CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
Definition of Political Law
- People V Perfecto 43 Phil 887
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public
law which deals with the organization and operation of
the governmental organs of the State and define the
relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory
(People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]).
It may be recalled that political law embraces
constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers
and elections.
Definition of Constitution
- Lopez v De los Santos (1930)
In Words and Phrases, vol. 2, p. 1462, the word
"Constitution" is thus defined:
A constitution is not the beginning of a country, nor the
origin of appropriate rights. It is not the fountain of law,
nor the incipient state of government. It grants no
rights to the people, but it is the creature of their
power, the instrument of their convenience. Designed
for their protection in the enjoyment of the rights and
powers they possessed before the constitution was
made, it is but the framework of political government,
and necessarily based on the preexisting rights,
habits, and modes of thought. (State vs. County
Treasurer, 4 S. C.[4 Rich.], 520,536.)
When the people associate, and enter into a compact,
for the purpose of establishing government, that
compact, whatever may be its provisions, or in
whatever language it may be written, is the constitution
of the state, revocable only by people, or in the
manner they prescribe. It is by this instrument that
government is instituted, its departments created, and
the powers to be exercised by it conferred. (Bates vs.
Kimball [Vt.], 2 D. Chip., 77, 84.)
A constitution is defined by Judge Story to be a
fundamental law or basis of government. It is
established by the people, in their original sovereign
capacity, to promote their own happiness, and
permanently to secure their rights, property,
independence, and common welfare.(McKoan vs.
Devries, 3 Barb., 196, 198 [quoting 1 Story, Const.,
secs. 338, 339];Church vs. Kelsey, 7 Sup. Ct., 897,
898; 121 U. S., 282; 30 L. ed., 960.)
A constitution is the form of government, delineated by
the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first
principles of fundamental laws are established. The
constitution is certain and fixed. It contains the
permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law
of the land. It is paramount to the legislature, and can
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be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it.
(Vanhornes's Lessee vs. Dorrance, 2 U. S. [2 Dall.] 304,
308; 28 Fed. Cas., 1012;1 L. ed., 391.)
A constitution is an act of extraordinary legislation by
which the people establish the structure and mechanism
of their government, and in which they prescribe
fundamental rules to regulate the motions of the several
parts. (Eakin vs. Raub [Pa.] 12 Serg. & R., 330, 347.)
Every state constitution is a compact made by and
between the citizens of a state to govern themselves in a
certain manner, and the Constitution of the United States
is likewise a compact made by the people of the United
States to govern themselves, as to general objects, in a
certain manner. (Per Jay, C.J., in Chisholm vs. Georgia
[Pa.], 2 Dall., 419, 471; 1 L. ed., 440.)
A constitution is the written charter enacted and adopted
by the people of a state through a combination of
representatives, or in any way the people may choose to
act, by which a government for them is obtained and
established, and by which the people give organic and
corporate form to that ideal thing, a state, for all time to
come, or during the life of the state. (Lynn vs. Polk, 76
Tenn. [8 Lea], 121, 165.)
The term "constitution" is used in several senses. In a
broad sense of the term, we may speak of a constitution
resting upon usage or acquiescence, as in England. But
in this country, when we use the term, we refer
exclusively to the sovereign acts of the people, acting by
conventions or in other constitutional modes. (Horsman
vs. Allen, 61 Pac., 796, 799; 129 Cal., 139 [citing
Cooley, Const. Lim., pp. 5, 6].)
In American constitutional law, the word "constitution" is
used in a restricted sense, as implying a written
instrument, agreed on by the people of the Union, or of
any one of the states, as the absolute rule of action and
decision for all departments and officers of the
government in respect to all of the points covered by it,
which must control until it shall be changed by the
authority which established it, and in opposition to which
any act or regulation of any such department or officer,
or even the people themselves, will be together void.
(Cline vs. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R., 320, 350,36 S. W. 1099,
1107; 37 S. W. 722; 61 Am. St. Rep., 850 [citing Cooley,
Const. Lim. p. 5].)
The term "constitution" implies an instrument of a
permanent and abiding nature, and, while it contains
provision for revision, it indicates the will of the people
that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well
as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a
like permanent and abiding nature. (Livermore vs. Waite,
36 Pac., 424, 426; 102 Cal., 113; 25 L. R. A. 312.)
A constitution "according to the common acceptation of
the word in the United States, may be said to be an
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agreement to the people in their individual capacities,
reduced to writing, establishing and fixing certain
principles for the government of themselves. Among
these principles, one of the most important in all our
constitutions is to prescribe and limit the objects of
legislative power. The people are sovereign, in power
they are supreme, and the legislature acts by
delegated and circumscribed authority; circumscribed
as to its objects, circumscribed as to its extent over
these objects." (State vs. Parkhurst, 9 N. J. Law [4
Halst.], 427 443.)
Ruling Case Law, vol. 6 p. 16, says:
2. Definitions and Purposes of Constitution. — A
constitution is a system of fundamental laws or
principles for the government of a nation, society,
corporation or other aggregation of individuals, and it
may be either written or unwritten. In the United
States, the word "constitution" as applied to the
organization of the federal and state governments
always implies a writing, and it is understood in the
further restricted sense of an enactment by the direct
action of the people providing for the form of
government and defining the powers of the several
departments, thus creating a fundamental law which is
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanated. Its purpose is to prescribed the
permanent framework of the system of government
and assign to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and to establish certain
fixed first principles on which government is founded.
A constitution differs from a statute in that a statute
must provide the details of the subject of which it
treats, whereas a constitution usually states general
principles, and builds the substantial foundation and
general framework of the law and government. In
some respects a constitutional provision is a higher
form of statutory law, which the people may provide
shall be self-executing where the object is to put it
beyond the power of the legislature to render such
provision nugatory by refusing to pass laws to carry it
into effect.
3. Permanency and Generality of Constitution. — A
constitution, unlike a statute, is intended not merely to
meet existing conditions, but to govern the future. It
has been said that the term "constitution" implies an
instrument of a permanent nature. Since it is
recognized that its framers could not anticipate
conditions which might arise thereafter in the progress
of the nation, and could not establish all the law which
from time to time might be necessary to conform to the
changing conditions of a community, as a rule a
constitution does not deal in details, but enunciates the
general principles and general directions which are
intended to apply to all new facts that may come into
being, and which may be brought within those general
principles or directions. It has been said that it would
have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable
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rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have
been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as
they occur, and that it would have deprived the
legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to
exercise its reason and to accommodate its legislation to
circumstances. Although the rigidity of a written
constitution may at times obstruct progress, its stability is
intended to protect the people from frequent and violent
fluctuations of public opinion.
The same rule is also laid down in Corpus Juris.
The people of the Philippine Islands have never adopted
a constitution or held a constitutional convention, and it
must be conceded that any powers or duties which the
Philippine Legislature may have were conferred upon it
by Acts of Congress of the United States, and that
Congress is powerless to adopt or even amend the
Constitution of the United States or of any State of the
United States, much less to adopt a constitution for the
Philippine Islands in the final analysis, any power which
the Philippine Legislature may have is not derived form a
constitution.
From an examination of the United States authorities
cited in Justice Malcolm's opinion, it will be found that all
of them are based upon the Constitution of the United
States or of a state constitution and that, for such
reasons in the cases cited, the court have held that the
legislature, acting and sitting under a constitution, for its
own preservation, has limited, inherent power to punish
for contempt.
As Ruling Case Law says:
A constitution differs from a statute in that a statute must
provide the details of the subject of which it treats,
whereas a constitution usually states general principles,
and builds the substantial foundation and general
framework of the law and government.
As stated in Words and Phrases above quoted:
The constitution is certain and fixed. It contains the
permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of
the land. It is paramount to the legislature, and can be
revoked or altered only by the authority that made it.
While the courts have held that in certain class of cases,
the Legislature, sitting and acting under a constitution,
has the inherent power to punish for contempt, no court
has ever held that the Legislature can invest a legislative
act with that inherent power, and that would be
especially true of a criminal law or an act of a criminal
nature.
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(Preamble (extrinsic, introductions, guide)
-Basco v. Pagcor 197 scra 52 (1991)
Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state
also that these are merely statements of principles
and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-
executing, meaning a law should be passed by
Congress to clearly define and effectuate such
principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather
directives addressed to the executive and the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed
to heed the directives of the articles the available
remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate
could express their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the language of
the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
- Kilos bayan Inc v. Morato 250 scra 130
As already stated, however, these provisions are not
self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be
enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for
legislative or executive action. By authorizing the
holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect
determined that consistently with these policies and
principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given
this authority. That is why we said with respect to the
opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de
Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegalper se. . . . It is left to
Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit."
(Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA
255, 268 [1994]).
Note:
Art 2 of the constitution are not self-executing.
Art 3 of the constitution are self-executing.
Preamble (not the source of rights)
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts 197 us 11
(1905)
We pass without extended discussion the
suggestion that the particular section of the
statute of Massachusetts now in question (§
137, chap. 75) is in derogation of rights secured
by the preamble of the Constitution of the
United States. Although that preamble indicates
the general purposes for which the people
ordained and established the Constitution, it
has never been regarded as the source of any
substantive power conferred on the government
of the United States, or on any of its
departments. Such powers embrace only those
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expressly granted in the body of the Constitution,
and such as may be implied from those so
granted. Although, therefore, one of the declared
objects of the Constitution was to secure the
blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign
jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no
power can be exerted to that end by the United
States, unless, apart from the preamble, it be
found in some express delegation of power, or in
some power to be properly implied therefrom. 1
Story, Const. § 462.
Definition of State
A community of persons, more or less
numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of
territory, independent of external control, and possessing
an organized government to which a great body of
inhabitants render habitual obedience. (Collector of
Internal Revenue V Campos Rueda)
State V Nation
State- is a legal or juristic concept.
Nation- is an ethnic or racial concept.
State V Government
Government is merely an instrumentality of the State
through which the will of the State is implemented and
realized.
ELEMENTS OF A STATE
1. People
2. Territory
3. Government
4. Sovereignty
Definition of People
Inhabitants of the State.
As requisite for Statehood: Adequate number for self-
sufficiency and defense; of both sexes for perpetuity.
(state continuity)
Definition of Territory
Fixed portion of the surface of the earth
inhabited by the people of the State.
Art I of the Constitution
“ The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas.”
