People v.

Bonifacio Gaylon
G.R. No. 219086, 19 March 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)

FACTS:

Accused Bonifacio Gaylon y Robidillo (“Gaylon”) was convicted was convicted for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.” In arguing for his innocence, accused contends that the prosecution failed to establish
the elements of the offense charged for its failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule results in the
prosecution’s the failure to establish the guilt of accused.

HELD:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule
results in the prosecution’s failure to establish the guilt of accused.

In this case, the prosecution had the burden of establishing the presence of the elements
of the crime of illegal sale of shabu in order to secure a conviction of the appellant therefor.

In this connection, both the RTC and the CA failed to take into consideration the buy-
bust team's non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. In particular, (1) the
prosecution's failure to show that the Inventory of Seized Properties/Items was prepared in the
presence of a media representative, a DOJ representative, and any elected public official who
should have signed the same and received copies thereof; (2) the prosecution did not offer as
evidence any photograph of the seized shabu; and (3) no explanation for such non-compliance
was proffered by the prosecution. In short, the prosecution failed to show "that the non-
compliance with the requirements was upon justifiable grounds, [and] that the evidentiary
value of the seized items was properly preserved by the apprehending team."

Verily, without the State's justification for the lapses or gaps, the chain of custody so
essential in the establishment of the corpus delicti of the offense charged against [appellant] was
not shown to be unbroken and preserved.

People v. Rachael Luna

G.R. No. 219164 21 March 2018
Caguioa, J.
TOPIC: R.A. No. 9165; Section 21 (Chain of Custody)
FACTS:

Accused Richael Luna y Torsilino (“Luna”) was convicted for violation of Section 5 and
11 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, In arguing for his acquittal, accused contends that the failure
to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule, without any justifiable reason, calls for his acquittal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule, without any
justifiable reason, calls of the acquittal of accused.

HELD:

Yes, failure to comply with the Chain of Custody rule, without any justifiable reason,
warrants the acquittal of accused.

Based on the circumstances of the present appeal, however, the saving clause was not
triggered because the first prong was not satisfied - the prosecution did not offer any justifiable
grounds for the noncompliance. No explanation was proffered as to why none of the insulating
witnesses was present at the place and time of the seizure, or as to the failure to photograph the
drugs immediately after seizure in the presence of such witnesses. There was likewise no
showing of any efforts exerted by the police officers to at least coordinate with witnesses ahead
of the buy-bust operation. In fact, only two (2) out of the three (3) required witnesses under
Section 21 were eventually summoned to affix their signature on the pre-accomplished
Inventory of Confiscated Evidence. Likewise, as already mentioned above, there was no
apparent reason to defer the photographing of the corpus delicti immediately after seizure
because the buy-bust team was able to perform an inventory at the scene.

In this case, the non-compliance with Section 21 without the triggering of the saving
clause is a showing of irregularity that effectively rebuts the presumption. As previously ruled
in People v. Enriquez, any divergence from the prescribed procedure, when left unjustified, is "an
irregularity, a red flag that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti.

Verily, the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty stands only when
no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official
duty. Applied to dangerous drugs cases, the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption when
there is a showing that the apprehending officers failed to comply with the requirements laid
down in Section 21. And, in any case, the presumption of regularity cannot be stronger than the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat
the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.
 All things considered, the evidence, appreciated in its totality, unequivocally points to
an acquittal. Firstly, there were patent breaches of the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165. Secondly, the prosecution utterly failed to trigger the saving clause as they did not
present justifiable grounds for such non-compliance. Case law has decreed that the procedure
enshrined in Section 21 is a matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects. This being so, considering that the State left the lapses of the police officers
unacknowledged and unexplained, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised, thereby creating reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant Luna
for the crimes charged. Hence, his acquittal must follow without delay.

People v. Joel Domingo

G.R. No. 204895 21 March 2018
Caguioa, J.
TOPIC: Murder/Double Jeopardy and Right to Speedy Trial

FACTS:

Accused Joel Domingo (“Domingo”) was charged before the trial Court for two counts
of murder and one count of attempted murder. During the course of trial, the prosecution’s
failure to present evidence in the settings allocated for it proved fatal as the trial Court granted
accused motion to dismiss the cases against him, raising his right to speedy trial. The
prosecution moved for reconsideration of the said order, which was granted by the trial court.
Thereafter, the trial Court convicted accused for the crimes charged.

Accused contends that his right to speedy trial was violated, and that the prosecution’s
reconsideration violated his right to double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conviction of accused violated his right against double jeopardy and
speedy trial, inasmuch as the trial Court already dismissed the case against him.

HELD: Yes, the Court held that accused convictions violated his right against double jeopardy
and speedy trial.

Prejudice to the accused is determined through its effect on three interests of the accused
that the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect, which are: "(i) to prevent oppressive
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired.

Accused-appellant was therefore prejudiced when the prosecution failed to present its
evidence during all the settings that were given to it. Every day spent in jail is oppressive, more
so when the reason for the prolongation of incarceration is the prosecution's unreasonable
motions for postponement.

In instances where the State has been given every opportunity to present its evidence,
yet it failed to do so, it cannot claim to have been deprived of a fair opportunity to present its
evidence. Such failure and the resulting dismissal of the case is deemed an acquittal of the
accused even if it is the accused who moved for the dismissal of the case.

To the mind of the Court, an accused cannot be made to needlessly and baselessly suffer
incarceration or any anxiety arising from criminal prosecution, no matter the duration. Any day
in jail or in fear of criminal prosecution has a grave impact on the accused. When the
prosecution is needlessly and baselessly prolonged, causing him prejudice, the Court is
constrained, as in this case, to arrive at a finding that accused-appellant's right to a speedy trial
was violated.

People v. Alfredo Opeña

G.R. No. 220490, 21 March 2018
Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC: Rape

FACTS:

Accused Alfredo Opeña y Baclagon (“Opeña”) was convicted by the trial court for
allegedly raping his daughter, “AAA.” In arguing for his acquittal, Opeña contends that
“AAA’s” failure to report the said incident for a period of nine years rendered her accusation
doubtful.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure to report an incident involving the crime of rape for nine
years renders a victim’s accusation doubtful.

HELD:

No, the Court held that the failure to report an incident for nine years does not render
the accusation doubtful.

It has been repeatedly ruled that "delay in reporting an incident of rape is not necessarily
an indication that the charge is fabricated, particularly when the delay can be attributed to fear
instilled by threats from one who exercises ascendancy over the victim." In People v. Coloma cited
in People v. Cañada, the Court considered an eight-year delay in reporting the long history of
rape by the victim's father as understandable and insufficient to render the complaint of a 13-
year old daughter incredible. In the present case, the inaction of "AAA" is understandable and
may even be expected as she was scared due to the threat on her and her mother if she would
divulge the incident done to her.

The question of whether the circumstances of force or intimidation are absent in

accomplishing the offense charged gains no valuable significance considering that appellant,
being the biological father of "AAA," undoubtedly exerted a strong moral influence over her
which may substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation.

People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and Camilo Loyola Sabio

G.R. No. 228494-96, 21 March 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
TOPIC: Malversation of Public Funds/ Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019

FACTS:

Accused Camilo Loyola Sabio (“Sabio”) was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan for the
charges of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and two counts of malversation of public funds, for the prosecution’s
failure to adduce sufficient evidence to establish the crimes charged.

In assailing said acquittal, the prosecution moved for the instant Petition for Certiorari,
arguing that since Sandiganbayan’s acquittal was tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
accused right against double jeopardy is not violated.

ISSUE:

Whether accused right against double jeopardy was violated when the prosecution
moved to file a Petition for Certiorari to assail his acquittal.

HELD: Yes, accused’s right against double jeopardy is violated in the absence of any showing
that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Generally, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory. The prosecution

cannot appeal the acquittal lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated. However, the rule admits of two exceptional grounds that can be challenged in a
certiorari proceeding under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: (1) in a judgment of acquittal
rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and (2) where the prosecution had been
deprived of due process.

A cursory reading of the present petition for certiorari demonstrates a prodding to

review the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sandiganbayan on account of grave abuse of
discretion. However, though enveloped on a pretext of grave abuse, the petition in actuality
aims to overturn the decision of Sandiganbayan due to perceived mistake in the appreciation of
facts and evidence. Unfortunately for the petitioner, the correction of this mistake does not fall
within the ambit of Rule 65.

In this case, the prosecution was given adequate opportunity to present several
witnesses and all necessary documentary evidence to prove the guilt of Sabio. However,
Sandiganbayan warranted the acquittal of Sabio due to insufficiency of evidence engendering
reasonable doubt on whether Sabio committed the offenses charged.

The Court finds no indication that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
when it gave a verdict of acquittal in favor of Sabio. The "grave abuse of discretion"
contemplated by law involves a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to discharge the burden that Sandiganbayan blatantly
abused its discretion in acquitting Sabio such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense
justice.

An action for certiorari does not correct errors of judgment but only errors of
jurisdiction. The nature of a Rule 65 petition does not entail a review of facts and law on the
merits in the manner done in an appeal. Misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous
conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the
level of grave abuse of discretion. Even granting that the Sandiganbayan erred in weighing the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, such error does not necessarily amount to grave abuse
of discretion.
People v. XXX, Alfredo Gilles, Niño G. Monter
G.R. No. 229860, March 21, 2018
Gesmundo, J.
TOPIC: Rape

FACTS:

Accused “XXX”, Aldredo Gilles (“Gilles”), Niño G. Monter (“Monter”) and Constante M.
Castil (“Castil”) were convicted for the crime of rape before the trial Court. Prosecution argues
that the accused took advantage of the victim, “AAA’s” mental condition, that she was a mental
retardate evidenced by the medical certificate issued by a certain Dr. Escalamado. Thus, “AAA”
cannot give consent as to the carnal knowledge that allegedly transpired. In arguing for their
acquittal, accused contends that “AAA” is not a mental retardate and gave consent to what
transpired in the incidents involving the case. In addition, accused argues that the medical
certificate does not deserve credence because the doctor who issued said medical certificate did
not testify during trial.

ISSUE:

Whether the failure of the prosecution to prove the alleged mental condition of accused
in a crime of rape results into accused’s acquittal.

HELD:

Yes, the prosecution’s failure results into the acquittal of accused. The state of being
feeble-minded has been explained as the incapacity of thinking and reasoning like any normal
human being, not being able to think and reason from birth, and devoid or deficient in those
instincts and other mental faculties that characterize the average and normal mortal. When a
woman is feeble-minded, she has no free and voluntary will. She is incapable of freely and
voluntarily giving consent which is necessary and essential from lifting coitus from the place of
criminality. In People of the Philippines v. Dalandas, the Court had the opportunity to
distinguish between the various degrees of mental retardation, and where "feeble-mindedness"
fell within the spectrum.

All elements of the crime of rape must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, including
the victim's mental condition. Although it is true that mental abnormality or deficiency is
enough for a woman to be considered "deprived of reason," thus dispensing with the proof of
force, threat, or intimidation, abnormality or deficiency of whatever state or degree should be
sufficiently and adequately established by orthodox and reasonably available methods and
procedures. It is possible that complainant could well have been merely on the lower end of the
acceptable mean for her age group, a condition which would have been aggravated by her lack
of education, but this, by any medical or psychological yardstick, does not itself negate
autonomous choice or decision-making based on reasoning.
 Here, however, the Court only has the RTC's assessment of AAA to go by and determine
that AAA was feeble-minded and therefore sexual congress with her equates to rape. The
medical certificate stated that "patient is known to have mental deficiency." However, this was
not even testified to by the doctor who signed the same.

In People of the Philippines v. Cartuano, Jr. (Cartuano), where it was held that the deficiency
of whatever state or degree should be sufficiently and adequately established by orthodox and
reasonably available methods and procedures, there was a dearth of medical records to sustain
a finding of mental retardation. In the recent case of People of the Philippines v. Rodriguez
(Rodriguez), where  Cartuano was invoked, the prosecution presented a neuro-psychiatric
examination and evaluation conducted by a psychologist, which included the administration of
the Standford Binnet Intelligence Test. The latter case shows that the doctrine in  Cartuano, that
there should be clear and convincing proof as to the mental state of the victim, is still good law.