area 4 is used in the event that other mustering areas are impaired.
Mustering Area 5 is used for personnel at HCS.
Mustering Area 6 is used for laboratory personnel
Figure 12-1 indicates the location of all the mustering areas for HMPS.
Figure 12-1: HMPS – Mustering Areas
Figure 12-2 shows the routes that can be used for the emergency vehicles (which are on standby
at the industrial area) to reach the alternative Mustering Area 4.

Figure 12-2: Routes from Industrial area to Alternative Mustering Area (Mustering
Area 4)
In the event where there is potential for impairment of Assembly Building from a process incident
(situation not under control), personnel inside the Assembly Building may evacuate to Mustering
Area 4 and then to the Secondary Assembly Area, or directly to the Secondary Assembly Area.
The location of Secondary Assembly Area for HMPS is Harweel camp (PDO Staff only, others to
respective camps), as per Figure 12-3.
For an Assembly Building / CCR (building fire), Personnel shall evacuate to the car park area
(Mustering Area 3) or Mustering Area 4.
Figure 12-3 shows the evacuation route from HMPS to Harweel camp. All Personnel will assemble
at the carpark area in front of Harweel camp and wait for command from LEBC.
Figure 12-4 shows the location of designated Secondary Assembly Area for Harweel.
Figure 12-3: Evacuation routes from HMPS

Figure 12-4: Assembly area at Harweel Camp (Secondary Assembly Area for
HMPS & RHIP)
An emergency at HCLS and substation will be treated as Off-plot emergency. The OSC will
communicate with the personnel at the location and after head count, personnel will evacuate to
Secondary Assembly Areas (respective camps).
The Primary Mustering Area for Harweel Compression Station (HCS) personnel is HCS Mustering
Area (Mustering Area 5). Alternative mustering area for HCS personnel is Assembly Building
(Mustering Area 2). Personnel shall muster at Alternative Muster Area by exiting through the
escape gate. Figure 12-5 shows escape route for HCS personnel.
Figure 12-5: Escape Route for Harweel Compression Station (HCS) personnel

In case of building fire at HCS Mustering Area (Mustering Area 5), HCS personnel shall muster at
Alternative Mustering Area by exiting through escape gate.
Figure 12-6 shows the escape route for HCS personnel during building fire at HCS mustering area
(Mustering Area 5).
Figure 12-6: Escape Route for building fire at Harweel Compression Station (HCS)
NOTE: In the event of the assembly building impairment, it will not be possible to deploy or continue
with the IT activities.

12.2.2 BGS
In case of emergency at BGS personnel evacuate to the nearest mustering area, as per the H2S
Training. The primary mustering area for BGS is located at Assembly Building (Mustering Area 2).
The ERT will go to Mustering Area 1 LCR.

The IT, FC and MC will go to Mustering Area 2 LCR Building.
Mustering Area 3 is used if the Muster Area 1 /2 is impaired

Mustering Area 4 is used if all other mustering areas are impaired.
Figure 12-7 provides the overview of designated mustering areas at BGS.
Figure 12-7: Birba Gathering Station (BGS) – Mustering Areas

Location of secondary assembly area for BGS is Marmul camp (PDO Staff only, others to respective
camps). PDO staff will assemble at designated area in Marmul camp (which is Marmul Football
Ground) and PDO contractor will assemble at the respective contractor camps and wait for
command from LECC. Figure 12-8 and Figure 12-9 show the evacuation route to the secondary
assembly area and the location of designated secondary assembly for BGS respectively.

Figure 12-8: Evacuation routes for BGS Gathering Station (BGS)
Figure 12-9: Assembly areas at Marmul camp (Secondary Assembly Area for BGS)

12.2.3 ANPS
In case of emergency at ANPS personnel evacuate to the nearest mustering area, as per the H2S
Training. The primary mustering area is located at Assembly Building (Mustering Area 2).
The ERT will go to Mustering Area 1 LCR.

The IT, FC and MC will go to Mustering Area 2 LCR Building.
Mustering Area 3 is used if the Muster Area 1 /2 is impaired

Mustering Area 4 is used if all other mustering areas are impaired.
Figure 12-10 provides the overview of designated mustering areas at ANPS.
In the scenario where there is potential of impairment of assembly building (situation not under
control), personnel inside the Assembly Building will evacuate to secondary assembly area
(respective camp). Figure 12-11 indicates evacuation routes for ANPS.
Figure 12-10: Al Noor Production Station (ANPS) – Mustering Areas

Figure 12-11: Evacuation routes for Al Noor Production Station (ANPS)
Location of secondary assembly area for ANPS is Amal Camp (PDO Staff only, others to respective
camps). PDO Staff will assemble at designated area in Amal Camp (which is carpark inside the
camp) and PDO contractors will assemble at respective camp and wait for command from LECC.
Figure 12-12 shows the location of designated secondary assembly for ANPS.
Figure 12-12: Assembly Areas at Amal camp (Secondary assembly area for Al Noor)
In case of emergency at Tayseer EDF, this will be managed by Exterran. The LEBC can provide
further support, if required.

12.2.4 RHIP
In case of emergency at RHIP personnel on site evacuate to the nearest mustering area, collecting
and connecting to a Supplementary BA Cylinder on their way, as per the H2S Training.
The ERT will remain in the CR building except:

• The IT and FC will go to the BA building.
All other personnel will make their way to one of the following:
Mustering Area South
Mustering Area East
Mustering Area North
Mustering Area West
All personnel shall swipe their ID card on arrival at mustering areas.
In the event of the Assembly building impairment, it will not be possible to deploy or continue with
the IT activities.
Figure 12-13 shows the muster facility locations at RHIP.
Figure 12-13: Assembly Areas at RHIP

Figure 12-14 highlights the main and the emergency evacuation route from RHIP plant to the
Harweel camp. All Personnel will assemble at the carpark area in front of Harweel Camp and wait
for command from LEBC. Figure 12-4 shows the location of designated secondary assembly for
Harweel Camp.

Figure 12-14: Evacuation routes from RHIP
12.2.5 RHPP
RHPP personnel go to the most suitable Mustering Areas South, East, North and West, as per
Figure 12-13.
There are no BA Supplementary Cylinder cabinets located within power plant and the workers
within RHPP evacuate directly to the appropriate musting location from outside the RHIP facility
boundary.
12.2.6 Facility Evacuation details

RHIP LCR is a shelter in place for 6 personnel, with a breathing air system capable of supplying
air for 2 hours. Personnel in RHIP (except ERT personnel) move to Assembly Areas; South, East,
North and West upon activation of emergency alarm.
BASC are provided in cabinets at specific places / buildings in the facility which are collected during
evacuation.
12.2.7 Facility evacuation when the Shelter In Place (LCR) is compromised

SHELTER IN PLACE is impaired at 10 ppm H2S. The OSC will assess the hazard and determine
the most suitable course of action. If deemed necessary, the OSC will evacuate the building and
advise the LEBC of the proposed location.

12.2.8 Camp
In case of a fire / incident at camp, the mustering areas as per Figure 12-15.
Figure 12-15 Assembly Areas at Harweel Camp
12.3 Access Control during an Incident
In the event of a major incident occurring at the facilities, access control of approach roads may be
required. Implementation of any restriction on access roads will be at the discretion of the LEBC.
Access control points will be established at all approach roads beyond the EPZ.
LECC Liaises with PDO’s Security function and ROP to coordinate and manage access control.
The ROP should be involved in emergency response exercises and made familiar with when and
where access control may be required in an emergency event. The ROP should be made familiar
with the requirements of this ERP.
During any emergency, no one shall re-enter any of the facilities without approval from the LEBC.
12.4 Manage Local Community
For public evacuation, LEBC shall advise the Duty Director (CECC) that EPZ evacuation is
required. Public evacuation and access control are managed by ROP with the involvement of
PDO’s Security function.
Local Community Relations Officer shall make best endeavors to maintain contact details of public
in the area up to date. In the event of emergency, the Local Community Relations Officer shall
provide these details via LECC to the CECC who will provide them to ROP.

12.5 Evacuation - Tiered Approach
The CSS H2S hazards require specific training and drills. These evacuation drills follow a tiered
approach, and their frequency shall be identified in the asset HSE Plan.
Tier 1 – Facility Only

Tier 2 – Facility and partial specific EPZ
Tier 3 – Specific EPZ and including 3rd parties
The final mustering locations for the drills to be implemented as per Table 12-1.
Table 12-1 Drill Mustering Locations

Tier Muster Locations
1 Facility Mustering Areas
2 Secondary Mustering Area (Camps)
3 Secondary Mustering Area (Camps)

13. MAH AND CREDIBLE SCENARIOS

13.1 The Major Accident Hazards
The HSE Cases define the Major Accident Hazards, and the Bow Ties identify those systems which
can prevent and mitigate those Hazards.
The main MAH are:

• Unignited - H2S Release,
• Ignited - Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Flash Fire, Vapour Cloud Explosion, Tank Fires, Bund Fire
• Environmental hazard
Note that the main requirement for this CSS ERP is the presence of high pressure / high toxicity
H2S, which causes hazard ranges far in excess of the ‘normal’ (non-toxic) oil and gas processing
facilities.
13.2 Driving Emergencies
If there is a road traffic accident, and the PDO emergency phone number (5555) is called, the LEBC
may choose to activate the LECC depending on the severity of the accident.
13.3 Security Emergencies
For security emergencies impacting CSS, the LEBC will notify PDO’s Security Team South to co-
operate with the ROP to manage the incident.

13.4 Summary Credible Scenarios
The credible scenarios are considered within the IAPs (APPENDIX 3), and are listed in Table
13-1
Table 13-1 Credible Scenarios

No. Credible Scenarios List
1 ISBL - H2S Smell / Single Personal H2S detected at ISBL
2 ISBL - Single H2S detection or multiple single from different zones
3 ISBL - Confirmed H2S detection
4 ISBL - Confirmed H2S detection – ISBL is unattended – Entry required
5 ISBL Fire Alarm Activation- controlled from Appropriate Control Room
6 ISBL - Fire Alarm Activation- not controlled from CR
7 ISBL - Facility Buildings Fire - Excludes Control Room & BA Buildings for HMPS/RHIP
8 ISBL - Flare Flame Out
9 ISBL - Sweet Hydrocarbon LOPC (Fuel gas / export gas / seal)
10 Sweet Hydrocarbon LOPC – liquid
11 Chemicals LOPC
12 OSBL - Confirmed H2S/Fire Alarm activation – daytime
13 OSBL - Confirmed H2S / Fire Alarm activation - night-time
14 Non-Process Related Fire in industrial and non-industrial areas
15 Medical Emergencies (A & B)
16 Severe Weather
17 Road Traffic Accident
18 Communication Failure
19 Un-availability of Personnel – Pandemics, weather, mass food poisoning etc
20 H2S / Fire Alarm Activation (ISBL; Controlled by Third Party)
21 H2S / Fire Alarm Activation (OSBL) – Wellhead, where well goes over third-party
facility.
22 RHPP Fire
23 IAP for re-entry
24 Second party well and exploration directorates

13.5 Scenarios Not Addressed within this ERP
13.5.1 Missing Persons

Missing Persons are not addressed within this ERP, please see “Personnel Missing or Overdue in
the Interior” procedure in PR-1066, Appendix 17 [Ref. 13].
13.5.2 Radiation Incidents

Radiation Incidents are also not addressed. Radiation sources on site are used by a third-party
inspection firm. These firms have their own ERP procedure to mitigate any radiation incident.
Nuclear instrumentation in the plant is protected by radiation free capsules. The sources must be
listed, because in a protracted fire these covers can be affected by the fire resulting in radiation
discharge to air.
13.5.3 Specialised Rescue

Specialised rescue of personnel from an incident location (such as rescue at height or confined
space) is also not addressed within this ERP. Provision of specialised rescue is to be agreed with
UIPT5.
13.5.4 Spill Management

For leak / spill management, site clean-up and restoration, refer to PR-1084 [Ref 10]. The purpose
of this procedure is to provide a high-level process for addressing loss of liquid containment
resulting in measurable and reportable releases to the environment.

14. GENERAL RESPONSE TO INCIDENT

14.1 General Response to Incident
Figure 14-1 shows the expected incident response.

Figure 14-1 General Response to Incident
14.2 Guidance for IT access to the facilities
Guidance to the OSC / LEBC / FC on when it may be considered suitable for the IT to be dispatched
into the facilities is provided in APPENDIX 10.
The entry limits noted therein should NOT be considered in isolation and should from part of the
Dynamic Risk Assessment.
The limits are applicable for IT search & rescue.

The limits are applicable for re-entry to the facility for the IT (only) for activities such as closing
valves.
14.3 Local Community / Nearby Community
Community Affairs (EVXC) team is aware of temporary Izbas (moving camps) and farms in the
area. The EVXC team advises those persons within the EPZ of the H 2S Hazard. In the event of an
incident where persons are known to be located, the ROP will be informed via CECC/UIC to
manage the response.
14.3.1 HMPS
Brassos village is located within Dhahaban EPZ. H2S awareness session and emergency exercise
was conducted in 2018 to ensure emergency preparedness.
A number of permanent / semi-permanent Izbas have been observed within the Harweel EPZ.
14.3.2 BGS
The nearest members of the public are located approximately 7km from BGS at Baishathan. This
area is mainly farmland with low population numbers. The farm is typically occupied and has
permanent dwellings.
The location of the farm is outside of the BGS EPZ, however it is within the EPZ for the 6” pipeline
from Budour to Birba (0.4 km). It is also noted that a number of additional farms (planted and
unplanted) have been established along this line and are now the subject of PDO review.

14.3.3 ANPS
A number of farms (planted and unplanted) have been established along the ANPS/ BGS pipeline
and are now the subject of PDO review.
Once an Izba is identified, PDO public relations (EVXC) will contact the inhabitants/ owners to
advise on the EPZ.
14.3.4 RHIP
There are no known communities in the RHIP EPZ as of 2023.
14.4 Medical Support
This section details the medical support and facilities available for the CSS. Provision of medical
services is in line with PR-1243.
In CSS, the PDO doctor is based in the Harweel camp. Doctors are also located in Marmul where
facilities include clinics and trained nursing staff. In Marmul, contractor doctors are also available
in the PACs (Permanent Accommodation for Contractors) and assist PDO medical staff in
emergency response. Rigs and contractor camps have medics and ambulances, and these are
included as medical resources.
During an emergency, medical teams liaise with OSC. Medical assistance including ambulance
can be called to the incident scene with a male nurse. The nurse is acting on advice from the
doctor in the LECC and has ultimate authority for IP treatment. The nurse, first-aid and stretcher
parties are under the control of the OSC for maintaining personnel safety and the overall efficiency
of the emergency response.
Further details of medical resources available, doctors, nurses and ambulances, may be found in:
• PR 1243: Contingency Plans Part III Volume 13 – Medical Emergencies.
• GU 288: Emergency Response Documents Part IV – Guidelines.
14.4.1 First Aiders

The baseline numbers of First Aiders at our facilities is 2 for both day and night (when manned).
The following minimum number of First Aiders shall be provided in the facilities, taking account of
the maximum POB, see Table 14-1 below:
Table 14-1 Minimum Numbers of First Aiders

Facility/ Normal Operating Construction
No. of First Aiders
HMPS / BGS Baseline is 2 First Aiders Baseline + 1 per 50
/ANPS/ RHIP additional persons
Should the POB be exceeded, the number of First Aiders to be re-assessed.

14.4.2 Mobilising Ambulance

Ambulances are available at Harweel and Marmul to serve both HMPS and RHIP.
An ambulance is also available 24 hours a day from the Nimr/Amal facility to serve ANPS with
another ambulance also available 24 hours a day from the Marmul facility to serve BGS. Transfer
times for the ambulances are noted in Table 14-2.
Table 14-2 Ambulance Transfer Times

Approximate driving times
Ambulance BGS ANPS HMPS RIHP
from
Harweel 60 mins 60 mins 30 mins 20 mins
Marmul 30 mins 60 mins 90 mins 80 mins
Amal 60 mins 45 mins 120 mins 110 mins
Nimr 90 mins 45 mins 120 mins 110 mins
Additional medical transport capacity is available from rigs/ WTU within the EPZ.
14.4.3 Medical Equipment
Medical equipment including defibrillator and first aid kits can be found in respective control rooms.
Stretchers are available in all stations.
14.4.4 Treatment Facilities
Mobilisation of the medical staff to the CSS facilities will be possible for medical emergencies that
do not involve escalating loss of containment events or H 2S release. Where access to the facility
is prohibitively dangerous, staff requiring medical attention will be transferred by vehicle from the
assembly areas to an agreed treatment location.
In agreement with the medics, temporary treatment locations may be established at a safe off-plot
location for initial medical intervention. First Aiders released from the operations team will assist
the doctor and nurse to treat injured parties.
All First Aiders will train and exercise to ensure certifications and competencies are maintained.
Response exercises will include stretcher handling and the preparation of IPs for medevac.
14.4.5 Hospitals and Specialised Medical Treatment
External medical support available for the CSS is managed by medical team. In addition to PDO
clinics, those facilities identified in Table 14-3 provide advanced medical treatment.
Table 14-3: Medical Support at CSS
HOSPITAL LOCATION
SQH Govt Hospital Salalah
Haima Govt Hospital Haima
Thumrait Health Center Thumrait

14.4.6 Triage For Mass Casualties

In case of an event which results in mass casualties, the LEBC shall make a request to the CECC
to provide all available medical support. Medical support will be provided at a safe location away
from the hazard area. See APPENDIX 9.
14.5 Fire & Rescue Services
PDO maintains a fire team at each of the main operating areas in the interior.
Table 14-4: Fire Support at CSS

LOCATION OF NEAREST FIRE &
REMARKS
RESCUE SERVICE
30 mins away from
HMPS/ RHIP GB Fire Station located at GB camp
camp by road
40 mins away from
BGS Marmul Fire Station
Fire station by road
60 mins away from
ANPS Nimr Fire Station
Fire station by road
In all emergency situations, the Fire Team Leader when being deployed to the incident site shall
report verbally in the first instance to the LECC and subsequently direct to the OSC.
14.6 Holding Points for Ambulances, Fire & Rescue Services and other
responders
The ambulance or Fire & Rescue Services, or other responders will:

• Proceed to the holding points as noted in Figure 14-2, Figure 14-3 and Figure 14-4.
• Liaise with the OSC by radio for further instructions.
Figure 14-2 HMPS and RHIP Emergency Services Holding Point

Figure 14-3 Birba Emergency Services Holding Point
Figure 14-4 ANPS Emergency Services Holding Point
14.7 Technical Support and Contractors
Technical support (e.g., engineering) and contractors resources requested from other areas will
inform the LECC on their entry into the EPZ. They will then be dispatched by the LECC to assist
and report to the OSC in emergencies where shutdowns, isolations, by-passes, or other specific
response activities need to be implemented.

14.8 Notification and Activation
All emergency telephone calls (5555) made on the PDO Network from Harweel area will be
received by the IIOC. In the event that this is not answered within 10 seconds, the call will transfer
to RHIP LCR, and thereafter to IOC Marmul.
All emergency telephone calls (5555) made in Birba on the PDO Network will be received by the
Marmul ETO, and ANPS will be received by the Nimr ETO.
Emergency calls placed on non-PDO networks & mobile phones (24675555, 24385555) will be
received by the coastal ETO in MAF. For emergencies relating to the CSS, the MAF ETO will
forward the call to the IIOC who will directly inform the CSS LEBC.
There is a hotline in all of the facilities (HMPS, BGS, ANPS, RHIP) which connect directly with the
IIOC.
In an emergency situation, LEBC will activate the LECC, as required. LEBC will also ensure that
other PDO interior locations (i.e. Marmul LEBC & Nimr LEBC) are informed, advise them on any
mutual assistance that may be required or may be made available.
All members of the LECC team shall be available on a 24-hour basis to support the LEBC. The
LEBC or his deputy will manage the emergency with the assistance of the LECC Team.
For process area emergency, OSC will lead the ERT to manage emergency.
For non-process area emergency, OSC will be nominated by the LEBC and control the appropriate
ERTs at the scene of the incident once the type of emergency is known.
14.9 Fire & Rescue Response Strategy
Fire and Rescue Services response for CSS facilities is in line with SP-1190-3, which states:
‘’The Strategy for Fire Mitigation on Critical Sour facilities shall be :
Detect, isolate, and blow down, in combination with separation, sloping and
drainage. Additional recovery measures to manage further escalation shall be
assessed and considered.
In principle, no attempt shall be made to extinguish sour gas fire /jet fire. No fire
brigade should be sent to fight a sour fire. Active fire protection shall only be for
cooling purpose to prevent escalation.
Critical Sour facilities are expected to be designed with minimum manual
intervention. Examples of this are automated shutdown & blow down, remote
activated deluge system, actuated boundary isolation valves and remotely
operated oscillating monitors.
Facilities shall have available an Immediate Action Plan that shall define for which
scenarios manual intervention can take place.
Mobile handheld active fire protection is only intended for small non-H2S fire.’’
14.10 External Support Arrangements and Resources

Arrangements are in place between PDO and other Omani organisations and Government
Emergency Agencies to provide assistance when required. For details refer to PR-1065 Section
2.8 [10].

15. RECOVERY
After an incident, prior to personnel re-entering the facility, a re-entry plan to be created with
the approval of the LEBC. This should include PPE, gas detection, routes and objective.
There should be a minimum of 2 persons.
The re-entry IAP to be followed. A 3.23

16. EMERGENCY RESPONSE ASSURANCE

16.1 ERT Training and Competency Requirements
The training and competency requirements are details in APPENDIX 2.
16.2 Competency Maintenance
The frequency of training to maintain competency are details within APPENDIX 2.
16.3 Emergency Plan Validation
This PR-2352 shall be subject to an L2 Audit within 2 years of implementation and thereafter
every 4 years.
16.4 Annual Skills Maintenance and Exercise Plan
Skills are maintained current by conducting training as per this section and facility drills as per
the Cluster HSE Plan.
16.5 ER KPIs
Typically, these KPIs apply to all the CSS facilities.
16.5.1 Emergency Response Team

The process of managing the emergency shall commence within 2 minutes.
The control base (OSC, LEO, Scribe, SL (LEOs & MC for RHIP)) shall be in place within 7
minutes.
The MC shall be in place within 7 minutes (HMPS, BGS, ANPS).
16.5.2 Muster
All facilities shall have a complete muster within 15 minutes.
16.5.3 FC/IT
All facilities FC/IT shall be ready to dispatch to site for rescue at Muster + 2 minutes.
16.6 Debriefs & Lessons Learned
After every significant incident an after-action review will be initiated to capture best practices
and lessons learned. The results will be communicated to the local team and other PDO clusters
if deemed beneficial to PDO Emergency response actions .
16.7 ERP Review
This PR shall be reviewed every 4 years, and in the event of a significant change in risks.

17. REFERENCES
1. API Recommended Practice 55, Recommended Practice for Oil and Gas Producing and
Gas Processing Plant Operations Involving Hydrogen Sulfide, Second Edition, March
2013.
2. ER Documents Part III, Contingency Plan Volume 3 – Production Operations, PR- 1066,
Rev.09, September 2018.
3. Emergency Response Management System: Guidelines – Part IV, GU-288, Version 4.0,
April 2018.
4. Greater Birba Emergency Response Review Workshop, Conducted on 23 rd to 25th

December 2018, 20th to 22nd January 2019 and 31st March to 2nd April 2019.
5. PR-1001e, Operations Procedure Temporary Variance, Version 1.0, March 2018.
6. Birba Operational HSE Case, Doc No. MSE-OC-B, Rev.02, January 2018.
7. Al Noor Operational HSE Case, Version 2.0, September 2018.
8. Harweel Phase 2 A/B Development, Operational HSE Case, Doc No. HWL-PDO-
OP724-0002-001, June 2014.
9. PR-1084, Leak / Spill Management, Site Clean-Up and Restoration, Revision 3.1,
September 2014.
10. PR-1065 Emergency Response Part II, Company ER Procedure,
11. PR-1243, Contingency Plans Part III Volume 13 – Medical Emergencies.
12. EPZ & SIMOPS Zones Definition Technical Note, BIR-00-000000-HX-7180-00002-

0001, R1
13. PR-1066, Emergency Response Document Part III, Contingency Plan Volume III
Production Operations

APPENDIX 1 COMMUNICATIONS
Emergency telephone numbers and contact details for all members of emergency response teams
are listed in below Table A1-1. Reference to be made to the PDO Crisis Contact Management
Directory
Table A1-1: Emergency Contact Numbers for Greater Birba

SR
POSITION REF ID OFF TEL GSM
NO
1 Duty Director 99340547
2 Operation Manager OSGO 24679818 N/A
3 Delivery Team Leader OSGOH 24387702/24387693 N/A
4 Production Coordinator OSGO1H 24387615 71110831
5 Maintenance Coordinator OSGO4H 24387640 71110832
6 HMPS Control Room OSGO141H 24387789/7798 N/A
7 Birba Control Room OSGO151H 24386494/78489 N/A
8 Al Noor Control Room OSGO141N 24382401/2416 97692073
9 HSE Advisor OSSH 24387625 71110835
Production Supervisor
10 OSGO15H 24387787/7786 71110842
(HMPS)
11 Production Supervisor(BGS) OSGO15H 24386393/86667 71110843
Production Supervisor
13 OSGO14N 24366065 97692050
(ANPS)
Maintenance Supervisor
14 OSGO41H 24387685 71110844
Rotating Equipment
15 OSGO44H 24387708 71110847
Static Equipment
16 OSGO42H 24387706 71110845
Electrical
17 OSGO43H 24387694 71110846
C&A
18 OSGO46H 24387707 71110848
QMI & Metering
19 RE Services Coordinator UIB5H 24387621 71110838
20 IM&T HWL OPN Supervisor UIIO6H 24387200 71110836
21 Prod Support Process Eng. OSGO231 24387693 71110833
Warehouse Supervisor
22 UWL424 24387755 71110834
Harweel

SR
POSITION REF ID OFF TEL GSM
NO
23 Staff Nurse MCN11H 24387323 71110837
97937164/
24 Tayseer EDF OSC Exterran 22060850
+88201644406056
Tayseer EDF Control Room
25 Exterran 22060852 N/A
number
26 PDO Chief Fire Officer UIPT5 24678538 99825455

APPENDIX 2 CSS ER TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Local
Local
Emergency On Scene Site Muster Forward
Emergency Intervention
Course Title Frequency Course code Base Commander Liaison Checker Controller
Operator Team (IT)
Controller (OSC) (SL) (MC) (FC)
(LEO)
(LEBC)
1 Local Emergency Base Controller 5 Years 500500111001
2 LECC Team Members 5 Years 500500111002
3 On Scene Commander training 5 Years NA
4 Critical Sour training ER 5 Years NA
Skill in Process Safety-Risk
5 10 Years 50059643
Assessment
Self-contained Breathing
6 3 years 50017742
Apparatus (SCBA)
AHA Heart saver 1st Aid, CPR &

7 2 years 50077087
AED Foundation Course (AHAF)
Chemical Hazard Awareness
8 4 Years 50062407
(CHA)
9 Fire Warden (FW) NA 50038600
Medical check up and fitness to
10 2 years NA
work
11 H2S Critical Sour 4 Years 50017736
Authorized Gas Tester course
12 3 Years 50038609
(AGT)
Control Room Operators
1 yr / 5 yr
13 managing Emergency and Critical + 50091850
Situation (CRO)
Skill at Dealing with Operational 1 yr / 5 yr

14 + 50385920
Emergencies (SO)

+
Participate in Integrated Exercise at 1-yearly intervals, with formal assessment under simulated conditions every 5 years

APPENDIX 3 IMMEDIATE ACTION PLANS
The aim of these Immediate Action Plans (IAPs) is to provide unambiguous instruction to ERT staff
who may be requested to evacuate, escape or possibly rescue staff during an emergency event.
This document addresses the required immediate response to an event only and does not detail
the corporate ER in terms of escalation of intervention, mutual aid or recovery beyond the initial
response to the major accident.
PIPs have been developed for credible scenarios for the CSS facilities and presented in this
Appendix.
Immediate Action Plans

(IAPs)
PDO Emergency
Contact Number
5555 (PDO Land Line)

24385555 / 24675555 (Mobile)


A 3.0. LIST OF IMMEDIATE ACTION PLANS
No. IMMEDIATE ACTION PLANS

1 ISBL - H2S Smell / Single Personal H2S detected
2 ISBL - Single H2S detection or multiple single from different zones
3 ISBL - Confirmed H2S detection
4 ISBL - Confirmed H2S detection – ISBL is unattended – Entry required
5 ISBL Fire Alarm Activation- controlled from Appropriate Control Room
6 ISBL - Fire Alarm Activation- not controlled from CR
7 ISBL - Facility Buildings Fire - Excludes Control Room & BA Buildings for
HMPS/RHIP
8 ISBL - Flare Flame Out
9 ISBL - Sweet Hydrocarbon LOPC (Fuel gas / export gas / seal)
10 ISBL - Sweet Hydrocarbon LOPC – liquid
11 Chemicals LOPC – For all types of chemicals
12 OSBL - Confirmed H2S/Fire Alarm activation – daytime
13 OSBL - Confirmed H2S / Fire Alarm activation - night-time
14 Non-Process Related Fire in industrial and non-industrial areas
15 Medical Emergencies (A & B)
16 Severe Weather
17 Road Traffic Accident
18 Communication Failure
19 Un-availability of Personnel – Pandemics, weather, mass food poisoning etc
20 H2S / Fire Alarm Activation (ISBL; Controlled by Third Party)
21 H2S / Fire Alarm Activation (OSBL) – Wellhead, where well goes over third-party
facility.
22 RHPP Fire
23 IAP for re-entry
24 Second party well and exploration directorates

A 3.1. ISBL - H2S SMELL / SINGLE PERSONAL H2S DETECTED
Step Actions Task Status

1 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment for the incident. OSC
Considerations (Not limited to):

• Verify the location of the Leak
• Check if there is a flammable cloud.
• Check Wind Direction and Speed.
• Confirm that Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) < 10 % by point gas
detection or 25% LEL by LOS detector, Or H2S < 100 ppm for point
H2S detector or 300 ppm.m for LOS detector.
Make a tactical plan.
Move to IAP2 if leak confirmed.
2 Prepare the IT team, to act with: OSC
• Correct PPE (hearing protection)
• SCBA (right pressure)
• Mobile gasdetector (H2S/ LEL/O2/CO)
• Radio
3 Search for leakage OSC
• Search for leakage by doing 360 (without compromising IT safety).
• Retreat the team if the process or weather conditions change in a
non expected direction;
• Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) ≥ 10 % by point gas detection or
25% LEL by LOS detector,
• H2S ≥ 100 ppm for point H2S Detector or 300 ppm.m for LOS.
Technical interventions
• Carry out the necessary operational manual interventions based
on the tactical plan.
4 OSC
• On confirmation of serious leakage start Confirmed H2S detection
at ISBL

A 3.2. ISBL - SINGLE H2S DETECTION OR MULTIPLE SINGLE FROM

DIFFERENT ZONES

1 • Ensure the Entry Turnstile Freewheel Button activated. OSC
2 • Ensure the activation of the site evacuation alarm. OSC
3 • Ensure nearby affected parties are notified. ( E.g: Lab, RHPP, LEBC
Wells/Construction teams..etc).
4 • Ensure if ESD is activated and working as expected. OSC
5 • Ensure all ignition sources are shut down. OSC
6 • Control the access to the affected area from public roads. LEBC
7 • Confirm the headcount. OSC
8 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment for the incident.

• Verify the location of the Leak.
• Confirm the pressure of the affected equipment has to be stable or
declining.
• Review the pattern of the readings of the H2S detectors and
OSC
approach from the safe (upwind/ crosswind side).
• Confirm head count. If there are people reported missing, rescue
them based on DRA and actual situation at site.
• Check for flame Impingement on any equipment.
• Refer to appropriate SHOC Cards or MSDS for chemicals.
• Check location of pressurised cylinders including temporary or
equipment close to hazard.
• Monitor the potential Impact on Occupied Buildings and Air
Intakes.
Based on the DRA the OSC decides where the donning of the RPE should
be done (for future implementation following training).
9 • Communicate verbally DRA and tactical plan with LEBC OSC
10 • Approve or disapprove tactical plan LEBC
11 Alert if necesseray: LEBC
• Fire & Rescue Service
• Medical
• ROP
• And other teams if neccesary
12 Prepare the IT team, to act with: OSC
• Mobile gas detector (H2S/ LEL/O2/CO)


• Radio
• Strecher if applicable
13 Search and Rescue OSC
• Search for people by doing a 360⁰ (without compromising IT
safety).
• Do a rescue based on the DRA. SPEED is more important than
good care for the IP to improve the chance on survival (snatch
rescue).
• If the IP is conscious, bring the IP in a safe position and give
Oxygen. → Professional medical attention is needed.
• If the IP is unconscious, bring the IP in a safe position and provide
CPR and give Oxygen. → Professional medical attention is
needed.
14 • If there are any serious injured personnel, contact DD/CECC for LEBC
MEDEVAC.
15 • Inform LEBC after emergency is under control. OSC
16 • Inform all parties that “LECC Stand down” after emergency is LEBC
under control.
17 • Inform LEBC and declare “All Safe” after emergency is under OSC
control.
18 • Refer to the Recovery Plan OSC

A 3.3. ISBL - CONFIRMED H2S DETECTION

1 • Ensure the Entry Turnstile Freewheel Button activated OSC
Wells/Construction teams..etc)
5 • Ensure all ignition sources are shut down OSC

declining.
OSC
Intakes.
• Medical
• ROP
12 Prepare the IT, to act with: OSC
• Appropriate PPE (hearing protection)
• Radio


safety).
• Lower Explosion Limit (LEL) ≥ 10 % by point gas detection or
rescue).
needed.
MEDEVAC.
under control.
control.

A 3.4. ISBL - CONFIRMED H2S DETECTION – ISBL IS UNATTENDED –

ENTRY REQUIRED

1 • Mobilse ERT from respective locations LEBC
2 • Ensure teams are equipped e.g. SCBA & Filter hoods OSC
4 • Check if ESD has been activated and working as expected. OSC
7 • Establish a staging area near the incident from which to prepare OSC
for facility entry

declining. OSC
Intakes.
Make a tactical plan
9 Communicate verbally DRA and tactical plan with LEBC
10 Approve or disapprove tactical plan
Alert if necesseray:
11 • Medical
• ROP
And other teams if neccesary
Prepare the IT, to act with:
• Appropriate PPE
12 • Mobile gasdetector (H2S/ LEL/O2/CO)
• Radio
• Stretcher if applicable
• Mobile EX lighting


Search and Rescue
safety).
13 good care for the IP to improve the chance on survival (snatch
rescue).
needed.
• If there are any serious injured personnel, contact DD/CECC for LEBC
14
MEDEVAC.
• Inform all parties that “LECC Stand down” after emergency is LEBC
16
under control.
• Inform LEBC and declare “All Safe” after emergency is under OSC
17
control.

A 3.5. ISBL FIRE ALARM ACTIVATION- CONTROLLED FROM

APPROPRIATE CONTROL ROOM

Wells/Construction teams…etc)
7 • Ensure the Fire & Rescue Service is mobilised. LEBC
• Verify the location of the leak / Fire
• Check wind Direction and Speed
declining.
• Review the pattern of the readings of the fire detectors and
approach from a safe ( up-wind / cross-wind side).
• Avoid Fire Radiation to IT.
• Be aware of toxic smoke. OSC
• Check flame Impingement on any equipment (Possible BLEVE
Scenario after 15 minutes of flame contacts).
• Check firewater provision and activate if applicable.
• Check for the location of pressurised cylinders including temporary
or equipment close to hazard.
• Monitor the potential impact on Occupied Buildings and Air
Intakes.
Make a tactical plan ( be aware of the knowledge limitations and cabability

of the team and the OSC ).
12 Alert if necessary: LEBC
• Medical
• ROP


13 Prepare the IT team, to act with ( be aware of the knowledge limitations OSC
and cabability of the team):
• Radio
safety).
rescue).
• If the IP is unsconcious, bring the IP in a safe position and provide
needed.
• If the IP has burns, professional medical attention is needed.
MEDEVAC.
under control.
18 • Inform CSS LEBC and declare “All Safe” after emergency is under OSC
control.

A 3.6. ISBL - FIRE ALARM ACTIVATION- NOT CONTROLLED FROM CR

7 • Ensure the Fire & Rescue Service is notified. LEBC
• Verify the location of the leak / fire
• Check wind Direction and Speed
declining
• Review the pattern of the readings of the fire detectors and
approach from a safe ( up-wind / cross-wind side)
• Check head count. If there are people reported missing, rescue
• Avoid rire radiation to IT.
• Be aware of toxic smoke
OSC
• Check flame Impingement on any equipment (Possible BLEVE
Scenario after 15 minutes of flame contacts).
• Check firewater provision and activate if applicable.
Intakes.
Make a tactical plan (be aware of the knowledge limitations and cabability
of the team and the OSC).
• Medical
• ROP


13 Prepare the IT team, to act with: ( be aware of the knowledge limitations OSC
and cabability of the team).
• Radio
safety).
rescue).
needed.
MEDEVAC.
16 • Based on the development of the fire, decide to evacuate the site. OSC
under control.
19 • Inform CSS LEBC and declare “All Safe” after emergency is under OSC
control.

A 3.7. ISBL - FACILITY BUILDINGS FIRE - EXCLUDES CONTROL ROOM

& BA BUILDINGS FOR HMPS/RHIP

3 • Ensure nearby affected parties are notified. LEBC
4 • Ensure the Fire & Rescue Service is mobilised LEBC
5 • Ensure the medical support is mobilised LEBC
7 • Check the headcount. OSC
8 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment from a safe location.
Considerations:
• Verify the location of the fire.
• Check wind direction and speed.
• Confirm if the size of the fire can be extinguished by 1 fire
extinguisher, if not then leave the firefighting for the Fire & Rescue
Service.
• Confirm the function of the building (essential or non-essential for
the plant operation).
• Confirm the pressure and blowdown (If applicable).
OSC
• Confirm safe accessability of affected (smoke/ vision and heat).
• Check if there is damage on any equipment by fire.
• Refer to appropriate SHOC Cards or MSDS chemicals.
• Monitor the potential Impact on adjacent Occupied Buildings and
Air Intakes.
Make a tactical plan (be aware of the knowledge limitations and capability
of the team and the OSC).
11 Alert if necesseray:
• ROP LEBC
12 Prepare the IT team, to act with: (be aware of the knowledge limitations
• SCBA (right pressure) OSC
• Radio
13 Search and rescue OSC


safety).
• If the Oxygen level below 18% retreat the team.
rescue).
• If the IP is concious, bring the IP in a safe position and give
• If the IP is unconcious, bring the IP in a safe position and provide
needed.
14 • If there are any serious injured personnel, contact DD/CECC for
LEBC
MEDEVAC.
18 • Inform all parties that “LECC Stand down” after emergency is
LEBC
under control.
19 • Inform CSS LEBC and declare “All Safe” after emergency is under
OSC
control.

A 3.8. ISBL - FLARE FLAME OUT

1 • Ensure automatic ignition is on-going, if not successful take below
OSC
steps.
4 • Ensure nearby affected parties are notified. ( E.g: Lab, RHPP,
LEBC
5 • Ensure the facility PSD is activated. (Do NOT ESD) OSC
6 • Ensure all other ignition sources are shut down. OSC
9 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment from a safe location

• Confirm which flare and its location.
• Confirm the process is stable.
OSC
Intakes.
12 Alert if necessary:
• Medical LEBC
• ROP
13 Prepare the IT team, to act with:
OSC
• Radio
14 Search and Rescue
• Search for people by doing a 360⁰ (without compromising IT OSC
safety).


rescue).
needed.
LEBC
MEDEVAC.
16 • Consider shutting-down the plant with a minimum release of flare
OSC
gas.
LEBC
under control.
19 • Inform CSS LEBC and declare “All Safe” after emergency is under
OSC
control.

A 3.9. ISBL - SWEET HYDROCARBON LOPC (FUEL GAS / EXPORT GAS

/ SEAL)


• Confirm if Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) < 10 % by point gas
detection or 25% LEL.m by LOS detector.
declining.
• Review the pattern of the readings of the flammable detectors and
OSC
Intakes.
• Based on the DRA the OSC decides where the donning of the
RPE should be done (for future implementation following training).
• Medical LEBC
• ROP
• SCBA (right pressure) OSC
• Radio


safety).
25% LEL by LOS detector
rescue).
needed.
14 • If there are any serious injured personnel, contact CECC for LEBC
MEDEVAC.
under control.
control.

A 3.10. ISBL - SWEET HYDROCARBON LOPC – LIQUID

5 • Ensure all ignition sources are shut down and directly affected
OSC
roads are blocked.

• Check if there is a flammable vapour.
detection or 25% LEL by LOS detector
declining.
• Review the pattern of the readings of the flammable detectors and
OSC
• Check for flame Impingement on any equipment by pool fire.
Intakes.
• Based on the DRA the OSC decides where the donning of the
RPE should be done (for future implementation following training).
• Medical LEBC
• ROP
• Correct PPE
OSC
• Radio


safety).
rescue).
needed.
MEDEVAC.
under control.
control.

A 3.11. CHEMICALS LOPC – FOR ALL TYPES OF CHEMICALS -

1 • Ensure all ignition sources local to the storage / leak area are shut
OSC
down.
2 • Make a PA (or radio / Emergency Channel) to announce to stay
OSC
away from the leak area.
3 • Control the access to the affected area by barrier. OSC
4 • Advise the LEBC of the spill. OSC
5 • Determine if PDO or alternate to manage spill. LEBC

• Verify the location type of chemical spilled.
• Refer to chemical hazard list (APPXX) for PPE.
• Check if there is a flammable vapour via 4 sensor gas detector
(LEL, H2S, CO, O2).
• Check Wind Direction and Speed, stay upwind
detection. OSC
• Confirm the pressure of the affected equipment is stable.
• Review PTW system to check if personnel are working in the area.
Confirm head count if there are people working in the area.
• Verify location and operabilty of the responder decontammination
facilities – safety showers.
• Rescue them using PPE based on DRA and actual situation at
site (if required).
• Based on the DRA the OSC decides where the donning & removal
of the RPE should be done (for future implementation following
training).
7 • Communicate verbally DRA and tactical plan with LEBC. OSC
• Medical LEBC
• ROP
• Select correct PPE based on chemical hazard list (APPENDIX 4)
• SCBA (right pressure) if necessary based on chemical hazard list
(APPENDIX 4)
OSC
• Radio
• Chemical spillage kit (APPENDIX 4)


safety).
• If the LEL is above 10%, then contact the Fire & Rescue Service
rescue).
needed.
12 • If there are any seriously injured personnel, contact DD/CECC for LEBC
MEDEVAC.
under control.
15 • Contact UIK to arrange specialised remediation activities. LEBC

A 3.12. OSBL - CONFIRMED H2S/FIRE ALARM ACTIVATION – DAYTIME

2 • Ensure nearby affected parties are notified. (E.g: Wells
LEBC
construction team)

• Expect extreme high level of noise.
• The pressure of the affected equipment has to be stable or
declining.
• Consider potential for metal embrittlement. (injection wells)
• Confirm the pressure of the affected equipment has to be stable or OSC
declining.
10 Alert:
Alter if necessary:
LEBC
• Medical
• ROP
OSC


• Radio
safety).
good care for the IP to improve the chance on survival (snatch OSC
rescue).
needed.
MEDEVAC.
under control.
control.

A 3.13. OSBL - CONFIRMED H2S / FIRE ALARM ACTIVATION - NIGHT-

TIME

2 • Ensure nearby affected parties are notified. (E.g: Wells
LEBC
construction team)

• Extreme high level of noise.
• The pressure of the affected equipment has to be stable or
declining.
• Metal embrittlement.
declining. OSC
Intakes.
10 • Ensure portable EX lighting is mobilised
11 Alert:
Alter if necessary:
LEBC
• Medical
• ROP


OSC
• Radio
• Stretcher (if personnel are known to be at site)
safety).
rescue).
needed.
MEDEVAC.
under control.
control.

A 3.14. NON-PROCESS RELATED FIRE IN INDUSTRIAL AND NON-

INDUSTRIAL AREAS

1 If the incident is within the EPZ, responding teams must meet EPZ
LEBC
requirement.
2 • Check if activation of the fire alarm, if applicable. LEBC
4 • Confirm the headcount from the fire warden. OSC
5 • Confirm the Fire & Rescue Service is mobilised. LEBC
6 • Ensure the medical team is notified. LEBC
7 • Ensure the ROP is notified. LEBC
8 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment from a safe location
• Confirm head count.
• If there are people reported missing, the rescue is done by the
Fire & Rescue Service. OSC
• In-case of special buildings, ask for drawings and inventory list.
Intakes.
9 • Chemicals -refer to appropriate SHOC Cards or MSDS. (if

applicable) LEBC

12 Alert:
Alter if necessary:
LEBC
• Medical
• ROP
13 • Provide the location of affected buildings to the Fire & Rescue
Service and also applicable information (Fire & Rescue Service is OSC
responsible for the firefighting, search and rescue).
LEBC
MEDEVAC.
LEBC
under control.
17 • Inform LEBC and declare “All Safe” after emergency is under
OSC
control.


A 3.15. MEDICAL EMERGENCIES (A & B)

1 • Ensure medical team is mobilised.
A. Facility
B. Other locations (e.g., Camps) LEBC
In case of A, this IAP is applicable. In case of B, the total control of the
medical care is managed by the medical team supported by the LEBC.
Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment from a safe location. OSC

• Location of IP(s)
• Number of IP(s)
• Reason for the need for medical attention:
o Toxic gas IP. Shift to scenario 2 (Confirmed H2S detection at
ISBL).
o Burn / steam injury IP.
o Broken limb(s).
o Major trauma.
o Spinal injury. OSC
2
o Single person injury requiring medivac.
o Multiple persons injured requiring establishment of medivac.
o Non-accidental death.
o Food poisoning.
o Poisonous snake or insect.
• Condition of the IP(s)
• Situation at site.
• Confirm Wind Direction and Speed.
• Head count if necessary
3 • Ensure there is a safe area to stablise and take care of the IP (‘s).
OSC
• If in ISBL take IP to relevant medical room.
5 • Approve or disapprove tactical plan. LEBC
Alert if necesseray:
6 LEBC
• ROP
7 Prepare the IT team including the Designated First Aiders, to act with:
• Correct PPE
• SCBA (If applicable)
OSC
• Radio
8 Search and Rescue
• Communicate with medical via radio or telephone to clarify the OSC
required actions (If status of IP (‘s) is not clear).


• Stablize and transport IP to the designated area.
• Prepare IP (‘s) for handover to medical team.
LEBC
MEDEVAC.
LEBC
under control.
OSC
control.

A 3.16. SEVERE WEATHER

1 • Confirm with nearby stakeholders if notification of severe weather
is received.
2 • Decide if road movement needs to be restricted.
3 • Ensure that ROP has been notified.
4 • Ensure that medical team is on stand-by. LEBC
5 • Activate the CSS Severe Weather Planning Checklist (Local)
6 • Activate ESD for when weather reaches the limits within the
facilities (60 km/s wind speed)
7 • Control the access to the affected area from public roads.
9 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment from a safe location. (If outdoors,
upwind or cross wind on a safe distance).
• Reason of evacuation if necessary.
• Weather condition:
o Abnormally high summer temperatures.
o Sand storm.
o Heavy rain and flash flooding impassable wadis.
o Lightning strike. LEBC
• Confirm food stock levels for 2 weeks in applicable area
• Confirm alternative needs for electricity.
• Facility needs is go to safe condition.
• Determine essential personnel count roster.
• Secure the site.
10 • Prepare the IT team, to act with appropriate PPE to control the

OSC
evacuation.
LEBC
MEDEVAC.

A 3.17. ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
Step Actions Task

1 • Ensure that ROP is notified.
2 • Ensure that medical team is notified.
LEBC
3 • Ensure that Fire & Rescue Service is notified.
4 • Control the access to the incident area from public roads is blocked.
This scenario can be subdivided as follows:
• Confirm if it is a Minor or Major incident with or without casualties.
• Verify the location of incident and nearest Fire & Rescue Service and
medical assistance.
• Confirm the time of day and expected volume of additional traffic on the
roads
• Consider restricting or stopping traffic.

• Confirm if chemicals are involved refer to the appropriate SHOC Card or
MSDS.
• Confirm if there is impact on local resources following any deployment of

ERT.
• Consider restricting facility to basic production operations. OSC
• Consider if assistance is needed from nearby resources (drilling rigs, well

services, engineering sites) within the EPZ and local civilian resources.
• Check if there is a flammable cloud (if applicable think of dangerious

goods and fuel).
• Confirm wind direction and speed.
• Confirm the flammable limit reading is lower than 10 % of Lower
Explosion Limit (LEL).
• Check head count. If there are people reported missing, rescue them
based on DRA and actual situation.
• Check for fire.
• Check for any possible escalating factors.
Based on the DRA the OSC decides where the donning of the RPE should be
done (for future implementation following training).
7 • Approve or disapprove tactical plan. LEBC
8 Alert other teams if necessary. LEBC
9 Prepare the IT, to act with: OSC
• Appropriate PPE
• SCBA (if applicable)
• Radio
• Stretcher if applicable (if applicable)

Step Actions Task

• Search for IP by doing a 360⁰ and assess the situation (without
compromising IT safety).
• If the weather conditions change in a non expected direction, flammable
limit is 10% LEL or higher retreat the team.
• Do a rescue based on the DRA.
• Hand the IP(‘s) over for medical team for professional medical attention.
• Carry out the necessary manual interventions based on the tactical plan.
MEDEVAC.
13 • Inform all parties that “LECC Stand down” after emergency is under LEBC
control.
14 • Inform LEBC and declare “All Safe” after emergency is under control. OSC

A 3.18. COMMUNICATION FAILURE

1 • Ensure the Entry Turnstile Freewheel Button activated (if
OSC
applicable).
4 • Ensure all ignition sources are shut down and directly affected
OSC
roads are blocked.
5 • Control the access to the possible affected area from public roads. LEBC
7 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment from a safe location.
• Consider what are the affected areas:
o ISBL
o OSBL
• Consider shutting down the applicable ISBL or OSBL by
safeguarding or let it run self-directed.
• Monitor if the facility is going into safe condition if safeguarding is
activated.
• Confirm head count. If there are people reported missing, rescue OSC
them based on:
o Confirmed H2S detection at ISBL.
o Confirmed H2S / Fire Alarm activation at OSBL - OSBL is
attended – day.
o Based on any other escalation start the applicable IAPs.
• Secure the site.
• Consider to evacuate operational personnel.

10 • Check the approximate duration and time to depressurise (if
LEBC
applicable).
• Medical
• Fire & Rescue Service LEBC
• ROP
• And other teams if necessary
LEBC
MEDEVAC.
13 • Inform LEBC after emergency is under control after the site is
OSC
evacuated.
LEBC
under control.


OSC
control.

A 3.19. UN-AVAILABILITY OF PERSONNEL – PANDEMICS, WEATHER,

MASS FOOD POISONING ETC.

1 • Ensure if notification of personnel availability is communicated LEBC
2 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment.

• Consider how to inform/provide personnel.
o Available personnel on site.
o Available personnel not on site.
LEBC
• Consider the logistics around personnel availability.
• Consider how to transport people.
• Consider catering (food, bed) availability.
• Consider long working hours, shift adjustments for available
personnel.
• Consider adding specialised personnel to site.

• Medical
• ROP LEBC
• And other teams if neccesary.
LEBC
MEDEVAC.
5 • Declare “All Safe” after emergency is under control. LEBC

A 3.20. H2S / FIRE ALARM ACTIVATION (ISBL; CONTROLLED BY THIRD

PARTY)

1 • Ensure the communication with third party is established LEBC
2 • Confirm the activation of the site evacuation alarm. LEBC
3 • Confirm nearby affected parties are notified. (E.g: Wells
LEBC
construction team)
4 • Confirm if ESD is activated and working as expected. LEBC
5 • Confirm all ignition sources are shut down LEBC
7 • Confirm the headcount. LEBC

• Consider the flammable limit reading outside the fence.
• Consider the H2S limit reading outside the fence.
• Consider the process conditions development at location LEBC
• Consider head count.
• Consider any escalation having an impact on the outside of the
fence.
• Consider involved/available chemicals on site, refer to appropriate
SHOC Cards or MSDS for chemicals.
• Medical LEBC
• ROP
• And other teams if necessary.
LEBC
MEDEVAC.
LEBC
under control.
12 • Declare “All Safe” after emergency is under control. LEBC

A 3.21. H2S / FIRE ALARM ACTIVATION (OSBL) – WELLHEAD, WHERE

WELL GOES OVER THIRD-PARTY FACILITY

1 • Ensure the communication with third party is established. OSC
2 • Confirm with third party, distribution of actions. (well ESD) OSC
4 • Ensure nearby affected parties are notified. (E.g: Wells construction
LEBC
team)

• Verify the location of the leak/fire
• Confirm wind direction and Speed.
• Consider extreme high level of noise.
approach from the safe (upwind/ crosswind side). OSC
• Monitor the potential impact on occupied buildings and Air Intakes.
10 • Check the approximate duration and time to depressurize (If
LEBC
applicable).
11 • Ensure activation of 3rd party communiation protocol LEBC
14 • Confirm the pressure of the affected equipment has to be stable or
declining.
• Medical LEBC
• ROP


OSC
• Radio
• Search for leakage by doing a 360⁰ (without compromising IT
safety).
rescue).
needed.
• Carry out the necessary operational manual interventions based on
the tactical plan.
18 • If there are any serious injured personnel, contact CECC for LEBC
MEDEVAC.
20 • Inform all parties that “LECC Stand down” after emergency is under LEBC
control.
control.

A 3.22. RHPP FIRE

4 • Ensure if ESD is activated via Power System Operations and OSC
working as expected.
5 • Ensure all ignition sources are shut down and directly affected OSC
roads are blocked.
6 • Confirm the Fire & Rescue Service is mobilised. LEBC
9 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment from a safe location. OSC
• Check if IT can work without being exposed to extensive fire
radiation.
• Check if there is flame impingement on any equipment.
• Monitor for toxic smoke.
• Confirm the flammable limit reading is lower than 10 % of Lower
Explosive Limit (LEL) by point gas detection.
• Confirm the pressure of the affected equipment is stable or
declining
them based on DRA and actual situation at site
Intakes.
Make a tactical plan (be aware of the knowledge limitations and cabability
of the team and the OSC ).
10 • Check the approximate duration and time to depressurise (If LEBC
applicable).
13 Alert if necessary: LEBC
• Medical
• ROP
• And other teams if necessary
14 Prepare the IT team, to act with: ( be aware of the knowledge limitations OSC
• Appropriate PPE (incl. hearing protection)


• Radio
• Stretcher if applicable
safety).
rescue).
needed.
MEDEVAC.
under control.
control.

A 3.23. IAP FOR RE-ENTRY

1 • Obtain approval of the LEBC to start entering the site OSC
2 • Ensure the reason that caused the evacuation is clear LEBC
3 Carry out a Dynamic Risk Assessment from a safe location. (If outdoors,
upwind or cross wind on a safe distance).
• Considerations for the plant entry:
o Check if the entry to the control room is safe.
o Check if the control room building is safe ( impaired
atmosphere or any other road problems).
o Check the process parameters of the plant to decide if its
safe to mobilise the IT team
• Use IAP : Confirmed H2S detection at ISBL, to send IT into the plant.
• Consider the following for IT checking abnormal situations:
• H2S
OSC
• LEL
• Abnormal sound
• Signs of liquid leakage
• Abnormal readings at local instrumentations
• Power outage
• Structural damage
• Accessbility problems
• Fencing & security
6 Alert if necesseray:
• Medical
• Fire & Rescue Service LEBC
• ROP
7 • Prepare the IT team in-line with the applicable IAP. OSC
8 • After the confirmation the site is safe, it can be declared safe for
LEBC
normal operation
LEBC
MEDEVAC.


10 • Inform LEBC after emergency is under control after the site is
OSC
evacuated.
LEBC
under control.
OSC
control.

A 3.24. SECOND PARTY WELL AND EXPLORATION DIRECTORATES
Step Actions
1 • Ensure the communication with second party is established
2 • Confirm with second party, distribution of actions.
3 • Ensure the activation of the site evacuation alarm.
4 • Ensure nearby affected parties are notified. (E.g: Wells construction team)
5 • Ensure if ESD is activated and working as expected.
6 • Ensure all ignition sources are shut down
7 • Control the access to the affected area from public roads.
8 • Confirm the headcount.

• Verify the location of the leak/fire
• Consider extreme high level of noise.
• Confirm that Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) < 10 % by point gas detection or 25% LEL by
LOS detector, Or H2S < 100 ppm for point H2S detector or 300 ppm.m for LOS detector.
• Review the pattern of the readings of the H2S detectors and approach from the safe
(upwind/ crosswind side).
• Check head count. If there are people reported missing, rescue them based on DRA
and actual situation at site.
• Check location of pressurised cylinders including temporary or equipment close to
hazard.
• Monitor the potential Impact on Occupied Buildings and Air Intakes.
Based on the DRA the OSC decides where the donning of the RPE should be done (for
future implementation following training).
10 • Check the approximate duration and time to depressurize (If applicable).
11 • Communicate verbally DRA and tactical plan with LEBC
12 • Approve or disapprove tactical plan
13 • Confirm the pressure of the affected equipment has to be stable or declining.
• Medical
• ROP
• Radio

Step Actions
• Search for leakage by doing a 360⁰ (without compromising IT safety).
• Retreat the team if the process or weather conditions change in a non expected
direction;
• Lower Explosion Limit (LEL) ≥ 10 % by point gas detection or 25% LEL by LOS
detector,
• Do a rescue based on the DRA. SPEED is more important than good care for the IP to
improve the chance on survival (snatch rescue).
• If the IP is conscious, bring the IP in a safe position and give Oxygen. → Professional
medical attention is needed.
• If the IP is unconscious, bring the IP in a safe position and provide CPR and give
• Carry out the necessary operational manual interventions based on the tactical plan.
17 • If there are any serious injured personnel, contact DD/CECC for MEDEVAC.
18 • Inform LEBC after emergency is under control.
19 • Inform all parties that “LECC Stand down” after emergency is under control.
20 • Inform LEBC and declare “All Safe” after emergency is under control.

APPENDIX 4 CHEMICAL HAZARD LIST & SPILL KITS

The following tables address the chemicals to be found at the Critical Sour South facilities and PPE to be used whilst attending a spill.
A 4.1. HMPS
HMPS
Equipment Breathing
Chemical Capacity Location we are using System quantity Quantity in Store PPE
No. Apparatus
SCBA
3 drums X 250
500 liters WTP(Chlorination) 100 lit + water Level C (concentration
kgs
dependent)
Sodium Hypochlorite T - 8553
600 liters (0.6
500 liters WTP(Coagulation) 100 lit + water Level C APR
Solicep MPT 150 (960Kgs) T -8551 IBC)
HYPERSPERSE MDC220 900 lit (0.9 IBC) +
250 liters WTP(Anti-scale) 80 liter + water Level C APR
(Indion 8111) FOR RO T -8562 525 lit (25 pails)
SCAL18070(FOR Wash water 1000 liters X Wash water de- 800 liters (0.8
1000 lit Level C APR
deaerator) IBC tank 2 nos. aerator(Anti-scale) IBC)
APR with acid
Tank
WTP(pH correction) 0 900 lit (0.9 IBC) Level C cartridge or
removed
98% Sulphuric Acid T -8563 SCBA
BETZDEARBORN DCL30 T -8564 500 liters WTP(de-chlorination) 100 lit + water 1600 lit (1.6 IBC) Level C APR
2600 kgs (2 IBC X
KLEEN MCT 103 IBC tank 1300 kgs WTP(RO cleaning) 120 lit + water Level C APR
1300 kgs)
V-8592 & Wash water & DM de- 1.5 drums X 275
EC6213A O2 Scavenger 100 lit. each 100 lit Level C APR
V-85102 aerator kgs/drum
PT14232 (Tank
14000 liters Demulsifier for oil 10000 liters 0 Level C APR
capacity:14000L) T -4161
Enercept 1304A (EC1304A) Sour water corrosion
IBC tank 1300 liters 1200 liters 0 Level C APR
TOTE inhibitor
Enercept 1304A (EC1304A) Export oil corrosion
T-8601 28000 liters 18000 liters 0 Level C APR
(Tank cap.:28000L) inhibitor
Corrosion inhibitor for 6 drums X 250 Splash
Sodium Acetate T -6141 1000 liters 600 liters Level D
TEG kgs protection
13 drums X 200 Splash
PETROFLO23Y4220 Drums 200 kgs Anti-foam for GSU 2 liters Level D
kgs protection

HMPS
Equipment Breathing
Chemical Capacity Location we are using System quantity Quantity in Store PPE
No. Apparatus
97 drums X 250 Splash
Sulfolane Drums 250 kgs Pre-mix2 in GSU full Level C
kgs protection
Splash
GT AMINE MDX2 Drums 200 kgs Pre-mix1 in GSU full 0 Level C
protection
Splash
GT AMINE MDX4 (200Kgs) Drums 200 kgs Pre-mix1 in GSU full 0 Level C
protection
Splash
Monoethylene Glycol MEG Drums 209 liters Pumps barrier seal 20 liters 0 Level C
protection
Splash
Biomate MBC 781 (22Kgs) Pails 25 liters WTP(RO cleaning) 3 liters 0 Level C
protection
Splash
Powerclean DC270 (25Kgs) Pails 25 liters General cleaning NOT used NOT used Level C
protection
V6151 & 32 m³ & 13 Sour & Sweet 26 IBC X 1000 Gloves/eye
TEG 14 m³ & 7.5 m³ Level D
V5566 m³ Dehydration liters protection
BCRW 85735 Corrosion
T -5005 1000 liters Excess gas to RHIP 800 liters 0 Level C APR
inhibitor
Asphaltenes (Tank Splash

T - 2011 Oil train 1/2/3 71% 0 Level D
capacity:111000L) protection

A 4.2. BGS
BGS
Equipment Location we Quantity in Breathing
Chemical PPE
No. are using Store Apparatus
TEG Glycol T-3651 Glycol unit 2.6 M3 Level C APR
ANTI-foam EM0401 T-36108 TEG Unit 9.2 M3 Level C APR
A 4.3. ANPS
ANPS
Equipment Location we are Quantity Breathing
Chemical PPE
No. using in Store Apparatus
Flexorb SE EC9016A V-81316 24 M3 Level C

Amine (H2S
Package) SCBA
Sulfolane
Level C APR
For stripper
Level C or Splash
Oxygen Scavenger(EC6213A ) T-81871 overhead injection 4 M3
D protection
(Amine unit)
PH inhibitor (SODIUM
T-81278 MGI TEG 0.69 M3 Level D APR
ACETATE)
MGI TEG Unit and Gloves/eye
TEG V-81253 3.99 M3 Level D
Export TEG Unit protection
Gloves/eye
MEG V-81354 Chiller Package 3 M3 Level D
protection
Gloves/eye
Scale inhibitor (EMP 221) T-8139 SOS team supply 0.6 M3 Level C
protection
Gloves/eye
Corrosion Inhibitor A-81871 supply by SOS 4.4 M3
Level C protection

A 4.4. RHIP
RHIP
Equipment Location we Breathing
Chemical Composition Tank Capacity PPE
No. are using Apparatus
S.B.S chemical SODIUM BISULPHATE,AQUEOUS TANK 7510 STORAGE
T-7510 Level C APR
(BETZDEARBORN DCL 30) SOLUTION > = 25% CAPACITY - 0.8 M3
WTP U/S of Phosphonic acid, (1-
Anti Scale (Hypersperse MDC RO to prevent hydroxyrthylidene < 5% TANK 7511 STORAGE
T-7511 Level D APR
220) scale in RO phosphonicacid,(1- CAPACITY - 0.15 M3
membrane hydroxythlidene)bis-disodium salt.
CHLORIDE 39-40%
WTP for TANK 7509 STORAGE
Coagulant (Ferric chloride) T-7509 ,HYDROCHRLORIC ACID 1- Level C APR
regeneration CAPACITY - 0.7 M3
2%,WATER 59-60%
WATER 85-
86%,HYPOCHLOROUS ACID, TANK 7530 STORAGE
Sodium Hypochlorite T-7530 WTP Level C SCBA
SODIUM SALT 13-15%,SODIUM CAPACITY - 0.6 M3
HYDROXIDE 1%
WATER 85-
86%,HYPOCHLOROUS ACID,
Sodium Hypochlorite (IBC) T-7530 WTP IBC CAPACITY 01 M3 Level C SCBA
SODIUM SALT 13-15%,SODIUM
HYDROXIDE 1%
WTP for pH
correction in
APR with acid
neutralization T-7512-CAPACITY
Sulphuric acid T-7512 SULPHURIC ACID - 90 TO 100%. Level C cartridge or
pit and mixed 15M3
SCBA
bed
regeneration
WTP for pH
APR with acid
correction in T-7512-CAPACITY
Sulphuric acid T-7512 SULPHURIC ACID - 90 TO 100%. Level C cartridge or
RO in let feed 15M3
SCBA
water
WTP for pH
Sodium hydroxide (caustic SODIUM HYDROXIDE - 50% , T-7513-CAPACITY
T-7513 correction in Level C SCBA
Soda) WATER - 50% 33M3
neutralization

RHIP
pit and mixed
bed
regeneration
Sulfolane 30 -
gas sweeting TANK 7753 STORAGE
Sulfinol X T-7753 40%,Methyldiethanolamine 50 - Level C APR
unit CAPACITY - 40 M3
60%
Sulfolane 30 -
60%
Sulfolane 30 -
60%
gas sweeting
OMSOL (PREMIX) IBC IBC CAPACITY 01 M3
unit
gas
TRIETHLENE GLYCOL GREATER TANK 7752 STORAGE
Fresh TEG T-7752 dehydration Level C APR
THAN 99% CAPACITY - 28 M3
unit
gas 1,2,4-trimethylbenzene (5-10%),
V 7701 STORAGE
Antiwax (EMO-926) V-7701 dehydration heavy aromatic naphtha (60-100%) Level C SCBA
CAPACITY - 29 M3
unit naphthalene (5-10%)
Di-/Triamine ethoxylate 5 - 10%,2-
Demulsifier (PHASE TREAT Break emulsion Ethylhexanol 10-30%,Naphthalene V-7702 STORAGE
V-7702 Level C SCBA
14232) uses in LH 1 -5%,Hydrocarbons, C10, CAPACITY - 10 M3
aromatics 30 -50%
Hydrocarbons, C10, aromatics 50 -
Corrosion Inhibitor (CRO80143) OFF PLOT Off Plot <75 %, Tall oil (DEATA) 10 -<25 %, OFF PLOT Level C APR
Naphthalene 1 - <2 %
ETHANEDIOL GREATER THAN
10% LESS THAN 25%,2-
Corrosion Inhibitor CRW-85735 OFF PLOT Off Plot OFF PLOT Level C APR
BUTOXYETHANOL LESS THAN
12%.
ETHANOLAMINE GREATER TK -8161 STORAGE
Morpholine (SteamateNA0880) T-8161 steam system Level C APR
THAN = CAPACITY - 2.5 M3

RHIP
25%,DEMETHYLAMINOPROPYL
AMINE = 10 -LESS THAN 25%.
MAGNESUIM NITRATE -(1-
5%),CUPRIC NITRATE (0.1-
Biocide (Biomate)Nalco EC 1%),MIX OF 05 CHLORO 2- TK -8171 STORAGE
T-8171 steam system Level C APR
6477A METHYL 4-ISOTHIAZOLIN 3-ONE- CAPACITY - 2.0 M3
2-METHYL 4ISOLTHIZOLIN-3-
ONE (0.6-2.5%)
Hydroquinone 1-2.5%, N,N
Oxygen Scavenger (Cortol TK -8102 STORAGE Face Shield or
T-8102 steam system Diethylhydroxylamine 10-30% Level C
OS5301) CAPACITY - 0.4M3 APR
Diethylamine <1% w/w 2. Other
Hydroquinone 1-2.5%, N,N
Oxygen Scavenger (Cortol TK -8152 STORAGE Face Shield or
T-8152 steam system Diethylhydroxylamine 10-30% Level C
OS5301) CAPACITY - 0.4M3 APR
Diethylamine <1% w/w 2. Other
Phosphate (OPTISPRSE-SP- TK -8101 STORAGE
T-8101 steam system POLYMER SOLUTION Level C SCBA
8300) CAPACITY - 1.19 M3
Phosphate (OPTISPRSE-SP- TK -8151 STORAGE
T-8151 steam system POLYMER SOLUTION Level C SCBA
8300) CAPACITY - 1.19 M3
TEG unit from
experience this
Anti-Foam (Maxmin 70B ) T-5001 never been POLYMER SOLUTION TK 5001- 370 LTRS. Level C APR
used in all GB
facilities
TEG unit from
experience this
Anti-Foam (Maxmin 70B ) T-6001 never been POLYMER SOLUTION TK 6001 - 370 LTRS. Level C APR
used in all GB
facilities
TEG system to
PH Control (Omsol-SA38) SODIUM ACETATE,ACETIC ACID Face shield or
T-5002 maintain the TK 5002-370 LTRS. Level D
Sodium Acetate AND SODIUM SALT APR
pH
TEG system to
PH Control (Omsol-SA38) SODIUM ACETATE,ACETIC ACID Face shield or
T-6002 maintain the TK 6002- 370 LTRS. Level D
Sodium Acetate AND SODIUM SALT APR
pH

RHIP
METHYLDIETHANOL AMINE
gas sweeting GREATER THAN 79%,
GT-AMINE MDX-2 PREMIX-2 N/A Level C APR
unit PIPERAZINE LESS THAN 15%,
WATER LESS THAN 10%
gas sweeting
GT-AMINE MDX-4 PREMIX-2 PROPRIETARY AMINES (2) N/A Level C APR
unit
SULFOLANE/SULFOLANE -AQ gas sweeting SULPHOLANE GREATER THAN
PREMIX-3 N/A Level C APR
Blue drum unit 99%.
Seal gas
compressor for Ethylene glycol - Single compound TK -7911 CAPACITY
Coolant tank (for K-7911) (MEG) T-7911 Level C APR
coolant - more than 99.3% m/m pure 1000 LITRES
chemical
Seal gas
compressor for Ethylene glycol - Single compound TK -7921 CAPACITY
Coolant tank (for K-7921) (MEG) T-7921 Level C APR
coolant - more than 99.3% m/m pure 1000 LITRES
chemical
GSU, always in
Anti-Foam (Petroflo 23Y4220) high POLYDIMETHYLSILOXANE 100% V-4011 CAPACITY 0.36 Level C
V-4011 consumption W/W M3 APR
GSU, always in
Anti-Foam (Petroflo 23Y4220 ) high POLYDIMETHYLSILOXANE 100% V-4021 CAPACITY 0.36 Level C
V-4021 consumption W/W M3 APR
WTP Dolamite
CO2 Cylinder
WTP filter system CARBONDIOXIDE 2 Nos Cylinder in line Level D SCBA
Condensate
Foam (Fire fighting) TK-3401A/B for
WTP fire protection KEROSENE - 60 -100% V 7534 - 4.2 M3 Level C APR or SCBA
CIP unit for
Chemical
Citric Acid cleaning RO
Yearly two
WTP times Citric Acid. 1.0 m3 Level C APR or SCBA
Acetic Acid (Concentrate 20%) This is used for
U50/60 cleaning the Acetic Acid 100% w/w N/A Level C APR or SCBA

RHIP
unit, which is
not normally to
be used
This is used for
cleaning the
Acetic Acid (Concentrate 10%) unit, which is
not normally to
U50/60 be used Acetic Acid 100% w/w N/A Level C APR or SCBA
Methyldiethanolamine (MDEA) : >
MDEA 99.0%, -N-Methylethanolamine: Eye/Face
U40 <0.5%. N/A Level C protection
This is used for
cleaning the
SODA ASH (Sodium Carbonate) unit, which is
not normally to
U50/60 be used N/A Level C APR
DC-720 (Cleaning agent) N/A N/A N/A NA
CABOT Norit Activated Carbon N/A N/A N/A NA
Jacobi Activated Carbon N/A N/A N/A
Activated Carbon (Petrodarco Filtering
4X10N ) U-40 sulfinol N/A N/A
controlled particle size premium
grade strong acid cation exchange
Use in WTP resin containing sulphonic acid 1260 kgs. Using one Gloves/eye
Cation INDION 2250H V-7503A/B Mix Bed groups time Level C protection/APR
Anion ion exchange resin strongly
Use in WTP basic anion exchange resin in Gloves/eye
Anion INDION GS-3000 V-7503A/B Mix Bed chloride form 740 kgs. Using one time Level C protection/APR
Exchanger cleaning agent from Gloves/eye
NIMIR IBC N/A N/A N/A Level C protection
This is Fuels, Diesel, No 2; Gasoil-
available in Unspecified 60 -100%, Fatty acids, Gloves/eye
Asphaltene U34 condensate C18 unsaturated, reaction products Level D protection

RHIP
export but with diethylenetriamine 5 -
never used 10%,Kero 5 -
10%,Diethylenetriamine 0.1 -1%
Frequency of
change each
MSU ceramic balls U40 5years N/A N/A

A 4.5. SPILL KIT REQUIREMENTS
Spill kit:
85 gallon plastic overpack drum with screw top lid.
Roll of 6 mil poly rubbish bags
Roll 6 mil poly sheeting
2 bales chemical absorbent pads
4 bales oil only absorbent pads
2 shovels
1 rake
pH paper
four gas monitor
IR Thermal thermometer
Optional: Recovery pump with hoses, Wilden P2 Air diaphragm pump with 1” camlock fittings and
petroleum rated hoses
PPE required
Level C and Level D protective suits: These are disposable PPE, at a minimum two people would
“dress out” for an incident. With the recommended PPE this would be for recon or rescue ONLY.
Training will be required to gain proficiency and understand HNS response methodology.
As these suits are disposable, provide 6 Level C suits and 12 Level D suits for each site. Suits
should be also used for training purposes.
• Level C: Tychem C coverall (EN 14126 category 3, Type 3,4,5,6 EN1149 antistatic treatment
• Level D: Tyvec poly-coated with hood (Tychem QC127S)
Note: other manufacturers suits maybe considered but should meet or exceed the specifications
as the suits listed here.

The controlled version of this CMF Document resides online in Livelink®. Printed copies are
UNCONTROLLED.
APPENDIX 5 GENERAL / SNATCH RESCUE TECHNIQUE
A brief description of the potential scenarios:
• A toxic gas release where the person has inhaled the gas and is unable to relocate themselves
to clear air.
• A medical condition that has caused the person to become disoriented or unconscious and
may fall.
• A fire or explosion where the person has been injured and will be further impacted if not moved
quickly.
• A mechanical malfunction that has caused incapacitating injury and continues to malfunction.
• A structural collapse where the person can be retrieved before further collapse occurs.
How are they caused
These events are generally caused by an event or condition that occurs rapidly and therefore the
person cannot escape quickly enough to keep themselves from harm. This can be the result of a
toxic gas release, a fire, an explosion, natural disasters such as earthquakes or flash flooding.
An adverse medical condition from the effects of alcohol, non-prescription drugs, diabetes, high and
low blood pressure and medications can in some cases cause the person to become disoriented
and a danger to themselves and others.
The Potential for Escalation
In the case of a snap/snatch rescue being required generally means that escalation is imminent as
such a decision is made to rescue an IP as soon as possible. However, if these hazards are not
assessed or evaluated correctly, such condition can endanger the safety and life of rescuers.
For general rescue, there are hazards that can be present that may escalate the incident such as
release of toxic gas, electrical exposures and physical hazards present in the worksite. These are
potential elements that may endanger the life and safety of workers and rescuer personnel.
Emergency Response Actions
In a snatch rescue situation, the rescuer is making an immediate decision to access the IP and
remove them from further harm. Considerations such as Primary and Secondary medical
assessments are not performed. The rescuer will however apply their training and skills to minimize
further injury to the IP.

UNCONTROLLED.
In general rescue situations, upon completion of an initial risk assessment and ascertaining if there
is safe access to the IP, a stretcher team composed of two or more rescuers will retrieve the IP
using a stretcher or other litter equipment. Four stretcher tenders (two per side) is the most typical
arrangement for carrying a patient with the addition of a fifth member, if available, at the tail of the
stretcher to provide additional assistance as required. Six members may be necessary for a very
heavy patient; however the use of six stretcher tenders (three per side) typically causes more
difficulties than benefits as the additional stretcher tenders may hamper extrication due to stepping
on one another’s feet and/or throwing each other off balance as they attempt to coordinate
movement.

UNCONTROLLED.
APPENDIX 6 TIME-OUT AGENDA TEMPLATE
Critical Sour South

Incident Management Timeout Agenda
This is a situation update from which the Incident Commander may make decisions or
change objectives.
1. Review incident objectives (PEAR for example)
2. Situation update:
a. Incident status (ongoing, escalating, de-escalating, secure) Use graphics if available.
i. Current actions to control the incident
ii. Emergency response team status
b. Weather forecast (any impacts to emergency operations)
c. Evacuation status (if evacuation is underway)
d. Impacts outside the fence line
3. Additional resources required

a. Ambulance
b. Medivac (aircraft)
c. ROP
d. Fire & Rescue Service
e. Specialist rescue team
f. Additional incident management resources
4. Projected incident timeline

a. Incident demobilisation planning
b. Site re-entry if full evacuation took place
5. Notifications
a. PDO
b. ROP
c. Other stakeholders

UNCONTROLLED.
APPENDIX 7 IT PRESSURE MONITORING PROTOCOL
Emergency Response Team SCBA Pressure Check Guidelines
This is for a 5 to 6 litre air cylinder at 300 barg starting pressure.

If the low pressure alarm on the SCBA sounds exit the hot zone immediately.
Status check Time interval

Verify starting pressure Time: Before ER team deployment
Field pressure check 1 Time: ER team deployment plus 15 minutes
Normally the safety low pressure alarm or whistle for the SCBA is 55 BARG and is designed
to give sufficient time to immediately retreat to a safe zone.

UNCONTROLLED.
APPENDIX 8 FORWARD CONTROLLER CHECKLIST
M.E.T.H.A.N.E.
Memory tool for incident reporting and information gathering

UNCONTROLLED.
APPENDIX 9 MASS CASUALTY TRIAGE
2438 5555

UNCONTROLLED.
APPENDIX 10 IT HAZARD AREA ENTRY LIMITS

The following table provides guidance to the OSC / LEBC / FC on when it may be considered
suitable for the IT to be dispatched. The entry limits noted below should NOT be considered in
isolation and should from part of the Dynamic Risk Assessment.
These are applicable for search & rescue.
They are applicable for re-entry to the facility for the IT (only) for activities such as closing valves.
Information from Limit Justification

Fixed Flammable Point 10% LFL This is the standard proposed by Shell and used worldwide
Fixed Flammable LOS 25% LFL.m The 25% LFL may be averaged over a 40m path, or could
be more concentrated in a smaller area. Use of personal
pumped detectors, and the method of approach shall also
mitigate the risk.
Personal LFL 10% LFL This is the standard proposed by Shell and used worldwide.
Fixed H2S Point 99ppm This is based on the maximum range of the H2S detector.
If 100ppm is reached the operator cannot advise if the
detector is reading 100ppm or greater.
Fixed H2S LOS 300ppm.m The maximum range of the LOS H2S detector varies from
500ppm.m to 1000ppm.m in the different facilities, with the
set point at 300ppm.m. H2S detectors are also used to infer
flammability where no flammable detectors are provided.
300ppm.m is the limit for IT entry.
Personal H2S 99ppm This is based on the maximum range of the H2S detector.
If 100ppm is reached the operator cannot advise if the
detector is reading 100ppm or greater.
Fixed SO2 Point* *19ppm The range is typically 1-20ppm. If 20ppm is reached the
operator cannot advise if the detector is reading 20ppm or
greater.
SO2 Portable 49ppm This is based on the maximum range of the SO2 detector.
If 50ppm is the maximum range of the detector, the
operator cannot know if the detector is reading 50ppm or
greater.
All personnel on the IT shall be provided with portable pumped multi-gas detector, which as a minimum
provides LFL, H2S and SO2 readings. If any personal detector unit reaches 10% LFL, 100ppm H2S or
50ppm SO2, the IT shall retreat to a safe location.
IT Personnel will have their RPE donned. The RPE is demonstrated suitable for those with facial hair –
CamLock FastCowl Mask with a very high protection factor (approx. 493,000). This will protect the IT
members against atmospheres far in excess of the limits discussed above.
*Note there are currently no fixed SO2 detectors in use at CSS facilities.

UNCONTROLLED.
APPENDIX 11 TAYSEER ERP
Note: Attached is Tayseer EDF ERP document prepared by Exterran for reference.
Tayseer EDF
ERP. pdf

UNCONTROLLED.
APPENDIX 12 SEVERE WEATHER CHECKLIST

In line with PR-1066, the PDO standard Severe Weather Checklist is included within this appendix.

UNCONTROLLED.
PDO Severe Weather Planning Checklist
Severe Weather Pre-Planning (3-7 days before event)

Number Action Action Party Check Notes
1 • Weather warning/alert to
be issued by UIC4
2 • Determine numbers of • This number will determine
PDO and Contractor staff the logistic effort required to
within the area move people out of the area.
3 • Liaise with other • It is essential to understand
PAC/PDO Camps to check as early as possible where
for availability of non-essential staff will be
accommodation, food evacuated.
and water supplies
4 • Contact all Rigs, WPH, • Early contact is essential to
FBU, construction camps allow for contingency
etc within the area. planning if communication is
Advise on situation and not established.
confirm communication
method.
5 • Establish numbers of • This type of temporary
people living in accommodation is unlikely to
temporary be suitable for sheltering
accommodation such as during a severe weather
portacabins and skid event.
based units
6 • Ensure site has sufficient • Ensure sufficient food, water
essential supplies and medical supplies are
available to last for the
predicted duration of the
event
7 • LEBC to inform • Contractors should be
contractors at earliest informed of any emergency
opportunity to allow duties that they may be
their own preparations to expected to carry out.
take place.
8 • Test all communication • A single method of
methods satellite, walkie communication should not be
talkie etc relied upon. Test all methods
including Tetra and Thuraya
prior to weather event.
9 • Hold Town Hall Meeting • Avoid
Inform all staff of unauthorised/inaccurate
situation and stress that communication to the
all outside contract staff by limiting the
communication must be route through LECC only.
routed through LECC

UNCONTROLLED.
10 • Consider protecting/
weatherproofing
essential electrical
distribution with
polythene sheeting??
11 • Remove/secure any • This includes cranes, heavy
equipment with the equipment etc..
potential to cause
significant damage from
the site /stations.
12
• Secure all loose items
•
such as thin metal sheets
stored in open area to
prevent flying in high
winds.
13 • Any chemicals, toxic • Plan to relocate chemicals
materials (e.g. Hg waste) above the floodplain in
in flood zones to be advance of a flood event.
stored in a flood proof Waste material and
area associated containers are at
risk of floating away
14 • Evacuate oil in open pits • Retained sludge or oil at risk
/effluent / waste of being lost if the system is
management sites flooded. Avoid pollution,
water and soil contamination
15 • Inspect tank roof drain •
system, make sure drains
do not have obstructions
16 • Check all windows and •
doors are secured.
Provide sand bags to
prevent flooding.
17 • Back fill any open • This include any exposed
trenches/ excavations green field off-plot pipeline
/flowline. Provide proper
support for exposed pipelines
etc where the area cannot be
back filled.
18 • Ensure generators and • Vehicles should be equipped
vehicles are topped up with tools that maybe
with fuel needed to respond to an
incident.
19 • Secure offshore assets • Suspend all offshore
maintenance and diving
activities, secure
maintenance barge at port
sultan Qaboos
20 • Develop evacuation plan • Early contact with logistics is
with logistics. essential to ensure sufficient

UNCONTROLLED.
aircraft and land transport is

provided.
21 • Develop contingency
plan for start up. Arrange
for likely start up
requirements to be
available at site such as
chemicals etc.

UNCONTROLLED.
Evacuation of staff /contractor (1-3 days before event)

Number Action Action Party Check Notes
22 • Maintain key staff in • This is balanced with the
designated safe area needs of the customer. For
• CECC /LECC will look at example if the customer
scale of storm and downstream (OLNG) are
likelihood to hit an area. shutting down then there is
This will be used to no point in risking keeping
determine what level of upstream operations online.
shutdown is required.
• Consider down manning
of all vs minimum
manning.
23 • Use pre planned list of • Skeleton crew is normally
key personnel to be kept maintained at the critical
in the area. facilities to facilitate a fast
o Instrument start up.
o Electrical • Booster stations which are far
o Telecoms/IT distance (e.g. Nahada) are
o Operations also manned.
o Catering • Allow for appropriate logistics
o Civil Engineering such as heavy earth moving
o First aiders equipment that may be
o Vehicle required to ensure wadis and
Mechanics roads can be secured at the
o Others earliest opportunity.
24 • Non essential personnel • Early evacuation is key to
are removed to ensure availability of logistical
dedicated evacuation support to move personnel
points with contact out of the area.
numbers. • When evacuating personnel
there is a duty of care but it is
also important to know who
is where to facilitate safe
efficient start up.
25 • Ensure any
unmanned/down
manned stations have
been securely locked.
This includes Greenfield
sites.
26 • Liaise with ROP to set up • ROP patrols are essential to
patrols in areas that have ensure the security of
been evacuated unmanned assets during a
severe weather event.
27 • Reduce storage tank • Provide additional
levels, interface levels in ullage/capacity to cope with
coordination with UCA. unexpected trips.
28 • Consider closing in high • Preserve high value process
water cut wells

UNCONTROLLED.
29 • Consider splitting • Reduce exposure/knock on

electrical grid to effect from a lightning strike
sectionalise the faults etc. Especially in vulnerable
areas where known integrity
issues exists.
30 • Consider shutting down • Preserve high value process
electrical power low
producing areas and non
essential equipment

UNCONTROLLED.
Immediately prior/during event

Action Chec
Number Action Notes
Party k
31 • Broadcast warning • Include broadcast to vehicles,
and those located out with
the main camp.
32 • Essential personnel • Asset should agree a regular
locate to a secure area check in time with CECC.
and maintain regular
contact with CECC
33 • Maintain communication • Set a plan to regularly check
within area communications with those
who remain in the area.
Inform LEBC/DD/CECC is
communication is lost.
34 • Advise DD/CECC on any
changes
35 • Monitor and report on
local weather conditions
36 • Monitor and report on • Shut in and evacuation of
the status of facilities if assets
safe to do so • Identify areas that require
additional damage support
• Emergency management of
any fire/spill etc during storm
37 • Run through recovery • Once a better understanding
and re deployment plan of this situation has been
gained then the area
recovery/re deployment plan
can be revised and adapted.

UNCONTROLLED.
Pre- Start Up post event

Planning Action Chec
Action Notes
Topic Party k
Personnel • Are all personnel • Check other camps/areas to
accounted for ensure everyone is accounted
for.
Communica • Check all communication
tions systems are functioning
Life Support • Are all essential life • Check electrical supplies and
support systems water/ food stocks to ensure
available it is safe to up man.
Area • If safe to do so and in • Assessment crews will drive
Assessment agreement with or fly heli either side of
DD/CECC an assessment weather window. The
trip can be made to the assessment crew should
outlying facilities to include a Civil Engineering
assess any damage. and Operations resource.
They liaise with LECC to
decide what will start up first
when safe to do so.
• Arrangement of a helicopter
for potential rescue /
providing supplies to booster
station, inaccessible facilities
• If vehicles are to be used,
mobilize a minimum of 2
vehicles together to a site so
that immediate support can
be ensured in the event of
difficulties. Each vehicle shall
always remain in sight of the
one following behind.
• Inspect critical • Focus should be on high risk
equipment for damage equipment such as tank roofs
• Inspect pipelines and • The following points should
associated equipment. be considered:
Pipeline exposure, Pipeline
windrow and Gabion wash
out/damage, CP system cable
and test posts wash
out/damage, UT and
corrosion monitoring
manholes wash out/damage,
BVS’s and remote
Launchers/Receivers fence
wash out/damage
• Staged up manning of • Follow recovery and re-
area deployment plan.
• Identify and repair
damaged wadi crossing
roads/access

UNCONTROLLED.
After Incident
CECC/LECC complete an • The outcome from the after
after action review. action review feeds into the
cluster evacuation plan and
desk top planning exercise.
DTL to arrange a Severe • The lessons learned
Weather lessons learned workshop shall include key
workshop
personnel who were involved
in the planning,
implementation and post
incident phases. The
workshop outcome shall be
approved by the DTL and the
lessons added to the Learning
Knowledge Base.

UNCONTROLLED.
APPENDIX 13 SAFETY EQUIPMENT LAYOUT- HMPS

UNCONTROLLED.
HMPS Control Room

HMPS PROCESS AREA

HMPS UTILITY AREA

HMPS OIL TANK AREA

HCS
AP/HP FLARE & LAUNCHER AREA

APPENDIX 14 SAFETY EQUIPMENT LAYOUT- BGS

BGS CONTROL ROOM

BGS STATION

APPENDIX 15 SAFETY EQUIPMENT LAYOUT- ANPS

ANPS CONTROL ROOM

ANPS STATION

ANPS STATION SOUTH

APPENDIX 16 SAFETY EQUIPMENT LAYOUT- RHIP

RHIP CONTROL ROOM

RHIP SUBSTATION BUILDING 2



RHIP TELECOM BUILDING

RHIP BREATHING AIR BUILDING

RHIP UNIT 61

RHIP UNIT 41

RHIP UNIT 51

RHIP UNIT 34, 61, 70, 79

RHIP UNIT 31,32, 33, 34, 36, 40, 41, 50, 60

RHIP UNIT 10, 70

RHIP UNIT 73, 43, 42, 40, 75

RHIP UNIT 72, 74, 77

RHIP SOUTH WEST

RHIP SOUTH EAST

RHPP


PR-2352 - Greater Birba Emergency Response Plan

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PR-2352 - Greater Birba Emergency Response Plan

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Petroleum Development Oman L.L.C.

Critical Sour South Emergency Response Plan

Document Type Procedure

Discipline Engineering & Operations

Owner OSGO – Sour Operations Manager

Issue Date June 2023

Keywords: Emergency Response

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Page | 2 Critical Sour South Emergency Response Plan

Sour Operation Manager GB DTL (OSGOH) GB Production Coordinator

Document Signatory Document Custodian Document Controller

Corporate Emergency RHIP DTL (OSGOR) RHIP Production Coordinator

Date: 25/04/2023 Date:26/05/23 Date:26/04/23

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ii. Revision History

Note: Rabab Harweel Integrated Project

iii. Related Business Processes

CODE BUSINESS PROCESS (EPBM 4.0)

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iv. Related Corporate Management Framework (CMF)

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION REFERENCE

Guideline Emergency Response Part IV, ER Guidelines GU-288

Plan Well Control Contingency Plan GU-576

Policy Security and Emergency Response PL-10

Procedure Emergency Response Document part II, PR-1065

Emergency Response Document part III,

Plan National Oil Spill contingency plan (NOSCP)

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS & ABBREVIATIONS

CCTV Closed Circuit Television MAF Mina Al Fahal

CRO Control Room Operator MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS & ABBREVIATIONS

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vi. Common Terminology in Critical Sour South

Table 1-1: Common Terminology in Great Birba

Emergency Response Team will manage the process area

Local Emergency Control Centre - this team supports the OSC,

Secondary Assembly Area This is an assembly area outside of the EPZ.

ISBL (Inside Battery Limit)

Previously Contingency Plan or Emergency Response Procedure.

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9.2.7 Scribe ......................................................................................................... 36

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14.4.5 Hospitals and Specialised Medical Treatment ........................................... 56

A 3.14. Non-Process Related Fire in industrial and non-industrial

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Table 1-1: Common Terminology in Great Birba ....................................................................... 8

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• Harweel Main Production Station (HMPS),

This document assumes transition to IIOC.

1.1 Facilities Overview

Figure 1-1 Critical Sour South Emergency Planning Zone (2023)

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• Harweel (including RHIP) EPZ

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The objectives of this plan are to:

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3. DOCUMENT OWNERSHIP AND MAINTENANCE

3.2 Document Authority

3.3 Distribution and Target Audience

3.4 Review and Improvement