EN BANC
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections
[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v. CHRISTIAN
MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, Respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel
for petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
proportions While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court’s decision in this case would indubitably have a profound
effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1),
Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for al least ten years."
(Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to
what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an
appointive office.
chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Black defines "practice of law" as: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of
litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of
law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees
for services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law Dictionary,
3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the
practice of law when he:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as
an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.
Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177) stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of
facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of
an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode
Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,
144). (Emphasis ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys
engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he
is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree
of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members
of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the provision — ‘who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.’"
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification
that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the
Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long
as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their
legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment
as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it
up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made
available whenever this provision on the qualifications as
regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice
of law for at least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that
this is equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Thank you." cralaw virtua1aw library
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides,
among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is
in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today,
although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is
still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners.
(Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The
term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal
services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called
"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The
firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In
most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneys called "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas
of law practice is essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any
acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust
Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting
Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626
[1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known
in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op.
cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at
once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend
little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their
entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer’s role colors much of both the public image and
the self-perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public
mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall
that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business
counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally
tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and
bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that
in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work
is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation
work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the
trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in
law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal
medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner
will engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different
legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions,
clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing
numbers of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even
within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift
from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an
importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the
lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead,
the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range
of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both
effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in
litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at
least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the
most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by
the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are those
of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein
below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a
departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are
finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied
by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The
recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of
estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of
information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress
the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged
in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate
legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to
legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by
those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an
early introduction to multi-variable decisional contexts and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master’s or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for
the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
problems would require the services of an astute attorney
because of the complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is
the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele
composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and
industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people
could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation
will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern
or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities
other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he
is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one’s work
actually fits into the work of the organization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work
first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered
this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country
is perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area coveted by
corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do
their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in
the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails
to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot
in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the
traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to
the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular significance to the
corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skills applicable to a corporate counsel’s management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel’s total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect
the counsel’s role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews
the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required
to make, and the need to think about a corporation’s strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other — often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in decision-making
within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modern
corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stockholder — in
some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decision-
making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside
existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers.
These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. (Emphasis supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and management
of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and
Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan’s MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness
of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations
has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment, coordinating work with
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the
organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been
found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding
both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels,
and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social,
and psychological. New programming techniques now make the
systems dynamics principles more accessible to managers —
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context
of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all
kinds of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on
on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the
legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills
that comprise a major part of the general counsel’s
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities
at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which
are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation’s evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel’s Office.
The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of
the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate
counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new
and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer’s aim is not the understand all of the law’s effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able
to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution" or make-up of
the modern corporation. "Business Star, The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to
have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance
of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next
is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar.
11, 1989, p. 4).chanrobles law library : red
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC
in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen
and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar,
having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of
86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also
been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having
hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank.
Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as
a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987)
of NAMFREL. Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod,
in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for Human Development,
has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a
quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990)
and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-
1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable
amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for
the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a
team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer
(such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo
V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction
is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of closing;
(4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their
countries’ sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser
of the United States Agency for International Development,
during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at
the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973).
(Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than
purely re negotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in re
negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987,
p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines
the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to
discharge an obligation. For a complete debt restructuring
represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate
analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they beat no
drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are
not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery.’ (See Ricardo
J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,"
Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
"practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
— verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said: chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom which
only the appointing authority can decide." (Emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v.
Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this
case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment
in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has
no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis
supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case
at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance
of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the
Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation,
the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson
v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its
consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without re
appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without re appointment. Appointment
to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity." cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion, suffice it to
say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s
definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practiced two or three times a week and would outlaw
say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years.
Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani
Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a
definition of law practice which really means nothing because
the definition says that law practice." . . is what people
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the
definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law
covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of
the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should
not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member
of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over ten
years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law,
without first becoming lawyers.
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even
disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the
ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I
greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be
brought against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he
is the incumbent President?
We now proceed: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the
public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined
that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise
of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion
is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no abuse, much
less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Additionally, consider the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

 
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by
 
the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission,
 
and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer
 
is in the negative.

 
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom

 
the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
 

 
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in
 
the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it
 
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still
 
reverse the U.S. Senate.
 

 
Finally, one significant legal maxim is: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

 
 
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the
spirit that giveth life."
 
 
cralaw virtua1aw library

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the  

procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson’s beloved)  
for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that  
—  
 
"No blade shall touch his skin;  
 
No blood shall flow from his veins."
 
cralaw virtua1aw library

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the
 
procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three
 
inches away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This blinded the
 
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved,
 
Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with
 
righteous fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on his word.
 
The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin?
 
Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly
 
relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.

 
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO

 
ORDERED.
 

 
 

 
 
 EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the
IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due
notice.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then
President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution
to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of
the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the
following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into
the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for
the removal of the delinquent member's name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be
sent by registered mail to the member and to the
Secretary of the Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the
respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President
and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint
reply.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3,
1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the
respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court
139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 - in
accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was
integrated - and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to
recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is
found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws
(supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the
order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court
Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of
membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the
Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. - There is hereby organized
an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose
names now appear or may hereafter be included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in
the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the
above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being
compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the
said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and
of no legal force and effect. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of
the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the
justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body." chanrobles virtual law library
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the
Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably
and inextricably come up to the surface whenever
attempts are made to regulate the practice of law,
define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the
license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The matters here complained of are the very same
issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of
the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The
Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that
case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973.
The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement
that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious
study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No.
526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of
the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of
the Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which
every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to
do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as
well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to
a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously
dictated by overriding considerations of public interest
and public welfare to such an extent as more than
constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all
legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise
chanrobles virtual law library
of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because
a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State - the administration of
justice - as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the
exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291
U.S. 502). chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State.
The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such
Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar
through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973,
and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were
prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands
of pressing public necessity. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property
and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim
goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare
is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and
all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise
power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article
X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers: chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this
Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even
without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the
Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with
plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to
and supervision of the practice of law. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the
legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of
the said profession, which affect the society at large,
were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic
to require him to conform to such regulations as might
be established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his
liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not
have clothed the public with an interest in his
concerns. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must
already fall. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however,
we now concisely deal with them seriatim. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that
the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence,
Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar
is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. 6
chanrobles virtual law library
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member. He became
a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to
provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate
with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by
the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
- the lawyers. 9 chanrobles virtual law library
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the
provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of
the 1973 Constitution) - which power the respondent
acknowledges - from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives
and purposes of integration. 11 chanrobles virtual law library
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement
of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation
chanrobles virtual law library of property without due process and hence infringes on
one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of
law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear
that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12 chanrobles virtual law library
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is
not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such
chanrobles virtual law library must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that
the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and unconstitutional nor illegal.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

the authorities holding such are legion. 14 chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Attorneys of the Court.
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
is inherent in this court as a court - appropriate, indeed Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the
argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court

 
is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative
 
likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
 
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is
 
an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
 
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the
 
facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
 
assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals
 

 
and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect

 
the public from overreaching and fraud. The very
 
burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power
 
will not be misused or prostituted. ..." chanrobles virtual law library

 

 
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our
 
1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
 
the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
 

 
practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and

 
the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the
 
power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to
 
remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
 
undoubtedly vested in the Court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
 

 
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule
 
of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated
 
 N BANC
[A.C. NO. 6792 - January 25, 2006]
ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant, v. Atty.
MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the
disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by
Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar
Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime involving
moral turpitude, together with the circumstances
surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;2 and constitutes sufficient ground
for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.3
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his
Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice
dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in
default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been
scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing,
complainant manifested that he was submitting
the case on the basis of the Complaint and its
attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him
to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27,
2004.6 Afterwards, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J.
Herbosa rendered her Report and
Recommendation, which was later adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12,
2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that
respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that
the conviction of the latter for frustrated
homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should
result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent's conviction were
summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota
Corolla and was on his way home after gassing
up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion,
Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi
driver overtook the car driven by the accused not
knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and
a prominent member of the Baguio community
who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed,
the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and
Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,
berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt.
To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced
open his door causing the accused to fall to the
ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused
had been drinking because he smelled of liquor.
Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly,
the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get
up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver
a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second
time, got up again and was about to box the taxi
driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his
arm around. The taxi driver held on to the
accused until he could be pacified and then
released him. The accused went back to his car
and got his revolver making sure that the handle
was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver
was on his way back to his vehicle when he
noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the
ground. He picked them up intending to return
them to the accused. But as he was handing the
same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of
the gun held by the accused who fired and shot
him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh
of the accused so the latter pushed him out and
sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio
Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the
taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto
Soriano."8
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes,
who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the
latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had
lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his
neck,9 complainant would have surely died of
hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending surgeon,
Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a
spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the
left part of his body and disabled him for his job
as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated
November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation,
which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of "the
civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of
the offended party, Roberto Soriano."10
According to the unrefuted statements of
complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply
with this particular undertaking, even appealed
the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.11
In her Report and Recommendation,
Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law
for having been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not
only been convicted of such crime, but that the
latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good
moral character, based on the following facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while
driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault
Complainant only because the latter, driving a
taxi, had overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his
attempted assault, Respondent went back to his
car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent
simply pushed him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and
overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that
he had shot Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied
when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation,
Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his
civil liabilities to Complainant."12
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for
its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations
of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character.13 In the
instant case, respondent has been found guilty;
and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of
frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has
already been established and is no longer open to
question, the only issues that remain to be
determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime
of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude,
and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals."14
The question of whether the crime of homicide
involves moral turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v.
NLRC,15 a labor case concerning an employee
who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction
for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime, this Court rejected the employer's
contention and held that homicide in that case did
not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime
would have been violative of the IRRI's
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a
ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that,
having disregarded the attendant circumstances,
the employer made a pronouncement that was
precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter
to determine conclusively whether a crime
involved moral turpitude. That discretion
belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may
be a question of fact and frequently depends on
all the surrounding circumstances. x x
x."16 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide
did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-
defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that
Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the
IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto
Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa
pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that
position that he drew a fan knife from the left
pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the
victim who released his hold on Micosa only after
the latter had stabbed him several times. These
facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay
the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and voluntary
surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance demonstrate that
Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust."17
The present case is totally different. As the IBP
correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince
the moral turpitude of respondent and his
unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he
pursued and shot complainant when the latter
least expected it. The act of aggression shown by
respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that
he was hit once and his arm twisted by
complainant. Under the circumstances, those
were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend
off the lawyer's assault.
We also consider the trial court's finding of
treachery as a further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot the victim when
the latter was not in a position to defend himself.
In fact, under the impression that the assault was
already over, the unarmed complainant was
merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon
when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make
matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of
his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the
earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and
feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted
like a god on the road, who deserved to be
venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of
the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced
vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a
person who has been grievously wronged, but the
obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of
superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an
unlicensed firearm18 and his unjust refusal to
satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly
violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders
of the courts. We remind him that, both in his
attorney's oath20 and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the
laws of the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this
incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense
of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the
trial court when it suspended his sentence and
granted him probation. And yet, it has been four
years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil
liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent
remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that
obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and
intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a
simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the
earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor
of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges
complainant the measly amount that could never
even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
may relate, not to the exercise of the profession
of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral
character.22 Where their misconduct outside of
their professional dealings is so gross as to show
them morally unfit for their office and unworthy
of the privileges conferred upon them by their
license and the law, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing them from that office.23
We also adopt the IBP's finding that respondent
displayed an utter lack of good moral character,
which is an essential qualification for the privilege
to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.24
In the case at bar, respondent consistently
displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As
found by the trial court, he had sought, with the
aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court
settlement with complainant's family.25 But when
this effort failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear that it was
complainant's family that had sought a
conference with him to obtain his referral to a
neurosurgeon.26
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went
on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of
having been mauled by complainant and two
other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less
than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty.
Dizon] does not support his allegation that three
people including the complainant helped each
other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he
sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if
not downright unbelievable[,] that three people
who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his
injuries sustain the complainant's version of the
incident particularly when he said that he boxed
the accused on the chest. x x x."28
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral
qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics
of the profession places a premium on honesty
and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence,
lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to
be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings,
they are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than
enhance public perception of the legal profession.
They constitute moral turpitude for which he
should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession,
and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only
upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally.
Because they are vanguards of the law and the
legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are
not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the
offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated
protect the administration of justice by requiring homicide, the attending circumstances - not the
that those who exercise this important function mere fact of their conviction - would demonstrate
be competent, honorable and reliable - - lawyers their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In
in whom courts and clients may repose the present case, the appalling vindictiveness,
confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent
degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a
yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid member of the bar.
our profession of odious members.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is
We remain aware that the power to disbar must hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
be exercised with great caution, and that STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy
disbarment should never be decreed when any of this Decision be entered in his record as a
lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be
In the instant case, however, the Court cannot served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
extend that munificence to respondent. His and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded circulation to all courts in the country.
his duties to society and his profession. We are
convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would SO ORDERED.
be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the

 
legal profession - - that every lawyer be a shining
 
exemplar of truth and justice.
 

 
We stress that membership in the legal profession
 

 
is a privilege demanding a high degree of good
 
moral character, not only as a condition
 
precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
 
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein
 

 
respondent has fallen short of the exacting
 
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the
 
legal profession.
 

