GUIDE IN MAKING CASE DIGESTS:

FACTS: Who are the petitioners? What is their problem/position? Who are the respondents?
How did they react? Ruling of the MTC? RTC? NLRC? CA? Keep it short, direct and simple.

ISSUE: Look for the issue regarding due process/ equal protection (checking the syllabus or the
contention of the petitioners usually helps in determining the issue) Keep it short, direct  and
simple.

HELD: Jump to the ruling. Was the petition reversed or affirmed? Why did the Supreme Court
ruled that way? How did the Supreme Court answered the problem of the petitioners? Are there
any doctrines laid down? Principles? Elements and requisites? Keep it short, direct and simple.

PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION

PEOPLE VS. MARTI [Gabe]

FACTS: Appeal from the RTC decision convicting accused of violation of RA 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act).

On August 14, 1987, accused and his wife Reyes went to the Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders in Pistang Pilipino Complex in Ermita, Manila, carrying with
them 4 gift-wrapped packages to be sent to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Accused filled up the necessary information for the transaction. 

Anita Reyes (the proprietress/not related to accused Reyes) inquired if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Accused refused, claiming they merely
contained books, cigars, gloves that were gifts to his friend. Before delivery, Mr.
Job Reyes (husband of Anita Reyes), following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. Upon opening the boxes, a peculiar odor
emitted. His curiosity was aroused so he squeezed one of the bundles. He felt dried
leaves inside. He opened one of the bundles and pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of the gloves. He took several grams of the contents.

Job Reyes prepared a report to the NBI, requesting for a laboratory examination of
the samples he extracted. By afternoon, he was interviewed by the Chief of
Narcotics Section, then 3 NBI agents went to Reyes’ office. 

Job Reyes opened the packages in front of the NBI agents and dried marijuana
leaves were found to have been contained inside. The alleged books also
contained dried marijuana leaves. NBI then tried to locate the accused but to no
avail. An information was filed against the accused in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. 
 RTC convicted the accused. He now argues that the dried leaves were obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and
privacy of communication (Secs. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution), making the same
inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III). Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON the dried leaves were illegally seized and therefore inadmissible as evidence
against the accused.

HELD: No. Evidence was legally obtained and can be used against him. 

The constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and

seizure originated in the 1935 Charter which was also derived verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment. Following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by
the US Federal Supreme Court, this Court held in Stonehill v. Diokno that evidence
obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure warrant is inadmissible as
evidence. 

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence
obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law
enforcers or other authorized government agencies.

In this case however, the evidence was discovered by a private person (Job
Reyes), acting in his private capacity and without intervention of State authorities.
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

The contraband in this case came into the possession of the Government without
the Government transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable search and
seizure. The Court sees no reason why the dried marijuana leaves should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. 

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore

applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State
(not to an individual) to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.

RAMIREZ VS. CA [Angel]

FACTS A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private respondent, Garcia, allegedly
insulted and humiliated her during a confrontation in the office, in an offensive manner contrary to
 morals, good customs and public policy. To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages.
In response, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for
violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to t : he Court of Appeals in a
Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as
null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner. 

ISSUE W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation. 
:

HELD: YES. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all parties to any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use
of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator under this provision of RA 4200

The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. Petitioner's contention that the
phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations"
narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which
meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)."

SILAHIS VS. SOLUTA [Josh]

FACTS: Silahis International Hotel, Inc. through Mr. Jose Marcel Panlilio, petitioners
approved its security agency for a surveillance on the labor union office, based on
reports of dollar smuggling, marijuana use, and prostitution allegedly happening
inside in late 1987. Morning of January 11, 1988, as union officer Soluta was trying
in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated she saw 5 men she
failed to recognize forcibly opening the door of the union office. She also saw one
hid something behind his back. Soluta lodged a complaint before the Security
Officer. He fetched a locksmith to assist him open the door. At that instant, men in
barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his
companions, drawing them to run to the female locker room, and from there went to
the Engineering Office where they called for police assistance. While waiting for the
police, Babay and Panlilio, on the latter's request, met. At the meeting, Panlilio told
Babay that they proceed to the union office where they would settle the mauling
 incident, to which Babay replied that the door could not be opened. 

Panlilio then told a security guard to force open the door. Once inside, Panlilio and
his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even
asked them if they had a search warrant.

They found a plastic bag containing marijuana flowering tops. Soluta was a union
officer. As a result of the marijuana found, he and along with other union officers
were charged with violating R.A. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act. The RTC acquitted
the accused for the marijuana flowering tops were inadmissible in evidence,
coupled by the suspicious circumstance of confiscation. 

Soluta and fellow union officers filed a case against petitioners for malicious
prosecution and violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. The RTC
ruled in favor of Soluta and held Silahis liable to pay damages. Petitioners
appealed. CA affirmed the RTC but found petitioners liable for damages for
violation of their constitutional right against illegal search. Not malicious
prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not an individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional
rights.

Relevant to our topic: Whether or not Petitioners search of the union office was
reasonable under the circumstances.

HELD: Yes, Article 32 of the New Civil Code.

Relevant to our topic: No, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received
reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly undertaken in the union office and
conducted surveillance of the union officers. Yet, in the morning of January 11,
1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office
without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one, and notwithsta
butnding the objection of Babay. The course taken by petitioners and company
stinks in illegality, it not falling under any of the exceptional instances when a
warrantless search is allowed by law. 

Neither does petitioners' claim that they were allowed by union officer Babay to
enter the union oce lie. Babay's account of why petitioners and company went to
the union office — to consider Panlilio's suggestion to settle the mauling incident is
more credible, as is his claim that he protested the search, and even asked if they
were armed with a search warrant. While it is doctrinal that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly, a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. 
 There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish it
to constitute a waiver thereof.  There must be proof of the following: 

(a) that the right exists;

(b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and, 

(c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 

In other words, the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.
The evidence shows otherwise, however. 

SALCEDO VS. CA [Rommel]

FACTS: Respondent Rafael Ortanez filed a complaint before the RTC for annulment of
marriage against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez on the grounds of lack of
marriage license and psychological incapacity.

Respondent offered in evidence three cassette tapes of alleged telephone

conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. The petitioner objected,
but the trial court and CA admitted all of respondent’s evidence.

ISSUE: WON the cassette tapes containing the conversation of the petitioner is admissible
as evidence. (No)

HELD: No. Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone conversations not admissible in

evidence. — RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes”
expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. 

The relevant provisions of RA 4200 as follows:

    Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,

substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information
therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Clearly, respondent’s trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent
 a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under
Rep. Act No. 4200.

DISINI VS. SEC OF JUSTICE [Jyra]

FACTS: The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on the constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175. The cybercrime law aims to regulate
access to and use of the cyberspace. Petitioners argued that even though the Act
is the government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate
sections of the Act, including Sections 4(c)(3) and 12, violate their constitutional
rights.

Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic

communications, commonly known as spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or offer
for sale of products and services unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or
when the purpose of the communication is for service or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users.

Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to
collect or record traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.” Traffic data under this Section
includes the origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the
communication, but not its content nor the identity of users.

1. WON Section 4(c)(3) is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: 2. WON Section 12 is unconstitutional.

1. Yes. The Court noted that spams are a category of commercial speech,
HELD: which does not receive the same level of protection as other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression, but is nonetheless entitled to protection. It
ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited communications would
deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Accordingly, the Court declared Section4(c)(3) as
unconstitutional.
2. Yes. The Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and
definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.

Since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private communications, it must

survive the rational basis standard of whether it is narrowly tailored towards
serving a government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the
government did have a compelling interest in preventing cyber crimes by
 monitoring real-time traffic data. 

As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first

recognized that the right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined
as “the right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live
freely without surveillance and intrusion.” In determining whether a
communication is entitled to the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part
test: (a) Whether the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation
of privacy over the communication, and (b) whether his expectation of
privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the society.

The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation
of privacy over their communications transmitted online. However, it did not
find the expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent
through internet “does not disclose the actual names and addresses
(residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.”

Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12
does not enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the
existence of enough data may reveal the personal information of its sender
or recipient, against which the Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard.
The Court viewed the law as “virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified
communication they want.”

PEOPLE VS. DAMASO [Sophia]   (s&s - searches and seizures)

Lt. Quijardo, with some companions, were sent to verify the presence of CCP/NPA
FACTS: members. Thereafter, they entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant
and he was not present. The person who let them enter the dwelling was, Morados,
a mere helper. The authorities saw copier machines, riffle, ammos, and other items
used for subversion. Hence, Damaso was charged with of PD 1866 (Codifying the laws
on illegal/unlawful possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or disposition, of firearms, ammunition or
explosives or instruments used in the manufacture of firearms, ammunition or explosives, and imposing stiffer
penalties for certain violations thereof and for relevant purposes") Damaso,  now, argues that such
s&s were unlawful due to the fact that he was not present during such s&s.

