(Oxford Handbooks) Tom L. Beauchamp - The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics-Oxford University Press (2014) - 166-190

A Humean Account of the Status and Character of Animals
Oxford Handbooks Online

A Humean Account of the Status and Character of
Animals
Julia Driver
The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics
Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp and R. G. Frey
Print Publication Date: Oct 2011 Subject: Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
Online Publication Date: May 2012 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195371963.013.0006
Abstract and Keywords
This article presents a theory inspired by and rooted in the work of the Scottish
philosopher and historian David Hume. Hume anticipated some features of Darwinian
thinking about animal minds. In particular, Hume believed that when the term
“understand” is used properly, animals can understand many features of the world. Hume
attributed rationality to some animals, on grounds that these animals are significantly like
humans in the principles of their nature, their patterns of learning, and their powers of
inference. This article interprets Hume to hold that animals resemble human beings both
in a variety of behaviors and in critical aspects of their mental lives. It finds that these
behavioral and psychological similarities form the basis of a Humean argument that
animals have moral status, though it acknowledges that Hume is less interested in moral
status questions and more interested in animal minds.
Keywords: Darwinian thinking, David Hume, animal minds, rationality, moral status
DAVID Hume believed that human beings resembled animals in a variety of important
behaviors.1 This resemblance led him to infer that animals possessed a mental life
analogous to that of human beings. These behavioral and psychological premises form the
basis for an argument that animals have some form of moral standing. Even though Hume
was not as clear on this point as he should have been, my view is that the Humean
account of animal character provides the basis for an account of moral standing that
acknowledges the moral considerability of animals as resting on a continuum with the
considerability of human beings. Nonhuman animals developed along the same
continuum as human beings in terms of reason and emotion. Even if they had not,
however, and even if nonhuman animals simply sprang into existence as they now are,
they would still possess moral standing on the basis of their psychology.2 Animals reason
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and feel. Because they reason and feel, we owe them consideration on the basis of duties
of humanity, though not, in Hume's very special sense, on the basis of justice. All beings
that have moral standing deserve moral consideration.3
What is distinctive in Hume's view of animal mentation is not that animals have mental
lives. That view had a long history prior to Hume, but Hume also had distinctive views
about what this similarity commits us to in terms of various forms of normativity. His
views are the result of arguments about the resemblance of (p. 145) humans and other
animals together with a naturalistic worldview. This account of animal status is in keeping
with contemporary views of mind and normativity that eschew the mysterious or
supernatural as the basis for the higher moral standing of human beings. My view is that
the Humean is committed to regarding nonhuman animals as similar in important
respects to humans. Further, the similarities are sufficient to ground moral standing for
animals, which, in turn, grounds human obligations to treat animals with compassion.
Importantly, animals resemble human beings with respect to their mental qualities.
Animals possess primitive capacities for reason, and they also possess emotions. Notably,
they possess sympathy. However, what prevents them from being full moral agents is
their lack of the right sort of metacognitive state regarding their sympathy and how it is
actually realized. They cannot approve or disapprove of these states. This is the crucial
difference between humans and animals, but it is insufficient to undermine moral
standing.
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Background: Against Human Exceptionalism

on Moral Standing
That human beings differ psychologically from the other animals is obvious. What I will
refer to as “human exceptionalism” goes beyond this claim, however. Human
exceptionalism is the view that the differences we observe between human beings and
the other animals account for a very special status that human beings have, a moral
status that is of a fundamentally different kind than that of the other animals, not merely
a difference of degree.4 This difference in kind accounts for the inherent superiority of
human beings and sets human beings apart from the natural world.
Historically, the human exceptionalism thesis has frequently explained the difference
between humans and animals by postulating something about human beings that is a
mark of divine favor. Human beings alone are created in God's image; they alone have
souls.5 Augustine, toward the beginning of The City of God, laid out the orthodox view:
“when we read ‘You shall not kill’ we assume that this does not refer to bushes, which
have no feelings, nor to irrational creatures, flying, swimming, walking, or crawling, since
they have no rational association with us, not having been endowed with reason as we
are, and hence it is by a just arrangement of the Creator that their life and death is
subordinated to our needs.”6 This view, I believe, Hume found unsupported by facts.
There is no spark of the divine in human beings that would warrant an exceptionalist
claim.7 Of course, even if there were, another argument would have to be given as to why
this would be relevant to the issue of moral standing.
The more contemporary version of human exceptionalism holds that human beings are
radically different from animals in a way that renders the lives of animals (p. 146) fairly
insignificant in themselves. What marks the difference seems to shift in writings on the
subject with the growing body of evidence we have about animal capabilities. There are
clearly cognitive dissimilarities between human and nonhuman animals, but the question
that is raised with the exceptionalism issue has to do with the significance of those
dissimilarities, assuming we abandon the outdated view that they are evidence of some
sort of divine aspect that humans possess and animals do not.
Hume believed in psychological continuity between animals and human beings. Given
that our psychological qualities are the qualities that confer moral standing, then the
Humean will be comfortable with the view that animals, as well as human beings, have
moral standing. My view is that Hume held this view. However, regardless of Hume's own
views, the theoretical framework he provides allows us to argue that this is the sort of
view he could have and should have articulated.
The exceptionalist view is based on a flawed methodology in which a biased sample of

evidence is used as providing the basis for the view. In the case at hand, the method
focuses on differences rather than similarities, and does not adequately consider the
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similarities in accounting for status. This general methodological bias is one that Hume
took explicit exception to in other areas as well. For example, he critiques proponents of
the design argument for a one-sided diet of evidence. In the case of animals, Hume
believes that if we consider a balanced diet of evidence, we will see the similarities as
well as differences, and the similarities are remarkable indeed.
In this chapter, I will agree with the view that human beings have higher moral status
than that of the other animals, but this agreement will be based upon considerations
having to do with the more sophisticated cognitive abilities human beings possess. The
aspect of exceptionalism that I will disagree with is that there is some dramatic
difference in kind between human beings and animals that marks us as apart from the
natural world and renders animals devoid of moral standing. There are many animals who
possess reason, and David Hume was one of the earlier philosophers to recognize the
significance of this fact. In arguing for this position, I will defend the Humean approach
against the frequently made criticism that it fails to account for animal welfare. This
criticism was leveled against Hume based on his remarks on animals and the norm of
justice. However, the limited scope of Hume's comments has led to misinterpretations of
his claims. His account can easily be expounded, or at least expanded, to include the view
that animals have moral standing, and that human beings owe animals consideration in
virtue of that standing. Hume's view that animals possess many of the same kinds of
mental states as human beings forms an important part of the argument.
