MURILLO, PAUL ARMAN T.

MURILLO, ASSIGNMENT #6
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, THURSDAY CLASS

1). Alipio vs. Jaring, GR? No. 134100 (Sept. 29,2000)

Facts:
Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco,
Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On
June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses
Placido and Purita Alipio and the Manuel Spouses. The sublessees only satisfied a portion
thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.

The RTC ruled that Surviving spouse should pay. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion on
the ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be
independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of her
husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.

The CA ruled that Surviving spouse should pay. It is noted that all the defendants, including the
deceased, were signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot
avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract has totally
extinguished their obligation.

Issue:
1. Whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is
owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or
2. Whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent.

Ruling:
1. Surviving spouse is not liable. The conjugal partnership of gains is liable. It is clear that
Climaco had a cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was,
however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money and the
corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of the
defendant, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court.  As held in Calma v. Tañedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no
complaint about the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be
made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The
reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the
surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court
having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving
spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any
property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void.  the inventory of the Alipios’ conjugal property is necessary
before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power
 exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent’s
estate and not to any other court.
2. The obligation is joint. Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the
obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e.,
the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being
considered distinct from one another. Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely
joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their
respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided
into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
2) Heirs of Pizzaro Sr. Vs. Consolacion, GR. No. L- 51278 (May 9/88)
Facts:

On August 12,1977, Luis Tan filed a verified petition with the CFI of Davao for the issuance of
letters of administration in favor of a certain Alfonso Atilano. The petition alleged, among others
that private respondent is the only surviving son of the deceased Dominga Garcia who died
intestate sometime in 1930 in Canton, China; that the deceased left a parcel of land located at
C.M. Recto Avenue, Davao City; and that the said lot is in the possession of the heirs of Ramon
Pizarro, petitioners herein.

On October 4, 1977, petitioners filed an opposition to the said petition claiming that they are the
heirs of Ramon Pizarro who died intestate on June 16, 1974; and that the deceased was the
vendee of one-half (1/2) of the aforementioned lot by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of
estate and deed of absolute sale executed by Vicente Tan in Hongkong on May 27, 1966.
Petitioners prayed that letters of administration of Dominga Garcia's estate be issued in favor of
anyone of them.

Accordingly, on March 27, 1978, after the judicial administrator had qualified and his inventory
of the assets of the late Dominga Garcia was approved, respondent court issued an order
requiring the filing of creditors' claim against the said estate within the period of six (6) months
from the date of the first publication. Copy of said order was received by petitioners through
counsel on March 28, 1979. 

Meanwhile, on January 23,1979, private respondent and the City of Davao filed a joint motion
asking respondent court to take notice of their agreement which in substance provides for an
agreement to file a joint motion in the CFI of Davao to proceed with the determination of the
heirs of the deceased Domingao Garcia which shall be determinative of their respective claims
against the estate. On February 19, 1979, petitioners filed their opposition to the said joint
motion on the sole ground that it is without procedural basis. Private respondent filed his reply
thereto on February 21, 1979. On February 22, 1979, respondent court issued an order taking
note of the agreement between private respondent and the City of Davao.

On February 28, 1979, private respondent filed a motion to drop and exclude the petitioners on
the ground that they do not even claim to be the heirs of the deceased Dominga Garcia and that
the extrajudicial deed of partition and deed of absolute sale allegedly executed in Hongkong in
favor of the petitioners' deceased father is spurious and simulated. On March 5, 1979,
petitioners filed their opposition to said motion. They likewise filed a claim against the estate of
the deceased Garcia in the amount of P350,000.00 representing services allegedly rendered by
their deceased father in favor of Vicente Tan. On March 8, 1979, private respondent filed a reply
to petitioners' opposition and a motion to strike out or dismiss the claim on the ground that it is
spurious and barred for having been filed beyond the six (6) month period set in the notice for
the filing of creditors' claim. On March 29, 1979, petitioners filed another claim against the
estate for P200,000.00 allegedly advanced by their deceased father for the payment of realty
and income taxes of the said lot sometime in 1936, to which claim private respondent filed an
opposition on the ground that it is barred for having been filed beyond the six (6) month period
and that it was merely intended to delay the proceedings.
In the Order of June 1, 1979, respondent court dismissed both claims of the petitioners on the
ground that they are barred for having been filed out of time.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were already barred.
Ruling:
No. It is the position of the petitioners that the order of June 1, 1979 of the respondent court,
which directed that the filing of claims against the estate of the late Dominga Garcia be filed
within six (6) months after the first publication of the notice thereof, is null and void in that it is
violative of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court. They contend that said provision
mandates that the filing of such claims should be for a period of six (6) months starting from the
sixth month after the date of the first publication of the notice down to the twelfth month. They
argue that to require filing of claims within the sixth month from publication of notice will shorten
the period in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 86, which provides:
Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the preceding
section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not
be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6) months after the date of the first publication of the
notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a
creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for
cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not
exceeding one (1) month.
We agree. The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give the probate court the
discretion to fix the period for the filing of claims. The probate court is permitted by the rule to
set the period provided it is not less than six (6) months nor more than twelve (12) months from
the date of the first publication of the notice thereof. Such period once fixed by the court is
mandatory. The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must
be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the
early delivery of the property to the person entitled to the same. In Sikat vs. Vda. Mafincode
Villanueva, this Court ruled that the speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the
benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the
debts and expenses of administration have been paid is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
However, in this case the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims within six (6)
months from the date of the first publication of the notice. It was obviously short of the minimum
limit of six (6) months provided for by the law. Petitioner correctly observed that the trial court
thereby shortened the period set by the law. Since the notice issued and the period set by the
trial court was not in accordance with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, what should then apply is the period as provided for by the rules which is not less than
six months nor more than twelve (12) months from the date of first publication of notice. The first
publication of the notice in the Mindanao Times was on March 30, 1978. Thus, the two claims of
petitioners against the estate which were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979
respectively were filed on time.
3) Barredo vs. CA. GR. No.L-17863 ( Nov. 28,1962)
Facts:
On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them their claims
with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first
publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by the administrator of the
intestate estate of Charles McDonough.
On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face
value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorney’s fees against the said
estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto Barredo over the
leasehold rights of McDnough The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage
were all annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the land. A deed of extrajudicial
partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs and was annotated at the back of
the aforesaid title.
The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after hearing, but
was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of
Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the 6 month period
fixed in the published notice to claims. The respondent administrator argues that the one-
month period for filing late claims should be counted from the expiration of the regular 6-
month period.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification?
Ruling:
No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause. A
tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure
to present said claim on time.
The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is
to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the
extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for
the presentation of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958)
However, the probate court’s discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing
claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent
merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners
alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto
Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground insufficient,
due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the
certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim, (as well as the payment of
P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.)
The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under Section
2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no
cause or for an insufficient cause.

4) Villanueva vs. PNB, GR. No. L-18403 (Sept. 30/61)

Facts:
For the administration of the estate of her deceased husband, Pascual Villanueva, the widow
Mauricia G. Villanueva, on December 19, 1949, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Agusan,
for letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 67). The petition was set for hearing and Notice
thereof was published on February 25, March 4, and 11, 1950, in the Manila Daily Bulletin. At
the hearing, other heirs while agreeing to the placing of estate under administration, opposed
the appointment the widow. The name of Atty. Teodulo R. Ricaforte, suggested and all the
parties agreed. After the taking the required oath, Atty. Ricaforte entered upon the performance
of his duties. Under date of November 9, 1950 the Clerk of the Agusan CFI, issued the following
Notice to Creditors.
The above notice contained the usual order for publication thereof (once a week for three
consecutive weeks) which was effected, thru the Morning Times of City, a newspaper of general
circulation, on Nov. 16, 23 and 30, 1950, which expired on November 16, 1951. On July 20,
1953, the defendant-appellant Philippine National Bank filed in the administration proceedings,
Creditor's Claim. On October 12, 1954, the Philippine National Bank filed a Motion for
Admission of claim, stating:
That the caused action for the recovery of the aforesaid amount of P1,847.45 is barred by the
statute of limitations, for more than ten (10) Years have elapsed since the cause of action
accrued up to present time; That the said claim is barred forever on the ground that notice to
creditors having been published in the MORNING TIMES of Cebu City, a newspaper of general
circulation in on November 16, 23 and 30, 1950, ... the Philippine National Bank failed to file its
claim within the time limited in the notice.
The appellant PNB, on November 14, 1958, more than four (4) Years after the opposition of the
claim presented by the administrator, filed a pleading captioned "Petition for an Extension of
time within which to File the Claim of Philippine National Bank", alleging, among others, that
Sec. 2, Rule 87 of the Rules, allows the filing of claims even if the period stated in the notice to
creditors elapsed, upon cause shown and on such terms as equitable; that its failure to present
the claiming with the period stated in the notice, was its lack of knowledge of administration
proceedings, for while said maintains a branch office in Agusan, the employees did not come to
know of the proceedings, the notice has been published in the Morning Times, a newspaper
very limited circulation.
Issue:
Whether or not PNB’s claim is already barred?
Ruling:
Yes. Admittedly, the claim was filed outside of the period provided for in the Order of the lower
court, within which to present claims against the estate. The period fixed in the notice lapsed on
November 16, 1951 and the claim was filed on July 20, 1953 or about 1 year and 8 months late.
This notwithstanding, appellant contends that it did not know of such administration
proceedings, not even its employees in the Branch Office in Butuan City, Agusan. It is to be
noted that the petition for Letters of Administration and the Notice to Creditors were duly
published in the Manila Daily Bulletin and in the Morning Times, respectively, which was a full
compliance with the requirements of the Rules. Moreover, the supposed lack of knowledge of
the proceedings on the part of appellant and its employees had been belied by uncontested and
eloquent evidence, consisting of a deposit of an amount of money by the administrator Of the
estate in said Bank (Agusan Agency). The deposit was made on December 1, 1951, inspite of
which the appellant Bank only filed its claim on July 20, 1953. It is quite true that the Courts can
extend the period within Which to present claims against the estate, even after the period limited
has elapsed; but such extension should be granted under special circumstances. The lower did
not find any justifiable reason to give the extension and for one thing, there was no period to
extend, the same had elapsed.
5) Evangelista vs. La Proveedora Inc., GR. No. L-32824 ( March 31/71)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the writ of execution, and the subsequent proceedings
which took place by virtue thereof, in Civil Case No. 2516 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Branch II (Guagua), entitled "La Proveedora, Inc. vs. Manuel Abad Santos."
None of the respondents filed an answer to the petition. The petitioner waived presentation of
a memorandum in lieu of oral argument, and the case was considered submitted for decision
on the basis of the petition and the supporting copies of the record in the lower court.
It appears that in the aforesaid Civil Case No. 2516 the respondent Court rendered judgment
on August 23, 1969. as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, LA
PROVEEDORA, INC., and against the defendant, MANUEL ABAD SANTOS. The said
defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff corporation the sum of P18,000.00, representing
the unpaid difference in the rent of the premises from February, 1957, to January 1965, and
an additional amount of P2,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees, with legal interest from the
date of this judgment and to pay the costs."
On June 2, 1970 Manuel Abad Santos, the judgment debtor, died in the City of Angeles.
Subsequently, or on September 30, 1970, the respondent Court issued a writ of execution,
pursuant to which respondent Provincial Sheriff levied on a parcel of land and on the house
situated thereon, both owned by the deceased Manuel Abad Santos and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 22937-M of the land records of the City of Angeles. The auction sale
was scheduled for November 23, 1970.
In the meantime an intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Manuel Abad
Santos was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch n (Angeles City),
docketed as Special Proceeding No. A-40. On November 23, 1970 the petitioner herein,
Hollanda A. S. Evangelista, was appointed special administratrix of the intestate.
On November 11, 1970, even prior to her appointment, having been notified of the writ of
execution and the scheduled auction sale of the properties levied upon, the petitioner
informed the respondent Provincial Sheriff of the death of the judgment debtor and
demanded that he desist from proceeding with the sale. This was followed by an urgent
motion in court that the writ of execution be recalled, but the motion was denied and the sale
was carried out, wherein respondent La Proveedora, Inc. was the highest bidder.
Issue:
WON the judgment against him should be presented as a claim against his estate?
Ruling:
The provisions of the Rules of Court on the matter at hand are clear. Section 7 of Rule 39
says:

"SEC. 7. Execution in case of death of party. — Where a party dies after the entry of the
judgment or order, execution thereon may issue, or one already issued may be enforced in
the following cases:
(c) In case of the death of the judgment debtor after execution is actually levied upon any of
his property, the same may be sold for the satisfaction thereof, and the officer making the
sale shall account to the corresponding executor or administrator for any surplus in his
hands."
Note that the property levied upon in case the judgment debtor dies after the entry of
judgment, as in this case, may be sold for the satisfaction of the judgment in case death
occurs "after execution is actually levied." On the other hand, Section 5 of Rule 86 provides
that a judgment for money against the decedent must be filed with the court in the
proceeding for the settlement of the estate. In other words, the cut-off date is the date of
actual levy of execution. If the judgment debtor dies after such levy, the property levied upon
may be sold; if before, the money judgment must be presented as a claim against the estate,
although of course the same need no longer be proved, the judgment itself being conclusive.
But the judgment creditor Will share the estate with other creditors, subject only to such
preferences as are provided by law.
Since in this case the death of the deceased Manuel Abad Santos preceded the levy of
execution on his properties, the judgment against him should be presented as a claim against
his estate, and the sale at auction carried out by the sheriff is null and void.
6) Buan vs. Laya, Ge. No. L-7593 ( Dec. 24 /57)
Facts:

The record discloses that on December 15, 1953, petitioners herein filed a contingent claim for
more than P500,000 against the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Florencio P. Buan
and Rizalina Paras Buan. The contingent claim was based on the fact that on August 3, 1952, a
Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by the deceased spouses Buan, collided with a car
in which Juan C. Laya, Rodolfo Escosa, Jose S. Palma, and Juan de Leon, were riding; that the
collision was caused by the fact that the driver of the bus managed and drove the vehicle in a
negligent manner; that as a consequence of the collision Juan C. Laya was killed and his
companions suffered physical injuries. The driver of the bus was Ernesto Triguero, and he was
charged with homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and was
sentenced therefor. The heirs of Juan C. Laya, petitioners herein, reserved the civil action for
damages, and on October 12, 1953, they filed an independent civil action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the administrator of the deceased spouses Buan. The petition for the
admission of a contingent claim was accompanied with a copy of the complaint filed in the civil
case above-mentioned (No. 20867, CFI Manila) and a sentence in the criminal case filed
against Ernesto Triguero, driver of the Philippine Rabbit Bus.

When the administrators learned of the filing of the contingent claim in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, they filed an opposition thereto on the ground that the same was not filed
before the death of the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras Buan, which took place on
January 3, 1953, and that it was also not filed within the period prescribed by Rule 89, Section 4
of the Rules of Court. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac admitted the claim in an order dated
December 16, 1953, but denied the prayer that a portion of the estate be set aside to respond
for the amount of the contingent.

The Court of First Instance of Tarlac, on a motion for reconsideration filed by the administrators
dated January 2, 1954, set aside its previous order of December 16, 1953, admitting the
contingent claim of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the contingent claim should be admitted.
Ruling:

A consideration of the facts and the proceedings set forth above will readily show that the order
of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing the contingent claim is based on incorrect and
erroneous conception of a contingent claim. A contingent claim is one which, by its nature, is
necessarily dependent upon an uncertain event for its existence or validity. It may or may not
develop into a valid and enforceable claim, and its validity and enforceability depending upon an
uncertain event. (E. Gaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810, 813; 2 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1957 edition, pp. 425-426.).
 A 'contingent claim' against an estate within the statute providing for the settlement
hereof, as one where the absolute liability depends on some future event which may
never happen, and which therefore renders such liability uncertain and
indeterminable. . . It is where the liability depends on some future event after the debtor's
death which may or may not happen, and therefore makes Words and Phrases, p. 113.).

A 'contingent claim' against an estate is one in which liability depends on some future
event which may or may not occur, so that duty to pay may never become absolute. (In
Re Flewell, 276 N. W. 732, 733; 9 Words and Phrases, p. 114.).

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the action brought in
Manila against the administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio Buan and
Rizalina P. Buan, is the uncertain event or contingency upon which the validity of the claim
presented in the administration proceedings depends. While the said action has not yet been
finally decided or determined to the effect that the petitioners herein, heirs of the deceased Juan
C. Laya, have no right of action against the estate of the deceased spouses Florencio P. Buan
and Rizalina P. Buan, the contingent claim that petitioners have filed in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in the proceedings for the administration of the deceased spouses Florencio
P. Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, may not be dismissed. The order of the court dismissing the
claim and declaring that the same may again be entertained if another valid complaint by the
petitioners herein is filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, is inconsistent with the nature
and character of a contingent claim. A contingent claim does not follow the temporary orders of
dismissal of an action upon which it is based; it awaits the final outcome thereof and only said
final result can cause its termination. The rules provide that a contingent claim is to be
presented in the administration proceedings in the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that
when the contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid claim, the court
should then be informed that the claim had already matured. (Secs. 5. 9, Rule 87.) The order of
the court subject of the appeal should, therefore, be set aside.