Definition of Government
- Sec 2 (1) Administrative Code of 1987
(1) "Government of the Republic of the Philippines"
refers to the corporate governmental entity through
which the functions of government are exercised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in
the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous
regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government.ch
- US. v. Dorr 2 Phil 332
The agency or instrumentality, through which the will
of the State is formulated, expressed and realized.
- Macani v. National Coconut
Sovereignty
The supreme and uncontrollable power
inherent in a State by which that State is governed.
- Laurel v. Misa 77 phil 856 (1947)
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them"
CHARACTERISTICS:
1. Permanence
2. Exclusiveness
3. Comprehensiveness
4. Absoluteness
5. Indivisibility
6. Inalienability
7. Imprescriptibility
- Nery v. Lorenzo 44 scra 131
Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
persons or individual who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis
other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of
what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This obligation
the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such
a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person
or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those
arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
4 By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties. On the
contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often
necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity,
and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot
protect themselves."
Social Contract
Sec. 1 art. 2 – state should be called as a
republican state – power from great body of
people.
- Marcos v Manglapus 177 scra 688
President has unstated residual powers implied from
grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for
specifying principal articles implied in the definition;
leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the
Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can
exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as
not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This
does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6
expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas
1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.
SC upheld – Republican – government by the
people for the people
- Metran v Paredes
In a republican state, like Philippines, government
immunity from suit without its consent is derived
from the will of the people themselves in freely
creating a government "of the people, and for the
people"-a representative government through which
they have agreed to exercise the powers and
discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the
common good and general welfare. In so agreeing,
the citizens have solemnly undertaken to surrender
some of their private rights and interest which were
calculated to conflict with the higher rights and
larger interests of the people as a whole,
represented by the government thus established by
them all. One of those "higher rights," based upon
those "larger interests" is that government immunity.
The members of the respondent Labor Union
themselves are part of the people who have freely
that government and participated in that solemn
undertaking. In this sense-and a very real one it is-
they are in effect attempting to use themselves
along with the rest of the people represented by
their common government-an anomalous and
absurd situation indeed.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF REPUBLICAN STATE
1. The Principles of Govt. of Laws and Not of
Men
2. All the Officers of the Govt. from the highest to
the lowest, are creatures of the laws and are
bounded to obey it(Martin, 1960)
3. The Observance of Rule of Majority
4. The observance of the rule of the majority is
an unwritten law of popular Govt.
5. Accountability of Public Officers
6. Under a republican system public officers are
at all times accountable to the people.
7. Legislature Cannot Pass Irrepealable Laws
8. The Congress, as a rule cannot pass
irrepealable laws or those permanent in
character.
9. Separation of Powers
10. The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of govt. Under the
principle of separation of powers, the powers
of Govt. are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent
organs: the legislative, the executive and the
judicial.
11. Principle of Checks and Balances
12. By this principle is meant that the Constitution
grants powers to each of three branches of
Govt. legislative, executive and judicial- to
check the acts of the others branches.
13. Existence of Bill of Rights
14. The Constitution under Article III provides for a
bill of Rights, which is a classified list of the
rights and privileges of Individuals.
15. Presence of Election Through Popular will
16. The means by which the people choose their
officials for.
“Government of Laws and not Men”
- Villavencio v Lukban 39 phil 778 (1990)
All persons, from officials to people must obey the
laws and must always resort to the rule of law.
That in the Philippine Islands there should exist a
government of laws and not a government of men and
that this decision may serve to bulwark the
fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to
protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.
- Que v. IAC 169 scra 137
- Arula v. Espino 28 scra 540
Opinion of Justice Fernando
The rule of law would be a meaningless term if
governmental agencies are permitted to transcend the
boundaries of the powers conferred on them. To
paraphrase Justice Miller, in United States v. Lee, 1
the supremacy of the law requires of every public
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official that he observe the limitation which it imposes
upon the exercise of the authority which it gives. The
military, no less than the civilian authorities, as a matter
of fact perhaps much more so because of the force of its
command, cannot be allowed to act beyond its pale. Any
challenge hurled against any assumption of competence
on their part must be inquired into provided of course it
comes from a party qualified to do so. In order that he
may be heard, he must have standing.
Conflict between treaty and municipal legislation
- Ichong v. Hernandez (Municipal Legislation shall be
given primacy-police power)
-
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold
that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy posed
by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from
dominance and control; that the enactment clearly
falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and future; that
the law does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out
its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident —
as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary — and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature,
with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere;
that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced
in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be said to be
void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations
because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
Article VIII sec 5(1)
- Gonzales v. Hechanova 9 scra 230
As regards the question whether an international
agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to
say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly
settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of
Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be
deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
the law or the rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1) All
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation
is in question". In other words, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it
runs counter to an act of Congress.
Treaties
Art. II sec 3 & 4
- People v. Lagman 66 phil 13 (1938)
- greatest good to the greatest number."
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this
constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in
faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
Government to defend the State cannot be performed
except through an army. To leave the organization of
an army to the will of the citizens would be to make
this duty of the Government excusable should there be
no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
This is so because the right of the Government to
require compulsory military service is a consequence
of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its
duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the
citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts
(197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that,
without violating the Constitution, a person may be
compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against
his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious
or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of
the army of his country, and risk the chance of being
shot down in its defense. In the case of United States
vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is
not deprivation of property without due process of law,
because, in its just sense, there is no right of property
to an office or employment.
Sec. 10 – Social Justice is imperative of Ph
society
Social Justice
- Calalam v. Williams
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism,
nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of
the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally,
6 By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-
honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social
justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of
the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount
objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
- Guido v. Rural progress administration 84 phil
847
Hand in hand with the announced principle,
herein invoked, that "the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people should be the concern of
the state," is a declaration, with which the former
should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a
Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino
people "the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy."
Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the
Constitution, embraces as its necessary
components freedom of conscience, freedom of
expression, and freedom in the pursuit of
happiness. Along with these freedoms are
included economic freedom and freedom of
enterprise within reasonable bounds and under
proper control. In paving the way for the breaking
up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity,
feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the
Constitution did not propose to destroy or
undermine the property right or to advocate equal
distribution of wealth or to authorize of what is in
excess of one's personal needs and the giving of
it to another. Evincing much concern for the
protection of property, the Constitution distinctly
recognize the preferred position which real estate
has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound
up with every aspects of social life in a
democracy as democracy is conceived in the
Constitution. The Constitution owned in
reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays
in the stimulation to economic effort and the
formation and growth of a social middle class that
is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the
backbone of every progressive and happy
country.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the
Constitution does not supply paramount basis for
untrammeled expropriation of private land by the
Rural Progress Administration or any other
government instrumentality. Social justice does
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
not champion division of property or equality of
economic status; what it and the Constitution
do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality
of political rights, equality before the law,
equality between values given and received on
the basis of efforts exerted in their production.
As applied to metropolitan centers, especially
Manila, in relation to housing problems, it is a
command to devise, among other social
measures, ways and means for the elimination
of slums, shambles, shacks, and house that are
dilapidated, overcrowded, without ventilation.
light and sanitation facilities, and for the
construction in their place of decent dwellings
for the poor and the destitute. As will presently
be shown, condemnation of blighted urban
areas bears direct relation to public safety
health, and/or morals, and is legal.
- Eastern Shipping v. POEA 166 scra 533
(1988)
When the conflicting interests of labor and capital
are weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter must be counter-
balanced by the sympathy and compassion the
law must accord the underprivileged worker. This
is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and
the right to assert and defend his cause not as a
subordinate but as a peer of management, with
which he can negotiate on even plane. Labor is
not a mere employee of capital but its active and
equal partner.
- Caleon v. Agus dev. Corp 207 scra 748
The social justice consecrated in our Constitution was
not intended to take away rights from a person and
give them to another who is not entitled thereto.
- PAL v. Santos Jr. 218 SCRA 415 (1993)
Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
backward to accommodate the interests of the working
class on the humane justification that those with less
privileges in life should have more privileges in law.
- Sosito v. Aguinaldo Development
Corporation, 156 SCRA 392, 396 [1987]
While the Constitution is committed to the policy
of social justice and the protection of the working
class, it should not be supposed that every labor
dispute will be automatically decided in favor of
labor. Management also has its own rights which,
as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement
in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its
concern for those with less privileges in life, this
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Court has inclined more often than not toward the
worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with
the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not
blinded us to the rule that justice is in every case
for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and the applicable law and
doctrine.
- Ondoy v. Ignacio 97 scra 611
"To be more specific, the principle of social justice is
in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic
view is that expressed in Agustin v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who
has resources to secure able legal advice, the law
has reason to demand from the latter stricter
compliance. Social justice in these cases is not
equality but protection.'
Social Order – art II sec. 9
- Accfa v cugco 30 scra 649
Protects the life of the unborn – Article XIII
- ROE v Wade
The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids
all abortions except in the case of a life saving
procedure on behalf of the mother is
unconstitutional based upon the right to privacy.
However, it does allow for regulation and
proscription of abortion when the statute is narrowly
tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such
as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The
court declined to address the question of when life
begins.
Intergenerational interest
- Oposa v. Factoran
Petitioner minors had legal standing to institute the suit
and had a valid cause of actionin questioning the
continued grant of TLAs for commercial logging
purposes, because the cause focuses on a fundamental
legal right.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to
be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be
said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
Autonomy of LGUs (decentralization of
administration) (Sec 25, Art II)
It does not make the local governments
sovereign within the State or an imperium in
imperio.
- Limbonas v Mangelin 170 scra 786
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable". At
the same time, it relieves the central government of
the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to
"ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law." He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves
an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities.
Separation of Powers
- Angara v. Electoral tribunal
The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
8 By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent
of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. For example, the
Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far
made a check on the legislative power that this
assent is required in the enactment of laws. This,
however, is subject to the further check that a bill
may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of
the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or
three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National
Assembly. The President has also the right to
convene the Assembly in special session whenever
he chooses. On the other hand, the National
Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in
the sense that its consent through its Commission
on Appointments is necessary in the appointments
of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority
of all its members is essential to the conclusion of
treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what
courts other than the Supreme Court shall be
established, to define their jurisdiction and to
appropriate funds for their support, the National
Assembly controls the judicial department to a
certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the
judicial power of trying impeachments. And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void
if violative of the Constitution.
- Marcos v. Manglapus
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provide the power of
legislative is vested in the congress.