That animals were capable of reason is a view that various influential writers held long
before Hume. Two hundred years before Hume wrote on the nature of mind, a Catholic
priest, Jerome Rorarius (1485–1566), wrote an essay, “That Animals Use Reason Better
Than Man.”8 Rorarius was struck by the fact that animals seemed to learn from
experience more adeptly than human beings (a view notably similar to that of his near
contemporary, Michel de Montaigne [1533–92]). (p. 147) Rorarius's essay was read and
discussed by Pierre Bayle in his Dictionary Historical and Critical, in the well-known
entry, “Rorarius.” Bayle, who was carefully read by Hume, was interested in Rorarius's
work because he thought that Descartes’ view of animal thought was mistaken, and
Hume may well be following Bayle's lead. Descartes was, and is still today, well known for
the view that animals lack souls, consciousness, and mentation beyond mere mechanical
reflex. Bayle noted that the Cartesian system—while it was able to preserve a sharp
distinction between animals and human beings—could not account for the cases of animal
intelligence that had motivated Rorarius to write his essay. For example, Rorarius
reported that he had seen, in Germany, wolves who were hung as an example to other
wolves, as a deterrent against killing sheep. Bayle writes of Rorarius's observation:
“Rorarius … saw two wolves hung on the gallows in the duchy of Juliers; and he observes
that this makes a stronger impression on other wolves than branding with a hot iron, the
loss of ears, [etc.]” make on human criminals.9 Animals seemed to be sensitive to such
warnings, if one were to judge merely by their behavior.
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Rorarius wasn’t alone in observing that animals seemed to act with intelligence and
consideration. Montaigne, in his “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” recounts many ordinary
examples of animals exhibiting intelligent behavior. One behavior that particularly
impressed him was that of seeing-eye dogs: “I have noticed how they stop at certain
doors where they have been accustomed to receive alms, how they avoid being hit by
coaches and carts …. I have seen one, along a town ditch, leave a smooth, flat, path and
take a worse one, to keep his master away from the ditch.” These sorts of observations on
intelligent behavior on the part of animals were much discussed in the seventeenth
century, particularly in light of the controversy surrounding Descartes’ view of the mind.
Descartes explicitly disagreed with Montaigne, challenging Montaigne's interpretation of
the observations and arguments presented in his Essays.10 Bayle wanted to introduce into
the debate early observations of animals at odds with the view that they lacked any
mental states whatsoever. There was a very lively debate on animal mentation, because a
good many people disagreed with Descartes’ views that animals were mechanistic
creatures utterly incapable of thought—that is, that they were automatons, which
exhibited behaviors associated with thought in human beings, yet with no thoughts of
their own.11
The other Sentimentalists also viewed animals as possessing mental states.

Sentimentalists held, roughly, that moral judgment requires emotion, and that reason
alone is insufficient ground for moral judgment. This commitment had to do with a view
about motivation: unless the emotions were somehow engaged, an agent would not be
moved to perform an action. Reason, the province of belief, was insufficient in itself to
provide this motivational force. However, the Sentimentalists did not deny reason a role in
moral judgment and action.
In the theory of Lord Shaftesbury (1671–1713), animals lack moral qualities such as
virtues because they cannot make the reflective judgments necessary to ascribe virtue to
others.12 Shaftesbury notes a distinction between goodness and virtue. (p. 148) Animals
can be good as animals, and as members of a given species, as long as they contribute to
the well-being of the species, or even broader categories such as the “system of all
animals.” They cannot have virtue, however. Note that Shaftesbury ties the possession of
virtue itself to the capacity to make judgments of virtue. These would be separated by
Hume. In Shaftesbury's view, virtue requires a second-order affection—that is, an
affection regarding another affection. Suppose that one witnesses an act of benevolence
as someone pulls a small child away from a speeding car. This makes one feel good.
Further, human beings have the capacity to reflect on this feeling, and form yet another
feeling about the feeling itself. Not only does one feel good, but after reflection, one feels
good about feeling good. When we act on this second-order feeling, we act virtuously. The
person performing the benevolent action experiences a kind of self-approval and acts
accordingly. This capacity to judge about and ascribe virtue is what Shaftesbury considers
the “moral sense.”
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For Hume, being judged morally and being a moral judge should be pulled apart. One can
be the object of approbation without being able, oneself, to judge and approve of the
mental qualities of others. Because animals do have a mental life, it seems reasonable to
hold that they possess “qualities of the mind” that constitute traits of character. These
traits of character can be pleasing or not, from the general point of view; thus, it seems
that animals, like persons, can possess their own form of virtue. Hume explicitly notes
that we often approve of certain traits in animals. This is an unusual feature of Hume's
account, and falls out of his third-person account of moral evaluation. A third-person
account of moral evaluation treats a judger's act of evaluating as primary in explaining
moral evaluation. For example, a view that holds that virtue is determined by what an
ideal observer approves of is a third-person account. By contrast, a view holding that the
virtuous action for me to perform is the one that I approve of is not a third-person
account; it would be a first-person account. On this first-person account, the criterion for
virtue is my approval, not the approval of an idealized third party. The relevance to the
animals issue is that, for Hume, it won’t matter whether animals themselves approve of
their qualities of the mind. What matters to the status of those qualities as virtues is
whether they are approved of from the “general” or “common” point of view. Animals may
not be able to make their own judgments of virtue, because they lack the crucial sort of
reflectivity, but they may be the objects of evaluation in terms of whether they possess
virtue.
That animals possess rich mental lives was a significant part of the background for
Hume's own writings on mind and animals, though only a piece of it. He was taking sides
in a debate that already had a long history that stretched much farther back than
Montaigne and in scope reached far beyond the writings of philosophers.13 However,
Hume was cognizant of relevant differences between human beings and animals,
differences that would be reflected in his account of moral agency. The Humean, then,
has a nice way of noting intuitive differences. I shall argue that animals have moral
standing and that they possess pleasing “qualities of the mind,” but that we have no
evidence, yet, that there are animals who are themselves moral agents.
(p. 149) Hume on Animal and Human Psychology

In Hume's view, we can learn a good deal about our own nature by looking at animals and
learn about animals by looking at ourselves. Any general account of mental processes
must include that of animals to be complete, and Hume was convinced that nature is not
radically bifurcated in terms of human-nonhuman. Simple observation of human and
animal behavior leads us to infer similar psychological mechanisms.
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Tis from the resemblance of the external actions of animals to those we ourselves
perform, that we judge their internal likewise to resemble ours; and the same
principle of reasoning, carry’d one step farther, will make us conclude that
because our internal actions resemble each other, the causes, from which they are
deriv’d, must also be resembling. When any hypothesis, therefore, is advanc’d to
explain a mental operation, which is common to men and beasts, we must apply
the same hypothesis to both; and as every true hypothesis will abide this trial, so I
may venture to affirm, that no false one will ever be able to endure it.14
The mental similarities had chiefly to do with the way we perceive and reason through
experience. Animals have mental faculties and are subject to forming habits, just as
people are. This is not to say that members of nonhuman species deliberate or engage in
arguments.15 They remember past events and develop habits of thought on the basis of
these memories. Remembering and developing habits of thought is what underlies
reasoning from cause to effect, and animals are capable in various degrees of this
reasoning—and may be very skilled at it.
There are differences—and there is some debate in the literature as to whether or not the
differences are matters of degree or kind. This issue can only be resolved when we
determine what we mean by “kind.” Hume clearly thought that human beings were
superior to animals in terms of the quality of reasoning. He was not a follower of Rorarius
on that score. He believed that animals were impressive, and at least when it comes to
non-demonstrative reasoning, their capacities are on a continuum with ours. Annette
Baier has argued that Hume seems to defend a continuum view of animal and human
nature.16 In this view, rather than human beings marking a dramatic shift in animal
development, we mark simply another point along the same continuum of development.
There could be many continua on the way to analyzing human and nonhuman nature, but
the capacities that are relevant here are those of reason and sympathy.
For Hume, the function of reason is to discover matters of fact, to enable the being to
arrive at true beliefs about the world around her. Human beings have highly developed
capacities for investigation. We try to discover truths that are not obvious, for example,
by experimenting—by engaging in complex manipulations. We try to determine why
something happened, and not merely note that it happened. This capacity is useful.
Noting that hurricanes tend to come in late summer and fall is useful, but it is also useful
to know why that is the case. There is a depth and scope to our use of this capacity that
exceeds that of the nonhuman animals.
A similar point can be made about sympathy. Human beings and animals both
(p. 150)
possess this capacity. However, human beings are capable of reflecting on the capacity
and forming metalevel emotional states of the sort that Shaftesbury discusses. Hume
placed a great deal of importance on this capacity with respect to moral agency. However,
most important is that our sympathetic capacities are shared with animals, albeit in a
more primitive form, where animals are spread out along the lower end of the continuum.
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Thus, we can make some feature of our use of reason and sympathy that distinguishes the
mental lives of humans from those of animals. My claim will be that there is a special kind
of metacognition involving an awareness that we have no evidence animals possess,
though a great deal of evidence that humans possess such metacognitive abilities. This is
important because it marks an ability to think about one's own cognitive states in a
critical way. And this is crucial to enhanced moral agency in the Humean view.
Nonetheless, developmentally, it is still along the same continuum of the development of
reason that we share with animals.
What evidence do we have that Hume himself regards human mental states as on the
higher end of the same continuum with animals? Hume attributes all sorts of mental
states to animals that are shared with human beings. For example, he attributes pride
and love to some animals.17 Baier notes that he makes much of similarities and
continuities between human beings and animals, so that human nature is not so much
different in kind from animal nature: “Indeed, one might say of Hume's version of human
nature, in all its aspects, that it presents us as not radically different from other animals
…. Both in our cognitive habits and our emotional range, human nature as Hume sees it,
is a special case of animal nature.”18
Others take a different view. For example, Tom Beauchamp argues that Hume did believe
that there were “kind” differences between animals and humans—that humans are
capable of demonstrative reason, whereas animals are not.19 In demonstrative reason, the
conclusion of a line of inquiry follows with certainty from the preceding premises in that
line of inquiry. When it comes to the sort of reason that underlies our knowledge of
matters of fact, non-demonstrative reason is what is used. Non-demonstrative reason
involves the sort of inference that yields probability rather than certainty, and is based on
features of past experience. Again, clearly, Hume believed, animals engaged in this sort of
reasoning, because they engage in cause and effect reasoning. Reason regarding matters
of fact is causal inference. While there are some difficulties with this classification, the
crucial point in the Humean account is that the way animals learn about the world is the
same as the way human beings do. Animals may not be capable of a priori knowledge
because they do not have the right cognitive structures for reasoning about ideas
themselves. Beauchamp is correct that Hume believed human beings possess a kind of
reason animals lack. However, this capacity will not be determinative for the issue of
whether or not an animal possesses some moral status.
To note that animals engage in cause-and-effect reasoning, and that they have many of
the same capacities to form mental habits as human beings, can deflate (p. 151) human
pretensions to possess amazing intellectual capacities that transcend instinct. Hume
notes in the same passage that,
Reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which
carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular
qualities, according to their particular situations and relations. This instinct, ‘tis
true, arises from past observation and experience; but can any one give the
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ultimate reason, why past experience and observation produces such an effect,
any more than why nature alone shou’d produce it? Nature may certainly produce
whatever can arise from habit: Nay, habit is nothing but one of the principles of
nature, and derives all its force from that origin.20
However, Hume did hold that the reasoning capacity of humans was superior to that of
animals.21 This is because we developed different traits for the purposes of survival.
There is this obvious and material difference in the conduct of nature, with regard
to man and other animals, that, having endowed the former with a sublime
celestial spirit, and having given him an affinity with superior beings, she allows
not such noble faculties to lie lethargic or idle; but urges him, by necessity, to
employ, on every emergence, his utmost art and industry. Brute-creatures have
many of their necessities supplied by nature, being cloathed and armed by this
beneficent parent of all things: And where their own industry is requisite on any
occasion, nature, by implanting instincts, still supplies them with the art, and
guides them to their good, by her unerring precepts. But man, exposed naked and
indigent to the rude elements, rises slowly from that helpless state, by the care
and vigilance of his parents; and having attained his utmost growth and
perfection, reaches only a capacity of subsisting, by his own care and vigilance.