The first order of the court admitted the claim but denied the petition for the setting aside of a
certain amount from the estate to respond therefor. The validity of the contingent claim is
apparent; as the driver of the bus belonging to the deceased spouses, Florencio P. Buan and
Rizalina P. Buan, was found guilty of negligence, as a result of which Juan C. Laya died, the
said deceased spouses—the employers of the driver—can be made responsible, as masters of
a servant, for damages for the death of the petitioner's father. A portion of the estate should
therefore, be set aside to respond for such damages as petitioners herein may subsequently
recover in the action they have brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila. This amount
should be fixed in the court below.

For the foregoing considerations, the order of the court dismissing the contingent claim filed by
petitioners is hereby set aside. It is hereby ordered that the claim be allowed to continue, and it
is further ordered that the court fix an amount that may be set aside to respond for the damages
that the petitioners herein may ultimately recover. Costs against the respondents.
7) Metrobank vs. Absolute Management Corp., GR.no. 170498 ( Jan.9/2013)
Facts:
Metrobank deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account; because of
Chua’s control over AMC’s operations, Metrobank assumed that the checks payable to AMC
could be deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account.

Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no right to demand and receive the checks that were
deposited to its account; despite Chua’s control over AMC and Ayala Lumber and Hardware,
the two entities are distinct, and checks exclusively and expressly payable to one cannot be
deposited in the account of the other.

In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chua’s estate should reimburse it if it
becomes liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account.

Issue:
Whether or not Ayala Lumber must return the amount of said checks to Metrobank.
Ruling:
Metrobank acted in a manner akin to a mistake when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala
Lumber and Hardware’s account because it assumed that the checks payable to AMC could be
deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account. This disjunct created an obligation on the
part of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, through its sole proprietor, Chua, to return the amount of
these checks to Metrobank.

This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint falls under the
quasi-contracts enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil Code. Article 2154 embodies the concept
“solutio indebiti” which arises when something is delivered through mistake to a person who has
no right to demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has been received through mistake.
Solutio indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, has two indispensable requisites:
first, that something has been unduly delivered through mistake; and second, that something
was received when there was no right to demand it.
8) Bautista vs. De Guzman, GR. No. L- 28298 (Nov. 25/83)
Facts:

On May 10, 1952, Numeriano Bautista, husband and father of the plaintiffs-appellees,
respectively, was a passenger of jeepney bearing Plate No. TPU-4013, owned and operated by
Rosendo de Guzman, deceased husband and father of defendants-appellants, respectively, as
one of the jeepneys used in his transportation business. Eugenio Medrano y Torres was
employed by said Rosendo de Guzman as the driver of said jeepney. Said driver drove and
managed said jeepney at that time along Taft Avenue, Pasay City, in a negligent and reckless
manner and, as a result, the jeepney turned turtle and, consequently, passenger Numeriano
Bautista sustained physical injuries which caused his death. Eugenio Medrano, the driver, was
accused and convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence by the trial court in a decision
promulgated on May 27, 1952 and sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of Numeriano Bautista, plaintiffs-
appellees herein, in the sum of P3,000.00. A writ of execution was issued against said driver,
Eugenio Medrano for the said sum of P3,000.00 but the same was returned to the Court
unsatisfied.

On May 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman died.

Because of their failure to collect the said sum of P3,000.00 from the driver, Eugenio Medrano,
plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 2050) dated October 7, 1952, with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against defendants-appellants alleging, among
other things besides the above-mentioned incidents, that they demanded from Rosendo de
Guzman and from the defendants-appellants the payment of the sums of P3,000.00 as
subsidiary liability; P10,000.00 as actual exemplary and moral damages and Pl,000.00 as
attorney's fees for the suit by reason of the death of Numeriano Bautista as related above, but
Rosendo de Guzman and later the herein defendants-appellants refused to pay the same.
Plaintiffs-appellees therefore prayed that the defendants-appellants be ordered to pay the said
sums as well as the costs of suit.

Defendants-appellants through counsel filed a motion to dismiss predicated on two grounds,

namely, that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation and that
the complaint stated no cause of action. In support of said motion, they maintained that the suit
was for a money claim against the supposed debtor who was already dead and as such it
should be filed in testate or intestate proceedings or, in the absence of such proceedings, after
the lapse of thirty (30) days, the creditors should initiate such proceedings, that the heirs could
not be held liable therefor since there was no allegation that they assumed the alleged
obligation.

The lower court sustained the motion to dismiss.

Issue:
WON the plaintiffs-appellees had a cause of action against the defendants-appellants?
Ruling:
We sympathize with the plight of the plaintiffs-appellees but they have lost their right to recover
because of negligence and a failure to observe mandatory provisions of the law and the Rules.
They overlooked the fact that they were no longer suing Rosendo de Guzman who died shortly
after the accident but his heirs.

Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides: 

All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedents, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever; except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants ...
Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.

The above-quoted rule is mandatory. The requirement therein is for the purpose of protecting
the estate of the deceased. The executor or administrator is informed of the claims against it,
thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. Therefore, upon the dismiss of the first complaint of herein plaintiffs-
appellees in Civil Case No. 2050, they should have presented their claims before the intestate
proceedings filed in the same court and docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1303-P. Instead
of doing so, however. the plaintiffs-appellees slept on their right. They allowed said proceedings
to terminate and the properties to be distributed to the heirs pursuant to a project of partition
before instituting this separate action. Such do not sanctioned by the above rule for it strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims against the decedent's estate in
order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the
residue. (See Py Eng Chong v. Herrera, 70 SCRA 130). With the exception provided for in the
above rule, the failure of herein plaintiffs-appellees to present their claims before the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Rosendo de Guzman within the prescribed period constituted a bar
to a subsequent claim against the estate or a similar action of the same import.

Therefore, it was an error on the part of the trial court to hold that the plaintiffs-appellees had a
cause of action against the defendants-appellants who are the heirs of the deceased against
whom the liability is sought to be enforced, much less take cognizance of the complaint.
9) Hilado vs. CA., GR.no. 164108 (May 8,2009)
Facts:
Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate. He was survived with his wife, Julita Campos Benedicto,
who was eventually appointed as an administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband. At
the time of his death, there were two civil cases against Benedicto involving petitioners.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished
with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. The wife-
administratrix, private respondent herein, opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the
personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Both the RTC
and CA denied petitioners’ manifestation/motion, holding that “the claims of petitioners against
the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in
separate proceedings before other courts.” Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in denying petitioners’ right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Roberto S. Benedicto.
Ruling:
No, the disposition of the RTC and CA is not erroneous. Intervention as set forth under Rule 19
does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice
to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and
published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. However, it
appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in
connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict
do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86. These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases
where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for
damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against
the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate
proceedings? Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but
they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings
allows not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate"
various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a
contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the
decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment
could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act
in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their
interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests
can be protected. Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been
recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern
of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge
Reyes, the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the
RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings,
which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the
provision stating that "the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be
available for the inspection of any interested person." The Court ruled that petitioners were
"interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings.
10) PNB vs. Asuncion, GR. No. L- 46095 (Nov. 23/77)
Facts:
On January 16 1963, Philippine National Bank granted various credit accomodations and
advances to Fabar Incorporated covering the importation of machinery and equipment. Said
credit accommodations reached an outstanding balance of P8, 449,169.98 on May 13, 1977. •
For failure of private respondents to pay their obligations, petitioner instituted a case for
collection against all private respondents and Manuel H. Barredo in a complaint dated October
31, 1972, and which was filed before the sala of the Honorable Elias B. Asuncion, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XII. • On May 19, 1975, before the case could be
decided, Manuel H. Barredo died. • Upon being notified of the death of the private respondent,
the respondent Court issued an Order of dismissal dated November 29, 1976 citing Rule 86,
Section 6 of the Rules of the Court stating:
“In view of the death of defendant Manuel Barredo, the Court hereby dismisses this case
since the present suit is for a money claim which does not survive the death of said defendant.”
On December 4, 1976, Petitoner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court order contending
that the dismissal should only be against the deceased respondent Manuel H. Barredo. The
respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of meritorious grounds. • The
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court erred in dismissing the case against all the
defendants, instead of dismissing the case only as against the deceased defendant and
thereafter proceeding with the hearing as against the other defendants, private respondents
herein.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the lower court was proper.
Ruling:
No. Respondent Court's reliance on Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court was
erroneous.
A cursory perusal of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that nothing
therein prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary debtors. Said
provision merely sets up the procedure in enforcing collection in case a creditor chooses to
pursue his claim against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. The rule has been set forth
that a creditor (in a solidary obligation) has the option whether to file or not to file a claim against
the estate of the solidary debtor. In construing Section 6, Rule 87 of the old Rules of Court,
which is the precursor of Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court said, in
the case of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama, et al. (107 Phil. 891) that:
It is evident from the foregoing that Section 6 of Rule 87 (of the Old Rules of Court)
provides the procedure should the creditor desire to go against the deceased debtor, but there
is certainly nothing in the said provision making compliance with such procedure a condition
precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving debtors, should the creditor choose to
demand payment from the latter, could be entertained to the extent that failure to observe the
same would deprive the court jurisdiction to 'take cognizance of the action against the surviving
debtors. Upon the other hand, the Civil Code expressly allow the creditor to proceed against any
one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously.
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this
matter. Said provision gives the creditor the night to "proceed against anyone of the solidary
debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. "The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary
creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the
solidary debtors, he (the creditor) may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary
debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors. It is not
mandatory for him to have the case dismissed as against the surviving debtors and file its claim
against the estate of the deceased solidary debtor, as was made apparent in the aforequoted
decision. For to require the creditor to proceed against the estate, making it a condition
precedent for any collection action against the surviving debtors to prosper, would deprive him
of his substantive rights provided by Article 1216 of the New Civil Code. As correctly argued by
petitioner, if Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court were applied literally, Article 1216
of the New Civil Code would, in effect, be repealed since under the Rules of Court, petitioner
has no choice but to proceed against the estate of Manuel Barredo only. Obviously, this
provision diminishes the Bank's right under the New Civil Code to proceed against any one,
some or all of the solidary debtors. Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle, which
is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural
rule. Otherwise stated, Section 6, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot be made to
prevail over Article 1216 of the New Civil Code, the former being merely procedural, while the
latter, substantive.
11) Maglasang vs. Manila Banking Corp., GR.No.171206 (Sept. 23,2013)
Facts:

On June 16, 1975, spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang) obtained a credit
line from respondent in the amount of ₱350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate
mortgage executed over seven of their properties located in Ormoc City and the Municipality of
Kananga, Province of Leyte. They availed of their credit line by securing loans in the amounts of
₱209,790.50 and ₱139,805.83 on October 24, 1975and March 15, 1976, respectively, both of
which becoming due and demandable within a period of one year. Further, the parties agreed
that the said loans would earn interest at 12% per annum (p.a.) and an additional 4% penalty
would be charged upon default.

After Flaviano Maglasang (Flaviano) died intestate on February 14,1977, his widow Salud
Maglasang (Salud) and their surviving children, herein petitioners Oscar (Oscar), Concepcion
Chona, Lerma, Felma, FeDoris, Leolino, Margie Leila, Ma. Milalie, Salud and Ma. Flasalie, all
surnamed Maglasang, and Glenda Maglasang-Arnaiz, appointed their brother petitioner Edgar
Maglasang (Edgar) as their attorney-in-fact. Thus, on March 30, 1977, Edgar filed a verified
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Flaviano before the then Court of
First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City, Branch 5 (probate court), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1604-
0. On August 9, 1977, the probate court issued an Order granting the petition, thereby
appointing Edgar as the administrator of Flaviano’s estate.

In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate court, on August 30, 1977,
issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money claims against Flaviano’s estate. Accordingly,
as one of the creditors of Flaviano, respondent notified the probate court of its claim in the
amount of ₱382,753.19 as of October 11, 1978, exclusive of interests and charges.

During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were able to obtain several
loans from respondent, secured by promissory noteswhich they signed.

In an Orderdated December 14, 1978 (December 14, 1978 Order),the probate court terminated
the proceedings with the surviving heirs executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of
Flaviano’s estate. The loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent, however, remained
unsatisfied due to respondent’s certification that Flaviano’s account was undergoing a
restructuring. Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized the rights of respondent
under the mortgage and promissory notes executed by the Sps. Maglasang, specifically, its
"right to foreclose the same within the statutory period."

In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps.
Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction for the amount
of ₱350,000.00. There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps. Maglasang’s obligation to
respondent. Thus, on June 24, 1981, respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount of
₱250,601.05 as of May 31, 1981 against the estate of Flaviano, his widow Salud and
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 1998-0.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent can still pursue the deficient amount.
Ruling:
No, the complaint for the recovery of the deficiency amount after extra-judicial foreclosure filed
by respondent is hereby dismissed.
Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their
estate. Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of
the Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply
suppletorily. Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules:
SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim against the
deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security
and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general
distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon
his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant,
and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or
the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security,
he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section;
or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any
time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be
admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets
of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator
from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is
held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for
the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.
As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured
by a mortgage or other collateral security" as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably
concluded that the aforementioned section covers all secured claims, whether by mortgage or
any other form of collateral, which a creditor may enforce against the estate of the deceased
debtor. On the contrary, nowhere from its language can it be fairly deducible that the said
section would – as the CA interpreted – narrowly apply only to mortgages made by the
administrator over any property belonging to the estate of the decedent. To note, mortgages of
estate property executed by the administrator, are also governed by Rule 89 of the Rules,
captioned as "Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent."
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured
creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his
indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt
from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and
prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other
security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a
claim for any deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct,
independent and mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars
the exercise of the others.
To obviate any confusion, the Court observes that the operation of Act No. 3135 does not
entirely discount the application of Section 7, Rule 86, or vice-versa. Rather, the two
complement each other within their respective spheres of operation. On the one hand, Section
7, Rule 86 lays down the options for the secured creditor to claim against the estate and,
according to jurisprudence, the availment of the third option bars him from claiming any
deficiency amount. On the other hand, after the third option is chosen, the procedure governing
the manner in which the extra-judicial foreclosure should proceed would still be governed by the
provisions of Act No. 3135.Simply put, Section 7, Rule 86 governs the parameters and the
extent to which a claim may be advanced against the estate, whereas Act No. 3135sets out the
specific procedure to be followed when the creditor subsequently chooses the third option –
specifically, that of extra-judicially foreclosing real property belonging to the estate. The
application of the procedure under Act No. 3135 must be concordant with Section 7, Rule 86 as
the latter is a special rule applicable to claims against the estate, and at the same time, since
Section 7, Rule 86 does not detail the procedure for extrajudicial foreclosures, the formalities
governing the manner of availing of the third option – such as the place where the application
for extra-judicial foreclosure is filed, the requirements of publication and posting and the place of
sale – must be governed by Act No. 3135. In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially
foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now,
their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not
exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it
merely notified the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of
Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to
exercise the third option of extrajudicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now
precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
12) Sarsaba vs. Vda. de Te, GR. No.175910 (July 30,2009)
Facts:
On February 14, 1995, a Decision was rendered in NLRC Case No. RAB-11-07-00608-93
entitled, Patricio Sereno v. Teodoro Gasing/Truck Operator, finding Sereno to have been
illegally dismissed and ordering Gasing to pay him his monetary claims in the amount of
₱43,606.47. After the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, Labor Arbiter Newton R.
Sancho issued an Alias Writ of Execution on June 10, 1996, directing Fulgencio R. Lavarez,
Sheriff II of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), to satisfy the judgment award.
On July 23, 1996, Lavarez, accompanied by Sereno and his counsel, petitioner Atty. Rogelio E.
Sarsaba, levied a Fuso Truck bearing License Plate No. LBR-514, which at that time was in the
possession of Gasing. On July 30, 1996, the truck was sold at public auction, with Sereno
appearing as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, respondent Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her
attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castañeda, filed with the RTC, Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur, a
Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck
pendente lite against petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 3488.
Respondent alleged that: (1) she is the wife of the late Pedro Te, the registered owner of the
truck, as evidenced by the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration; (2) Gasing merely
rented the truck from her; (3) Lavarez erroneously assumed that Gasing owned the truck
because he was, at the time of the "taking," in possession of the same; and (4) since neither
she nor her husband were parties to the labor case between Sereno and Gasing, she should
not be made to answer for the judgment award, much less be deprived of the truck as a
consequence of the levy in execution. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following
grounds: (1) respondent has no legal personality to sue, having no real interests over the
property subject of the instant complaint; (2) the allegations in the complaint do not sufficiently
state that the respondent has cause of action; (3) the allegations in the complaint do not contain
sufficient cause of action as against him; and (4) the complaint is not accompanied by an
Affidavit of Merit and Bond that would entitle the respondent to the delivery of the tuck pendente
lite.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC should have dismissed the complaint against all the defendants and
that the same should be filed against his estate.
Ruling:
Only the case against Patricio Sereno will be dismissed and the same may be filed as a claim
against the estate of Patricio Sereno, but the case with respect to the three (3) other accused
will proceed.
Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other
proper court officer, either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by
substituted service. On the other hand, summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of
the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court may
acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Records show that petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of legal
personality of respondent; the allegations in the complaint did not sufficiently state that
respondent has a cause of action or a cause of action against the defendants; and, the
complaint was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit and bond. The RTC denied the motion
and held therein that, on the basis of the allegations of fact in the complaint, it can render a valid
judgment. Petitioner, subsequently, filed his answer by denying all the material allegations of the
complaint. And by way of special and affirmative defenses, he reiterated that respondent had no
legal personality to sue as she had no real interest over the property and that while the truck
was still registered in Pedro Te's name, the same was already sold to Gasing.
In fine, We cannot countenance petitioner's argument that the complaint against the other
defendants should have been dismissed, considering that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Sereno. The court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a
defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to
invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of
Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants.
Failure to serve summons on Sereno's person will not be a cause for the dismissal of the
complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have been served with copies of
the summons and complaints and have long submitted their respective responsive pleadings. In
fact, the other defendants in the complaint were given the chance to raise all possible defenses
and objections personal to them in their respective motions to dismiss and their subsequent
answers.
We agree with the RTC in its Order when it resolved the issue in this wise: As correctly pointed
by defendants, the Honorable Court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Patricio
Sereno since there was indeed no valid service of summons insofar as Patricio Sereno is
concerned. Patricio Sereno died before the summons, together with a copy of the complaint and
its annexes, could be served upon him. However, the failure to effect service of summons unto
Patricio Sereno, one of the defendants herein does not render the action DISMISSIBLE,
considering that the three (3) other defendants, namely, Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba, Fulgencio
Lavares and the NLRC, were validly served with summons and the case with respect to the
answering defendants may still proceed independently. Be it recalled that the three (3)
answering defendants have previously filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was
denied by the Court.
13) Saligumba vs. Palanog, GR. No. 143365 (Dec. 4, 2008)
Facts:

Spouses Monica and Avelino Palanog filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages against
spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. with the RTC. The spouses Palanogs
alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession as owners for
more than 50 years of a land in Aklan. Allegedly, the spouses Saligumbas prevented them from
entering and residing on the said property and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the
land. Thus, spouses Palanogs prayed that they be declared the true and rightful owners of the
same.

During the proceedings, Eliseo Saligumba Sr. died in 1984, while Valeria Saligumba also
passed away the following year. However, Atty. Miralles, failed to inform the court of the said
events. Further, he was appointed as an MCTC judge and told the court that he would withdraw
as counsel for the spouses Saligumbas because of it. But, on the date of the presentation of
evidence of the spouses Saligumbas, only spouses Palanogs and their counsel appeared.
Thus, upon motion of the spouses Palanogs, the spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have
waived the presentation of their evidence.

On August 7, 1987, the RTC rendered jugment declaring the spouses Palanogs as the righful
owners of the land and ordering the spouses Saligumbas to vacate the premises. The trial court
also directed that a copy of its decision be furnished to Monica Palanog and Valeria Saligumba.
Later, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed. However,
on May 8, 1997, the trial court ruled that since more than 5 years had elapsed after the date of
the decision's finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion.

So, on May 9, 1997, Monica Palanog, who is now a widow, filed an action to revive and enforce
the RTC decision on 1987 which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of limitations.
Eliseo Saligumba Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba who are heirs and children of spouses
Saligumbas were also impleaded in the new action. Apparently, Eliseo Saligumba Sr. died in
1984, while Valeria died in 1985. Further, no motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed
nor did an order issue for the substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas in the complaint
filed by spouses Palanogs. Accordingly, Atty. Miralles and Eliseo Saligumba Jr. never confirmed
the death of the spouses despite notices sent to them to appear. Moreover, the siblings were
declared in default for failure to file any responsive pleading.

RTC: On The trial court ruled in favor of Monica Palanog and ordered the revival of the 1987
judgment.  It also ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased spouses did not have any legal
significance as it was solely the negligence of the spouses Saligumba's counsel by failing to
inform the court of the death of his client. Hence this present petition filed by the siblings
Saligumba.
Heirs of Spouses Saligumbas: The 1987 decision should be rendered void since there was no
proper substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite the trial court's knowledge that
the deceased spouses Saligumbas were no longer represented by counsel. Thus, they were
deprived of due process. Moreover, since the trial court acknowledged in its ruling that the lack
of substitution was the fault of Atty. Miralles of the spouses Saligumbas, thus, the 1987 decision
has no legal effect because their parents were not duly represented by the said counse. Further,
they contend that they have never taken part in the proceedings of the case which was decided
in 1987, therefore, “[i]t’s unfair to bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased
parents.”

Issue:
Whether or not the revival of judgment in this case was proper considering that the defendants
in the action for revival were not the original contending party in the original case.
Ruling:

Yes. "An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the
execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years
without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any
issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or correctness of the
first judgment.

An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from
either the recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is
the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be
enforced is rendered. Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be
revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory."

In the instant case, the 1987 judgment of the RTC had been rendered final and executory by the
lapse of time with no motion for reconsideration nor was an appeal having been filed.
Furthermore, there was no formal withdrawal received and approved by the court from Atty.
Miralles as the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas at that time, thus, since there was no such
formal withdrawal, he remained the counsel for the spouses Saligumbas until the RTC rendered
judgment. His acts bind his clients and the latter’s successors-in-interest. Additionally, it was
shown on record that Eliseo Saligumba Jr.was also furnished copies of the  trial court’s orders
and notices. It is also clear that in the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners
have not shown much interest in the case

It is also important to take note that the complaint filed at that time was an action for quieting of
title with damages which is an action involving real property. It is an action that survives
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not extinguished by the death of a party. And
when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides for the procedure, thus: Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is
not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30)
days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within
said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative
shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges
involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is
the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the
deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of
death by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal
representative or heir of the deceased. There was no court order for deceased’s legal
representative or heir to appear, nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be
substituted for the deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such
legal representative, nor did the heirs ever asked to be substituted.