 

 
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 244. March 29, 1963.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF
TELESFORO A. DIAO, v. SEVERINO G.
MARTINEZ, Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION TO BAR OBTAINED UNDER
FALSE PRETENSES. — Admission to the Bar obtained under
false pretenses must be revoked.
2. ID.; REQUISITES TO BECOME ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. — Before
the study of law, an applicant for admission to the Bar must
have
DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held
in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with
having falsely represented in his application for such Bar
examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications.
The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor-General
who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he
submitted a report recommending that Diao’s name be erased
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in
his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education,
specially in the following particulars:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never
obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the
credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful
completion of the "required pre-legal education."
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao,
practically admits the first charge; but he claims that although
he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service
of U. S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given
therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school
diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational
authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd
and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts about the validity of this claim, what
with respondent’s failure to exhibit any certification to that
effect (the equivalence) by the proper school official. However,
it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is
clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from
Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination
represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the
Arellano University in April 1949, he says he was erroneously
certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing
College, in his school records.
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the
"error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his
application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano
University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April
1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd
semester of 1948- 1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and
the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath,
"That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.)
as prescribed by the Department of Private Education." (italics
on "previous")

 
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take
 
the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he
 
was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
 
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained
 
under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact
 
that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
 
such examination is not the only qualification to become an
 
attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in
 
the regular manner is equally essential.
 

 
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of
 
attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is
 
required to return his lawyer’s diploma within thirty days. So
 
ordered.
 

 
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
 
Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
CIRCULAR NO. 13-90.
CIRCULAR NO. 13-90
TO: THE COURT OF
Voluntary Termination of
Membership in the Bar of
Atty. Jose Principe, to
wit:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

APPEALS, "WHEREFORE, there

SANDIGANBAYAN, being due compliance by
COURT OF TAX said attorney with the
APPEALS, REGIONAL IBP By-Laws on
TRIAL COURTS, voluntary termination of
SHARI'A DISTRICT membership in the IBP,
COURTS, and considering his
METROPOLITAN TRIAL reasons therefor, the
COURTS, MUNICIPAL Court Resolved to-
TRIAL COURTS IN APPROVE the request of
CITIES, MUNICIPAL Atty. Jose Principe and
TRIAL COURTS, hereby ORDERS that he
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT be dropped from the Roll
TRIAL COURTS, of Attorneys. xxx"
SHARI'A CIRCUIT Manila, October 16,
COURTS AND THE 1990.
INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES
SUBJECT: VOLUNTARY [Sgd.] MEYNARDO A.
TERMINATION OF TIRO
MEMBERSHIP IN THE Court Administrator
BAR OF ATTY. JOSE
 
PRINCIPE.
 

 
For the information and

 
guidance of all
 
concerned, quoted
 
hereunder is the
 
dispositive portion of
 
Resolution of the
 

 
Court En Banc dated

 
September 20, 1990, in
 
Bar Matter No. 543, Re:
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23959. November 29, 1971.]
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENEZA, Petitioners, v.
BINALBANGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS & QUINTIN MUNING, Respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates, for Petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; ATTORNEY’S FEES; SHARING THEREOF
WITH NON-LAWYERS, UNETHICAL AND IMMORAL. — Applicable to the
issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers’ Association, Et.
Al. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, that an
agreement providing for the division of attorney’s fees, whereby a non-lawyer union
president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of
Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
attorney’s fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-LAWYER REPRESENTING A PARTY IN LABOR CASES,
NOT ENTITLED THERETO. — The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
875 that — "In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the
parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel . . ." is no justification
for a ruling that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney’s fees: for the same
section adds that — "it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing
Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist
in the orderly presentation of evidence," thus making it clear that the representation
should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOVERY THEREOF IMPORTS EXISTENCE OF
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. — The permission for a non-member of
the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of the party-
litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing — "Sec.
24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled
to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, . . ." imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition
to the recovery of attorney’s fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client’s
representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot
establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas or
with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney’s fees. Certainly public
policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be
entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to observe
the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS FOR DISALLOWING NON-LAWYERS TO
RECOVERY THEREOF, CITED. — The reasons are that the ethics of the legal
profession should not be violated; that acting as an attorney without authority
constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,
and the law will not assist a person reap the fruits or benefit of an unlawful act or an
act done in violation of law; and that if fees were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it
would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of
necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-
lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. "And the general rule above-
stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney’s fees by non-lawyers) cannot be
circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an
‘agent’ and not as an attorney."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR UNIONS; LEGITIMATE
LABOR ORGANIZATION MAY APPEAL AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
WHICH ARE DEDUCTIBLE FROM BACKPAY OF ITS MEMBERS. — We hold
that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney’s fees
which are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor
organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, on behalf of its
members; and the union was organized "for the promotion of the employees’ moral,
social and economic well-being" ; hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its
members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6,
Republic Act 875, which provides: "Sec 6. Unfair Labor Practice Cases — Appeals.
— Any person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court
of the Philippines . . .," since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a
position to bear the financial burden of litigations.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; ISSUES CAN NOT BE RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. — Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is
engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and
many others like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances
as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious
situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue
and enforce by position action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought
in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners,
however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in
the practice of law.
 DECISION Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates 10%

Quintin Muning 10%

REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Atty. Atanacio Pacis 5%
May a non-lawyer recover attorney’s fees for legal services
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer
rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review
according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present
of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution,
petition.
dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in
its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning,
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present
a non-lawyer, attorney’s fees for professional services in the
petition on the ground of late filing but his motion was
said case.
overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration,
but, considering that the motion contained averments that go
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No.
into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered
72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled, "PAFLU, et al, v. Binalbagan-Isabela
the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent’s
Sugar Co., Et. Al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations
answer to the petition for review. 2 The case was considered
rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the
submitted for decision without respondent’s brief. 3
reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila
and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final On 18
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in
October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for
Amalgamated Laborers’ Association, Et. Al. v. Court of Industrial
the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney’s hen
Relations, Et Al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an agreement
equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November
providing for the division of attorney’s fees, whereby a non-
1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas, on 3
lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-
immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
objection to an award of attorney’s fees for 25% of their
attorney’s fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract,
backwages, and, on the same day, Quintin Muning filed a
as in the present case.
"Petition for Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of
the backwages. Muning’s petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
& Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer.
"In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was
thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by
filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis.
legal counsel . . ."
All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances
cralaw virtua1aw library

made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney

is no justification for a ruling that the person representing the
Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.
party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is
not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney’s fees: for the same section
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25%
adds that —
of the backwages as compensation for professional services
rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
"it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the

parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of evidence." cralaw virtua1aw library
thus making it clear that the representation should be
exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or
appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant
does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for
such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court, providing —
"Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney’s agreement as to fees. —
An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client
no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, . . ."
virtua1aw library
cralaw
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a
condition h the recovery of attorney’s fees. Such a relationship
cannot exist unless the client’s representative in court be a
lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish
an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover
attorney’s fees. Certainly public policy demands that legal work
in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to
those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn to
observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as
being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of
courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is
persuasive. There, it is stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been
enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to the bar
from practising law, and under statutes of this kind, the great
weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for strictly
legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been
admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction where
the service were rendered." 5
"No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an
attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice . .
. and is an attorney in good standing at the time." 6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should
not be violated; 7 that acting as an attorney without authority
constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a person to
reap the fruits or benefit of an unlawful act or an act done in
violation of law; 9 and that if fees were to be allowed to non-
lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to
whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a
chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
"And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of
attorney’s fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when
the services were purely legal, by seeking to recover as an
‘agent’ and not as an attorney." 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer
may not be awarded attorney’s fees should suffice to refute the
possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the
Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground
that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special
jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot
justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may
appeal an award of attorney’s fees which are deductible from
the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because
it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of
time to file the present petition for review; union members
Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition that was
subsequently filed, it being contented that, as to them (Entila
and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners
was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may
appeal an award of attorney’s fees which are deductible from
the backpay of its members because such union or labor
organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial
court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was
organized "for the promotion of the employees’ moral, social
and economic well-being" ; 13 hence, if an award is
 
disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an
 
appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act
 
875, which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
 

 
"Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice Cases — Appeals. — Any person
 
aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme
 
Court of the Philippines . . .",
 

 
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a
 
position to bear the financial burden of litigations.
 

 
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the
 
habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations,
 
and many others like him who are not licensed to practice,
 
registering their appearances as "representatives" and
 
appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious
 
situation demanding corrective action that respondent court
 
should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that
 
purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before
 
the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case.
 
Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons
 
alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
 

 
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside
 
insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney’s
 
fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in
 
all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
 

 
Concepaion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
 
Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. NO. RTJ-08-2119 : June 30, 2008]
[Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI No. 07-2709-RTJ]
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, Complainant, v. JUDGE
MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint dated May 19, 20061 which was
received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant)
charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent),
Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court,
Calamba City, of "demean[ing], humiliat[ing] and
berat[ing]" him during the hearing on February 27,
2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C, "Rural Bank of
Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al" in which he
was counsel for the plaintiff.
To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made
by respondent in the course of the proceedings
conducted on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by
stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz:
COURT:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the
University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon
University[,] [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
No, you're not from UP.
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
COURT:
Then you're not from UP. Then you cannot equate
yourself to mebecause there is a saying and I know
this, not all law students are created equal, not all law
schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created
equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are
created equal in His form and substance.2 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary
Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings
were "duly recorded in a tape recorder" by
stenographer de Guzman, and despite his motion (filed
on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her to
furnish him with a copy of the tape recording, the
motion remained unacted as of the date he filed the
present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He,
however, attached a copy of the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on February 27, 2006.
In his Comments3 dated June 14, 2006 on the
complaint filed in compliance with the Ist Indorsement
dated May 31, 20064 of the OCA, respondent alleged
that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an
"Urgent Motion to Inhibit,"5 paragraph 36 of which was
malicious and "a direct assault to the integrity and
dignity of the Court and of the Presiding Judge" as it
"succinctly implied that [he] issued the order dated 27
September 2005 for [a] consideration other than the
merits of the case." He thus could not "simply sit idly
and allow a direct assault on his honor and integrity."
On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to
furnish complainant with a copy of the "unedited" tape
recording of the proceedings, respondent quoted
paragraphs 4 and 37of the motion which, to him,
implied that the trial court was "illegally, unethically and
unlawfully engaged in 'editing' the transcript of records
to favor a party litigant against the interest of
[complainant's] client."
Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the
two motions that he ordered complainant, by separate
orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain within 15
days8 why he should not be cited for contempt.
Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of
September 4, 2006,9 stating that it was a mere result of
his impulsiveness.
In its Report dated November 7, 2007,10 the OCA came
up with the following evaluation:
. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from
pursuing an administrative complaint does not divest
the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials
and personnel. Thus, the complainant's withdrawal of
the instant complaint will not bar the continuity of the
instant administrative proceeding against respondent
judge.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not
the statements and actions made by the respondent
judge during the subject February 27, 2006
hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the
respondent's comment and the documents at hand, we
find that there is no issue as to what actually transpired
during the February 27th hearing as evidenced by the
stenographic notes. The happening of the incident
complained of by herein complainant was never denied
by the respondent judge. If at all, respondent judge
merely raised his justifications for his complained
actuations.
xxx
. . . [A] judge's official conduct and his behavior in the
performance of judicial duties should be free from the
appearance of impropriety and must be beyond
reproach. A judge must at all times be temperate in his
language. Respondent judge's insulting
statements which tend to question complainant's
capability and credibility stemming from the fact
that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP
Law school is clearly unwarranted and
inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate
language, the lawyer can return the attack on his
person and character, through an administrative case
against the judge, as in the instant case.
Although respondent judge's use in intemperate
language may be attributable to human frailty, the
noble position in the bench demands from him
courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are
demanded to be always temperate, patient and
courteous both in conduct and language.
 xxx
Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should
always observe courtesy and civility. In addressing
counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid
a controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity.
Judges should always be aware that disrespect to
lawyers generates disrespect to them. There must be
mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-
way ticket where the judge should be respected
but free to insult lawyers and others who appear
in his court. Patience is an essential part of dispensing
justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good
breeding. If a judge desires not to be insulted, he
should start using temperate language himself; he who
sows the wind will reap a storm.
It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not
only did respondent judge make insulting and
demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary
"lecturing" and "debating". . .
xxx
Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of
the motion to inhibit filed by complainant, but, instead,
he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct
that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a
judge. If respondent judge felt that there is a need to
admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he should have
called him in his chambers where he can advise him
privately rather than battering him with insulting
remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking
him from what school he came from publicly in the
courtroom and in the presence of his clients.
Humiliating a lawyer is highly reprehensible. It betrays
the judge's lack of patience and temperance. A highly
temperamental judge could hardly make decisions with
equanimity.
Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun
from lecturing the counsels or debating with them
during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his
fairness and integrity. While judges should possess
proficiency in law in order that they can competently
construe and enforce the law, it is more important that
they should act and behave in such manner that the
parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.11 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The OCA thus recommended that respondent be
reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition of the
same shall be dealt with more severely.12
By Resolution of January 21, 2008,13 this Court required
the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings already filed. Respondent complied on
February 26, 2008,14 manifesting in the affirmative.
The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct
reads:
Rule 3.04. - A judge should be patient, attentive, and
courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the
court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into
the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the
courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
An authorexplains the import of this rule:
Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that
a judge should be courteous to counsel, especially to
those who are young and inexperienced and also to all
those others appearing or concerned in the
administration of justice in the court. He should be
considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon
his court. He should be courteous and civil, for it
is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate
language during the hearing of a case. In his
conversation with counsel in court, a judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure
the merits of the dispute between litigants and lead to
its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt counsel in
their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their
positions. Nor should he be tempted to
an unnecessary display of learning or premature
judgment.
A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust
may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper appreciation
of their duties to the courts, to their clients and to the
adverse party and his lawyer, so as to enforce due
diligence in the dispatch of business before the court.
He may utilize his opportunities to criticize and
correct unprofessional conduct of
attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not
do so in an insulting manner.15 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
cralawlibrary
The following portions of the transcript of stenographic
notes, quoted verbatim, taken during the February
27, 2006 hearing show that respondent made sarcastic
and humiliating, even threatening and boastful remarks
to complainant who is admittedly "still young,"
"unnecessary lecturing and debating," as well as
unnecessary display of learning:
COURT:
xxx
Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?
ATTY. MANE:
Ah, with due respect your'
COURT:
Tell me, what is your school?
ATTY. MANE:
I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.
COURT:
Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of
the principle of Stare Decisis and the
interpretation of the Supreme Court of the rules of
procedure where it states that if there is already a
decision by the Supreme Court, when that
decision shall be complied with by the Trial Court
otherwise non-compliance thereof shall subject
the Courts to judicial sanction, and I quote the
decision. That's why I quoted the decision of the
Supreme Court Sir, because I know the problem
between the bank and the third party claimants and I
state, "The fair market value is the price at which a
property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled
to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to
buy." Sir, that's very clear, that is what fair market
value and that is not assessment value. In fact even
you say assessment value, the Court further state, "the
assessed value is the fair market value multiplied. Not COURT:
mere the basic assesses value. Sir that is the decision
of the Supreme Court, am I just reading the decision or No, sir.
was I inventing it?
ATTY. MANE:
ATTY. MANE:
Yes your Honor . . .
May I be allowed to proceed.
COURT:
COURT:
No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you
Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court to the IBP Because hindi naman ako ganon. I am not
decision which I quoted and which you should have that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take
researched too or I was merely imagining the Supreme cover from the instruction of your client because even if
Court decision sir? Please answer it. the instruction of a client is "secret." Upon
consideration, the language of the pleader must still
ATTY. MANE: conform with the decorum and respect to the Court. Sir,
that's the rule of practice. In my twenty (20) years of
No your Honor. practice I've never been haled by a judge to any
question of integrity. Because even if I believed that the
COURT: Court committed error in judgment or decision or grave
abuse of discretion, I never imputed any malicious or
Please answer it. unethical behavior to the judge because I know and I
believe that anyone can commit errors. Because no one
xxx is like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand that this
Court, this Judge is not God but this Judge is human
COURT: when challenge on his integrity and honor is lodged. No
matter how simple it is because that is the only thing I
That's why. Sir second, and again I quote from your have now.
own pleadings, hale me to the Supreme Court otherwise
I will hale you to the bar. Prove to me that I am Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my
grossly ignorant or corrupt. statement of assets and liabilities?

ATTY. MANE: ATTY. MANE:

Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . . I think that is not necessary your Honor.
COURT:
No counsel because the imputations are there, that's
why I want you to see. Show him my assets and
liabilities for the proud graduate of MLQU. Sir, look
at it. Sir, I have stock holdings in the U.S. before I
joined the bench. And it was very clear to everyone, I
would do everything not be tempted to accept bribe but
I said I have spent my fifteen (15) years and that's how
much I have worked in fifteen (15) years excluding my
wife's assets which is more than what I have may be
triple of what I have. May be even four fold of what I
have. And look at my assets. May be even your bank
can consider on cash to cash basis my personal assets.
That is the reason I am telling you Atty. Mane. Please,
look at it. If you want I can show you even the Income
Tax Return of my wife and you will be surprised that my
salary is not even her one-half month salary. Sir, she is
the Chief Executive Officer of a Multi-National Publishing
Company. That's why I have the guts to take this job
because doon po sa salary niya umaasa na lamang po
ako sa aking asawa. Atty. Mane, please you are still
young. Other judges you would already be haled to the
IBP. Take that as a lesson. Now that you are saying that
I was wrong in the three-day notice rule, again the
Supreme Court decision validates me, PNB v. Court of
Appeals, you want me to cite the quotation again that
any pleadings that do not conform with the three-day
notice rule is considered as useless scrap of paper and
therefore not subject to any judicial cognizance. You
know sir, you would say but I was the one subject
because the judge was belligerent. No sir, you can go
on my record and you will see that even prior to my
rulings on your case I have already thrown out so many
motion for non-compliance of a three-day notice rule. If
I will give you an exception because of this, then I
would be looked upon with suspicion. So sir again,
please look again on the record and you will see how
many motions I threw out for non-compliance with the
three-day notice rule. It is not only your case sir,
because sir you are a practitioner and a proud
graduate of the MLQU which is also the Alma Mater of
my uncle. And I supposed you were taught in
thought that the three-day notice rule is almost
sacrosanct in order to give the other party time to
appear and plead. In all books, Moran, Regalado
and all other commentators state that non-
compliance with the three-day notice rule makes
the pleading and motion a useless scrap of paper.
If that is a useless scrap of paper, sir, what would
be my ground to grant exception to your
motion? Tell me.
xxx
COURT:
Procedural due process. See. So please sir don't confuse
the Court. Despite of being away for twenty years from
the college of law, still I can remember my rules, In
your motion you said . . . imputing things to the
Court. Sir please read your rules. Familiarize
yourself, understand the jurisprudence before you
be the Prince Valiant or a Sir Gallahad in Quest of
the Holy Grail. Sir, ako po ay mahirap na tao,
karangalan ko lang po ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking
mga anak at iyan po ay hindi ko palalampasin maski
kanino pa. Sir, have you ever heard of anything about
me in this Court for one year. Ask around, ask
around. You know, if you act like a duck, walk like
a duck, quack like a duck, you are a duck. But have
you ever heard anything against the court. Sir in a
judicial system, in a Court, one year is time enough for
the practitioner to know whether a judge is what,
dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent; and 3)
whether the judge is just playing loco. And I have sat
hear for one year sir and please ask around before you
charge into the windmill. I am a proud product of a
public school system from elementary to college. And
my only, and my only, the only way I can repay the
taxpayers is a service beyond reproach without fear or
favor to anyone. Not even the executive, not even the
one sitting in Malacanang, not even the Supreme Court
if you are right. Sir, sana po naman inyo ring igalang
ang Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga po, tinatanggap
ko, kung inyo pong mamarapatin, meron pong mga
corrupt, maaari pong nakahanap na kayo ng corrupt na
Judge pero hindi po lahat kami ay corrupt. Maaari ko rin
pong tanggapin sa inyong abang lingcod na merong
mga Hukom na tanga pero hindi po naman lahat kami
ay tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako
sa husgado ko. Aalis po ako dito sa hapon, babasahin
ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko po malaman kung any po
ang kaso, para po pagharap ko sa inyo at sa publiko
hindi po ako magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have
the decency, not the respect, not to me but to the
Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot respect
the Court then you have no business appearing before
the Court because you don't believe in the Court
system. That's why one of my classmates never
appeared before Court because he doesn't believe in
that system. He would rather stay in their
airconditioned room because they say going to Court is
useless. Then, to them I salute, I give compliment
because in their own ways they know the futility and
they respect the Court, in that futility rather than be a
hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi mo ako kilala, I've never
disrespect the courts and I can look into your eyes.
Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di po ako dito nagpractice
para po walang makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako po
naman ay inyong babastusin ng ganyang handa po
akong lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And you can
quote me, you can go there together to the Supreme
Court. Because the only sir, the only treasure I have is
my name and my integrity. I could have easily let it go
because it is the first time, but the second time is too
much too soon. Sir, masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal
na po ninyo ako nung primero, dinuran pa po ninyo ako
ng pangalawa. That's adding insult to the injury po.
Hindi ko po sana gagawin ito pero ayan po ang dami
diyang abugado. I challenge anyone to file a case
against me for graft and corruption, for incompetence.
xxx
COURT:
I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they
believe that you are not imputing any wrong doing to
me I will apologize to you.
Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect
the old practitioner, whose integrity is unchallenged.
Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to
defend your position, so be it.
Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I
know that you are an old practitioner hammered out by
years of practice and whose integrity by reputation
precedes you. Please read what your younger
companero has written to this Honorable Court in
pleading and see for yourself the implications he hurled
to the Court in his honest opinion. Remember he said
honest. That implication is your honest opinion of an
implication sir.
Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your opinion and the old practitioner hammered through
honest opinion. Remember the word you said honest years of practice could only say indiscretion committed
opinion. by this judge. Much more I who sits in this bench? cralawred

Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant Now is that your honest opinion?16 (Emphasis and
and vigorous in the pursue of pride. But if you are underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

vigilant and vigor, you should never crossed the line.

The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-
Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three taken.
paragraphs?
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly
ATTY. HILDAWA: of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar
Examinations which this Court administers, taking of
There will be some . . . the Lawyer's oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys,
a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his
COURT: functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the
court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree.
What sir? For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a
lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is
ATTY. HILDAWA: clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.

. . . indiscretion. A judge must address the merits of the case and not on
the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his
COURT: integrity and dignity were being "assaulted," he acted
properly when he directed complainant to explain why
Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of
an old practitioner could say to the Court because of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted
respect. portions of the transcript of stenographic notes show,
engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
Sir, salamat po.
This Court has reminded members of the bench that
xxx even on the face of boorish behavior from those they
deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in a
COURT: manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the
court.17
Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado.
Indiscretion na lang. Now you say that is your honest
Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a
 

 
judge, classified as a light charge under Section 10,

 
Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is
 
penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by any
 
of the following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but
 

 
not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand;

 
and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes
 
upon him the penalty of reprimand.
 

 
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B.
 

 
Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
 
Branch 36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of conduct
 
unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED therefor.
 
He is further warned that a repetition of the same or
 

 
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
 

 
SO ORDERED.
 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
G.R. No. 89591-96 August 13, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T.
JAVELLANA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
In the morning of 11 February 1986, the late ex-Governor of Antique, Evelio Javier,
was gunned down in the plaza of San Jose, Antique.
Immediately thereafter, the authorities conducted an
investigation, and as a result thereof, a complaint against John
Paloy and Vicente Vegafria was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, private respondent Avelino
T. Javellana appeared as counsel for John Paloy and Vicente
Vegafria, until Federico Carluto, Jr., executed an
affidavit, 1 dated 16 June 1986, and Evelyn Magare and Fritz
Xavier their sworn statements, 2 dated 19 February 1986 and 7
March 1986, respectively, implicating private respondent in the
killing of the late Evelio Javier.
On 29 October 1986, the then Senior State Prosecutor Tirso
D.C. Velasco, now RTC Judge of Quezon City, filed with the
RTC of Antique, six (6) separate informations, 3 all dated 13
October 1986, charging private respondent Avelino T. Javellana
together with John Paloy, Vicente Vegafria, Eduardo
Iran alias "Boy Muslim", alias "Muklo" Rudolfo
Pacificador Alias "Ding", Arturo F. Pacificador and several John
Does, with the crime of murder, frustrated murder and for four
(4) counts of attempted murder. 4
Meanwhile, on 23 September 1986 and 27 October 1986,
Romeo Nagales and Jose Delumen executed their respective
sworn statements, 5 admitting their participation in the kiling of
Evelio Javier, and implicating other persons in the commission
of the crime.
On the basis of their sworn statements, the prosecution, through
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, amended the
aforesaid informations by including therein the following persons
as accused, namely: Ramon Hortillano alias "Ramie", Henry
Salaber alias "Henry", Eleazar Edemne alias "Toto", Arleen
Limoso alias "Arleen", Romeo Nagales alias "Reming", Rolando
C. Bernardino alias Lando Jose De Lumen alias "Marlon", Jose
Delumen alias "Winfield", Oscar
Tianzon alias "Oca", alias "Nono", alias Akong alias "Nonoy", ali
as "Tatang" and alias "Dolfo". 6
On motion of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, the
said criminal cases were consolidated in Branch 12 of the RTC
of Antique, presided over by respondent Judge.
Of the nineteen (19) accused, only six (6) had been
apprehended and/or surrendered, namely: John Paloy, Vicente
Vegafria Rolando Bernardino, Jesus Garcia y
Amorsolo alias "Nono Picoy" Jose Delumen alias "Winfield" and
Romeo Nagales alias "Reming". All the others were at large,
including herein private respondent Avelino Javellana. 7 Hence,
trial proceeded only as against the said six (6) accused.
On 9 May 1989, the prosecution moved to discharge the
accused Jose Delumen and Romeo Nagales, claiming that their
testimonies were absolutely necessary against accused
Rolando Bernardino as well as the other accused, including
private respondent who was then at-large.
On 11 May 1989, the court a quo granted the motion to
discharge Romeo Nagales but denied it as regards Jose
Delumen, the latter having admitted a prior conviction for the
crime of robbery.
However, despite the discharge of Rome Nagales, the
prosecution rested its case without presenting him his state
witness and reserved its right to present him as a witness
against the other accused who were then at-large.
On 12 May 1989, private respondent was arrested by the
Constabulary Security Group (CSG) in Parañaque, Metro
Manila. On 15 May 1989, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), Iloilo Chapter, through its President, Atty. J.T. Barrera,
enterred its appearance as counsel for private respondent with a
motion that the IBP, Iloilo Chapter be allowed to as assume
custody of the private respondent as his jailer and/or in the
alternative, to confine him at the Military Stockade at Camp
Delgado and/or at the Iloilo Provincial Jail. 8
When private respondent was brought before the trial court on 7
June 1989, Atty. J.T. Barrera manifested and moved that his
motion of 15 May 1989 be heard. During the hearing, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor John Turalba opposed the motion. The
issue was heatedly argued by the prosecution and the defense.
Whereupon, private respondent pleaded that he be allowed to
approach the bench together with all the counsel, which
respondent Judge reluctantly granted. Private respondent
informed the court that there exists a real and grave danger to
his life if he were to be confined in the Antique Provincial Jail.
He then narrated an incident when he, as the then counsel for
John Paloy and Vicente Vegafria prior to his inclusion as one of
the respondents, was refused the right to visit and confer with
his clients by a drunk jail guard at the Antique Provincial Jail;
that the said guard was toying with his armalite rifle while
standing at the gate of the provincial jail and did not allow him to
enter; that said guard aimed and pointed his armalite rifle twice
at him; and that because of his complaint, the guard was
suspended but has long been back on duty of the provincial jail.
After hearing the narration, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor John
Turalba withdrew his objection. 9
Hence, on the same date, 7 June 1989, respondent Judge
issued an order, 10 the pertinent part of which reads:
. . . , without jurisdiction on the part of Prosecutor
John Turalba, accused Javellana is hereby
ordered confined at PC, Stockade, Bugante Point
San Jose, Antique in the custody of the PC/INP
Provincial Commander who is directed to take
charge of the custody of said accused and to bring
him back to court whenever required.
On 2 August 1989, the Provincial Commander, Col. Teodulo
Abayata wrote respondent Judge:
I am in receipt of instruction from CPC to turn over
Atty. Avelino Javellana to the Provincial Jail
effective immediately and for me to give feedback
NLT today 2 August 1989.
Since his custody under the Provincial
Commander was through the order of that
Honorable Court, request that another order be
issued for me to be able to comply (sic) the
instructions from my superior officers. 11
On the same date, 2 August 1989, respondent Judge issued an
order 12 granting the request of Col. Abayata, and ordered the
private respondent to be confined as a detention prisoner at the
Binirayan Rehabilitation Center, San Jose, Antique, subject to
the conditions set forth therein.
Upon receipt of the order on the same day, private respondent
filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration, 13alleging
that the Binirayan Rehabilitation Center, aside from being a little
bit far and unsafe, has conditions which may not work well for
his health; that he underwent retrograde operation less than a
year ago and up to the present he is still taking medication for
maintenance; that he has a history of heart treatment and very
often he takes maintenance pills and he is confronted by his
unstable blood presure; that the location of the rehabilitation
center and the absence of facilities there may cause adverse
effects on his health condition; and praying that he be confined
in the Provincial Jail of Iloilo where he can be nearer to better
hospital facilities.
When the aforesaid motion for private respondent was called for
hearing in the afternoon of 2 August 1989, respondent Judge
required the presence of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor John
Turalba. The latter appeared and reiterated the earlier objection
of the Senior State Prosecutor to the confinement of private
respondent in any place other than the Provincial Jail of Antique.
After the hearing, respondent Judge issued an
order, 14 reconsidering and setting aside the earlier order, and
directed that —
. . . the accused, should in the meantime, be
committed to the Angel Salazar Memorial Hospital
and subjected to a physical check-up at the
expense of the accused Javellana. The head of
the said hospital is directed to submit his report
soonest on the physical condition of accused
Javellana.
Meantime, while the check-up is being undertaken,
the Station Commander of San Jose, Antique is
directed to take custody and provide adequate
security for accused Javellana in order to prevent
his escape and to continue such custody until
further orders from the court. . . .
On 3 August 1989, the head of the hospital issued a certification
on the result of the physical check-up conducted on private
respondent, thus:
As per order of your Honor, dated August 2, 1989,
Atty. Avelino T. Javellana was examined by Dr.
Felipe Rosendo Muzones and his ECG
examination showed that everything is within
normal limits. However, Dr. Muzones contends
that the same is not the only determinant factor as
far as the condition of the heart is concerned.
Hence, he recommends that blood chemistry
examination is necessary. We are sad to inform
your Honor that we do not have necessary
chemicals for this type of examination at
present. 15
In view of the aforesaid certification, the private respondent filed
on the same day an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion, 16praying that he
be allowed further medical examination at the Iloilo Mission
Hospital in Iloilo City under at least two (2) police escorts. When
the motion was called in open court in the afternoon, the private
respondent and the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor appeared,
and both argued for and against the motion. Thereafter, the
respondent Judge issued an order, 17 the pertinent part of which
reads, as follows:
It is the considered view of the Court that whether
the blood chemistry examination is necessary or
not, the fact still remains that the examination
conducted on the heart of movant is incomplete
and the court will not leave to chance the condition
of the heart of movant who stands charged of a
serious crime in these cases. The Court believes
that the best interest of justice may be served
should the accused be given time to be subjected
to a more complete and exhaustive physical
examination particularly his heart condition,
especially considering the information given in
open court by movant that his brother died at a
tender age of thirty-three (33) of coronary
thrombosis and their family has a history of heart
ailment and according to specialist doctor, movant
himself is prone to coronary thrombosis.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Station Commander of San Jose, Antique is
 hereby directed to assign two (2) guards to whom
custody of movant Javellana is entrusted by the
Court to escort the movant Avelino Javellana to
Iloilo Mission Hospital, Iloilo City for a complete
medical check-up, particularly on the heart of Mr.
Javellana. . . .
However, before private respondent and his two (2) police
escorts could leave for Iloilo City, P/Col. Magsinpoc, Station
Commander of San Jose, Antique, verbally conveyed to
respondent Judge an "unforseen emergency" necessitating the
"response of all personnel of his Command" and requesting
authority to recall the police escorts. In view thereof, respondent
Judge was constrained to issue on the same day, 3 August
1989, another order, 18granting the request of the Station
Commander, and directed the Provincial Probation Officer of
Antique to take custody of private respondent and to escort him
to Iloilo City for medical check-up and bring him back to court
not later than 8:30 A.M. on Monday, 7 August 1989. Thus, the
Provincial Probation Officer brought the private respondent to
the Iloilo Mission Hospital and left him there for a 3-day medical
check-up, and thereafter brought him back to court at 8:30
o'clock in the morning of 7 August 1989.
When the cases were called in the morning of 7 August 1989,
Attys. Amelia K. del Rosario, Arturo Alinio and J.T. Barrera
entered their appearance as counsel for private respondent, and
argued that the custody of private respondent be entrusted to
the IBP, Iloilo Chapter, headed by Atty. J.T. Barrera. However,
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe moved that the
resolution of the incident be held in abeyance until the hearing,
in the afternoon.
On the other hand, Atty. Jose A. Alegario entered his
appearance as counsel for the then recently arrested accused
Oscar Tianzon, who manifested that his client was ready for
arraignment. Accordingly, the said accused was arraigned. He
pleaded "not guilty."
Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an order, 19 terminating
the custody of the Provincial Probation Officer, and, in the
meantime, gave the custody of private respondent to his
lawyers, as officers of the court, ordering the confinement of
accused Oscar Tianzon with the Antique Provincial Jail Warden
and setting the continuation of the hearing to 8 August 1989.
After the hearing in the afternoon, the respondent Judge issued
another order, 20 deputizing private respondent's lawyers as
deputies of the court and ordered the confinement of private
respondent at the San Jose residence of Atty. Deogracias del
Rosario, who happened to be the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Antique.
On 8 August 1989, respondent Judge issued an
order, 21 terminating the deputization of private respondent's
lawyers and ordered them to turn over the custody of private
respondent to the Clerk of Court and Ex-OficioProvincial Sheriff
of the RTC of Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, directing
the latter to hold and detain private respondent in his residence
at San Jose, Antique and not to allow him liberty to roam around
but to hold him as a detention prisoner thereat.
Meanwhile, on 21 June 1989, Atty. J.T. Barrera filed a motion
for admission to bail on behalf of private respondent. 22 On 4
July 1989, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio Trampe filed his
opposition 23 thereto, alleging that private respondent was
charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder and
attempted murders and that the evidence of guilt is strong;
hence, he is not entitled to bail as a matter of right.
On 26 June 1989, private respondent was arraigned, and
thereafter, private respondent's petition for bail was set for
hearing on 7, 11 and 28 August 1989 to 1 September 1989, as
agreed upon by the prosecution and the
defense. 24
On 7 August 1989, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe
filed a motion 25 dated 3 August 1989 to discharge accused
Oscar Tianzon to be utilized as a state witness, alleging that
there is an absolute necessity for his testimony against all the
accused; that there is no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offenses except the testimony of said
accused, which can be substantially corroborated in its material
points by other evidence; that the accused Tianzon does not
appear to be the most guilty among the accused, as he acted
merely as a lookout and did not actually participate in the
assassination of the deceased Evelio Javier, and that he has not
been previously convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude. The hearing of the motion was set on 9 August 1989
at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
The scheduled hearing on the aforesaid motion of the
prosecution was, however, cancelled and the hearing thereof
was reset to 23 August 1989.
At the hearing on 23 August 1989, the prosecution adduced its
evidence in support of the motion; however, respondent Judge
deferred the resolution of the motion. Thereupon, the
prosecution moved that the presentation of its evidence in
opposition to private respondent's petition for bail, which was set
for hearing on 28 August 1989 and 1 September 1989, be
likewise deferred on the ground that accused Oscar Tianzon is a
material witness against private respondent and that his
testimony is necessary for the purpose of determining private
respondent's qualification for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of
guilt is strong.
On 28 August 1989, petitioner filed the instant petition
for CERTIORARI, to annul and set aside the orders dated 3, 7
and 8 August 1989, claiming that said orders were issued with
grave abuse of discretion and PROHIBITION to enjoin the
respondent Judge from hearing private respondent's petition for
bail until he has resolved the motion to discharge accused
Oscar Tianzon, and praying that a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order be issued.
As prayed for, the Court issued on 31 August 1989 a temporary
restraining order, 26 ordering the respondent Judge to cease and
desist from continuing the hearing on respondent-accused
Avelino Javellana's petition for bail until after the respondent
Judge has resolved the motion to discharge Oscar Tianzon as
state witness.
When private respondent's petition for bail was heard on 28
August 1989, respondent Judge was apprised of the filing of the
petition before this Court; hence, the hearing was reset to 1
September 1989.
At the afternoon hearing on 1 September 1989, the prosecution
furnished respondent Judge and the defense, copies of the
restraining order issued by this Court. The respondent Judge,
however, advised the parties that the motion to discharge
accused Oscar Tianzon has already been resolved in the
morning and that copies of the resolution would be available at
any time then. 27 Thereafter, respondent Judge released the
resolution, 28 dated 1 September 1989, denying the
prosecution's motion to discharge accused Oscar Tianzon to be
utilized as a state witness. He ruled, among others, as follows:
The court searched the records for evidence to
corroborate the material points in the aforesaid
testimony of Tianzon against Javellana but found
none to corroborate his statement pointing to
Javellana as the gun supplier and the plotter.
Neither has the prosecution presented evidence
during the hearing to determine Tianzon's
qualification tending to corroborate the implication
of Javellana nor did the prosecution indicate to the
court where such corroboration can be found by
the court.
On the contrary, the court notes a clash of the
statements of Tianzon in the question and answer
No. 45 of his affidavit with the testimonies of the
previous witnesses for the prosecution because
question and answer No. 45 specifies the names
of the passengers of the two (2) nissan jeeps but
the same does not mention either accused John
Paloy or Vicente Vegafria as one of the
passengers of the same jeeps while the
testimonies of previous witnesses for the
prosecution proclaim that they (Paloy and
Vegafria) were among the passengers of the such
jeeps who alighted therefrom at the Plaza where
the late Governor Evelio Javier was killed.
Not only that. The court finds no absolute
necessity to date of Tianzon's testimony because
the court earlier on May 11, 1989 dis charged
accused Romeo Nagales on motion of the
Prosecutor to be utilized as a state witness. But,
instead of utilizing Nagales as a state witness, as
promised by the Prosecutor, the prosecution did
not present him up to this writing but proceeded to
formally offer its evidence and thereafter rested its
case.
What is more, when the prosecution asked for the
discharge of state witness Nagales, it assured the
court that:
That in the instant cases, there is an
absolute necessity for the
testimonies of accused Jose
Delumen and Romeo Nagales as
against accused Arturo Pacificador,
Rodolfo Pacificador, Avelino
Javellana, Eduardo Iran, Ramon
Hortillano, Henry Salaver, Arlene
Limoso, Rolando Bernardino, Oscar
Tianzon, Eleazar
Edemne alias "Nono", Alias Akong
and Alias Tatang, Alias Dolfo, as
shown in their sworn statements,
copies hereto attached as Annexes
"A" and "B" and form part hereof;
That there is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution
of the offenses committed by the
accused named in the next
preceding paragraph except the
testimonies of said Delumen and
Nagales which can be substantially
corroborated in its material points by
other evidence.
But neither did the prosecutor use state witness
Nagales against accused Rolando Bernardino nor
did the prosecution use his testimony against Jose
Delumen and Jesus Garcia. Consequently, there
being no evidence against accused Delumen and
Garcia, on motion of their respective counsel, the
cases against these two (2) accused were
dismissed.
These situation disturbs, let alone alarms, the
court in the conduct of the prosecution in these
cases. The failure of the prosecution to adduce
any evidence against Delumen and Garcia
appears to lend credence to the charge of accused
Javellana that the prosecution in these cases has
adopted a "scandalous dual theory of the
prosecution."
Upon receipt of the resolution, the prosecution through Senior
State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, immediately filed a motion
to inhibit 29 the respondent Judge, dated 24 August 1989, on the
ground of manifest partiality to private respondent, and set it for
hearing on 16 October 1989. Thereupon, the prosecution moved
to defer the presentation of its evidence in opposition to private
respondent's petition for bail. Despite the opposition of the
prosecution, the respondent Judge reset the hearing on 14, 15
September 1989 to 4, 5 and 6 October 1989.
Afterwards, the prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration 30 of the order of 1 September 1989 which
denied the prosecution's motion to discharge accused Oscar
Tianzon.
On 4 September 1989, the Senior State Prosecutor also filed a
motion 31 to reset the hearings on 14, 15 September 1989 and 4,
5, 6 October 1989 on the petition for bail, on the grounds that
the motion to inhibit should first be resolved and also because of
the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the order of 1
September 1989.
At the hearing on 14 September 1989, only Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor John Turalba appeared for the prosecution. He
manifested that he was appearing only to reiterate the Senior
State Prosecutor's motion for deferment of the scheduled
hearings on private respondent's petition for bail. Private
respondent opposed the motion. The respondent Judge denied
the motion, and directed the prosecution to present its evidence
in opposition to the private respondent's petition for bail. The
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor moved for reconsideration,
claiming that his position is subservient to that of the Senior
State Prosecutor who is the duly designated principal prosecutor
and as a matter of conviction, he cannot proceed with the trial
as well as with the subsequent trials which were covered by the
motion of 4 September 1989, and that, moreover, to proceed
would render moot and academic the petition
for certiorari before this Court. Respondent Judge denied the
motion for reconsideration, and, again, directed the prosecution
to present its evidence. At this juncture, the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor manifested that he was not participating in the
proceedings and begged to be allowed to leave the courtroom,
which the respondent Judge refused.
Nevertheless, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor John Turalba
walked out and, while walking towards the door, respondent
Judge ordered the Sheriff to arrest him. Thereafter, respondent
Judge issued an order finding Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
John Turalba in contempt of court; declaring the prosecution to
have waived its right to present evidence in opposition to private
respondent's petition for bail; and considering the said petition
for bail submitted for resolution. 32 The respondent Judge
imposed upon the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor the penalty of
ten (10) days imprisonment. 33
Hence, the petitioner filed with this Court a Supplemental
Petition to annul and set aside the orders of 1 September 1989
as well as the order of 14 September 1989; and to inhibit
respondent Judge from further taking cognizance of Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350 to 3355; and praying that a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction be issued directing respondent Judge to
promptly order the release of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
John Turalba from custody on the cognizance of the Provincial
Prosecutor.
As prayed for, the Court issued on 22 September 1989 a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. 34 However, when the
respondent Judge received it on 26 September 1989, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor John Turalba had already been released
on 25 September 1989 having served his sentence.
Petitioner contends that the respondent Judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the following orders, to wit:
(a) the order of 3 August 1989, placing custody of private
respondent with the Antique Provincial Probation Officer;
(b) the order of 7 August 1989, transferring the custody of
private respondent to his own lawyers;
(c) the Order of 8 August 1989, entrusting the custody of private
respondent with the Clerk of Court and ex-oficioProvincial
Sheriff, Deogracias del Rosario; and
(d) the Order of 1 September 1989, which denied the
prosecution's motion to discharge Oscar Tianzon to be utilized
as a state witness.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he insisted on continuously hearing private
respondent's petition for bail and in ordering the arrest and
commitment of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor John Turalba in
the Provincial Jail.
It has been repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of
discretion justifying the issuance of a writ of certiorari where
there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice,
or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law. 35
In claiming that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the orders of 3 August 1989, 7 August 1989
and 8 August 1989, petitioner argues that there was no
compelling reason for the respondent Judge to order, with
undue haste, the medical "check up" of private respondent at
the Iloilo Mission Center notwithstanding the absence of any
police escort or other law enforcer to ensure that private
respondent would not take flight as he had previously done; that
while all the other accused were confined in the Provincial Jail of
Antique, the respondent Judge merely "entrusted" the custody
of private respondent to his lawyers, and then to the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Antique, who is the son of one of private
respondent's lawyers; and that respondent Judge has not
advanced a valid and legal rationale for the "accommodations"
afforded private respondent who, in law, occupies no better
position and no preferential rights over those of his co-accused.
The respondent Judge, however, has, to our mind, sufficiently
explained in the order of 7 August 1989 the reasons behind the
issuance of the aforesaid orders. He said:
The Court is aware of certain reasons why
accused Javellana should not be placed in the
Provincial Jail. This was the subject of a
discussion in open court before the Presiding
Judge of this court between the lawyers of
Javellana and Javellana, himself and Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor John I-C. Turalba who, after
hearing the particular reason given by Javellana
withdrew his opposition to the placing of Javellana
other than in the Provincial Jail of Antique and
acceded that custody of Javellana be placed at the
hands of the Provincial Commander of Antique.
Recently, particulary on August 2, 1989 as well as
on August 3, 1989, the court had difficulty in
securing the safety of accused Javellana. The
court was left with no other choice but to entrust
his custody to the Provincial Probation Officer to
escort him to Iloilo City for a medical check-up. It is
the perception of the court that there are
movements going ground, by whom is unknown
yet to the court, to compel the incarceration of
accused Javellana in the Provincial Jail. The court
abhors this situation and the court will not be
intimidated by anyone. It is the perception of this
court that even its lawful orders have somehow
been subverted. The court's perception of the
circumstances presently obtaining on the custody
and place of detention of Javellana is a hot
agenda and of grave importance, particularly his
safety and well being during detention in order that
the court can try him on the charges against him.
After serious deliberation, it is the considered view
of the court that his detention be placed
somewhere else. The court hereby appoints Attys.
Del Rosario, Barrera and Alinio as deputies of the
court and as such to take custody of accused
Javellana meantime that the motion to fix bail is
going on and for them to bring the accused to
court whenever his presence is needed.
As earlier noted, the court perceives a movement
to compel detention of the accused in the
Provincial Jail of Antique. This disturbs the court.
This even lends credence to the information by
Javellana that there is indeed danger to his life if
he is placed in the Provincial Jail of Antique. This
perception of the court is premised on what
appears to be a subversion of the order of the
court placing custody of accused Javellana with
the Provincial Commander of Antique. The court,
however, allowed, on motion of the Provincial
Commander, that Javellana be transferred to the
Binirayan Rehabilitation Center. But, on motion of
Javellana for reasons of health, as the same
center is too far away and no adequate (sic)
transport facilities at certain time of the day and
night are available to convey accused should an
emergency occur, accused was ordered confined
at the Angel Salazar Memorial Hospital in San
Jose, Antique for check-up. Because of the
incomplete results of the examination, order was
issued for his complete check-up in a hospital in
Iloilo. The court ordered the Station Commander of
San Jose, Antique to provide police escorts and
security to prevent escape of accused in
conducting check-up. Before the accused and his
escorts could depart, on August 3, 1989 for Iloilo
City, the INP Station Commander of San Jose
begged the Presiding Judge of this Court to allow
him to recall the security personnel he has
assigned and ordered to conduct accused
Javellana to Iloilo City. It left the court with no
choice and no enforcers. The court, however, had
to be assured on the physical condition of accused
Javellana that he will be able to face trial against
him. Accordingly, the court ordered the Provincial
Probation Officer, to whom the custody of accused
Javellana was entrusted, to escort the latter to
Iloilo City for the medical check-up. The Probation
Officer earlier this morning manifested that there
was opportunity for accused Javellana to escape
but despite such opportunity he came back to
court today to face the trial against him. This, to
the mind of the court is to be considered in his
favor.
The aforesaid movements directed to compel the
court to place Javellana in the Provincial Jail, is
(sic) to the mind of the court, as (sic) indication
that should (sic) be place there, something may
happen to him and this court will not allow that
thing to happen. And as it is the considered view
of the court that justice maybe better served to
deputize, as the lawyers of accused Javellana
have been deputized, as deputies of the court. As
such they are now drawn from the status of private
individuals but are now the deputies of the court.
In the matter of facilities, accused Javellana is to
be confined at the San Jose residence of Atty.
Deogracias Del Rosario, the son of Atty. Amelia
del Rosario who happens to be the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Antique.
There may be truth to the Prosecutor's contention
that there will be nothing to prevent the other
accused from following suit in asking that their
custody likewise (sic) be transferred to their
respective lawyers.
But, such is only to request. The grant or denial
thereof is a matter altogether different.
 In the present incident it is the findings (sic) of the
court that indeed the life of Javellana will be
imperilled if confined elsewhere other than the
place above directed.
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds and so holds that
respondent Judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion, i.e.,
that he did not act "arbitrarily", "capriciously" or "despotically"
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned orders of 3, 7 and 8 August 1989.
Coming now to the 1 September 1989 order of respondent
Judge, denying the prosecution's motion to discharge accused
Oscar Tianzon, the Court reiterates the rule that, for a writ
of certiorari to issue, it must not only be shown that the board,
tribunal or officer acted without jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, but also that there is no appeal or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. 36 Thus, before filing a petition for certiorari in a higher court,
the attention of the lower court should generally be first called to
its supposed error and its correction should be sought. The
reason for the rule is that issues which the lower courts are
bound to decide should not summarily be taken from them and
submitted to an appellate court without first giving such lower
courts the opportunity to dispose of the same with due
deliberation. 37 In other words, all available remedies in the lower
court must first be exhausted before filing a petition
for certiorari in the higher courts.
In the case at bar, the petitioner had filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of 1 September 1989 which is still
pending resolution by respondent Judge. A petition
for certiorari may not be granted where there is an appeal or
other adequate remedy, like a motion for reconsideration, which
is still pending in the court below, 38 as in the present case.
The Court, however, holds that respondent Judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he insisted in continuously hearing private
respondent's petition for bail and in ordering the arrest and
commitment of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
It is well to recall that in the restraining order issued on 31
August 1989, this Court ordered the respondent Judge to cease
and desist from continuing the hearing on private respondent's
petition for bail until after he had resolved the motion for
discharge of Oscar Tianzon as state witness. Although the
aforesaid motion had already been denied in the order of 1
September 1989, nevertheless, the prosecution had filed a
motion to reconsider the said order which is still pending
resolution. Hence, the said motion has not yet been resolved
with finality. When respondent Judge, therefore, denied the
prosecution's motion for deferment of the scheduled hearings on
private respondent's petition for bail and in proceeding to hear
the said motion, by ordering the prosecution to present its
evidence — which precipitated the walk-out of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor and his consequent arrest and
commitment to the Provincial Jail — he (respondent judge) was
acting in violation of the restraining order issued by this Court.
Had the respondent Judge granted the prosecution's motion for
deferment, or at least, cancelled the hearings on 14 and 15
September 1989, and instead, resolved the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration of the order of 1 September 1989,
this unfortunate incident could have been avoided.
Although the matter of adjournment and postponement of trials
is within the sound discretion of the court, such discretion should
always be predicated on the consideration that more than the
mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the
ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. 39 After
all, postponements and continuances are part and parcel of our
procedural system of dispensing justice. 40
Besides, contempt of court presupposes a contumacious
attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the
court. 41 And, while courts are inherently empowered to punish
for contempt to the end that they may enforce their authority,
preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and insure the
effectiveness of the administration of justice, 42 nevertheless,
such power should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle, for the power to punish for contempt,
being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be
resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justicen 43
A perusal of the transcript of the hearing held on 14 September
1989 shows that Assistant Provincial Prosecutor John Turalba
had not made any statement that could be considered as
"contumacious" or an affront to the dignity of the court. And,
while the act of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Turalba of
"walking out" does not meet our approval — as he should have
stayed after the respondent Judge had denied his motion for
permission to leave the courtroom — yet, the respondent Judge,
in ordering the incarceration of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Turalba, acted beyond the permissible limits of his power to
punish for contempt.
And now to the question on whether or not respondent Judge
should be disqualified from further hearing Crim. Cases Nos.
3350-3355, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:
for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above.
In the case at bar, the reason relied upon for the inhibition or
disqualification of respondent Judge, i.e. manifest partiality to
private respondent, is not based on any of the grounds
enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137
which per se disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case, but on
the second paragraph thereof. The settled rule is that the judge
is left to decide for himself whether he will desist, for just or valid
reasons, from sitting in a case. Respondent Judge has not as
yet decided whether or not he will inhibit himself from further
hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 in the face of the
prosecution's motion to disqualify or inhibit him. It would be
premature for the Court at this stage to rule on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED insofar as
the order of 14 September 1989 is concerned, and the said
order is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.— No judge Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Regalado, JJ., concur.
or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he,
or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of
 