Every thing is sold to skill and labour; and where nature furnishes the materials,
they are still rude and unfinished, till industry, ever active and intelligent, refines
them from their brute state, and fits them for human use and convenience.22
As this passage reveals, Hume believed that human beings differ from animals in that we
need to employ artifice in order to survive. Our superior intellect is utterly necessary to
our survival, given how little nature has provided us. Men make tools, build their shelters,
weave cloth, all to make up for nature's “frugality” in allocating natural resources.23 I
believe that Hume would have been pleased to discover what current scientists find in
animal behavior: some animals do employ tools. Capuchin monkeys use rocks to open
nuts.24 New Caledonian crows use leaves that they have modified to harvest insects from
holes.25 There are other examples, but this tool use is more primitive than that in
humans. Our capacity for instrumental reason outstrips animals’ and it's a good thing for
us that it does, otherwise we couldn’t survive. Hume would have been very much at home
with Darwin. The Darwinian continuum view is that the fact that we are surviving, in spite
of our feeble physical capacities and gifts, is evidence of the benefits of instrumental
reason.26
For the Humean, these benefits include artificial virtue. Hume distinguishes artificial
virtue from natural virtue. Artificial virtues, unlike natural virtues, are (p. 152) essentially
conventional. Just as we weave cloth to make up for our lack of fur, we construct social
systems to regulate behavior such as the behavior surrounding acquisition and transfer of
goods, or property. We create such virtues in the course of creating social systems. The
Humean regards the development of artificial virtues as representing the emergence of
norms as a way of solving cooperation and coordination problems. We benefit from living
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in groups where certain traits, and corresponding rules, are approved of. For example,
any society needs a system for the governance of property—such a system establishes
norms of property acquisition and transfer. Without such a system, people would be in
constant conflict over property.
The standard for evaluating the artificial norms will be pure social utility. To take one of
Hume's cases, he argues that chastity in women is not something that is immediately
agreeable, and, indeed, can be disagreeable in many ways. However, without a norm that
censured lack of chastity, fathers would fail to support offspring out of a concern that
they were not the actual fathers of the children. This situation would be socially
disruptive. In the case of property norms, animals are not included in the class of beings
that require consideration. They are not included simply because solving the specific
problem does not require a consideration of what animals will do. This insight is one that
underlies Hume's own controversial view of justice, which will be explored in the next
section.
The mental life of animals differs from that of humans in other respects that are
significant to the capacity for moral judgment. Hume was sensitive to both relevant
differences and relevant similarities between human beings and animals. Animals lack
the kind of reflective capacity necessary for making their own moral evaluations. Animals
have mental states, but they do not reflect on those mental states, nor the mental states
of others. They cannot survey the character of other beings. They cannot have thoughts
about the thoughts of other beings. They are incapable, on this view, of metacognition.
There is current debate about whether metacognition is possible for those animals that
seem to display attitudes such as uncertainty, which suggests that they believe that they
do not know something to be the case. Uncertainty is by no means the only metacognitive
state animals are capable of, but it is one that has been extensively researched and shows
that animals possess a general capacity to have mental states about other mental states.
Uncertainty would indicate a kind of intrapersonal metacognition rather than
interpersonal metacognition, but it would still be highly significant because it is
committed to attributing thoughts about thoughts to other animals. This data was not
available to Hume, but it is to the modern Humean, and it is worth considering how other
kinds of metacognition are relevant to moral agency. The Humean would regard
metacognition as important to agency and moral standing, but not solely determinative of
moral standing. It is in virtue of metacognitive capacities that human beings have greater
moral standing than animals, but these capacities are not solely sufficient to determine
whether or not a being has some form of moral standing. In the case of moral agency, the
requisite metacognition might more properly be termed “meta-affect.” It involves
approving one's mental states and the mental states of others.
Much of the contemporary work on animal metacognition has focused on the

(p. 153)
attitude of uncertainty. In human beings, we understand uncertainty to consist in a failure

to know that one knows, or, weaker, a failure to believe that one knows. To experience
uncertainty one needs metacognitive capabilities—one needs the capacity to form mental
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states about whether or not one has other mental states. One needs to be able to think
about one's own thoughts or the thinking process itself. There is evidence that some
animals can become uncertain about what they believe to be the case. The most famous
experiment involves macaque monkeys. In these experiments, the monkeys were required
to choose among several options that were represented on a computer screen. They were
required to make discriminations on the basis of how many pixels a box on the computer
screen contained—over 2,950 pixels, and choosing the box was correct; less than that,
then choosing the box was mistaken. They could also decline the choice by making
another selection, the “UR,” or “Uncertainty Response.” The upshot of the trials was that
the monkeys “assessed correctly when they risked a discrimination error and they make
URs to selectively decline these trials.”27 Further, these results matched the results for
humans, leading the experimenters to conclude that “there is strong cross-species
isomorphism in the use of the UR … that produces some of the closest existing human-
animal performance correspondences.”28 When humans engage in the same test, they
report conscious uncertainty. Similar uncertainty results are available in a dolphin trial
that required the dolphin to discriminate between sounds.29 After reporting the data
however, the researcher goes on to caution against overinterpretation. Still, the evidence
is highly suggestive that some higher animals, such as monkeys and dolphins, do have
beliefs about their own mental states. Being able to have beliefs about one's mental states
is important for self-regulation. Generalizing to beliefs about the mental states of others
is important for evaluation, particularly on the Humean view where the main focus of
moral evaluation is motive.
In order to engage in reflective endorsement, a kind of self-approval that involves

approving one's own commitments, we need to have beliefs about them. As far as we
know, human beings are the only beings capable of reflective moral endorsement.30
However, metacognitive capacities are a precondition to being able to engage in
reflective endorsement of one's moral sense. Animals possess this precondition. What we
see in some animals in terms of their mentality are various early stages of development in
the continuum leading up to the fully rational and sympathetically engaged human. We
need metacognitive faculties to engage in “reflective endorsement” of our own mental
states and abilities. Some animals apparently have sympathy and the ability to think
about their own mental states, though there is no evidence yet that they can approve or
disapprove of the sympathy they feel, or any other mental state. It is this that is required
for moral agency of the sort that the Humean focuses on: judgments of virtue require
being able to evaluate, and not just think about, mental qualities.
Psychologists have speculated that metacognitive capabilities evolved so that animals

would be able to regulate their internal operations.31 This ability indicates an executive
level of cognition that monitors lower level cognition. The identification (p. 154) of
metacognitive capabilities in animals has led some to further speculate on the cognitive
differences between humans and animals. Domain-generality of knowledge is one
identified difference: Sara Shettleworth notes that candidates for human cognitive
uniqueness include the findings that animals lack “domain-general abilities to form
abstract concepts, make transitive inferences, plan, and teach,” though humans possess
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all of these cognitive capacities.32 These domain-general capacities are important

because they demonstrate an ability to infer that something that works in one specific
context can be used differently in another context—presumably, though, on the basis of
the same features. This requires a good deal of imaginative abstract reasoning. The stick
that helps me probe a hole also helps me lever a rock. This particular difference may be
of interest to Humeans because it underlies something that Hume stressed in our
psychology—our penchant for generality in various forms.
While there certainly is this sort of difference in the reasoning mechanisms, it does not
seem to follow that the Humean model of continuity between animal and human reason is
disrupted. The continuity model presupposes that there will be differences, but the
differences will be understood in terms of degrees. There is a difference between being
tall and being short, but the difference is one of degree measureable along the parameter
of height. An ant and an elephant differ from each other dramatically along a wide variety
of measures. One is height, and along this measure the difference is one of degree rather
than kind, even though it is a dramatic degree difference. Humans and plovers both
engage in use of deceptive strategies, though humans are far more sophisticated about
it.33 Both creatures use deception, but the human being is capable of using it more often
and more effectively. Consider a person who uses a hammer to hammer nails, but does
not see that it can also be used to hammer other things, or to prop open a door, or to dig
up an ant hill, and so forth. Generalizing the use of a strategy is itself a helpful strategy
that animals may well lack (or may possess by degrees), but it can be represented along
the same continuum of strategy utilization. However we decide to model the difference,
there is no doubt there is a difference and one that a Humean will recognize. Hume
himself repeatedly points to the tendency human beings have to generalize and to prefer
general rules. His reason typically has to do with pragmatic concerns: it would be too
inefficient and unworkable in complex social settings to do anything else.
In his essay “Of the Immortality of the Soul,” Hume explicitly holds that animals have
wills: “Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason, tho’ in a more
imperfect manner than man.”34 This passage provides evidence that he viewed animals as
possessing qualities of the mind, and it is only qualities of the mind that are either useful
or agreeable that qualify as virtues. Hume himself didn’t seem to hold that animals make
judgments of virtue. Though they do possess mental states, their metacognitive abilities
seem to be limited in the way discussed previously. They aren’t able to approve from the
general point of view, and therefore cannot grasp whether another being possesses a
virtue. However, the moral standing of these animals does not depend on the ability to
approve from the general (p. 155) point of view. To hold otherwise without further
argument is to conflate the capacity for moral judgment with the capacity to have morally
significant qualities. The Humean approach to animals was a precursor to the utilitarian
approach in that it distinguished being a moral patient—that is, being the sort of creature
that can be harmed, that can be acted on morally—from being a moral agent—that is,
being the sort of creature capable of moral agency. The Humean goes further than just
making this particular distinction by ascribing to animals virtue traits. Hume, for
example, notes animals are capable of kindness, to each other as well as to human
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beings.35 It would then be a separate issue as to whether some animals perform virtuous
actions. Anthony Pitson believes they do not in Hume's view, though he admits to some
“diffidence” on this issue. He holds that, for Hume, virtue requires that the possessor
exercise it with some discrimination:
To possess a trait as a virtue, the agent must be able to assess its likely effects so
as to exercise it in favor of those who will truly benefit from it. I imagine that this
is a capacity which Hume would regard as belonging exclusively to persons on
account of their superior understanding; and, if so, this would provide some
rationale for his reluctance to treat animals as moral agents, capable of virtue and
vice.36
However, Hume frequently noted how animals seem to exhibit various sorts of
discrimination in their actions. They care properly for their young, for example. This
behavior might be from instinct or habit, but then so is cause-and-effect reasoning, in
Hume's account, and social animals should be capable of the sorts of traits that suit them
to social living as well. This is quite in keeping with the spirit of Hume's theory. Thus,
Pitson's conclusion seems unduly speculative and unwarranted. Of course animals do not
possess all the virtues that humans possess, and it does not follow that all animals
possess some virtue. It simply follows that animals who possess “qualities of the mind”
that are agreeable or have utility from the right perspective, which is the general and
impartial point of view, have the virtue in question.
Some recent empirical work on animal personality traits is supportive of the view that
animals do, indeed, have characters of the relevant sort. Researchers such as Samuel
Gosling and Oliver John, in studying animal psychology, examined research that tested
certain animals along the same parameters humans are tested to determine personality
traits. Their finding was that “Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Agreeableness showed the
strongest cross-species generality, followed by Openness; a separate Conscientiousness
dimension appeared only in chimpanzees, humans’ closest relatives.”37 To consider one
example, agreeableness, the authors looked at studies that displayed behavior in animals
that demonstrated trust, tender-mindedness, cooperation, and lack of aggression.
Agreeableness was displayed over a wide range of animals tested, including nonprimates,
with the exception of guppies and octopi.38 They write: “These remarkable commonalities
across such a wide range of taxa suggest that general biological mechanisms are likely
responsible.”39 Of course, different species display personality differently. Their example
involved the extroversion/introversion set: human introverts (those who score low on the
extroversion measure) tended to stay home on Saturday night; the octopus keeps to
(p. 156) his den and tries to blend in with the surroundings. Interestingly, and relevantly,
they found no markers for what they term conscientiousness in their study of other
animals, except for chimpanzees. Conscientious behaviors are ones that are taken to
display “deliberation, self-discipline, dutifulness, order.”40 These are the behaviors that
we normally associate, in humans, with moral awareness and agency. The study indicates
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that traits associated with conscientiousness evolved fairly recently, and evolved in the
subgroup of primates that includes chimps and humans.
There is, in principle, a difference between a personality trait and a character trait,
though the two overlap. Traditionally, character traits, which include the virtues, are
those qualities of the mind that are thought to involve the exercise of a will. As noted
earlier, Hume explicitly holds that animals possess wills. Given that animals possess
character traits that correspond to what we think of as virtues (e.g., pleasing in a certain
way), then they can possess virtues as well, though not to the degree or in as
sophisticated a form as human beings.
We should also be careful to distinguish the possession of a virtue trait and the
performance of virtuous action. We should think in terms of three theses rather than two:
(1) Animals are moral patients, that is, they have some moral status.
(2) Animals possess mental qualities that are pleasing from the general point of view
(i.e., virtues).
(3) Animals are moral agents.
The Humean holds that (1) and (2) are true. At this time, my view is that (3) is
unsupported by the evidence, even in the case of higher animals. Animals engage in
behaviors that we can call “good” behaviors for those animals, for example, a mother bird
who risks her life to defend her babies. However, there is no evidence that the mother
bird reflects on and endorses her own motives in so acting. However, the vital point is
that (2) and (3) are, in principle, separable on the Humean account of virtue and moral
agency. One can have virtues without being a moral agent because possessing pleasing
mental qualities does not entail moral agency. There is the entailment of some agency or
other, perhaps, but moral agency is distinctive because it calls for guidance by norms of
approval and disapproval of a particular sort, of the sort that can be generalized. So far,
we do not have evidence of this in animals.
Hume is clear that one can possess a virtue as a natural ability. That is, the possession of
the virtue itself, the disposition to act a certain way, may not be voluntarily acquired at
all. In this way, Hume's account of virtue departed dramatically from the classical
conception of virtue in Aristotle, where virtue is portrayed as something people need to
work at and to decide to acquire. It does not follow from the fact that the virtues may not
be voluntarily acquired that the actions that are performed in accordance with the virtue
are not, themselves, voluntary. A person who is naturally generous still performs
voluntary generous actions. For example, a person who never tried to develop the habit or
disposition of generosity because she was by nature always generous is still giving
voluntarily to the poor when she makes a charitable donation. She is acting on her own
desires, even if she did not train (p. 157) herself to have those desires. This form of action
can apply to animal characters as well. Simply because an animal does not train himself
to have a certain disposition does not mean that the disposition is not a virtue and does
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not mean that the actions the animal performs from that disposition are not, in some
sense, voluntary.
Hume's view of the significance of animals’ resemblance to humans contrasts sharply

with Kant's.41 Kant also thought that animal behavior resembled human behavior, but that
animals lack reason, at least of the sort relevant to moral agency and moral standing. For
Kant, the sort of reason relevant to moral decision making and moral standing requires
the ability to represent rules and to conform one's behavior to a rule. Animals, in his view,
lack this capacity. Kantians and Humeans share the view that animals lack certain sorts of
metacognitive abilities associated with moral approval of one's own mental states and the
states of others. They disagree, however, on the issue of the moral significance of the
difference. The Kantian holds that the difference indicates a lowered moral status (if any)
and that animals may be used as mere means, at least in principle. The resemblance of
human and animal behavior had some significance for Kant, though, in terms of actual
moral practice. But the significance is indirect. That is, the resemblance of animal
behavior to human behavior explains why we have indirect duties to animals.42 That is,
hurting animals is, morally, to be avoided, but if and only if it would lead the agent to
undermine his character in such a way that he would become more likely to hurt human
beings. The direct duty is still only to other rational beings.
However, when we look at what Hume actually wrote on the issue of what we owe to
animals, his view is murkier than one might hope. He never directly engages with the
issue of moral status. The Humean must work to develop an account of moral standing
using Hume's views about the nature of animal cognition. This Humean view will hold, as
I have argued in this section, that moral standing is an issue that should be considered
separately from the issue of the possession of morally significant properties such as
virtue or agency. One can be an appropriate object of moral consideration even if one is
not a moral agent.
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Moral Sense and Moral Standing

Hume does not attribute moral sense, or the ability to engage in moral judgment, to
animals.43 They cannot take the general point of view required for warranted moral
approval, which has sometimes been called the moral point of view. Beauchamp believes
that the premise that animals have no such capacity was Hume's considered view.44
Setting aside matters of textual interpretation, this claim is compatible with the claim
that there is a kind of proto-moral sense in animals. Hume noted that, though animals do
not possess the moral sense, they do possess sympathy, which is one requirement for the
moral sense. He seems to regard the sympathy as a kind of contagion—the feelings of one
animal are communicated to another through the (p. 158) medium of sympathy. For
example, fear, anger, and courage are communicated via sympathy in such a way that the
animal will feel it without perceiving the original cause—thus, there must be sympathetic
engagement of a sort, on Hume's view. Another bit of evidence he uses is the
phenomenon of dogs hunting in packs. He notes that, though they have “little or no sense
of virtue and vice,” they do experience pride and humility, love and hatred; it is just that
they lack the mental abilities to reflect on these passions. The causes of the passions, for
them, he judges, are in the body.
The modern Humean has more empirical evidence available on animal sympathy.
Scientist Frans de Waal has written extensively, and controversially, on animal empathy
and sympathy.45 His use of “empathy” is similar to Hume's “sympathy” in that it refers to
the capacity to respond to the emotions of others—and de Waal focuses on the emotion of
distress. Sympathy, on his view, is more focused than empathy, and, specifically, is other
directed—motivating individuals to try to alleviate the other individual's distress. Other
forms of empathic engagement may be self-directed, in the sense that perception of the
sadness of others might make the individual try to alleviate his distress that the empathic
engagement generates. Researchers visited homes in which family members were
supposed to pretend to sadness—in the form of crying—or some other distress. Not only
did the children in the households, as young as one year of age, display comforting
behavior, but some pets in the household did as well: they “appeared to be as worried as
the children by the ‘distress’ of a family member, hovering over them or putting their
heads in their laps.”46
The issue of empathy and sympathy deficits in animals is an engaging issue. In human
beings, we know that empathy deficits are associated with psychopathology, for example.
There are also empathy deficits that are associated with autism spectrum disorder,
though the Humean would note that in the case of autism there is a higher-order concern
to be a good person and to act appropriately that is lacking in psychopaths. Some writers,
such as Jeannette Kennett, have used empathy deficit disorders as evidence against a
Humean account of moral agency. However, the existence of these disorders and the ways
in which, for example, autistic moral agents are able to act on norms regardless of the
empathy deficit, does not settle the question as to whether Hume or Kant is right on
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whether or not moral action requires antecedent desire, that is, basic antecedent desire
that is not itself the result of the independent recognition of a moral reason. Humeans are
warranted in arguing that autistic moral agency can be accounted for on their account via
more general desires (such as a desire to be a good person) or higher-order desires (such
as a desire not to have malicious desires). The speculative issue raised for this chapter
has to do with whether there are equivalents in the animal kingdom. Are there autistic
chimps, for example, and how does the empathic deficit display in terms of their
behavior?47 That research might shed some light on cognitive difference between humans
and animals in terms of empathic behavior.