W/N there were unreasonable searches and seizures. 

ISSUE:

YES, there were unreasonable s&s. The SC held that the right against
HELD: unreasonable s&s is personal and may only be waived by a) the person whose
rights are injured or b) the one who expressly authorized to make the waiver on his
behalf. In this case, a helper does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such
 right, even if she was, there is no evidence to prove such.

SPOUSES VEROY VS. LAYAGUE [Pau]

Petitioners are husband and wife who formerly resided at Davao City. When
FACTS: petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator
of the Social Security System, he and his family transferred to Quezon City where
they are presently residing. The care and upkeep of the house was left to 2
houseboys. The Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house (master’s bedroom
and children’s room, only the key to the kitchen were entrusted to Edna Soquilon.

Capt. Reynaldo Obrero acting upon a directive issued by Metrodiscom Commander

Col. Franco Calida, raided the house of the petitioners in Davao City on the
information that the said residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers
but were only able to enter the yard with the help of the caretakers. Petitioner Ma.
Luisa was contacted by telephone by Capt. Obrero to ask permission to search the
house, the latter responded that she is flying to Davao City to witness the search
but relented if the search would not be conducted in the presence of Major
Macasaet. 

Relying on the given authority by Mrs. Veroy, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet
conducted the search and found among other things a .45 cal. handgun with a
magazine in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer and three half-full jute
sacks containing printed materials of RAM-SFP found in the children’s room. 

An Information against herein petitioners for violation of PD. No. 1886 was filed by
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC. 

PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT: They concede that Capt. Obrero had permission

from Mrs. Veroy but it was for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the
alleged “rebel” soldiers. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the articles seized during the search are admissible as evidence
considering that it is in violation of the constitutional rights of the spouses against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

No, the articles seized during the search are inadmissible as evidence. 
HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, there are exceptions to the rule:
1. A search is incidental to an arrest
2. A search of a moving vehicle
3. Seizure in plain view
 None of these exceptions pertains to the case at bar. Also, under the
circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample time to procure a
search warrant but did not. Hence the rule having been violated and no exception
being applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are therefore
protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be used as evidence against
the petitioners in the criminal action against them for illegal possession of firearms.

PEOPLE VS. EVARISTO [Christian]

FACTS: Romeroso, Vallarta, and Maligaya, members of Philippine Constabulary, and 2

Integrated National Police Officers were on a patrol duty when they heard bursts of
gunfire. Proceeding to the source of the shot, they came upon Rosillo who was
firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the house of Evaristo. The patrolmen chanced
upon Evaristo and Carillo and inquired about the whereabouts of Rosillo which they
were told that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Sgt. Vallarta
noticed a bulge around the waist of Carillo who admitted the same to be a gun.
After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of the military nor had a
license to possess the gun, it was confiscated and Carillo was invited for
questioning.

Romeroso sought Evaristo’s permission to scour through the house, which was
granted. In turn, Romeroso found firearms and paraphernalia used for the repair
and manufacture of firearms.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless search and arrest 

HELD: YES. The 1987 Constitution prohibits the unreasonable searches and seizures. For
a search to be reasonable under the law, there must be a search warrant issued by
an appropriate judicial office. However, this is not an absolute rule. Among these
exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view. It is recognized that objects
inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence.

In this case, Romerosa was granted permission by Evaristo. The officer’s purpose
was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. The search for
firearms was not Romerosa’s purpose in entering the house, rendering his
discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent. Thus, the Court sustains the
 validity of the firearm’s seizure and admissibility in evidence.

As to the warrantless arrest of Carillo, the Court held that the second circumstance
by which a warrantless arrest may be undertaken is applicable (Section 5, rule 113
of the Criminal Procedure provides: (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it.) An offense is committed in the presence or within the
view of an office, when the officer sees the offense or hears the disturbance
created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof.

The visual observation along with the gunfire as well the officer’s professional
instincts are more than sufficient to pass the test of the Rules regarding the
existence of personal knowledge of the officer.

OKABE VS. JUDGE [Yllisa]

FACTS: Petitioner, engaged in “door-to-door delivery” business from Japan to the

Philippines was charged with estafa after failing to deliver the money entrusted to
her by one of the respondents and for having denied the same at first only to return
some of the money back later on. 

Thereafter, the trial court ordered her arrest with a recommended bond that she
had posted accordingly. 

However, after the private prosecutor has raised its concern as to how the
petitioner can easily evade arraignment and plea for just posting bond and
immediately leave for Japan, the trial court issued a Hold Departure Order to
prevent the petitioner from departing from the Philippines. 

This then is what she assails because her arraignment turned to become a
condition before her motions to recall the hold departure order be granted. This is
so, because the trial court as affirmed by the CA, saw her act of posting a personal
bail bond as already a waiver of her right to assail the infirmities that led to the trial
court’s issuance for her arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has indeed waived her right to assail when she posted
a personal bail bond.

HELD: No, because for her to be considered to have waived such right, there must first be
a clear and convincing proof to be established showing that she intends to
 relinquish the same. Therefore, as her posting of a personal bail bond was actually
a matter of necessity to avoid imprisonment, it should not be deemed as an
indication that she has waived her right to assail her arrest. 

VIVARES VS. STC [Kim]

FACTS: Graduating students (minors) of St. Theresa's College - Cebu  were sanctioned and
barred from attending the graduation ceremony for posting photos that showed
them wearing swimsuits/undergarments as well as drinking and smoking. It was
reported by Escudero, a teacher in STC who saw through some of her students
who showed her the pictures. The school held that the said students violated the
student handbook for possession of alcoholic drinks/cigarettes, engaging in
immoral and obscene acts, wearing apparel that exposes underwear and posing
and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure. Petitioners
(Mothers of the students) filed a petition for issuance of Writ of Habeas Date on the
basis of the ff: 

1. Photos of their children in their undergarments were taken for before they
changed into their swimsuits for a beach party;
2. The privacy settings of their FB accounts were set at "Friends Only."
Privacy of the girls has been invaded plus after viewing the photos, they
were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
3. The photos belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced
without their consent. Escudero, violated their rights by saving copies of the
photos in the computer lab of the school and by showing them to STC’s
officials; 
4. The data and digital images were boldly broadcasted by respondents,
constituting an invasion of their children’s privacy. 

ISSUE: WON the Writ of Habeas Data should be issued? (No)

HELD: Petition was denied. The court stated that The Writ of Habeas Data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission by gathering information regarding the
person. It is a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in
the information age.

Requisites:

1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy

2.  An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
 security of the victim (proven by substantial evidence)

The court held that STC did not violate petitioner’s right to privacy since the subject
photos were viewable by the girls FB friends and technically by the public.
Petitioners claimed that the privacy of said photos were only viewable by 5 students
(sila lang daw mag tropa ang nakalagay sa settings) but this was not supported by
evidence. Escudero did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given by some of her students who had legitimate
access to the photos; She was a mere recipient of what was posted. The court also
stated that had the privacy setting was set to “Me Only” or was limited to some
people, through “Custom” setting, the result may have been different, since there
would be intention to limit access to the pictures, instead of being broadcasted to all
the user’s friends and technically to the public.

Notes:

 Writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person
 Writ not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

NEAR VS. MINNESOTA [Shaira]

FACTS: A Minnesota statute declares that one who engages “in the business of regularly
and customarily producing, publishing,”etc.,” “a malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical, “is guilty of nuisance, and
authorizes suits, in the name of the StatE, IN WHICH SUCH PERIODICALS MAY
BE ABATED AND THEIR PUBLISHERS ENJOINED FROM FUTURE
VIOLATIONS. In such a suit, malice may be inferred from the fact of publication. 

In The Saturday Press,  a Minneapolis newspaper, Jay Near and Howard Guilford
alleged that certain officials and officer were neglecting their duties to prosecute
known criminal activity. 

A permanent injunction was filed against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it
violated the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory and that they could be enjoined from further comitting or maintaining
the nuisance.
ISSUE: W/N the statue violated the free press provision  

In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Charles Hughes, the Court held that the
HELD: statute authorizing the injunction was facially unconstitutional, meaning the decision
was based on an analysis of the law's general applications, not the specific context
of this case. The Court held that the statutory scheme constituted a prior restraint
and hence was invalid under the First Amendment.
The protection even as to prior restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the
limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases. . . . No one would
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its
recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary requirements
of decency may be enforced against obscene publications. The security of
the community life may be protected against incitements to acts of violence
and the overthrow by force of orderly government . . . . 
The Court established as a constitutional principle the doctrine that, with some
narrow exceptions, the government could not censor or otherwise prohibit a
publication in advance, even though the communication might be punishable after
publication in a criminal or other proceeding. In some situations, such as when
speech is obscene, incites violence, or reveals military secrets, the government
might be able to justify a prior restraint.

