Small Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS) Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Like
Surveillance Concept of Operations: A Path Forward
for Small UAS Surveillance
Gregory L. Orrell Angela Chen
The MITRE Corporation The MITRE Corporation
McLean, VA USA McLean, VA USA
gorrell@mitre.org angelachen@mitre.org
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS) are becoming more
common in the National Airspace System (NAS). The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) forecasts SUAS growth to be over
2.69 million by 2020 [1]. The majority of these operations are
expected to occur below 400 feet above ground level. Due to the
clutter of SUAS operations, a surveillance system will likely be
required to help SUAS operators avoid collisions with other
aircraft and eventually, to help integrate these operations into the
National Airspace. A concept for such a SUAS surveillance service
is presented in this paper. A surveillance solution concept is
proposed that leverages Automatic Dependent Surveillance –
Broadcast (ADS-B) and Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks to
provide ADS-B like services to SUAS. Using both networks
enables surveillance coverage at low altitude that is able to be
integrated with existing FAA surveillance services.
This paper describes the need for a new SUAS surveillance service,
a set of use cases for that service, and proposes a conceptual system
solution, referred to as ‘Vigilant'. The Vigilant proposal includes
the use of a new ADS-B frequency for air-to-air communications,
a concept for leveraging the LTE network, and new surveillance
message content specific to SUAS operations. Future research
needs are discussed to expand on the concept, furthering the
capability of the system to support SUAS operations. The Vigilant
SUAS surveillance communication concept will enable the safe
and efficient integration of SUAS into the NAS.
Keywords—ADS-B, SUAS, LTE, Surveillance
I. INTRODUCTION
The fastest growing new entrant to the National Airspace
System (NAS) is Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS).
With projections of continued sales and registration growing to
2.69 million SUAS by 2020 as the FAA’s lower bound estimate
[1], more SUAS will be entering the NAS by 2025 for a variety
of uses. Uses could include hobby, commercial, and
government use. A majority of these operations are expected to
occur below 400 feet above ground level (AGL). All aircraft
are
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Christopher J. Reynolds
The MITRE Corporation
McLean, VA USA
creynolds@mitre.org
required to maintain well clear of other traffic which will also
be a requirement for the operator of the SUAS. It is therefore
important that the operator have a keen cognizance of nearby
traffic for situational awareness. SUAS operators waivered into
Class B and Class C airspace will be required to equip with
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
by 2020 [2],[3],[6]. With the above requirements, there are
some challenges that face the SUAS operator community.
Current cooperative surveillance methods have limitations
in supporting SUAS operating under 400 feet AGL. First, air
traffic management (ATM) radar systems have limitations in
detecting SUAS or Transponder-only aircraft close to the
ground. Second, ADS-B surveillance today can work under
certain SUAS density and transmission power constraints
[4][5]. However, ADS-B ground radio stations today are not
designed to provide coverage down to the ground, as it focuses
on airborne traffic above 500 feet. There are a few identified
specific airport equipage cases, such as major Class B covered
airports, where surveillance coverage to the ground is
improved, but SUAS operations under Part 107.41 are restricted
from Class B airspace, without prior authorization [6].
To retrofit the current ADS-B radio stations and increasing
the number of ADS-B radio stations to support terrestrial facing
surveillance services would incur a large cost. Leveraging an
existing system, such as LTE, may offset this cost. The use of
LTE alone for SUAS surveillance communications could be
leveraged however, subscription costs, limited coverage in rural
areas and link initialization times are limiting factors in using
only LTE. Leveraging both systems will enable better quality
of surveillance services at low altitude and reduce costs to all
users.
The SUAS ADS-B Surveillance Concept of Operations
(ConOps) proposed in this paper, will cover a conceptual
system, referred to as ‘Vigilant,' that will expand ADS-B to low
altitude SUAS. The ConOps will cover a set of use cases to
describe how the system could support SUAS at low altitudes,
a new ADS-B frequency for air-to-air communications, a
concept for leveraging the Long Term Evolution (LTE)
network, and how the surveillance communications could be
leveraged. Concept surveillance message content regarding
SUAS operations will be discussed below as well.
A. Scope
This ConOps proposes a communication architecture that
allows the exchange of SUAS surveillance information for the
purpose of seeing and being seen, to enable the exchange of
information for managing the airspace demand and traffic
density. The identified methods for the exchange of SUAS to
SUAS air-to-air surveillance information are through LTE
networks and a separate ADS-B channel within the protected
Aeronautical Radio Navigation spectrum (e.g., 979 MHz or
1104 MHz).
B. Assumptions
- No assumptions on the operating environment in regards
to geographic location (e.g., near an airport).
- No assumptions on how current cooperative traffic is
communicated to the SUAS, only that it is.
- Assume the SUAS is 55 pounds or less and operating
under 87 knots ground speed.
- Assume SUAS is allowed to 400 feet AGL.
- Assume SUAS can transmit and receive surveillance
information.
- Assume the SUAS will avoid manned aircraft.
- Assume Manned Aircraft do not have SUAS surveillance
information.
- Assume conventional ATC does not have SUAS
surveillance information.
C. Problem Statement
As mentioned in the introduction, current ADS-B
cooperative surveillance methods have limitations in
supporting SUAS operating under 400 feet AGL. Factors
limiting current ADS-B systems from supporting SUAS
include:
- Line-of-sight (LOS) radio communication concerns at
low altitude
- Required transmission and reception power needs to
support SUAS operations.
Figure 1, provides a visual summary of LOS
communication impacts.
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Fig. 1. Line of Sight Radio Communications by Altitude
Summary.
LOS radio communications require an unobstructed path for
the energy to be passed from transmitter to receiver. Obstacles
can, depending on the materials encountered, reflect or absorb
the energy emitted during the broadcast transmission. SUAS
broadcasting surveillance information on line-of-sight radio
frequencies such as those proposed under Vigilant are at a
greater risk of obstruction interference lower to the ground. At
higher altitudes, receiving too many surveillance messages on
the same frequency can have an impact as well, through co-
channel interference. However, that is not expected in this
shared system concept. Depending on terrain obstructions close
to ground infrastructure, good to fair LOS to ADS-B ground
radio stations and LTE towers would be expected. The lower
the altitude of the SUAS, the LOS capabilities to ground ADS-
B radio stations and LTE towers slowly diminish. LTE is
expected to maintain higher connectivity levels as it is more
terrestrial focused when compared to ADS-B. In metropolitan
areas, with urban canyon effects, or areas of rugged terrain LOS
communications will be most impacted. The LTE infrastructure
is population centered, allowing for better service in
metropolitan areas, but LTE is still greatly impacted by LOS
obstructions in dense building environments. In this case, ADS-
B air-to-air would be the only alternative available in the dense
building environment, but hampered due to obstructions
Guterres, et al. [4] introduced a relationship between traffic
density and transmission power given a set reception sensitivity
for Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) ADS-B. Depending
on how the variables of transmission power, traffic density, and
reception sensitivity are defined, performance characteristics
could negatively impact an ADS-B channel assuming an
architecture like UAT. Risks of co-channel interference
resulting in a low probability of decoding a surveillance
message could negatively impact airborne system users.
II. CONCEPT USE CASES
A. Use Case 1 – Visual Line of Sight Operation with
Unmanned Aircraft
UAS 1, a fixed-wing SUAS is at 400ft AGL, conducting a
crop inspection. The ground control station for the crop
inspection SUAS is 0.25 miles from the SUAS present position.
SUAS 2, a rotorcraft SUAS is operating at 300ft AGL, for the
purpose of inspecting power lines crossing the farmland. The
ground control station for the power line inspection SUAS is
0.5 miles from its present position. The weather is clear, with
15NM visibility. Visual Flight Rules (VFR) prevail.
The operators of SUAS 1 and SUAS 2 both have a traffic
display. The pilot of the power line inspection SUAS 2 can
visually acquire SUAS 1 with the help of the traffic display.
SUAS 2’s pilot notices SUAS 1 moving in a search grid pattern
over a field, noting the traffic is 100ft above and on a head-on
collision course. The pilot of power line inspection SUAS 2
elects to reduce altitude to 150ft to stay well clear of SUAS 1
and continues to monitor the traffic.
B. Use Case 2 – Visual Line of Sight Operation with Manned
Aircraft
A medivac helicopter has just left the scene of an accident
and is at 700 ft AGL, en route to a local hospital. Nearby, a real
estate company is operating a small SUAS, at 300 ft AGL,
taking pictures of property for a client. The weather is clear,
with 15 nautical mile visibility. Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
prevail.
The SUAS operator, able to see the SUAS from the ground,
notices the helicopter approaching from the East on their traffic
display before visually acquiring the helicopter. The pilot of the
helicopter does not see the SUAS. Unsure about the helicopter’s
intentions, the SUAS operator elects to descend their aircraft to
100 ft AGL until the helicopter passes. After the helicopter
passes, the SUAS operator climbs back to 300 ft AGL and
resumes taking pictures.
C. Use Case 3 – Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operation
SUAS 1, a fixed-wing SUAS is at 400 ft AGL, transiting a
Mode C Veil area for the purpose of topographic mapping a
railroad right-of-way. The ground control station for SUAS 1 is
25 miles from its present position. SUAS 2, a rotorcraft SUAS
is operating at 300 ft AGL, for the purpose of news gathering
on traffic. The weather is clear, with 15NM visibility, in the
twilight hours. Visual Flight Rules (VFR) prevail.
The operators of SUAS 1 and SUAS 2 both have a traffic
display. SUAS 2 can acquire SUAS 1 on the traffic display
moving away from the intended flight path. SUAS 2 maintains
its heading for a half nautical mile and transitions to a hover
over the traffic.
D. Human-in-the-loop and Autonomy
The use cases presented above assume a human operator is
in the loop for decision making. Autonomous systems could be
applied to the use cases with machine based decision making
being used for conflict avoidance. The content and methods for
the communication of surveillance information is agnostic to
the user, be it a human operator or machine. For near-term
operational purposes, the human operator scenarios were
chosen for this ConOps. Further concept use cases could be
developed for use with higher levels of autonomy.
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III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION
The concept presented in this paper removes SUAS traffic
from current manned ADS-B channels onto a separate
dedicated system, consisting of a separate channel under the
protected Aeronautical Radio Navigation and LTE networks.
This system removes the risks of co-channel interference on the
978 MHz frequency due to the forecast traffic densities and
transmit power needed for SUAS operations. To supplement
the lack of coverage at low altitudes with this new ADS-B
channel assuming a similar installation of the new transceivers
to current ADS-B (both air and ground), LTE is envisioned to
support the air-to-air communication of surveillance
information. In the concept, signal quality would be the decider
for which communication subnetwork would be best to support
the communication of surveillance information. The challenges
of a new ADS-B channel and LTE supporting this concept are
discussed below. Figure 2 below illustrates the concepts
communication pathways for SUAS surveillance information
to be broadcast air-to-air to other cooperative traffic using the
Vigilant system. Note that some pathways are not defined as
they are out of the scope of this document and the defined
assumptions. The following sections will discuss the
conceptualized message payload structures along with concept
message content, followed by the communication of the
surveillance message using a new ADS-B channel and LTE.
Fig. 2. Concept Communications Architecture
IV. VIGILANT CONCEPT UTILIZATION
This ConOps proposes the Vigilant System as an ADS-B
system variant dedicated to SUAS operations, with the
additional benefit of modified messages for new entrants.
Providing a new SUAS ADS-B channel to unmanned
operations will not only diminish the impact on the
conventional ADS-B infrastructure but also provide a means to
address several potential needs specific to the unmanned
domain. The inherent nature of SUAS operations introduces a
new range of challenges different from those specific to
manned aircraft operations. By providing an alternative
channel to ADS-B, communication messages can be configured
to accommodate those challenges directly, while still providing
for interoperability with manned aircraft, if required in the
future.
A. Interoperability with Unmanned Aircraft
The fundamental purpose of Vigilant is to serve as an
expansion of ADS-B services for the SUAS community without
negatively impacting manned operations by saturating the
legacy ADS-B channels. Users of Vigilant will be able to
communicate with other users participating on the Vigilant
subnetworks. Multiple participants on the same communication
paths equates to a cooperative network specifically designed for
sharing SUAS surveillance information with other SUAS in a
comprehensive service area. The exchange of information is
intended to be shared directly from aircraft to aircraft, or when
required, by making use of ground communication
infrastructure as an intermediary between pairs of aircraft.
Vigilant users can increase situation awareness by exchanging
standardized surveillance messages.
This ConOps proposes to provide core surveillance
messages that included the legacy ADS-B message structures.
Ideally, the surveillance messages being exchanged would be
formatted in a consistent manner with legacy ADS-B systems
so that it can be backwards compatible with existing systems
when warranted.
B. Interoperability with Manned Aircraft
Vigilant does not intend to broadcast messages directly to
manned aircraft on legacy ADS-B channels (i.e., 1090ES and
UAT). Receiving legacy ADS-B message content is critical, in
that it allows a SUAS to obtain surveillance information of
manned flight operations taking place within the operating
environment. The SUAS receiving manned aircraft surveillance
information will support SUAS in fulfilling their obligation to
always give way to manned aircraft as stated in the
assumptions. There is no assumption that manned aircraft will
require SUAS surveillance information, Use Case 2 identified
in Section II of this paper, illustrates a case where a SUAS is
interacting with a manned aircraft. Surveillance information
obtained from the legacy ADS-B channels can inform the
operator of the SUAS about the manned traffic. The SUAS
operator can then acquire and avoid the traffic.
It is expected that Vigilant users will receive messages
broadcast on legacy ADS-B channels (1090ES, UAT), but the
most practical manner in which this is to occur requires further
exploration and remains outside the scope of this ConOps. Two
possible options could be the SUAS has receivers for all
surveillance information channels or that a ground system
would rebroadcast the manned ADS-B information to the
SUAS. This ConOps proposes to amend the Vigilant
surveillance message with an additional field that indicates the
source of aircraft surveillance information.
C. NASA UAS Traffic Management
NASA is currently spearheading a comprehensive research
effort envisioned to pave the way for emerging SUAS
operations to interface with today’s complex NAS
environment. To ensure the safety of all NAS users, NASA has
partnered with industry, government, and academia to provide
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a UAS Traffic Management (UTM) solution [26]. This effort
is envisioned to bring together the necessary airspace structure
and services for SUAS to safely operate in low altitude airspace
for both visual line of site (VLOS) and beyond visual line of
site (BVLOS) operations.
Past flight testing has incorporated multiple beyond visual
line-of-sight operations within sparsely populated areas. It
served as a pioneer in several areas, such as multiple
simultaneous BVLOS flights, automated alerting, and dynamic
re-routing capabilities. [27],[28]
Overall, the proposed NASA UTM architecture is intended
to receive and disseminate appropriate information to SUAS
operators (and other stakeholders) on a case-by-case basis, so
that an appropriate level of situational awareness can be
ascertained. To bring this concept to fruition, an underlying
possibility suggests that the clear majority of these capabilities
being proposed will require each SUAS to perform a wireless
broadcast of own ship information, and therefore require a
common wireless channel to do so. The NASA UTM ConOps
document [26] suggests that “ADS-B Like” transceivers or
vehicle-to-vehicle communications can be a strategic approach
to providing air traffic deconfliction functionality among SUAS
operators. The specific type of information and how often it is
broadcasted may be dependent on the operating environment or
activity being conducted.
D. SUAS Identification & Tracking
Deriving a technical solution for UAS identification and
tracking has become a high priority for both the FAA and
several other federal agencies tasked with ensuring national
security. The FAA is seeking innovative solutions that provide
a means to identify and track UAS for security and public safety
purposes. There is concern that U.S. airspace populated with
unidentified UAS can be used for nefarious purposes.
Therefore, emerging technologies alongside additional
operating requirements are being developed to provide a
practical mitigation to this growing security concern. The intent
is to develop a lightweight, low-power, low-cost SUAS ID &
Tracking solution that can be utilized by UAS weighing more
than 0.55 lbs., for both public and civil UAS operations.
A feasible solution would likely include a remote electronic
identification system for UAS, that can be monitored by
security agencies and law enforcement to detect and respond to
suspicious activity when appropriate.
This ConOps proposes to address the UAS ID and tracking
problem by offering a solution that utilizes the Vigilant
platform as a means of communicating UAS ID. Every
Vigilant message is envisioned to broadcast UAS ID alongside
surveillance information on a routine basis. Any receiving air
or ground-based device would obtain this information and be
able to use it to track and monitor the broadcasting flight.
Further validation can occur by matching the configurable
SUAS ID with the static ICAO address built into the Vigilant
transceiver.
E. Control Station Location
For all practical purposes, a SUAS is comprised of an
aircraft and the control station. Legacy ADS-B systems
broadcast surveillance information regarding the aircraft
component, but with the advent of SUAS, there is a need to
broadcast information regarding the control station location.
Having the ability to locate the control station (and pilot)
provides essential information when responding to safety and
security concerns. Having the ability to locate the control
station quickly and efficiently may reduce the occurrence of
deploying UAS counter measures in the future. In cases where
the control station location cannot be determined by the SUAS,
the originating departure location would be reported in its place.
This ConOps proposes to address safety and security
concerns by amending the surveillance information in the
Vigilant surveillance message with the broadcast control station
location. In situations where the control station location is
unknown to the broadcasting aircraft, the originating departure
location would be used.
F. Aircraft Intent Information
This ConOps proposes to amend the Vigilant surveillance
message to provide future aircraft intent information in the form
of GPS coordinates for the next intended waypoint. This
information would be useful for identifying potential route
conflicts and help prevent conflicting traffic situations in
advance. Control station displays can leverage aircraft intent
information to supplement nearby aircraft location with where
these aircraft are intending to fly.
Mission intent could also be broadcast in the Vigilant
surveillance message. For example, broadcasting a message
field to indicate the SUAS is on an agricultural operation would
be one of the forms of mission intent.
This ConOps proposes to allow for surveillance information
communicated by the Vigilant system to be shared with existing
Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems. Vigilant surveillance
information can be used to supplement or validate other
surveillance information obtain through future certifiable DAA
solutions and techniques. Mission intent data could be shared
to provide priority in right of way scenarios or be used for other
data analysis functions.
G. Aircraft Status Indication
Degraded aircraft states, such as lost-link events, are a
relatively common occurrence among UAS. A loss of a
command and control link is defined as an unmanned aircraft
system state in which the control link no longer allows the pilot
to intervene in the management of the flight. Often the aircraft
executes a set of pre-programmed contingency procedures until
the control link is reestablished. In more rare circumstances,
the aircraft fails to execute the contingency procedures as
intended and performs unpredictably; this is often referred to as
a “fly-away” event. In either case, the event results in aircraft
behavior that was unanticipated nor planned. Unplanned
behavior is considered a degraded aircraft state and should be
made known to other NAS users to ensure that the operating
environment remains as safe and efficient as practical. Since
degraded aircraft states introduce a heightened level of
unpredictability, it becomes imperative that other airspace
participants are notified of the situation so that they can respond
accordingly.
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This ConOps proposes to amend the Vigilant surveillance
information with a field that indicates to other participants
within the operating environment that an unmanned aircraft has
entered into an altered aircraft state, such as lost link or a fly-
away condition.
H. Detect Obstacles
Providing a means to detect and avoid other aircraft has
been a tough research and development challenge since the
onset of widespread SUAS operations. In addition to
detecting other aircraft, SUAS also have a heightened need to
avoid obstacles [25]. Legacy ADS-B is already being used to
report obstacles that could pose a hazard to manned aviation.
The detection aspect of DAA requires the ability for a SUAS
to sense the location of other aircraft and obstacles within the
operating environment.
This ConOps proposes to amend the Vigilant surveillance
information with a field that indicates whether the transmitting
source is emanating from an airborne platform or ground-
based obstacle.
I. Configurable Message Sets
Automated devices, such as SUAS, can perform complex
tasks with a high level of timing and precision, that would
otherwise be unattainable if done manually. Quick and efficient
sharing of information between devices is often necessary to
allow these tasks to occur. When operating as a swarm, for
example, SUAS may act as nodes in distributing additional
information within the fleet. Perhaps the broadcast of additional
information to ground infrastructure, such as pilot in command
information, would also prove valuable. Potential applications
are endless, and allowing for a user-configurable message-set
may accommodate future SUAS needs without requiring a full
revamping of the Vigilant system.
This ConOps proposes to amend the Vigilant surveillance
information to allow for a pre-allocated, user-configurable,
message space that can be broadcasted over the Vigilant
subnetwork. The capability would allow future SUAS
participants to share unconstrained information between
devices on a protected communication channel.
V. CONCEPT MESSAGES & COMMUNICATION SUBNETOWRKS
A. Concept Message Payloads
Current ADS-B provides pilots with a wealth of traffic and
weather information presented on a graphical display. ADS-B
provides data such as a unique aircraft address, latitude,
longitude, altitude, velocity vector (X, Y, Z), and associated
accuracy and integrity measures. RTCA DO-282B [7], the
minimum operational performance standards for Universal
Access Transceiver (UAT) ADS-B, describes the components
of the UAT message payload in detail. The surveillance
message for this concept is envisioned to be similar to UAT
ADS-B messages with alterations suitable for SUAS
operations.
The concept SUAS ADS-B message structure, sample
message payload content, and sample performance are
summarized below. These messages are envisioned to be sent
over both of the new SUAS ADS-B and LTE communication
networks.
The current UAT ADS-B message payload structure will be
used; however, the content is expected to change. Figure 3
illustrates the message structures for both a short and long
message on both communication networks.
Fig. 3. Short and Long SUAS ADS-B Message Format
Each message will have a designated header, to inform the
receiver of the type of message being received. The state vector
contains the core surveillance information about the SUAS.
Information in the state vector would change slightly in this
concept to support SUAS operations. For example, given the
estimated population of SUAS, a 24-bit aircraft address may
sufficient to identify all SUAS uniquely. Leveraging the
Address-Qualifier filed, a reserved field, or the Air-Ground
State field of the current UAT ADS-B message could increase
the aircraft address to 25-bit or 27-bit to alleviating the
problem.
Like today where weather, traffic information and other
supporting operational data is shared in the long message
structure in manned aviation ADS-B [7][8], SUAS specific
information could be shared. If connected to the autopilot of the
SUAS, information such as next waypoint, home point location,
range and bearing to the ground control station (GCS), and C2
link status could be included in the long message structure.
Section IV of this paper will discuss how this conceptual
surveillance message content could be leveraged.
B. ADS-B Subnetwork
No significant changes to the method of ADS-B air-to-air
communication would be applied in this concept. Three
parameters to consider are required transmitter power for the
SUAS, the required receiver sensitivity, and traffic density on
the channel.
First, the battery power needed to operate the ADS-B radio
will impact the SUAS flight time. The UAT transmitter has a
very low duty cycle and requires relatively low power while the
receiver, which is usually on all the time, will require
significantly more power from the SUAS. Modeling and
analysis by Stanley Jones at the MITRE Corporation has shown
the transmitted signal power level for SUAS surveillance could
be very low relative to current UAT standards. Jones’s findings,
contained in Guterres et al. (2017) also identified a relationship coverage maps of the four major cellular network operators, it
between SUAS traffic density and transmitted signal power by
a SUAS population and the impact on air traffic control users
of ADS-B. The study described a traffic scenario, with manned
high-density traffic on 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (ES) and
UAT along with SUAS equipped with UAT ADS-B Out, at
altitude few hundred feet above the ground. Results from the
study showed that in high-density environments a transmitted
signal power for SUAS should be 0.01 Watt (W) or less to
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support mixed operations. A transmitted UAT message at
0.01W would have a usable range of 1.9 nautical miles (NM)
per equation (2). The calculated distance identified assumes a
confidence level of 95 percent of message reception at that
range. Equation (1) converts a power ratio to a ratio in decibels
(dB) relative to 1W (dBw) then converts to decibel relative to
1milliwatt (dBm). In equation (2) the MTL is the receiver
sensitivity in dBm. G is the total transmitter and receiver
antenna gains in dB relative to an isotropic source (assumed to
be 0 dBm for aircraft antennas). Fo is the frequency in
megahertz (MHz), set to 978, the UAT frequency, as an
example.
Pu = 10 * log(PL) + 30 (1)
Ro(Pu) = 10*((Pu - MTL + G - 20*log(Fo) - 37.8) / 20) (2)
Certifiable ADS-B devices today can utilize a minimum
transmit power of 7W [RTCA DO-282B]; however the FAA
requirements for using ADS-B for air traffic services is 16W.
A 7W transmitted signal power results in an free space range of
49NM. Flight tests resulted in a range of 20-50NM with
antenna performance variances contributing most significantly.
Considering Use Case 1 as an example, where both SUAS
are at the maximum allowable speed for Part 107.51(a) of Title
14 Code of Federal Regulation. Part 107.51(a) states that “The
ground speed of the small unmanned aircraft may not exceed
87 knots (100 miles per hour).” In this use case, the 200mph
closure rate would have to be considered for a conservative
definition of surveillance range needs.
Second, receiver sensitivity is not envisioned to change
from the standard -93dBm if the current UAT frequency was
used or if another frequency was designated for SUAS use.
Third, the UAT channel bandwidth was sized for air traffic
applications with manned aircraft and it may not support high
concentrations of SUAS. Alternative UAT signal modulation
schemes [9] may be considered to increase bandwidth or create
sub-channels for specific user groups. If the current UAT
frequency was used, there would be an impact on UAT
performance due to an increase in the signal noise floor.
C. LTE Subnetwork
To complement SUAS ADS-B and improve LOS coverage
at low altitude, the licensed LTE cellular communication
network has promising potential to support and compliment
SUAS ADS-B [10],[11]. The purely flat IP-based network
architecture of LTE could achieve high data rates with low end-
to-end delay based on Quality of Service (QoS) requirements
(priority, delay, and packet loss rate) to end users. From the
appears LTE could provide extensive coverage at low altitude
and provide the adequate signal level and quality below 400ft
[11. Moreover, LTE could potentially support seamless
handovers between base stations for SUAS [10],[11],[12] at
high speed. Altitude and speed considerations must be explored
for this concept for 4th Generation (4G) and 5th generation (5G)
LTE. LTE could provide internetworking functionality to non-
3GPP networks (e.g., WiMAX) and allow for backward
compatibility with 3rd generation (3G) service for the expansion
of service into remote areas. More detail and analysis of LTE
characteristics not able to be captured in this document can be
found in [10],[11],[13].
For SUAS operators to maintain situation awareness of their
operating environment, LTE can support the exchange of
surveillance information between SUAS using two key
features: Evolved Multimedia Broadcast Multimedia Service
(eMBMS) and Device-to-Device Communication (D2D).
Introduced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
these services are envisioned to play an important role in this
communication concept. The eMBMS offers high-quality
broadcast to all the SUAS users or multicast transmissions to a
set of registered SUAS users, instead of sending it to every
SUAS user individually system-wide. Subsection C-2 describes
how this service supports the communication of surveillance
information for Vigilant. Today, all LTE transmissions must
pass through the core network. However, LTE D2D will enable
direct communication (e.g., vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
connectivity [12]) at distances up to 500 meters (0.3 NM) with
low energy consumption and low latency. LTE D2D is
envisioned to support the communication of surveillance
information both in-coverage and out-of-coverage of the base
station. Subsection C-3 describes in more detail how this
service supports the communication of surveillance
information for Vigilant. Figure 4 illustrates the
communication pathways for SUAS surveillance information
using eMBMS and D2D for the concept.
Fig. 4. Surveillance Communication Pathways for eMBMS and D2D for
SUAS.
LTE was chosen as a supplement communication method
for Vigilant over other wireless technologies (i.e., IEEE 802.11
family and Bluetooth) because of range characteristics, latency,
and QoS. Additional comparisons between the LTE D2D
scheme over other short range wireless technologies can be
found in [12][13][14][15]. Exploiting LTE using eMBMS and
D2D increases situation awareness by increasing the range of
reception while reducing unbounded transmission delays and
maintaining greater QoS guarantees. These features are
particularly important to safety critical messages.
1) Standards of LTE (4G and beyond)
[12],[14],[16],[17],[18]
LTE standards have been developed by the 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP), and the current published version
is Release 14.
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Standards for eMBMS, also knowns as LTE Broadcast,
were initially developed in Release 9. D2D concepts,
commonly known as Proximity Services (ProSe), Sidelink or
LTE direct, were introduced in Release 12 of the LTE
standards. A priority of Release 12 was the use of LTE
technology for emergency and security services. The eMBMS
and D2D services have developed over time to the present
Release 14 standards which have expanded on group
communication for public safety users (e.g., firefighter) and
incorporate more commercial use cases. As ADS-B is a
broadcast service, the identified LTE methods for one-to-many
communications is the focus of this ConOps for the LTE
communication subnet. LTE support for V2X (Vehicle-to-
Everything) services, for example, has resulted in enhancement
of ProSe and multicast features [12]. Release 15, in draft now,
will deliver the first set of 5G specifications. Note that one of
the focus areas of 5G is under the title “Critical
Communications” and includes “Drones & Robotics.” This
section of the 5G standards is still in early development. It’s
envisioned that Release 15 standards can provide more robust
surveillance information exchange needs for the drones and
robotics.
2) Key Feature 1: LTE Broadcast [12],[17],[19],[20]
eMBMS is one LTE service that supports the
communication of surveillance information in the Vigilant
concept. Commonly known as LTE broadcast, eMBMS can
provide delivery of Unicast, Broadcast and Multicast message
transmit services, as shown in Figure 5. LTE eMBMS provides
transmission methods for sending message content using the
Broadcast could transmit surveillance messages to all SUAS
users, using Multicast to transmit to a specified set of SUAS
users in a service volume, or using Unicast to transmit to a
particular SUAS user. The same radio resource can be flexibly
allocated between Unicast mode and Broadcast/Multicast mode
so that eMBMS can deliver the same content to a large number
of SUAS users more efficiently with lower cost, e.g. radio
spectrum utilization.
Fig. 5. Communication Path Comparison between Unicast, Broadcast, and
Multicast modes to SUAS
Leveraging eMBMS functionality embedded in the existing
LTE network infrastructure will allow for a group of adjacent
eNBs to relay an SUA’s surveillance message, in a strictly time
synchronized manner, to multiple receiving SUAS on the same
frequency. The process would eliminate the need to transmit a
surveillance message multiple times to each SUAS in the
service area and allow offloading the data from unicast
transmission for common content.
 The eMBMS network is currently designed so that
surveillance information could be distributed to SUAS up to 8.1
NM from the eNB [20], at peak performance. The transmission
range allows for a max service volume diameter of 16.2 NM.
Linking multiple eNB service volumes to create a service area,
allows the LTE communication architecture to function similar
to ADS-B today. While Broadcast is the preferred method of
this concept, LTE eMBMS Unicast and Multicast could be
leveraged under this concept for additional use cases (e.g.
SUAS fleet messaging). Benefits of eMBMS Unicast,
Broadcast, and Multicast transmission methods include the
following:
• Dynamically switching between different modes
on demand
• Increase system capacity via Multiple-Input-
Multiple-Output (MIMO) technology
• Allocate resources better by measuring the channel
quality
There is an opportunity for LTE eMBMS to operate in
unlicensed bands, particularly the Industrial, Scientific and
Medical (ISM) bands [20]. Small cell enhancement (which is
partitioning a service volume into smaller parts) enables
communications on ISM Bands, providing a greater capability
for stable Broadcast and Multicast communications within an
obstructed area. With ISM band, traffic can be offloaded from
the licensed spectrum, while boosting the coverage range and
user capacity. However, operating in ISM band may be
susceptible to greater risks of interference.
3) Key Feature 2: LTE D2D [21],[22],[23],[24]
Another service of LTE that can support the communication
of surveillance information for the Vigilant concept is LTE
Device-to-Device communication (D2D). In earlier LTE
releases, unless D2D is enabled, communication is routed
through the core network, regardless of the distance between
the communication devices. This would result in a larger
transmission delay of the SUAS to SUAS surveillance message
if those devices are in close proximity. D2D allows the direct
communication exchange between a SUAS and one or more
SUAS, without data relay via an eNB, as long as they are within
a specified range. The LTE network has control elements in
place to manage functions such as authentication,
synchronization, and selecting appropriate radio resources
(e.g., mode selection, scheduling, power control, resource block
allocation, intra-intercell interference management) for D2D
transmissions. Figure 6 illustrates the difference between
current LTE and D2D communication paths.
Fig. 6. Communication Path Routed through Core Network Versus Directly
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Figure 7 contains the direct communication path variations
enabled by D2D. The presence of network coverage is shown
in the figure as the dashed oval volumes.
Fig. 7. D2D Communication Scenario
Summaries of each communication path variation for D2D are
covered below in the following three scenarios.
a. In-Coverage
- In this scenario, both SUAS would be within a service
coverage area. SUAS can do direct surveillance
information communications with the control link being
set up by an eNB.
b. Partial Coverage
- In this scenario, SUAS1 is within the service coverage
area, while SUAS2 is outside of service coverage.
SUAS2 can still receive service from the LTE network
through D2D relay functionality via SUAS1, which has
service coverage.
c. Out-of-Coverage
- In this scenario, both SUAS are outside of service
coverage (e.g., off-shore). The SUAS are still able to
communicate with each other via D2D, with the control
link being established by the SUAS themselves.
The enhanced architecture shown in Figure 8 illustrates
support for the D2D communication scenarios. The ProSe
function is a logical configuration element of a D2D operation.
The ProSe function can control the air-to-air communication
state of D2D for a one-to-one or one-to-many communication.
The ProSe function is responsible for the device service
authorization, coordination of the proximity discovery, and
monitoring the ongoing D2D communication link. A SUAS can
contact a ProSe function to receive network related
information, such as radio resource parameters and group IP
multicast address for configuring air-to-air communications.
Fig. 8. LTE D2D Network Architecture
D2D communication in LTE consists of two basic
functions: Device Discovery and Direct Communication. These
functions occur regardless of service coverage availability. In
the Vigilant concept for D2D communications, the device
discovery function can facilitate direct discovery of other
SUAS within the vicinity of the transmitting SUAS, even in the
absence of an eNB. Direct Communication functions control
the communication pathway of the surveillance message
exchanges to discovered SUAS without the requirement of
relaying through an eNB. These two main functions are
illustrated in Figure 9. In Device Discovery SUAS-A in the
figure has an awareness range that enables the discovery of
SUAS-B & SUAS-C. SUAS-D, located outside of the
awareness range of SUAS-A will not be included in the D2D
communications. Direct Communication will then occur
between the discovered SUAS.

Fig. 10. Device Discovery and Direct Communication Signal Flow [22],[24]

Processes to initiate Device Discovery for SUAS surveillance

communications will need to be verified as being acceptable for
SUAS operations when developing the concept requirements.
Once the discovery request and response transactions are
completed between SUAS, the network will determine if D2D
communications or eMBMS Unicast, Broadcast, or Multicast
communications can occur.
VI. DISCUSSION AND NEXT STEPS
Fig. 9. Device Discovery and Direct Communication The proposed Vigilant infrastructure provides a system-of-
systems capability dedicated to supporting SUAS surveillance
Device discovery [24] is an essential enabler for D2D
communications. As the fastest growing new entrant to
communication. There are two models for direct device
aviation, SUAS has the potential to saturate the current ADS-B
discovery: Model A (“I am here”) and Model B (“Who is
infrastructure. Vigilant would provide an alternative channel,
there”). Model A, an automatic broadcast method, similar to
thereby minimizing risks to manned ADS-B services.
ADS-B, broadcasts where the own ship SUAS is to other
Additionally, the Vigilant communication infrastructure
nearby SUAS without the need for a reply. Model B, an active
provides resilient communication pathways among low-altitude
interrogation method, similar to Mode-C/S transponder
structures and obstacles.
communications, where the device interrogates nearby SUAS
By leveraging LTE networks and a separate ADS-B channel
and waits for a response. However, if the ownship SUAS does
within the protected Aeronautical Radio Navigation,
not find any nearby SUAS, LTE D2D under Model B will not
surveillance coverage is expanded to SUAS at low altitude
transmit the surveillance message through direct
using the interoperable subnetworks. The multiple
communication. This feature could potentially lower the energy
communication subnetworks also provide greater probability of
consumption and interference on the LTE channel.
successfully communicating the surveillance messages at low
LTE D2D direct Device Discovery can work in both in-
altitude.
coverage and partial/out-of-coverage scenario. Direct Device
SUAS to SUAS air-to-air surveillance communications allows
Discovery can support an awareness range up to 500 meters
SUAS operators to have traffic awareness and aid in their
from the own ship SUAS to other SUAS in the partial/out-of-
understanding of other SUAS operations within the
coverage scenario or even greater distances via networked eNB
environment. The SUAS community has recently been
in coverage. Figure 10 depicts the signaling flow to complete
developing applications leveraging SUAS surveillance
the Device Discovery process and the configure Direct
information. Providing comprehensive surveillance coverage
Communication.
along with SUAS applicable surveillance message content,
Vigilant is envisioned to support these applications and future
developments.
The proposed Vigilant concept proposed is focused on the
air-to-air surveillance communications; future work is intended
to identify how this air-to-air surveillance communication
architecture will operate in conjunction with a ground
infrastructure ConOps. Additional research is needed to
incorporate the ground infrastructure, surveillance message
information, the SUAS ADS-B channel, and the LTE channel.
Expanding the Vigilant concept to include a ground network
infrastructure will increase the utility of the system. The
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concept ground infrastructure could assist in relaying traffic
information between SUAS and support traffic management.
Traffic information is passed through the ground network could
include appropriatre information about manned traffic avialable
from ADS-B and radar. Weather and airspace status
information, such as Notices to Airmen may also be useful to
some SUAS operators. Joining an ADS-B network and an LTE
network for seamless communications will require further
research to enable the cooperative ground network for the
Vigilant system. Additionally, connecting Vigilant to ground-
services can also provide for the storage and retrieval of
information shared throughout the Vigilant network, allowing
for extensive data analysis and trending.
As mentioned in Section III, surveillance messages for
Vigilant are not yet defined and there is an opportunity to
include new information specific to SUAS operations. For
example, if connected to the SUAS autopilot, information such
as next waypoint, home point location, range and bearing to the
GCS, and C2 link status could be included.
The concept proposed a new ADS-B channel dedicated to
SUAS. Research into available channels that can adequately
support the surveillance concept within Aeronautical Radio
Navigation spectrum will need to be explored further. Further
investigation into low power transmission and reception
capabilities are needed. Enabling surveillance services at the
required distances for SUAS operational concepts while
reducing the power-consumption impact on SUAS operation
time, are critical for ensuring the efficient operation of SUAS
in the environment.
Exploiting the LTE D2D and eMBMS services are
anticipated to provide better performance regarding spectrum
utilization, power consumption, and transmission latency.
These services require additional exploration in the Vigilant
concept development to ensure their capabilities support SUAS
operations.
DISCLAIMER
The contents of this document reflect the views of the author
and The MITRE Corporation and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the
Department of Transportation (DOT). Neither the FAA nor the
DOT makes any warranty or guarantee, expressed or implied,
concerning the content or accuracy of these views.
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