Executive-
Judicial-
- Abueva v. Wood 45 phil 612
The Government of the United States in the
Philippine Islands is one whose powers have been
carefully apportioned between the three distinct
departments which have their powers alike limited
and defined, and are of equal dignity and within their
respective spheres of action equally independent. It
is a maxim, under the Government of the United
States, that the legislature cannot dictate to the
courts what their judgments shall be, or set aside or
alter such judgments after they had been duly
considered and rendered. It could, says Mr. Justice
Cooley, constitutional liberty would cease to exist;
and if the legislature could in like manner override
executive action also, the government would
become only a despotism under popular forms. On
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
the other hand, it would be readily conceded that
no court can compel the legislature to make or to
refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at
its command, or to take any action whatsoever,
though the duty to take it be made ever so clear
by the constitution or the laws. If the courts could
intervene in the administration of the other
independent departments of the government or
vice versa, they would break away from those
checks and balances of government which were
meant, under our system of government, to be
checks of cooperation and not of antagonism or
mastery, and would concentrate in their own
hands something at least of the power which the
people, either directly or by the action of their
representatives, decided to entrust to the other
departments of the government.
- Pantranco v public services commission 70
phil221
The theory of the separation of powers is designed
by its originators to secure action and at the same
time to forestall overaction which necessarily results
from undue concentration of powers, and thereby
obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. Thereby,
the "rule of law" was established which narrows the
range of governmental action and makes it subject to
control by certain devices. As a corollary, we find the
rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and
from the earliest time American legal authorities have
proceeded on the theory that legislative power must
be exercised by the legislature alone. It is frankness,
however, to confess that as one delves into the mass
of judicial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of
confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the
development of the principle of separation of powers
and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest
delegari or delegata potestas non potest delegari,
attributed to Bracton (De Legius et Consuetedinious
Angliae, edited by G. E. Woodbine, Yale University
Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also
recognized in principle in the Roman Law (D.
17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the
complexities of modern governments, giving rise to
the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
"subordinate legislation," not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern
governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeña,
G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12,
1939.) Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty
of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of
the practice by the court. (Dillon Catfish Drainage
Dist, v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct.
178; State vs. Knox County, 54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976,
165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such growing
9 By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
tendency, this Court, since the decision in the case of
Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board
of Public Utility Commissioner (34 Phil., 136), relied
upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its
seal of approval to the "delegation of greater powers by
the legislature."
- People v Rosenthal 68 PHIL 328
The theory of the separation of powers is designed
by its originators to secure action and at the same
time to forestall over action which necessarily
results from undue concentration of powers, and
thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism.
Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which
narrows the range of governmental action and
makes it subject to control by certain legal devices.
As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation
of legislative authority, and from the earliest time
American legal authorities have proceeded on the
theory that legislative power must be exercised by
the legislative alone. It is frankness, however, to
confess that as one delves into the mass of judicial
pronouncements, he finds a great deal of confusion.
One thing, however, is apparent in the development
of the principle of separation of powers and that is
that the maximum of delegatus non potest delegare
or delegata potestas non potest delegare, attributed
to Bracton (De Legibus et Consuetudinious Angliae,
edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press
[1922], vol. 2, p.167) but which is also recognized in
principle in the Roman Law (D.17.18.3), has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern
governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation", not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments.
The difficulty lies in the fixing of the limit and extent
of the authority. While courts have undertaken to lay
down general principles, the safest is to decide each
case according to its peculiar environment, having
in mind the wholesome legislative purpose intended
to be achieved.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
Bengzon v Drilon 208 scra 133 (1992)
FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the
Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the
Lower Court’s General Appropriations were
vetoed by the President because a resolution by
the Court providing for appropriations for retired
justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill
provided for the increase of the pensions of the
retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the
Court of Appeals as well as members of the
Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President
on that portion of the General Appropriations bill
is constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested
rights to the accrued pension that is due to them
in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The
president has no power to set aside and override
the decision of the Supreme Court neither does
the president have the power to enact or amend
statutes promulgated by her predecessors much
less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is
unconstitutional since the power of the president
to disapprove any item or items in the
appropriations bill does not grant the authority to
veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item.
NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed
Under the Constitution, the President does not
have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e.,
disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The
failure of the President to communicate his veto
of any bill represented to him within 30 days after
the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill
to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under
the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto
messages long after he should have acted on
the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new
laws are in force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art
6 of the Constitution which grants the President
power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in
such case shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
3 ways how a bill becomes a law.
1. When the President signs it
10
2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is
overridden by 2/3 vote of all the members of
each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon the
measure within 30 days after it shall have been
presented to him.
- Romulo v. Iňigez 141 scra 263
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere
with the Batasan’s power of impeachment
NO.
The dismissal by the majority of the members of
the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is
an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise
of powers that have been vested upon it by the
Constitution beyond the power of this Court to
review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan
to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by
petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as
a body of the resolution and complaint for
impeachment makes irrelevant under what
authority the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government had acted.
1. In Re Wilfredo torres 257 scra 709
2. Torres v Gonzales 152 scra 272
3. Tesoro v director of prisons 68 phil 154
4. Sales v director of prisons 87 phil 492
5. Esuarez v provincial warden of bohol
108 phil 353
We ruled consistently, viz., in Tesoro v.
Director of Prisons,1 Sales v. Director of
Prisons 2 Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of
Bohol3 and Torres v. Gonzales,4 that, where
a conditional pardonee has allegedly
breached a condition of a pardon, the
President who opts to proceed against him
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code need not wait for a
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime or for his conviction
therefor by final judgment, in order to
effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee
to prison. The grant of pardon, the
determination of the terms and conditions of
the pardon, the determination of the
occurrence of the breach thereof, and the
proper sanctions for such breach, are purely
executive acts and, thus, are not subject to
judicial scrutiny. We have so ruled in the
past, and we so rule now.
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
- People’s movement for freedom v.
Manglapus
Petitioners were seeking
information from the Presidents
representatives on the state of the
then on-going negotiations of the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
The Court denied the petition,
stressing that secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries
is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or
of the press nor of the freedom of
access to information. The
Resolution went on to state, thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires
centralization of authority and
expedition of decision which are
inherent in executive action.
Another essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential
nature. Although much has been
said about open and secret
diplomacy, with disparagement of
the latter, Secretaries of State
Hughes and Stimson have clearly
analyzed and justified the practice.
In the words of Mr. Stimson:
A complicated negotiation cannot
be carried through without many,
many private talks and discussion,
man to man; many tentative
suggestions and proposals.
Delegates from other countries
come and tell you in confidence of
their troubles at home and of their
differences with other countries
and with other delegates; they tell
you of what they would do under
certain circumstances and would
not do under other circumstances
If these reports should become
public who would ever trust
American Delegations in another
conference? (United States
Department of State, Press
Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-
284)
Delegation of Powers
Delegata potestas non potest delegari or
delegatus non potest delegare ("one to whom
power is delegated cannot himself further
delegate that power")
11
- People v. Vera 65 Phil 56
Under the constitutional system, the powers
of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent
organs: the legislative, the executive and
the judicial. Each of these departments of
the government derives its authority from
the Constitution which, in turn, is the
highest expression of popular will. Each
has exclusive cognizance of the matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere.
The power to make laws — the legislative
power — is vested in a bicameral
Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and
in a unicamiral National Assembly by the
Constitution (Act. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of
the Philippines). The Philippine Legislature
or the National Assembly may not escape
its duties and responsibilities by delegating
that power to any other body or authority.
Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle
that potestas delegata non delegare potest.
This principle is said to have originated with
the glossators, was introduced into English
law through a misreading of Bracton, there
developed as a principle of agency, was
established by Lord Coke in the English
public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its
way into America as an enlightened
principle of free government. It has since
become an accepted corollary of the
principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc.
of the Social Sciences, p. 66.) The classic
statement of the rule is that of Locke,
namely: "The legislative neither must nor
can transfer the power of making laws to
anybody else, or place it anywhere but
where the people have." (Locke on Civil
Government, sec. 142.) Judge Cooley
enunciates the doctrine in the following oft-
quoted language: "One of the settled
maxims in constitutional law is, that the
power conferred upon the legislature to
make laws cannot be delegated by that
department to any other body or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the state has
located the authority, there it must remain;
and by the constitutional agency alone the
laws must be made until the Constitution
itself is charged. The power to whose
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high
prerogative has been intrusted cannot
relieve itself of the responsibilities by
choosing other agencies upon which the
power shall be devolved, nor can it
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
substitute the judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism of any other body for those to
which alone the people have seen fit to
confide this sovereign trust." (Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p.
224. Quoted with approval in U. S. vs.
Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court
posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle
that such a delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by
the delegate by the instrumentality of his
own judgment acting immediately upon the
matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another. (U. S. vs.
Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the
delegation of legislative power is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of
exceptions. An exceptions sanctioned by
immemorial practice permits the central
legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs.
Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil.,
660; U. S. vs. Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil.,
102; Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129
U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 256; State vs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H.,
279.) "It is a cardinal principle of our system
of government, that local affairs shall be
managed by local authorities, and general
affairs by the central authorities; and hence
while the rule is also fundamental that the
power to make laws cannot be delegated,
the creation of the municipalities exercising
local self government has never been held
to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is
not regarded as a transfer of general
legislative power, but rather as the grant of
the authority to prescribed local regulations,
according to immemorial practice, subject of
course to the interposition of the superior in
cases of necessity." (Stoutenburgh vs.
Hennick, supra.) On quite the same
principle, Congress is powered to delegate
legislative power to such agencies in the
territories of the United States as it may
select. A territory stands in the same relation
to Congress as a municipality or city to the
state government. (United States vs.
Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 742; 51 L. ed., 1098; 11 Ann. Cas.,
688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195
U.S., 138; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law.
ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have
also sustained the delegation of legislative
power to the people at large. Some
authorities maintain that this may not be
done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C. L., p.
164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207
12
N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442; Ann. Cas.,
1914C, 616). However, the question of
whether or not a state has ceased to be
republican in form because of its adoption
of the initiative and referendum has been
held not to be a judicial but a political
question (Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs.
Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed.,
377; 32 Sup. Cet. Rep., 224), and as the
constitutionality of such laws has been
looked upon with favor by certain
progressive courts, the sting of the
decisions of the more conservative courts
has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of
the Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N.
E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113; Kiernan vs.
Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac.,
379; 1132 Pac., 402; 37 L. R. A. [N. S.],
332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs.
Oregon, supra.) Doubtless, also, legislative
power may be delegated by the
Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2,
of article VI of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides that "The National
Assembly may by law authorize the
President, subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, to fix within
specified limits, tariff rates, import or export
quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues."
And section 16 of the same article of the
Constitution provides that "In times of war
or other national emergency, the National
Assembly may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribed, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry
out a declared national policy." It is beyond
the scope of this decision to determine
whether or not, in the absence of the
foregoing constitutional provisions, the
President could be authorized to exercise
the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the
other hand, whatever doubt may have
existed has been removed by the
Constitution itself.
- US V Barrias
One of the settled maxims in constitutional
law is, that the power conferred upon the
legislature to make laws can not be
delegated by that department to any body
or authority. Where the sovereign power of
the State has located the authority, there it
must remain; only by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until
the constitution itself is changed. The
power to whose judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism this high prerogative has been
intrusted can not relieve itself of the
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
responsibility by choosing other agencies
upon which the power shall be developed,
nor can its substitutes the judgment,
wisdom, and patriotism and of any other
body for those to which alone the people
have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust.
(Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed.,
p. 137.)
This doctrine is based on the ethical
principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation
and not through the intervening mind of
another. In the case of the United States vs.
Breen (40 Fed. Phil. Rep. 402), an Act of
Congress allowing the Secretary of War to
make such rules and regulations as might
be necessary to protect improvements of the
Mississipi River, and providing that a
violation thereof should constitute a
misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground
that the misdemeanor was declared not
under the delegated power of the Secretary
of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. So
also was a grant to him of power to
prescribe rules for the use of canals. (U.S.
vs. Ormsbee, 74 Fed. Rep. 207.) but a law
authorizing him to require alteration of any
bridge and to impose penalties for violations
of his rules was held invalid, as vesting in
him upon a power exclusively lodged in
Congress (U.S. vs. Rider, 50 Fed. Rep.,
406.) The subject is considered and some
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in re Kollock (165 U.S. 526),
which upheld the law authorizing a
commissioner of internal revenue to
designate and stamps on oleomargarine
packages, an improper use of which should
thereafter constitute a crime or
misdemeanor, the court saying (p. 533):
The criminal offense is fully and completely
defined by the Act and the designation by
the Commissioner of the particular marks
and brands to be used was a mere matter of
detail. The regulation was in execution of, or
supplementary to, but not in conflict with the
law itself. . . .
- Bataan shipping lines v POEA (US V ANG
TAN HO)
There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
13
the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing
he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is
applicable to all the three major powers of
the Government but is especially important
in the case of the legislative power because
of the many instances when its delegation
is permitted. The occasions are rare when
executive or judicial powers have to be
delegated by the authorities to which they
legally certain. In the case of the legislative
power, however, such occasions have
become more and more frequent, if not
necessary. This had led to the observation
that the delegation of legislative power has
become the rule and its non-delegation the
exception.
EXEPTION TO DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
1. Permissible by the Constitution itself.
2. Power is delegated to LGU (Rubi V.
Provincial Board of Mindoro)
3. Delegation to administrative bodies.
(People V Vera)
4. Delegated to the people at-large.
(Referendum)
- Cervantes v auditor general 91 phil 351
(UNDUE DELEGATION)
The rule is that so long as the Legislature
"lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute" there is no
undue delegation. (11 Am. Jur. 957).
Republic Act No. 51 in authorizing the
President of the Philippines, among others,
to make reforms and changes in
government-controlled corporations, lays
down a standard and policy that the
purpose shall be to meet the exigencies
attendant upon the establishment of the
free and independent government of the
Philippines and to promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in their operations.
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
The standard was set and the policy fixed.
The President had to carry the mandate.
This he did by promulgating the executive
order in question which, tested by the rule
above cited, does not constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power.
- Pelaez v auditor general 15 scra 569
Although1a Congress may delegate to
another branch of the Government the
power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set
forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate2
— and (b) fix a standard — the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his
functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, the delegate would in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which
is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted
within or beyond the scope of his
authority.2b Hence, he could thereby
arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also — and this is worse
— to unmake it, by adopting measures
inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress, thus
nullifying the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and
balances, and, consequently, undermining
the very foundation of our Republican
system.
- Maceda v Macaraig 197 scra 771
Delegation need not be expressed in the
law.
- Chiongbian v Orbos 245 scra 253
There is, therefore, no abdication by
Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power to
merge administrative regions. The question
is whether Congress has provided a
sufficient standard by which the President is
to be guided in the exercise of the power
granted and whether in any event the grant
of power to him is included in the subject
expressed in the title of the law.
14
First, the question of standard. A legislative
standard need not be expressed. It may
simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need
it be found in the law challenged because it
may be embodied in other statutes on the
same subject as that of the challenged
legislation. 11
- People v Dacuycuy 173 scra 90
In the case under consideration, the
respondent judge erronneously assumed
that since the penalty of imprisonment has
been provided for by the legislature, the
court is endowed with the discretion to
ascertain the term or period of
imprisonment. We cannot agree with this
postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the
term of imprisonment where no points of
reference have been provided by the
legislature. What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an exercise
of discretion to fix the length of service of a
term of imprisonment which must be
encompassed within specific or designated
limits provided by law, the absence of
which designated limits well constitute such
exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an
outright intrusion into or assumption, of
legislative power.
- Ynot v IAC 148 scra 659
There had been an existing law which
prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued
EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from interprovinces
but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of
EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said
that the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without
being heard is unconstitutional. The lower
court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO
is a valid exercise of police power in order
to promote general welfare so as to curb
down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not
valid as it indeed violates due process. EO
626-A ctreated a presumption based on the
judgment of the executive. The movement
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

of carabaos from one area to the other does

not mean a subsequent slaughter of the
same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they
can be confiscated. The SC found that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of
the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment
on the administrative authorities of the
power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine
of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

*the questionable manner of the disposition

of the confiscated property as prescribed in
the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall be
distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of
the National Meat Inspection Commission
may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics
supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous
condition, if condition it is. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and
abuse, and even corruption. One searches
in vain for the usual standard and the
reasonable guidelines, or better still, the
limitations that the officers must observe
when they make their distribution. There is
none. Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what
criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they
and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive
discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving
commission a wide and sweeping authority
that is not canalized within banks that keep
it from overflowing,' in short a clearly
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Legislative Power
-The author or power under the
constitution to propose, enact, amend and
repeal laws.
Where Vested
-In the congress, except to the extent
reserved to people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.
- Gov. v. Spinger 50 phil 259
Comprehensive, plenary, complete.
Circumscribe only the constitutional
limitation.
It is legislative power which has been
vested in the Philippine Legislature. What is
legislative power? Judge Cooley says he
understands it "to be the authority, under
the constitution, to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them." Those matters which the
constitution specifically confides to the
executive "the legislature cannot directly or
indirectly take from his control." (Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 126-
131, 157-162.) President Wilson in his
authoritative work, "The State", page 487,
emphasizes by italics that legislatures "are
law making bodies acting within the gifts of
charters, and are by these charters in most

15 By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
cases very strictly circumscribed in their
action." If this is true, the converse that
legislative power is not executive or judicial
or governmental power needs no
demonstration. The Legislature essentially
executive or judicial. The Legislature cannot
make a law and them take part in its
execution or construction. So the Philippine
Legislature is not a partaker in either
executive or judicial power, except as
thePhilippine Senate participates in the
executive power through the Governor-
General, and except as the Philippine
Senate participates in the executive power
through having the right to confirm or reject
nominations made by the Governor-
General, and except as the Legislature
participates in the judicial power through
being made the sole judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its elective
members and through having the right to try
its own members for disorderly behavior.
The Philippine, Legislature may
nevertheless exercise such auxiliary powers
as are necessary and appropriate to its
indenpdence and to make its express
powers effective. (McGrain vs. Daugherty
[1927], 273 U. S., 135; 71 Law. ed., 580.)
Co-equality of Senate and
House of Representatives
- Tolentino v Secretary of Finance 235
scra 632
In vesting legislative power to the Senate, the
Constitution means the Senate "... composed of
twenty-four Senators ... elected at large by the
qualified voters of the Philippines ... ." 7
Similarly, when the Constitution vested the
legislative power to the House, it means the
House "... composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members ... who shall be
elected from legislative districts ... and those who
... shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations." 8 The Constitution thus, did
not vest on a Bicameral Conference Committee
with an ad hoc membership the power to
legislate for it exclusively vested legislative
power to the Senate and the House as co-equal
bodies. To be sure, the Constitution does not
mention the Bicameral Conference Committees
of Congress. No constitutional status is accorded
to them. They are not even statutory creations.
They owe their existence from the internal rules
of the two Houses of Congress. Yet,
respondents peddle the disconcerting idea that
16
they should be recognized as a Third Chamber
of Congress and with ex post veto power at that.
- Eastern Shipping Lines v POEA
Petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum
Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and
even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to
delegation.
Held: MC 2 is valid.
There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing
he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is
applicable to all the three major powers of the
Government but is especially important in the
case of the legislative power because of the
many instances when its delegation is
permitted. The occasions are rare when
executive or judicial powers have to be
delegated by the authorities to which they
legally certain. In the case of the legislative
power, however, such occasions have become
more and more frequent, if not necessary. This
had led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the
task of government and the growing inability of
the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of
society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation
has become necessary. To many of the
problems attendant upon present-day
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These
solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in
the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of
legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more
necessary to entrust to administrative agencies
the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions of the statute. This is called
the "power of subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may
implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the
Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of
Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.
- Misolas v Panga 181 scra 648
ADVANTAGES OF BICAMERAL
1. Quality legislation
2. Seriously studying by collective effort of
both houses.
3. Hasty improvident legislation may be
avoided.
4. More representative.
DISADVANTAGES OF BICAMERAL
1. Costly.
2. Legislative process is longer and time
consuming.
3. There can be an interchamber (impair
legislative power)
LEGISLATIVE POWER
1. ORIGINAL
2. 2. DERIVATIVE
COMPOSITION
SENATE HOR
24 Senators Not more than 250
members.
- Tobias v Abalos 236 scra 106
17
As to the contention that the assailed law
violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution,
a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House
of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, "unless otherwise
provided by law." The inescapable import of the
latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself
so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is
not unconstitutional.
- Mariano v COMELEC 242 scra 211
hese issues have been laid to rest in the recent
case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we
ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts
may be made through a special law, such as in
the charter of a new city. The Constitution9
clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty
(250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment of the law. This is its
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting
R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in
Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold
that reapportionment can only be made through
a general apportionment law, with a review of all
the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an
inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will
deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.
