PDEA V.

BRODETT

FACTS: Richard Brodett and Jorge Joseph were charged with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26 (b), of Republic
Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act in the Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City. Likewise, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City; filed another information charging only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No.
9165.

Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence.  He averred that during his arrest, PDEA had seized several personal non-
drug effects from him, including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551; and that PDEA refused to return his
personal effects despite repeated demands for their return.

The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the instrument in the commission of
the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs. The
RTC directed the release of the car.

PDEA contend that Brodett’s Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence  did not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and
that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not  ipso facto  authorize its release, because she was
under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime.

HELD:

It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in connection with the illegal
possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in
any other criminal proceedings.

The Court agrees with the finding of the CA that:

A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to
"all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, money and other
assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was
committed unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act. " Simply put, the
law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture any property that is owned by a third
person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the
name of Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case
that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and
sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason
why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.

Even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165 relevant to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of the  Revised Penal Code, which provides that “Such proceeds and
instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government,  unless they be the property of a third person not
liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.”

To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a third person, therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third
person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the
third person, for a mere suspicion of that person's participation is not sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods
seized. 

However, the Court also agrees with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor that the release was premature:

We note that the RTC granted  accused  Brodett's Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence  on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings
were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car  at that point  of the proceedings was premature,
considering that the third paragraph of Section 20,  supra, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation,  or transfer  of any property, or
income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165  during the pendency of the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court.  Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom should remain
in custodia legis  in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.

Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code  and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part of
the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whether or not the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful
act) would be  subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear
as to this.
The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTC as being
in custodia legis  is primarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release it before the judgment is
rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.

We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and
should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the judgment,
even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.