INTRODUCTION: EX-PARTE DECREE

An ex-parte decree is a decree passed in the absence of the defendant. Where the plaintiff
appears and the defendant does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing and if the
defendant is duly served, the court may hear the suit ex-parte and pass a decree against
him. It has been laid down that every judge in dealing with an ex-parte case should take
good care to see that the plaintiff’s case is at least prima facie proved. The mere absence of
the defendant does not of itself justify the presumption that the plaintiff’s case is true. 1 The
court has no jurisdiction to pass an ex-parte decree without evidence being given by or on
behalf of the plaintiff.2 Also, the court has no power to pass an ex-parte decree before the
returnable date mentioned in the summons. An ex-parte decree may be issued in two
stages. The decree referred to is clearly a decree passed either at the first hearing under
rule 6 of Order IX, or at an adjourned hearing under Rule 2 of Order XVII read with Order
IX. A final decree passed in the absence of the defendant is an ex-parte decree within the
meaning of Order IX Rule 13. However, a decree cannot be ex-parte when there is evidence
already on record and the Court goes into the merits before decreeing the suit. 3

Such a decree is neither null and void nor inoperative, but merely voidable and unless and
until it is annulled on legal and valid grounds, it is legal, valid, operative and enforceable
like a bi-parte decree and it has all the force of bi-parte decree. 4 The defendant, against
whom an ex-parte decree has been passed, has the following remedies available to him: -

 To apply under Order IX Rule 13 to set aside the ex-parte decree

 To appeal from the decree under Section 96(2)
 To apply for a review under Order XLVII Rule 1
 To institute a suit on the ground of fraud
These remedies can be invoked simultaneously and are not operative in derogation with
one another.5

SETTING ASIDE EX-PARTE DECREE: RULE 13

1
Satyendra Nath v Narendra (1924) Cal LJ 279
2
Ross & Co. v Scriven 43 Call 1001
3
AIR 1931 All 294
4
Chandu Lal v Khailur Rahman, AIR 1950 PC 17; Pandurang v Shantibai, AIR 1989 SC 2240
5
Man Singh v Dal Chand AIR 1934 All 163; Santosh Chopra v Teja Singh AIR 1977 Del 110
1
Rule 13 of Order IX deals with setting aside of ex-parte decrees against defendants. A
second proviso has been added to the rule to ensure that the Court should not set aside an
ex-parte decree merely on the ground of irregularity in the service of the summons in a
case where the defendant had adequate notice of the date of hearing of the suit. There was
divergence of judicial opinion as to whether an ex-parte decree could be set aside under
this rule after an appeal against such decree had been disposed of. An explanation has been
added to the rule to clarify that an ex-parte decree cannot be set aside under this rule when
an appeal against such decree has been disposed of. However this prohibition does not
apply if the appeal against ex-parte decree has been withdrawn. 6 In an application under
this rule the court has first of all to see that the application is presented within the
prescribed period of limitation under Sec 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which the
defendant can apply within thirty days from the date of the decree or, where the summons
is not duly served, within thirty days from the date of his knowledge of the decree. 7 The
court has no inherent power to enlarge the limitation period 8 unless sufficient cause is
shown to the court for such delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Scope: Rule 13 to Order IX provides for cases where it may be necessary in the ends of
justice to set aside the decree not only against the applicant but also against the other
defendants.9 This rule is wide enough to cover every application to set aside an ex-parte
decree provided the defendant’s allegation is either that the summons was not duly served
or that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was
called out for hearing. The object of the rule is to ensure, within reasonable limits as to
public convenience, that every defendant shall have a hearing, 10 and to place the successful
plaintiff in the same position in which he would have been if no decree had been passed
against him. Where an ex-parte decree has been passed against a defendant who has failed
to appear at the hearing, he is not entitled to have the decree set aside as a matter of course
even if he applies on the same day for the purpose. It is a matter of discretion for the

6
Chitaley & Bakhaley, AIR Commentaries on The Code of Civil Procedure, 9th Edition (1977), Vol. 3, p. 232
7
Supra at p. 262
8
1966 All LJ 640
9
Dookhee Khan v Rajessure Ranee (1871)15 WR 371 per Norman CJ and Loch J
10
(1895) 22 Cal 981
2
court.11 An application under this rule is not strictly speaking an application for re-hearing
although it may result in it. 12 The proceedings contemplated are not merely a branch of the
suit which terminated when the ex-parte decree is passed; the suit itself does not revive
until after the proceedings in the application are terminated successfully. 13

Where no application under Order IX rule 13 was moved for setting aside as ex parte
decree, in an appeal against such decree under Section 96(2), 14 an error, defect or
irregularity which has affected the decision of the case can be challenged. An ex-parte order
was made on a certain date, and on the next date of hearing, an application for setting it
aside was made. It was held that the application could not be dismissed on the ground that
it was not filed within 30 days as no limitation period is prescribed for such an
application.15 Where the court refuses to set aside an ex-parte decree, the order itself is not
appealable. But the fact that the defendant thereafter does not participate in later
proceedings does not operate as res judicata so as to prevent him from appealing against
the main decree.16 Such an appeal cannot be converted into proceedings for setting aside
the ex-parte decree. The code prescribes the remedy for setting aside the ex-parte decree
under Order IX rule 13 and when a plea under the said provision fails, an appeal is
specifically provided under Order XLIII rule 1(d) of the Code against an order of the trial
court refusing to set aside the ex-parte decree.17

Overriding technical considerations, the aim of achieving the substantial justice deserves to
be preferred but one has to see whether the delay has occasioned on account of culpable
negligence, wantonly, or on account mala fides. 18 Contrarily, it has also been laid down that
the Court ought not to light-heartedly disturb the legal right accruing to the opponent by
the applicant's failure in filing application in time. 19 It is needless to emphasise when a
litigant causes delay, he runs a serious risk. The defendant against whom ex-parte decree

11
Currimbhoy v Moos (1929) 31 Bom LR 468
12
AIR 1971 Punj 463
13
AIR 1927 Lah 200
14
96. Appeal from original decree: (2) An appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte.
15
Delhi Development Authority v Shanti Devi AIR 1982 Del 159
16
Badimeri Pochaiah v Gatla Akkapalli AIR 1992 AP 42
17
Bakshi, P.M., Mulla’s Civil Procedure Code (Abridged), Butterworths, 13th ed (2000), p. 402
18
Kaja Mohideen v The Tamilnadu Mercantile Bank Limited, decided on 12 th August 2009
19
Myla Belli and ors v B.Rajagopal (2005) 3 M.L.J. 86
3
has been passed may apply for setting it aside. Where there are two or more defendants,
one or more of them may also make such an application. 20 The term ‘defendant’ has wide
connotations and includes any person affected by such ex-parte decree. However, if a suit
has been dismissed against a defendant, he cannot apply for setting aside the ex-parte
decree as he does not fit into the definition of “aggrieved”.21 Such application may be filed in
the same court which passed the decree. If the decree was confirmed, reversed, or modified
by some superior court, application lies in such superior court.

This rule requires that the court be satisfied of the existence of either of the following
grounds:

(i) The summons was not duly served: - Order IX rule 6 states that the suit may proceed
ex-parte against the defendant only when it is proved by the plaintiff to the
satisfaction of the court that the defendant did not appear even though the
summons was duly served. A presumption in ex-parte decree is that the defendant
was duly served summons and it has to be refuted by the aggrieved applicant that
the case is otherwise and there has been fraud or collusion between other parties
against him.

Fraud vitiates even the most solemn transactions. A suit will therefore lie to set aside an ex-
parte decree on the ground of fraud. 22 It has been held that where non-service of the
summons in the previous suit has not by itself been found sufficient to prove fraud, it is
permissible to go into the merits of the previous suit to see if there was a motive for willful
or fraudulent suppression of the notice or summons in order to obtain a decree based on a
false claim.23 If non-service is proved against the plaintiff’s claim, it can be inferred that the
omission to serve the summons was intentional.24

Collusion in a judicial proceeding is a secret arrangement between two persons that one
should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the decision of a judicial tribunal
for some sinister purpose. A suit will lie to set aside such a collusive ex-parte decree. The

20
Sultan Hussein v Satnarain Lal AIR 1953 Hyd 191
21
Narayanmurthi v. Venkatayya AIR 1927 Mad 227
22
Bhojai v Salimullah AIR 1967 All 221
23
AIR 1961 Pat 88
24
AIR 1959 Cal 776
4
mere fact, however, that the defendant did not defend the earlier suit would not necessarily
prove collusion.25

(ii) He was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called
out for hearing. The expression 'sufficient cause' is elastic enough to apply the law in
a purposeful way to secure the ends of justice. In a recent judgement of the Madras
High Court,26 it has been explained: sufficient cause to the subjective satisfaction of
this Court in regard to the condonation of delay application in preferring Order IX
Rule 13 application to set aside the ex parte decree.

According to B.C. Mitra, J., if the suit was disposed of ex parte as against the defendant and
if there was sufficient cause for his failure to appear at the first or the further hearing of the
suit, he cannot and should not be deprived of the right to advance and to agitate the
grounds of his defence to the plaintiff's claim. 27 In a situation where the defendant
appeared by his pleader who was duly instructed and who conducted the case up to the
stage when he failed to attend the hearing, 28 Kolkata High Court held that Order IX by itself
does not apply to a case in which the defendant has already appeared in answer to the
summons; the procedure for such a case is prescribed by Order XVII which deals with
adjournments. It was held that in that case Rule 2 of Order XVII applied and not Rule 3.
Rule 2 provides that if on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned the parties
failed to appear, the Court may dispose of the suit in the manner prescribed by Order IX
and R. 3 provides that where any party to whom time has been granted fails to produce his
witnesses or to cause the attendance of his witnesses the Court may proceed to decide the
suit forthwith Rule 2 deals with cases where the hearing was adjourned at the instance of
the Court, and Rule 3 to cases where the hearing was adjourned at the instance of the party
to whom time has been allowed to do some act. It was however, held that in order to attract
Rule 3 of Order XVII of the Civil Procedure Code two conditions must be satisfied namely (i)
the adjournment must have been at the instance of the party and (ii) there must be
materials on record for the Court to proceed to decide the suit, and that the presence of one
25
[1964] 7 SCR 760
26
Kaja Mohideen v The Tamilnadu Mercantile Bank Limited, decided on 12 th August 2009
27
Sohanlal Ruia & Anr. v Kedarnath Purushottamdas & Co. Private Ltd. & Ors. AIR 1969 Cal 516
28
Satish Chandra Mukherjee v. Ahara Prasad Mukherjee, (1907) ILR 34 Cal 403 (FB): Sohanlal Ruia & Anr. v
Kedarnath Purushottamdas And Co. Private Ltd. & Ors. AIR 1969 Cal 516
5
condition without the other, did not justify the application of Rule 3. It was further held
that the adjournment in that case was not at the instance of the party and as the suit was
adjourned at the instance of the Court Rule 2 of Order XVII applied and further that if that
Rule applied then Rule 13 of the Order IX was attracted and an application for setting aside
an ex parte decree was maintainable.

The Kolkata High Court in a 7-Judge Bench unanimous decision, 29 relying on Bhimacharya
v. Fukirappa,30 observed that under the Code, the summons issued to the defendant calls
upon, him to appear and answer the claim in person or by a pleader duly instructed and
able to answer all material questions relating to the suit; where, therefore, there is a
pleader physically present, who is not in a position to conduct the case, there is no
representation of the defendant so as to give to the suit the character of a defended action.
The principle applies quite as much to a plaintiff as to a defendant, and when either party
to a litigation is represented by a pleader, it is upon the assumption that the pleader is duly
instructed and able to answer all material questions relating to the suit. If, therefore, the
mere physical appearance of the pleader was treated as appearance within the meaning of
the Code, the policy of the law and the course of justice would both be defeated.

A Full Bench decision31 of the Kolkata High Court has held that, “in the great majority of
cases in which a defendant having a good defence has had an ex parte decree passed
against him, the disadvantage he labours under is that he has not been able to substantiate
his defence by evidence before the Court- Upon the record, as it stands, the ex parte decree
may be wholly unassailable, but if the defendant has an opportunity (which he was
prevented from having owing to some sufficient cause) of placing on the record evidence
which he could have adduced to substantiate his defence, no such decree should have been
passed. The remedy in such a case cannot be by way of appeal which must ordinarily
proceed upon the record as it stands. The proper remedy must be the one provided by
Section 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure (1882). 32 Now is there any reason for saying that
such a remedy is appropriate only in cases in which there has been a failure to appear from

29
Satish Chandra Mukerjee vs Ahara Prasad Mukerjee (1907) ILR 34 Cal 403, per Mookerjee, J.
30
(1867) 4 Bom. H.C. 206
31
Jonardan Dobey v. Ramdhone Singh, (1896) ILR 23 Cal 738 (FB).
32
Corresponding provision Order IX rule 13 in Code of Civil Procedure:
6
the beginning, and that it is inappropriate or less appropriate in a case in which appearance
was once entered, though it might be (as was the case here) not to make any defence or file
any written statement, but merely to ask for time for filing a written statement and then
there was failure to appear at the adjourned hearing which must have been the real first
hearing in the case? We fail to discover any real difference between the two cases, and we
are clearly of opinion that to hold that Section 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not
apply to a case of the last mentioned kind would be to deprive the defendant of the only
proper remedy that he can have, and would lead to grave miscarriage of justice in many
cases.”33 The majority view of the Full Court was that the petitioner was entitled to have the
decree set aside. In effect it was therefore held that even though only one of the defendants
appeared and asked for leave to file written statement the decree as a whole must be
treated to have been passed ex parte and was liable to be set aside.

33
(1896) ILR 23 Cal 738 (FB)
7
THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA

Res Judicata is a rule of claim preclusion where a valid and final judgement on a claim
prevents a second on that claim or any part of it. The primary principle early found
expression in the maxim "Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium," based on public policy, and
the secondary or subordinate one in the form "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem
causa" for guarding private interest. The whole doctrine bears a close resemblance to the
doctrine of “exceptio rei judicatae” of the Roman law.34

English law employs three different doctrines in order to implement the binding nature of
adjudication: res judicata, issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. 35 Res judicata
implies that once ‘the res – the thing actually or directly in dispute – has been already
adjudicated upon, by a competent court, it cannot be litigated again.’ 36 It means the decision
of a court of competent jurisdiction gives rise to estoppel per rem judicatam so that the
parties to the proceedings are bound by it and stopped from disputing it in future
proceedings. This general doctrine of estoppel per rem judicatam consists of two distinct
rules known as cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. These two branches of estoppel
per rem judicatam share a common justification. Parties who have invested money and
effort in litigation and have obtained a final judgement are entitled to peace from further
legal challenge regarding the matters that have been once adjudicated. The idea is
expressed in the Latin maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa: a person
should not be troubled twice for the same reason. Lord Blackburn has explained:

“the object of the rule of res judicata is always put upon two grounds – the one public policy,
that it is in the interest of the state that there should be an end of litigation, and the other, the
hardship on the individual, that he should not be vexed twice for the same cause.”

Res Judicata, by its very words, means a matter which the court has exercised its judicial
mind and has, after argument and consideration, come to a decision on a contested

34
Moschziske, Robert Von, Res Judicata, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Jan., 1929), p. 299, available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/790303 as on 4th August 2009
35
Zuckerman, Adrian, Civil Procedure, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003, pp. 803-804
36
Ord v Ord [1923]2 KB 432 at 439
8
matter.37 In a 1964 judgement,38 the apex court observed that the scope of the principle of
res judicata is not confined to what is contained in s. 11 but is of more general application
is also not in dispute. Again, res judicata could be as much applicable to different stages of
the same suit as to findings on issues in different suits... this Court said in Satyadhyan
Ghosal v. Sm. Deorajin Debi39 where Das Gupta, J. speaking for the Court expressed himself
thus: "The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial
decisions.” The section requires that there should be a final decision. 40 Thus, where in the
judgement and decree in the former suit in it is stated that it is to be a subject to a decision
of a higher court, the decision is not a final one.

Moreover, the requirement that a judgment, to be res judicata, must be rendered "on the
merits" guarantees to every plaintiff the right once to be heard on the substance of his
claim. One of the exceptions to this rule is found in FRCP41 41(b).42 It provides that an
involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute, or for failure to comply with the Rules or any
order of the court, shall operate as an "adjudication upon the merits," although the
substantive issues of the case are never reached.

However, the mere fact that a matter directly and substantially in issue in a suit was
directly and substantially in issue in a former suit is not sufficient to constitute the matter
res judicata; it is also essential that it should have been heard and finally decided. In
dealing with questions under the present head, it is important to note that-

(1) If a decree is specific, and is at variance with a statement in the judgement, regard
must be had to the decree, and not to the statement in the judgement. 43

37
Gur Prasad v. Gur Prasad AIR 1944 Oudh 321: Jenkins v Robertson (1867) 1 HLSc App 147
38
Arjun Singh v Mohinder Kumar & ors. 1964 SCR (5) 946, at 956
39
[1960] 3 S.C.R. 590
40
Parsotam Gir v Narabada Gir 26 IA 175 (PC)
41
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, US legislation
42
Rule 41. Dismissal of Actions: (b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect.- If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.
Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not
under this rule — except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19
— operates as an adjudication on the merits.
43
Indarjit v Riccha (1893) 15 All 35
9
 (2) Neither an obiter dictum nor a mere expression of opinion in a judgement has the
effect of res judicata.44

(3) ...

One of the most important conditions in the present context is that an ex-parte decree, to
bar future claims, must be able to qualify the test of “heard and finally decided.” A matter
will be said to have been ‘heard and finally decided’ notwithstanding that the former suit
was disposed of ex-parte.45 If the defendant does not appear and the court, on its own
returns the plaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the order may not operate as res
judicata, but if the defendant appears and an issue is raised and decided, then the decision
on the question of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit although the
reasons for its decision may not be so. In case of Rafiq v. Munshilal, 46 the Court observed
that in the ex parte decree could be set aside on account of negligence or misdemeanour of
the advocate of the party but in all the case decree need not be set aside only on account of
negligence of advocate. Further, the dismissal of any suit without the adjudication of any of
the matters involved in the suit does not operate as res judicata; 47 where the matter in
issue was left undecided in the former suit, Sec 11 does not place a bar on fresh suit. 48

In order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in
the former suit must have been one on merits. Hence, it could not be said of a matter that it
was heard and finally decided, if the former suit was dismissed for default of plaintiff’s
appearance under Order IX rule 8;49 but a fresh suit on the same action may be barred
under Order IX rule 9. The dismissal of an application under Sec 47 for default does not
operate as res judicata.

44
Devarakonda v Devarakonda (1881)4 Mad 134: State of MP v Ladlisaran AIR 1958 MP 326
45
Baldevdas v Mohanlal 49 BLR 902: Bisheshar v Jafri Devi AIR 1937 All 251: Radha Mohan v Eliza Jane Hilt
AIR 1947 All 147
46
(1981)2 SCC 788
47
Girjanand v Bhagwan AIR 1967 Pat 101
48
Lakshmi Prasad Bhagat v Satate of Bihar AIR 1979 Pat 169 (DB)
49
Kempegowda v Annagowda AIR 1951 Mys 48: Mukhasingh v Ramchariter AIR 1956 Pat 143: Kesavan v
Venkataraman AIR 1957 AP 737
10
CASE LAWS

1. Where ex-parte decree did not operate as res judicata

In the 1996 decision of the Madras High Court, 50 it was held that the principle of res
judicata would not apply as the former suit was decided ex parte. In that decision, the
observation that the ex parte decree shall not operate as res judicata was made on the basis
that the earlier petition which was filed for eviction against the tenants was dismissed only
on technical grounds, and after keeping this fact in mind only, the Madras High Court held
that the ex parte decree would not operate as res judicata inasmuch as the petition was not
heard and finally decided as contemplated in Section 11 of the CPC.

2. Where ex-parte decree operated as res judicata

Res judicata operates on an ex-parte decree if all conditions fulfilling the doctrine are
proved in court. An ex parte decree passed on defendant's non compliance with condition
precedent of defending suit operates as res judicata. 51 Extracts of a landmark judgement 52
of the apex court is worth noting here:

“3. The core question which needs to be decided in this appeal is whether the High Court
was justified in holding that the ex parte decree passed in favour of Saroja and her minor
children Suganthamani and Ramesh (Saroja being Respondent No.3 in this appeal) would
operate as res judicata in the subsequently filed suit at the instance of the appellant against
the respondents, and out of which the present appeal arises.

9. ... It is well settled that an ex parte decree is binding as a decree passed after contest on
the person against whom such an ex parte decree has been passed. It is equally well settled
that an ex parte decree would be so treated unless the party challenging the ex parte
decree satisfies the court that such an ex parte decree has been obtained by fraud... it(the
decree) was passed during the pendency of the subsequent suit. But then it was open to the
appellant to file an amendment of the plaint in the subsequent suit by introducing a case of
50
A.S.Mani (deceased) by L.Rs. Thirunavukkarasu & Ors. Vs. M/s.Udipi Hari Niwas represented by Partners &
Ors. 1996 (1) MLJ 171
51
V. Baldev Karsandas Patel v. Mohanlal Bapalal Bahia AIR 1948 Bom 232
52
Saroja v Chinnusamy (Dead) by L.Rs and Anr, decided on 24 th August 2007, [2007] RD-SC 861
11
fraud or collusion and by challenging the ex parte decree on the ground of fraud also
although the ex parte decree was passed during the pendency of the subsequent suit. This,
however, was not done by her. Therefore, in our view, since the appellant could not make
out a case of fraud or collusion challenging the transaction by which she had purchased the
suit property from Kuppusamy in the manner indicated above, it is not open to the court to
hold that the said ex-parte decree would not operate as res judicata. The Madras High
Court has observed:53 “A decree which is passed ex parte is as good and effective as a
decree passed after contest. Before the ex parte decree is passed, the court has to hold that
the averments in the plaint and the claim in the suit have been proved... It is undoubtedly a
decree which is passed without contest; but it is only after the merits of the claim of the
plaintiff have been proved to the satisfaction of the trial court, that an occasion to pass an
ex parte decree can arise.” A similar view has also been expressed by a Division Bench of
the Allahabad High Court.54”

It was observed in Chenniappa Mudaliar v Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madras 55 and

recently affirmed in L. Sundaram And Ravichandran v Lakshmanan (Died), L. Sadagopal 56
that, "the dismissal of a case for default can in no sense amount to an adjudication on its
merits, quite unlike a case of ex parte decision, where there is an adjudication on merits
and that the former cannot operate as res judicata, while the latter would." However, the
fact remains true that even where a case is decided on merits ex parte, the case is required
to be reheard, if the applicant shows sufficient cause for his previous non-appearance.

53
Arukkani Ammal Vs. Guruswamy (1987) The Law Weekly Vol.100, 707
54
Bramhanand Rai v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur AIR 1987 All 100
55
[1964] 53 ITR 323 Madras
56
(2003) 1 MLJ 95 (Mad)
12
CONCLUSION

In the end, it can be reasonably inferred that the judicial trend is to hold an ex-parte decree
as res judicata provided:

- Ex-parte decree, per se, is technically proved. The court must be satisfied to
categorically hold the impugned decree ex-parte;

- Conditions of res judicata are fulfilled under section 11.

Thus, an ex-parte decree passed by a competent court on merits will operate as res
judicata.

As a matter of principle, it is said that one who comes to the court for relief, must come
with clean hands. Though a defendant always has the right to be reheard, the court may
deny him a chance to restore to his position before the ex parte decree i.e., the defendant
must prove to the satisfaction of the court – that the summons was not duly served or he
was prevented from attending court due to sufficient cause – to have the ex parte decree
set aside.

13
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books: -

Bakshi, P.M., Mulla’s Civil Procedure Code (Abridged), Butterworths, 13th ed (2000)
Chitaley & Bakhaley, AIR Commentaries on The Code of Civil Procedure, 9th Ed (1977), Vol. 3
Takwani, C.K., Civil Procedure, Eastern Book Company, 6th ed. (2009)
Zuckerman, Adrian, Civil Procedure, LexisNexis Butterworths, 1st ed (2003)

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