- Nuval V Guray
It is an established rule that "where a voter
abandons his residence in a state and
acquires one in another state, he cannot
again vote in the state of his former
residence until he has qualified by a new
period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p.
71, par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so
used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which
imports not only intention to reside in a
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
fixed place, but also personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144
N. Y. S., 145.)
- Aquino v COMELEC 248 scra 400
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home," 21
where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence
for the purposes of election law. The manifest
purpose of this deviation from the usual
conceptions of residency in law as explained in
Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or
newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and
needs of the community" from taking advantage
of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. While there is
nothing wrong with the practice of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the
essence of representation, which is to place
through the assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the
period of residency mandated by law for him to
qualify. That purpose could be obviously best
met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who
have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be
imperative for this Court to inquire into the
threshold question as to whether or not petitioner
actually was a resident for a period of one year
in the area now encompassed by the Second
Legislative District of Makati at the time of his
election or whether or not he was domiciled in
the same.
- Romualdez marcos v comelec 248 scra
300 residence – domiciliary law
In election cases, the term "residence" has
always been considered as synonymous
with "domicile" which imports not only the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in-that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs.
Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs.
RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to
the Philippines in 1991, the residence she
18
chose was not Tacloban but San Juan,
Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and
not Tacloban.
- Coquilla V COMELEC
The term residence is to be understood not in its
common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation,[21] but rather to domicile or legal
residence,[22] that is, the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi).[23] A
domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. It is usually the place where the childs
parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice).
Congress cannot expand, alter or
diminish the qualifications of the
members of the congress because it
defeats the supremacy of the
constitution (w/c provided the
qualifications)
- Maquera v. Borra 15 scra 7
To require the private respondent to own
property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a
property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meet the age,
citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also
own property in order to be qualified to run.
- Caasi v ca 191 scra 229 (1990)
It was held that immigration to the US by virtue
of the acquisition of “green card” constitutes
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
Green card pertains to permanent residency in
the US and not loss of Philippine citizenship.
Salaries of Congress – sec 10 article VI
- Philconsa v mathay 18 scra 300
It is admitted that the purpose of the
provision is to place "a legal bar to the
legislators yielding to the natural temptation
to increase their salaries. Not that the
power to provide for higher compensation is
lacking, but with the length of time that has
to elapse before an increase becomes
effective, there is a deterrent factor to any
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
such measure unless the need for it is
clearly felt" (Tañada & Fernando,
Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p.
867).
- Martinez v Morfe 44 scra 22 (1972)
- 'incompatible' and the acceptance of the
Sec 11 Article VI – Privileges from arrest
- Warth v Norton 56 south Carolina 45
If the congressman is on leave, can he still
enjoy the privilege from arrest?
NO
- Jimenez v cabangbang 17 scra 876
The issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the
purview of the phrase "speech or debate
therein" — that is to say, in Congress —
used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made
by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in
the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or
not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside
the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members
of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. (Vera v
Avelino)
- Antonino v. Valencia 57 scra 70
Privilege of Speech and Debate can’t be
invoked in libelous words.
Conlict of interest
- Punsalan v Mendoza 140 scra 153
(dissenting opinion of j. Teehankee)
The rule that physical impossibility to
perform the functions of the two or more
offices held constitutes legal incompatibility.
The rule is founded on logic common law
and common sense.
It is based on public policy. "Public policy
requires that any one accepting and
retaining a public office should not place
19
himself, by the accepting of another office,
in such a position that it is physically
impossible for him properly to perform the
duties of both offices, and if the nature of
the two offices is such that such
impossibility does appear, the offices are
second office, ipso facto, vacates the first.
Perkins vs. Manning, 122 p. 857.
. . . What, then, does constitute
incompatibility in offices? In 5 Bac,-Abr Title
Offices K, we find the rule laid down, upon
the authority of Lord Coke, in these words:
'Offices are said to be incompatible and
inconsistent, so as to be executed by the
same person, when, from the multiplicity of
business in them, they cannot be executed
with care and ability, . . .(Emphasis
supplied)
This Court adopted this rule in Nacionalista
Party vs. Bautista 13 wherein it was held
that . . . the permanent office of the
respondent [referring to the position of
Solicitor General] may not, from the strict
legal point of view, be incompatible with the
temporary one [membership in the
Commission on Elections) which he has
been designated, tested by the nature and
character of the functions he has to perform
in both offices, but in a broad sense there is
an incompatibility, because his duties and
functions as Solicitor General require that
all his time be devoted to their efficient
performance. Nothing short of that is
required and expected of him.
In Zandueta vs. de la Costa, 14 this Court
likewise held that "when a judge of first
instance, presiding over a branch of a Court
of First Instance of a judicial district by
virtue of a legal and valid appointment,
accepts another appointment to preside
over the same branch of the same Court of
First Instance, in addition to another court of
the same category, both of which belong to
a new judicial district formed by the addition
of another Court of First Instance to the old
one, enters into the discharge of the
functions of his new office and receives the
corresponding salary, he abandons his old
office and cannot claim to be entitled to
repossess it.
The broader test holds that "incompatibility
of offices exists where there is conflict in the
duties of the offices, so that the
performance of the duties of the one
interferes with the performance of the duties
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
of the other. They are generally considered
incompatible where such duties and
functions are inherently inconsistent and
repugnant, so that because of the contrariety
and antagonism which would result from the
attempt of one person to discharge faithfully,
impartially and efficiently the duties of both
offices, considerations of public policy render
it improper for an incumbent to retain both,
15 Under this test, respondent himself
realized such conflict and contrariety when
he told petitioner upon turning over the
governorship that "he would not want his
Office of Ministry of Justice to be involved in
a controversy regarding dual positions,
specially because it is his said office which
rules on said controversy and issues arising
therefrom for administrative purposes.16
This was shown all the more when
respondent ruled in his own favor in effect
when in January, 1985 he 'Reassumed the
position of governor'. . . (in) implementation
of the KBL Caucus recommendation
approved by the President, 17 instead of
disqualifying himself as a protagonist in view
of the serious constitutional and legal
obstacles.
- US v Pons 24 phil 729
Can congress validly enact bill even after
reglamentary period?
Yes, when the enrolled bill is in sine die session.
Determination of quorum
- Avelino v Cuenco 53 Phil 17
The constitution of our state ordains that a
majority of each house shall constitute a quorum.
the house of representative consist of 125
members; 63 is a majority and quorum. When a
majority or quorum are present, the house can
do business; not otherwise. A quorum
possessed all the powers of the whole body, a
majority of which quorum must, of course,
govern. (In re Gunn, 50 Kan., 155; 32 P., 470,
476; 19 L.R.A., 519.)
Quorum as used in U. S. C. A. Const. Art. 4 sec.
8, providing that a majority of each house shall
constitute a quorum to do business, is, for the
purpose of the Assembly, not less than the
majority of the whole number of which the house
may be composed. Vacancies from death,
resignation or failure to elect cannot be deducted
in ascertaining the quorum. (Opinion of Justice,
12 Fla. 653.)
20
The general rule is that a quorum is a majority
of all the members and a majority of this
majority may legislate and do the work of the
whole. (State vs. Ellington 117 N. C., 158; 23 S.
E. 250-252, 30 L.R.A., 532; 53 Am. SR., 580.)
. . . a majority of each House is necessary to
transact business, and a minority cannot
transact business, this view being in keeping
with the provision of the Constitution permitting
a smaller number than a quorum to adjourn
from day to day merely. (Earp vs. Riley, 40
OKL., 340; p. 164; Ralls vs. Wyand, 40 OKL.,
323; 138 P. 158.)
The Constitution provides that "a majority of
each (house) shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, when a majority are
present the House is in a position to do
business. Its capacity to transact business is
then established, created by the mere presence
of a majority, and depend upon the disposition
or assent or action of any single member or
faction of the majority present. All that the
Constitution required is the presence of a
majority, and when that majority are present, the
power of the House arises. (U. S. vs. Ballin,
Joseph & Co., 36 Law ed. 321, 325.)
If all the members of the select body or
committee, or if all the agents are assembled, or
if all have been duly notified, and the minority
refuse, or neglect to meet with the other, a
majority of those present may act, provided
those present constitute a majority of the whole
number. In other words, in such case, a major
part of the whole is necessary to constitute a
quorum, and a majority of the quorum may act.
If the major part withdraw so as to leave no
quorum, the power of the minority to act is, in
general, considered to cease. (1 Dillon, Mun.
Corp. 4th ed., sec. 283.)
- Astorga v Villegas 56 scra 714
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is
set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark
as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled
bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to
the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
legislative branch of the government, and
that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which
pass Congress shall be presented to him.
And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill
not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in
the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative
and executive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that
it was passed by Congress. The respect due
to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is
in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is
based mainly on "the respect due to coequal
and independent departments," which
requires the judicial department "to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it
has also been stated in other cases that if
the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the
courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment. This was the logical conclusion
reached in a number of decisions, 10
although they are silent as to whether the
journals may still be resorted to if the
attestation of the presiding officers is
present.
- Premiscias & Gardiner V Paredes & Clarin
61 phil 118
Where a question is suggested as to whether
or not a certain bill was duly approved by both
Houses of the Philippine Legislature and where
the journal which the Organic Act requires
each House of the Legislature to keep is not
identified, the return of the Speaker of the
House and the Acting President of the Senate
that the bill did not pass, supported by certified
documents prepared by officers whose duty it
21
is to prepare them, imports absolute verify and
must be accepted as conclusive.
The judiciary by means of a writ of mandamus
operating upon the heads of a legislative
body, can not supervise the making up of a
record of the proceedings of that body. To
attempt to do so would constitute an
inquisition into the conduct of members and
officers of the Legislature and would do
violence to the rights of a coordinate body.
Electoral Tribunals (Sec. 17, Art VI)
Composition
Three Supreme Court justices
designated by the Chief Justice, and six
members of the house concerned chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior justice
shall be its chairman.
Power
The Electoral Tribunal of the Houses of
Congress shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to election, returns and qualifications of
their respective members.
- Duenas V HRET & Reyes
Discretion of HRET to Use Its
Own Funds In Revision Proceedings
When jurisdiction is conferred by law on a
court or tribunal, that court or tribunal,
unless otherwise provided by law, is
deemed to have the authority to employ all
writs, processes and other means to make
its power effective.54 Where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise
of one or the performance of the other is
also conferred.55 Since the HRET
possessed the authority to motu propio
continue a revision of ballots, it also had the
wherewithal to carry it out. It thus ordered
the disbursement of its own funds for the
revision of the ballots in the remaining
counter-protested precincts. We hark back
to Rule 7 of the HRET Rules which provides
that the HRET has exclusive control,
direction and supervision of its functions.
The HRET’s order was but one aspect of its
power.
But what is "grave abuse of discretion?" It is
such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment which is tantamount to lack of
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is
insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be
grave, that is, the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility. It must be so
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In other words, for
a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must
be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
There is also grave abuse of discretion when
there is a contravention of the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence.62 Using
the foregoing as yardstick, the Court finds
that petitioner miserably failed to discharge
the onus probandi imposed on him.
- Navaja v Judge de Castro GR 182926
*represented by atty edgar borje. HAHAHA
- Abbas v Senate Electoral Tribunal 166 scra
651
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned
Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of
the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of
whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility
might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last
time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at
stake. Yet the Constitution provides no
scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations or for the substitution of Senators
designated to the Tribunal whose
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in
such situations must simply place their trust
and hopes of vindication in the fairness and
sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that
no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself
from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case
where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of
an objective and impartial judgment. What
we are merely saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such,
22
absent its entire membership of Senators
and that no amendment of its Rules can
confer on the three Justices-Members alone
the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
- Lazatin v HRET 168 SCRA 391
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of
the House of Representatives, to
promulgate rules and regulations relative to
matters within its jurisdiction, including the
period for filing election protests before it, is
beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power
granted it by the Constitution. This is the
import of the ruling in the landmark case of
Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil.
139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking
through Justice Laurel, declared in no
uncertain terms:
... [The creation of the Electoral
Commission carried with it ex necessitate
rei the power regulative in character to limit
the time within which protests entrusted to
its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled
rule of construction that where a general
power is conferred or duly enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise
of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139).
In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the
Electoral Commission, therefore, the
incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary
implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission. [At p. 177; emphasis
supplied.]
- Bondoc v Pineda 201 SCRA 792
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for
termination of membership in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be
non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence even
independence from the political party to which
they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
"breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds
for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the
HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor
of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and
the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the
House of Representatives committed a grave
abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation
of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion
against Congressman Camasura is, therefore,
null and void.
Hret resolution is null and void. Action of hret is
violative of constitutional mandate because:
1. It is a clear impairment of the constitutional
prerogative of the hret to be the sole judge of the
election contest bet. Pineda and bondoc. To
sanction interference by the house of rep. Would
reduce tribunal as tool for the aggrandizement of
the party in power (ldp)
2. Members of the tribunal must be non-
partisan. Camasura was discharging his
functions with complete detachment, impartiality
and independence. Disloyalty to party and
breach of party discipline -> not valid ground for
expulsion of member of the tribunal
3. It violates camasura’s right to security of
tenure. Members of hret are entitled to security
of tenure. Membership may not be terminated
w/o undue cause such as: expiration of term of
office, death, permanent disability, resignation
from political party, formal affiliation with another
party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause.
Commission on Appointments
Composition
The Senate President, as ex officio
Chairman, 12 Senators and 12 Members of
the House of Representatives, elected by
each house on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman shall not
vote except in case of a tie.
Nature and Powers
Serve as an administrative check on the
appointing authority of the President.
Confirm or rejects the appointment of the
President.
The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within 30
session days of Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority of its members.
Who may be appointed by the President?
23
1. Heads of the executive departments.
2. Ambassadors
3. Other public ministers and consuls
4. Officers of the armed forces (from the
rank of colonel or naval captain)
5. Other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in the constitution.
- Sarmiento III v Mison 156 scra 549
FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs and Carague as the
Secretary of the Department of Budget, without
the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the
appointments as unconstitutional by reason of
its not having been confirmed by CoA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.
RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing
Salvador Mison, without submitting his
nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is
thus entitled to exercise the full authority and
functions of the office and to receive all the
salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
there are 4 groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and
bureaus heads, ambassadors, other public
ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers with the consent and confirmation
of the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by
law;
3rd those whom the President may be
authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments
the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
First group of officers is clearly appointed with
the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers
are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints.
2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the
present bone of contention. By following the
accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated, it
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
would follow that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group
require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
- Guingona v Gonzales 219 scra 336
It is evident that the position of Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not
one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the
Commission on Appointments is required. The
1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the
position of "heads of bureaus" from
appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments.
- Cayetano v Monsod 201 scra 210
The appointing process in a regular
appointment as in the case at bar, consists
of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission
(in the Philippines, upon submission by the
Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President
issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of
bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-
3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
Is the COA rejections and confirmations
subject to judicial review?
The Commission on the basis of evidence
submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined
that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution).
Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.
24
Non Mandatory Character of
The Commissioner of
Appointments’ Membership
We do not agree with respondents' claim
that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to
the Commission on Appointments. The
Constitution does not contemplate that the
Commission on Appointments must
necessarily include twelve (12) senators
and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives. What the Constitution
requires is that there be at least a majority
of the entire membership. Under Section
18, the Commission shall rule by majority
vote of all the members and in Section 19,
the Commission shall meet only while
congress is in session, at the call of its
Chairman or a majority of all its members
"to discharge such powers and functions
herein conferred upon it". Implementing the
above provisions of the Constitution,
Section 10 Chapter 3 of the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments, provides as
follows:
Sec. 10. — Place of Meeting and Quorum:
The Commission shall meet at either the
session hall of the Senate or the House of
Representatives upon call of the Chairman
or as the Commission may designate. The
presence of at least thirteen (13) members
is necessary to constitute a quorum.
Provided, however, that at least four (4) of
the members constituting the quorum
should come from either house. . . .
It is quite evident that the Constitution does
not require the election and presence of
twelve (12) senators and twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives
in order that the Commission may function.
Other instances may be mentioned of
Constitutional collegial bodies which
perform their composition is expressly
specified by the Constitution. Among these
are the Supreme
Court, 13 Civil Service Commission, 14
Commission on Election, 15 Commission on
Audit. 16 They perform their function so
long and there is the required quorum,
usually a majority of its membership. The
Commission on Appointments may perform
its functions and transact it s business even
if only ten (10) senators are elected thereto
as long as a quorum exists.
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
It may also be mentioned that while the
Constitution provides for equal membership
from the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments, the senators on the one
hand, and the representatives, on the other,
do not vote separately but jointly, and
usually along party lines. Even if Senator
Tañada would not be able sit in the
Commission on Appointments, the LP-LDP-
LABAN would still be represented in the
Commission by congressman Ponce Enrile
who has become a member of the LP. On
the other hand, there is nothing to stop any
of the political party in order to fill up the two
vacancies resulting from this decision.
Assuming that the Constitution intended that
there be always twelve (12) senators in the
Commission on Appointments, the instant
situation cannot be rectified by the Senate in
disregard of the rule on proportional
representation. The election of senator
Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of
the Commission on Appointments by the
LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a
violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Their nomination and
election by the LDP majority by sheer force
of superiority in numbers during the Senate
organization meeting of August 27, 1992
was done in grave abuse of discretion.
Where power is exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the command of the
Constitution, and by reason of numerical
strength, knowingly and not merely
inadvertently, said exercise amounts to
abuse of authority granted by law and grave
abuse of discretion is properly found to exist.
Proportional representation in
the membership of Commission
of Appointments
- Coseteng v Mitra 187 SCRA 377
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators,
and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a
tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The
25
commission shall rule by a majority vote of all
the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.)
The composition of the House membership in
the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political
parties in the House. There are 160 members of
the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of
the House membership (which may be rounded
out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12
members in the Commission on Appointments
would equal 9.6 members, which may be
rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP.
The remaining two seats were apportioned to
the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the
next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and
the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the
principal opposition party in the House. There is
no doubt that this apportionment of the House
membership in the Commission on
Appointments was done "on the basis of
proportional representation of the political
parties therein."
The other political parties or groups in the
House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is
presumably a member also of the Coalesced
Majority), are bound by the majority's choices.
Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an
opposition party, its lone member (petitioner
Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than 1%
of the House membership, hence, she is not
entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the
Commission on Appointments. To be able to
claim proportional membership in the
Commission on Appointments, a political party
should represent at least 8.4% of the House
membership, i.e., it should have been able to
elect at least 17 congressmen or
congresswomen.
Congressional Inquiries (Legislative
Inquiries- Question Hour)
The heads of departments may, upon their
own initiative with the consent of the President,
or upon the request of either House, as the
rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the
State or the public interest so requires, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive
session. (Sec 22, Art VI)
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
Constitutional Requirement for Inquiry:
1. It must be in the aid of legislation.
2. The rights of the person appearing must
be respected.
- Bengzon III v Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee 203 scra 767
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in
aid of legislation" means, it can readily be
seen that the phrase contributes practically
nothing towards protecting witnesses.
Practically any investigation can be in aid of
the broad legislative power of Congress.
The limitation, therefore cannot effectively
prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103
U.S. 168 [1880]) characterized as "roving
commissions" or what Watkins v. United
States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as
exposure for the sake of exposure. (Bernas,
Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present
casem, it can readily be seen that the
Senate is investigating an area where it may
potentially legislate. The ease with which
relatives of the President were allegedly
able to amass great wealth under the past
regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if
we tack on the alleged attempts o f relatives
of a succeeding adminsitration to duplicate
the feat, the need for remedial legislation
becomes more imperative.
-Arnault v Nazareno 87 Phil 29
This case arose from the legislative inquiry
into the acquisition by the Philippine
Government of the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates sometime in 1949.
Among the witnesses called to be examined
by the special committee created by a
Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a
lawyer who delivered a partial of the
purchase price to a representative of the
vendor. During the Senate investigation,
Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said
representative, at the same time invoking
his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Senate adopted a
resolution committing Arnault to the custody
of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned
“until he shall have purged the contempt by
revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, as
well as answer other pertinent questions in
26
connection therewith.” Arnault petitioned for
a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty
against those who refuse to answer its
questions in a congressional hearing in aid
of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate
to impose penalty in carrying out their duty
to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it
must be herein established that a witness
who refuses to answer a query by the
Committee may be detained during the
term of the members imposing said penalty
but the detention should not be too long as
to violate the witness’ right to due process
of law.