NEW YORK CO. VS. US [Christopher]

FACTS: In 1971, the Court faced these issues again in a case brought by the New York
Times. The newspaper had obtained a copy of documents known as "The
Pentagon Papers"—an internal Defense Department report that detailed
government deception with regard to the Vietnam War.The Pentagon Papers
surfaced at a time when the American people were deeply divided on the
question of United States involvement in the war.The New York Times fought
for the right to publish the papers under the umbrella of the 1st
Amendment.The Pentagon Papers, officially known as "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy," were illegally copied and then
leaked to the press.The New York Times and the Washington Post had
obtained the documents. Acting at the Government's request, the United States
district court in New York issued a temporary injunction—a court order—that
directed the New York Times not to publish the documents.The Government
claimed that the publication of the papers would endanger the security of the
United States. The New York Times appealed the order to the United States
Supreme Court, arguing that prior restraint— preventing publication—violated the
1st Amendment. 
ISSUE: Whether or not the efforts to prevent publication of what is termed “classified
information” violate the freedom of the press under the first amendment? 

HELD:  

Yes. The court held that the government did not overcome the “heavy presumption
against prior restraint of the press in this cause, Justices argued that the vague word
“security should not be used to abrogate the fundamental law embodied in the First
Amendment. The court hasl also held that since publication would not cause an
inevitable, direct, and immediate event imperilng the safety of AMERICAN forces,
prior restraint was justified.

FREEDMAN VS. MARYLAND (note Iglesia ni Kristo case) [Justine]

FACTS: Freedman was convicted for exhibiting a motion picture without submitting it to the
Maryland State Board of Censors for prior approval. Freedman showed the film “Revenge
of Darkness” in his theater. His contention was the film censorship statute unconstitutionally
impaired freedom of expression. 

The State of Maryland concedes that the film does not violate any statutory standard for
movies and would actually receive a license if it had been submitted to them. 

ISSUE: W/N the submission of a film to the Maryland State Board of Censors is a valid exception to
the constitutional prohibition of prior restraint? (NO)

HELD: The Board of Censors rules did not follow the safeguards required by the law in order for
their action to be exempted in the prohibition of prior restraint.  

The prior submission of a film to censor will only be valid if it follows the
guidelines/safeguards:

1. The burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression must rest on the
censor. 
2. o   The State can advance the submission of all films in order to regulate and bar
those which are considered as unprotected films. However, they are not allowed to
 provide a finality to its censorship – i.e. banning it. Courts are the only entities that
could provide a valid final restraint because only a judicial determination can ensure
the sensitivity to such an issue.

The Maryland State Board of Censor  violates the prohibition on prior restraint on these 3
grounds:

1. If the board disapproves the film, the exhibitor has the burden of initiating a judicial
proceeding in order to persuade the court of the non-obscene status of the film or
that it is protected expression.
2. When the Board has acted on the film and has ruled against it being shown, the
exhibitor could not show it lest he be charged of a violation of the law. The exhibitor
could also be charged if he showed it, in lieu with unsuccessfully getting a license,
absent any judicial decision in the film’s obscenity.
3. The Board does not ensure any judicial determination that could validly make a final
determination regarding the film’s status. 

In relation to the Iglesia vs CA, (short summary)

Facts: Iglesia ni Cristo has a television program that presents its religious beliefs, doctrines
and practices that often times shows its difference with other religions. Sometime in 1992,
INC submitted to the Board Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its
TV program. The Board classified it as X or not for public viewing on the grounds that they
offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. 

Issues: 

1. W/N the Board have the power to review petitioner’s program? (YES)
2. Assuming that it has the power, did it gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited
the airing of the TV shows? (YES(

Held: 

1. As stated in PD 1986, The board has the power to screen, review and examine all
television programs. TV programs / TV is a medium that reaches even the eyes and
ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health,
public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion
can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its
blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in
our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the
space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not
leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides
and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.

2. [A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and
should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent
 Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. It clearly suppresses
the freedom of speech of the petitioner and interferes with its right to free
exercise of religion.  

AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [Reyson]

FACTS: Ayer Productions, movie production company, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful
struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. 

The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the
MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. 

Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be
viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating
four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background. 

But Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or
television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation.

Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie
script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint
was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. 

Petitioners contends that the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech
and expression; and the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public interest and
concern and not on the individual private life of respondent.

RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to
plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which
nevertheless is based on or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the
appeal.

ISSUE: Won the projected motion picture is guaranteed under the freedom of speech and
expression
HELD: Yes. The Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them
through television. Along with press, radio, and television, motion pictures constitute a
principal medium of mass communication for information, education, and entertainment.

This freedom of speech is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-
owned motion pictures companies.

The EDSA revolution where private respondent is a major character is one of public
interest. Private respondent is a public figure due to his participation in the culmination of
the change of government. The right of privacy of the a “public figure” is necessarily
narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.

EASTERN BROADCASTING VS. DANS JR. [Clarence]

FACTS: A petition was filed by Eastern Broadcasting Corporation to compel the respondent, Hon.
Jose P. Dans, Jr., Minister of Transportation & Communications, et al. 

The petitioner is contending that the respondents denied them of due process for the
closure of said corporation on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite
people to sedition. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action
which closed the radio station was taken against it. 

The petitioners also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records, the
charge arose from the petitioner’s shift towards what it stated as the coverage of public
events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.

However, before the Court could promulgate a decision, the petitioner through its president,
Mr. Rene G. Espina, suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.

ISSUE: W/N Eastern Broadcasting Corporation was deprived of freedom of speech?   

HELD: The Court was not able to rule on the case since it has become moot and academic.
However, the court, for guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising
judicial functions, issued guidelines. 

1. Primary requirements for administrative proceedings in a precedent case should be

followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed. 
2. Government actions must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty and
property, in each appropriate case, may be valid.
3. All forms of media, whether in print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection
of freedom of speech and expression clause. 
 4. Radio broadcasting more than any other media receives limited protection from free
expression clause due to its accessibility and uniquely pervasive presence. 
5. The supervision of radio stations whether by government or through self-regulation
by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. The
government has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the
listeners to violently overthrow it. At the same time, the people have the right to be
informed. Radio and television also deserve special protection.  

ALEXANDER VS. US [Maricar]

FACTS: After a full criminal trial petitioner Ferris J. Alexander, owner of more than a dozen
stores and theaters  dealing in sexually explicit materials, was convicted on, inter
alia, 17 obscenity counts and 3 counts of violating the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Petitioner was in the so-called adult
entertainment business for more than 30 years selling pornographic magazines and
sexual paraphernalia showing sexually explicit movies and eventually selling and
renting videotapes of a similar nature.

The obscenity convictions, based on the jury’s findings that four magazines and
three videotapes sold at several of petitioner’s stores were obscene, served as the
predicates for his three RICO convictions. In addition to imposing a prison term of
6yrs and fine $100, 000, the District Court ordered the petitioner to forfeit his
wholesale and retail businesses, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1963 (1988 ed. And Supp.
III), & almost $9million in moneys and certain assets that were directly related to his
racketeering activity as punishment for his RICO violations. Petitioner argues that
this forfeiture violated the First and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. We
reject petitioner’s claims under the First Amendment but remand for reconsideration
of his Eighth Amendment challenge. 

According to the petitioner, forfeiture of expressive materials and the assets of the
businesses engaged in expressive activity, when predicated solely upon previous
obscenity violations, operates as a prior restraint because it prohibits future
presumptively protected expression in retaliation for prior unprotected speech. 
Practically speaking, petitioner argues, the effect of the RICO forfeiture order here
was no different from the injunction prohibiting the publication of expressive
material found to be a prior restraint in Near v. Minessota ex rel Olson. 

As petitioner puts it, the forfeiture order imposed a complete ban on his future
expression because of previous unprotected speech. The Court disagrees. By
lumping the forfeiture imposed in this case after a full criminal trial with an injunction
enjoining future speech, petitioner stretches the term  - prior restraint - well beyond
the limits established by our cases. To accept petitioner’s argument would virtually
obliterate the distinction, solidly grounded in our cases, between prior restraints
(administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued
in advance of time that such communications are to occur ex temporary restraining
order and permanent injunctions and court order that actually forbid speech
 activities are classic examples) and subsequent punishments. 

ISSUE: Is the forfeiture in this case, which effectively shut down his adult entertainment
business, constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech rather than a
permissible criminal punishment?

HELD: RICO forfeiture order was not a prior restraint on speech, but a punishment for past
criminal conduct. 

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING VS. DY [Rogelyn]

FACTS: Newsounds is a radio station which was denied a mayor’s permit and ordered by
Cauayan City to cease operation because of the lack of the same permit.This case
focuses on the issue which deals with Freedom of the Press and Expression
specifically ‘prior restraint’. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions
on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or
dissemination.

•    Petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network Inc., (Newsounds) which runs

DZNC and Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) which run Star FM are
stations operated, organized, and incorporated by Bombo Radyo Philippines
(Bombo Radyo). Both petitioners are operating out of Cauayan City, Isabela.

•    In 1996, Newsounds relocated its broadcasting station, management office and
transmitters on property still in Cauayan City, owned by another affiliate corporation
of Bombo Radyo which is CBS Development Corp. (CDC).

•    During the same year 1996, CDC secured necessary permits from the municipal
government to build a commercial establishment on the said property. the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a Zoning Decision certifying the
property as commercial. Also, the Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (OMPDC) of Cauayan affirmed that the commercial
establishment to be constructed by CDC conformed to local zoning regulations,
noting as well that the location “is classified as a Commercial area. Similar
certifications would be issued by OMPDC from 1997-2001.

•    A building was erected and both DZNC and Star FM operated from 1997-2001
after securing necessary operating documents.

•    When they were renewing their 2002 operating documents, additional
documents were required from them which were not required before. Hence, they
 were not able to secure the necessary operating documents.

•    Petitioners obtained from the DAR orders stating that the land is considered
commercial. They submitted this for the 2003 operating documents renewal.
However the City Administrator claims that the DAR orders were void. Again, the
mayor’s permit was denied. This also continued for the 2004 renewal and the
permit was again denied.

•    The legal officer of the City attempted to physically close the station however
the petitioners filed with the COMELEC seeking enforcement of the Election Code
which prohibited the closure of radio stations during election period. Petitioners
were able to continue operations until the end of the election period.

•    Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus and preliminary mandatory injunction
to the RTC but was denied. They also filed actions (Certiorari) with the CA but also
lost.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of the freedom of speech and of
the press?  Yes, there is a violation.

HELD: The court recognized that the LGU concerned has legal authority to promulgate
ordinances required for permits. However, the burden is with the government
concerned to establish compelling reasons to infringe the freedom of speech and
expression as in the case at bar. The court justifies further its ruling based on the
concept of content based restraint (subject to more strict scrutiny) rather than
content neutral regulation for the reason that the circumstances surrounding the
case warrants it such as the alleged ill motives of the defendants together with the
timing as it is very near election. The steps employed by the City is to ultimately
shutdown the petitioners. The case falls on the classification of Prior Restraint. To
reiterate, Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or
other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [Dianne]

FACTS: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was
challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and
free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. 

Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the
4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila
 to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the
other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political
leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a
candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency
and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among
themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the
regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence
of clear and present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners
meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as
amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a
limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He
did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being
the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and
degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in
politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine
Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women
Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act
was based on the police power of the state. 

ISSUE: WON RA 4880 unconstitutional.  

HELD: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable
criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present
danger” rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence
of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is
the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according
to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what
words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such
words are punishable.” It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in
general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite
persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body seeks to prevent. 

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited
more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation
under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such
provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and
appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence
of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well
as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political
activities in this country. 

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens
 to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of
grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent. 

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of

interviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the
prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the
solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign
literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a
constitutional command.

PEOPLE VS. PEREZ [Gabe]

FACTS: Isaac Perez, municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a
citizen of that municipality, met on April 1, 1922 and became engaged in a
discussion regarding the administration of Governor General Wood. It resulted to
Perez shouting "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence."

He was charged in the CFI Sorsogon with violation of Article 256 RPC. 2 witnesses
for the prosecution, Lumbao and Anguistia testified that Perez said The Filipinos,
like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood,
because he has recommended a bad administration in these Islands and has not
made a good recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the
independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not obtained
independence and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off."

Defense did not deny but endeavored to explain that the discussion was between
Perez and Madrid; Perez blaming Governor General Wood, while Madrid blames
the Nacionalista Party. Accused Perez maintains that the discussion was held in a
peaceful manner.

Judge found that his guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: WON criticism against the government is protected speech.

HELD: No. The provisions of Act. No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the
freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even
to the foundations of Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
 Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of
speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and
effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed
to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution
and the laws, and the existence of the State.

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine
Islands. The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the US
President and holds office at the pleasure of the President.

In this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of
free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was intended as
there is a seditious tendency in the words used.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done
an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has
made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety or order of the Government.

DENNIS VS. US [Angel]

FACTS: In 1948, eleven Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating the violent
overthrow of the US government and for the violation of several points of the Smith Act. The
Act made it unlawful to knowingly conspire to teach and advocate the overthrow or
destruction of the United States government. The Petitioners were brought up on charges
under the Act for allegedly (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the
Communist Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the overthrow of
the United States government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating and
teaching the duty to do the same. The party members who had been petitioning for socialist
reforms claimed that the Act violated their First Amendment rights.

The jury convicted the defendants following the trial judge’s direction that they could not
convict unless they found that there was enough evidence to show that the defendants
intended to overthrow the government “as speedily as circumstances would permit,” but
that, if they so found, then, as a matter of law, there was sufficient danger of a substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent, to justify application of the Smith statute under the
First Amendment.

The trial court sentenced the defendants to five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. 
ISSUE: WON Smith Act violated the First Amendment as an unlawful abridgement of free speech?

HELD: NO. In a 6-to-2 decision, the Court upheld the convictions of the Communist Party leaders
and found that the Smith Act did not "inherently" violate the First Amendment.

In the plurality opinion, the Court held that there was a distinction between the mere
teaching of communist philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy
created a "clear and present danger" that threatened the government. Given the gravity of
the consequences, the Court held that success or probability of success was not necessary
to justify restrictions on the freedom of speech. The Court emphasized that, the text of the
First Amendment aside, free speech is not an unlimited right, and that the low societal value
of some speech justified its restriction.

The Court found a clear and present danger to sustain a conviction. Even though the
defendants’ efforts had not yet culminated in an attempt to overthrow the government, the
Communist Party was dedicated to overthrowing the government as soon as circumstances
permitted, the party constituted a organized conspiracy, its members were rigidly
disciplined, Communist Party members were “ready to make the attempt” to overthrow the
government, and there were “inflammable nature of world conditions” and related uprisings
in other countries. The defendants’ contention that mere conspiracy could not be punished
was incorrect, as the existence of the conspiracy itself created a clear and present danger.

Finally, the law was not a violation of the Fifth and First Amendments for being too vague by
“not sufficiently advising those who would speak of the limitations upon their activity.” While
application of the clear and present danger test is not a definite mathematical formula, the
clear and present danger test is an established standard as interpreted by the courts. It
made no difference that the clear and present danger rule is a creature of case law created
by the courts instead of one put into the text by the legislature: it is the rule and it is
sufficiently clear.

US VS. O’BRIEN [Josh]

FACTS: David Paul O’Brien along with three companions burned their Selective Service
registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. An FBI agent
ushered O'Brien to safety inside. After advising him of his right to counsel and to
silence, O'Brien stated that he had burned his registration certificate because of his
beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal law. He produced the charred
remains of the certificate, which, with his consent, were photographed. 

The Universal Military Training and Service Act by the 1965 Amendment Congress
added to § 12(b)(3) of the 1948 Act the provision here at issue, subjecting to
criminal liability not only one who "forges, alters, or in any manner changes", but
also one who "knowingly destroys, [or] knowingly mutilates" a certificate. 

He argued he wanted to publicly influence others: “so that other people would
 reevaluate their positions with Selective Service, with the armed forces, and
reevaluate their place in the culture of today, to hopefully consider my position.”

For this act, O'Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. He violated Section 462(b) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 which makes  an offense
committed by any person: “who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly
mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate…”

O’Brien argued that the 1965 amendment should be struck down for violating free
speech. Burning his registration certificate was protected "symbolic speech" within
the First Amendment. His argument is that the freedom of expression which the
First Amendment guarantees includes all modes of "communication of ideas by
conduct," and that his conduct is within this definition because he did it in
"demonstration against the war and against the draft."

ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition of knowing destruction or mutilation of certificates,

the 1965 Amendment, was unconstitutional for it abridged free speech

HELD: No, the 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free speech on its face, and we
do not understand O'Brien to argue otherwise. Amended § 12(b)(3), on its face,
deals with conduct having no connection with speech. It prohibits the knowing
destruction of certificates issued by the Selective Service System, and there is
nothing necessarily expressive about such conduct. The Amendment does not
distinguish between public and private destruction, and it does not punish only
destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views.

Whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,
“speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the “nonspeech” element
can justify incidental limitations on such freedoms. 

To characterize the governmental interest which must appear, the Court employed
a variety of descriptive terms: compelling, substantial, subordinating, paramount,
cogent, and strong.

The Court think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is

within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. 

The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make all
laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping. Congressional
 power to conscript for military service is “beyond question”. 

Both the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment are
limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct. The governmental
interest and the scope of the 1965 Amendment are limited to preventing harm to
the efficient functioning of the Selective Service System. When O'Brien deliberately
rendered unavailable his registration certificate, he willfully frustrated this
governmental interest. For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for
nothing else, he was convicted.

O’Brien Doctrine:

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified 

[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; 

[2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 

[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;

and 

[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest

BLUE RIBBON VS. MAJADUCON [Shaira]

Senate  Blue Ribbon  Committee served  subpoena on respondent  Flaviano to

FACTS: appear and testify  before it in connection with its  investigation of the alleged
misuse  and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds,  it did so pursuant to
its authority to conduct  inquiries in aid of legislation however the Respondent
Judge issued a TRO directing the Committee to cease and desist from proceeding
with the inquiry. The committee now files a petition for certiorari. 

This prompted the Philippine Star to publish a news report on the filing by the
Committee with this Court of the petition for certiorari. The  news report quoted
portions of the petition filed by the Committee, alleging that Regional Trial
Court Judge Majaducon was guilty  of gross ignorance of the rules and
procedures when he issued the temporary restraining order and the writ of
preliminary injunction  because, under the principle of separation of powers,
courts cannot interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to 
conduct investigations in aid of legislation. 
Respondent Judge cited the petitioner indirect contempt of court because the news
created the impression that he violated separation of powers. 
ISSUE: w/n respondent  Judge erred in convicting  petitioner Pimentel of indirect 
contempt of court.

HELD: YES. it  does not  appear that  Pimentel caused  the publication in  the
Philippine Star of  the fact of filing of the  petition for certiorari by the 
Committee and the reproduction of  excerpts thereof. He had no right to
choose  which news articles will see print in the newspaper.  Rather, it is the
publisher thereof which decides which  news events will be reported in the
broadsheet. In doing  so, it is allowed the widest latitude of choice as to
what  items should see the light of day so long as they are relevant   to a
matter of public interest, pursuant to its right of press freedom.

Finally,  the statement  that respondent  Judge was grossly  ignorant of the
rules  of law and procedure does not  constitute improper conduct that  tends
to impede, obstruct or degrade  the administration of justice. As correctly 
argued by petitioner, the phrase gross ignorance  of the rules of law and
procedure is ordinarily found  in administrative complaints and is a necessary
description  to support a petition which seeks the annulment of an order  of a
judge wherein basic legal principles are disregarded.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC (repeat case)

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC [Christian]

FACTS: President Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum for the Citizens
Assemblies to resolve the issues of martial law, interim assemblies, and the length
of the period for the exercise of by the President of his powers.

President issued another related decree, PD 1031 amending PD 991 by declaring

 that the canvass of votes in Citizen Assemblies applicable to the national
referendum-plebiscite. 2

The President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite. The Decree recites in its
"whereas" clauses that the people's opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have it abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment which will be submitted to the people in the referendum-
plebiscite.

ISSUE: WON Freedoms of expression and assembly were disturbed by the martial law and
by the issues of referendum-plebiscite 

HELD: NO. There is no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies the
freedom to dissent. There are no restraints of the individual liberty, no total
suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The referendum-plebiscite recognizes all the
embracing freedoms of expression and assembly. The President announced that
he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting view on the issues as he
is only concerned of the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand.

The dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear
their adverse views on the proposed amendments.

Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free
to participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the
referendum-plebiscite issues.  

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB VS. COMELEC [Kim]

FACTS: Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of Sec 11 of RA 6646 (Electoral Reforms

Law) which banned political ads except for those dedicated to Comelec. It
prevented the sale or donation of space and time for political ads. Petitioners
contend that it violates the freedom of expression as it amounts to censorship,
because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression, only publications
of a particular content namely, media-based election or political propaganda.
Petitioners also contend that it abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and
that the suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except
those appearing in the Comelec, would bring about a substantial reduction in the
quantity of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby
 curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion. 

ISSUE: WON Sec 11 of RA 6646 constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of

speech and freedom of the press? (No)  

HELD: Petition was dismissed. The court held that the freedom of speech and of the press
has to be taken in conjunction with Art 9, which is a special provision applicable
during a specific limited-- only during election period. In fact, it does not prohibit
reports or commentaries that, in responsible media, are not paid for by candidates
for office; it is designed to cover only paid political ads of political candidates. The
limitation is reasonable connection with a constitutional objective, for it is precisely
in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the
resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial
difference. What Sec 11 brings into operation is designed to promote equal
opportunity, and equal time and space, for political candidates to inform all and
sundry about themselves.

ADIONG VS. COMELEC [Justine]

FACTS: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 that prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers to “mobile” places such as cars and other types of vehicles.

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate during 1992 Election assailed that the
said Resolution is violative of 82 of Omnibus Election Code and Sec 11(a) of RA 6646. He
contended that as a neophyte candidate, he suffers grave and irreparable injury. That
posting of decals and stickers are his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a
senatorial candidate. 

ISSUE: W/N the prohibition of posting decals and stickers is in violative on the citizen’s
fundamental right of free speech? (NO)

HELD: The Court ruled that the said prohibition of COMELEC is null and void.

1. It unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of speech enshrined in the

     
Constitution. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction
involved in this case. The posting of the decals and stickers in “mobile” places like vehicles
 poses no clear and present danger that the Congress may prohibit. 

2. The statute is void for overbreadth. The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the
citizen’s private property, such as the privately owned vehicles.  The posting of stickers
does not require consent from the owners of the vehicles. In fact, even the owners
themselves can make stickers for their candidates, and if we are to deprive the owners of
these vehicles that right, we are in turn depriving them of due process and free speech.

3. The Constitution protects the right of the candidates.

ABS-CBN VS. COMELEC [Christopher]

FACTS: A Petition for Certiorari raised by ABS-CBN under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No.
98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN
or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit
survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.

                The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon

"information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the
elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections
for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of
which shall be [broadcast] immediately."

                The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the
official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National
Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

                On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order
prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until
further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining
order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed resolution is valid. 

HELD: The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot be justified. It does not
leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of
information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other
valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of
avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by
exit surveys.

                A specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated.
Only professional survey groups may be allowed to conduct the same.
Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They
may be required to explain to voters that the latter may refuse interviewed,
and that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. The
pollsters may further be required to wear distinctive clothing that would show
they are not election officials.48 Additionally, they may be required to
undertake an information campaign on the nature of the exercise and the
results to be obtained therefrom. These measures, together with a general
prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and orderly
election.

                The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our

democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a
higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. . . . [T]his must be
so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that
freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every
other form of freedom."14

                Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed

abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.15In the landmark case
Gonzales v. Comelec,16 this Court enunciated that at the very least, free
speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.

                The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-

fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in
social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between
stability and change.17 It represents a profound commitment to the principle
that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open.18 It means more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or
economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take
refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any of public consequence. And
paraphrasing the eminent Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,19 we stress that
the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the thought we
agree with.

                In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually
exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not
compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their
identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by
the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the
conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our
 people.

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS VS. COMELEC (note freedom to campaign) [Sophia]

G.R. No. 14571 (based on greenbook)

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the COMELEC from
FACTS: enforcing sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:

Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days before an election.

Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the
period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media
the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner KPC, on the
other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day
of the elections on May 14, 2001. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the
publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. 

COMELEC justifies the restrictions in sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 as necessary to prevent

the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and
erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on
the publication of election survey results during the period prescribed by law bears
a rational connection to the objective of the law; (2) it narrowly tailored to meet the
“evils” sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is
minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration.

ISSUE: W/N sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 violates the freedom of speech, expression, and press.

YES, sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 violates the freedom of speech, expression, and press.
HELD: The court saw the law as a form of prior restraint and therefore presumed to be
invalid. The grant of power to the COMELEC was limited to enforcing “equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply” as well as uniform and reasonable
rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for “public information
campaigns and forums among candidates.”

What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of sec.
5.4? in United States v. O’Brien:

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional

 power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.

Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O’Brien test because the causal connection
of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest “not
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” By prohibiting the publication of
election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might
undermine the integrity of the election, sec.5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of
expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject
matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists,
and other opinion makers. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted
is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free
expression is only incidental, sec. 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the
O’Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further
the governmental interest. 

SC hold that sec. 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
the suppression of freedom of expression.

IMBONG VS. OCHOA [Rogelyn]

FACTS: Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the
doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may
produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen (14)
petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional.

Does RH law violate the right of free speech?

HELD: It is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one’s participation in the support of modem reproductive health
measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong
according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing
with “faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of
a church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise,
while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH
Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the petitioners
are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because
it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God
the things that are God’s. The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a
patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A.
Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.

The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers,
whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the
RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers.
Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they
fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3),
the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion.

The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24,
considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and
services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious
freedom of health care service providers should be respected. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or
who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
 which the Court cannot allow.

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS. COMELEC [Rommel]

FACTS: Petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. They were posted on the front walls of the
cathedral within public view.

The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.

The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay”
with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the RH Law. Those who voted
for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

(baka lang magtanong si sir ng sample candidates: Team Buhay Honasan

Trillanes, Team Patay Cayetano Alan Escudero))

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of
candidates for the 2013 elections.

COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin pursuant to Comelec Resolution No, 9615 that the lawful size of
propaganda is 2ft x 3ft only, otherwise it will file an election offense against the
petitioners.

Petitioner assail that the letter for removal of the tarpaulin violates their
fundamental right to freedom of expression

ISSUE: WON the tarpaulins are a form of speech or expression and thus, protected by
freedom of speech (Yes.)

HELD: The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list
 group.

Court discussed political vs commercial speech.

Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to

public deliberation about some issue, fostering informed and civic minded
deliberation. On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech
that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression
resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

Court then discussed content-based vs content-neutral restriction.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject

matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of
the speech.

The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court

has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Under this rule, “the evil
consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”

With the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of
the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is
no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the
tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
else’s constitutional rights.

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS VS. COMELEC 755 SCRA 124

COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 directed SWS and Pulse Asia, to submit to
FACTS: COMELEC the names of all commissioners and payors of all surveys published
from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013, including those of their “subscribers.”
SWS and Pulse Asia alleged that following the issuance of Resolution No. 9674
and as of their filing before this court of the present Petition, they have not been
furnished copies of Resolution No. 9674. Furthermore, they assert that Resolution
No. 9674 transgresses the Fair Elections Act in making itself executory immediately
after publication.
 W/N the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the requirement to
ISSUE: submit the names of their subscribers.

HELD: NO, Section 5.2(a)’s requirement of disclosing subscribers neither curtails

petitioners’ free speech rights nor violates the constitutional proscription against the
impairment of contracts.

What is involved here is petitioners’ freedom of speech and of expression, that is,
to publish their findings. More specifically, what is involved here is their right to
political speech, that which “refers to speech ‘both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,’ ‘fostering informed and civic-
minded deliberation.’”

The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the
constitutional respect for human potentiality and the effect of speech. It valorizes
the ability of human beings to express and their necessity to relate. On the other
hand, a complete guarantee must also take into consideration the effects it will
have in a deliberative democracy. Skewed distribution of resources as well as the
cultural hegemony of the majority may have the effect of drowning out the speech
and the messages of those in the minority. In a sense, social inequality does have
its effect on the exercise and effect of the guarantee of free speech. Those who
have more will have better access to media that reaches a wider audience than
those who have less. Those who espouse the more popular ideas will have better
reception than the subversive and the dissenters of society. To be really heard and
understood, the marginalized view normally undergoes its own degree of struggle.

However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity

must provide limits to some expression during electoral campaigns. The required
judicial temperament in appraising speech in the context of electoral campaigns
which is principally designed to endorse a candidate, both by candidates and/or
political parties, on the one hand, and private citizens, on the other, has thus been
articulated: Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns
made by candidates or the members of their political parties or their political parties
may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our rulings in
Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC:Regulation of
speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not
candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as
a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider
during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with the
guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the
electorate including those that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate
in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
 
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen
which will not amount to an election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches
into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of
a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative
 speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a
candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c)
narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the
rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored
on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is
made with or on private property.

CENTRAL HUDSON GAS VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION [Reyson]

FACTS: The energy crisis of 1973 resulted in utility shortages, prompting the PSC to ban
advertisements that promoted energy consumption. In 1976, after the crisis was over, PSC
extended the policy by creating separate categories of advertisements: promotional and
informational. Promotional ads were those “intended to stimulate the purchase of utility
services” while informational ads were “not clearly intended to promote sales.” Informational
ads were permitted under the policy but it banned all promotional advertising as it was
“contrary to the national policy of conserving energy”.

Central Hudson Gas challenged this ban, arguing that the ban violated its right to
commercial speech guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court
upheld the ban, as did the New York Court of Appeals, which noted that “the governmental
interest in the prohibition outweighed the limited constitutional value of the commercial
speech at issue.”

ISSUE: WON the PSC’s ban on advertising violate the freedom of speech.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that the PSC’s ban violated the right to commercial speech.

The Court recognized the importance of commercial speech — commercial speech serves
not only the economic interest of the speaker, but it also assists consumers and aids in
disseminating information to the public. The latter is imperative to ensure that the public is
well informed.

The Court reiterated that the Constitution affords commercial speech less protection than
non-commercial speech. In order for a regulation on commercial speech to be
constitutional, a four-part test must be satisfied: 1. the speech must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading; 2. the asserted governmental interest must be
substantial. If the first two parts are established, then it must also be determined
that: 3. the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and 4.
the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

In applying this four-part test, the Court found that the advertising was commercial speech
that is protected by the First Amendment. In reaching its conclusion, the Court found that
 the speech at issue concerned a lawful activity that was not misleading. The Court
conceded that the State’s justifications — energy conservation, and that utility rates be fair
and efficient — for the ban were substantial. The Court also determined that there was an
immediate, yet tenuous, connection between the advertising and the demand for electricity.
But most significantly, the Court found that the restriction was more extensive than
necessary to serve the government’s purpose for the advertising ban.

PHARMACEUTICAL VS. SEC OF HEALTH [Clarence]

FACTS: The petitioner in this case is the Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines, while the respondent are DOH Secretary Francisco Duque III, et al.  

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Milk Code since the RIRR is not valid as
it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to
implement. 

The respondents are contending that the RIRR intends to implement not only the Milk Code
but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition.
According to the respondents, the said international instruments are deemed to be part of
the law of the land and therefore may implement them through the RIRR. 

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners have the right to freedom of expression?  

HELD: The Court ruled on the legal standing of the petitioners. According to the Court, the modern
view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view
fuses the legal identity of an association with that view of its members. An association has
standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are
affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its
constituents.

CITY OF LAUDE VS. GILLEO [Yllisa]

FACTS: Petitioner promulgated an ordinance that bans all residential signs subject to some
exceptions, for the principal purpose of minimizing the visual clutter associated with
 those prohibited signs.  

Respondent now alleges that such ordinance violates her right to free speech as
she was prohibited from displaying a sign from her home. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance has indeed violated its residents’ right to free speech.

HELD: Yes, because although the Petitioner has a valid interest in minimizing visual
clutter, it has likewise almost completely foreclosed an important and distinct
medium of expression to political, religious, or personal messages at its expense.
Therefore, considering the effectiveness and efficiency of residential signs as a
form of communication, only for it to be prohibited, the ordinance is declared
invalid. 

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF

THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA 
[Jyra]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

RE: PETITION TO ANNUL 98-7-02 SC [Maricar]

FACTS: This involves the rule promulgated by the Supreme Court governing
demonstrations in the vicinity of courts. Among the prescriptions was the
following: Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons
are enjoined from holding any activity on the sidewalks and streets adjacent
to, in front of, or within a radius of 200 meters from the outer boundary of the
Supreme Court Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other building that
 houses at least one court sala. Such activities unquestionably interrupt and
hamper the working conditions in the salas, offices, and chambers of the
courts.     

ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is valid? 

HELD: The validity of the resolution was challenged on at least two grounds. First,
that it was an arrogation of legislative power thereby violating separation of
powers. Second, that it transgressed freedom of expression. Since in effect
the challenge asked the Court to shoot its own foot, the outcome perhaps
should have been predictable. 

The Court characterized the argument based on separation of powers as “low

watts” asserting against it what might be called its high wattage right to
promulgate rules regulating conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of
courts to assure our people of an impartial and orderly administration of
justice.  Quite obviously the Court was also appealing to its power to
promulgate rules of procedure which, however, according to the
Constitution, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. In
fact, to the contrary, the new Constitution asserts the power of the Court to
promulgate rules for the protection of rights. In the Narvasa Court’s view,
however, it would seem, curtailment of assemblies outside court premises do
not diminish substantive rights and may be done by the Court itself without
waiting for Congress to act. 

US VS. GRACE [Pau]

On different ocassions, Thaddeus Zywicki and Mary Grace, standing on the

FACTS: sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building was approached by police officers
and informed him that what they were doing was prohibited by Title 40 USC Sec.
13k and that they could be arrested. 

(In May 1978, Thaddeus Zywicki, standing on the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building distributed
leaflets to passersby containing reprints of a letter to the editor of the Washington Post from a United States
Senator concerning the removal of unfit judges from the bench. An SC police officer approached him and told him
accurately, that Title 40 of the US Code prohibited the distribution of leaflets on the SC grounds, which includes the
sidewalk. Zywicki left. 

January 1980 , Zywicki on the same place distributed pamphlets containing information about forthcoming
meetings and events concerning “the oppressed peoples of Central America” Again, he was approached by a
police officer and was informed that what he was doing was prohibited by law and he would be arrested if the
leafletting continued. Zywicki left. 

February 1980, on the same place distributed handbills concerning oppression in Guatemala. Zywicki  had
 consulted with an attorney concerning the legality of his activities, and had been informed that the Superior Court
for the District of Columbia had construed the statute that prohibited leafletting, 40 USC Sec. 13k, to prohibit only
conduct done with the specific intent to influence, impede, or obstruct the administration of justice. 

March 1980, Mary Grace on the same place displayed a sign which was inscribed the verbatim text of the First
Amendment. She too was approached by a police officer and was told of the same prohibition as Zywicki.)

Zywicki and Grace filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. They sought an injunction against the continued enforcement of 40 USC
Sec. 13k and a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitutional on its
face 

DISTRICT COURT: Dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. 

COURT OF APPEALS: Reversed the decision of the District Court and went on to
strike down Sec. 13k on its face as an unconstitutional restriction on First
Amendment Rights in a public place 

ISSUE: Whether or not Title 40 USC Sec. 13k is unconstitutional.

Section 13k, as applied to the public sidewalks surrounding the Court builing
HELD: is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 

Section 13k prohibits two distinct activities: It is unlawful either “to parade, stand, or
move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds” or
“to display therein any flag, banner or device designed or adapted to bring into
public notice any party, organization, or movement.”

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the
freedom of speech.” There is no doubt that, as a general rule, peaceful picketing 
and leafletting are expressive activities involving “speech” protected by the First
Amendment. 

"Public places," such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, historically associated with
the free exercise of expressive activities, are considered, without more, to be
"public forums." In such places, the Government may enforce reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations, but additional restrictions, such as an absolute
prohibition of a particular type of expression, will be upheld only if narrowly drawn
to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.  

POLICARPIO VS. MANILA TIMES [Dianne]

FACTS: Plaintiff Lumen Policarpio seeks to recover P150,000.00, as actual damages, P70,000, as
 moral damages, P60,000 as correctional and exemplary damages, and P20,000, as
attorney's fees, aside from the costs, by reason of the publication in the Saturday Mirror of
August 11, 1956, and in the Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956, of two (2) articles or news
items which are claimed to be per se defamatory, libelous and false, and to have exposed
her to ridicule, jeopardized her integrity, good name and business and official transactions,
and caused her grave embarrassment, untold and extreme moral, mental and physical
anguish and incalculable material, moral, professional and business damages. The
defendants are The Manila Times Publishing Co., Inc., as publisher of The Saturday Mirror
and The Daily Mirror, which are newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, and
Constante C. Roldan, Manuel V. Villa-Real, E. Aguilar Cruz and Consorcio Borje, as the
reporter or author of the first article and the managing editor, the associate editor and the
news editor, respectively, of said newspapers.  

ISSUE: WON Manila Times had acted maliciously in publishing the articles.

HELD: It goes without saying that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in
determining the manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the
importance to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its presentation in a sensational
manner is not per se illegal. Newspaper may publish news items relative to judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the
public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official
and non-confidential, are open to public consumption. But, to enjoy immunity, a publication
containing derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made
in good faith and without any comments or remarks In the case at bar, aside from
containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the article published on August 11, 1956,
presented her in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was. In other words,
said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings there in alluded to. 

What is more, its sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD" — is a comment

or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations contained in said
article are "presumed to be malicious". We note that the news item published on August 13,
1956, rectified a major inaccuracy contained in the first article, by stating that neither Col.
Alba nor the PCAC had filed the aforementioned complaints with the city fiscal's office. It,
likewise, indicated the number of sheets of stencil involved in said complaints. But, this
rectification or clarification does not wipe out the responsibility arising from the publication
of the first article, although it may and should mitigate it (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52).
For this reason, we feel that the interest of justice and of all parties concerned would be
served if the defendants indemnify the plaintiff in the sums of P3,000, by way of moral
damages, and P2,000, as attorney's fee. 

LOPEZ VS. CA [Angel]

FACTS:  
 ISSUE:  

HELD:  

NEW YORK TIMES CO. VS. SULLIVAN [Josh]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

BORJAL VS. CA [Gabe]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

VASQUEZ VS. CA [Shaira]

FACTS:  
 ISSUE:  

HELD:  

TIME INC. VS. FIRESTONE [Christian]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

HUSTLER MAGAZINE VS. FALWELL [Pau]

FACTS: Petitioner Hustler Magazine, Inc., is a magazine of nationwide circulation.

Respondent Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister who has been active as a
commentator on politics and public affairs, sued petitioner for invasion of privacy,
libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the publication of an
advertisement for Campari Liqueur. It contained the name and picture of Falwell
and was entitled “Jerry Falwell talks about his first time. The parody portrayed
respondent as having engaged in a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his
mother in an outhouse. The jury found against respondent on the libel claim,
specifically finding that the parody could not "reasonably be understood as
describing actual facts or events," but ruled in his favor on the emotional distress
claim, stating that he should be awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioners' contention that "actual malice" must
be met before the respondent can recover for emotional distress. It is the intent to
cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort, and the State’s interest in preventing
emotional harm simply outweighs whatever interest a speaker may have in this
type of speech, rejecting as irrelevant the contention of the petitioner that, because
the jury found that the parody did not describe actual facts, the ad was an opinion
protected by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ad's publication was sufficiently outrageous to constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress sufficient to deny the First Amendment
protection to speech.

No, the ad’s publication was not sufficiently outrageous to constitute

HELD: intentional infliction of emotional distress sufficient to deny the First
Amendment protection to speech that is critical of public officials and public
officers. 

In order to protect the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures and
public officials from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress by reason of the publication of a caricature such as the ad
parody at issue without showing in addition that the publication contains a false
statement of fact which was made with "actual malice," i.e., with knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. The
State's interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not sufficient
to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is
intended to inflict emotional injury when that speech could not reasonably have
been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. Here,
respondent is clearly a "public figure" for First Amendment purposes, and the lower
courts' finding that the ad parody was not reasonably believable must be accepted. 

JAL VS. SIMANGAN [Kim]

FACTS: Simangan was supposed to donate a kidney to his cousin who was in the US. He
was issued an emergency US visa. He then purchased a round trip plane ticket
from Japan Airlines.  While inside the airplane, JAL's airline crew suspected him of
carrying falsified travel documents and imputed that he would only use the trip to
the US as a pretext to stay and work in Japan. The plane took off and he was left
behind. It was later confirmed that the respondent's travel documents were in order.
Simangan filed for an action for damages against JAL. The issue became
publicized and JAL filed an action for libel.  

ISSUE: WON JAL can claim damages for allegedly suffering from the publications made
against them? (No) 

HELD: No JAL cannot claim damages for allegedly suffering from the publications made
against them. The court held that JAL is a common carrier hence it deals with the
public, its bumping off Simangan without a valid reason naturally drew public
 attention and generated a public issue. The publications involved matters that the
public has the right to be informed. The Court stated that even if assuming that
Simangan caused the publications, he is still not liable for damages for it. The
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press includes fair
commentaries on matters.  

The court again reiterated the doctrine in the Borjal case,  there must be an actual
malice in order that a discreditable imputation to a public person in his public
capacity or to a public official may be actionable. To be considered malicious, the
libelous statements must be shown to have been written or published with the
knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or
not. Even though JAL is not a public official, the rule on privileged commentaries on
matters of public interest applies to it since it is a matter of public concern.
Considering that the published articles involve matters of public interest and that its
expressed opinion is not malicious but based on established facts, the imputations
against JAL are not actionable.  

ADONIS VS. REPUBLIC [Justine]

FACTS: Adonis worked as a radio broadcaster at Bombo Radyo. That he received a “dispatch”
involving a congressman’s purported “illicit” relationship with a married television
personality. That during his news program with his station manager, he broadcasted the
said information without disclosing any names. The same information was also discussed
during his radio programme at 11 AM.

On Oct 23, 2001, a congressman filed two criminal complainants for libel, one against the
author for his 7 am show and another one against the author for his 11 am show. 

The RTC of Davao acquitted him in the first libel case but he was convicted for the second
case.

While his case was pending, he transferred to another duty station that resulted into his
depression and his stoppage from reporting to his work. In consequence of this, his
employer suspended the payment of his legal counsel. His former lawyer filed a motion to
withdraw against the author. 

He claims that his conviction for defamation constitutes an unlawful restriction of his right to
freedom of expression. He also stated that sanction for libel causes permanent damage to a
journalist’s career and prompts an extremely inhibitory self-censorship among journalists.   

ISSUE: W/N the the right to due process and freedom of expression of Adonis was violated? 
HELD: The Committee concludes that Adonis’s rights under Art 14, have been violated.

The Committee takes note of the author’s allegation that his conviction for defamation
under the Philippine Penal Code constitutes an illegitimate restriction of his right to
freedom of expression because it does not conform to the standards set by article 19,
paragraph 3, of the Covenant. The author maintains, in particular, that the criminal
sanction of imprisonment established by the Philippine Revised Penal Code for libel is
neither necessary nor reasonable, because of the following reasons: (a) there are less severe
sanctions available; (b) it admits no proof of truth as a defence except for very limited cases;
(c) it does not take into account the public interest as a defence; or (d) it presumes malice in
the allegedly defamatory statements placing the burden of proof on the accused.

MILLER VS. CALIFORNIA [Jyra]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

GONZALES VS. KALAW KATIGBAK [Christopher]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

SORIANO VS. LAGUARDIA [Sophia]

 FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

BARNES VS. GLEN THEATER [Yllisa]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

FCC VS. PACIFICA FOUNDATION [Rommel]

FACTS: (for edit pa) On October 30, 1973, at 2:00 p.m., a New York radio station, owned by
the Respondent, Pacifica Foundation broadcast the “Filthy Words” monologue. A
few weeks later, a man who stated that he heard the broadcast while driving with
his young son, wrote a letter complaining to the Petitioner, the Federal
Communications Commission.

In response to the complaint, the Respondent explained that the monologue had
been played during a program about contemporary society’s attitude toward
language and that, immediately before its broadcast, listeners had been advised of
the monologue’s language. 

The Petitioner, after characterizing the language as patently offensive, though not
necessarily obscene, issued a declaratory order granting the complaint, but not
imposing any formal sanctions. The Petitioner concluded that the language as
broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 18 U.S.C. Section:1464, prohibiting the
broadcast of obscene, indecent or profane language. The United States Court of
 Appeals Columbia District reversed.

ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner has any power to regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent
but not obscene? 

HELD: It is not necessary for the Petitioner to determine that a communication is obscene
before it may exercise its regulatory power. The Petitioner can use its regulatory
power to “channel” indecent material to times when children are not able, or much
less likely, to receive it.

The decision was based upon the same principles that are found within the law of
nuisance. In the case before the Supreme Court of the United States,, the majority
focused upon the prospect that children may be listening to the broadcast in
question. Furthermore, the nature of radio is one in which the audience is
constantly tuning in and out and prior warnings cannot adequately protect the
listener. Since children could be forever harmed by merely being around when such
a broadcast is made, the court found that the Petitioner could regulate the
Respondent through “channeling” the indecent communication to a more
appropriate time and place. The fact that the monologue was broadcast at 2:00
p.m. in the afternoon made it more susceptible to regulation by the Petitioner.

The concept of indecent is intimately connected with the exposure of children to

language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and
organs, at times of the day when there is reasonable risk that children may be in
the audience.

RENTON VS. PLAYTIME THEATERS [Reyson]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  
BETHEL SCHOOL VS. FRASER [Clarence]

FACTS: The petitioner in the case is Bethel School which filed a case before the court regarding the
controversial speech of a student during a voluntary assembly at the school. The
respondent in the case, a student nominating a fellow student for a student elective office
referring to his candidate in an elaborate, graphic and explicitly sexual metaphor. 

Due to this behavior in front of an approximately 600 student crowd, some students started
yelling and some were embarrassed of the act. After the assembly, the respondent was
called to report to the Assistant Principal’s Office to explain his behavior during the
assembly. 

The school administration was not satisfied with the respondent’s explanation, leading to a
decision to suspend the student and strike out his name from those who will give a
graduation speech.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent’s right to freedom of speech was violated by the school?

HELD: No. According to the Court, the respondent is indeed entitled to such right, however, the
entitlement is subject to certain limitations. The law provides protection to all of their
freedom of speech. However, the manner of delivering the speech of the respondent was
not acceptable since it was too vulgar and offensive since the crowd are students. 

Moreover, the Court reiterated that a public school has the right to instill discipline among its
students the right conduct. Due to the grave misconduct of the student, the appropriate
sanctions imposed by the school is deemed acceptable to this Court.

HAZELWOOD SCHOOL VS. KUHLMEIER [Maricar]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  
ASHCROFT VS. FREE SPEECH COALITION [Rogelyn]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

US VS. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION [John]

 
FACTS:
The Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) was passed by Congress in
2000.

CIPA forbids public libraries to receive federal assistance for Internet access
unless they install software to block obscene or pornographic images and to
prevent minors from accessing material harmful to them.

Appellees (Respondent), The American Library Association which is  a group

of libraries, patrons, Website publishers, and related parties, sued the
Government, challenging the constitutionality of CIPA's filtering provisions.
They claimed that it improperly required them to restrict the First Amendment
rights (Freedom of Speech) library patrons.

The District Court ruled in favor American Library Association (Respondent).

The State/United States appealed the decision of the District Court to the
Supreme Court.

 
ISSUE:   W/N or not the act is violative of freedom of speech

HELD: The Court held that public libraries in pursuing their traditional mission of
facilitating learning and cultural enrichment “must have broad discretion to
decide what material to provide to their patrons,” dismissing the notion that
public libraries “seek to provide universal coverage.

Based on the above analysis, the Court concluded that as “public libraries’
use of Internet filtering software does not violate their patrons’ First
Amendment right, CIPA does not induce libraries to violate the Constitution,
and it is a valid exercise of Congress’ spending power.” The Court therefore
reversed the district court’s ruling.

NAVARRO VS. VILLEGAS [Christopher]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

PBM EMPLOYEES VS. PBM [Dianne]

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor
union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the
petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the
Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The
Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that
the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
 operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by
the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed,
because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting
to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400
proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the
first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of
the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for
bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

HELD: Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent
criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. 

It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up
the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to
intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom
of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of
local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting
for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the
morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property
rights. 

The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and
persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above
intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police
of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that
of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom
of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over
property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not
against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation
of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and
of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are
reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the
demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised
 of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be
regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their
position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

JBL REYES VS. BAGATSING [John]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD:  

MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO [Kim]

FACTS: The Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University conducted a rally. They
were granted a permit to hold the rally from 8am-12pm at the basketball court. On
the scheduled date, the students continued the rally beyond the allowed time and
held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed their
opposition in a vehement language, uttering severely critical of the University
authorities and using megaphones in the process thus disrupting classes and office
work.  Petitioners were found guilty of holding an illegal assembly and oral
defamation, sanctioning a 1-year suspension as punishment. Petitioners contend
that the University failed to accord respect to their constitutional rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech calls.  

ISSUE: WON the University violated petitioner’s right to peaceful assembly and free speech
calls? (Yes) 

HELD: The Court held that the freedom of peaceable assembly implies that the right to
free speech has been violated. The right to peaceably assembly and free speech
are embraced in the concept of freedom of expression, which is identified with it the
liberty to discuss any matter of public interest publicly and truthfully without
censorship or punishment and that is not to be limited, much less denied. While the
 University has the authority over the conduct of students, it cannot go so far as to
violate constitutional safeguards. The right to peaceably assemble and free speech
are guaranteed for students and their exercise to discuss matters affecting their
welfare or involving public interest cannot be subject to prior restraint or
subsequent punishment. If the assembly is to be held in school premises, permit
must be sought from the school authorities. In granting the permit, there may be
conditions such as the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of
classes or work of the personnel but should there be a violation of the terms, the
penalty incurred should be proportionate to the offense. In the present case it was
held that there was a violation of the permit, but the penalty of 1-year suspension
was too harsh, so the court lowered it to 1-week instead. 

BAYAN VS. ERMITA [Yllisa]

FACTS:  

ISSUE:  

HELD: