Feb 2 Admin Cases

[1] [PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR v.
CA]
G.R. No. 83578 | March 16, 1989| Jurisdiction | Sarmiento, J.| Dula
Petitioner: THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE

Respondents: HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L. GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding
Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147,NCR (MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT
CO.,INC.
Case Doctrine:
-As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the
Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
-A quasi-judicial body has been defined as “an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking.
-It is the basic function of these quasi-judicial bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and
unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality
and become executory.
FACTS:
The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (PADS Task Force), the President’s arm
assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called “dollar salting” activities in the country under PD 1936 as
amended by PD 2002. [Note, just in case tanungin ni sir: Dollar salting is committed when dollars are
removed from the Philippines without approval from the Central Bank and transferred to an account
outside the county.]
State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the PADS Task Force issued 6 search warrants
against the respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co., and 5 others. Thereafter, PADS Task Force went to
the RTC on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. RTC declared the
search warrants as null and void. PADS Task Force filed an MR, denied.
Then, PADS Task Force went to the respondent CA to contest on certiorari the order of the lower court. In
ruling INITIALLY for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held: “Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial
body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations defined
and punished under P.D. No. 1883. The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the
RTC, and the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null
and void.”
Respondent Karamfil filed a motion for reconsideration contending that PADS Task Force is not the “such
other responsible officer” countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure.
[Note: at the time of filing of the case 1973 Consti pa]. Upon consideration, CA reversed itself.
Petitioner PADS Task Force appealed to SC alleging that the respondent CA “committed grave abuse of
discretion and/or acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction,” specifically:
-RTC may not may countermand or restrain the enforcement of lawful writs or decrees issued by a
quasi-judicial body of equal and coordinate rank, like the PADS Task Force.
-In ruling that the petitioner PADS Task Force has not been granted under PD 1936 “judicial or
quasi-judicial jurisdiction.”
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the PADS Task Force a quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with
the Regional Trial Court,and accordingly, beyond the latter’s jurisdiction. (NO, not quasi-judicial therefore
not co-equal in rank and standing with RTC)
Whether or not may the said presidential body be said to be “such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law” to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution. (NO)
HELD:
1st issue:
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the
Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank
and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as “an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking.
[In case lang matanong] The most common types of such bodies have been listed as follows: [ako lang
nagunderline]
1. Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant,
or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans,
and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.
2. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain
government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board
of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank
of the Philippines.
3. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business
service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.
4. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business
affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office
of the Insurance Commissioner.
5. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police
power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission,
Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional
Regulation Commission.
6. Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual
controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor
Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of
Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, a Women and Minors
Bureau.
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights,
and unless its decisions are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain
finality and become executory.
A perusal of the PADS Task Force’s organic act, PD 1936, as amended by PD 2002, convinces the Court
that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims
and execute its judgments. As the President’s arm called upon to combat the vice of “dollar salting” or the
blackmarketingand salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution
of such activities, but nothing more.
The Court sees nothing in the PADS Task Force’s organic act (except with respect to the Task Force’s
powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial
responsibilities relative to offenses punished by PD 1883 [defining the crimes of blackmarketing and
salting of foreign exchange and imposing increased penalties]. Its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to
determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court,
meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action “of
appropriate authorities''.
If the PADS Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate
with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing
at par with the said court. In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal’s
resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.
2nd issue
It is the contention of petitioner PADS Task Force that it is a quasi-judicial body since it is empowered to
issue warrants of arrest, search and seizure.
It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive
upon judges. To that extent, the case has become moot and academic. Nevertheless, since the question
has been specifically put to the Court, we find it unavoidable to resolve it as the final arbiter of legal
controversies, pursuant to the provisions of the 1973 Constitution during whose regime the case was
commenced.
The Court held that the “responsible officer” referred to by the fundamental law should be one capable of
approximating “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.” That when the 1973 Constitution spoke of
“responsible officer” to whom the authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by
legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased.
It is to be noted that the Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be
“responsible”.
The Court agreed that the PADS Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers,
and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached “judge” to determine the existence of
probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested
in the success of his case. Although his office “is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure
the conviction of the necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused,” To permit him to issue
search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when
he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, PD 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 2002, unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

[2] [PCGG V. Peña]
G.R. No. 77663 | April 12, 1988| Jurisdiction | Tehankee, C.J.| Feraren
Petitioner: Presidential Commission on Good Government

Respondents: HON. Emmanuel G. Peña
Case Doctrine:
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) because the Commission exercises a quasi-judicial function which means
that it is a co-qual body with the regional trial courts and “co-equal bodies have no power to control the
other.” Therefore they may not interfere with and restrain or set aside orders and actions of the
Commission.
Only the “Sandiganbayan” has jurisdiction over the PCGG since under Section 2 Executive Order No. 14
(Cory’s Legislative Power), The PCGG shall file cases with the Sandiganbayan which shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the
Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan,
which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and Dnal orders
are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.
FACTS:
The Commission ( Presidential Commission on Good Government/ PCGG) issued an order freezing the
assets, effects, documents and records of two garment manufacturing firms dominated as American
Interfasion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. Two-thirds or 67% of the stock
of the corporations were subscribed by so-called Local Investors represented by Renato Z. Francisco
and Atty. Gregorio R. Castillo and one-third or 33% thereof were subscribed by the so-called Hongkong
Investors, namely respondents Yeung Chun Kam and Yeung Chan Ho. THe Commission appointed Ms.
Noemi L. Saludo as OKcer-inCharge (OIC) of the said corporations with full authority to manage and
operate the same.
On June 27, 1986, the Commission designated the OIC, Saludo, and Mr. Yeung Chun Ho, private
respondent herein, as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two
corporations.
On September 4, 1986, the Commission designated Mr. Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence
of Mr. Yeung Chun Ho, and Mr. Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Ms. Saludo.
However on February 3, 1987, Ms. Saludo released a memorandum addressing to depository banks of
the said corporation, that she revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam
Shing was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa,
On February 11, 1987, the OIC withdrew the amount of P400,000.00, more or less, from the Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company against the accounts of the said corporations for payment of the salaries of the
staff, employees and laborers of the for the period from February 1 to 15 of 1987.
On February 13, 1987, respondents Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan who are all in
Hongkong, instituted through Yim Kam Shing, an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the said bank, the Commission, then Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista and the
OIC, Saludo, docketed as Civil Case No. 54298 of Branch 152 of the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro
Manila, presided by respondent judge, and questioning the aforesaid revocation of the authorization as
signatory previously granted to Mr. Yim Kam Shing as private respondents' representative.
On February 16, 1987, respondent judge issued ex-parte the questioned temporary restraining order
enjoining the bank and the Commission from enforcing the memorandum dated February 3 1987.
On February 20, 1987, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the Presidential Commission on Good
Government. (PCGG). NO
HELD:
Then former President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative power granted by the
Provisional (Freedom Constitution) issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the PCGG (Presidential
Commission on Good Government). Its task was to recover all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.
The Commission was granted power to conduct investigations; require submission of evidence by
subpoena ad; administer testificandum and duces tecum; administer oaths; punish for contempt. It was
given power also to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of (its creation).
As can be readily seen from the foregoing discussion of the duties and functions and the power and
authority of the Commission, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial
functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have no
power to control the other.
The lack of jurisdiction of regional courts over quasi-judicial agencies is recognized in section 9,
paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which otherwise
vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over all Dnal judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
or commissions.
But as stated in Executive Order No. 14 section 2, the Court of Appeals likewise is not vested with
appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the Commission. Section 2 provides that "The Presidential
Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the
Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof."
Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must
seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original
jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and Dnal orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari
exclusively by this Court.llcd
[3] [Freeman, Inc. v. SEC]
G.R. No. 110265 | July 7, 1994 | Jurisdiction | BELLOSILLO, J. | Grefal
Petitioner: FREEMAN, INC., FREEMAN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., CHIAO LIAN,
LECHU S. LIM, PERLITA S. DYOGI, OLIVIA S. SANTOS, CARMEN S. SAW and RUBEN CHUA
Respondents: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SAW MUI, RUBEN SAW,
DIONISIO SAW, LINA S. CHUA, LUCILA S. RUSTE and EVELYN SAW
Case Doctrine: (1) Administrative agencies like the SEC are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such
can exercise those powers which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes.
(2) Doctrine of non-interference which should be regarded as highly important in judicial stability and in
the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
opened, modified or vacated by any court or tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. The SEC is at the very
least co-equal with the Regional Trial Court. As such, one would have no power to control the other.
FACTS: Freeman, Inc. (FREEMAN) was granted a loan by Equitable Banking Corporation (EQUITABLE).
When FREEMAN failed to pay its obligations, EQUITABLE instituted a collection suit against FREEMAN.
EQUITABLE also prayed for preliminary attachment. The collection case was terminated when the parties
entered into a compromise agreement duly approved and a decision was rendered by the court. However,
FREEMAN failed to comply with the judgment.
A writ of execution was issued and 2 parcels of land belonging to FREEMAN were levied upon and sold
at a public auction. The highest bidder was one of the petitioners, Freeman Management and
Development Corporation (FREEMAN MANAGEMENT), which thereafter registered its certificate of sale
with the Register of Deeds.
Before FREEMAN MANAGEMENT could consolidate its title over the properties purchased at the auction
sale, private respondents, representing the minority shareholdings of FREEMAN, filed a petition with the
SEC seeking the dissolution of FREEMAN, accounting and reconveyance of the properties.
SEC Hearing Officer Juanito B. Almosa, Jr., issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
consolidation of ownership of petitioner FREEMAN MANAGEMENT over the properties it acquired in the
auction sale. Petitioners assailed the order of the SEC Hearing Officer by filing a petition for certiorari with
the SEC en banc which denied the petition. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as also denied.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the SEC acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting the writ of injunction enjoining
consolidation of ownership in FREEMAN MANAGEMENT (YES)
HELD: Our ruling in Saw v. Court of Appeals should be understood in the light of two basic legal
principles.
First, that administrative agencies like the SEC are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such can
exercise those powers which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes.
Section 5 of PD 902-A provides the cases over which the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide. These include controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations
between and among stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and, between such corporation,
partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as
such entity. Section 6 of the same decree empowers the SEC to issue preliminary or permanent
injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has jurisdiction.
The action for dissolution of FREEMAN filed by its minority stockholders is well within the jurisdiction of
the SEC to resolve in accordance with PD 902-A. However, the inclusion in the SEC case of FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT of which private respondents are not stockholders for the purpose of compelling it to
reconvey to FREEMAN the properties originally owned by the latter but were levied upon and sold to
FREEDOM MANAGEMENT in a public auction is a matter outside of the limited jurisdiction of the SEC.
The petition for reconveyance of properties against FREEMAN MANAGEMENT is not an intra-corporate
controversy since private respondents have no shares or interests whatsoever in FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT, a corporation separate and distinct from FREEMAN, which is undergoing dissolution in
the SEC.
The second basic principle is the doctrine of non-interference which should be regarded as highly
important in judicial stability and in the administration of justice whereby the judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or vacated by any court or tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction. The SEC is at the very least co-equal with the Regional Trial Court. As such, one would have
no power to control the other.
Moreover, in the instant case, judgment was rendered by the trial court approving the compromise
agreement between EQUITABLE and FREEMAN. A writ of execution was issued against the defendants
to enforce the judgment and two (2) properties of FREEMAN were levied upon and sold to FREEMAN
MANAGEMENT as highest bidder in the public auction.
[4] [DE SYQUIA v BOARD OF WATER WORKS]
L-42783-85| 11-29-1976| Jurisdiction| Teehankee| CJ Arellano
Petitioner: CARIDAD CRUZ DE SYQUIA
Respondents: BOARD OF POWER AND WATER WORKS (formerly Public Service Commission),
Case Doctrine: A question that is purely civil in character is to be adjudged under the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which
has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Ø In December, 1974, private respondents filed three separate complaints with

respondent Board of Power and Waterworks charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia
Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise issued by
respondent board, in that petitioner billed respondents-complainants various specified amounts for their
electricity consumption at their respective apartments for the months of May to September, 1974 in
excess of the Meralco rates authorized by respondent board.
Ø Petitioner Syquia filed a motion to dismiss the complaints asserting that they involved contractual
obligations of the respondents which is beyond the board’s jurisdiction. However, the latter dismissed
the motion.
Ø Petitioner thereupon filed her answer, wherein she again questioned the complaints as beyond the
jurisdiction of respondent as a regulatory board, since she is not engaged in the sale of electric power
but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in
accordance with their lease contracts, and their relationship is contractual in nature.
Ø Respondent, in its order issued a computation which would allow the petitioner to charge the
respondents only the cost of electricity registered in their individual apartment meters and disallow the
actual cost of additional electricity charged them pro rata by petitioner for the cost of electricity
consumed by all tenants in the common areas. The petitioner pointed out that based on the issued
computation, a resulting loss was imposed upon her. She reiterated that the same was a contractual
obligation of the tenants which the board had no jurisdiction. The board dismissed the motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the issue
Whether or not (YES/NO) - No
HELD: Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner. Respondent board acquired no
jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since
petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities
used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a
question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil
Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction
but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against
petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common
areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year, arrogated the judicial function.
Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.
[5] [VILLANUEVA V. PALAWAN]
GR 178347| FEB 23, 2013 | JURISDICTION | DEL CASTILLO, J.| F. Gonzales
Petitioner: SALVACION VILLANUEVA, TEOFILO TREDEZ, DONALD BUNDAC, DANNY CABIGUEN,

GREGORIO DELGADO, and BILLY BUNGAR
Respondents:
PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (PCSD),
represented by Executive Director ROMEO DORADO, and
PATRICIA LOUISE MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PLMDC),
represented by Engineer FERNANDO ESGUERRA
Case Doctrine: Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
FACTS:
On June 19, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7611 or the “Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan
Act” was signed into law. It called for the establishment of the Environmentally Critical Areas Network
(ECAN), which is a “graded system of protection and development control over the whole of Palawan.”
The ECAN will categorize the terrestrial areas, coastal areas, and tribal lands in Palawan according to the
degree of human disruption that these areas can tolerate.
The controversy in the instant case arose when PCSD issued an SEP Clearance to Patricia Louise
Mining and Development Corporation (PLMDC) for its proposed smallscale nickel mining project to be
conducted in a controlled use area in Barangay Calategas in the Municipality of Narra, Province of
Palawan.
The petitioners, who are farmers and residents of Barangay Calategas, sought the recall of the said
clearance in their letter to PCSD Chairman, Abraham Kahlil Mitra. The PCSD, through its Executive
Director, Romeo B. Dorado, denied their request for lack of basis.
On August 7, 2006, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against PCSD and PLMDC
with the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. They prayed for the nullification of the said SEP
Clearance for violating various provisions of RA 7611 and PCSD Resolution No. 05-250.
PLMDC and PCSD sought the dismissal of the Petition on various grounds, including the impropriety of
the remedy of certiorari. PCSD argued that it did not perform a quasi-judicial function. The trial court
denied the said motions. It ruled, among others, that certiorari is proper to assail PCSD’s action. PCSD
Administrative Order (AO) No. 6 series of 2000 or the Guidelines in the Implementation of SEP Clearance
System states that the PCSD must conduct a public hearing, and study the supporting documents for
sufficiency and accuracy, before it decides whether to issue the clearance to the project proponent. The
trial court concluded that this procedure is an exercise of a quasi-judicial power.
The trial court denied reconsideration of the above Order. PLMDC and PCSD again filed Motions to
Dismiss but this time on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that, under Section 4 of Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, only the Court of Appeals [CA] can take cognizance of a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus filed against a quasi-judicial body.
The trial court agreed and issued the assailed Order. Petitioners appealed directly to this Court. In their
respective memoranda, all the parties submitted that PCSD is exercising quasi-judicial functions.
PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT:
The RTC has certiorari jurisdiction over PCSD because the latter is a quasi-judicial body functioning only
within the RTC’s territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, the RTC is the proper court following the principle of
judicial hierarchy.
RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT:
Under Section 4 of Rule 65, only the CA can take cognizance of certiorari petitions against quasi-judicial
bodies.
ISSUE/S:
WON PCSD performs quasi-judicial function that is reviewable by petition for certiorari. (NO)
HELD:
The Court disagrees with the parties’ reasoning and holds that PCSD did not perform a quasi-judicial
function that is reviewable by petition for certiorari. There must be an enabling statute or legislative act
conferring quasi-judicial power upon the administrative body. RA 7611, which created the PCSD, does
not confer quasi-judicial powers on the said body.
The following requisites must concur for a Petition for Certiorari to prosper, namely:
“(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
Save possibly for the power to impose penalties under Section 19(8) (which is not involved in PCSD’s
issuance of an SEP Clearance), the rest of the conferred powers, and the powers necessarily implied
from them, do not include adjudication or a quasi-judicial function.
A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it renders decisions or awards that determine
the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same effect as a judgment of the
court.
In issuing an SEP Clearance, the PCSD does not decide the rights and obligations of adverse parties with
finality. The SEP Clearance is not even a license or permit. All it does is to allow the project proponent to
proceed with its application for permits, licenses, patents, grants, or concessions with the relevant
government agencies. The SEP Clearance allows the project proponent to prove the viability of their
project, their capacity to prevent environmental damage, and other legal requirements, to the other
concerned government agencies. The SEP Clearance in favor of PLMDC does not declare that the
project proponent has an enforceable mining right within the Municipality of Narra; neither does it
adjudicate that the concerned citizens of the said municipality have an obligation to respect PLMDC’s
right to mining.
A review of the Petition for Certiorari reveals another flaw. The alleged grounds for the nullity of the SEP
Clearance are its violations of certain provisions of RA 7611 and PCSD Resolution No. 05-250. Clearly,
an ordinary action for the nullification of the SEP Clearance is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available to the petitioners, which precludes resort to a special civil action. This ordinary action will allow
the parties to litigate factual issues, such as petitioners’ contention that PLMDC’s proposed mining site is
in a core zone, it being in a natural forest and a critical watershed, contrary to PCSD’s claim that it is in a
controlled use zone. Certiorari would not have provided the petitioners with such an opportunity because
it is limited to questions of jurisdiction and does not resolve factual matters. Certiorari does not involve a
full-blown trial but is generally restricted to the filing of pleadings (petition, comment, reply, and
memoranda), unless the court opts to hear the case. Since an ordinary action is available and in fact
appears to be more appropriate, petitioners were wrong to resort to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
The same fate befalls the Petition for Mandamus. Petitioners prayed that the PCSD be compelled to
comply with the provisions of RA 7611. Clearly, the success of the Petition for Mandamus depends on a
prior finding that the PCSD violated RA 7611 in issuing the SEP Clearance. There can be no such finding
with the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari.
Given the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issue presented by the parties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed May 7, 2007 Order of Branch 47 of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4218, is AFFIRMED but for being an IMPROPER REMEDY.
Notes.—Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
[06] [PEÑA vs. GSIS]
GR.159520| Sept. 19,2006 | Jurisdiction | CHICO-NAZARIO, J. | Garay
Petitioner: FELISA L. PEÑA
Respondents: GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
Case Doctrine: Administrative decisions must end sometime, as fully as public policy demands that
finality be written on judicial controversies. Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated
should not be altered at every step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what had already
been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not commend itself to sound
public policy.
The rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative body is
"not a question of technicality but of substance and merit, " the underlying consideration therefore, being
the protection of the substantive rights of the winning party. Nothing is more settled in law than that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether
it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential
to an effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Court must guard against any scheme calculated to bring
about that result and must frown upon any attempt to prolong the controversies. The only exceptions to
the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
FACTS: Petitioner Felisa Peña acquired three subdivision lots from Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc.,
through its President Isabel Arrieta, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, with a right to repurchase the
same within two months, for the sum of P126,000.00 plus interest. However, petitioner alleged that
Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc. failed to repurchase said lots and refused to deliver the corresponding
titles of the said subdivision lots because the same were mortgaged to herein respondent GSIS, allegedly
sometime in 1971 and 1972, without the written approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) as required by Presidential Decree No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree."
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Annulment of Mortgage, and Damages before the
HLURB Regional Office against Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., its President Isabel Arrieta, and
respondent, asking for the cancellation of the mortgage to respondent and the consolidation of ownership
to her, alleging that the mortgage of the subject lots to the respondent was null and void because it had
no written approval of the HLURB as required under Presidential Decree No. 957.
HLURB, through Housing and Land Use Arbiter Cesar A. Manuel, rendered a in favor of petitioner.
Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the afore-mentioned Decision. Petitioner then claimed that for
failure of respondent to file the proper mode of appeal within the reglementary period before the HLURB,
its Decision dated 20 December 1995 already became final and executory.
However, respondent filed a Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio before the Board of
Commissioners of the HLURB, claiming that the Regional Office of HLURB had no jurisdiction to resolve
the Complaint for it involved title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, the jurisdiction of which
belonged to the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE/S: Whether the Office of the President can set aside and reverse a judgment of the HLURB
Regional Office that has long become final and executory for failure of the respondent to interpose the
proper mode of appeal within the reglementary period as provided for in the 1994 Rules of Procedure of
HLURB;
HELD: No. The decision of the HLURB Regional Office had long become final and executory for failure of
the respondent to seasonably appeal or file a Petition for Review within the reglementary period.
Consequently, the Office of the President had no more jurisdictions over such final and executory
judgment. The decision of HLURB Regional Office was already final and executory, no court, not even the
highest court of the land, can revive, review, change or alter the same. It is already well settled in our
jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their
quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of
public, executive, or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction.
In view of the foregoing, the Motion to Declare Judgment Null and Void Ab Initio filed by respondent on 25
September 1996, or after so many months from the finality of the Decision it seeks to be declared null and
void, can no longer be entertained by the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The same was just an
attempt to reinstate an appeal that had already been lost. Even granting arguendo that the said Motion
was proper, still, the allegation therein of the respondent that the HLURB Regional Office had no
jurisdiction over the case because it involved title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, the
jurisdiction of which supposedly belonged to the Regional Trial Court, was not sufficient to warrant the
declaration of the Decision of the HLURB as null and void. Such ground relied upon by the respondent is
untenable because the jurisdiction involving unsound real estate practices and other matters in
connection thereto belongs to HLURB.
When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to
the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said
administrative agency or body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Therefore, the Complaint for Specific
Performance, Annulment of Mortgage, and Damages filed by petitioner against respondent, though
involving title to, possession of, or interest in real estate, was well within the jurisdiction of the HLURB for
it involves a claim against the subdivision developer, Queen’s Row Subdivision, Inc., as well as
respondent.
Thus, when the Office of the President acted upon the appeal of the respondent and thereby
reversing the final and executory Decision of the HLURB Regional Office, it acted without
jurisdiction. It bears stressing that after the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office had become final
and executory as early as March 1996, even the Office of the President had no more jurisdiction to revive,
review, change or alter the same. Such final resolution or decision of an administrative agency also binds
the Office of the President even if such agency is under the administrative supervision and control of the
latter.
In sum, the Decision of the HLURB Regional Office dated 20 December 1995 had become final and
executory for failure of respondent to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period in the manner
provided for in the HLURB Rules. Hence, the said Decision became immutable; it can no longer be
amended nor altered by the Office of the President. Accordingly, inasmuch as the timely perfection of an
appeal is a jurisdictional requisite, the Office of the President had no more authority to entertain the
appeal of the respondent. Otherwise, any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the
final and executory judgment would be null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
[7] [SPS DACUDAO V. GONZALES]
GR No. 188056 | January 8, 2013 | Jurisdiction | BERSAMIN, J. | Maningo
Petitioner: SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO and OFELIA R. DACUDAO
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Case Doctrine:The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
FACTS:On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182
(DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special
Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in
issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the equal
protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was
an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009
exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and
pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum
dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the Constitution.
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which to seek
and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of
the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance
of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S: WON petitioners properly brought their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly
to the Court (NO)
HELD:The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and merit, is
dismissed.
Petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court with their
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or
compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.
The court emphasized that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the
recourse.
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions
or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance
of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of... the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court,
it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be presented. This is
and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial
Courts, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by
this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals, although prior to the effectivity of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs
was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however,
to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice
of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard... for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It
is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court's docket.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely:
(a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b)
the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[9] The burden of... proof lies on petitioners to
demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely alleged that
the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show
that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the
Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his
questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates' efficiency and economy in the
conduct of the... preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function
involved was purely executive or administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial
office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the
DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of
probable cause in any case.
[8] [Angara vs. Electoral Commission]
G.R. L-45081| July 15, 1936 | Rules of Procedure | Laurel | Merle
Petitioner: Jose Angara

Respondents: The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor
Case Doctrine:
FACTS:
Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of
member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. Angara was proclaimed
as member-elect due to having the most number of votes. Resolution No. 8 was passed which states that
the acts of election of the Deputies against whom a protest has not been duly presented before the
adoption of this resolution be, as hereby, approved and confirmed. Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a Motion of Protest against Angara and praying that he (Ynsua) be declared as the elected
member or that the election of the position be nullified. Angara then filed a Motion to Dismiss the protest
alleging that (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of
its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its
members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted
formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period. Ynsua replied that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation.
ISSUE/S:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
HELD:
Supreme Court has Jurisdiction
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. But it does not follow
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees
to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and
justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the governments of the government.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the
resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to
entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935,
is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission
has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the
resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for
filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. The
Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a
specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when
and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions.Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts
of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting
within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under
Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also
significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate
from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission
is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45
Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed
in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral
Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should
be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such
case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of
the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring
this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the
resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the
Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality
without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National
Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our
Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will
inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this
result should not be permitted.
[9] [PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION VS. AGRAVA]

L-12426| February 16, 1959 | Rules of Procedure | Montemayor, J | Jamilano
Petitioner: PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION

Respondents: CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office
Case Doctrine:A member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training should be
allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification.
Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law,
and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much
of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of
the patent law and other laws applicable as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved. That part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that
appeals from his orders and decision are under the law taken to the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
1. This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
2. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the
rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers
and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
3. It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the act
of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before
said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent,
is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
4. Respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases
"does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of
patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons with sufficient
scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office.
5. Action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the
Patent Law of the Philippines, which is similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which
the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by
respondent.
ISSUE/S:Whether or not a lawyer may practice their profession before the Patent Office without further
examination or other qualification. - YES
HELD:A member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training should be allowed to
practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. The Director of
Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a
member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before
the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of
Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practicing before him
enlist the assistance of technical men and scientists in the preparation of papers and documents, such as,
the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way
that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his client, is required
to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
Members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may
practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office
involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the
functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and
make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient
administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within
the jurisdiction of his bureau.
The petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring
members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before ore being
permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
[10] [Agusmin v. CA]
L-48478| 30 Sept 1982 | Rules of Procedure | Concepcion | Delos Reyes
Petitioner: AGUSMIN PROMOTIONAL ENTERPRISES, INC.

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, P. B. DE JESUS & CO., INC., BENJAMIN V. GUIANG, AND
CRISOSTOMO LICERALDE
Case Doctrine:
FACTS:
Guiang and Liceralde and six (6) other timber concessionaires asked the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources if they could consolidate their timber concessions in the name of a corporation which
they will form. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources allowed the incorporation, which lead to
Guiang, Liceralde and the six (6) other timber licensees, organized the AGUS-MIN PROMOTIONAL
ENTERPRISES, INC. covering a total forested area of 18,890 hectares in the municipalities of Comuta
and Talacogon, Agusan del Sur
Guiang and Liceralde, due to some differences with the majority group in the corporation, requested the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that they be allowed to withdraw their respective forest
areas under their original timber licenses from the consolidated timber license of AGUSMIN.
The request was referred to the Director of Forestry declared that the request is beyond his jurisdiction
since the decision of the eight (8) original licensees to consolidate their forest areas had the effect of
renouncing their respective identities as individual licensees and that the issuance of a new timber license
to Guiang and Liceralde will be in violation of forestry rules and regulations.
Guiang and Liceralde appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, wherein
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the decision of the Director of Forestry and
authorized Guiang and Liceralde to withdraw their forest areas from the timber license of AGUSMIN.
AGUSMIN interposed an appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
stating that it was appealing said decision to the Office of the President.
AGUSMIN filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal that contended that the appellant failed to comply
with all the requirements of Executive Order No. 19 to perfect an appeal to the Office of the
President by not paying the appeal fee of P20.00 which is charged for every appeal or petition for
review with the Office of the President. Therefore, the Office of the President did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case, and, hence, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources became
final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of the said decision.
Office of the President issued a decision in the appealed case, reversing and declaring of no force and
effect the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. (so bawal na ulit mag-back out
sina Guiang)
Guiang, Liceralde, and DE JESUS & CO., filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction. However, the case was dismissed on the ground that the court considered it too presumptuous
for it to take over and decide the matter which was then still pending consideration in the Office of the
President.
As a result, Guiang and Liceralde filed with the Office of the President an ex-parte petition for the
resolution of their urgent motion for reconsideration.
During the pendency of the appeal, AGUSMIN requested the Director of Forestry for a renewal of its
timber license. The request was favorably endorsed to the Office of the President and was given due
course by that Office.
Upon learning of the matter, DE JESUS & CO. requested the Office of the President to recall its approval
of the petition for renewal of AGUSMIN's timber license covering a forest area of 32,800 hectares, instead
of only 25,560 hectares, since the portions previously consolidated by Guiang and Liceralde have already
been consolidated in its own working unit. The timber license of AGUSMIN was modified and renewed to
cover only 25,560 hectares under its timber license
AGUSMIN appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources denied the appeal for lack of merit. Office of the President issued a decision declaring
its decision involving the 7,240 hectares of Guiang and Liceralde as final and executory
DE JESUS & CO., Guiang and Liceralde filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul
and set aside the letters-decisions of the Executive Secretary.
President of the Philippines ordered the cancellation of Timber License issued to AGUSMIN. AGUSMIN
appealed to the Court of Appeals appellate court issued a decision, affirming in full the judgment of the
trial court.
ISSUE/S:W/N the decision of the Executive Secretary became final → NO
HELD:The petitioner excepts to the findings of the trial court that AGUSMIN had not perfected its appeal
from the adverse decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the Office of the
President for its failure to pay the correct amount of the appeal fee within the period prescribed by
Executive Order No. 19
While there may be some merit in the arguments of the petitioner since the rule is that "in deciding
administrative questions, technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in
the strict judicial sense is not indispensable," little, if any, useful purpose could be gained in further
discussing these issues because Letter of Instruction No. 172, which ordered the cancellation of the
timber license issued to AGUSMIN, in effect, reversed and set aside the said decisions of the Executive
Secretary.
In the words of the Court of Appeals, the said decisions "did not acquire any finality.'' The office of the
Executive Secretary reversed the order of the DANR but this decision of the office of the Executive
Secretary did not acquire any finality for the same was received by the petitioners-appellees Benjamin V.
Guiang and Crisostomo Liceralde and an urgent motion for reconsideration with the office of the President
was interposed
Motion for reconsideration remained unresolved, prompted the filing of Civil Case. Incidentally Civil Case
was dismissed without considering the merits of the petition, but only on the ground that the basic issue in
the petition was then still pending before the Office of the President.
Considering that up to May 30, 1972 no resolution on petitioners' motion for reconsideration was made by
the Office of the President, petitioners understandably filed anew or reiterated its suit against respondent
AGUS-MIN. No finality was ever achieved by the letter decision of the Executive Secretary in favor of
respondent AGUSMIN in view of the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners.
Under such situation the Surety Bond, earlier posted by petitioners duly approved by Director of Forestry,
subsists as a restraining factor that would enjoin respondent AGUS-MIN from immediately conducting
logging operations in the area conceded to the petitioners
As now stands, the letter decision of the Office of the Executive Secretary never gained finality and has in
fact now been overturned in the judgment rendered in Civil Case
Decisions of the Executive Secretary did not acquire any finality.
Record shows that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was immediately
executed upon the filing of a bond by the private respondents to answer for whatever damages AGUSMIN
may incur as a result of the immediate execution of the decision should its appeal from the said decision
be found meritorious. A consolidated timber license was issued in the name of DE JESUS & CO., so that
AGUSMIN was in bad faith when it conducted logging operations in the forest areas which have already
been awarded to DE JESUS & CO.
[11] Carmelo v Ramos
L-17778 | 30 Nov 1962 | Subpoena | Regala | Valentino
Petitioner: IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO,

in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the Mayor of Manila
Respondents: Armando Ramos
Case Doctrine: The delegation of such power to investigate does not also entail a delegation of the
power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be required by the compulsory
process of subpoena.
FACTS: Mayor of Manila (MoM), through an EO, created a committee "to investigate the anomalies
involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the
City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this Office (of the Mayor)”, naming Carmelo as
chair of said committee. Said committee duly served a subpoena to Ramos, a Casa de Alba’s
bookkeeper, and required him to appear before it in connection with an administrative case against
Crisanto. However, Ramos refused to appear.
Petitioner then asked the CFI to declare Ramos in contempt, which the CFI denied, holding that there is
no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that
witnesses testify under oath and that compelling Ramos to testify would violate his right against
self-incrimination.
In a statement given to the committee, Ramos admitted having misappropriated several times, money
given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of its taxes and that this fact had not been
discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in the City Treasurer’s office at Casa de
Alba.
The CFI held that to compel Ramos to confirm this statement in the administrative case against certain
employees in the Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could be
used against him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended party.
ISSUE/S: Whether the committee has the power to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for
their punishment in case of refusal (NO)
HELD: The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior
courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the
one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court,
as is done in paragraph 2 of section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Even if the petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, he must first show that he
has "authority to take the testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of
hostile witnesses.
To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a
grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain
city employees.
Petitioner is correct in stating that MoM has the implied power to investigate city officials and employees
appointed by him to the end that the power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such officials
or employees (Sec. 22, Republic Act No. 409) may be justly and fairly exercised. However, the delegation
of such power to investigate does not also entail a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence
of witnesses whose appearance may be required by the compulsory process of subpoena.
Petitioner’s reliance on 50 Am. Jur. 449 is bereft of merit. In the first place, the authority cited speaks of
statutory grant of power to a body. Here, whatever power the committee may claim may only be traced to
the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied from his power to suspend or remove certain city
employees. There is no statutory grant of power to investigate the petitioner's committee.
In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance of
witnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that the Mayor can not delegate this power to a body
like the committee of the petitioner.
[12] [CARINO v. CHR]
G.R. No. 96681.| December 2, 1991 | Subpoena Power | J. Narvasa | ACAIN
Petitioners: HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of

Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of
City Schools of Manila
Respondents: THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA
BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER
Case Doctrine:
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. The teachers participating in the
mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education, Carino, to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants, herein private respondents, were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given 5 days to answer the charges.
They were also preventively suspended 90 days.
The MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner
Secretary Cariño, which was dismissed. Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court on certiorari, in an
attempt to nullify said dismissal. After their petitions were denied, respondent teachers thereafter
submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain
that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements
as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. The
Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño
requiring his attendance therein. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of
complainants' evidence.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations in volving civil or political rights. (NO)
HELD:
The CHR has no such power. It was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function
of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function the
Commission does not have.
It cannot try and decide cases as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not
to adjudicate or adjudge.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find
out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection
of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." Meanwhile, in the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To
settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest
sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or
condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and
should not "try and resolve on the merits" the matters involved. These are matters undoubtedly and
clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the Secretary of Education had already taken cognizance of the
issues and resolved them, and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved
parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said
issues. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no
business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service
Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own
judgment on the questions involved.
The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the
matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service
Commission. It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
[13] [Guevara vs. COMELEC]

G.R. No. L-12596| July 31, 1958 | Contempt Power | J. Bautista | Pinto
Petitioner: Enrique M. Fernando

Respondents: Dominador D. Dayot
Case Doctrine:
COMELEC has no power to punish for contempt if the Commission is merely discharging ministerial duty.
The controversy merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its
administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by the Constitution. In proceeding
on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the
case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature.
FACTS:
Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for
having published in the newspaper an article which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC
awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of ballot boxes; and which article likewise tended
to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission
and its Chairman.
Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the Commission has no jurisdiction to
punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the Constitution nor
in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the same.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt
proceedings against petitioner with a view to imposing upon him the necessary disciplinary penalty in
relation to its publication. NO
HELD:
Power to punish for contempt inherent in courts The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts;
its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice” (Slade
Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U. S. vs. Loo Hoe, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 Off. Gaz.
2570; In Re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary
incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative
bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony (People vs. Swena,
296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative
function has been held invalid (Langenberg vs. Decker, 31 N.E. 190; In Re Sims 37 P., 135; Roberts vs.
Hacney, 58 S.W., 810).
Thus, the COMELEC has no power to punish for contempt if the Commission is merely discharging
ministerial duty the controversy merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed
in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by the Constitution. In
proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the
[14] [Dumarpa v. Dimaporo]
G.R. No. 87014-16 | September 13, 1989 | Contempt Power | Narvasa, J. | Navarro
Petitioner: SALIC B. DUMARPA, MARANAO C. DANGANAN and SAADUDDIN ALAUYA

Respondents: JAMIL DIMAPORO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case Doctrine:
The Revised Administrative Code authorizes the Acting Governor to seek advice from the municipal or
provincial fiscal. As such, the Acting Governor may not be faulted for consulting the lawyers of the
province as to the effects of a judgment on the authority and actuations of municipal or provincial officials,
or the fiscals for advising him/her on such matters. The law implicitly authorizes the former to seek such
advice and expressly imposes upon the latter the duty to give it on request.
FACTS:
On February 3,1988, Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers Mayor-elect of
Marogong.
The annulment of the proclamation and the canvass on which it was based was sought in two (2)
separate petitions filed by defeated mayoralty candidates: one filed on February 15, 1988 by Datu
Abdulmadid Panondiongan Maruhom (docketed as SPC No. 88-646), and the other, on February 17,
1988, by Monabai Panondiongan Balt (docketed as SPC Nos. 88-697 and 88-697-A).
While these petitions were pending adjudgment, the Secretary of Local Governments issued on May 1-.9,
1988 a memorandum addressed to the Regional Director, Region XII of the Department of Local
Governments, designating Maclis Balt "Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong.
A copy of this memorandum was furnished to Governor Saidamen Pangarungan. Governor Saidamen
issued on May 23, 1988 a memorandum to lift the suspension of the processing of vouchers and other
financial matters as well as the encashment of pertinent checks for the municipalities of Bacolod-Grande
and Marogong, Lanao del Sur.
Evidently on the strength of the designation of the Secretary of Local Governments and said
memorandum of Governor Pangarungan, Maclis Balt assumed the position and discharged the functions
of OIC, Office of the Mayor, Marogong.
The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo's proclamation were ultimately dismissed by the First
Division of the COMELEC, by decision rendered on July 11, 1988. Motions for reconsideration thereof
were seasonably presented by both petitioners. These were brought up to the Commission en banc for
resolution.
Datu Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his status as mayor-elect of Marogong, as
confirmed by the First Division's Decision of July 11, 1988.
Datu Dimaporo’s counsel sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor Saidamen B. Pangarungan
pertaining to the resolution of the First Division of COMELEC recognizing the status as mayor elect.
Governor Pangarungan referred the formal communication to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur by
3rd Indorsement dated August 1, 1988, of Atty. Sa-Aduden Alauya, "Vice Governor-OIC Governor.”
Provincial Fiscal Dumarpa, confirmed by Fiscal Danganan’s opinion was communicated to the Vice
Governor. The Vice Governor issued a 4th Indorsement (with attached legal opinion form the fiscals) that
Datu Maclis Balt is still the Mayor of the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.
Datu Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, as
well as Vice-Governor Alauya, in contempt. His motion, dated August 22, 1988, inter alia drew attention to
the inaccuracy in the 4th Indorsement.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Dumarpa, Danganan and Alauya are liable for contempt. - NO
HELD:
Upon the facts above narrated at some length, the Court is constrained to nullify and set aside the
conviction by the COMELEC en banc of the petitioners for contempt.
The essential accusation against the petitioners was that the rendition by the petitioner fiscals of a legal
opinion upon request of petitioner Vice Governor had caused "chaos and confusion among the National,
Provincial, Municipal officials and the general public on who is really the legal Mayor of Marogong, Lanao
del Sur, considering the conflict of the defendants' legal opinion and the 'Resolution' of the COMELEC
Division, as aforesaid, resulting to damage, injury and prejudice not only upon the complainant but to
public service, particularly the people of Marogong, Lanao del Sur."
The trouble is, there is nothing in the challenged Resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, or anywhere else
in the record, for that matter, to demonstrate the actuality of the alleged (1) "chaos and confusion among
the National, Provincial, Municipal officials and the general public," or (2) "suspension of the effects of the
proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo ..(in order to) pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to
office by an Officer-in-Charge," or (3) that the latter 'is the wife of one of the parties to the instant
petitions;" or (4) that the legal opinion was "a deliberate contrivance .. meant to undermine the efficacy of
official acts of the Commission from the municipal board of canvassers to the First Division of the
Commission and even the Commission en banc which had not in any way issued any restraining order to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate."
On the other hand, there are the facts asserted by the petitioners--- never denied or disputed by
respondents --- that as of the time that the fiscal's opinion was solicited and even thereafter, Datu
Dimaporo had never yet "enjoyed the powers and functions appurtenant to the Office of the mayor," had
never been paid his salary as mayor, and had not as yet "been accorded recognition as elected mayor ...
by the provincial and national government; and that indeed, "long before the query for legal opinion was
lodged, (Maclis) Balt .. (had been) already designated as Officer-in-Charge" and since then and during an
the time material to the inquiry, had been discharging the functions of mayor of Marogong.
The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been held, must be exercised, not on the vindictive,
but on the preservative principle. 21 It is not to be meted out of pique, or from an imperial sense of the
nature and functions of judicial office. What appears to be an honest difference of opinion has been blown
up into something that it is not --- a direct and confrontational challenge to the puissance and prerogatives
of the Commission. In a word, petitioners have been found in contempt because, to put it baldly, their
opinion did not sit well with the Commission and failed to conform to its own views. Judicial sensibilities
should not become too tender or self-protective. All things considered, the contempt ruling here cannot be
justified on the preservative principle, there being no clear showing, either in the terms of the allegedly
contumacious opinion or from the circumstances that led to its issuance, of any intent to denigrate the
authority of the respondent Commission or erode the faith and respect due its decisions, orders or other
actuations.
[15] [Masangkay vs COMELEC]
GR No. L-13927 | September 28, 1962 | Contempt Power | Bautista Angelo, J | Aguinaldo
Petitioner: Benjamin Masangkay

Respondents: The Commission on Elections
Case Doctrine:
The Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its ministerial functions, such as the distribution of ballots
and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities, has no power to punish for contempt,
because such power is inherently judicial in nature.|||
FACTS:
Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before the Commission on
Elections with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing serial numbers 1-8071, 1-8072 and
1-8073 containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of
the instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated on September 2, 1957, and
its unnumbered resolution dated March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence
of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized
representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens' Party, as required in the
aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court. Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commission
in its resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt and custody of the
official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different
municipalities of the province.
Evidence was presented by both the prosecution and the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the
Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and
sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary
imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other
respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Commission on Elections lacks power to impose the disciplinary
penalty meted out to petitioner (YES)
HELD:The Court expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot
exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature.
As this Court has aptly said: 'The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders
and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice'. The exercise of that power by
an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid.
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the
charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an
administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the
distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact,
Masangcay, who as provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one designated to take charge of the receipt,
custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was charged with having opened three
boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several municipalities in violation of the instructions
of the Commission which enjoin that the same cannot be opened except in the presence of the division
superintendent of schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista
Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and distribution not in
accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said resolutions. And because of such violation
he was dealt as for contempt of the Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the
Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and
void.
[16] [Distribution v. Santos]
GR No. 212616 | 10 July 2017 | NOTICE AND HEARING | PERALTA, J | Mansilla
Petitioner: DISTRIBUTION & CONTROL PRODUCTS, INC./VINCENT M. TIAMSIC

Respondents: JEFFREY E. SANTOS
Case Doctrine: The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination
of employment can be effected:
(1) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and
(2) t he second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
Facts:
Respondent filed against herein petitioners a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal and payment of
separation pay. Respondent contended that:
· he started working as petitioners' company driver on April 5, 2005;
· on December 16, 2010, he received a notice informing him that he was being placed under preventive
suspension for a period of thirty (30) days beginning December 17, 2010 because he was one of the
employees suspected of having participated in the unlawful taking of circuit breakers and electrical
products of petitioners;
· a criminal complaint was filed against him and several other persons with the Prosecutor's Office of
Mandaluyong City;
· he immediately inquired from petitioner company's Human Resources Department as to the exact
reason why he was suspended because he was never given the opportunity to explain his side before
he was suspended but the said Department did not give him any concrete explanation; and after the
lapse of his 30-day suspension he was no longer allowed to return to work without any justification for
such disallowance.
Labor Arbiter: finding respondent to be illegally terminated from his employment. Thus, ordering his
reinstatement and payment of his full back wages.
NLRC promulgated its Decision dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming, with modification, the
decision of the LA. In addition to the payment of back wages, the NLRC ordered petitioners to pay
respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, instead of reinstatement.
CA rendered its assailed Decision denying the certiorari petition and affirming the questioned NLRC
Decision and Resolution
Issue: Was the Respondent Illegally dismissed?
Held:
Our Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence uniformly guarantee to every employee or worker tenurial
security. What this means is that an employer shall not dismiss an employee except for a just or
authorized cause and only after due process is observed. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests
upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily
mean that the dismissal was illegal.
In the instant case, petitioners contend that their termination of respondent's employment was based on
their loss of trust and confidence in him.
Loss of trust and confidence is a just cause for dismissal under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, which
provides that an employer may terminate an employment for "fraud or willful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative."
However, in order for the employer to properly invoke this ground, the employer must satisfy two
conditions:
1. The employer must show that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence.
a. managerial employees, or
b. those who, by the nature of their position, are entrusted with confidential and delicate
matters and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected
2. establish the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence.
[Notice and Hearing]
As to whether or not respondent was afforded procedural due process, the settled rule is that in
termination proceedings of employees, procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of notice
and hearing.
The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment
can be effected:
(1) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and
(2) t he second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera, this Court laid down the guidelines on how to comply with procedural
due process in terminating an employee:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds
for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the opportunity to submit
their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus
Rules means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to enable
them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed as a period of at least five (5)
calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an opportunity to study the accusation
against them, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the
defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to
intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of
the facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company
rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against
the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or conference
wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the
charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence
presented against them by the management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are
given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel
of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to
come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the
employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge
against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the
severance of their employment.
In the instant case, the LA, the NLRC and the CA again uniformly ruled that respondent was dismissed
sans procedural due process. The only notice given by petitioners to respondent was the notice of his
30-day preventive suspension and, as found by the LA, nothing therein indicated that he was required nor
was given the opportunity to explain his side, considering that he was being implicated in the theft of the
subject circuit breakers and other electrical products. It is true that petitioners conducted their own
investigation but the same was made without the participation of respondent.
[17] [Suntay v. People]
G.R. No. L-9430 | 29 June 1957 | Administrative Due Process | Ponente | Ty
Petitioner: Emilio Suntay

Respondents: People of the Philippines
Case Doctrine:
FACTS:Emilio Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. He
used this passport to leave the Philippines for San Francisco, California, USA on January 20, 1955 for his
studies.
While in the United States for his studies, Suntay’s passport was cancelled by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs through the Consul-General in San Francisco (who received the orders through the
Philippine Ambassador to the United States). The cancellation of the passport was ordered on March 7,
1955.The passport of Suntay was cancelled on the grounds of the criminal charges that he was facing in
the Philippines at that time. Suntay was then compelled to return to the Philippines in order to stand trial
for the criminal charges that he was facing.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Secretary of Foreign Affairs breached Administrative Due Process when he
ordered for the cancellation of Suntay’s passport (NO)
Whether or not Suntay’s criminal charges was a valid reason for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to cancel
his the petitioner’s passport (YES)
RATIO:The Supreme Court ruled that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs had not breached Administrative
Due Process when he ordered for Suntay’s passport to be cancelled. Furthermore, Suntay’s criminal
charges being the reason for the passport’s cancellation does not equate to the disregard of
Administrative Due Process for Suntay. When necessary, the DFA Secretary may order for the
cancellation of a passport without the need of a hearing such as in cases where a person with criminal
charges leaves the Philippines to evade criminal charges. Such action is under the DFA Secretary’s
discretion and is also allowable under the Constitution in the exception provided for by Section 6 of the
Bill of Rights.
[18] [Ang Tibay v. CIR]
G.R. No. L-46496 | February 27, 1940 | Administrative Due Process | Laurel, J. | Teñido
Petitioner: Ang Tibay, represented by Toribio Teodoro, manager and proprietor, and National WOrkers
Brotherhood
Respondents: Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union
Case Doctrine: Requisites of Administrative Due Process
These are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) The Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the
person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
"While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached."
This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) The evidence must be "substantial."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
FACTS:The Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations has filed a motion
for reconsideration wherein the court has considered the legal conclusions stated in Spanish language.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgment of the majority of this
court and remanded the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for new trial averring among other
issues 1) that Toribio Teodoro claimed that there was a shortage of Ang Tibay leather shoes thus it made
him necessary to lay off the members of the National Labor Union, Inc. 2) That the supposed lack of
leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of
this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army. 3) That the National Worker's
Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence
and functions of which are illegal. 4) That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice
for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc. and unjustly favoring the National Workers’
Brotherhood.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the issues should be properly directed, resolved or determined by the Court of
Industrial Relation. (YES)
HELD: Yes, the CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation. It
is more administrative than part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a
more receptive organ of the Government. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act 103.
The Court, on some occasions, point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner
as it may deem just and equitable.
However, the fact that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements
does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The Court held that there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to failure to receive
all relevant evidence. Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted and the entire record of this case is
remanded to the CIR.
[19] [Pascual v. Board of Examiners]
GR No. L-25018| May 26, 1969 | Administrative Due Process| Fernando, J. | Ricasio
Petitioner: ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR
Respondents: BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA

GATBONTON
Case Doctrine: : The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while
administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in
the revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine.
FACTS: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of
Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant.
It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case7 for alleged immorality, counsel
for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was
the respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made a record of his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board
of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on
February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the
meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. the lower court ordered that a
writ of preliminary injunction issue against the respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or
further proceeding with such an administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter.
The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee to
the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the
affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee’s remedy is to object once he is in the
witness stand, for respondent “a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,”
precluding the issuance of the relief sought.
Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted with grave abuse of discretion. A decision was
rendered by the lower court in favor of the petitioner-appellee.
ISSUE/S: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself. (YES)
HELD: The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while administrative
in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in the revocation
of the license of the respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness
stand.
The right against self-incrimination extends not only to the right to refuse to answer questions put to the
accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the
witness stand when called as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self
incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the
human personality.
[20] [Zambales Chromite v. CA]
GR No. L-49711| November 7, 1979 | Administrative Due Process| AQUINO, J. | Almase
Petitioner: ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO., GONZALO P. NAVA, VIOLA S. NAVA, FEDERICO S.
NAVA, PERLA NAVA, HONORATO P. NAVA, ALEJANDRO S. NAVA, PURIFICACION SISON, A.
TORDESILLAS, GUIDO ADVINCULA, PEDRO ANGULO and TOMAS MARAMBA
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL

RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, GREGORIO E. MARTINEZ, ALEJANDRO MENDEZ, NICANOR
MARTY, VICENTE MISOLES, GUILLERMO YABUT, ANDRES R. FIAGOY, MIGUEL A. MANIAGO,
CASIMIRO N. EBIDO, ENRIQUE RIVERA, SEVERINO MIVA, ELENITO B. MARTINEZ, LUCAS
EDURAIN, FELIMON ENCIO, EMILIO ILOCO, DIOSDADO MISOLA, ERNESTO VALVERDE, PABLO
PABILONA, ARMANDO MINAS, BARTOLOME MARAVE and CECILIO OOVILLA
Case Doctrine: : The reviewing officer must be other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of
the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he
would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. That is the obvious, elementary reason
behind the disqualification of a trial judge, who is promoted to the appellate court, to sit in any case
wherein his decision or ruling is the subject of review
FACTS: This is a mining case. The petitioners appealed from the second decision o f the Court of
nd holding that it was improper from Benjamin M. Gozon, as
Appeals, reversing its first decision a
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, to affirm his own decision as Director of Mines.
Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc. (group of Gonzalo Nava, petitioners) filed a case and sought to be
declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of 69 claims located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They
are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and Pabilona.
On the basis of petitioners’ evidence, Director Gozon dismissed the case. He found that the petitioners
did not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law. He further
ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and Pablo Pabiloña (respondents, MP
group) were duly located and registered.
Petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (SANR). Pending appeal,
Director Gozon was appointed as SANR. Instead of inhibiting himself, he decided the appeal as if he was
adjudicating the case for the first time. He acted as trial judge and appellate judge in the same case. He
ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the disputed mining claims, while, on the other hand the MP
group had validly located said claims. Appeal was dismissed.
ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared that ZCM had the
rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis
found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that
Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural
Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier decision
to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied both
petitions.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Sec. Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as
Director of Mines (YES)
HELD:
Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of
Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his
own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice.
The Mining Law (CA 137) provides that the decision of the Director of Mines may be appealed to
the SANR. In case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision of either, the matter may be
taken to the court of competent jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the provision contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different from the
Director of Mines. The reviewing officer must be other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of
the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he
would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. That is the obvious, elementary reason
behind the disqualification of a trial judge, who is promoted to the appellate court, to sit in any case
wherein his decision or ruling is the subject of review.
Sec. Gozon should have asked his Undersecretary to undertake the review. Petitioners were
deprived of due process, meaning fundamental fairness, when Sec. Gozon reviewed his own decision as
Director of Mines.
[21] [Anzaldo v. Clave]
G.R. No. L-54597 | December 15, 1982 | Administrative Due Process | J. Aquino | Chua
Petitioner: Felicidad Anzaldo

Respondents: Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and as Presidential
Executive Assistant; Jose A.R. Melo, as Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, and Eulalia L.
Venzon
Case Doctrine:
FACTS: Anzaldo seeks to annul the decision of Clave, revoking her appointment as Science Research
Supervisor II and directing the appointment to that position of Venzon. The contested position became
vacant when its incumbent, Dr. Quintin Kintanar, became Director of the Biological Research Center.
Doctor Kintanar recommended that Dr. Venzon be appointed to that position. Dr. Anzaldo protested
against that recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to be valid and
meritorious. Because of that impasse, which the NIST Commissioner did not resolve, the position was not
filled up. At the time the vacancy occurred, Anzaldo and Venzon were holding similar positions in the
Medical Research Center. Both were next-in-rank to the vacant position. Later, Dr. Afable became the
Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. He appointed Dr. Anzaldo to the contested position. The appointment was
approved by the CSC. Afable explained that the appointment was made through a thorough study and
screening and upon the recommendation of the NIST Staff. Venzon appealed to the President of the
Philippines, which was later sent to the CSC.
Clave and Melo recommended in Resolution No. 1178 that Dr. Venzon be appointed to the contested
position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the appointment of Dr. Anzaldo which was duly
attested and approved by the CSC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Clave denied due process to Anzaldo on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. (YES)
HELD:It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive
Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission.
The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-49711, November 7,
1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the decision of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining case as Director of Mines was void
because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative justice.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed
Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should
be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of
the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.
In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Service
Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service
Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case,
that would not be fair to the appellant.
We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in favor of
Doctor Venzon. The appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in accordance with law and properly
exercised his discretion in appointing Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position. Doctor Anzaldo is senior
to her in point of service. Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently and satisfactorily discharged
the duties of the contested position for more than four (4) years now and that she is qualified for that
position, her appointment should be upheld. Doctor Venzon's protest should be dismissed.
[22] [Caoile v. Vivo]
G.R. No. L-27602 | October 15, 1983 | Administrative Due Process | Plana, J. | Bernardino
Petitioner:
● L-27602: Vicente Caoile, Santos Caoile and Filipe Caoile
● L-27603: Jose Caoile
● L-28082: Commissioner of Immigration and Captain Delfin Macalinao, CIS, PC
Respondents:
● L-27602 and L-27603: Martiniano P. Vivo, Acting Commissioner of Immigration, the Board of
Commissioners of Bureau of Immigration, and Felix Endencia as Deportation Officer of the
Bureau of Immigration
● L-28082: Juan Garcia
Case Doctrine: A review by the Commissioners of the board’s decision is based on the evidence already
presented before the board. The law does not require notice and hearing for such a review. The
petitioners were already heard when they presented their evidence before the board of special inquiry.
Hence, the immigrants seeking entry are not entitled to another hearing. In exclusion cases, like the
instant case, the court has no power to overrule the factual findings of the immigration authorities, unless
their findings are manifestly unfair or their conclusions are arbitrary.
FACTS: The petitioners sought admission as Filipino citizens on the basis of the certificates of
registration which were issued to enable them to travel directly to the Philippines from Hongkong allegedly
as children of Antonio Caoile, a Philippine citizen. The airport immigration officer referred to their
admission to the board of special inquiry to determine filiation and paternity to a Filipino citizen since the
certificate is not conclusive evidence to establish citizenship. At the investigation, the petitioners and their
alleged father testified. The board concluded that the petitioners are Filipino citizens under the principle of
jus sanguinis, being the children of Antonio Caoile.
The two decisions were submitted to individual members of the Board of Commissioners of Immigration
where Commissioners wrote “Exclude” and “Noted” on the said decisions. On January 24, 1962, the
Secretary of Justice, acting in the public interest, pursuant to section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code issued Memorandum No. 9 where he directed that in view of the fact that “for the past several
years, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on
the cases coming before it, all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal from, or on review motu propio of, decisions of the board of special inquiry”
were “set aside.”
The Secretary instructed the Board of Commissioners to review all the decisions of the board of special
inquiry admitting entry of aliens into the Philippines and give preference to all cases where the entry has
been permitted on the ground that the entrant is a citizen of the Philippines. In compliance with this, the
Commissioner of Immigration ordered an immigration officer to study and review the proceeding and the
evidence as to the admission of Teban, Felipe, Vicente, and Santos. The trial court observed that the
petitioners were denied due process because the investigation was conducted without notice to the
immigrant and without hearing them. The immigration officer recommended the reversal of the decision of
the board of special inquiry but only to the case of Teban, Felipe, Vicente, and Santos. The Board of
Commissioners found that the said persons were aliens not properly documented for admission pursuant
to Immigration Law. The lower court held that Vicente, Santos, Filipe, and Jose were entitled to remain in
the Philippines as Filipino citizens. It ruled that the Commissioner’s decision was void because it was
rendered beyond the statutory one-year period for reviewing the decision of the board of special inquiry.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petitioners (Vicente, Santos, and Felipe) were given due process of law.
HELD: Yes. The trial court’s observation that petitioners were denied due process because
Commissioners Vivo, Ranola and Gaston reviewed the decision of the board of special inquiry without
notice to them and without hearing them is not well-taken. The law does not require notice and hearing for
such a review. The petitioners were already heard when they presented their evidence before the board
of special inquiry. The trial court manifestly erred in nullifying the finding of Commissioners Vivo, Ranola,
and Gaston that the evidence presented before the board of special inquiry was not sufficient to establish
the alleged Philippine citizenship of the Caoiles. In arriving at that conclusion, the Commissioners did not
act with grave abuse of discretion. There is no showing that it was a glaringly erroneous conclusion. In
exclusion cases, like the instant case, the court has no power to overrule factual findings of the
immigration authorities, unless their findings are manifestly unfair or their conclusions are arbitrary. And
since the Commissioners of Immigration are under the Department of Justice, in this case, they followed
the Secretary’s order setting aside the individual actions of the former Commissioners, the aggrieved
parties should have exhausted their administrative remedies by appealing to the Secretary before seeking
judicial intervention. Hence, the decisions of the trial court in L-27602 and L-27603 are reversed and set
aside. The petitions are dismissed.
[23] [Cenon Cordero and Pedro Cordero vs. The Public Service Commission, Francisco Caguicla
and Manuel Opulencia]
Docket No. L-32489| March 28, 1983 | Administrative Due Process | Vasquez, J. | Lim
Petitioner: Cenon Cordero and Pedro Cordero

Respondents:The Public Service Commission, Francisco Caguicla and Manuel Opulencia
Case Doctrine: The order requires, in addition to publication, individual notice to the operators affected
by the application and whose names appeared in the list, attached to the order. The requirement,
therefore, is not in the alternative, but conjunctive. It cannot be disputed that this requirement of the Public
Service Commission itself in connection with an application for a certificate of public convenience, is
within the power of the Commission to impose. The inadequate notification to the interested parties in this
case, which resulted in the oppositor’s failure to be present during the hearing, deprived them of their day
in court. The decision rendered in disregard of said right, consequently is null and void.
FACTS:Petitioners have taken this appeal from a decision of the respondent Public Service Commission
authorizing the private respondents to sell ice and supply cold storage for the province of Batangas and
the City of Lipa. The petitioners are holders of a certificate of public convenience to operate an ice-plant in
the municipality of Bauan and to sell the ice produced therein in the municipalities of Bauan and Mabini,
province of Batangas.
In assailing the validity of the decision appealed from, the petitioners contend that the decision is null and
void due to the lack of the requisite notice of hearing and the hearing having been delegated to an official
of the respondent Commission who is not a member of its legal division nor a chief of a division.
The lack of notice adverted to by the petitioners is the failure of the notice of hearing to be served
individually by registered mail or personal delivery on “all affected parties” mentioned in the list supposed
to be attached to the notice of hearing. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioners may
not complain that they were not notified of the hearing inasmuch as the notice of hearing was published in
two newspaper of general circulation in the province of Batangas and the requirement of individual
notices to the affected parties could not have been complied with as no such list was attached to the
notice of hearing issued by the hearing officer.
ISSUE/S:Whether or not there was a violation of due process. (YES)
HELD:In Olongapo Jeepney Operators Association vs. Public Service Commission, the notice of hearing
of an application for a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility service was published in
two newspapers of general circulation in the province, but no individual notices were sent to the operators
affected. Under those facts, the following pronouncement was made: “In this instance, respondent
applicant contends that the publication of the notice of hearing in 2 newspapers of general circulation in
the province of Zambales is notification not only to the interested parties, but to the whole world in
general. This is inaccurate. The order required, in addition to publication, individual notice to the operators
affected by the application and whose names appeared in the list attached to the order. The requirement,
therefore, is not in the alternative, but conjunctive. It cannot be disputed that this requirement of the Public
Service Commission itself in connection with an application for a certificate of public convenience, is
within the power of the Commission to impose. The inadequate notification to the interested parties in this
case, which resulted in the oppositor’s failure to be present during the hearing, deprived them of their day
in court. The decision rendered in disregard of said right, consequently is null and void.”
Thus, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside.
[24] [Naguiat v CA]
G.R. No. 116123.| March 13, 1997| Administrative Decisions | Panginiban | Hidalgo
Petitioner: Naguiat
Respondents: CA
Case Doctrine:
FACTS:Clark Field Taxi inc., headed by Naguit (President), had a concessionaires contract for the
operation of taxi services in Clark Air Base. Respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxi
drivers. Due to the Phase out of the US military bases in the Philippines. The services of respondents
were terminated.
The union negotiated with the company regarding their separation benefits. It was agreed that the amount
will be 500 php for every year of service. Respondents refused, left the union and joined a National union
and filed a complaint v Naguiat for separation pay. Claiming that they are regular employees of Naguiat
enterprises after being hired by CFTI.They claimed CFTI closed due to financial losses.
The Labor arbiter ruled that they are regular employees of CFTI and ordered the award of 1.2k php for
every year of service for “humanitarian reasons”. LA did not award separation pay since CFTI did not
close due to financial loses , but due to the untimely closure of Clark Air Base.
NLRC: Reversed, and unilaterally increased the amount of separation pay granted by the LA, Naguiat
claims that this is not supported by substantial evidence since it is a self serving allegation of the drivers
that their take home pay was not lower than $240.
ISSUE/S:Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolution
increasing the amount of separation pay(YES/NO)
HELD:NO,Long-standing and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the judicial dictum that findings of
fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality;
and are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion, or where it is
clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record.
Private respondents set forth in detail the work schedule and financial arrangement they had with their
employer. Therefrom they inferred that their monthly take-home pay amounted to not less than $240.00.
Herein petitioners did not bother to refute nor offer any evidence to controvert said allegations. Remaining
undisputed, the labor arbiter adopted such facts in his decision. Petitioners did not even appeal from the
decision of the labor arbiter nor manifest any error in his findings and conclusions. Thus, petitioners are in
estoppel for not having questioned such facts when they had all opportunity to do so. Private
respondents, like petitioners, are bound by the factual findings of Respondent Commission.
[25] [Reyes vs Zamora]
GR No.L-46732 | May 5, 1979 | Administrative Appeals and Review | Santos | Brubio
Petitioner: Mario Reyes

Respondents: HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA as Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Office of
the President, MARSMAN and Co., Inc., and e.g. Vito
Case Doctrine: Petitioner’s bare allegation that the Office of the President acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in conducting a new hearing on appeal is devoid of
merit. Firstly, if that were his belief, he should not have taken part in the hearing, and testified therein. He
should have taken proper legal steps to raise his objection at the earliest opportunity. With his
participation and cooperation in said new hearing, he is now estopped from complaining that the Office of
the President conducted new hearings on appeal. Secondly,petitioner can cite no law or jurisprudence to
support his argument. For the truth is, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, “(T)here is no law which
prohibits the Office of the President from conducting additional hearings in an appealed case” and that the
said Office “is by itself an administrative body and as such is possessed with fact-finding prerogative,
especially so when the purpose thereof is necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper adjudication of the
case.” Further, the Solicitor General observed that the new hearing was necessary because “public
respondent found the evidence on record wanting in some important factual aspects as to be able to
determine whether or not petitioner’s suspension and/or dismissal is justified.”
FACTS:Petitioner Mario Z. Reyes is Credit and Collection Manager and Operations Coordinator of
Marsman andCo., Inc. On January 17, 1974, the Company thru its Vice-President,E.G. Vito, herein
private respondent, suspended him indefinitely for“misappropriation of company funds.” At that time,
petitioner has been with the Company for seven years, six months and twelve days.
It appears that in December, 1973, the Company sponsored a sales promotional contest to advertise its
pondocillin products. A certain Evangeline R. Tagulao, a nurse employed at SingerIndustries Phil., Inc.,
won the first prize—a Volkswagen Beetle1200. However, Miss Tagulao chose to receive the cash value of
the car which was P24,000.00. Accordingly, the Company issued PCIBCheck No. 416234 dated
December 19, 1973 for P24,000.00 in favor of Miss Tagulao. The check was delivered to Miss Tagulao by
petitioner Reyes,accompanied by Ms co-employee Victor Santos. Together, the three of them went to a
bank to cash the check.
The Company received letters from the winner, Tuglao. The letter stated that she only received 20,000
from Reyes and that she expects to receive the remaining balance of 4,000. Thereafter, the company
issued a check amounting to 4.000 to Tuglao and advised Reyes that he was being placed under
suspension. It also filed withNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on January 21, 1974, an
application for clearance to terminate the complainant's services.
However, during the same day, Tuglao informed the company that she is returning the check and that she
did actually receive the full amount of 24,000.
Reyes filed with the NLRC an "Opposition to Request for Clearance to Dismiss" and prayed that
respondent Company be ordered "to immediately reinstate (him) to his former position with full
back-salaries.
The case was assigned to Mediator-Fact-finder Mirasol Corleto for mediation and/or fact-finding. After
hearing, she submitted a "Mediation Report" to the NLRC wherein she found the petitioner innocent of the
charge of misappropriation and recommended his reinstatement with back wages. The NLRC issued an
order adopting the findings of the mediator. From the NLRC’s order, both parties appealed to the Minister
of Labor. The minister of labor’s decision ordered the reinstatement of Reyes with back wages.
Respondents Company and E.g. Vito filed a Motion for Reconsideration The Minister of Labor, Hon. Blas
F. Ople, found the Motion for Reconsideration "lacking of merit" and denied the same. A Second Motion
for Reconsideration filed by respondents was again denied.
Respondents then appealed to the Office of the President, praying for the reversal of the Order of the
Minister of Labor denying their motion for reconsideration.
The Office of the President decided the appeal after additional hearings were conducted by it. It reversed
the decision of the Minister of Labor ordering the reinstatement of Reyes with backwages, having found
Tagulao's "diamond ring story" implausible.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Office of the President has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of private
respondents, under RuleXXI, Sec. 13 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code of the
Philippines ?
HELD: Petitioner’s allegation that the grounds relied upon are not those provided for is more apparent
than real. For the truth is, as theSolicitor General and the private respondents point out, the allegation that
“(T)he order is contrary to law and jurisprudence on the matter” raises a question of law and hence can be
subsumed under paragraph (b), aforequoted. Indeed when one alleges that anorder is contrary to law and
jurisprudence, plain common sense dictates that the order is being attacked on question of law.
Again, the second ground—that “the order contains serious errors in the findings of facts and would cause
grave or irreparable damage and injury to appellants”—is in the final analysis tantamount to alleging “
abuse of discretion”, and may be subsumed under paragraph (a), supra. Serious errors in the findings of
facts may not per se be equated with abuse of discretion. UnderRule XIII, Section 7 of the Rules and
Regulations providing for appeals from the decision of the Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitration to the
NLRC, “abuse of discretion” and “serious errors in the findings of facts” are two separate and distinct
grounds, i.e. (a)and (d) thereof. In this case, however, a careful perusal of private respondents' appeal will
show that they are raising principally grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Minister in rendering his
decision. As previously stated, the main thrust of respondents' argument is that under the circumstances
of the case, the Ministermade a palpably erroneous conclusion in holding that petitioner did not commit a
breach of respondents’ trust and confidence. This is tantamount to ascribing to him an abuse of
discretion.
In any event, the first ground, which raised a question of law,already conferred jurisdiction in the Office of
the President to entertain the appeal.
Petitioner's bare allegation that the Office of the President acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
and/or with grave abuse of discretion in conducting a new hearing on appeal is devoid of merit. Firstly, if
that were his belief, he should not have taken part in the hearing, and testified therein. 31 He should have
taken proper legal steps to raise his objection at the earliest opportunity. With his participation and
cooperation in said new hearing, he is now estopped from complaining that the Office of the President
conducted new hearings on appeal. Secondly, petitioner can cite no law or jurisprudence to support his
argument. For the truth is, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, "(T)here is no law which prohibits the
Office of the President from conducting additional hearings in an appealed case" * and that the said Office
"is by itself an administrative body and as such is possessed with fact-finding prerogative, especially so
when the purpose thereof is necessary, nay indispensable, to the proper adjudication of the case."
Further, the Solicitor General observed that the new hearing was necessary because "public respondent
found the evidence on record wanting in some important factual aspects as to be able to determine
whether or not petitioner's suspension and/or dismissal was justified."
[26] [Equitable Banking Corporation vs. NLRC]
G.R. No. 102467| Quantum of Evidence| Topic |J. VITUG| Jalandoni
Petitioner: EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, Chairman MANUEL L. MORALES, President &
Director GEORGE L. GO, Vice-Chairman & Director RICARDO J. ROMULO, Vice-Chairman & Director
JOHN C.B. GO, Director HERMINIO B. BANICO, Director FRANCISCO C. CHUA, Director PETER GO
PAILIAN, Director RICARDO C. LEONG, Director JULIUS T. LIMPE and Director PEDRO A. ORTIZ
Respondents: HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, First Division, and RICARDO L.
SADAC
Case Doctrine: It would virtually be foolhardy to so challenge the NLRC as having committed grave
abuse of discretion in coming up with its above findings. Just to the contrary, NLRC appears to have been
rather exhaustive in its examination of this particular question (existence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship between the parties). Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of
evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, connotes
merely that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to be adequate in
justifying a conclusion.
FACTS: Private respondent Sadac was appointed, effective 01 August 1981, Vice-President for the Legal
Department of petitioner bank by its then President, Manuel L. Morales, with a monthly salary of
P8,000.00, plus an allowance of P4,500.00 and a Christmas bonus equivalent to a two-month salary.1 On
08 December 1981, private respondent was also designated as the bank’s General Counsel. The turning
point in the relationship among the parties surfaced, when, on 26 June 1989, nine lawyers3 of the bank’s
Legal Department, who were all under private respondent, addressed a “letter-petition” to the Chairman of
the Board of Directors, accusing private respondent of abusive conduct, inefficiency, mismanagement,
ineffectiveness and indecisiveness.4 The individual written complaints of each of the nine lawyers were
attached to the “letter-petition.” Private respondent was furnished with a copy of the letter.
Private respondent promptly responded and manifested an intention to file criminal, civil and
administrative charges against the nine lawyers. Petitioner Morales, by now Chairman of the Board of
Directors, called the contending lawyers to a conference in his office in an attempt to resolve their
differences. The meeting held on 29 June 1989, in the presence of Vice-President for Personnel and
Human Relations Dean Alejandro C. Reyes, apparently did not amount to much and only resulted, it
would seem, in a broad commitment of the parties to implement the “existing procedures and practices in
the Legal Department.” The dialogue was marked, in fact, by “rancorous and very heated altercation”
between the private respondent and his subordinates. Mr. Morales considered the problem serious
enough to merit the Board’s attention. In its meeting on 11 July 1989, the Board of Directors, apprised of
the situation, adopted a resolution directing one of its directors, petitioner Herminio B. Banico, to look
further into the matter and to “determine a course of action for the best interest of the bank.”
Petitioner Banico met with the complaining nine lawyers on 17 July 1989. He was warned that if private
respondents were to be retained in his position, the lawyers would resign en masse. The following day,
Mr. Banico saw the private respondent. The latter denied the charges leveled against him. Although the
two would appear to have explored various alternatives and avenues to solve the crisis, nothing positive,
however, came out of their meeting. Convinced that reconciliation was out of the question, Mr. Banico, on
08 August 1989, submitted a report to the Board of Directors. Two days later, or on 10 August 1989, Mr.
Morales issued a memorandum to the private respondent which stated that he was going to be
substituted by Atty. William R. Veto due to how the private respondent acted during the formal hearing
against him.
Reacting to the above memorandum, private respondent, on 14 August 1989 addressed a letter to Board
Chairman Morales, furnishing the other members of the Board, to the effect that the report of Mr. Banico
contained libelous statements and that the implementation of the chairman’s memorandum would lead to
an illegal dismissal. Pointing out that he could not now in conscience resign in the face of Mr. Banico’s
“baseless and libelous findings,” private respondent requested for a full hearing by the Board of Directors
so that he could clear his name. On 17 August 1989, petitioner Ricardo J. Romulo, Board Vice-Chairman,
answered the private respondent. Mr. Romulo stressed that private respondent’s services were not
terminated by the Board which, instead, was merely exercising its managerial prerogative “to control,
conduct (its) business in the manner (it) deems fit and to regulate the same.” In reply to private
respondent’s request for a formal hearing, Mr. Romulo reiterated the Board’s decision that it would be to
the best interest of all concerned if the “distasteful spectacle” of a hearing would not be resorted to “in
order to adhere to (the bank’s) long standing compassionate policy.”
Undaunted, private respondent, in his memorandum of 07 September 1989 to the individual members of
the Board of Directors, persisted in his request for a formal investigation.13 Having been unheeded,
private respondent, on 09 November 1989, filed with the Manila arbitration branch of the NLRC, a
complaint, docketed NLRC Case No. 00-11-05252-89, against herein petitioners for illegal dismissal and
damages. Pursuing their stand that the association between the bank and private respondent was one of
a client-lawyer relationship, herein petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint with the NLRC on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Private respondent, opposing the motion, insisted on the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between them. Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr., on 02 October
1990, rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.20 The Labor Arbiter was convinced
that the relationship between petitioner bank and private respondent was one of lawyer-client based on
the functions of the latter which “only a lawyer with highly trained legal mind, can effectively discharge.”
On appeal, the NLRC concluded differently. On 24 September 1991, the First Division of the NLRC
rendered a resolution reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that the private respondent was
an employee of petitioner bank which “never stated that complainant was an outside counsel for he was
never so” as against the pronouncement of the Court in Hydro Resources that distinguished between an
inhouse counsel and an outside counsel hired on a retainer basis. Certain other circumstances that
likewise did not escape NLRC’s attention were that petitioner George L. Go, the bank’s president, had
enjoined private respondent to attend a bank-sponsored symposium on Japanese investment on 08
September 1989 at the Hotel Intercontinental; that in petitioners’ letter of 31 August 1989, private
respondent was referred to as an employee; that in another letter, dated 24 November 1989, petitioner
admitted having terminated private respondent’s employment and requested the return of the 1988
Mitsubishi Galant 1800 which he had acquired through the bank’s car plan; and that, through a
communication of 02 January 1990 of the Personnel and HRD Department, the bank announced that
private respondent’s employment had been terminated effective 21 November 1989.
The NLRC held that because he had not been afforded a hearing in accordance with law, there was no
factual basis to support the allegation of loss of confidence made by petitioners who, instead, had relied
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. The NLRC ruled that the private respondent was denied the right to
due process with the bank’s failure to observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing. NLRC
instructed petitioners to reinstate the respondent, to pay him full back wages, pay him moral damages
and pay for his legal fees.
Ending the above incidents, particularly the motion for reconsideration of NLRC’s resolution that has
reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision, petitioners have filed the instant petition for certiorari, with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, before this Court.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the NLRC established quantum evidence required to establish a fact in cases
before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies. - YES
HELD: Yes, the NLRC established quantum evidence required to establish a fact in cases before
administrative and quasi-judicial bodies. It would virtually be foolhardy to so challenge the NLRC as
having committed grave abuse of discretion in coming up with its above findings. Just to the contrary,
NLRC appears to have been rather exhaustive in its examination of this particular question (existence or
absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties). Substantial evidence, which is the
quantum of evidence required to establish a fact in cases before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies,
connotes merely that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to be adequate
in justifying a conclusion.
[27] [MIRO vs MENDOZA]
GR Nos. 172532 & 17544-75 | Nov. 20, 2013 | Quantum of Evidence | Brion, J. | Ruth Tan
Petitioner: Primo C. Miro, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
Respondents: Marilyn Mendoza vda. de Erederos, Catalina Alingasa, and Porferio I. Mendoza
Case Doctrine: Quantum of proof needed for administrative cases- Substantial Evidence (Sec. 27,
Ombudsman Act of 1989-from case; Sec. 5, Rule 133, ROC-from outline)
Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there
is reasonable ground to believe, based on evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the
complaint thereof. It does not need to be overwhelming or preponderant, as required in an ordinary civil
action, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be
enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
FACTS: Respondents, who were LTO officers and employees, were charged with an administrative
charge for Grave Misconduct and a criminal charge for violating RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) on the ground that they sold confirmation certificates (P2500.00/pad) to the complainants,
which were supposed to be issued by LTO for free. More people filed the same complaints. Hence, the
cases were consolidated.
Thereafter, Deputy Ombudsman Miro rendered a joint decision on the administrative cases, and a joint
resolution on the criminal cases and held that the employees were guilty as charged and imposed a
penalty of dismissal from service.
Upon appeal to the CA, it reversed and set aside DO Miro’s joint decision in the administrative cases and
held that DO Miro’s finding of grave misconduct was not supported by substantial evidence because the
affidavits, on which the decision was mainly anchored,were not corroborated by any other documentary
evidence, and that the complainants failed to specify that the respondents personally demanded the
payments- an allegation that the CA deemed material in establishing their personal knowledge. Without
such allegation of personal knowledge, CA held that the statements in the affidavits were mere hearsay,
and thus, should not be given any evidentiary weight.
*as for the criminal cases, CA held that it had no jurisdiction to review it
DO Miro filed for a reconsideration but it was dismissed. Hence, the present petition.
DO Miro claims that the evidence adduced by the complainants satisfied the requisite quantum of proof.
He argues that the complainants’ personal knowledge can be gleaned from the preface of their narration.
Hence, their affidavits could not have been hearsays. Furthermore, he claims that his decision was also
based from the NBI/Progress report and not just from the complainant’s affidavit. Thus, all these evidence
more than satisfy the required quantum of proof to hold respondents liable.
ISSUE/S: W/N the evidence shown were enough to satisfy the required quantum of evidence. (Which is
substantial evidence for the Office of the Ombudsman) (NO)
HELD: NO. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the findings of fact by the Office of
the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.
The Court affirmed CA’s findings that for an affidavit to be deemed as a substantial evidence, it must
contain *2 important elements, which are (1)personal knowledge; and (2) corroborating evidence.
Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there
is reasonable ground to believe, based on evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for the
complaint thereof. It does not need to be overwhelming or preponderant, as required in an ordinary civil
action, or evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as required in criminal cases, but the evidence must be
enough for a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.
In the present case, the only pieces of evidence presented by the complainants to establish respondents’
guilt are (1)their complaint-affidavits; and (2)NBI/Progress report, which, as found by the CA and affirmed
by SC, do not meet the quantum of proof required in an administrative cases.
Baka lang itanong ni Atty. Kaw.

*
(1) Personal Knowledge – those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may not testify on
what he merely learned, read, or heard from others as such is considered as hearsay.
In the present case, records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of
money from one respondent to another. Next, such transfers of money were not even specifically alleged
in their affidavits. Lastly, complainants did not allege any specific acts of the respondents.
(2)Corroborated Evidence
In the present case, the affidavits were never identified by the complainants as they did not appear during
the scheduled hearings. Furthermore, all allegations were uncorroborated by evidence, other than the
NBI/Progress report.
[28] [Ligtas v. People]
G.R No. 200751 | August 17, 2015 | Quantum of Evidence | Leonen, J. | Maulion
Petitioner: Monico Ligtas

Respondents: People of the Philippines
Case Doctrine:
1. The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board that
Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having
rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have their own produce.
2. Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are
entitled respect id supported by substantial evidence. This court is not tasked to weigh again “the
evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the
sufficiency of evidence. “
FACTS:
Monico Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of RPC. Essentially, the Information
states that on June 29, 2000, Ligtas entered into the abaca plantation of Anecita Pacaete in Sitio Lamak,
Sogod, Southern Leyte, and harvested 1000 kilos of abaca fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00
per kilo, without the consent of the owner, Anecita Pacaete. Ligtas pleaded not guilty.
Ligtas admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner. According to him,
he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacaete since 1993. Andres
installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to 2 hectares of land involved in the criminal case. Further,he alleged
that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacaete sent workers to harvest abaca from the land he cultivated. Ligtas
prevented this harvest since he was the rightful tenant of the land. Lastly, he denied harvesting on June
29, 2000. He claimes he was attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, Sogod, Southern Leyte.
On November 21, 2000, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Dept of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Sogod, Southern Leyte, for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession. On January 22, 2002, the
DARAB ruled that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land in question. RTC and CA considered this
DARAB decision.
However on August 16, 2006, RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove theft. CA affirmed RTC’s
ruling. CA declared that Ligtas reliance on DARAB decision is irrelevant in the case at bar. Ligtas filed a
motion for reconsideration, however it was denied, hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the DARAB decision is conclusive - YES
HELD:
1. Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private complainant’s tenant.
The DARAB decision is entitled to respect, even finality, as the Dept of Agrarian Reform is the
administrative agency vested with primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters
relating to tenancy relationship.
The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence. To require petitioner to prove
tenancy relationship through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the
witnesses is absurd and goes beyond the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence.
SC held that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on
courts if supported by substantial evidence. Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding
on criminal proceedings. However, the case at bar does not involve an administrative charge stemming
from the same set of facts involved in a criminal proceeding. It only involves a determination of whether
there exists a tenancy relationship between Ligtas and Pacaete.
Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are
entitled respect id supported by substantial evidence. This court is not tasked to weigh again “the
evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the
sufficiency of evidence. “
2. According to Ligtas, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the RPC were not established since
he was a bona fide tenant of the land. The Court concurred.
The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and
private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the
owner’s consent. The DARAB Decision implies that Ligtas had legitimate authority to harvest the
abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

[29] American Tobacco v. Director,
L-26803 | October 14, 1975 | Delegating to hear | Antonio, J. | Saquido
Petitioner: AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, CARNATION COMPANY, CURTISS CANDY

COMPANY, CUDAHY PACKING
Respondents: THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P.
VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ
Case Doctrine: it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency
vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which
the decision of the administrative agency will be made.
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine
Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any
ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director
and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or
trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of priority of
adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a
trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases,
alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under the Trade Mark law (RA
166) the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes cases. Said objections were
overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel The
Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the delegation of the Director of Patent to its officer to hear the case of the petitioner is
valid. - YES
HELD:
The court held that Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the
assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other departments,
bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned,
controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter
submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same
Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent
Office." The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement
of the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166).
It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a
statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order
to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There is no
provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the
designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred
from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act.
The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited
laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act No. 165) should be construed so as to give the
aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his
duties in the administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine
the question of priority in patent interference proceedings, decide applications for reinstatement of a
lapsed patent, cancellations of patents under Republic Act No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as
oppositions, claims of interference..
Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency
vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of
which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. The rule that requires an
administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as
a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the
facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion
finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the
requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will
make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is
no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met.
Petition Dismissed.
Note:
The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases 168. - Original Jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. —
The Director of Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, xxxx [Such inter
partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title shall be heard before the
Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking official designated by the Director, but all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the
Director and signed by him.”
[30] SKYWORLD v. SEC
G.R. No. 95778 | July 17, 1992 | Delegating Authority to Hear | Gutierrez, J. | Paralejas
Petitioner: Skyworld Condominium Home Owners Assoc
Respondents: SEC
Case Doctrine: The Commission can validly delegate the authority to exercise the specific powers
assigned to it by law. The final paragraph of Section 6, Pres. Decree No. 902-A states:
In the exercise of the foregoing authority and jurisdiction of the Commission, hearings shall be conducted
by the Commission or by a Commissioner or by such other bodies, boards, committees and/or officers as
may be created or designated by the Commission for the purpose
FACTS: On September 12, 1975, Inter Realty obtained a loan from the CBC as security for which it
mortgaged three (3) parcels of land, which were later consolidated into one title, TCT No. 33451, and the
improvements thereon. On July 21, 1987, the initial indebtedness was increased to P7,000,000.00.
For Inter-Realty's failure to pay the debt, the CBC foreclosed the condominium project. The foreclosure
sale was held on April 11, 1983 after compliance with the notice requirements. The project was sold to
CBC which who the highest bidder.
On April 6, 1984, Inter-Realty and CBC executed a Memorandum of Agreement providing for an extended
period for redemption of the condominium project, until all the condominium units shall have been sold
and the proceeds turned over to the CBC and applied to the loan accounts of Inter-Realty (Rollo, pp.
38-42).
Meanwhile, on the same date, April 6, 1984, Inter-Realty made a written authorization in favor of Angel
Bautista, a real estate dealer, to buy or sell the condominium units to buyers (Rollo, pp. 43-44). The
authority was for a period of one year or until April 1985 in order to facilitate the disposition of the units
and the payment of indebtedness with the CBC.
In May, 1985, CBC was notified by petitioner SCOAI through Angel Bautista, who was the latter's
president, of the organization and official incorporation of the SCOAI.
When Inter-Realty failed to redeem the foreclosed properties by October 1985, CBC consolidated its
ownership over the land (now covered by TCT No. 38837) and 78% of the condominiums residential units
and common areas.
On December 16, 1985, the CBC as new owner of the foreclosed properties and with the aim of
recovering the unpaid debt of Inter-Realty, authorized Angel Bautista to sell the unsold condominium
units. This authority was, however, revoked by CBC on April 17, 1986 after discovering that Bautista
violated his fiduciary obligations as agent.
Two petitions were filed against the petitioner SCOAI, one of them contesting the existence of the
petitioner as an entity, and the other, for a writ of preliminary injunction praying that the petitioner be
stopped from exercising the prerogatives of a condominium corporation. The first petition was filed on
August 8, 1986 by CBC before the SEC docketed as SEC No. 3035. The second was filed on October 9,
1986 before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch V (Civil Case No. 915-R) by the respondent
Baguio Skyworld Condominium Corporation (BSCC) which was organized at the instance of CBC and
registered with the SEC on September 19, 1986.
On October 3, 1986, a petition was filed by CBC against Angel Bautista before the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City (Branch III, Civil Case No. 908-R) for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Mr. Bautista
from further representing himself as agent of the new owner-developer, the CBC, which already revoked
his authority to sell. The trial court granted a writ of preliminary injunction which was later made
permanent by the Court of Appeals.
On November 14, 1986, the case filed by the BSCC was dismissed by the trial court. On February 3,
1988, the case filed by the CBC was dismissed by the SEC.
On June 20, 1988, BSCC filed a complaint before the SEC's Prosecution and Enforcement Department
(PED) to revoke the certificate of registration of petitioner on the ground of fraudulent procurement of the
certificate. The case was docketed as PED No. 88-0418 (Rollo, p. 73, et. seq).
On January 13, 1989, petitioner SCOAI in turn sued to revoke the certificate of registration of the BSCC
before the SEC's Securities Investigation and Clearing Department (SICD). The case was docketed as
SEC No. 3493.
Acting upon the complaint of the BSCC in PED No. 88-0418, the PED, through Senior SE Specialist
Norberto Ruiz filed a petition docketed as SEC No. 3601 dated June 30, 1989 with the BSCC as a relator,
for the revocation of the registration of the herein petitioner. (See Rollo, pp. 95-107). The said petition was
approved by PED Director Elnora Adviento as recommended by the Chief of the Prosecution Division,
Villamin P. Lam.
On July 5, 1989, the SICD endorsed SEC No. 3493 (the one filed by SCOAI) to the PED so that a new
docket number, PED No. 89-572-A was assigned to that case.
The two cases for revocation of registration of the SCOAI (PED No. 88-0418) and the BSCC (PED No.
89-572-A) were consolidated on July 25, 1989.
A hearing was conducted on September 11, 1989 by the PED with Mr. Norberto Ruiz as the hearing
officer. The counsels of the two parties were present.
On December 12, 1989, the PED issued a resolution ordering the revocation of the certificate of
registration of the SCOAI. The resolution was prepared by Mr. Norberto Ruiz after studying the
substantial evidence he received and the arguments of the parties in the memoranda submitted by the
parties to him. On the same date, the resolution was presented by PED Director Elnora Adviento before
the Commission en banc w hich approved the same.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Mr. Ruiz has authority to hear the case via Delegation of the Authority to Hear by the SEC
HELD:
The Commission can validly delegate the authority to exercise the specific powers assigned to it by law.
The final paragraph of Section 6, Pres. Decree No. 902-A states:
In the exercise of the foregoing authority and jurisdiction of the Commission, hearings shall be conducted
by the Commission or by a Commissioner or by such other bodies, boards, committees and/or officers as
may be created or designated by the Commission for the purpose. . . .
In the consolidated cases, the Commission empowered the PED to conduct the hearing and to decide on
the revocation of a certificate of registration. The task was assigned to Mr. Ruiz for and in behalf of the
Commission.
It is true that Mr. Ruiz signed a petition with the BSCC as a relator prior to the consolidation of the two
cases. However, that petition was apparently disregarded. Mr. Ruiz was validly authorized to handle the
two cases simultaneously filed by the private parties themselves against each other. It must be recalled
that in PED No. 88-0418, BSCC pursued its case by itself and not as a mere relator suing through the
help of the PED. A private entity is not prohibited from prosecuting its action for revocation of registration
by itself. Otherwise, the petition of SCOAI against the BSCC also seeking the revocation of the latter's
registration would not have been taken cognizance of by the SEC on the ground that the case should
have been prosecuted by the Commission upon the relation of SCOAI. Under the old rules, the
Commission may, motu propio, commence such an action (Section 3(c), Rule XX, SEC Rules of
Procedure [1977]; See also Section 2(a) and (b), Rule XX, SEC Revised Rules of Procedure [1989]).
Commencement of a similar action by a private citizen or corporation is not precluded.
In judging the merits of the case at the instance of the Commission, Mr. Ruiz acted only as a trier of the
facts presented to him and not as a prosecutor at the same time. The resolution arrived at was adopted
by the Commission, en banc as its own decision, upon its approval.
.
[31] CAB v. PAL
G.R. No. L-40245 | April 30, 1975 | Enforcement of Decision | Esguerra, J. | Jimenez
Petitioner: Civil Aeronautics Board
Respondents: Philippine Air Lines, Inc
Case Doctrine: The fine imposed is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are
empowered to impose without criminal prosecution.
FACTS: Philippine Air lines, Inc (PAL) provides services between Tuguegarao and Manila (Flight 213)
and between Baguio and Manila (Flight 205). In 1970, PAL had an excess of 20 passengers from Baguio
to mAnila who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate these 20 passengers, PAL
required the aircraft operating Flight 213 to pass Baguio City on its way to Manila and pick up these
passengers. Flight 213 at that time was carrying only five passengers.
The following are the additional facts established before the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB):
A. At the time of the incident, no other airline served Manila and Baguio. No other airline was
affected by the flagstop.
B. The expenses incurred by the PAL in operating the flagstop at Baguio City far exceeded the
revenue that it derived from the twenty passengers that it fetched at Baguio City. The flagstop,
therefore, was motivated not by profit but solely by PAL's desire to meet a public need for
additional service between Baguio and Manila on that date..
C. No one, except perhaps the Chairman of the CAB, filed any formal complaint with the CAB. The
complaint claims that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CAB before operating
the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of RA No. 776. The CAB, in its first resolution,
imposed a fine of P5,000 against PAL and further resolves to warn PAL that a repetition of the
same will be dealt with more severely. PAL filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAB
Resolution and argues that "the power and authority to impose fines and penalties is a judicial
function exercised through the regular courts of justice, and that such power and authority cannot
be delegated to the Civil Aeronautics Board by mere implication or interpretation".
The CAB held after considering PAL’s motion for consideration reduced the fine to P2,500.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CAB has the legal authority to impose fines (YES)
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the CAB is fully authorized by RA No. 776 to impose fines in the nature of
civil or administrative penalty for violation of its rules and regulations but not to impose fines in the nature
of criminal penalty which can be done only by courts of justice.
The Civil Aeronautics Board "shall have the general supervision and regulation of, and jurisdiction and
control over, air carriers as well as their property, property rights, equipment, facilities, and franchise, in
so far as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act." (Sec. 10 Republic
Act 776). It has the power "to issue, deny, amend, revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend or revoke, in
whole or in part, upon petition or complaint, or upon its own initiative any temporary operating permit or
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity" (Sec. 10(c) (1) Republic Act 776).
The CAB has the power to "investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, whether any individual
or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and regulations issued
thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may be necessary to
prevent further violation of such provisions, or rules and regulations so issued (Section 10(D) Republic
Act 776).
Likewise, the CAB has the power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any
administrative decision or order" of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to
"imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and
regulations issued thereunder." It has the power also "either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal
from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to impose, remit,
mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and civil penalties, as the case may be." (Sec. 10(F) (G)
Republic Act 776). (Emphasis for emphasis). The power to impose fines and/or civil penalties and make
compromise in respect thereto is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator (Sec. 32(17)
Republic Act 776).
The penalty imposed is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose
without criminal prosecution.
There is no doubt that the fine imposed on appellant PAL in CAB resolution 109(70) and 132(70) is that
fine or civil penalty contemplated and mentioned in the foregoing provisions of Republic Act 776 and not a
fine in the nature of criminal penalty as contemplated in the Revised Penal Code, because the "fine" in
this case was imposed by the C.A.B. because of appellant PAL's violation of C.A.B. rules on flagstops
without previous authority.
To deprive the C.A.B. of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision
and control over air carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to
insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. If everytime the C.A.B. would like to impose a
civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulations it would have to resort to courts of
justice in protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent, efficient and
effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording
safe and convenient air transit.
The SC modified the fine imposed on PAL to P100.

[32] [Bautista v. Board of Energy]
75016.|13 Jan 1989| Enforcement of Decision| Paras J| Carig
Petitioner: Samuel Bautista
Respondents: PERLA C. BAUTISTA, GREATER MANILA FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS
DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, Petitioners, v. BOARD OF ENERGY, MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
The Solicitor General for public Respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent MERALCO.
Camilo D. Quiason co-counsel for Meralco.
Case Doctrine:
Under similar circumstances, this Court has upheld the authority of regulatory boards like the Energy
Regulatory Board (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, Et Al., G.R. No.
78888-90, June 23, 1988), to grant provisional relief upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint
or at any stage thereafter, and without the need of prior hearing, but it shall call a hearing thereon within
thirty days thereafter for the determination of its final decision.
FACTS: On May 30, 1986, MERALCO filed with the BOE a verified application for an upward revision of
its rates alleging that the company has suffered net losses in 1984 and 1985, a drop in kilowatt sales and
the deterioration of system loss, among others. The proposed rate increase is 9.5 centavos per kilowatt
hour. However, consumptions up to 130 kilowatt hours per month of residential customers, and up to
70kilowatt hours of small commercial customers, and consumptions of government-owned hospitals
andpublic street lighting services are not affected by the increase.On June 9, 1986, the petitioners filed for
an opposition and prayed that no provisional approval should begranted by the BOE. They alleged that
they, together with others similarly situated, are adversely affected by the increase in rates of MERALCO
and that the increase in rates is exorbitant and unreasonable as the prices of petroleum products had
already gone down.On June 11, 1986, the BOE provisionally approved MERALCO's revised rate
schedules without hearing. Alleging that they were not afforded the opportunity to be heard, the
petitioners moved for reconsideration of the BOE’s order. The motion was denied by the Board without
setting it for hearing,contending that it has the power to grant provisional relief on motion of a party in a
case or even on itsown initiative under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6173, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1128,in relation to Section 9(e) of Presidential Decree No. 1206 .Petitioners argue that the
authority of the BOE to grant provisional approval without hearing is not absolute, but is subject to the due
process clause of the constitution and that their opposition to the grant of provisional approval — should
have been set for hearing for MERALCO to present a prima facie case on the issue of urgent public
need.Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the Board of Energy acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it provisionally approved the application for increase in rates of MERALCO without
hearing.
Held: Petition DISMISSED.The records show that the issue has become moot and academic as
MERALCO decreased its rate by 12.6 centavos per kilowatt hour in its electric, bills for August 1986,
apart from a 4.2 centavo cut per kilowatt-hour for September 1986. Where during the pendency of the
case, certain events or circumstances have taken place which would render the case moot and academic,
the petition for certiorari will be dismissed. Hence, the Court will neither determine an abstract proposition
nor express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief may be granted in view of supervening
events. Assuming that the case has not yet become moot, it is beyond dispute that when
BOEprovisionally authorized private respondent's application without hearing, it merely exercised
prerogatives granted to it by law.This Court has upheld the authority of regulatory boards like the Energy
Regulatory Board to grant provisional relief upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any
stage thereafter and without the need of prior hearing, but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days
thereafter for the determination of its final decision. The order granting such provisional relief, however,
must be based upon substantial evidence — supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, and is
without prejudice to rendition of a final decision after hearing.
[33] [San Luis vs Court of Appeals]
G.R. No. L-80160 | June 26, 1989 | Enforcement of Decision | Cortes, J | Villaganas
Petitioner: GOVERNOR FELICISIMO T. SAN LUIS, THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN,

PROVINCIAL ENGINEER JUANITO C. RODIL AND PROVINCIAL TREASURER AMADEO C. ROMEY,
ALL OF LAGUNA,
Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIANO L. BERROYA, JR
CASE DOCTRINE: Decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when
such officers acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
FACTS:
1. Berroya denounced graft and corrupt practices by employees of the provincial government of
Laguna. Governor San Luis issued Office an order transferring Berroya. Berroya challenged this
transfer. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) ruled that the transfer was violative of RA 2260,
and ordered that Berroya be reverted to his regular position of quarry superintendent.
2. Instead of complying with the CSC, San Luis suspended Berroya. The CSC reiterated its directive
for the immediate reversion of Berroya to his former position and ruled the one-year suspension
illegal. San Luis appealed to the Office of the President (OP). The OP reversed the CSC rulings.
3. Berroya filed a motion for reconsideration, the OP rendered another Decision setting aside the
previous decision. In the interim, San Luis dismissed Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent
unauthorized absences, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of duty and abandonment of
office, which was appealed by Berroya to the CSC. CSC resolved said appeal by again in favor of
Berroya
4. San Luis sought relief from the CSC decision declaring Berroya's dismissal unjustified. The CSC
Merit System Board denied said motion for reconsideration. San Luis then moved to set aside the
OP Decision. The OP dismissed said motion.
5. The RTC upheld the validity of Berroya's dismissal, but it ordered his reinstatement to an
equivalent position as a matter of equity.
ISSUE/S: WON the RTC erred in setting aside the findings of the administrative bodies? Yes.
HELD: The trial court’s act of reviewing and setting aside the findings of the two administrative bodies
was in gross disregard of the basic legal precept that accords finality to administrative findings of facts.
The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of
administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or
in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and
agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence. The reinstatement of Berroya as ordered in the final and executory administrative decision,
became clear ministerial duty on the part of authorities.
[34] [Heirs of Derla v. Heirs of Hipolito]
G.R. No. 157717 | April 13, 2011 | Res Judicata | Leonardo-De Castro, J. | Bernardino
Petitioners: Heirs of Maximino Derla, namely: Zelda, Juna, Geraldine, Aida, Alma, all surnamed Derla;
and Sabina Vda. De Derla, all represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, Zelda Derla
Respondents: Heirs of Catalina Derla Vda. De Hipolito, Mae D. Hipolito, Roger Zagales, Francisco
Derla, Sr., Jovito Derla, Exaltacion Pond, and Vina U. Castaway, in her capacity as the Register of Deeds
of Tagum, Davao Del Norte
Case Doctrine: Literally, res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment." It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered
on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
While it is true that this Court has declared that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, we have also limited the
latter to proceedings purely administrative in nature. Therefore, when the administrative proceedings take
on an adversary character, the doctrine of res judicata certainly applies.
Facts: Petitioners are surviving heirs of Maximino Derla, respondent Catalina is cousin of Derla.
Respondent owned 23.9 ha fishpond area. 20.5 ha was originally maintained by Derla. Derla
subsequently executed a SPA to Catalina wherein his rights are recognized and that Catalina owns one
half of the fishpond. Derla soon sold all his interests to Catalina for 10k. The fishpond application for the
20.5 ha fishpond bought from Derla was soon filed.
Derla filed his own application over a 7.5 ha fishpond area adjoining Hipolito’s fishpond area. On
November 21, 1960, Catalina charged Derla with Qualified for gathering and carrying away fish from
Catalina’s fishpond. Derla, in his defense, claimed that he was still part-owner of the fishpond when he
harvested the fish. On the strength of the "Transfer of Rights in Fishpond Permit" and Hipolito’s Affidavit
that he and Derla are co-owners of the fishpond and that he promised to pay Derla after the settlement of
the fishpond boundary conflict, the court acquitted Derla on November 29, 1960.
The Director of Fisheries approved the application but was reversed by Sec. of Agri due to appeal by
Catalina. Derla now sought the CFI for a “Declaration of Nullity of Transfer of Right in a Fishpond Permit”
but was dismissed on the grounds of prescription and estoppel, since it has now been 10 years, action to
annul contract has prescribed and estoppel because that document was used to acquit him in the earlier
criminal case.
The Office of the President affirmed the decision by the Agri Sec. on the fishpond application. But the
application for the fishpond area was opposed by Panabo, saying this will affect their development as
directed by RA 5743. This claim was denied by the Office of the President.
Appeal by Derla to the CA and SC denied. SC decision became final and executory.
Panabo filed for Certiorari w/Prelim Injunction to assail the application of Catalina. In the midst of the
case, President Marcos commented via a letter to Sec. Zamora that the sale of the fishpond area will
affect the developments in Panabo. OP revoked its former decisions on granting the application to
Catalina. Catalina then filed for Certiorari w/Preliminary Injunction. The latter relief was granted.
After EDSA, she filed a petition with the OP saying she was a victim of the Marcos regime’s schemes, as
to her fishpond application. It was referred to the Sec. of Agri who found for Catalina, saying that she was
not afforded due process in denying her the sales application.
November 11, 1991 Order by the OP: Deciding in Catalina’s favor, the Office of the President held that
the late Hipolito, having complied with all the terms and conditions for an award of the subject fishpond
area, had already acquired a vested right therein.The Office of the President also applied the doctrine of
res judicata as its February 5, 1974 decision rejecting Hipolito’s fishpond sales application was based on
then President Marcos’ marginal note, which it found to be legally and constitutionally suspect for having
been issued after the February 11 and November 2, 1972 decisions had become final and executory. The
Office of the President also ruled on the prohibition under Presidential Decree No. 43, saying that the
SANR at that time directed the continuance of the processing of the pending fishpond sales application
subject to a final inspection and verification.
Petitioners once again came into the picture but both the RTC and Court of Appeals denied the
petitioners’ claims on the ground of res judicata. The lower courts have similarly held that the annulment
of the titles, as sought by the petitioners, relied on the same facts and evidence that were already
presented and passed upon in the earlier O.P. Case No. 4732; thus, barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata applies.
Held: Yes, the doctrine of res judicata applies. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated
the elements of res judicata as follows:
a. The former judgment or order must be final;
➔ The November 11, 1991 Decision in O.P. Case No. 4732 has attained finality twenty
(20) years ago. It is valid and binding. In fact, on April 27, 1995, the Office of the
President issued an Order for the sole purpose of declaring its November 11, 1991
decision final and executory.
b. It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
➔ The facts and evidence which supported Catalina's petition for revival of Hipolito's
fishpond sales application in O.P. Case No. 4732 are the same facts and evidence now
before us; hence, the difference of actions in the two cases is of no moment. In O.P.
Case No. 4732, the action was to revive Hipolito's fishpond sales application, which,
when granted, gave the respondents the right to the subject fishpond area, eventually
leading to their ownership over the same.
c. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and
➔ The action in Civil Case No. 97-15, the case that was elevated to become this petition, is
for the nullification of the respondents' respective titles to the subject fishpond area on
the ground that the respondents have no right thereto. If we allow the nullification of these
titles on the ground presented by the petitioners, then we would also be nullifying the
decision in O.P. Case No. 4732, because it is the decision in that case that gave the
respondents the right to the subject fishpond area.
d. There must be, between the first and second actions, the identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of the cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between
the same parties.
➔ The parties, although later substituted by their respective successors-in-interest, have
been the same from the very beginning and in all the proceedings affecting the subject
fishpond area. The concerned agencies and the lower courts have validly ruled on the
rights to the subject fishpond area, the validity of the documents covering it, and even the
actions associated and related to it. The subject fishpond area is undoubtedly the same
subject matter involved in O.P. Case No. 4732 and the petition now before us.
[35] [Brillantes v. Castro]
GR No. L-9223 | June 30, 1956 | Res Judicata | Montemayor, J. | Navarro
Petitioner: EDUARDO BRILLANTES

Respondents: LEONARDO CASTRO, doing business under the name and style of “ALMACAS
POLICE PROTECTIVE BUREAU”
Case Doctrine:
The principle of res judicata is applicable to decisions of a quasi-judicial body like the WAS. In
this connection, it has been declared that whatever a final adjudication of persons invested with
power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the SC, upon a writ of
error or a certiorari; such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.
FACTS:
On December 1, 1953, Brillantes filed a complaint against Castro before the Wage Administration Service
(WAS) for the recovery of the alleged unpaid salary and overtime pay. On February 15, 1954 Brillantes
and Castro entered into an Arbitration Agreement whereby they agreed “1. That they submit their case to
the WAS for investigation; and 2. That they bind themselves to abide by whatever decision WAS may
render over the case; and that they recognize said decision to be final and conclusive.
WAS ruling: the claim for overtime and underpayment is hereby dismissed but the respondent is adjudged
to pay the claimant P50.88 corresponding to his salary for services rendered in the month of November.
No appeal was taken from this decision and on November 10, 1954, Brillantes filed a complaint against
Castro with this Court over the same subject matter and cause of action litigated between them before
and decided by the WAS. The counsel of Brillantes agreed that the decision rendered by the hearing
officer of the WAS is an order issued pursuant to section 7 of Minimum Wage Law in relation section 12
which authorizes delegation by the Secretary of Labor of his powers in the administration or enforcement
of the MWL to the Chief of the WAS, however he contends that the right to go to the Supreme Court for
review of said order granted by section 7 of MWL is not exclusive because under said section the review
by this Tribunal is limited to question of law and that the findings of fact contained in the appealed
decision must be accepted.
Trial Court ruling: dismissed the complaint on the ground that it is barred by prior judgment. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the second complaint is barred by prior judgment. - YES
HELD:
The SC fully agree with the decision of the trial court that the complaint is barred by prior judgment. There
is no question that the complaint filed by Brillantes with the WAS may be regarded as a suit by one party
as against another to enforce a right; that the WAS in entertaining said suit, hearing the parties and
deciding the case acted as quasi-judicial body and the proceedings before it were quasi-judicial
proceedings, and conducted in accordance with law, and so was the decision rendered. The failure of
Brillantes to appeal from said decision to the SC as provided by the Minimum wage law rendered it final
and conclusive and served as a bar to another action between the same parties involving the same
subject matter and cause of action and the same issues. Besides, the parties signed an agreement
whereby they submitted their case to the WAS, binding themselves to abide by whatever decision it would
validly render.
[36] [Ipekdjian v. CTA]
GR L-15430.| 30 Sept 1963 | Res Judicata | Ponente | Carig
Petitioner: IPEKDJIAN MERCHANDISING CO., INC.,

Respondents: COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
Petitioner: Latorre, Blanco, Gadioma & Josue

Respondent: Solicitor General, Special Attorneys P. R. Gonzales and J . C . Llamas
Case Doctrine:
The essential requisites for the existence of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must
be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions: (a) identity of
parties (b) identity of subject matter and (c) identity of cause of action (Navarro v. Director of Lands,
L-18814, July 31, 1962; Aring v. Original, L-18464, Dec. 29, 1962).
The doctrine of res judicata does not apply exclusively to courts but may be extended to
decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
FACTS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed from Ipekdjian P97, 502.25 as
compensating tax and surcharge on gold chains imported by it, which were later converted into gold
bullion, plus P200 compromise penalty. Ipekdjian appealed to Board of Tax Appeals. TheBoard of Tax
Appeals affirmed the Commissioner’s judgment. Ipekdjian appealed to SupremeCourt but the latter
dismissed the same. Ipekdjian sought to reinstate its appeal with SupremeCourt but was denied.
Ipekdjian sought to reopen the case with CTA. CTA dismissed. Motion For Reconsideration was also
denied. Ipekdjian made partial payment, but later it filed with theCommissioner a claim for refund of the
same. This was denied. Ipekdjian filed petition for review in CTA. Commissioner filed his answer in the
CTA case, raising the affirmative defense of res judicata. Motion for execution of judgment in BTA case
was granted by CTA; hence this petition for certiorari. Ipekdjian argues that res judicata applies only to
judgment of courts, not to decisions of administrative agencies.
Issue:Whether or not res judicata applies to decisions of administrative agencies.
Held:YES.
From appellant’s petition in B.T.A. Case No. 10 and the decision of the Board it may be gathered that
what appellant sought therein was the review of the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue holding
it liable for P97,502.25 as compensating tax, etc., with the purpose in mind of having the same reversed.
In its petition for review in C.T.A. Case No. 374, after alleging the same facts embodied in the B.T.A.
decision, with the addition of the circumstance of payment, it prayed that it be held not subject to the
aforementioned compensating tax; that the Collector be made to refund the P5,000.00 it had paid; and
that the respondent Collector’s demand or assessment for the balance of the compensating tax be
cancelled. It is clear that the alleged cause of action in both cases is the same: appellant’s claim to
non-liability for compensating taxes.
The only appreciable difference is that while in the B.T.A. case it assailed the Collector’s decision
assessing the sum of P97,502.25 as compensating tax, etc., and holding him responsible therefore, in the
C.T.A. case, he ostensibly tried a different tack, by assailing the Collector’s denial of the claim for refund
and request for cancellation of the balance of the assessment. Nonetheless, in both cases, the issue is
the same: whether or not appellant is liable for the compensating tax prescribed in Section 190 of the Tax
Code. Appellant cannot, by merely superficially changing the form of his action, plead the non- application
of the rule of bar by prior judgment. 2
All the requisites for the defense of res judicata being present, respondent court properly dismissed the
petition in C.T.A. Case No. 374.
The resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing the petition is hereby affirmed, with costs against
herein petitioner.
[37] [Delfin v. Inciong]
GR No. 50661 | December 10, 1990 | Res Judicata | Medialdea | Villaganas
Petitioner: RUBEN DELFIN ET. AL.
E HON. AMADO G. INCIONG in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Labor; NLRC

Respondents: TH
Commissioners DIEGO ATIENZA, CLETO VILLATUYA and GERONIMO QUADRA; ATLANTIC
CONTAINER CORPORATION; INLAND INDUSTRIES, INC., LAZARO ARRIOLA ET. AL.
CASE DOCTRINE: The requisites of Res Judicata: a) it must be a final judgment or order; (b)the court
rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (c) it must be a
judgment or order on the merits, and (d) there must be between the two cases identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action.
FACTS:
1. The 136 petitioners in this case are former employees of private respondent Atlantic Container
Corporation and affiliated with the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU). Atlantic and
FEDLU executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement. The petitioner filed a complaint against
Atlantic claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager Jacinto refused to implement the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
2. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) dismissed the case. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was again denied. The CIR was then abolished, and the case was transferred
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC Arbiter Collado rendered a
decision that reinstated 86 out of 136 of the petitioners. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration which was granted.
3. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed. Petitioners then
appealed to the Secretary of Labor Deputy Minister Inciong which also dismissed based, on
among others res judicata was barred by the prior judgment.
ISSUE/S: WON the case is barred by res judicata? Yes.
HELD: For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur
a) it must be a final judgment or order; (b)the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the parties; (c) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (d) there must
be between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. There is no question that
the first three (3) requisites are present in this case.
First, the decision in the first complaint had already become final and executory. The motion for
reconsideration filed by the union in that case was denied by the CIR and no petition questioning the
denial was brought to this court. The fact of its finality was admitted by the petitioners in their second
complaint. Second, the CIR which rendered the decision had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over
the parties. Third, the judgment rendered therein was a judgment on the merits of the case after the
parties presented their evidence, oral and documentary.
[38] [Montemayor vs Bundalian]
GR No.149335 | July 1, 2003 | Res Judicata | Puno, J. | Aguinaldo
Petitioner: EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR

Respondents: LUIS BUNDALIAN, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, Executive Secretary, Office of the President,
AND GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, Secretary, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
Case Doctrine:
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA APPLIES ONLY TO JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR assails the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated April 18, 2001, affirming the decision of the Office of the President in
Administrative Order No. 12 ordering petitioner's dismissal as Regional Director of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for unexplained wealth.
Petitioner's dismissal originated from an unverified letter-complaint, dated July 15, 1995, addressed by
private respondent LUIS BUNDALIAN to the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. Private respondent accused petitioner, then OIC-Regional Director, Region III, of the DPWH, of
accumulating unexplained wealth, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019. Private respondent
charged that in 1993, petitioner and his wife purchased a house and lot at 907 North Bel Aire Drive,
Burbank, Los Angeles, California, making a down payment of US$100,000.00. He further alleged that
petitioner's in-laws who were living in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and
they could not have purchased such an expensive property for petitioner and his wife. Private respondent
accused petitioner of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works projects.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case
subject of this review (NO)
HELD:
The Court did not sustain the petitioner's stance that the dismissal of similar charges against him before
the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the PCAGC moot and academic.
To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject
of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible
criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential
appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the
President over him. As the PCAGC's investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine
of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar.
[39] [BF GOODRICH v. WCC]
G.R. No. L-38569 | March 28, 1988| Res Judicata | Bidin, J. | Dula
Petitioner: B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC.

Respondents: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and LEANDRO M. CASTRO
Case Doctrine:Whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and
rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final
adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof. "The more equitable
attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred".
FACTS: This case stemmed from a claim for disability benefits under Workmen's Compensation Act as
amended by RA 4119 filed by private respondent Leandro M. Castro against petitioner company for
pulmonary tuberculosis alleged to have been contracted in the course of his employment resulting in
disability for labor.
On April 19, 1968, private respondent filed a claim for Workmen's Compensation with the Workmen's
Compensation Section.Thereafter, a Stipulation of Facts, Agreement and Release was entered into
between the parties. Respondent received from petitioner the sum of P1,327.35 in full payment of his
Workmen's Compensation claim. A decision was rendered by the hearing officer and acting referee of the
Workmen's Compensation Section whereby the agreement was approved.
On February 27, 1969, the private respondent filed another claim for Workmen's Compensation on the
basis of the same illness. A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on the ground of res judicata. DOLE
Regional Office 4 thru its Acting Referee, Vivencio Escarcha, dismissed the aforementioned claim on the
ground of res judicata.
November 27, 1973, private respondent filed his third claim for Workmen's Compensation on the basis of
the same illness. The Acting Chief Referee, Atty. Ernesto A. Cruz, of the DOLE, Regional Office No. 4
Workmen's Compensation Section, issued an award in favor of private respondent Leandro M. Castro,
ordering petitioner to pay the claimant, the sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) as compensation and
the Workmen's Compensation Fund. petitioner appealed the said award to the Workmen's Compensation
Commission praying that the same be reversed and rendered null and void. The aforementioned appeal
was dismissed by the Commission. Petitioner filed for MR, but was also dismissed.
ISSUE:Whether or not res judicata applies in this case. (NO)
HELD: There appears to be no dispute that in the case at bar, there is a judgment on the merits rendered
by a quasi-judicial body having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties and that, between the
previous actions and the case at bar, there is identity of parties, of subject matter, and cause of action.
Although the hearing officer and acting referee of the Workmen's Compensation Section cannot be
considered as an ordinary court, "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public,
executive or administrative ocers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme
Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata."
The doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof. "The more equitable
attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred".
In the instant petition, the former judgment is based on a prohibited or null and void contract. Therefore,
there is no valid judgment which can be predicated on res judicata.
While it may be true that respondent claimant Leandro M. Castro received the sum of P1,377.00 from
petitioner which the former acknowledged as full payment of his Workmen's Compensation, on a
Stipulation of Facts, Agreement and Releases, nonetheless, such is not his full compensation under the
law and the aforesaid document is null and void under Section 7 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Clearly, in the instant petition, the amount given to the private respondent was not his full compensation
under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition filed, is Dismissed for lack of merit.

Feb 2 Admin Cases

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[1] [PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR v.

Petitioner: ​THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Petitioner: Presidential Commission on Good Government

L-42783-85| 11-29-1976| Jurisdiction| Teehankee| CJ Arellano

Petitioner: ​CARIDAD CRUZ DE SYQUIA

Ø In December, 1974, private respondents filed three separate complaints with

Whether or not (YES/NO) - No

Petitioner: SALVACION VILLANUEVA, TEOFILO TREDEZ, DONALD BUNDAC, DANNY CABIGUEN,

Petitioner: ​SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO and OFELIA R. DACUDAO

Respondents: ​SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Petitioner: Jose Angara

[9] [PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION VS. AGRAVA]

Petitioner: PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION

Petitioner: ​AGUSMIN PROMOTIONAL ENTERPRISES, INC.

ISSUE/S:​W/N the decision of the Executive Secretary became final → NO

Decisions of the Executive Secretary did not acquire any finality.

Petitioner: IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO,

Petitioners: ​HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of

[13] [Guevara vs. COMELEC]

Petitioner: Enrique M. Fernando

Petitioner: SALIC B. DUMARPA, MARANAO C. DANGANAN and SAADUDDIN ALAUYA

Petitioner: ​Benjamin Masangkay

Petitioner: DISTRIBUTION & CONTROL PRODUCTS, INC./VINCENT M. TIAMSIC

·​ ​he started working as petitioners' company driver on April 5, 2005;

Issue:​ Was the Respondent Illegally dismissed?

a.​ ​managerial employees, or

[Notice and Hearing]

Petitioner: Emilio Suntay

Case Doctrine: ​Requisites of Administrative Due Process

(2) The Tribunal must ​consider the evidence presented.

(3) The ​decision must have something to support itself​.

(4) The ​evidence must be "substantial."

Petitioner: ​ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR

Respondents: ​BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA

Respondents: ​COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL

Petitioner: ​Felicidad Anzaldo

Petitioner: ​Cenon Cordero and Pedro Cordero

ISSUE/S:​Whether or not there was a violation of due process. (YES)

Petitioner: Mario Reyes

Baka lang itanong ni Atty. Kaw.

Petitioner: ​Monico Ligtas

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

Petitioner: AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, CARNATION COMPANY, CURTISS CANDY

Petitioner: ​Skyworld Condominium Home Owners Assoc

Petitioner: ​Civil Aeronautics Board

Respondents:​ Philippine Air Lines, Inc

The SC modified the fine imposed on PAL to P100.

The Solicitor General for public Respondent.

Jose W. Diokno for respondent MERALCO.

Camilo D. Quiason co-counsel for Meralco.

Petitioner: ​GOVERNOR FELICISIMO T. SAN LUIS, THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN,

Issue:​ Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata applies.

Petitioner: EDUARDO BRILLANTES

Petitioner: ​IPEKDJIAN MERCHANDISING CO., INC.,

Petitioner: ​Latorre, Blanco, Gadioma & Josue

Issue​:Whether or not res judicata applies to decisions of administrative agencies.

GR No. 50661 | December 10, 1990 | Res Judicata | Medialdea | Villaganas

Petitioner: ​RUBEN DELFIN ET. AL​.

​ E HON. AMADO G. INCIONG in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Labor; NLRC

ISSUE/S: ​WON the case is barred by res judicata? Yes.

Petitioner: ​EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR

Petitioner: THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE

Petitioner: CARIDAD CRUZ DE SYQUIA

Petitioner: SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO and OFELIA R. DACUDAO

Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Petitioner: AGUSMIN PROMOTIONAL ENTERPRISES, INC.

ISSUE/S:W/N the decision of the Executive Secretary became final → NO

Petitioners: HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of

Petitioner: Benjamin Masangkay

· he started working as petitioners' company driver on April 5, 2005;

Issue: Was the Respondent Illegally dismissed?

a. managerial employees, or

Case Doctrine: Requisites of Administrative Due Process

(2) The Tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) The decision must have something to support itself.

(4) The evidence must be "substantial."

Petitioner: ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR

Respondents: BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA

Respondents: COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL

Petitioner: Felicidad Anzaldo

Petitioner: Cenon Cordero and Pedro Cordero

ISSUE/S:Whether or not there was a violation of due process. (YES)

Petitioner: Monico Ligtas

Petitioner: Skyworld Condominium Home Owners Assoc

Petitioner: Civil Aeronautics Board

Respondents: Philippine Air Lines, Inc

Petitioner: GOVERNOR FELICISIMO T. SAN LUIS, THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN,

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of res judicata applies.

Petitioner: IPEKDJIAN MERCHANDISING CO., INC.,

Petitioner: Latorre, Blanco, Gadioma & Josue

Issue:Whether or not res judicata applies to decisions of administrative agencies.

Petitioner: RUBEN DELFIN ET. AL.

E HON. AMADO G. INCIONG in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Labor; NLRC

ISSUE/S: WON the case is barred by res judicata? Yes.

Petitioner: EDILLO C. MONTEMAYOR

Petitioner: B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC.