CRIMINAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA) vs. RICHARD

BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, G.R. No. 196390, September 28, 2011.

FACTS:

On April 13, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Muntinlupa
charged Richard Brodett and Joseph Jorge for violating Section 5, in relation
to Section 26 (b) of RA 9165 after being caught selling and trading 9.8388
grams of methamphetamine HCL on September 19, 2008. Likewise, on April
16, 2009, Brodett was charged for violating Sec. 11 of RA 9165
for possession of various drugs in an incident on the previously noted date.

On July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence, among
which is a 2004 Honda Accord car registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett
that PDEA refused to return as it was used in the commission of the crime
and which was supported by the OCP, stating that such vehicle be kept
during the duration of the trial to allow the prosecution and defense to
exhaust its evidentiary value.

On November 4, 2009, the RTC ordered the return of the car to Myra S.
Brodett after it was duly photographed. PDEA filed a motion for
reconsideration, such being denied. PDEA then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, which was also denied, citing Sec. 20 of RA 9165.

ISSUE/S:

Can the car owned by an innocent third party not liable for the unlawful act
be returned to its owner although such car was used in the commission of a
crime?

RULING:

The Court ruled that a property not found to be used in an unlawful act and
taken as evidence can be returned to its rightful owner but only when the
case is finally terminated. The Court further states that the order to release
the car was premature and in contravention of Section 20, Par. 3of RA 9165
which states that property or income in custodia legis cannot be disposed,
alienated or transferred during the pendency of the case. Court resolves that
all RTCs comply with Section 20, RA 9165 and not release articles, drugs or
non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before rendition of judgment,
even if owned by innocent third party. Respondents having been acquitted of
the crime charged the Court will not annul the orders of the RTC nor reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals.

MICHAEL PADUA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 168546,

July 23, 2008.

FACTS:

Michael Padua, 17 years old, was charged with the crime in violation of Sec.
5 Art II of RA No 9165, otherwise known as "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002". Padua, not being lawfully authorized to sell any
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dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a police poseur-buyer, one
folded newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops.
Padua initially pleaded "not guilty", however Padua's counsel manifested that
his client was willing to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of
guilty to avail of the benefits granted to first-time offenders under Section
70 of RA 9165. Without any objection from the prosecution, Padua was re-
arraigned and pleaded guilty. Subsequently, Padua filed a Petition for
Probation, alleging that he is a minor who desires to avail of the benefits of
probation under Presidential Decree No 968. Chief Probation and Parole
Officer Josefina J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to
the RTC recommending that Padua be placed on probation. However, public
respondent Pairing Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the
Petition for Probation on the ground that under Section 2419 of Rep. Act No.
9165, any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Michael Padua can avail of probation being a minor under the
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law?

RULING:

No. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed,
cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No.
968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words
and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken
to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. Court further emphasized that the Court
of Appeals correctly pointed out that the intention of the legislators in
Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment
for those persons convicted of drug trafficking or pushing while extending a
sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who
are found guilty of violation of Sections 1132 and 1533 of the Act.

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and

ESTER S. GARCIA, G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995.

FACTS:

Petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event (aconfrontation in the

private respondents office where the later allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive
to petitioner's dignity and personality,") and sought moral
damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount
of P610, 000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at
the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based
was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As
a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a
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criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation
of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit
andpenalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes."

Petitioner argues, as her "main and principal issue" that the applicable
provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that
the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.

In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the

conversation must be alleged in the Information; otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.

Finally, petitioner argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication, not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act
of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal
under the said act.

ISSUE/S:

(1)Whether the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply
to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.

(2)Whether the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged

inthe Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute avi
olation of R.A. 4200.Whether R.A. 4200 penalizes only the taping of a
"private communication and not a "private conversation"

RULING:

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language

of a statute.

Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would
lead to an injustice. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and
Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication
and Other Purposes," provides:
Section I. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken wordby using a device commonly known as a dicta
phone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for

any person, not authorized by all the parties to any privatecommunication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the

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private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.

Second, the nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violationof

the statute

The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in

the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of
the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before
the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that
before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the
conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should
be professed."

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"privateconversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word"communic
ation" to a point of absurdity.

The word communicate comes from the Latin word communicare, meaning
"to share or to impart."In its ordinary signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,
or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs
or gestures)" These definitions arebroad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressivecommunications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally - charged exchange, on February
22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of
the latter's office

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMAN DERILO, ISIDRO BALDIMO y

QUILLO, alias "Sido", LUCAS DOOS, ALEJANDRO COFUENTES, and
JOHN DOE ISIDORO BALDIMINO y QUILLO, G.R. No. 117818 April 18,
1997

FACTS:

Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doos, Alejandro Cofuentes

and one John Doe were charged with the crime of murder committed by a
band before the First Branch of the former Court of First Instance of
Borongan, Eastern Samar.

Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was apprehended

and brought within the trial court's jurisdiction. At his arraignment on appellant
pleaded not guilty. However, by the time the People had formally finished
presenting its evidence on August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de parte,

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manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of not
guilty and substitute the same with one of guilty. Consequently, a re-arraignment
was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant entered a plea of guilty to
the charge of murder.

A series of questions was then propounded by the trial court to test appellant's
voluntariness and comprehension of the consequences in making his new plea of
guilty. Satisfied with the answers of appellant, the trial court convicted him of the
crime of murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the plea of guilty of the respondent constitutes admission of the
crime and its surrounding circumstances that would warrant the imposition of death
penalty?

RULING:

The trial court should not have concluded that evident premeditation attended the
commission of the crime of murder on the bases of its findings regarding the
admission of guilt by appellant and the existence of conspiracy with his co-accused.
As earlier stated, appellant entered his plea of guilty after the prosecution had
presented its evidence. Thereafter, no further evidence whatsoever was adduced by
it to prove the supposed evident premeditation.

It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstance

before being taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of
the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as
that which establishes the commission of the act charged as the criminal offense. It
is not only the central fact of a killing that must be shown beyond reasonable doubt;
every qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged to have been present and to
have attended such killing, must similarly be shown by the same degree of proof.
The Court must still require the introduction of evidence for the purpose of
establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant. This is the proper
norm to be followed not only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Court in
determining whether or not the accused really and truly comprehended the
meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea.

JOEMAR ORTEGA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151085,

August 20, 2008.

FACTS:

Petitioner, then about 14 years old, was charged with the crime of Rape in
two separate informations both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping
AAA, then about eight (8) years of age. Before these disturbing events,
AAA's family members were close friends
of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. Ho
wever, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own
home. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA. There,
AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3) different
occasions. The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996.
MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old and son BBB, then 10 years old,
in the care of Luzviminda Ortega, mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights
because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was
sick. During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the
room where AAA slept together with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner
woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped AAA. The

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second occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's
residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA
to their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner
inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances,
petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.
AAA did not tell her parents about her ordeal. The third and last occasion
happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house
of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered
television. At that time, Luzviminda
wasconversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitione
r called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside
the said room which was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled
AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts an
d panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA.
AAA described petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of
two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base
of his penis. This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony.
When BBB was about to drink water in their kitchen, as he was passing by his
room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from their
waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA
and making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the
latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB reported the incident to his
mother, MMM. MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree
Katalbas, the Rural Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and
found no indication that she was molested. Refusing to accept such
findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr.
Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made
an unofficial written report showing that there were abrasions on both right
and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior
fourchette. She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals
were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could
disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her
certification that her findings required the confirmation of the Municipal
Health Officer of the locality. Subsequently, an amicable settlement was
reached between the two families through the DAWN Foundation, an
organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement
required petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA. As
such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality. However, a few
months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to bring his
dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was
infuriated and confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went
to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the
three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only filed the two
(2) instant cases.

ISSUE/S:

(1)Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA.

(2)2. Whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to

petitioner's case, considering that at the time he committed the
alleged rape, he was merely 13years old.

RULING:

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1. In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape
against AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is the single
most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis. The RTC, as
affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive
for her to charge
petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to positively identify him as them
alefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that he
saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While petitio
nerasserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the
crime, we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF
would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the
embarrassment of
a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage theird
aughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.2. Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.

A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of
the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A
child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada who is being prosecuted for under RA 7080

otherwise known as An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the
effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses
with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The
Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the
accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law
in the terms it uses which are: combination, series and unwarranted.
Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the
mentioned law.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack the
validity of the law using the facial challenge.

RULING:

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The terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The
petitioners contention that it would not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what the lawseeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-
form
vagueness doctrine is manifestlymisplaced under the petitioners reliance sin
ce ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction
cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the
statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires
a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude. On the other hand, over breadth
doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade t
he area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial
challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech.
Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech. A facial challenge to legislative acts is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools
developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect
to such statue, the established rule is that one to who application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its
face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported
ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of
plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress
decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and
petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

ROMARICO MENDOZA vs. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 183891, OCTOBER 19,

2011

FACTS:

Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for

violating a special law known as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009
for non-remittance of the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to
his employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza
admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court has
to render judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura
lex sed lex).The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison term.
Considering the circumstances, the court the Court transmitted the case to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS
the grant of executive clemency to the petitioner.

ISSUE/S:

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Without violating the separation of powers, can the Supreme Court
recommend to the President, the grant of executive clemency to a convict?

RULING:

The Court the discretion to recommend to the President actions it deems

appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed
as excessive. It is clearly stated in the Revised Penal Code which provides;
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as
may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence,
when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the
degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

REMEDIAL LAW CASE DIGESTS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION) AND EFREN L.
ALAS, G.R. NOS. 147706-07, FEBRUARY 16, 2005.

FACTS:

Two separate opinions for violation of Section 3 (e) of A 3019, otherwise

known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on November 17, 1999 against Efren l. Alas. The charges
emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered into by
Alas in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine
Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which
purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government.

On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a Motion to Quash the information for lack of
jurisdiction, which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution.
After considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court ruled
that PPSB was a private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein
respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.

- Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers unless

private persons are charged with them in the commission of the
offenses.
- The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings bank is a
subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation which is a
government owned corporation, the same is not created by special
law.
- Said entity is formed was primarily for business.

The People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this
petition arguing, in essence, that the PPSB was a government owned or
controlled corporation as the term defined under Section 2 (13) of the
Administrative Code of 1987. RA 8294 (Act defining jurisdiction of
Sandiganbayan did not make a distinction as to the manner of creation of the
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government owned or controlled corporation for their officers to fall under its
jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or

trustees, or managers of government owned or controlled corporations
organized and incorporated under corporation Code for the purposes of the
provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
practices Act?

RULING:

More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the
government while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who were
themselves officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly
sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354, otherwise known as the Postal Service
Act of 1992, for purposes of among others, to encourage and promote the
virtue of theft and the habit of savings among the general public, especially
the youth and the marginalized sector in the country xxx and to facilitate
postal service by receiving collections and making payments, including
postal money orders.

It is a basic principle in statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish.

Constitution: The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court known as

Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices such other offense committed by public
officers and employees, including government owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.

PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PACIFIC

CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, MR. PATRICIO LIM and MR.
DAVID LIM,
vs. IGNACIO B. TAGYAMON,PABLITO L. LUNA, FE B. BADA YOS, GRACE
B. MARCOS, ROGELIO C. NEMIS, ROBERTO B. ILAO, ANICIA D. DELA
CRUZ and CYNTHIA L. COMANDAO, G.R. No. 191475, December 11,
2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) dismissed its

regular and permanent employees, respondents
Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela Cruz, and Comandao on March 15, 2004 and
Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis on March 31, 2004, together with fifteen (15) other
employees on the ground of lack of market/slump in demand. PCMC,
however, claimed that they availed of the companys voluntary retirement
program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their respective Deeds of Release,
Waiver, and Quitclaim.

Aggrieved by PCMCs decision to terminate their employment, respondents

filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal against PCMC, Pacific Carpet
Manufacturing Corporation, Mr. Patricio Lim and Mr. David Lim. These cases
were later consolidated. Respondents questioned the validity of the
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companys retrenchment program. On August 23, 2007, Labor Arbiter (LA).
rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The LA found
no flaw in respondents termination as they voluntarily opted to retire and
were subsequently re-employed on a contractual basis then regularized,
terminated from employment and were paid separation benefits. In view of
respondents belated filing of the complaint, the LA concluded that such
action is a mere afterthought designed primarily for respondents to collect
more money, taking advantage of the 2006 Supreme Court decision.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) sustained the LA

decision. In addition to the LA ratiocination, the NLRC emphasized the
application of the principle of laches for respondents inaction for an
unreasonable period.

Respondents elevated the matter to the CA which reversed the earlier

decisions of the LA and the NLRC, the CA refused to apply the principle of
laches, because the case was instituted prior to the expiration of the
prescriptive period set by law which is four years.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the principle of laches apply in this instant case?

RULING:

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it. It has been repeatedly held by the Court that:

x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our

courts are basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be
invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. x x x Courts
exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary
discretion to disregard them. InZabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x x, this Court
was more emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure. We said therein:

As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality,"
this is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as
in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis.
The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and
prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.

Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period,
recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply
the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the
commencement of actions at law."

An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an

injury to the complainants rights which should be brought within four years
from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code.

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Respondents complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal
dismissal was still well within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot,
therefore, be invoked yet. To be sure, laches may be applied only upon the
most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of laborers are
protected under the social justice provisions of the Constitution and under
the Civil Code.

JAMAR KULAYAN, et. al. vs. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as
Governor of Sulu, G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012

The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to

the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation
of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul,
Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly
inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they
were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members
of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu
Crisis Management Committee was then formed to investigate the
kidnapping incident. The committee convened under the leadership of
respondent Abdusakur MAhail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.

Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of

emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping
incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act
pursuant to the Human Security Act (RA 9372). It also invoked Section 465
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during
manmade and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and
lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints,
conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions
necessary to ensure public safety.

Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et. al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was
issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to
exercise emergency powers and calling out powers as the chief executive of
the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling out powers of a President.

RULING:

It has already been establish that there is one repository of executive

powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President,

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as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling out powers under Section 7, Article VII therof.

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution
mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military,
aiming the civilian president the nations supreme military leader. The net
effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a
civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the
armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the president must be
possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he
has the power to direct military operations and to determine military
strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command
of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.

Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call
upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state
of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own
Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official,
even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified
by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

PHILIPPINE WOMAN'S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION, INC., vs.

TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS
FOUNDATION, INC., G.R. No. 199595, April 2, 2014

FACTS:
On May 19, 2004, respondent Teodoro R. Yangco (2nd and 3rd Generation
Heirs) Foundation, Inc. (TRY Foundation) filed before the RTC of Quezon City,
acting as a Land Registration Court, a Petition for the Issuance of New Title in
Lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 20970 T-22702 of the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

TRY Foundation alleged that it is composed of the 2nd and 3rd generation
heirs and successors-in-interest to the first generation testamentary heirs of
the late philanthropist Teodoro R. Yangco (Yangco) who donated on May 19,
1934 a 14,073-square meter parcel of land (subject property) located at 21
Boni Serrano Avenue, Quezon City.

PWCTUIs corporate term expired in September 1979. Five years thereafter,

using the same corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SEC Registration No.
122088 and forthwith applied for the issuance of a new owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. 20970 over the subject property. The application was
granted and PWCTUI was issued a new TCT No. 20970 T-22702.

TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of PWCTUIs corporate term in

1979 effectively rescinded the donation. PWCTUI opposed the petition.

In a Resolution dated April 4, 2005, the RTC denied the Opposition of

PWCTUI. According to the trial court, when the corporate life of PWCTUI
expired in 1979, the property ceased to be used for the purpose for which it

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was intended, hence, it automatically reverted to Yangco. As such, TRY
Foundation, being composed of his heirs, is considered "other person in
interest" under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 with a right to file a petition for
the issuance of title over the property. The RTC granted TRY Foundations
petition by ordering the cancellation of PWCTUIs TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and
the issuance of a new title in the name of TRY Foundation.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant case?

RULING:

The issues embroiled in revocation of donation are litigable in an ordinary

civil proceeding which demands stricter jurisdictional requirements than that
imposed in a land registration case.

Foremost of which is the requirement on the service of summons for the

court to acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. Without a
valid service of summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. Service of
summons is a guarantee of ones right to due process in that he is properly
apprised of a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to
present his defenses to the suit.

In contrast, jurisdiction in a land registration cases being a proceeding in

rem, is acquired by constructive seizure of the land through publication,
mailing and posting of the notice of hearing Persons named in the application
are not summoned but merely notified of the date of initial hearing on the
petition.

The payment of docket fees is another jurisdictional requirement for an

action for revocation which was absent in the suit filed by TRY Foundation.
On the other hand, Section 111 of P.D. No. 1529 merely requires the payment
of filing fees and not docket fees.

Filing fees are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of
cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe
benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to man hours used in handling of
each case. Docket fees, on the other hand, vest the trial court jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of action.

The absence of the above jurisdictional requirements for ordinary civil

actions thus prevented the RTC, acting as a land registration court, from
acquiring the power to hear and decide the underlying issue of revocation of
donation in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04). Any determination made involving
such issue had no force and effect; it cannot also bind PWCTUI over whom
the RTC acquired no jurisdiction for lack of service of summons.

"Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering
justice; that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have

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authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties."

Conclusion

All told, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over
the actual subject matter contained in TRY Foundations petition for issuance
of a new title. TRY Foundation cannot use the summary proceedings in
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to rescind a contract of donation as such action
should be threshed out in ordinary civil proceedings. In the same vein, the
RTC had no jurisdiction to declare the donation annulled and as a result
thereof, order the register of deeds to cancel PWCTUIs TCT No. 20970 T-
22702 and issue a new one in favor of TRY Foundation.

The RTC, acting as a land registration court, should have dismissed the land
registration case or re-docketed the same as an ordinary civil action and
thereafter ordered compliance with stricter jurisdictional requirements. Since
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for revocation of donation
disguised as a land registration case, the judgment in LRC Case No. Q-
18126(04) is null and void. Being void, it cannot be the source of any right or
the creator of any obligation. It can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is likewise void. It may even be considered as a lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.

Resultantly, the appellate proceedings relative to LRC Case No. Q-18126(04)

and all issuances made in connection with such review are likewise of no
force and effect. A void judgment cannot perpetuate even if affirmed on
appeal by the highest court of the land. All acts pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect.

PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. Vs. EIJI YANAGISAWA, G.R. No. 175303,
April 11, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Eiji Yanagisawa (Eiji), a Japanese national, and Evelyn F.

Castaeda (Evelyn), a Filipina, contracted marriage on July 12, 1989 in the
City Hall of Manila.

On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a 152 square-meter townhouse unit

located at Bo. Sto. Nio, Paraaque, Metro Manila (Paraaque townhouse
unit). The Registry of Deeds for Paraaque issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 99791 to "Evelyn P. Castaeda, Filipino, married to Ejie Yanagisawa,
Japanese citizen, both of legal age.

In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Evelyn on the ground of bigamy (nullity of marriage case). The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-776, was raffled to Branch 149 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Makati RTC).

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During the pendency of the case, Eiji filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application for a Writ of a
Preliminary Injunction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or
encumbering all of the properties registered in her name.

At the hearing on the said motion, Evelyn and her lawyer voluntarily
undertook not to dispose of the properties registered in her name during the
pendency of the case, thus rendering Eijis application and motion moot. On
the basis of said commitment, the Makati RTC rendered the Order dated
October 2, 1996, which was annotated on the title of the Paraaque
townhouse unit or TCT No. 99791.

Sometime in March 1997, Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from

petitioner Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN). To secure the loan, Evelyn
executed on August 25, 1998 a real estate mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN
over the Paraaque townhouse unit covered by TCT No. 99791.

At the time of the mortgage, Eijis appeal in the nullity of marriage case was
pending before the CA. The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyns
marriage, and had ordered the liquidation of their registered properties,
including the Paraaque townhouse unit, with its proceeds to be divided
between the parties. The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its
October 2, 1996 Order on Evelyns commitment not to dispose of or
encumber the properties registered in her name.

Eiji learned of the REM upon its annotation on TCT No. 99791. Deeming the
mortgage as a violation of the Makati RTCs October 2, 1996 Order, Eiji filed a
complaint for the annulment of REM against Evelyn and PAFIN at the
Paraaque RTC.

The Paraaque RTC dismissed Eijis complaint for failure of the plaintiff to
state a cause of action against Evelyn and PAFIN. Eiji appealed the trial
courts decision arguing that the trial court erred in holding that his inability
to own real estate property in the Philippines deprives him of all interest in
the mortgaged property, which was bought with his money. The CA annulled
the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN, on the basis of Evelyns
commitment and its annotation on TCT No. 99791.

The parties to the annulled mortgage filed separate motions for

reconsideration on August 22, 2006, which were both denied for lack of merit
by the appellate court in its November 7, 2006 Resolution.

PAFIN filed this petition for review.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the Paraaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as
the same issue was already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending
appeal in the CA.

2. Whether an undertaking not to dispose of a property pending litigation,

made in open court and embodied in a court order, and duly annotated on
the title of the said property, creates a right in favor of the person relying
thereon.

RULING:
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Cojuangco v. Villegas states: "The various branches of the [regional trial
courts] of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority
and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not,
cannot and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much
less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to
confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice."

The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the

cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the
Makati RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC
over the issue operates as an "insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent
assumption by the Paraaque RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same issue,
the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs resolution of
the issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.

Petitioner maintains that it was imperative for the Paraaque RTC to rule on
the ownership issue because it was essential for the determination of the
validity of the REM. The Court disagrees. The RTC erred in dismissing the
complaint based on Eijis incapacity to own real property. This defense does
not negate Eijis right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC
and to hold third persons, who deal with the registered property, to the
annotations entered on the title.

The October 2, 1996 Order, embodying Evelyns commitment not to dispose

of or encumber the property, is akin to an injunction order against the
disposition or encumbrance of the property. Jurisprudence holds that all acts
done in violation of a standing injunction order are voidable as to the party
enjoined and third parties who are not in good faith. The party, in whose
favor the injunction is issued, has a cause of action to seek the annulment of
the offending actions.

ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR vs. CONSTANTINO ANGELES,

substituted by LUZ G. ANGELES, G.R. No. 171219, September 3,
2012

FACTS:

Respondent-appellee ANGELES is one of the registered owners of a parcel of

land located at 1287 Castanos Street, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 150872. The subject parcel of land was
occupied by one Jelly Galiga (GALIGA) from 1979 up to 1993, as a lessee with
a lease contract. Subsequently, Fe Salvador (SALVADOR) alleged that she
bought on September 7, 1993 the subject parcel of land from GALIGA who
represented that he was the owner, being one in possession. Petitioner-
appellant SALVADOR remained in possession of said subject property from
November 1993 up to the present.

On November 18, 1993, the registered owner, the respondent appellee

ANGELES, sent a letter to petitioner-appellant SALVADOR demanding that the
latter vacate the subject property, which was not heeded by petitioner-
appellant SALVADOR. Respondent-appellee ANGELES, thru one Rosauro Diaz,
Jr. (DIAZ), filed a complaint for ejectment on October 12, 1994 with the

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Metropolitan Trial Court [MeTC] of Manila, Branch 16, docketed as Civil Case
No. 146190-CV.

The [MeTC] rendered its decision on November 29, 1999 in favor of herein
respondent-appellee ANGELES, ordering petitioner-appellant to vacate and
pay the former.

In the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant SALVADOR, she alleged, among

others, that DIAZ, who filed the complaint for ejectment, had no authority
whatsoever from respondent-appellee ANGELES at the time of filing of the
suit. Petitioner-appellant SALVADOR's appeal was denied by the [Regional
Trial Court] RTC in a Decision dated March 12, 2003. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by SALVADOR was denied in an Order dated March 16,
2004.

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review, but in a
Decision dated September 16, 2005, said petition was dismissed for lack of
merit. A motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied in a
Resolution dated January 13, 2006.

ISSUE/S:

What is the effect Rosauro Diaz's (respondent's representative) failure to

present proof of his authority to represent respondent-appellee ANGELES in
filing the complaint?

RULING:

In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically stated that "if a

complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff [by one] who is not
authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized
complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss
the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint
and the plaintiff.

Note that the complaint before the MeTC was filed in the name of
respondent, but it was one Rosauro Diaz who executed the verification and
certification dated October 12, 1994, alleging therein that he was
respondent's attorney-in-fact. There was, however, no copy of any document
attached to the complaint to prove Diaz's allegation regarding the authority
supposedly granted to him. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed
with the MeTC, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
respondent-appellee ANGELES. The courts could not have delved into the
very merits of the case, because legally, there was no complaint to speak of.
The court's jurisdiction cannot be deemed to have been invoked at all.

SIXTO CHU vs. MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION, G. R. No.

184333, April 1, 2013

FACTS:

Respondent Mach Asia Trading Corporation is a corporation engaged in

importing dump trucks and heavy equipments. Petitioner Sixto N. Chu
purchased on installment equipments from respondent to be paid in 12
monthly installments through postdated checks. However, upon presentment
Page 18 of 20
of the checks for encashment, they were dishonored by the bank either by
reason of "closed account," "drawn against insufficient funds," or "payment
stopped."

On November 11, 1999, respondent filed a complaint before the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for sum of money, replevin, attorneys fees and
damages against the petitioner. The RTC issued an Order allowing the
issuance of a writ of replevin on the subject heavy equipments.

On December 9, 1999, Sheriff proceeded at petitioners given address for the

purpose of serving the summons, together with the complaint, writ of
replevin and bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summons
personally upon the petitioner, since the latter was not there. The Sheriff
then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the
complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the
petitioner.

Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading, which prompted respondent

to move for the declaration of defendant in default. On January 12, 2000, the
RTC issued an Order declaring defendant in default and, thereafter, allowed
respondent to present its evidence ex parte.

On December 15, 2000, after respondent presented its evidence, the RTC
rendered a Decision against the petitioner. On July 25, 2007, the CA rendered
a Decision affirming the Decision of the RTC. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Resolution dated August 28, 2008.

Hence, the petition for review on certiorari assigning the following errors
assailing the Decision dated July 25, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 70666, and the Resolution dated August 28, 2008 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA committed a serious error in defiance of law and

jurisprudence in finding that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant even when the substituted service of summons was
improper.

2. Whether or not the CA committed a serious error in defiance of law and

jurisprudence in holding that herein petitioner should have set up a
meritorious defense even when the summons was improperly served.

RULING:

As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only

when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of
time that substituted service may be resorted to.

It is to be noted that in case of substituted service, there should be a report

indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendant's
behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence,
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. Also,
impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that
efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such
efforts have failed.
Page 19 of 20
In the case at bar, clearly, it was not shown that the security guard who
received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and
possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive
the summons. Thus, service on the security guard could not be considered as
substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.

The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due

process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court
acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against
them is null and void. Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner, the judgment rendered by the court could not be
considered binding upon him for being null and void.

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