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
 
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of
 
the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
 
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
 
which he has presided in any inferior court when
 
his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
 
without the written consent of all parties in interest,
 
signed by them and entered upon the records.
 

 
A judge, may in the exercise of his sound
 
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
 
 EN BANC
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with
the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the
same year’s bar examinations with a general weighted
average of 82.7.2cralaw virtualaw library
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine
International Convention Center (PICC) together with the
successful bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on
his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office
when he went home to his province for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college
files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys.
It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the
roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC
was probably just an attendance record.7 cralaw virtualaw library
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already
working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate and
taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in
litigation practice. Thus, he operated “under the mistaken
belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as
crucial to his status as a lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing
in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and
was subsequently forgotten.”9 cralaw virtualaw library
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his
roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be
credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed
the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys.11
cralaw virtualaw library
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a
clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September
201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this
Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the
instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It explained that,
based on his answers during the clarificatory conference,
petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence
in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15 cralaw virtualaw library
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s
prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a
cralaw virtualaw library
fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension
from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is
warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral
character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in
the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party
who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission;
rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own
lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When
asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file
the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied: chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what
can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you
don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a
combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna
happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come
here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for
disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is more than
what we can say of other individuals who were successfully
admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court,
this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the
strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that
he has prima facieshown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able
legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel
Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw library
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who
have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the
rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner
Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since
1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but
based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment.”22 cralaw virtualaw library
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a
person from the legal consequences of his acts23 as it
negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may
have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact when
he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance
before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he had signed
was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim
an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure
to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without
taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements
for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by
one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and
acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect
contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the
filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed
indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in
unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge
pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit
is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys
will be dealt with severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts
in the country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law,

the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is SO ORDERED.
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of
 
Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized
 
practice of
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
 
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound
 
to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
 
standards of the legal profession.
 
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of

 
Canon 9 have warranted the penalty of suspension from the
 
practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer,
 
we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However,
 
we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension

 
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year
after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the
 
prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we
 
likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000.
 
During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is
 
not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly
warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
 
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
 
with severely by this Court.
 

 
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado

 
is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1)
 
YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
 
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his
 
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period,

 
petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and
A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M.
Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled
"People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of Public
Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40.1 While respondent's letter-request was pending action,
Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2,
1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's
authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal
case.2 On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator
referred the matter to respondent for comment.3
In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted
that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior
authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances
surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of
his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of
a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was
a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his
cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the
criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public
since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his
appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved by
the presiding judge.1âwphi1.nêt
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying
respondent's request for authorization to appear as counsel and
directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges
against him for appearing in court without the required authorization
from the Court.5 On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed
the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating
Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,"
which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts
and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
x x x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their
profession unless authorized by the Constitution
or law, Provided, that such practice will not
conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to
comment on the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are
"close blood cousins" who belong to a "powerless family" from the
impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood
until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported
and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser.
Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's
help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885
for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres,
whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to "seek
vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his cousin's discord with
Ms. Andres started when the latter's husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres,
left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course
of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3)
children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the
falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since
he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept
Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her counsel since she not have enough funds
to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that
in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with
the Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had
performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in
this particular case that he had been administratively charged for
extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal
assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of
his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned
appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that
during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by
his approved leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's
comment and referred the administrative matter to the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-
Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the
following findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as
counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for
"Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of
Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the previous permission
of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions
that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the
METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence.
Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was
aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent
appeared as pro bonocounsel likewise cannot be denied. His
cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that
the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her.
Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in
the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion
and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that
respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family
who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the
purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his
Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for
his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been
in government service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent
appeared as counsel for his cousin without first securing
permission from the Court, and considering that this is his first
time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance was
not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding
Judge, it is hereby respectfully recommended that he be
REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of
such act would be dealt with more severely.6
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which
prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section
reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other
official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of
the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession,
specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does
not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of
the term "private practice" prohibited by the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule
did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan.
864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E.
522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practice of law. The following observation of the
Solicitor General is noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies
that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood
or in consideration of his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule
had been given permission by his immediate superior, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case
at bar, who is a relative.8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when
respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal
Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law
profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not
amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written
permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this
Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules, thus:
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in
any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected
with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of
the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at
the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities,
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally,
That no permission is necessary in the case of investments,
made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or
apparent conflict between his private interests and public
duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his
duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings
on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13,
1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is
true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he
appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission
from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to
which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law. 1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M.
Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any
repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]
EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY.
EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended
party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch
273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff
versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the
proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva,
counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check
No. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn
against her account with the Philippine National Bank,
as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her
client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but
respondent assured him that the same will be paid upon
its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested
that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is
not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed
upon by complainant to accept the check.
Consequently, he desisted from participating as a
complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to
the dismissal of the same and the release of the
accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was
returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason:
Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a
letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face
value of the check.1 However, his demand was ignored
by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal
complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No.
97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City
Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22against respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva.2cräläwvirtualibräry
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent
for deceit and violation of the Lawyers Oath.3 cräläwvirtualibräry
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to
respondents given address at Carmelo Compound,
Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was
required to comment on the complaint within ten (10)
days from notice.4 However, it was returned unserved
with the notation Moved.5 The Assistant National
Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of
respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.6 cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring
respondent to comment on the administrative complaint
filed against her was served at the aforesaid address.
This was again returned unserved with the notation:
Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for
investigation, report and recommendation.7 cräläwvirtualibräry
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating
Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent
guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the
Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon
complainant to accept her personal check by way of
settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio
Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have
sufficient funds when presented for payment. In doing
so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his
complaint against her client in exchange for a check
which she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by
respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to
deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which
she should be accordingly penalized.8 Such an act
constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for such
malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to
do so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a
lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since
this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to
enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof
is equally essential during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross
misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in
serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the
practice of law.9 cräläwvirtualibräry
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason
whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment,10 because it is important that members of
the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest
standards of morality.11 Any wrongdoing which indicates
moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary
action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is
unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of
the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct
must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion.12cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately
refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a
deplorably willful character or disposition which stains
the nobility of the legal profession.13 Her conduct not
only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority;
it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister
character flaw in her psyche which renders highly
questionable her moral fitness to continue in the
practice of law: a defiance for law and order which is at
the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career
in the administration of justice because obedience to
the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.
lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to
serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to
follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and
foremost command of the Code of Professional
Responsibility could not be any clearer:

 
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
 
CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF
 
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
 
FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
 

 
Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to
 
comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even

 
an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct
which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to

 
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
 
at all times. She can only do this by faithfully
 
performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the
 
courts and to her clients.14 We can not tolerate any
 
misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name of an
 
honorable profession.
 

 
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the
 
practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective
 
upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be
 
entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the
 
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
 
country for their information and guidance.
 

 
SO ORDERED.

 
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
 
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-
 
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
 
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 
 [G.R. NO. 154207 : April 27, 2007]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ALBERTO MINA,
HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of law, with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution
dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137,
which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45,
Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC's
Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued
by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed
before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats,
where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student,
justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of
the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a
non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an
agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore
avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of
the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz
appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC
denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down
in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a
Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the February
1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student
Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding
Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule
is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court
alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
against the private respondent and the public respondent
MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain
public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the
RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the
issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of
Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is
one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for
civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion
for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that nowhere does
the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil
aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated
June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance
of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or
friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a
member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for
Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC
seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the
said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a
Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of
the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied
the petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration and his
Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the
RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner
before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court,
the instant Petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when
it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of injunction of the
herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the
necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,
TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT
RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON
THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT,
FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD
IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE
ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE
LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE
CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS
BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC'S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons,
or if warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may
take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation,
clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19
governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the
Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student,
may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of
a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as
encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, prohibits
the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his
appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in
the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly
accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student
who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular
four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a
recognized law school's clinical legal education program
approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student
authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision
and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all
pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in
behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter
No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears
before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may
appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a
lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of
a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar
Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of a
municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138,
thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the Court of a
municipality a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his
Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on September 25, 2000.
No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in
these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34
of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the appearance
of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is
expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for
conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34
of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been confused by
the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in
his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been
used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as
private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason
that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner's
appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the
inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in
Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior
courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that,
by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from the crime
of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a
private prosecutor is not possible.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no
reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may
rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,
Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED
to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct
control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had SO ORDERED.
been intended by the RTC. In denying the issuance of the
injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was
no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for
 
damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for
a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner's
 
appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally
 
untenable.

 
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person
 
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable except in
 
instances when no actual damage results from an offense,
such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy
 
country, and crime against popular representation.9 The
 
basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery

 
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
 
deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended
 
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
 
action.10
 

 
 [G.R. NO. 176530 : June 16, 2009]
SPOUSES CONSTANTE AGBULOS AND ZENAIDA
PADILLA AGBULOS, Petitioners, v.NICASIO GUTIERREZ,
JOSEFA GUTIERREZ and ELENA G.
GARCIA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the review of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 6,
2007 in CA G.R. CV No. 83994 which set aside the dismissal
of a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract,
cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.
The case stems from the following antecedents:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez,
Josefa Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through
their counsel, Atty. Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, a
complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos
and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of
contract, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages.
The complaint alleged that respondents inherited from their
father, Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-hectare parcel of land
located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name
of Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners
succeeded in making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez
executed a Deed of Sale on July 21, 1978 when, in truth, he
died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No. NT-123790 was
cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was issued in
the name of petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of
the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
and awarded to Lorna Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette
Nuega who were issued Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs).
In their defense, petitioners averred that respondents were
not the real parties in interest, that the Deed of Sale was
regularly executed before a notary public, that they were
possessors in good faith, and that the action had prescribed.
On the day set for the presentation of the respondents'
(plaintiffs') evidence, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter
of the case. Petitioners contended that the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), not the RTC,
had jurisdiction since the subject land was covered by the
CARP, and CLOAs had been awarded to tenants.
Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the motion
had been filed beyond the period for filing an Answer, that
the RTC had jurisdiction over the case based on the
allegations in the complaint, and that the DARAB had no
jurisdiction since the parties had no tenancy relationship.
In an Order2 dated October 24, 2002, the RTC granted the
petitioners' motion and dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The RTC held that the DARAB had jurisdiction,
since the subject property was under the CARP, some
portions of it were covered by registered CLOAs, and there
was prima facie showing of tenancy.3
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. On
November 13, 2003, the RTC denied the motion.4
Atty. Magbitang filed a Notice of Appeal5 with the RTC, which
gave due course to the same.6 The records reveal that on
December 15, 2003, respondent Elena G. Garcia wrote a
letter to Judge Arturo M. Bernardo, Acting Judge of RTC
Gapan, Branch 87, stating that they were surprised to
receive a communication from the court informing them that
their notice of appeal was ready for disposition. She also
stated in the letter that there was no formal agreement with
Atty. Magbitang as to whether they would pursue an appeal
with the CA, because one of the plaintiffs was still in
America.7
On February 6, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of
respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED and the assailed Order dated October 24, 2002
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, Branch 87, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the subject complaint is reinstated and the records of the
case is (sic) hereby remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
SO ORDERED.8
The CA concluded that the dispute between the parties was
purely civil, not agrarian, in nature. According to the CA, the
allegations in the complaint revealed that the principal relief
sought was the nullification of the purported deed of sale and
reconveyance of the subject property. It also noted that
there was no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian
relations between the parties.
Thus, this petition, raising the following issues for the
resolution of this Court:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the appeal
despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed the
notice of appeal without respondents' knowledge and
consent;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to the
appeal despite the fact that Atty. Magbitang's appellants'
brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the
contents of an appellants' brief; and
3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC
(Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD
(Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over respondents' complaint.9
The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on
both procedural and substantive grounds.
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is
presumed to represent such client before the appellate court.
Section 22 of Rule 138 creates this presumption, thus:
SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to
represent client on appeal. - An attorney who appears de
parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to
continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate
court.
A reading of respondent Elena Garcia's letter to the RTC
would show that she did not actually withdraw Atty.
Magbitang's authority to represent respondents in the case.
The letter merely stated that there was, as yet, no
agreement that they would pursue an appeal.
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may
be ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly.
Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer's first
appearance and validates the action taken by him.10 Implied
ratification may take various forms, such as by silence or
acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits
flowing therefrom.11Respondents' silence or lack of
remonstration when the case was finally elevated to the CA
means that they have acquiesced to the filing of the appeal.
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to "serve his client with
competence and diligence."12Consequently, a lawyer is
cralawlibrary
entreated not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him;
otherwise, his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.13 In light of such mandate, Atty.
Magbitang's act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting
for her clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if purely civil and not agrarian in nature falling within the
not commendable. exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.

The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within On the alleged deficiency of the appellants' brief filed before
the jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB. the CA by the respondents, suffice it to state that the
requirements in Section 13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must appellate court in arriving at a just and proper resolution of
be a tenancy relationship between the parties. It is, the case. Obviously, the CA found the appellants' brief
therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court was
elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly held
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural that technical and procedural rules are intended to help
lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an secure, not to suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from
agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the a rigid enforcement of the rules may, thus, be allowed in
parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the order to attain this prime objective for, after all, the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or courts.16
agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
lessee.14 The Court of Appeals' Decision dated February 6, 2007 is
AFFIRMED.
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.15Respondents' complaint did not SO ORDERED.
contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest,
imply that there was a tenancy relation between them and
the petitioners. We are in full agreement with the following

 
findings of the CA on this point:
 
x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint
 
reveals that the principal relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants
 
is for the nullification of the supposedly forged deed of sale
which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-188664
 
covering their 8-hectare property as well as its
reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as

 
claimed by defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties
 
herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this

 
controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws.
 
Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this
case nor the latter's entitlement thereto questioned. Hence,
 
contrary to the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is
 January 10, 2018
A.C. No. 9000
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant
vs.
ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint1 filed by
Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (complainant) against Atty. Haide V. Gumba
(respondent), and for which respondent was suspended from the
practice of law for six months. The issues now ripe for resolution arc:
a) whether respondent disobeyed a lawful order of the Court: by not
abiding by the order of her suspension; and b) whether respondent
deserves a stiffer penalty for such violation.
Factual Antecedents
According to complainant, in August 1999, respondent obtained from
him a ₱350,000.00 loan with 12% interest per annum. Incidental
thereto, respondent executed in favor of complainant an undated
Deed of Absolute Sale2 over a 105- square meter lot located in Naga
City, and covered by Transfor Certificate of Title No. 20553 under the
name of respondent's father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said Deed
was a Special Power of Attorney4 (SPA) executed by respondent's
parents authorizing her to apply for a loan with a bank to be secured
by the subject property. Complainant and respondent purportedly
agreed that if the latter failed to pay the loan in or before August 2000,
complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register
of Deeds (RD).5
Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite
repeated demands, she failed to settle her obligation. Complainant
attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD of Naga
City but to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered the
authority of respondent to mortgage the property to a bank, and not to
sell it.6
Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, he
would not have approved her loan. He added that respondent
committed dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and her moral
ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that
respondent be sanctioned for her infraction.7
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated February 9, 2009; Commissioner
Jose I. de la Rama, Jr. (Commissioner de la Rama) faulted
respondent for failing to file an answer, and participate in the
mandatory conference, He further declared that the SPA specifically
authorized respondent to mortgage the property with a bank. He
stressed that for selling t.lie property, and not just mortgaging it to
complainant, who was not even a bank, respondent acted beyond her
authority. Having done so, she committed gross violation of the
Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1,9 Rule 1.01,10and Canon 711 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
In the Resolution No. XIX-2010-44612 dated August 28, 2010, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner de la Rama.
Action of the Supreme Court
Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution13 dated October 5, 2011,
which sustained the findings and conclusion of the IBP. The Court
nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper, pursuant to its
sound judicial discretion and on the facts of the case. Accordingly, it
suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months,
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.
On March 14, 2012, the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5,
2011 Resolution upon respondent because its previous copy sent to
her was returned unserved.14 In its August 13, 2012 Resolution,15 the
Court considered .the October 5, 2011 Resolution to have been
served upon respondent after the March 14, 2012 Resolution was
also returned unserved. In the same resolution, the Court also denied
with finality respondent's motion for reconsideration on the October 5,
2011 Resolution.
Subsequently, Judge Margaret N. Armea (Judge Armea) of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Naga City, Branch 2 wrote1 a
letter16 inquiring from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
whether respondent could continue representing her clients and
appear in courts. She also asked the OCA if the decision
relating to respondent's suspension, which was downloaded from the
inten1et, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her to appear in
courts for the period of her suspension.
According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent
represented a party in a case pending in her court; and, the counsel of
the opposing party called Judge Arrr1ea's attention regarding the legal
standing of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea added
that respondent denied that she was suspended to practice law since
she (respondent) had not yet received a copy of the Court's resolution
on the matter.
In her Answer/Comment17 to the query of Judge Armea, respondent
countered that by reason of such downloaded decision, Judge Armea
and Executive Judge Pablo Cabillan Formaran III (Judge Formaran
III) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City disallowed her
appearance in their courts. She insisted that service of any pleading
or judgment cannot be made through the inte1net. She further
claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of the Court's.
October 5, 2011 Resolution.
On January 22, 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred
the October 5, 2011 Resolution to the OCA for circulation to all
courts.18 In response, on January 30, 2013, the OCA issued OCA
Circular No. 14-201319 addressed to the courts.20 the Office of the
Chief State Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), and the
IBP informing them of the October 5, 2011 and August 13, 2012
Resolutions of the Court.
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution No XX-2013-35921 dated March
21, 2013, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation22 of Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero
(Comrnissioner Cachapero) to dismiss the complaint against
respondent. According to Commissioner Cachapero. there is no rule
allowing the service of judgements through the internet; and. Judge
Armea and Judge Formaran III acted ahead of time when they
implemented the suspension of respondent even before the actual
service upon her of the resolution concerning her suspension.
Statement and Report of the OBC
In its November 22, 2013 .Statement.23 the OBC stressed that
respondent received the August 13, 2012 Resolution (denying her
motion, for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution) on
November 12, 2012 per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365. Thus, the
effectivity of respondent's suspension was from November 12, 2012
until May 12, 2013. The OBC also pointed out that suspension is not
automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of suspension. It is
necessary that an order be issued by the Court lifting the suspension
to enable the concerned lawyer to resume practice of law.
The OBC further maintained in its November 27, 2013 Report24 that
respondent has no authority to practice law and appear in court as
counsel during her suspension, and until such time that the Court has
lifted the order of her suspension. Thus, the OBC made these
recommendations:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully
recommended that:
1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to
lift order of her suspension, attaching therewith certifications from the
Office of the Executive Judge of the court where she practices [h]er
profession and IBP Local Chapter of which she is affiliated, that she
has ceased and desisted from the practice of law from 12 November
2012 to 12 May 2013, immediately: and 2. The IBP be REQUIRED to
EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they should not be sanctioned for
disciplinary action for issuing said Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-
359, dated 21 March 2013, purportedly dismissing this case for lack of
merit.25
On February 19, 2014, the Court noted26 the OBC Report, and
directed respondent to comply with the guidelines relating to the lifting
of the order of her suspension as enunciated in Maniago v.Atty. De
Dios.27
Upon the request of respondent, on December 2, 2014, the OBC
issued a Certification,28 which stated that respondent had been
ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months, and as of
the issuance of said certification, the order of her suspension had not
yet been lifted.
Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso
On February 6, 2015, respondent filed with the RTC a verified
Complaint29 for nullity of clearance, damages, and preliminary
injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order against
the OCA, the OBC, and Atty. Nelson P. Paraiso (Atty. Paraiso). The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2015-0007.
Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending
her from the practice of law even if the administrative case against her
was still pending with the IBP. She likewise faulted the OBC for
requiring her to submit a clearance from its office before she resumes
her practice of law after the suspension. In turn, she argued that Atty.
Paraiso benefited from this supposed "bogus suspension" by publicly
announcing the disqualification of respondent to practice law.
In its Answer,30 the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the action, which seeks reversal, modification or enjoinment of a
directive of the Court. The OCA also stressed that respondent should
raise such matter by filing a motion for reconsideration in the
administrative case, instead of filing a complaint with the RIC. It also
stated that the instance of OCA Circular No. 14-2013 was in
compliance with the Court's directive to inform all courts, the CSP, the
PAO, and the IBP of the suspension of respondent.
For its pmt, the OBC declared in a Report31 dated March 24, 2015 that
during and after the period of her suspension, without the same
having been lifted, respondent filed pleadings and appeared in courts
in the following cases:
x x x (l) Civil Case No. 2013-0106 (Romy Fay Gumba v. The City
Assessor of Naga City, et. al.), (2) Civil Case No. RTC 2006-0063
(Sps. Jaime M. Kalaw et. al. v. Fausto David, et al.), (3) Other Spec.
Proc. No. RTC 2012-0019 (Petition for Reconstitution of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 21128 of the Registry of Deeds of Naga City v.
Danilo O. Laborado).32
The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March
24, 2015 Report, the Court had not yet lifted the order of suspension
against respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to comply with the
order of her suspension, respondent deliberately refi1sed to obey a
lawful order of the Court. Thus, it recommended that a stiffer penalty
be imposed against respondent.
On June 4, 2015, the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil
Case No. 2015-0007 for lack of jurisdiction, and pending resolution
was respondent's motion for reconsideration.33
Issue
Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law
during the period of her suspension and prior to an order of the Court
lifting such suspension?
Our Ruling
Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the
practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege [subject] to the
inherent regulatory power of the [Court],"34 It is a "privilege burdened
with conditions."35 As such, lawyers must comply with its 1igid
standards, which include mental fitness, maintenance of highest level
of morality, and full compliance with the rules of the legal profession.36
With regard to suspension to practice law, in Maniago v. Atty.
De Dios,37 The Court laid down the guidelines for the lifting of an order
of suspension, to wit:
l) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the
practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately
executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which
to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion
shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall
file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar
Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of
his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local
Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where
respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where
he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's
compliance with the order of suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer
tmder oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe
punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.38
Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a
Resolution dated October 5, 2011 suspending respondent from the
practice of law for six months effective immediately. Respondent filed
her motion for reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012, she
received the notice of the denial of such motion per Registry Return
Receipt No. 53365.
While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only
personally or by registered mail,39 and that mere showing of a
downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent is
not a valid service, the fact, however, that respondent was duly
informed of her suspension remains unrebutted. Again, as stated
above, she filed a motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution, and the Court duly notified her of the denial of said
motion. It thus follows that respondent's six months suspension
commenced from the notice of the denial of her motion for
reconsideration on November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.
In lbana-Andrade v. Atty. Paita-Moya,40 despite having received the
Resolution anent her suspension, Atty. Paita-Moya continued to
practice law. She filed pleadings and she appeared as counsel in
courts. For which reason, the Court suspended her from the practice
of law for six months in addition to her initial one month suspension,
or a total of seven months.
Too, in Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,41 respondent therein, Atty.
Lozada, appeared and signed as counsel, for and in behalf of her
husband, during the period of her suspension from the practice of law.
For having done so, the Court ruled that she engaged in unauthorized
practice of law. The Court did not give weight to Atty. Lozada's
defense of good faith as she was very well aware that when she
represented her husband, she was still serving her suspension order.
The Court also noted that Atty. Lozada did not seek any clearance or
clarification from the Court if she can represent her husband in court.
In this regard, the Court suspended Atty. Lozada for six months for
her willful disobedience to a lawful order of the Court.
Similarly, in this case, the Court notified respondent of her
suspension. However, she continued to engage in the practice law by
filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the period
of her suspension.
It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a
lawyer from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from
performing all functions which require the application of legal
knowledge witl1in the period of his or her suspension.42 To stress, by
practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training,
and experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of
the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires
the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.''43 In fine, it will
amount to unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful order of
the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in the practice of law during
the pendency of his or her suspension.44
As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and
even after the period of her suspension and without filing a sworn
statement for the lifting of her suspension, respondent signed
pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel. Clearly, such acts of
respondent are in violation of the order of her suspension to practice
law.
Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is
necessary that there is an order from the Court lifting the suspension
of a lawyer to practice law. To note, in Maniago, the Court explicitly
1âwphi1
stated that a suspended lawyer shall, upon the expiration of one’s
suspension, file a sworn statement with the Court, and that such
statement shall be considered proof of the lawyer's compliance 1Nith SO ORDERED.
the order of suspension.

In this case, on February 19, 2014, the Court directed respondent to

comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order
 
against her by filing a sworn statement on the matter. However,
respondent did not comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil Case
 
No. 2015-0007) against the OCA, the OBC and a certain Atty. Paraiso
with the RTC. For having done so, respondent violated a lawful order
 
of the Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the
order of suspension against her.
 
To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court
 
is two-fold: 1) she filed pleadings and appeared in court as counsel
during the period of her suspension, and prior to t1e lifting of such
 
order of her suspension: and 2) she did not comply with the Court's
directive for her to file a sworn statement in compliance with the
 
guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order.

 
Under Section 27,45 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from practice of law for willful
 
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, among other
grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful
 
orders by failing to comply with the order of her suspension, and to
the Court's directive to observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof.
 
Pursuant to prevailing Jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6)
months from the practice of law against respondent is in order.46
 
WIIEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from
 
the practice of law for an additional period of six (6) months (from her
original six (6) months suspension) and WARNED that a repetition of
 
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

 
Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to infom1 the Court of the date of
her receipt of this Decision, to determine the reckoning point when her
 
suspension shall take effect.

 
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
 
information and guidance. 'The Office of the Bar Confidant is
DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to the record of
 
respondent as member of the Bar.
G.R. No. 82760 August 30, 1990
FELIMON MANANGAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH
28, respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
For abuse of Court processes, hopping from one forum to another, filing a labyrinth of cases and
pleadings, thwarting the smooth prosecution of Criminal Case No. 639 against him for no less
than twelve (12) years, and for masquerading as Filemon Manangan when his real name is
Andres Culanag, petitioner has brought upon himself the severest censure and a punishment for
contempt. The Petition for Certiorari he has filed likewise calls for dismissal.
The Petition, Amended Petition, and Second Amended Petition seek
the annulment of the entire proceedings in Criminal Case No. 639 of
respondent Court, including the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by it,
dated 19 July 1979, "for being stale/functus officio." It is claimed, inter
alia, that respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in
making it appear that petitioner was duly tried and convicted when the
contrary was true, and that the Alias Warrant of Arrest was irregularly
issued because respondent Court had already accepted a property
bond.
In the Amended Petition, petitioner further alleges that respondent
Court had irregularly assumed jurisdiction as it is the Sandiganbayan
that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the case considering that
he was Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands, Region II, and that he
had supposedly committed the offense in relation to that office.
Piecing together the facts from the hodgepodge of quotations from the
Decisions in the different cases filed by petitioner, we recite the
relevant ones below.
On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a lawyer,
was appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II (p.
98, Rollo).
On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon
Manangan alias Andres Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK
3906, p. 20) was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya, First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner with
"Execution of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised
Penal Code (the Criminal Case, for short). Apparently, the Director of
Lands had given his imprimatur to the charge.
On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge
Gabriel Dunuan of respondent Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).
On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of First
Instance, et al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of
respondent Court to try the criminal case and seeking to stay the
Order of Arrest of 30 June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May
1979 for non-payment of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).
On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation,
petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared for about a year.
On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed
(Comment, Solicitor General, p. 61, Rollo), this time Identifying the
accused as "Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon
Manangan Atty. Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."
On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a
bailbond with the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga
del Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983,
Annex B, Petition, p. 2).
On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel
Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant that is challenged herein.
On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss
the Criminal Case, which was denied by respondent Court (see CA-
G.R. No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP entitled
"Filemon Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya."
The Petition sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands,
dated 27 March 1980, finding petitioner guilty of extortion,
impersonation and abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal
from the service; and (2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to
dismiss Criminal Case No. 639 pending in its Court." In a Decision,
promulgated on 27 February 1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the
Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and holding,
among others, that "the non-withdrawal of the Information for
execution of deeds by intimidation . . . is not covered by mandamus"
(hereinafter, the German Decision). 1
On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, ostensibly through counsel,
Atty. Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on
the ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971
such that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his
person. The Motion was denied.
On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision
as a final judgment of conviction, respondent Court reset the
promulgation to 19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen to produce
the body of the accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing
the mistake, on 9 July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and
ruled that "the warrant of arrest issued by this Court through Judge
Gabriel Dunuan on 19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect"
(Annex F, Petition).
On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in
another Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one
Atty. Benjamin Facun as counsel for petitioner, this time praying for
the annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the ground
that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him
guilty of the crime . . . was rendered." The pleading alleged "that
petitioner is of age, Filipino, deceased, but has come to this
Honorable Court through counsel. . . ." In a Decision promulgated on
29 November 1982, Certiorariwas denied for being devoid of merit
inasmuch as "there is nothing on record to show that such dismissal
had been sought before the decision was rendered" (briefly, the
Kapunan Decision). 2 (Actually, no judgment has been rendered by
respondent Court).
Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the
accused, on 10 February 1983, filed a Manifestation before
respondent Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the
Criminal Case on the same ground that the accused had allegedly
died.
On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court
refused to declare the case closed and terminated inasmuch as the
accused was alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his bailbond
(citing the Kapunan Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant
issued by the Court on July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not
yet been served upon the accused as in full force and effect."
For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the
Deceased Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The
Petition sought to annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983
denying the closure and termination of the Criminal Case.
On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the
Kapunan Decision and the Catral Order, dismissed the Petition
(hereinafter, the Aquino Decision) 3 holding, inter alia, that "whether or
not its denial of the motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion, was already passed upon by this Court in CA-
G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It
may not be litigated anew, no matter what form the action for that
purpose may take."
On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused
filed an Omnibus Motion with Motion for New Trial, which was denied
for lack of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In the same
Order, respondent Court ordered the case archived until such time
that the accused is brought to the Court.
On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to
Quash on the grounds that: "(1) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused;
and (2) the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted of the offense charged."
It was at that stage of the case below, without awaiting disposition on
the Motion to Quash, that the present Petition was instituted.
The obvious conclusion from the recital of facts given is that the
Petition is without merit. Petitioner-accused had a pending Motion to
Quash before respondent Court and should have awaited resolution
thereon. He had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law and resort to this Petition is decidedly premature.
Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is
valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest by disappearing from the
jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the
records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the
Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been
accepted by respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the basis
thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged.
Unlike a warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule
126, Sec. 9), a Warrant of Arrest remains valid until arrest is effected
or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore, cannot be faulted
with grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full
force and effect.
Although there may have been some initial confusion on the part of
respondent Court arising from the Kapunan Decision, that was timely
rectified. In the final analysis, respondent Court has not made it
appear that petitioner-accused has already been arraigned and tried,
let alone convicted. No jeopardy has attached, as alleged. Again,
therefore, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to
respondent Court.
Petitioner's argument in his Amended Petition and Second Amended
Petition that it is the Sandiganbayan that has exclusive jurisdiction
over the Criminal Case neither holds water considering that not only is
he ineligible for the position of Legal Officer I in the Bureau of Lands,
Region II, for not being a lawyer, but also because he was dismissed
from the service on 27 March 1980 by the Director of Lands, who
found him, with the approval of the Minister of Natural Resources,
guilty of extortion, impersonation and abandonment of office CA-G.R.
No. 11588-SP, p. 2).
The foregoing conclusions could dispose of the case.
However, on 8 June 1989, the Solicitor General filed a
"Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out" the present petition for being
fictitious and that by reason thereof petitioner should be cited for
contempt of Court. The Solicitor General has also prayed that he be
excused from filing a Comment on petitioner's Second Amended
Petition, which we resolve to grant.
The Solicitor General maintains that a re-examination of the records in
the Criminal shows that:
a. Filemon A. Manangan is only an alias of Andres M.
Culanag, the person charged in Criminal Case No. 639;
b. Filemon A. Manangan was a lawyer from San
Marcelino, Zambales, who died on September 29, 1971
in the vicinity of his residence where he and his driver
died on the spot; and
c. [Andres M. Culanag] knew the real Filemon
Manangan and knowing about the latter's death,
assumed the name, qualifications and other personal
circumstances of Filemon Manangan. By means
thereof, he was able to pass himself off as a lawyer
and to actually practice law, using even the Certificate
of Admission to the Philippine Bar of Filemon
Manangan which states that he was admitted to the
Bar on March 6, 1964. By this guise, [Andres M.
Culanag] succeeded in obtaining a position as legal
Officer I in the Bureau of Lands.
In opposition, petitioner maintains that he is not a fictitious person,
having been born out of the lawful wedlock of Segundino Manangan
and Felipa Asis; and that assuming that there is sufficient basis to
charge him for contempt, it will no longer prosper on the ground of
prescription.
Petitioner's posturings are completely bereft of basis. As the Solicitor
General had also disclosed in the German Decision, petitioner
[Andres Culanag] had, on 23 February 1977, filed Sp. Procs. No. 23
with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, San Jose City Branch,
for the change of his name from Andres Culanag to Filemon
Manangan. In that petition, he claimed that his real name is Andres
Culanag; that his entire school records carry his name as Filemon
Manangan: and that he is the same person as Andres Culanag, the
latter being his real name. The imprisonment was carried to the
extreme when, in petitioner's Manifestation, dated 10 February 1983,
before respondent Court, his supposed heirs alleged that accused
had died before the filing of the Information on 29 September 1971,
the exact date of death of the real Filemon Manangan. More,
petitioner also masquerades under the name of Atty. Benjamin M.
Facun in the several pleadings filed in connection with the Criminal
Case.
In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner
had also committed imprisonation when, representing himself as Atty.
Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with this Court praying that his
right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those
cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres
Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres
Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
for filing the two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September 30,
1971, 41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this Court would
not discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the
Court promising that he would not commit the same act if he is
excused and given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after
finding his explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged him guilty of
indirect contempt of Court under Rule 71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of
Court 4 and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.
While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions
allude to Filemon Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just
an alias of Filemon Manangan, those statements actually refer to the
person of Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan,
long since dead.
The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that
the contumacious acts continue to this day.
WHEREFORE, (1) the Petition, Amended Petition, and the Second
Amended Petition are hereby dismissed for utter lack of merit; (2)
petitioner is adjudged in contempt of Court, severely censured, and
sentenced to suffer three (3) months imprisonment, the same to be
served at the Provincial Jail of Nueva Vizcaya to ensure his
appearance during the trial of the subject criminal case; (3)
respondent Court is hereby directed to retrieve Criminal Case No. 639
from its archives and to proceed to its determination with deliberate
dispatch; (4) all Courts are directed not to recognize any person
representing himself as Filemon Manangan, Atty. Filemon Manangan,
or Atty. Benjamin M. Facun; and (5) petitioner's real name is declared
to be Andres Culanag.
Treble costs against petitioner.

Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190, SO ORDERED.
entitled "In Re Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and
Bar Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena vs. Andres Culanag" Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that
petitioner be subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the
Paras, J., took no part.
National Mental Hospital" after noting that petitioner was suffering
from some kind of mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
petitioner's present liability for contempt.

It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing

antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to claim that he is, in truth and
in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand, without need for

 
more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply
establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is
 

 
guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper
conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a
mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).

A.C. No. 11131, March 13, 2019
DENNIS M. MAGUSARA, PETITIONER, v. ATTY. LOUIE A.
RASTICA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a disbarment complaint1 filed by Dennis M. Magusara
(complainant) on March 1, 2011 before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-CBD)
charging Atty. Louie A. Rastica (respondent) of violating Section
20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.2
The Facts
On November 14, 2007, Yap-Siton Law Office filed a formal
complaint before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on
behalf of its client Ramie P. Fabillar (Ramie), charging
complainant of committing an election offense punishable under
Section 261, paragraph (e) of the Omnibus Election
Code.3 Attached to the formal complaint are Ramie's Complaint-
Affidavit,4 his medical certificate,5 a police blotter,6 and Wilson
Fabillar's (Wilson) affidavit.7 Ramie's complaint-affidavit and
Wilson's affidavit were subscribed and sworn to before
respondent. On February 10, 2008, Ramie filed an Affidavit of
Desistance8 before the COMELEC, claiming that he was
surprised to find that there was a complaint for election offense
against complainant supposedly filed by him. He narrated that
he thought that what he signed was a complaint for grave
coercion against complainant. Since the contents of the
complaint-affidavit prepared by respondent were not translated
to him in the local dialect, he did not understand its meaning
when he signed the same. According to complainant, this
alleged act of respondent violated Section 20(d),9 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.
To support the present complaint, complainant attached several
documents which appear to be pleadings and supporting
documents he submitted before the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter
in relation to a 2008 disbarment complaint he filed against
respondent. Among these documents are: (1) two
affidavits10 executed by Wilson dated December 7, 2007 and
August 5, 2008, respectively, showing different signatures
appearing above his name; (2) a manifestation11dated February
21, 2011 where complainant reiterated his allegations in the
2008 disbarment complaint and accused IBP Negros Oriental
Chapter of causing delay in the proceedings for releasing the
resolution only after two years and six months from the filing of
the complaint; and (3) two documents12 allegedly notarized by
respondent despite the expiration of his notarial commission.
In his answer,13 respondent maintains that the allegations are
baseless and the present complaint should be dismissed
outright for lack of a certification of non-forum shopping. He
claims that the present complaint was instituted by complainant
as revenge for having been defeated by respondent's mother in
the election for barangay chairperson. Respondent pointed out
that the facts stated in the complaint-affidavit are similar to
those which are declared in the police and barangay blotters
attached therein, and to the complaint-affidavit14 filed before
the Provincial Prosecutor's Office charging complainant of grave
coercion. Aside from these, the facts and circumstances
attested to by Ramie in his complaint-affidavit for the election
offense were corroborated by Wilson's affidavit, which was
subscribed and sworn to before Prosecutor Violeta Baldado.
Moreover, Ramie graduated from high school and worked in
Metro Manila. His education and work experience show that he
is capable of managing his affairs; thus, he cannot disavow
knowledge and understanding of the contents of his complaint--
affidavit in the election offense. Lastly, the divergence in the
affidavits of desistance Ramie executed shows the influence and
deceitful intentions of complainant. In the affidavit of desistance
dated February 4, 2008 Ramie filed in the grave coercion case,
he said that he was "doubtful of [his] actuations that [he was]
also a paredelicto and that being neighbor and friend, [he]
absolutely withdraw the case."15 On the other hand, in the
affidavit of desistance dated February 10, 2008 Ramie filed
before the COMELEC, the reason he gave for desisting was "I
was only made to sign the Complaint-Affidavit and the same
was not translated to me, and the person who prepared the
[same] is the son of Brgy. Chairman Lorna Rastica, Atty. Louie
Rastica and the same was not translated x x x in local dialect so
as I can understand."16 As clarification, he presented an
affidavit executed by Ramie on August 5, 2008 where the latter
stated that he fully understood the contents of the complaint-
affidavit for the election offense.17
On June 22, 2011, complainant filed his preliminary conference
brief, where aside from violation of Section 20(d), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, he included as issue the alleged notarization
of respondent without authority.18
On September 9, 2011, complainant filed before the IBP-CBD a
verified complaint "in compliance" with the order of the
Investigation Commissioner during the August 19, 2011
hearing. In this verified complaint, complainant accused
respondent of violating notarial laws and rules. Notably, the
description of the two documents allegedly notarized without
authority is similar to the two documents presented in the 2008
disbarment complaint filed before the IBP Negros Oriental
Chapter.19
During the scheduled clarificatory hearing, only respondent
appeared.20 Both parties failed to submit position papers.
In his Report and Recommendation dated November 14, 2012,
Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner
Cachapero) recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent for lack of merit. He noted that Ramie
graduated from high school, where the English language is the
medium of instruction. As such, he "must have been equipped
with the basic learning of the said language and must have fair
understanding of the same whether written or spoken."21 It is,
thus, incredible that he was aware of the contents of the
complaint-affidavit in the grave coercion case he executed and
filed which is written in the English language, yet not have any
knowledge of the contents of a similar complaint for election
offense he filed against complainant. Further, Ramie in his
affidavit22 dated August 5, 2008 has already clarified that he
understood the contents of the complaint-affidavit for election
offense. There is, thus, no sufficient evidence showing
respondent's supposed breach of his ethical duties.23 No
discussion was made regarding the alleged notarization of
documents without authority.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation to dismiss the complaint in Resolution No. XX-
2013-250.24 Complainant, however, filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that the IBP Board of Governors erred
in not taking into consideration the fact that respondent
engaged in notarial practice without authority.25
On May 3, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XXI-2014-24526 where it resolved to grant complainant's
motion for reconsideration. The Board of Governors found that
respondent notarized two documents prior to the approval of his
notarial commission. Accordingly, it disqualified respondent
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two
years and ordered the revocation of his notarial commission, if
existing.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.27 He claims that
he was not given the chance to be heard and defend himself
because: (1) the issue on the notarization of documents without
authority was not part of the original complaint; and (2) no
investigation was ever held to give him an opportunity to verify
the authenticity of the alleged documents notarized without
authority.28
The Court's Ruling
We do not agree with the IBP Board of Governors.
At the outset, we note, through complainant's own submissions,
that he filed two complaints against respondent. The first is the
2008 disbarment complaint for violation of the rules on notarial
practice filed before the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter. The
second is the present complaint for violation of Section 20(d),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court filed before the IBP-CBD.
We agree with Commissioner Cachapero's finding that there was
no substantial evidence to prove that respondent violated
Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Respondent's
narration of facts and the documentary evidence he presented,
especially the affidavit of Ramie clarifying that he understood
the contents of the subject complaint-affidavit, substantiated
his claim of innocence.
We also agree with the Commissioner Cachapero in exluding the
allegation that respondent engaged in notarial practice despite
the expiration of his notarial commission in his resolution of the
complaint. A review of complainant's pleadings shows that this
issue, along with the documents submitted to support the
charge (specifically the compromise agreement between the
Municipal Treasurer of Bindoy, Negros Oriental and Felix
Villanueva, Jr. and the verification executed by Kristie Marie E.
Fernandez),29 were already subject of an earlier investigation by
the IBP Negros Oriental Chapter. The records also show that the
IBP-CBD did not order the consolidation of these two
complaints. From these, it is apparent that the inclusion of the
additional issue (i.e., notarizing documents without authority) in
resolving this complaint would result in a situation where two
separate complaints are filed against respondent by the same
complainant concerning the same offense based on the same
set of facts.
There is forum shopping when two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.30 To include this additional ground in the present
complaint would constitute forum shopping as the same is
similar to complainant's cause of action in the 2008 disbarment
complaint he filed against respondent. Therefore, we find that
the IBP Board of Governors erred when it took into
consideration the additional ground, which, to repeat, is
identical to the charge in an earlier disbarment complaint.
In essence, we find that respondent was able to refute
complainant's claim that he violated Section 20(d), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. The additional charge of violating notarial
rules, on the other hand, is already subject of an earlier
disbarment proceeding. Consequently, there is no basis to
impose disciplinary action against respondent at this time. The
proceedings in the 2008 disbarment complaint filed before the
IBP Negros Oriental Chapter against respondent should be
allowed to run its course to determine the latter's culpability as
to the charge that he notarized documents without authority.
This will also prevent the situation of two or more courts or
agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the
same issue31 and ensure that the proceedings for the
disbarment and discipline of attorneys are followed. The
procedures outlined by Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court are
meant to ensure that the innocents are spared from wrongful
condemnation and that only the guilty are meted their just due.
Obviously, these requirements cannot be taken lightly.32
The Court will exercise its disciplinary power only after
observing due process and upon showing of lawyer's
administrative guilt by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. This norm is aimed at preserving the integrity and
reputation of the Law Profession, and at shielding lawyers, in
general, due to their being officers themselves of the
Court.33 Further, filing multiple petitions or complaints
constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends to degrade
the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.34
The public must be reminded that lawyers are professionals
bound to observe and follow the strictest ethical canons.
Subjecting them to frivolous, unfounded, and vexatious charges
of misconduct and misbehavior will cause not only disservice to
the ideals of justice, but a disregard of the Constitution and the
laws to which all lawyers vow their enduring fealty.35
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XXI-2014-245 dated May 3, 2014
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors
is SET ASIDE. The complaint filed against Atty. Louie A. Rastica
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C. J., (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Gesmundo,
and Carandang, JJ., concur.