Republic of the Philippines

Regional Trial Court

Second Judicial Region
Branch 14
Lagawe, Ifugao

RICARDO BINWAG CIVIL CASE No. 393

Plaintiff-APPELLANT,

-versus-

JUILO BUYUCCAN,
Defendant-Appellee.

x--------------------------------x

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE’s BRIEF

WITH THE GREATEST RESPECT TO THE HONORABLE COURT,

defendant-appellee through the undersigned counsel most respectfully

submits this Brief and for this purpose most respectfully state:

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 8, 2004, plaintiff Ricardo Binwag filed with the trial

Court a complaint for recovery of possession, damages and injunction

with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ

of preliminary injunction.

On December 22, 2004 defendant, Julio Buyuccan filed an answer

with compulsory-counter-claim denying the material allegation of the

complaint and the denial of the issuance of a restraining order and writ

of injunction. The case was tried and heard on the merits.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of defendant, Julio

Buyuccan. Plaintiff belately filed his brief and belatedly assigns the

following errors allegedly committed by the Court:

I. The trial court failed to appreciate that the amicable

settlement (Exhibit “E”) has the force and effect of a final judgment.
 II. The trial court erred in the holding that the Amicable

Settlement is not binding to herein defendant-appellee;

III. The trial court erred in disregarding the Amicable

Settlement simply because the condition was not complied with;

IV. The trial Court erred in holding that the rip-rap (stonewall)

between the house of defendant and the land in question was not

the boundary;

V. The trial Court erred in holding that the land in dispute is

part of the land of defendant’s adjoining land;

V1. The trial court erred in holding that the land in dispute is

part of the land of defendant’s adjoining land;

COUNTER STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant, Julio Buyuccan is the owner and present possessor of

a certain parcel of land located at Guinihingan, Piwong, Hingyon, Ifugao.

He inherited the same from his grandfather Dumangeng Tobiagon who

had it declared under his name for taxation purposes as early as 1948.

Taxes on the land had been faithfully and religiously paid by

plaintiff and his forebears. The tax declarations and tax receipts are

attached to the records of this case.

Dumangeng Tobiagon, also known as "Daddal”, in his lifetime had

been using said land as a rice field consisting of three rice paddies.

When he died, the parents of Julio Buyuccan took over possession and

ownership of said land. They continued cultivating said land utilizing it

as a rice field with the help of defendant Julio Buyuccan and some hired

laborers. (TSN, Tinaynan Nipahoy, p. 55, TSN Marcela Canayan, pp. 63-

64, TSN Julio Buyuccan, pp. 80-81).

When the aforementioned land ceased to be a rice field as there

was no more irrigation, defendant together with his parents and sister
continued introducing improvements on the land. They planted various

trees which still exist until the present. The bigger plants seen on the

land in dispute during ocular inspection were planted by the mother of

defendant. These trees are the orange, acacia, pomelo and santol. (TSN,

Julio Buyuccan, pp. 83-84).

The santol and pomelo had been bearing fruits and it was

defendant and his family who had been gathering these fruits. Plaintiff,

Ricardo Binwag, who is an immediate neighbor, had been seeing them

gather these fruits but he never prevented nor raised any whisper of

protest. Defendant and his sister, Marina Tayaban, continued improving

the land.

Where before, the land he inherited from his grandfather,

Dumangeng Tobiagon, was a rice field consisting of three rice paddies, in

the place of the largest rice paddy now stood the houses of defendant,

Julio Buyuccan and his sister Marina Tayaban.

In the place of the two additional rice paddies now stood the

pigpen and garage of Julio Buyuccan and the plants and trees planted by

him and her mother.

The trees introduced by defendant on the land are the mangoes,

coconuts, papayas and sugarcane. They exist until now and were seen

by this Court during the Ocular Inspection.

These plants were planted by defendant and such fact was even

admitted by plaintiff, Ricardo Binwag, in his testimony and during his

cross –examination. (TSN, Ricardo Binwag, P.24, TSN, testimony of

Ricardo Binwag during the ocular inspection)

When defendant and his sister were constructing their houses,

plaintiff never prevented them nor protested to such construction. When

Julio Buyuccan was building his garage and pigpen, plaintiff never
prevented him or raised any howl of protest despite the fact that he was

present during the construction as he is an immediate neighbor (TSN,

Julio Buyuccan, pp. 81-83, June 27, 2006) TSN, Ricardo Binwag, p. 25,

May 5, 2005).

On July 7, 2001, the land subject of dispute was the subject of a

“HADDAKAN” or ‘UGGUB” between defendant Julio Buyuccan and

Spouses Herman and Mary Habbiling. Said “UGGUB” or “HADDAKAN” is

a traditional mode of settling land disputes in Ifugao among claimants of

the land. Plaintiff, Ricardo Binwag was very much aware of said

haddakan as he was present and the haddakan was performed along the

road in front of his house.

In said year, when the haddakan took place, plaintiff, Ricardo

Binwag, was not included in the haddakan as he was not laying any

claim on the land now being disputed by him and defendant so he never

bothered to join. He is very much aware, being a full-blooded Ifugao,

that whoever wins in said haddakan would own the land. Despite said

knowledge, he never bothered to participate.

Four years after the “ haddakan” or “Uggub” where he never

participated as he never laid claim on the disputed land, he surprisingly

now manifests his desire to lay claim on the land which was already

adjudicated in favor of defendant during that haddakan and now files

this baseless claim for recovery of possession and ownership against

defendant, Julio Buyuccan.

ARGUMENTS

I. REFUTATION OF THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR

Plaintiff-appellant insist that the amicable settlement (Exhibit “E”)

has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court and it is now the

ministerial duty of the court to see to it that the same shall be enforced.
 It must be noted, however, that before an amicable settlement can

have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, there must be

due execution and authenticity of said amicable settlement.

Plaintiff-appellant erroneously presumed that there was due

execution and authenticity despite the glaring truth that there was none.

He alleged that the defendant-appellee never questioned the due

execution and authenticity of said amicable settlement, hence, the same

is now established.

A perusal, however, of the pleadings attached to the records of the

case would prove otherwise. In paragraph 4 of the answer, defendant-

appellee, pointed out that the amicable settlement was fatally defective

as on its face it was made to appear that the amicable settlement was

entered into by the parties on February 15, 1996 when in fact it was only

typed on August 2004 and the parties affixed their signatures only in

2004 and not in 1996.

In the comment/objection to plaintiff’s formal offer of evidence,

defendant vigorously objected to the admission in evidence of the

secondary evidence which is the amicable settlement, marked as Exhibit

“E” on the ground that said agreement is patently defective as there was

no due execution of said amicable settlement as none of the parties,

therein, ever signed the document on February 15, 1996. Defendant

proceeded to cite relevant jurisprudence to the effect that indeed there

was no due execution of the amicable settlement.

Furthermore, in said comment, defendant pointed out that the

amicable settlement is grossly and patently defective as the alleged

agreement was not written in a language or dialect known to the parties.

Said settlement was written in English, a language not understood

by defendant. Admittedly, defendant is illiterate.

 Furthermore, said amicable settlement was never signed by the

parties in 1996, the year when the amicable settlement was allegedly

entered.

Thus, there is utter and gross violation of section 41 of the Local

Government Code which provides that “ all amicable settlement shall be

in writing in a language or dialect known to the parties, signed by them,

and attested to by the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat Chairman, as the

case may be.”

Considering the glaring fact that the amicable settlement was

fatally defective for the reasons stated above, it is very clear that the Trial

Court committed no reversible error in ruling that the amicable

settlement heavily relied upon by plaintiff is tainted with irregularity.

Indeed, the original amicable settlement which plaintiff claims to have

been executed in February 15, 1996 was never signed by the parties.

Hence, there is no amicable settlement to speak of as the parties

never signed to show their conformity. The best evidence to a contract

which includes amicable settlement is the signature of the parties to said

contract. Admittedly, the parties never signed any amicable settlement in

1996 as testified by Maria Liwayan, plaintiff’s very own witness. Since

there was no contract to speak of entered into in 1996, there is definitely

no reason why the typewritten amicable settlement which was prepared

in 2004 be antedated to 1996.

Furthermore, it is indeed very very doubtful if there was any

amicable settlement entered in 1996. According to the plaintiff, the

amicable settlement was placed in a yellow paper pad contradicting his

own witness, Maria Liwayan who testified that it was placed in a long

coupon bond. Indeed, the original unsigned 1996 amicable settlement

was never presented in Court but was conveniently thrown away.

 Considering the reasons stated above, the amicable settlement

typewritten in 2004 cannot be admissible as secondary evidence to prove

the contents of the original 1996 amicable settlement.

There was no due execution of the amicable settlement in 1996 as

the parties never affixed their signature to that settlement.

It is due execution of the original document and subsequent loss

or destruction that would constitute the foundation for the introduction

of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document. (Republic

vs. CA, 75 SCRA 146)

Thus, the Trial Court was correct in ruling that the amicable

settlement typewritten in 2004 cannot be admitted as secondary

evidence to prove the contents of the 1996 amicable settlement as it was

not at all convinced of the existence and due execution of said 1996

amicable settlement.

Before proof of contents can be admitted, the court should be

satisfied of the existence and due execution of the original document in

the same manner as if the said original were produced (Republic vs. CA,)

Secondary evidence is inadmissible when it is the party offering it

that caused the loss or destruction of the original evidence for in all

likelihood, the secondary evidence is false or misleading (9 Wheat, 483,

U. Ed. 140)

Furthermore, if plaintiff insists that the amicable settlement of

1996 has long become final and executory, why did plaintiff not cause its

execution? Why did he instead file this case?

Clearly, plaintiff filed the instant case as he was fully aware that

the alleged amicable settlement was null and void for lack of signatures

of the parties.

II. REFUTATION OF SECOND ASSIGNED ERROR

 Plaintiff would go on to insist that even if defendant was not a

party to the alleged amicable settlement, he is still bound by said

amicable settlement.

In support thereof, plaintiff invokes section 28, Rule 130 of the

Rules of Court.

It must be noted however, that not even the mother of defendant is

a party to the alleged amicable settlement. Allegedly, it was she who

showed the boundary. What is very surprising though is the fact that her

name never appeared in the amicable settlement as a party to said

settlement although she was the owner of said land. If, indeed, she was

present and even showed the boundary, there is no reason why her name

never appeared in the amicable settlement.

The truth of the matter is that she was never present at the time

the alleged amicable settlement was entered, if, indeed there was any

settlement which, of course, is very doubtful. Indeed, defendant’s sister,

Marina Tayaban flatly denied that there was any agreement in 1996.

III. REFUTATION OF THE THIRD ASSIGNED ERROR

Plaintiff claims that the lower court erred in not giving weight to

the amicable settlement because the same was not complied with.

Indeed, a perusal of the alleged amicable settlement would readily

show that one of the conditions imposed is for the respondent, Ricardo

Binwag, to give a chicken to the complainant as full payment of said lot.

Ricardo Binwag testified in court that he never gave the chicken to

complainant, hence, the lower court was correct in stating that the

amicable settlement was not complied with and for this reason, the

amicable settlement cannot be the basis of the plaintiff in claiming

ownership of the disputed land.

 Very clearly then, not only is the alleged amicable settlement very

defective for want of signatures of the parties but also because there was

no compliance of the conditions imposed therein and that said amicable

settlement was not written in a language understood by the parties in

utter and gross violation of the law.

IV. REFUTATION OF THE FOURTH ASSIGNED ERROR

Plaintiff-appellant questions the appreciation by the Honorable

Court of the evidence adducced. Plaintiff-appellant would insist that the

testimony of Napoleon Binwag that the rip-rap is the boundary should be

given much weight instead of the testimony of defendant who testified

that the rip-rap was constructed by him to support his house.

Suffice to say that the Trial Court, being the court which receives

the evidence, is in a better position to evaluate and appreciate the

credibility of the witnesses.

Case law has it that the findings of the trail court are binding and

conclusive upon the appellate court.

Indeed, the rip-rap was built by defendant with his own sweat to

support his house built above and not to show the boundary.

As a matter of fact, the rip-rap did not even exist in 1996, the year

when the amicable settlement was allegedly entered. It was only in the

year 2001 that the defendant constructed said rip-rap to support his

house.

V. REFUTATION OF THE FIFTH ASSIGNED ERROR

Plaintiff-appellant claims that the trial court erred in holding that

the land in dispute is part of the land of the defendant’s adjoining land.

Again, plaintiff-appellant questions the appreciation by the

Honorable Court of the evidence adduced.

 In the case of Ginete v. C.A. 296 SCRA 38, the Supreme Court held

and cited the following:

“The evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is

received on appeal with the highest respect because such court has the

direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine if

they are telling the truth or not.” (Pp. v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296)

“Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their

testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed

on appeal” (Pp. v. Andres, 296 SCRA 318)

It must be noted that the land in dispute was part of the rice field

of the late Dumangeng Tobiagon, defendant’s grandfather consisting of

three rice paddies which were contiguous and adjoins each other.

Indeed, during ocular inspection the land in dispute was seen to be

contiguous and adjoins the land where the house of the defendant now

stood. This fact together with other evidence convinced the court that the

subject land is part of defendant’s adjoining land occupied by his house.

The Trial Court was, therefore, correct in ruling that indeed, the

land in dispute is part of the defendant’s adjoining land occupied by his

house.

VI. REFUTATION OF THE SIXTH ASSIGNED ERROR.

Plaintiff-appellants cries foul for the trial court to award the land

in dispute to defendant-appellee.

The records would clearly show that the land in dispute is declared

in the name Dumangeng Tobiagon who had it declared under his name

for taxation purposes as early as 1948. He had also been paying taxes on

the land as early as 1958. Said tax declaration and receipts were

attached to the records of the case.

 Dumangeng Tobiagon was also very much earlier in actual and

physical possession of said land as he had been cultivating it as a rice

field during his lifetime.

As compared to Bugan Guiniling from whom plaintiff alleged to

have acquired the land, this Bugan Guiniling if ever she really used the

land as Kaingin only entered the picture when the land was not anymore

a rice field. This would clearly show that Dumangeng Tobiagon was in

the land in dispute very much earlier as he has been cultivating the land

when it was still a rice field.

Bugan Guiniling does not even have a tax declaration of the land

in dispute nor did she ever pay a single peseta on the land as realty tax.

From the foregoing, it is not hard to concur with the ruling of

the Trial Court that the preponderance of evidence weigh in favor of

defendant-appellee.

PRAYER

Wherefore, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court

that the appealed Decision dated November 15, 2006 be affirmed.

Lagawe, Ifugao, April 10, 2007.

GERALD B. TAYABAN
Counsel for Defendant-appellee
Public Attorney’s Office
Lagawe, Ifugao

Copy Furnished:
Atty. Romeo Habbiling
Lagawe, Ifugao