Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
Obviously, ites is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal
profession, to know the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy.
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C.
Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct
and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as
follows:
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing
eleven (11) cases (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969,
inclusive) filed by the undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the
DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec.
34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .;
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper
reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily
Globe) concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of
the Philippines of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange
restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per
statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive
Department on the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers
which are reputable and of national circulation had the effect of repealing
Central Bank Circular No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court
decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and,
therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned
"for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has
no more jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a
Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof,
has not even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere
newspaper account of the advance announcement made by the President of
the said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent
 judge acted prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of
determining the full intent of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board
resolution, and whether the same provided for exception, as in the case of
persons who had pending criminal cases before the courts for violations of
Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations previously issued on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial
notice purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper
account that the President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange
restrictions as basis for his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular,
erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent judge to take judicial notice
thereof even before it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text
published as required by law to be effective shows his precipitate action in
utter disregard of the fundamental precept of due process which the People is
also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing
public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. How can the Honorable
Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet come into force and
the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been published and
ascertained to be the basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had
miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at
bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituting Grave
Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first
the comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank
Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing
the same, thereby denying the Government of its right to due process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the
cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was
undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the
order of the court (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .)
dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October
1, 1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of
fair play, thereby depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and
clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without
even waiting for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even
placed his dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his
comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central
Bank (CB) circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple
reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of
general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without
qualification, and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the basis of such
announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the erroneous statement of the
President that the new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed
against Mrs. Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published in the
newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of
dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised by his advisers and,
instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for
errors in the latter's announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of
their failures to respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of
the President which had become of public knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB
Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations involving
violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases dismissed involved charges for
violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused cannot be tried and convicted under a
law different from that under which she was charged; that assuming that respondent judge
erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an appeal
therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake
committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a
"court can reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or
judges whose decisions were reversed or modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the
Supreme Court are later reversed, so how much more for the lower courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to
explain because, as he theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the
President was talking 'through his hat' (to use a colloquialism) and should not be believed?
That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged by complainants), of a still then non-
existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my
dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not refer to CB
Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it was
discretionary on him to take judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge,
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of complainants that he acted
prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of dismissal on a mere newspaper
account is contrary to the wordings of the newspaper report wherein the President
announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be effected
in the future, because of the use of the present perfect tense or past tense "has lifted," not
that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department
of Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that
"proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential" when they
caused to be published in the newspapers the filing of the present administrative case
against him; and he emphasizes the fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and
pure legal matter in consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy
disposition of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause
under Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it
will be noted that Section 111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause
substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No.
960. Hence, whether under Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving
violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged
that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven cases, without according the prosecution the
opportunity to file a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why the cases
against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is clearly reflective of
respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the
advocate of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of
the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The
corresponding report and recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by
Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator
Ernani Cruz-Paño.
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restrictions as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal
provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases;
apparently the other accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto,
was not arrested and therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person; trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992
that the government has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also
reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board
arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992
and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to give full
confidence and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive
Department, specially from the highest official of that department; the Courts
are charged with judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
without introduction of proof, the announcement published in at least the
two newspapers cited above which are reputable and of national circulation.
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil.
520, People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People
vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the repeal of
a penal law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute or
punish the offense committed under the old law and if the law repealing the
prior penal law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined
and penalized in the repealed law, the repealed law carries with it the
deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons
charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited
decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and not only to the crimes
punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The
Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged
is considered as a penal law because violation thereof is penalized with
specific reference to the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which
penalizes violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited
 in the Supreme Court decisions and since according to the decisions that
repeal deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio  dismisses all
the eleven (11) cases as a forestated in the caption, for not to do so opens this
Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila,
Br. 54 and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her
comment, private respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court
gave due course to the petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite
notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary
injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-
101959 to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by
counsel for the accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to
be heard, and solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing that the
President has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the
enactment can become effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1,
Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992,
entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in
the August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the
Manila Bulletin. Per certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular
No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of
CB Circular No. 1353, he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB
Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was
already repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the
repeal of the regulations on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not
absolute, as there is a provision that with respect to violations of former
regulations that are the subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall
be governed by the regulations existing at the time the cause of action
(arose). Thus his conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal cases
is precipitate and hasty. Had he awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by
the accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution to comment/oppose
the same, his resolution would have been the result of deliberation, not
speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
promptly resolved in the negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the
usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. 14 This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not
be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of
the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters
coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life,
or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they
may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere
newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice
removed, took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter
which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general notoriety.
Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force when
the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken
of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is not yet in
force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and
unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take
judicial notice of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him,
to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the
time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent
Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits
and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government
service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any
judgment or order, or continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective
upon receipt of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
 
Separate Opinions
 
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 178158               December 4, 2009
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, Respondents.
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS BERHAD, Intervenor.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 180428
LUIS SISON, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and RADSTOCK SECURITIES
LIMITED, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
On 1 May 2007, the 30-year old franchise of Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) under Presidential Decree No. 1113 (PD 1113), as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1894 (PD 1894), expired. During the 13th Congress, PNCC sought to extend its franchise.
PNCC won approval from the House of Representatives, which passed House Bill No.
57492 renewing PNCC’s franchise for another 25 years. However, PNCC failed to secure
approval from the Senate, dooming the extension of PNCC’s franchise. Led by Senator
Franklin M. Drilon, the Senate opposed PNCC’s plea for extension of its franchise. 3 Senator
Drilon’s privilege speech4 explains why the Senate chose not to renew PNCC’s franchise:
I.
The Case
Before this Court are the consolidated petitions for review9 filed by Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation (STRADEC) and Luis Sison (Sison), with a motion for intervention
filed by Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad (Asiavest), challenging the validity of the
Compromise Agreement between PNCC and Radstock. The Court of Appeals approved the
Compromise Agreement in its Decision of 25 January 200710 in CA-G.R. CV No. 87971.
II.
The Antecedents
PNCC was incorporated in 1966 for a term of fifty years under the Corporation Code with the
name Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). 11 PD 1113, issued on
31 March 1977, granted CDCP a 30-year franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll
facilities in the North and South Luzon Tollways. PD 1894, issued on 22 December 1983,
amended PD 1113 to include in CDCP’s franchise the Metro Manila Expressway, which would
"serve as an additional artery in the transportation of trade and commerce in the Metro
Manila area."
Sometime between 1978 and 1981, Basay Mining Corporation (Basay Mining), an affiliate of
CDCP, obtained loans from Marubeni Corporation of Japan (Marubeni) amounting to
5,460,000,000 yen and US$5 million. A CDCP official issued letters of guarantee for the loans,
committing CDCP to pay solidarily for the full amount of the 5,460,000,000 yen loan and to
the extent of ₱20 million for the US$5 million loan. However, there was no CDCP Board
Resolution authorizing the issuance of the letters of guarantee. Later, Basay Mining changed
its name to CDCP Mining Corporation (CDCP Mining). CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni
loans when CDCP and CDCP Mining were still privately owned and managed.
Subsequently in 1983, CDCP changed its corporate name to PNCC to reflect the extent of the
Government's equity investment in the company, which arose when government financial
institutions converted their loans to PNCC into equity following PNCC’s inability to pay the
loans.12 Various government financial institutions held a total of seventy-seven point forty-
eight percent (77.48%) of PNCC’s voting equity, most of which were later transferred to the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT) under Administrative Orders No. 14 and 64, series of 1987 and
1988, respectively.13 Also, the Presidential Commission on Good Government holds some
13.82% of PNCC’s voting equity under a writ of sequestration and through the voluntary
surrender of certain PNCC shares. In fine, the Government owns 90.3% of the equity of PNCC
and only 9.70% of PNCC’s voting equity is under private ownership. 14
Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid. On 20 October 2000,
during the short-lived Estrada Administration, the PNCC Board of Directors 15 (PNCC Board)
passed Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 admitting PNCC’s liability to Marubeni for
₱10,743,103,388 as of 30 September 1999. PNCC Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 reads as
follows:
RESOLUTION NO. BD-092-2000
RESOLVED, That the Board recognizes, acknowledges and confirms PNCC’s obligations as of
September 30, 1999 with the following entities, exclusive of the interests and other charges
that may subsequently accrue and still become due therein, to wit:
a). the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
₱36,023,784,751.00; and
b). Marubeni Corporation in the amount of ₱10,743,103,388.00. (Emphasis supplied)
This was the first PNCC Board Resolution admitting PNCC’s liability for the Marubeni loans.
Previously, for two decades the PNCC Board consistently refused to admit any liability for
the Marubeni loans.
Less than two months later, or on 22 November 2000, the PNCC Board passed Board
Resolution No. BD-099-2000 amending Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000. PNCC Board
Resolution No. BD-099-2000 reads as follows:
Conclusion
In sum, the acts of the PNCC Board in (1) issuing Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-
099-2000 expressly admitting liability for the Marubeni loans, and (2) entering into the
Compromise Agreement, constitute evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence,
amounting to fraud, in the management of PNCC’s affairs. Being public officers, the
government nominees in the PNCC Board must answer not only to PNCC and its
stockholders, but also to the Filipino people for grossly mishandling PNCC’s finances.
Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, the Compromise Agreement is "inexistent and void
from the beginning," and "cannot be ratified," thus:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
 (1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy;
xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The Compromise Agreement is indisputably contrary to the Constitution, existing laws and
public policy. Under Article 1409, the Compromise Agreement is expressly declared void and
"cannot be ratified." No court, not even this Court, can ratify or approve the Compromise
Agreement. This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
existing laws, and fundamental public policy. This Court must not shirk in declaring the
Compromise Agreement inexistent and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 180428. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated
25 January 2007 and the Resolutions dated 12 June 2007 and 5 November 2007 of the Court
of Appeals. We DECLARE (1) PNCC Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099-2000
admitting liability for the Marubeni loans VOID AB INITIO for causing undue injury to the
Government and giving unwarranted benefits to a private party, constituting a corrupt
practice and unlawful act under Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
(2) the Compromise Agreement between the Philippine National Construction Corporation
and Radstock Securities Limited INEXISTENT AND VOID AB INITIO for being contrary to
Section 29(1), Article VI and Sections 3 and 7, Article XII of the Constitution; Section 20(1),
Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; Sections 4(2), 79,
84(1), and 85 of the Government Auditing Code; and Articles 2241, 2242, 2243 and 2244 of the
Civil Code.
We GRANT the intervention of Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad in G.R. No. 178158 but
DECLARE that Strategic Alliance Development Corporation has no legal standing to sue.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
The Obligation of PNCC to
Marubeni Was Established
In the RTC, PNCC urged the following grounds as affirmative defenses, namely: 1) that the
plaintiff had no capacity to sue; 2) that the loan obligation had already prescribed, because
no valid demand had been made; and 3) that the letter of guarantee had been signed by a
person not authorized by a valid board resolution.
On appeal (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 66654), PNCC raised the same grounds, to wit: 1) that the cause
of action was barred by prescription; 2) that the pleading asserting the claim stated no cause
of action; 3) that the condition precedent for the filing of the instant suit had not been
complied with; and 4) that the plaintiff had no legal capacity to sue.
As the excerpts of the Court’s decision in G.R. No. 156887 show, 114 the defense of
prescription of the claim and the other defenses of PNCC were passed upon, and the Court
upheld the CA’s affirmance of the RTC’s denial of PNCC’s motion to dismiss based on such
defenses. The ruling in G.R. No. 156887 bars the re-litigation in these consolidated cases of
the same issues, particularly a bar by prescription, because of the application of the doctrine
of law of the case.
Law of the case is defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule between
the same parties in the same case  continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be facts of the case before the court,115 notwithstanding that the rule laid down
may have been reversed in other cases.116 Indeed, after the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point presented to it with a full opportunity to be heard having been
accorded to the parties, that pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and
should not be reopened on a remand of the case.117
The concept of the law of the case is explained in Mangold v. Bacon, 118 thus:
The general rule, nakedly and badly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first
appeal, whether on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only
prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity
thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in all after steps below or above on
subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on convenience, experience, and reason. Without
the rule there would be no end to criticism, re-agitation, re-examination, and reformulation.
In short, there would be endless litigation. It would be intolerable if parties litigant were
allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the change of our
rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law
of a given case. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in the
foolishness of the inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew. Courts are
allowed, if they so choose, to act like ordinary sensible persons. The administration of justice
is a practical affair. The rule is a practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use.
Resultantly, the liability of PNCC to Radstock was established, rendering the decision to
enter into a compromise agreement a wise move on the part of PNCC. The same result
cannot be contemplated if the nullification of the compromise agreement were decreed
herein, because PNCC would probably lose by an adjudgment against it of a larger liability.
I
The Resolution of PNCC’s Board Recognizing
Its Obligation to Marubeni Bound PNCC
Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 dated October 20, 2000 proves that PNCC incurred an
obligation in favor of Marubeni. PNCC’s Board of Directors would not have issued the
resolution if the obligation was unfounded, considering that the resolution admitted its
liability, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. BD-09202000
RESOLVED, That the Board recognizes, acknowledges and confirms PNCC’s obligations as of
September 30, 1999 with the following entities, exclusive of interests and other charges that
may subsequently accrue and still become due therein, to wit:
 a). the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
P36,023,784,751.00; and
b). Marubeni Corporation in the amount of P10,743,103,388.00.
Yet, the majority would have the Court strike down the resolution, and not give it effect,
because it was null and void. They opine that the PNCC Board approved a transaction that
was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the National Government, and that such
transaction was even a corrupt and unlawful act. They conclude that the resolution, being
unlawful and a criminal act, was void ab initio and could not be implemented or in any way
given effect by the Executive or Judicial Branch of the Government.
I am not persuaded.
That its issuance might have been unwise or disadvantageous to PNCC, which I do not
concede, did not invalidate Resolution No. BD-092-1000. The resolution, being simply a
recognition of a prior indebtedness in favor of Marubeni and the Government, was clearly
issued within the corporation’s powers; hence, it was neither illegal nor ultra vires.  Indeed,
had PNCC remained a purely private corporation, no issue would be raised against the
propriety of its Board of Directors thereby recognizing an indebtedness.
The majority rely heavily on the transcripts of the Senate Committee hearings to buttress
the imputation of bad faith behind the passage of the board resolution that recognized
PNCC’s debts to Marubeni. They copiously quote the privilege speech of Senator Franklin
Drilon delivered during the plenary session of December 21, 2006; and the transcripts of the
Senate Committee hearings held on December 14, 2006.
To me, the reliance on the privilege speech and the transcripts of the Senate Committee
hearings is unwarranted and misplaced.
The speeches of legislators delivered on the floor and the testimonies of resource persons
given in Congressional committee hearings, like those quoted in the majority opinion, have
no probative value in judicial adjudication, for they are not recognized as evidence under the
Rules of
Court. Even the rule on judicial notice embodied in Section 1,119 Rule 129, of the Rules of Court
does not accord probative value to such speeches and testimonies, because the rule extends
only to the official acts of the Legislative Department. The term official acts, in its general
sense, may encompass all activities of the Congress, like the laws enacted and resolutions
adopted, but the statements of the legislators and testimonies cannot be regarded, by any
stretch of legal understanding, as the "official act of the legislative department." At best, the
courts can only take judicial notice of the fact that such statements or speeches were made
by such persons, or that such hearings were conducted.
Although this Court can take cognizance of the proceedings of the Senate, as acts of a
department of the National Government, the testimonies or statements of the persons
during the hearings or sessions may not be used to prove disputed facts in the courts of law.
They cannot substitute actual testimony as basis for making findings of fact necessary for
the determination of a controversy by the courts. In other words, they are incompetent for
purposes of judicial proceedings.
Moreover, in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 120 the Court defined the
limitation on the power of the Legislative Department to investigate a controversy
exclusively pertaining to the Judicial Department, and regarded as an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction any probe or inquiry by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan,
declaring:
In fine, for the respondent [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to probe and inquire into that
same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment
into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt v.
United States, it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot
inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches of
the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into
matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the
Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. xxx.
Indeed, the distinctions between court proceedings, on one hand, and legislative
investigations in aid of legislation, on the other hand, derive from their different purposes.
Courts conduct hearings to settle, through the application of law, actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights.121 In court proceedings,
the person’s rights to life, liberty and property may be directly and adversely affected. The
Rules of Court prescribes procedural safeguards consistent with the principles of due
process and equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution. The manner in which disputed
matters can be proven in judicial proceedings as provided in the Rules of Court must be
followed. In contrast, the legislative bodies conduct their inquiries under less safeguards and
restrictions, because inquiries in aid of legislation are undertaken as tools to gather
information, in order to enable the legislators to act wisely and effectively, and in order to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws, or to enact new or remedial
legislation.122
In particular, the Senate is not bound by the Rules of Court. Its inquiries permit witnesses to
relate matters that are hearsay, or to give mere opinion, or to transmit information
considered incompetent under the Rules of Court. The witnesses serve as resource persons,
often unassisted by counsel, and appear before the legislators, who are the inquisitors. The
latter have no obligation to act as impartial judges during the proceedings. The inquiries do
not include direct examinations and cross-examinations, and leading questions are frequent.
Cogently, the proper treatment of the findings of congressional committees by courts of law
became the subject of the following observations made in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:123
Finally, the respondent Congressmen assert that at least two (2) committee reports by the
House of Representatives found the PIATCO contracts valid and contend that this Court, by
taking cognizance of the cases at bar, reviewed an action of a co-equal body. They insist that
the Court must respect the findings of the said committees of the House of Representatives.
With due respect, we cannot subscribe to their submission. There is a fundamental
difference between a case in court and an investigation of a congressional committee. The
purpose of a judicial proceeding is to settle the dispute in controversy by adjudicating the
legal rights and obligations of the parties to the case. On the other hand, a congressional
investigation is conducted in aid of legislation. Its aim is to assist and recommend to the
legislature a possible action that the body may take with regard to a particular issue,
specifically as to whether or not to enact a new law or amend an existing one. Consequently,
this Court cannot treat the findings in a congressional committee report as binding because
the facts elicited in congressional hearings are not subject to the rigors of the Rules of Court
on admissibility of evidence. The Court in assuming jurisdiction over the petitions at bar
simply performed its constitutional duty as the arbiter of legal disputes properly brought
before it, especially in this instance when public interest requires nothing less.
V
Asiavest’s Intervention
Had No Leg to Stand On
Asiavest was a judgment creditor of PNCC by virtue of the Court’s judgment in G.R. No.
110263. After 5 years from the issuance of a writ of execution in its favor, Asiavest’s
judgment award is yet to be satisfied.124
In G.R. No. 178158, Asiavest filed its urgent motion for leave to intervene and to file the
attached opposition and motion-in-intervention, claiming that it had a legal interest as an
unpaid judgment creditor of PNCC, nay a superior right, over the properties subject of the
compromise agreement.125 It prayed, if allowed to intervene, that the compromise
agreement be nullified because, otherwise, PNCC might no longer have properties sufficient
to satisfy the judgment in favor of the former.
The Court granted the urgent motion  of movant-intervenor Asiavest for leave to intervene
and to file opposition and motion in intervention [re: judgment based on
compromise].126 However, Asiavest was not required to file a comment.
The position of Asiavest cannot be sustained.
To start with, Asiavest has no direct and material interest in the approval (or disapproval) of
the compromise agreement between PNCC and Radstock.
Secondly, Asiavest’s request to intervene was made too late in the proceedings. Under
Section 2, Rule 19, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, an intervention, to be permitted, must be
sought prior to the rendition of the judgment by the trial court.
Thirdly, the avowed interest of Asiavest in PNCC’s assets emanated from its being a creditor
of PNCC by final judgment, and was not related to the personal obligations of PNCC in favor
of Marubeni (that is, the guarantees for the loans) that were the subject of the compromise
agreement. Such interest did not entitle Asiavest to attack the compromise agreement
between PNCC and Radstock. The interest that entitles a person to intervene in a suit
already commenced between other persons must be in the matter in litigation  and of such
character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of
the judgment.127 The conditions for a proper intervention in relation to Asiavest simply did
not exist. Moreover, sustaining Asiavest’s posture may mean allowing other creditors to
intervene in an action involving their debtor brought by another creditor against such
debtor upon the broad pretext that they were thereby prejudiced. The absurdity of
Asiavest’s posture, being plain, can never be permitted under the rules on intervention. 128
Fourthly, that Asiavest is yet to recover from PNCC under the final judgment rendered in G.R.
No. 110263 gave the former no standing to intervene in the action Radstock brought against
PNCC to enforce the latter’s guarantees. Asiavest was an absolute stranger to the juridical
situation arising between Radstock and PNCC. The proper recourse of Asiavest was,
instead, to pursue the execution of the judgment until satisfaction, a remedy that is amply
provided for in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Lastly, Asiavest’s argument that the compromise agreement might be in fraud of it as a
judgment creditor of PNCC, in support of which newspaper reports are cited, 129 is
unpersuasive. The allegation of fraud remains unsupported by admissible and credible
evidence presented by Asiavest, considering that mere newspaper reports are incompetent
and inadmissible hearsay.130
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, I vote to dismiss the petitions in G.R.
No. 178158 and G.R. No. 180428; to disallow the intervention of Asiavest Merchant Bankers
Berhad; to affirm the decision dated January 25, 2007, the resolution dated May 31, 2007
promulgated in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 87971, and the resolution dated June 12, 2007 promulgated
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 97982.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130656. June 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARMANDO REANZARES* also known as
ARMANDO RIANZARES, Accused-Appellant.*
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case is with us on automatic review of the 26 May 1997 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tanauan, Batangas, finding accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as
"Armando Rianzares" guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 2 and
sentencing him to the extreme penalty of death. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of his
victim Lilia Tactacan P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses, P50,000.00 as
indemnity for death, P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag, and to reimburse Gregorio
Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from him.
The facts, except as to the identity of accused Armando Reanzares, are undisputed. Spouses
Gregorio Tactacan and Lilia Tactacan owned a sari-sari store in San Miguel, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas. On 10 May 1994 at around 8:10 in the evening, the Tactacan spouses closed their
store and left for home in Barangay San Roque, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on board their
passenger-type jeepney. As Gregorio was maneuvering his jeep backwards from where it
was parked two (2) unidentified men suddenly climbed on board. His wife Lilia immediately
asked them where they were going and they answered that they were bound for the town
proper. When Lilia informed them that they were not going to pass through the town
proper, the two (2) said they would just get off at the nearest intersection. After negotiating
some 500 meters, one of the hitchhikers pointed a .38 caliber revolver at Gregorio while the
other poked a balisong at Lilia's neck and ordered Gregorio to stop the vehicle. Two (2) other
persons, one of whom was later identified as accused Armando Reanzares, were seen
waiting for them at a distance. As soon as the vehicle stopped, the accused and his
companion approached the vehicle. Gregorio was then pulled from the driver's seat to the
back of the vehicle. They gagged and blindfolded him and tied his hands and feet. They also
took his Seiko wristwatch worth P2,500.00. The accused then drove the vehicle after being
told by one of them, "Sige i-drive mo na."3cräläwvirtualibräry
Gregorio did not know where they were headed for as he was blindfolded. After several
minutes, he felt the vehicle making a u-turn and stopped after ten (10) minutes. During the
entire trip, his wife kept uttering, "Maawa kayo sa amin,  marami kaming anak,  kunin nyo na
lahat ng gusto ninyo." Immediately after the last time she uttered these words a commotion
ensued and Lilia was heard saying, "aray!" Gregorio heard her but could not do anything.
After three (3) minutes the commotion ceased. Then he heard someone tell him, "Huwag
kang kikilos diyan,  ha,"  and left. Gregorio then untied his hands and feet, removed his gag
and blindfold and jumped out of the vehicle. The culprits were all gone, including his wife. He
ran to San Roque East shouting for help.4cräläwvirtualibräry
When Gregorio returned to the crime scene, the jeepney was still there. He went to the
drivers seat. There he saw his wife lying on the floor of the jeepney with blood splattered all
over her body. Her bag containing P1,200.00 was missing. He brought her immediately to
the C. P. Reyes Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. 5
At the time of her death Lilia Tactacan was forty-eight (48) years old. According to Gregorio,
he was deeply depressed by her death; that he incurred funeral, burial and other related
expenses, and that his wife was earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Lily D. Nunes, Medical Health Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, conducted a post-mortem
examination on the body of the victim. Her medieport disclosed that the victim sustained
eight (8) stab wounds on the chest and abdominal region of the body. She testified that a
sharp pointed object like a long knife could have caused those wounds which must have
been inflicted by more than one (1) person, and that all those wounds except the non-
penetrating one caused the immediate death of the victim. 7cräläwvirtualibräry
Subsequently, two (2) Informations were filed against accused Armando Reanzares and
three (3) John Does in relation to the incident. The first was for violation of PD 532 otherwise
known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for allegedly conspiring, with
intent to gain and armed with bladed weapons and a .38 caliber revolver, to rob and carry
away one (1) Seiko wristwatch owned by Gregorio Tactacan and P1,000.00 cash of Lilia
Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed her. The second was for violation of RA
6539, An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, for taking away by means of violence and
intimidation of persons one (1) passenger-type jeepney with Plate No. DBP 235 owned and
driven by Gregorio Tactacan and valued at P110,000.00. Only the accused Armando
Reanzares was arrested. The other three (3) have remained unidentified and at large.
The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not have perpetrated the
crimes imputed to him with three (3) others as he was in Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena,
Camarines Sur, for the baptism of his daughter Jessica when the incident happened. 8 His
father, Jose Reanzares, corroborated his story. Jose claimed that the accused
borrowed P500.00 from him for the latter's trip to Bicol although he could not say that he
actually saw the accused leave for his intended destination.9 To bolster the alibi of the
accused, his brother Romeo Reanzares also took the witness stand and alleged that he saw
the accused off on 9 May 1994, the day before the incident. Romeo maintained that he
accompanied the accused to the bus stop that day and even helped the latter carry his
things to the bus. He however could not categorically state where and when the accused
alighted or that he in fact reached Bicol. 10cräläwvirtualibräry
On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecutions evidence credible and ruled that the
alibi of the accused could not prevail over his positive identification by complaining
witness Gregorio Tactacan. The court a quo  declared him guilty of Highway Robbery with
Homicide under PD 532 and sentenced him to death. It further ordered him to pay the heirs
of Lilia Tactacan P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and
related expenses, and P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag. The accused was also
ordered to reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from
him.11 But the trial court exonerated the accused from the charge of carnapping under RA
6539 for insufficiency of evidence.
Finally, the accused chides Gregorio for supposedly suppressing a very material piece of
evidence, i.e., the latter failed to present as witnesses a certain Renato and his wife who
allegedly saw the holduppers running away from the crime scene. But this is only a
disputable presumption under Sec. 3, par. (e), Rule 131, of the Rules of Court on evidence,
which does not apply in the present case as the evidence allegedly omitted is equally
accessible and available to the defense.
These attempts of the accused to discredit Gregorio obviously cannot hold ground. Neither
can they bolster his alibi. For alibi to be believed it must be shown that (a) the accused was
in another place at the time of the commission of the offense, and (b) it was physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus the trial court was correct in disregarding the alibi of the accused not only because he
was positively identified by Gregorio Tactacan but also because it was not shown that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene on the date and time of the incident.
As to the damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim, we sustain the award
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the wrongful death of Lilia Tactacan. In addition, the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages is ordered. Also, damages for loss of earning
capacity of Lilia Tactacan must be granted to her heirs. The testimony of Gregorio Tactacan,
the victims husband, on the earning capacity of his wife, together with a copy of his wifes
payroll, is enough to establish the basis for the award. The formula for determining the life
expectancy of Lilia Tactacan, applying the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, is as
follows: 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). 16 Since Lilia was 48 years of
age at the time of her death,17 then her life expectancy was 21.33 years.
However, the award of P1,000.00 representing the cash taken from Lilia Tactacan must be
increased to P1,200.00 as this was the amount established by the prosecution without
objection from the defense. The award of P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related
expenses must be reduced to P22,000.00 as this was the only amount sufficiently
substantiated.18 There was no other competent evidence presented to support the original
award.
The amount of P2,500.00 as reimbursement for the Seiko wristwatch taken from Gregorio
Tactacan must be deleted in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence aside
from the self-serving valuation made by the prosecution. An ordinary witness cannot
establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of
goods which is a matter of public knowledge or is capable of unquestionable demonstration.
The value of jewelry therefore does not fall under either category of which the court can
take judicial notice.19cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE , the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused ARMANDO REANZARES
also known as "Armando Rianzares" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery
with Homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity
for death, another P50,000.00 for moral damages, P1,200.00 for actual
damages, P438,971.40 for loss of earning capacity, and P22,000.00 for funeral, burial and
related expenses. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,  (Chairman), Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago,  and De Leon, Jr.,  JJ.,  concur.
 EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 135695-96               October 12, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch
28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of
two counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City
Prosecutor’s Office two separate complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint,
docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father
of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said
offended party against the latter’s will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father
of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said
offended party against the latter’s will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the
charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellant’s defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the
rape charges against him since he and his daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly
reprimanded her for going out whenever he was not at home." 3
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty
of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape
upon her; and
 (2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article
2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the
pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the
crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
c) To pay the costs.
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty
of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her;
and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in
relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral
shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape with one
qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
(3) To pay the costs.
4
SO ORDERED.
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainant’s version of what accused
did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows
that private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to
read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living
with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, she was in the house
together with her father. But before she went to sleep, her father was already lying down on
the mat while herself (sic) just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside
him. However, when she was already sleeping, she noticed that her father who was already
undressed was beside her and was embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she
resisted but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after
that, he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect,
his penis penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the
time asking by saying (sic) : ‘Does it feel good?’ And at the same time, he was laughing and
further, told her that a woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got
angry with her when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she
felt intense pain that she cried and told him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said:
‘Why will I pull it out when it feels so good(?)’
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to
heaven if she did not get married, her father just stayed there and continued smoking while
she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her
father was just smoking and squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied
(sic) down to sleep when her father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to
her, she placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid down with her
and was able to take her womanhood again by using a very sharp knife which he was
holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her father’s place and went to her
neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what had happened to her, who, in
turn, advised her to report the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the
policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and after
her medical examination, she was brought back by the police and was investigated by
them."5
Appellant’s claim that the complainant’s charges were manufactured did not impress the
trial court, which found him twice guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double
conviction, simply contending that:6
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that
on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gal’s Bakery in Mandaue
City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 o’clock that evening. On
November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for
him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, "he went
to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such
wrongdoings."7
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the
trial court’s decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and
indemnity ex delicto be modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of
the penalty of death imposed in each of these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone
unturned in its review of the records, including the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of
guilt.8 But here we find no room to disturb the trial court’s judgment concerning appellant’s
guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.
Appellant’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a
worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life.
Against the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative matters, 9 such
defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes
even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the
violator of her honor.10 Indeed, we find that private complainant was unequivocal in charging
appellant with ravishing her. The victim’s account of the rapes complained of was
straightforward, detailed, and consistent.11 Her testimony never wavered even after it had
been explained to her that her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty
by the court.12
In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s credibility is the single most important
issue.13 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial
court. The rationale for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at
first hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position
to form an accurate impression and conclusion. 14 Absent any showing that certain facts of
value have clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of the case,
or that the trial court’s finding are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of
origin must be respected and the judgment rendered affirmed.15
Moreover, we note here that private complainant’s testimony is corroborated by medical
findings that lacerations were present in her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr.
Bessie Acebes upon the private complainant yielded the following results:
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainant’s
private parts meant a history of sexual congress on her part. 17 According to her, the
lacerations may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into complainant’s
genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be inferred
from complainant’s U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not yet
experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.18 While Dr. Acebes conceded under cross-
examination, that the existence of the datum "U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively
and absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused
by masturbation of fingers or other things,"19 nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal
lacerations tends to support private complainant’s claim that she was raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because
she had quarreled with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the
prosecution did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with
private complainant. He urges us to consider the charges filed against him as the result of his
frequent castigation of her delinquent behavior.20
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case
for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken seriously.
It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag
herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her
natural instinct to protect her honor.21 More so, where her charges could mean the death of
her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes
imputed to him considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for.
This argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his
wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with him. 22 As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, appellant was thus "free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his
daughter."23
Nor does appellant’s assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems
and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility
of her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the
consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as shown by the
following testimony of the victim on cross-examination:
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victim’s
father.29 But the victim’s age was not properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable
doubt. She testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she
admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell
her. She further said that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother. In her own
words, the victim testified - 30
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request
for judicial notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted. …
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on
without proof because they already know them.31 Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice
may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts -
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial
notice of facts -
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought
to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the
rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or
place. The offense of rape can and has been committed in places where people congregate,
e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people
inside, or even in the same room which the victim is sharing with the accused’s sister. 32
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipina’s inbred modesty and shyness and
her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue. 33
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an
example would be facts which are ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g.
as to when court notices were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial
notice, the court can take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that -
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. -  During the trial, the court, on its own
initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense
counsel’s admission, thereof acceding to the prosecution’s motion. As required by Section
3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can
take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth
or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said
documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for
the purpose.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed
by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its
unqualified form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A.
7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7, 1997, after the
effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on
October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in
Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas
Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well
as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:
Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director
of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with
defendant company [herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila.
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to
plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an
original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted
the offer and commenced working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month
probation period, plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979.
(Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to
five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex
"C" p. 31, Rec.).
During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of
a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff
apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the
aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few
days until he was investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.
On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion
training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having
successfully completed and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April
7, 1981, for solo duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as
captain of the A-300 fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia.
(Annexes "D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures.
Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the
defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant
informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to
take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to
terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however,
immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible
 promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve
were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the twelve.
On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective
November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three
months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on
such short notice, plaintiff requested a three-month notice to afford him time to
exhaust all possible avenues for reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only
two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said
motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the
instant case for damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the
court a quo  (Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1)
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that
Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that
the complaint is for illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in
the course of plaintiffs employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who
have the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since
plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment contract
and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant postulates that Singapore
laws should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.).
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items
demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an
obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case
involves a question that is beyond the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3)
if the complaint is grounded not on the employee's dismissal  per se but on the
manner of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, the case falls under the
jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-
84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied
upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches,
waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of
action . (pp. 102-115)1
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano
and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
the amounts of —
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid;
 SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of
exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as
consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid;
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary
damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED.2
Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of
jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
. . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the
effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's
action has already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS
UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN
INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER
ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE RETRENCHED BY HIS
EMPLOYER?
3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE
EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on
the application of Philippine law, thus:
Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal
under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific
laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of
Singapore. The defendant that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this
case has the burden of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the
Philippine law should be applied.4
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before
said court.5 On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-
appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction. 6
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is
amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the
retrenchment:
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's
termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample
notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of
discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON KAMLON
HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi," JUMATIYA
AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y
MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y
SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and
JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case,
also pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence,
both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench
and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.
The Case
On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060,
10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos.
10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed 1 before the Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma
Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de Kamming, 2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam 3 Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and
Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical
allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the
person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] 4 and for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person
of said Felix Rosario, 5 a male public officer of the City Government of
Zamboanga, who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976
which was being ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio
Tigbao Lisomo, Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario 6 to different
mountainous places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he
was detained, held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989,
 the day when he was released only after payment of the ransom was made
to herein accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being
present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was
committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity.
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting one another, by means of threats and
intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of MONICO
SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] 7 a male public officer of the
City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with
the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya
Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan,
Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial
on the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-
page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this
Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot
[g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for
[k]idnapping, their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL y
MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy
in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim.
Cases Nos. 10060-10067).
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid
of armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on
them shall be at their maximum period.
WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and
pursuant to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer
and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life
 imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)
For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar,
and their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art.
268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four
accused — Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih — are sentenced to serve two (2) jail
terms ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen
(18) years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and
10067).
3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges of
[k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065,
10066 and 10067).
But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five
charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)
imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum
to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-1 0064).
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN (charged
as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges
for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges.
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners,
they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to
serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF  prision mayor as
maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders
"convicted of an offense punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree
No. 1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for
[r]ansom is such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are
sentenced further to return the following personal effects taken on
December 12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their
liability being solidary.
To Jessica Calunod:

One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00

One Bracelet P 2,400.00

One Shoulder Bag P 200.00

Cash P 200.00

To Armado C. Bacarro:

One (1) wrist watch P 800.00

One Necklace P 300.00

One Calculator P 295.00

Eyeglasses P 500.00

One Steel Tape P 250.00

To Edilberto S. Perez:

One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00

One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00

Cash P 300.00

To Virginia San Agustin-

Gara:

One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be
extended to those sentenced.
The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon
a.k.a. "Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John Does" and
Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their arrest.
Costs against the accused convicted.
SO ORDERED. 9
On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais
and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal. 10 In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the
same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application
for "amnesty." In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the
appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court. 11
The Facts
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and
one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon
him six terms of "life imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal
detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court
ratiocinated as follows:
Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and
their version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3,
1989. On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution
witnesses and their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and
convincing. No taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to
[p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify,
[p]rosecution witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a]
sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of
alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on
what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the
accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of
the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by
[p]rosecution evidence.
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the
course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1)
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5)
Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid",
and Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted
based on reasonable doubt.
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty
as conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven
accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the
purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off
from established communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved
from place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed
band moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving
them material and moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of
the kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting them.
x x x           x x x          x x x
II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul
Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of
kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were
armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off
the military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place,
and in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais
were positively identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped
the eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.
 The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to
prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions
and circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be
accomplished and from which may logically be inferred that there was a
common design, understanding or agreement among the conspirators to
commit the offense charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs.
Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the
murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et.  al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object,
whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or
collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contribute to the
wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though
performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA 759, 772
(1968).) 14
The Assigned Errors
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:
I
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in
another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader
of the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants
in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to
cross-examine him.
II
On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken
judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the
same for being highly improbable and contradictory.
III
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani,
Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with
material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the
kidnapping for ransom cases.
IV
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and
Norma Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth
offenders considering that they were minors at the time of the commission
of the offense. 15
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their
appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will
no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will
be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of
the penalty imposed by the trial court.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial
notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the
team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported
cohorts. 16 Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material
witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latter's testimony
should not be used against him. 17
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have
been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. 18 This is especially true in
criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of
the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases
against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction
was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims,
namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were
subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best,
then, the trial court's mention of Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional
surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially prejudiced
Appellant Kulais.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony:
xxx xxx xxx 19
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one
of the culprits:
Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping
or detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three
days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais
was a member of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was
one of those who guarded the victims during the entire period of their captivity. His
participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial court that he was a conspirator.
Kidnapping
for Ransom
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also
apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the
accused and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and
Edilberto Perez. 28 The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver
the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to
by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan 29 and Teddy Mejia. 30
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, 31 having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having
been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial court's finding
of appellant's guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.
Kidnapping of
Public Officers
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members
of the government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to
the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so,
appellant's identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod,
Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction
occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours 32 does nor matter.
In People vs. Domasian, 33 the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released
even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they
could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave
coercion was committed, if at all. 34 Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal
detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an
eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he was restrained from going home.
The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not only in placing
a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any manner, of his
liberty. 35 Likewise, in People vs. Santos, 36 the Court held that since the appellant was
charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the
deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was
locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few
hours is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers 37 — Gara was a
fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineer's Office, and
Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant
Kulais should be punished, therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, and not Art, 268, as the trial court held.
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that
the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt
that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a  member of the armed group which
abducted the victims.
Third Issue:
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of
kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty
imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion
perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three
terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara,
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other accused who withdrew their
appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their monetary value, taken
from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of P122,000
representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.