1.

Civil obligations are those which are demandable and within the
contemplation of the law. It can be enforceable through court.
While natural obligations are those which are not based from positive law
but on natural law, that when an obligor voluntarily fulfill an obligation which is
not demandable by the obligee, the obligor can no longer demand for the return of
the thing delivered or obligation that is rendered. Some examples of natural
obligations are as follows:
1. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive
prescription, the obligor who voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what
he has delivered or the value of the service he has rendered.
2. When without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, a third
person pays a debt which the obligor is not legally bound to pay because the action
thereon has prescribed, but the debtor later voluntarily reimburses the third person,
the obligor cannot recover what he has paid.
3. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the
annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received,
notwithstanding the fact he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to
demand the thing or price thus returned.
4. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has
entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily
pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation,
there shall be no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or
consumed it in good faith. (1160A)
5. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has failed the
defendant voluntarily performs the obligation, he cannot demand the return of what
he has delivered or the payment of the value of the service he has rendered.
6. When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent
exceeding the value of the property which he received by will or by the law of
intestacy from the estate of the deceased, the payment is valid and cannot be
rescinded by the payer.
 7. When a will is declared void because it has not been executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law, but one of the intestate heirs, after
the settlement of the debts of the deceased, pays a legacy in compliance with a
clause in the defective will, the payment is effective and irrevocable.
2.
An obligation to pay a sum of money evidenced by a promissory note is not
a natural obligation. It is a civil obligation which give right of action to compel the
performance by the debtor.
3.
Yes, I agree with Julia. Sara can no longer demand to return the money she
has paid to Julia. Because her action of paying the interest is a natural obligation
from her delayed payment of debt.
4.
Based on the case filed by Mrs. A, the source of Mr. X’s obligation is delict.
Because the injured sustained by Mrs. A, which is serious injuries and the
unintentional abortion suffered by her are punishable under the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, Mrs. A has the right to demand for civil damages incurred by her.
5.
No, the bank cannot take over Saachi’s bank deposit. Saachi is only
suspected for the crime of estafa and still pending with the Prosecutor’s office,
they cannot take over the bank deposit until proven that he is guilty of the crime.
6.
Yes. Although the criminal liabilities of an accused are extinguished through
his death, the offended party may still institute to claim the damages incurred by
the accused. And if an award was given to the offended party, she may file a claim
against the estate of the accused.
7.
In CBK Power v. CIR, there is no solution indebiti. There is solutio indebiti
when: (1) Payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the
payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment; and (2)
Payment is made through mistake and not through liberality or some other cause.
 In this case, there exists a binding relation between petitioner and the CIR,
the former being a taxpayer obligated to pay for that liability. Second, the payment
of input tax was not made through mistake, since petitioner was legally obligated
to pay for that liability. Hence, solution indebiti will not apply.
While in the case of Andres v. Mantrust, solution indebiti is present. For this
to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1) that he who paid was not under
obligation to do so; and 2) that payment was made by reason of an essential
mistake of fact. There was a mistake, not negligence, in the second remittance. It
was evident by the fact that both remittances have the same reference invoice
number.
8.
No, the employer and his driver-employee cannot be held solidarily liable
for breach of contract. It is only the employer who can be made liable for breach of
contract being one who has the existing contract of common carriage to the
passengers. Hence, the driver-employee is not liable for breach of contract.
In cases of delict, only the driver-employee should be held liable. However,
if the driver-employee cannot fulfill his obligation to pay the damages incurred his
employer may be subsidiarily liable.
9.
Yes, one of defenses that can be raised by a common carrier is the exercise
of diligence over the selection and supervision of the employees. That if the
employer exercised the required diligence, the common carrier cannot be made
liable for damages.

10
An obligation shall be complied through delivery of a thing or fulfillment of
the obligation by the debtor to the creditor.
11.
Yes. If the obligation to deliver is a generic thing, then it can be fulfilled
through delivery of any specific thing with the same kind. Hence, the obligation
will be sufficiently complied with.
 12.
a. The obligation is valid. Because it is an obligation subject to an indefinite
period. When the creditor knows that the debtor already has the means to pay, he
must file an action in court to fix the period.
b. This obligation is void. The obligation to pay when he likes is a
suspensive condition solely on the will of the debtor. A condition is void when it
is based in the sole will of the debtor.
c. This obligation is also valid. Because the condition does not based solely
on the will of the debtor but also on the other factors outside the control of the
debtor.
d. The obligation is valid. The death of the son of cancer within one year is
made a negative suspensive condition to his making the payment. The obligation is
demandable if the son does not die within one year.
13.
14.
No, he is not correct. The condition is not purely potestative because it does
not depend solely on the will of one party. Moreover, the condition depends on the
will of the creditor and not the debtor.
15.
I will advice Nolan to go to Court and asked Court to fix the period for the
payment of Zeny. Because when a debtor binds himself to pay when his means
permit him to do so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period and
when a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration to fulfill the
obligation.
16.
In the case of Millare v. Hernando, article 1197 is not applicable. The first
paragraph of Article 1197 is clearly inapplicable, since the Contract of Lease did in
fact fix an original period of five years, which had expired. It is also clear from
paragraph 13 of the Contract of Lease that the parties reserved to themselves the
faculty of agreeing upon the period of the renewal contract. The second paragraph
of Article 1197 is equally clearly inapplicable since the duration of the renewal
period was not left to the will of the lessee alone, but rather to the will of both the
lessor and the lessee. Most importantly, Article 1197 applies only where a contract
of lease clearly exists. Here, the contract was not renewed at all, there was in fact
no contract at all the period of which could have been fixed.
In the case of Lim v. People, article 1197 is likewise inapplicable. It is clear
in the agreement, Exhibit “A”, that the proceeds of the sale of the tobacco should
be turned over to the complainant as soon as the same was sold, or, that the
obligation was immediately demandable as soon as the tobacco was disposed of.
Hence, Article 1197 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the courts may fix
the duration of the obligation if it does not fix a period, does not apply.
17.
Yes, even before the arrival of a period the creditor has the right to demand
for fulfillment of obligation against the debtor at any time.

18.
Yes, the creditor may still compel the debtor to perform his obligation even
before the arrival of the said period. However, debtor may oppose any premature
demand on the part of the creditor for performance of the obligation, or if he so
desires, he may renounce the benefit of the period by performing his obligation in
advance.