14) Lao vs. Dee, L-3890 (June 23/52)

Facts:

It appears from the record that on the 5th day of September, 1922, Yap Siong died in the
municipality of Angeles, Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, leaving a considerable
amount of property to be distributed among his heirs. An administrator was appointed to
administer his estate. During the course of the administration and distribution of the estate there
appeared the petitioners and the respondents, each claiming to be the legitimate heirs of Yap
Siong and entitled to his estate. The petitioner Maria Lao claims to be the legitimate widow of
Yap Siong, having been legally joined to him in holy wedlock on the 24th day of June, 1903, in
the Philippine Islands (Exhibit 1) and that Jose Lao is a legitimate child born of that marriage,
and that they are therefore entitled, as heirs, to the estate of Yap Siong, deceased.

Upon the other hand Dee Tim claims to be the legitimate widow of Yap Siong; that she and Yap
Siong were joined in the holy wedlock on the 14th day of September, 1893, in accordance with
the laws of China (Exhibits A and A-1), and that the said Yap Kim Ting, Yap Kim Seng, and Yap
Hu Cho were her legitimate children born of that wedlock.

In support of the contention of the petitioners, Maria Lao and her son Jose Lao, a great deal of
proof was presented. Exhibits 1 and 1-A, certificates of marriage, were presented to show that
she had been legally married to Yap Siong. A number of other documents (Exhibits 9 to 13)
were presented to show that Yap Siong had admitted that he was a married man. Exhibits 14 to
17 were presented for the purpose of proving that Yap Siong had admitted in a public document
that Maria Lao was his wife.
Issue:
How must property of Yap Siong be divided between the two families?
Ruling:
The estate of Yap Siong be divided equally, one-half going to Maria Lao and her son, Jose Lao,
and the other one-half to Dee Tim and her three children.
Under the Leyes de Partidas (Law 1, title 13, partida 4), where two women innocently and in
good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, their children born will be
regarded as legitimate children and each family will be entitled to one-half of the estate of the
husband upon distribution of his estate. That provision of the Leyes de Partidas is a very
humane and wise law. It justly protects those who innocently have entered into the solemn
relation of marriage and their descendants. The good faith of all the parties will be presumed
until the contrary is positively proved.
15) Paula vs. Escay, GR. No. L- 8559 (Sept. 28/55)
Facts:

This is a special civil action of certiorari instituted in this Court, seeking to annul an order of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, the Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr., presiding,
approving the claim of respondent Jose Escay in the amount of P5,418.31 plus legal interest of
P2,682.06 and P810.03 as attorney's fees and approving its payment by the administratrix out
of the funds of the estate. The claim arose out of a contract of lease between claimant Jose
Escay as lessee of Hacienda Puyas No. 1, and the administratrix as lessor. This contract of
lease was executed on May 12, 1937, with the court's approval, and amended on April 29,
1942, also with the court's approval. Under the original contract of lease (Exhibit A of Annex A),
the administratrix was obligated to deliver to Escay ten per cent of the sugar, rice and corn
produced from Hacienda Puyas No. 1 from 1943 until the full sum of P7,000, the estimated cost
of property transferred to the estate, was fully covered. In the subsequent amendment of the
contract, the lease was declared terminated with the close of the 1942-43 harvest, with the right
on the part of either party to demand a liquidation of the accounts in relation to the lease one
year after the re-establishment of the peace.

Pursuant to the above agreement, Jose Escay filed his claim on June 29, 1954, attaching
thereto a copy of the contract of lease and a detailed statement of accounts showing that the
administratrix is indebted to him in the sums of P5,418.31 as principal and P2,682.06 as
interest. The administratrix opposed the claim on the following grounds, namely, (1) that it can
not be presented as a claim because the administration proceedings were commenced since
1932 yet and the claim can not now be presented as one under section 5 of Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) that the court sitting in probate has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim,
especially as the same is being controverted. The lower court held that the claim was properly
filed (under the authority of III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, pp. 393-94 and the
case of Escueta vs. Sy Juilliong, 5 Phil., 405). As to be contention that the claim is not
chargeable against the estate but against the administratrix in her personal capacity because
there is an over payment of rentals, the trial court held that as the contract of lease was
approved by the court and the claim is an offshoot of said contract, she may not now repudiate
it. As to the claim that the administratrix had not been given opportunity to contest the
correctness of the claim, the court held that the administratrix had not offered to disprove the
items contained in the statement of accounts.

Issue:
Whether or not the estate is liable under the contract of lease
Ruling:
No, the demands should be charged against the personal responsibility of the administratrix.
There is no question that the claim does not fall under the provision of section 5 of Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court, because the same is not a debt or money claim incurred by the deceased
during his lifetime and collectible after his death. It is an ordinary demand or claim for the
payment of the balance of an account due under a contract of lease entered into by the
administratrix under the court's approval. There is no express provision of the Rules governing
the method by which the demand for payment may be made.
The objection of the administratrix to be the presentation of the claim before the court may have
impelled by the belief that the amounts she may be compelled to pay by virtue of the demand of
Escay may be charged against the estate, when the same should fall under her personal
responsibility. She was entitled to receive only the amount of the rentals under the lease
contract and no more, and Escay should not make the estate under administration responsible
for the amount received by the administratrix in excess of the rentals actually due. The
consideration of the claim in the administration proceedings, however, does not necessarily
mean that the administratrix may not be held personally laable for the excess. The mere fact
that the court in passing upon the claim may order her, the administratrix, to pay the full amount
of the demand, does not mean that the total amount which she is compelled to pay could be
chargeable against the said estate under administration.
Certainly, the estate would only be responsible for the amount, which she is legally entitled to
receive as rentals; it cannot be held responsible for the excess of the amount collected over the
above the rentals due under the lease. For this excess the administratrix will have to be
personally responsible and the court in ordering payment of the said excess would order the
adminstratrix to be personally responsible therefor. The above circumstances, however, do not
deprive the court of power to consider the claim; and the administratrix for herself is estopped
from denying that the amounts received in excess of the true rentals were received by her in
such capacity. One who contracts with another in a representative capacity cannot claim that
amounts received by her in said representative capacity are due from her in another capacity.