Hume recognized that animals have likes and dislikes that they can communicate to
others. There is behavior that they do not like; a dog does not like being struck, and
(p. 159) a mother dog will not like her puppies being struck. “The affection of parents to
their young proceeds from a peculiar instinct in animals, as well as in our species.”48
There is no telling what goes on in the dog's mind when he avoids the person who tends
to strike him. He may just regard that person as something to be avoided, like a hole in
the ground or a raging current. It would seem that in Hume's view, the animal cannot
recognize the person as having a morally bad character, as opposed to simply possessing
a bad quality. Thus, simply judging by the animal's behavior, we cannot tell if the animal
is making even a primitive evaluation of character.
Given his enlightened view of the continuity between animal nature and human nature,
one might have thought that Hume would have been clear, and enlightened, on the moral
status of animals as well. I noted earlier that the issue of moral status is distinct from the
issue of moral agency. I argued in the previous section that on Hume's account it should
be possible for animals to possess virtue and that it is reasonable to suppose that some in
fact do, particularly the social animals. But one could argue that even though they can be
virtuous, they lack moral standing in the sense that they are not owed any particular form
of treatment, or consideration, from rational beings such as ourselves who are capable of
moral judgment. What little Hume actually said on this subject seems to indicate that, in
terms of justice, we owe nothing to animals:
Were there a species intermingled with men, which, though rational, were
possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were
incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make
us feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is that
we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these
creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with
regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property exclusive of such
arbitrary lords.49
At the end of the passage he then invites comparison with animals. The disparity in power
is such that they would never be able to press any claims of justice against us. I promised
earlier in the essay to show how the Humean could develop an account of animal moral
standing while remaining largely faithful to what Hume said. The key is that it does not
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follow from what Hume was saying specifically about justice, that we have no duties to
animals or that animals are deserving of no moral consideration.50 We simply have no
duties of justice in the sense required in his theory of justice.
In Hume's view, virtues such as justice displayed a triumph of human ingenuity. It would
be surprising to see this replicated in animals who lack the social organization necessary
to give rise to the social concerns that made justice helpful, perhaps even necessary, for
human well-being. Hume famously distinguishes the natural from the artificial virtues.
The virtues animals may possess at least at the primitive, or proto-virtue, level in his view
would be natural, but not likely the artificial. Justice is an artificial virtue; its usefulness
rests on convention: “there are some virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by
means of an artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessities
of mankind.”51 Examples of artificial (p. 160) virtues are promise keeping, justice, and
chastity. There is nothing naturally pleasing in these qualities. Rather, to be pleased
regarding these traits one needs to reflect on the systematic usefulness of the traits.
Their usefulness renders them virtues. In the case of natural virtues, however, such as
benevolence, we are pleased by the individual instances in which the virtuous agent
displays the disposition. Again, the underlying mechanism is sympathetic engagement,
though in the case of the natural virtues, it is unmediated by consideration of systematic
usefulness. In the case of justice, the idea is that norms of justice develop among social
creatures such as ourselves because they are needed to regulate our behavior in
nondestructive ways that are beneficial overall. Given other features of our natures—the
facts that we tend toward selfishness and favoritism and that we are roughly equally
matched in terms of strength and abilities—the rules of justice are necessary to maintain
any sort of social order with respect to property. Human beings and animals, however, are
not equally matched in Hume's view. Thus, we have no need, or necessity, to respect
property rights for animals in order to maintain a stable society.52 Hume's view that
justice is limited to contexts in which interacting beings can make their demands felt on
each other has struck many writers as implausible, not simply as it regards animals.53
Whether we are talking about animals, or some other type of being with equal, even
superior, cognitive capacities, it seems too harsh to claim that justice is a norm that
applies only to our dealings unless those beings can make their demands felt. This claim
seems to deny standing to sentient creatures simply on the basis of weakness, which is
surely not a morally relevant consideration.
However, a careful reading shows that Hume is not committed to the view that animals
have no moral standing when it comes to what we today think of as requirements of
justice. He is simply committed to the view that they have no property rights in justice.
Any misreading of Hume is due to the fact that when we currently use the word “justice,”
we have in mind something much broader than he had in mind. His view of justice is
focused on the acquisition and transfer of property within society. Beings that would sit
by and not be able to defend their “property” are not, as a matter of justice, entitled to it.
This does not however mean that such beings lack moral standing, that it is impossible to
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treat such beings unfairly or in a morally reprehensible way. A dog that has worked long
and hard for his human owner deserves benefits, not a kick.
This raises an interesting issue in interpreting Hume. What is it to “make one's demands
felt”? Is the bear that kills a man over a loaf of bread making his demands felt? Hume's
example in the above passage seems to indicate that it is force of physical strength that
matters, and that in order to maintain human society against people exerting this
strength to make their demands felt, we need a system of justice and rights; otherwise,
there would be chaos. We have nothing like this to fear from animals as a group. There
may be an occasional conflict between a person and an animal over an object in which the
animal wins, but that is rare. As a group, animals are no threat to humans. Of course, as a
group, humans are no threat to some animals. We’ve tried very hard to eliminate rats,
roaches, and some other pests as a group, at least in certain locations, so if that were
what establishes the relevant (p. 161) criteria, we have failed. This does not seem to make
the account consistent with what we know about other animals.
In comparing Hume and Kant on the treatment of animals, Christine Korsgaard has taken
the following line on what she regards as Hume's considered view:
I noted that most people seem to hold that we should not kill or hurt the animals
unless we have a good reason, but also that any reason except malicious fun is
probably good enough. In the same way, Hume's “laws of humanity” do not clearly
forbid us to use the other animals in any way that we might find convenient. We
are, after all, as Hume says, stronger than they are, and able to outsmart them.
And since we do not need their willing cooperation, and can extort their services,
Hume thinks we owe them nothing in return. Although he urges kindness when it
is not inconvenient, his view is apparently that when one kind of animal is able to
control the others, as human beings are, that is the end of the matter.54
I do not believe the texts support this interpretation of Hume. Arthur Kuflik argues that
Hume really could not have meant that it is by dint of physical force that we owe justice
to those who can exert such force against us.55 For Hume, justice, as an artificial virtue,
is itself justified on the basis of social usefulness. Under some circumstances, such as
extreme material deprivation or a utopian plenty, justice does not come into play because
it serves no purpose. This raises an issue. As Kuflik notes, if there are groups within a
society that the society could “do without,” then would the remainder owe them any
considerations of justice?