Although there is no provision in the [1935]
Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the
end that it may exercise its legislative
functions as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry – with process to
enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function.
- Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative
v Sangguniang Panlungsod
The power of inquiry-with process to
enforce it-is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information —
which is not infrequently true — recourse
must be had to others who possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing,
and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.
(McGrain vs. Daugherty 273 U.S., 135; 71
L. ed., 580; 50 ALR 1) The fact that the
Constitution expressly gives to Congress
the power to punish its Members for
disorderly behaviour, does not by
necessary implication exclude the power to
punish for contempt by any person.
(Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton 204; 5 L.
ed., 242)
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
But no person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness before either
House, unless his testimony is required in a
matter into which that House has jurisdiction
to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26,
L.ed., 377.)
Appropriation Bill sec. 24 art. VI
- Association of Small Land Owners v.
Sec. Agrarian Reform 175scra 343
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself
being questioned on the ground that it
does not conform to the requirements
of a valid appropriation as specified in
the Constitution. Clearly, however,
Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation
measure even if it does provide for the
creation of said fund, for that is not its
principal purpose. An appropriation law
is one the primary and specific
purpose of which is to authorize the
release of public funds from the
treasury. 19 The creation of the fund is
only incidental to the main objective of
the proclamation, which is agrarian
reform.
It should follow that the specific
constitutional provisions invoked, to
wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of
Article VI, are not applicable. With
particular reference to Section 24, this
obviously could not have been
complied with for the simple reason
that the House of Representatives,
which now has the exclusive power to
initiate appropriation measures, had
not yet been convened when the
proclamation was issued. The
legislative power was then solely
vested in the President of the
Philippines, who embodied, as it were,
both houses of Congress.
- Tolentino v Sec. of Finance
In sum, while Art. VI, §24 provides that all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills must "originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives," it
also adds, "but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments." In the exercise of this
power, the Senate may propose an entirely new
bill as a substitute measure. As petitioner
Tolentino states in a high school text, a
committee to which a bill is referred may do any
of the following:
27
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to
make changes in the bill omitting or adding
sections or altering its language; (3) to make
and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute,
in which case it will be known as a committee
bill; or (4) to make no report at all.
- Garcia v Executive Secretary 211 scra 219
Facts: Executive Order no 475 imposed an
additional duty of 9% on crude oil and oil
products while Executive Order 478 imposed a
special duty on crude oil and oil products.
Petitioners claimed that both EOs are
unconstitutional because all revenue measures
must originate from the House of
Representatives and the Tariff and Customs
Code authorized the president to increase the
tariff duties only to protect local industries but
not to raise additional revenue for the
government.
Issue: Whether or not the tariff rates imposed
are valid?
Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
The assailed Executive Orders are valid.
Congress may by law authorize the president to
fit tariff rates and other duties within specified
limits. The issuance of these EOs authorized by
Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. There is nothing in the law that suggests
that the authority may only be exercised to
protect local industries. Custom duties may be
designated to achieve more than one policy
objective the protection of local industries and to
raise revenue for the government.
Doctrine of Augmentation sec 25(5) Art.
VI (Transfer of Funds)
-impermissible or illegal.
XPN:
1. When the transfer is for augmenting
either in GAA.
2. Funds must come from their
savings.
- Demetria v Alba 148 scra 208
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of constitutional commis
ions may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for
one item to another was explicit and categorical
under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford
the heads of the different branches of the
government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of
public funds and resources, the constitution
allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the
transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body concerned. The leeway
granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred
were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for
the purpose of augmenting an item and such
transfer may be made only if there are savings
from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body.
LIMITATION ON THE POWER OF CONGRESS
TO APPROPRIATE
1. Constitutional Limitations
a. Sec 25 (1) Art VI
b. Sec 25 (2) Art VI
c. Sec 25 (4) Art VI
d. Sec 25 (5) Art VI
e. Sec 29 (2) Art VI
2. Extra-Constitutional Limitations
a. For a public purpose.
b. Amount must be certain and
definite.
ENROLLED BILL V JOURNAL
- Mabanag v Lopez Vito 78 phil 1
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8
representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election
irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House
except in the election of the House Speaker.
They argued that some senators and House
Reps were not considered in determining the
required ¾ vote (of each house) in order to pass
the Resolution (proposing amendments to the
Constitution) – which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes
were already entered into the Journals of the
respective House. As a result, the Resolution
was passed but it could have been otherwise
28
were they allowed to vote. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative
votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-
fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the
furtherance of the said resolution amending the
constitution. Respondents argued that the SC
cannot take cognizance of the case because the
Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take
cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not
the said resolution was duly enacted by
Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is
concerned, even if both the journals from each
House and an authenticated copy of the Act had
been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may
be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The
SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity
in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced.
It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the
journals behind the enrolled copy in order to
determine the correctness of the latter, and rule
such copy out if the two, the journals and the
copy, be found in conflict with each other. No
discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did
not say or so much as give to understand that if
discrepancy existed it would give greater weight
to the journals, disregarding the explicit
provision that duly certified copies “shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly
introduced, finally passed by both houses,
signed by the proper officers of each, approved
by the president and filed by the secretary of
state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: “Official documents may be proved as
follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislatives body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or
of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or
of either house thereof, or by published statutes
or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided,
That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when
there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies,
it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly
authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of
an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the
journals.
- Morales v Subido 27 SCRA 131
Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was
adopted. Whatever doubt there might have been
as to the status and force of the theory in the
Philippines, in view of the dissent of three
Justices in Mabanag, 9 was finally laid to rest by
the unanimous decision in Casco Philippine
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. 10 Speaking for the
Court, the then Justice (now Chief Justice)
Concepcion said:
Furthermore it is well settled that the enrolled bill
— which uses the term "urea formaldehyde"
instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor
of the measure passed by Congress and
approved by the President (Primicias vs.
Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections,
L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it
was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive — on which we
cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
By what we have essayed above we are not of
course to be understood as holding that in all
cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill.
To be sure there are certain matters which the
Constitution 11 expressly requires must be
entered on the journal of each house. To what
extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters
entered on the journal, is a question which we do
not now decide. 12 All we hold is that with
respect to matters not expressly required to be
entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails
in the event of any discrepancy.
29
- Gonzales v Macaraig 191 SCRA 452
Facts:
On 16 December 1988, Congress
passed House Bill 19186, or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989.
As passed, it eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed
budget submitted by the President.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision on
the passage of bills, Congress presented
the said Bill to the President for
consideration and approval. On 29
December 1988, the President signed the
Bill into law, and declared the same to have
become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special
Provisions and Section 55, a “General
Provision,” were vetoed. On 2 February
1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381
(“Authorizing and Directing the Committee
on Finance to Bring in the Name of the
Senate of the Philippines the Proper Suit
with the Supreme Court of the Philippines
contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto
by the President of Special and General
Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the
General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No.
19186) and For Other Purposes”) was
adopted. On 11 April 1989, the Petition for
Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by Neptali
A. Gonzales, et al, as members and ex-
officio members of the Committee on
Finance of the Senate and as “substantial
taxpayers whose vital interests may be
affected by this case,” with a prayer for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the
constitutionality or legality of the
Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking
to enjoin Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Vicente
Jayme, Carlos Dominguez, Fulgencio
Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes
Quisumbing, Raul Manglapus, Alfredo
Bengson, Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos,
Mita Pardo De Tavera, Rainerio Reyes,
Guillermo Carague, Rosalina Cajucom and
Eufemio C. Domingo from implementing RA
6688. No Restraining Order was issued by
the Supreme Court. Gonzales et al.’s cause
is anchored on the following grounds: (1)
the President’s line-veto power as regards
appropriation bills is limited to item/s and
does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
exceeded her authority when she vetoed
Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90)
which are provisions; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an
appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the
item-veto power but should veto the entire
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentation
in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987
Constitution, has to be provided for by law
and, therefore, Congress is also vested with
the prerogative to impose restrictions on the
exercise of that power. The Solicitor
General, as counsel for Macaraig et al.,
counters that the issue in the present case is
a political question beyond the power of the
Supreme Court to determine; that Gonzales
et al. had a political remedy, which was to
override the veto; that Section 55 is a “rider”
because it is extraneous to the
Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the
President’s veto; that the power of the
President to augment items in the
appropriations for the executive branches
had already been provided for in the Budget
Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD
1177, as amended by RA 6670 (4 August
1988); and that the President is empowered
by the Constitution to veto provisions or
other “distinct and severable parts” of an
Appropriations Bill.
Issue:
whether or not the President
exceeded the item-veto power accorded by
the Constitution or differently put, has the
President the power to veto provisions of an
Appropriations Bill
Held:
No. The veto power of the
President is expressed in Article VI, Section
27 of the 1987 Constitution. Paragraph (1)
refers to the general veto power of the
President and if exercised would result in the
veto of the entire bill, as a general rule.
Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the
item-veto power or the line-veto power. It
allows the exercise of the veto over a
particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the
President may not veto less than all of an
item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words,
the power given the executive to disapprove
any item or items in an Appropriations Bill
does not grant the authority to veto a part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion
of the same item. Notwithstanding the
elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the
1987 Constitution of any reference to the
veto of a provision, the extent of the
30
President’s veto power as previously
defined by the 1935 Constitution has not
changed. This is because the eliminated
proviso merely pronounces the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of
a bill may be the subject of a separate veto.
The restrictive interpretation urged by
Gonzales et al. that the President may not
veto a provision without vetoing the entire
bill not only disregards the basic principle
that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be the subject of a separate veto but
also overlooks the Constitutional mandate
that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein and
that any such provision shall be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it
relates. In other words, in the true sense of
the term, a provision in an Appropriations
Bill is limited in its operation to some
particular appropriation to which it relates,
and does not relate to the entire bill. The
President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY
‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) because they
nullify the authority of the Chief Executive
and heads of different branches of
government to augment any item in the
General Appropriations Law for their
respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations, as
guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of
the Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that
the power to augment from savings lies
dormant until authorized by law. When
Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90)
prohibit the restoration or increase by
augmentation of appropriations disapproved
or reduced by Congress, they impair the
constitutional and statutory authority of the
President and other key officials to augment
any item or any appropriation from savings
in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
The exercise of such authority in respect of
disapproved or reduced items by no means
vests in the Executive the power to rewrite
the entire budget, the leeway granted being
delimited to transfers within the department
or branch concerned, the sourcing to come
only from savings. More importantly, for
such a special power as that of
augmentation from savings, the same is
merely incorporated in the General
Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is
“one the primary and specific aim of which
is to make appropriation of money from the
public treasury”. It is a legislative
authorization of receipts and expenditures.
The power of augmentation from savings,
on the other hand, can by no means be
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
considered a specific appropriation of
money. It is a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure.
Issue:
whether the Legislature’s inclusion
of qualifications, conditions, limitations or
restrictions on expenditure of funds in the
Appropriation Bill was proper
Held:
There can be no denying that
inherent in the power of appropriation is the
power to specify how money shall be spent;
and that in addition to distinct “items” of
appropriation, the Legislature may include in
Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions,
limitations or restrictions on expenditure of
funds. Settled also is the rule that the
Executive is not allowed to veto a condition
or proviso of an appropriation while allowing
the appropriation itself to stand. The veto of
a condition in an Appropriations Bill which
did not include a veto of the items to which
the condition related was deemed invalid
and without effect whatsoever. However, for
the rule to apply, restrictions should be such
in the real sense of the term, not some
matters which are more properly dealt with in
a separate legislation. Restrictions or
conditions in an Appropriations Bill must
exhibit a connection with money items in a
budgetary sense in the schedule of
expenditures. Again, the test is
appropriateness. “It is not enough that a
provision be related to the institution or
agency to which funds are appropriated.
Conditions and limitations properly included
in an appropriation bill must exhibit such a
connexity with money items of appropriation
that they logically belong in a schedule of
expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of
appropriateness.” Tested by these criteria,
Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90)
must also be held to be inappropriate
“conditions.” While they, particularly, Section
16 (FY ‘90), have been “artfully drafted” to
appear as true conditions or limitations, they
are actually general law measures more
appropriate for substantive and, therefore,
separate legislation. Further, neither of them
shows the necessary connection with a
schedule of expenditures. The reason is that
items reduced or disapproved by Congress
would not appear on the face of the enrolled
bill or Appropriations Act itself. They can
only be detected when compared with the
original budgetary submittals of the
31
President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and
16 (FY ‘90) themselves provide that an item
“shall be deemed to have been disapproved
by Congress if no corresponding
appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act.” Herein, there is no
condition, in the budgetary sense of the
term, attached to an appropriation or item in
the appropriation bill which was struck out.
For obviously, Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16
(FY ‘90) partake more of a curtailment on
the power to augment from savings; in other
words, “a general provision of law, which
happens to be put in an appropriation bill.”
Issue:
whether the legislature has a
remedy when it believes that the veto
powers by the executive were
unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. If, indeed, the legislature
believed that the exercise of the veto
powers by the executive were
unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by
the Constitution is crystal clear. A
Presidential veto may be overridden by the
votes of two-thirds of members of Congress
(1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section
27[1]). But Congress made no attempt to
override the Presidential veto. Gonzales et
al.’s argument that the veto is ineffectual so
that there is “nothing to override” has lost
force and effect with the executive veto
having been herein upheld. There need be
no future conflict if the legislative and
executive branches of government adhere
to the spirit of the Constitution, each
exercising its respective powers with due
deference to the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of the other.
Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of
governmental powers remains on even
keel.
Note:
SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a
general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in
separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must
be treated as “item,” which can be vetoed
by the President in the exercise of his item-
veto power. The SC went one step further
and rules that even assuming arguendo that
“provisions” are beyond the executive
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ‘89) and
Section 16 (FY ‘90) were not “provisions” in
the budgetary sense of the term, they are
“inappropriate provisions” that should be
treated as “items” for the purpose of the
President’s veto power.
Note: Executive Impoundment
Definition: This refers to a refusal by the
President, for whatever reason, to spend
funds made available by Congress. It is the
failure to spend or obligate budget authority
of any type.
Argument against executive
impoundment: Those who deny to the
President the power to impound argue that
once Congress has set aside the fund for a
specific purpose in an appropriations act, it
becomes mandatory on the part of the
President to implement the project and to
spend the money appropriated therefor. The
President has no discretion on the matter,
for the Constitution imposes on him the duty
to faithfully execute the laws.
Argument for executive impoundment:
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at
least three principal sources of the authority
of the President. Foremost is the authority to
impound given to him either expressly or
impliedly by Congress. Second is the
executive power drawn from the President’s
role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the
Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is
the same provisions invoked by petitioners
herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful
execution of the laws requires that the
President desist from implementing the law if
doing so would prejudice public interest. An
example given is when through efficient and
prudent management of a project,
substantial savings are made. In such a
case, it is sheer folly to expect the President
to spend the entire amount budgeted in the
law.
- Bolinao Electronics Operations v Valencia
11 SCRA 486
Under the Constitution, the President has the
power to veto any particular item or items of
an appropriation bill. However, when a
provision of an appropriation bill affects one or
more items of the same, the President cannot
veto the provision without at the same time
vetoing the particular item or items to which it
relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20.)
32
It may be observed from the wordings of the
Appropriations Act that the amount
appropriated for the operation of the
Philippine Broadcasting Service was made
subject to the condition that the same shall
not be used or expended for operation of
television stations in Luzon, where there are
already existing commercial television
stations. This gives rise to the question of
whether the President may legally veto a
condition attached to an appropriation or item
in the appropriation bill. But this is not a novel
question. A little effort to research on the
subject would have yielded enough authority
to guide action on the matter For, in the
leading case of State v. Holder,2 it was
already declared that such action by the
Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that
the executive's veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions, has been adhered to in
subsequent cases.3 If the veto is
unconstitutional, it follows that the same
produced no effect whatsoever,4 and the
restriction imposed by the appropriation bill,
therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by
the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of
installing or operating a television station in
Manila, where there are already television
stations in operation, would be in violation of
the express condition for the release of the
appropriation and, consequently, null and
void. It is not difficult to see that even if it
were able to prove its right to operate on
Channel 9, said intervenor would not have
been entitled to reimbursement of its illegal
expenditures.
- Aglipay v Ruiz 64 phil 201
The Director of Posts announced on May
1936 in Manila newspapers that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps for
the commemoration of the 33rd
International Eucharistic Congress
celebration in the City of Manila. The said
event was organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the
petitioner, is the Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, requested
Vicente Sotto who is a member of the
Philippine Bar to raise the matter to the
President. The said stamps in consideration
were actually issued already and sold
though the greater part thereof remained
unsold. The further sale of the stamps was
sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
Issue:
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
Whether or not the respondent violated the
Constitution in issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress
Held:
No, the respondent did not violate the
Constitution by issuing and selling the
commemorative postage stamps. Ruiz acted
under the provision of Act No. 4052, which
contemplates no religious purpose in view,
giving the Director of Posts the discretion to
determine when the issuance of new
postage stamps would be “advantageous to
the Government.” Of course, the phrase
“advantageous to the Government” does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. In
the case at bar, the issuance of the postage
stamps was not intended by Ruiz to favor a
particular church or denomination. The
stamps did not benefit the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the
sale of the stamps given to that church. The
purpose of issuing of the stamps was to
actually take advantage of an international
event considered to be a great opportunity to
give publicity to the Philippines and as a
result attract more tourists to the country. In
evaluating the design made for the stamp, it
showed the map of the Philippines instead of
showing a Catholic chalice. The focus was
on the location of the City of Manila, and it
also bore the inscription that reads “Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress,
Feb. 3-7, 1937.” In considering these, it is
evident that there is no violation of the
Constitution therefore the act of the issuing
of the stamps is constitutional.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a
writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as
to costs.
Sec 32 – Initiative
- Santiago v COMELEC 127325
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with
COMELEC a petition to amend Constitution,
to lift term limits of elective officials, by
people’s initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC
to control and supervise said people’s
initiative the signature-gathering all over the
country. The proposition is: “Do you approve
of lifting the term limits of all elective
government officials, amending for the
purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI,
33
Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of
Article 8 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution?” Said Petition for Initiative will
first be submitted to the people, and after it
is signed by at least 12% total number of
registered voters in the country, it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for
publication of the petition. Petitioners Sen.
Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin
Petition on the ground that it is not the
initiatory petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on people’s
initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3
systems on initiative but failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative. This
deliberate omission indicates matter of
people’s initiative was left to some future
law.
c. COMELEC has no power to provide rules
and regulations for the exercise of people’s
initiative. Only Congress is authorized by
the Constitution to pass the implementing
law.
d. People’s initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution, not to
revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor any government agency
has not yet appropriated funds for people’s
initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly
propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER
It was intended to include or cover people’s
initiative on amendments to the Constitution
but, as worded, it does not adequately cover
such intiative. Article XVII Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution providing for amendments
to Constitution, is not self-executory. While
the Constitution has recognized or granted
the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution via PI, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of
COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The inclusion of the word
“Constitution” therein was a delayed
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the
section which is silent as to amendments of
the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other
systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for
initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does
not include the provisions of the Constitution
sought to be amended, in the case of
initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative
on the Constitution. This conspicuous
silence as to the latter simply means that the
main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. The
argument that the initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is not accepted to be
subsumed under the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum because it is
national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III,
the classification is not based on the scope
of the initiative involved, but on its nature
and character.
National initiative – what is proposed to be
enacted is a national law, or a law which
only Congress can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance or
resolution which only legislative bodies of
the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays can pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be
delegated. The recognized exceptions to the
rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the
President; [2] Delegation of emergency
powers to the President; [3] Delegation to
the people at large; [4] Delegation to local
34
governments; and [5] Delegation to
administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an
administrative body exercising quasi judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority. In every case of
permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It
is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable –
to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Republic Act
No. 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements
in subordinate legislation. The delegation of
the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is void.
COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise
of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that
power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take
cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a
petition solely intended to obtain an order:
(a) fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to
assist Delfin’s movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of
the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE
DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded
ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance
with the power of Congress to implement
By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 REVIEWER

the right to initiate constitutional

amendments, or that it has validly vested
upon the COMELEC the power of
subordinate legislation and that COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
Petition.

The Delfin Petition does not contain

signatures of the required number of voters.
Without the required signatures, the petition
cannot be deemed validly initiated. The
COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a
petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc.

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory

petition under RA6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The petition was merely entered
as UND, meaning undocketed. It was
nothing more than a mere scrap of paper,
which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on
12 December 1996, and the order directing
Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or
oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted
its time, energy, and resources.

Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not

apply to constitutional amendment.

35 By: CHESKA MHEY D. DELA PAZ