Kuflik argues that much attention has been paid to the literal reading of the passage on
justice and animals, without adequate attention to what Hume says elsewhere. The best
view, he argues, is that Hume is overstating his case in this passage; to hold otherwise is
to uncharitably attribute to him a very implausible view, the view that justice would cease
to be a virtue under circumstances in which injustice can be “perpetrated with
impunity.”56 It is not simply that this view is implausible: it conflicts with other claims
Hume made, notably in the Treatise, to the effect that there must be a distinctive motive
to honesty and justice, and not simple private interest—because simple private interest
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itself is the source, frequently, of violence and injustice.57 It cannot be the case that no
injustice exists where one's private interests will be enhanced by a vicious action. Thus,
we violate norms of justice at least some of the time when we act to promote private
interest. Simply being able to “get away with it” does not nullify the norms of justice.
An important distinction exists between public interest and private interest. In discussing
the artificial virtues, Hume is careful to note that the best strategy for promoting public
interest, in general, which itself is crucial for preservation of private interest, is to hold to
conventions, or rules, that one might determine do not yield the best consequences in
some situations.58 This is due to two factors—the first is that private interest varies from
person to person, even though public interest does not. However, individuals have
differing opinions about what, in particular, is in the public interest. “We must, therefore,
proceed by general rules, and regulate ourselves by general interests, in modifying the
law of nature concerning the stability of possession.” Further, individual acts of artificial
virtue may not promote either (p. 162) public or private interest. Rather, it is adherence
to the norms in general that systematically promotes both public and private interest. As
animals do not fit into either public or private spheres of interest, artificial virtues have
no scope with respect to the animals’ interests.
Kuflik notes that Hume does not make the same argument with groups such as Native
Americans and women with respect to European males, even though these groups at the
time seemed quite vulnerable to exploitation by European males. In the case of women,
Hume indicated that their “charm” and “insinuations” could come to their rescue, so to
speak.59 Kuflik notes, however, that many women lack charm. For every Mme. de
Pompadour there are numerous women with no rights or privileges granted them by
stronger men. And Hume describes their situation as a “severe tyranny.” This leads Kuflik
to the reasonable view that for Hume it wasn’t physical equality—equality in physical
power—that mattered, but, rather, mental or intellectual equality. Animals are clearly
mentally inferior to autonomous humans, as they cannot argue with us.60 Korsgaard notes
as well that it is significant (for Hume's view) that we can outsmart animals. If Kuflik's
interpretation is correct, then what Hume means by making one's “demands felt” has to
do with the ability to argue for one's interests, not the ability to physically force others to
respect them.
This interpretation would make Hume similar to Kant: the reason we make a sharp
distinction between animals and humans—in Hume's case when it comes to justice—has
to do with their inability to reasonably press claims. Mental inferiority of certain sorts is
responsible for diminished moral standing. Though, for Hume, while mental inferiority
may explain why animals will not be subject to the norms of justice, it does not lead to
complete lack of moral standing. Hume's emphasis on the laws of humanity can provide a
plausible response to Korsgaard. I grant that Hume was not as clear on this point as he
could have been. His remarks, however, indicate a strategy for today's Humean. There is
private interest and public interest, and these are often discussed by Hume in explicating
what is at stake in artificial virtue. Another distinction would be that between private
interest and common interest. Common interest consists of the combination of individual
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interests (i.e., private interests). Common interest is either honored or promoted via the
natural virtues. We have a duty of humanity to promote the common interest, and
animals’ interests count as part of the common interest.
In virtue of their sentience, they fall into the class of beings with interests. All animals
have welfare interests that are tied to their good. These are interests associated with
living a good life for them. They have, for example, interests in avoiding hunger and pain.
Some animals may have more sophisticated interests that go beyond living minimally
good lives in terms of survival and bare comfort—for example, they may have conscious
desires and aims, such as a desire to advance through a social system (as with apes).61
The duty of humanity obtains independent of any social conventions whatsoever. A person
who causes misery to an animal is bereft of the natural sentiment of sympathy. Not to the
extent that an abusive parent is, not to the extent that a murderer is, and so forth, but
nevertheless, if a person who is thoughtful and rational, and able to reflect on the
suffering of others, (p. 163) fails to see a reason not to cause suffering to an animal, this
fact does denote a failure of character.
The Humean can soften the criticism by holding that the suffering of an animal only
provides us with an easily defeasible reason to avoid causing it. This position raises
another set of familiar problems. Why easily defeasible? I take it that this is at the heart
of Korsgaard's problem with the Humean picture. If it is “very easily” defeasible, then the
animal's suffering can be outweighed by a human whim, a desire for mild amusement.
This form of defeasibility would make the reason to refrain from harming animals much
too weak. The contemporary Humean could argue, however, that the duty of humanity
with respect to animals is not so easily defeated. It is defeated only in conflict with duties
to other human beings—duties to refrain from causing pain to other human beings, and
duties to alleviate their misery. In this way, a person's mere whim would not outweigh the
animal's suffering. The framework is there in Hume's writings.
Further, there are animals that have a kind of society with us—pets and other
domesticated animals that human beings interact with. Might it be the case that this
relationship sets up a separate class of artificial norms governing interactions between
humans and animals in the same society? As a group, again, they lack the strength and
coordination to make demands against human beings, but they possess other capacities.
These capacities are what make them likely candidates for domestication in the first
place. It is likely, for example, that dogs became domesticated by human beings in part
because their own pack social structure made them amenable to cooperative social
structures.62 In the case of pets, they served a useful function of some sort, which was
either manifested in their behavior or their appearance. In the case of dogs, they helped
to herd other animals, they kept other predators away, and they displayed a childlike
affection that appealed to us. When they were hungry, we were motivated to feed them—
we wanted to. What of, then, the individual dog who is too old to work, mangy, and
decrepit? The Humean could argue that, in the case of animals that are more than simply
intermingled with us, but also have actual society with us, our obligations extend further.
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It may not be justice, and it may be more specific than beneficence. There is a kind of
debt of gratitude or friendship that does not exist in the case of animals bearing no
connection to humans.
Hume was committed to the force of generality in our thoughts. So, the reference to the
“laws of humanity”63 is not off the cuff for Hume. Unlike Adam Smith, who seemed to
believe that the duty of humanity was completely unnecessary for social cohesion, Hume
believed in a very substantive duty of humanity, or, more generally, benevolence.64 In
interpreting Hume, one does need to tread lightly here, because Hume seldom writes of
duty, and when he does use the term, it is not clear that he meant something
corresponding to a strict obligation. Indeed, in the Treatise he clearly separates acting
from a motive of benevolence from strict obligation, but then speaks of a “duty” of
humanity. In the passage in question Hume writes: “Tho’ there was no obligation to
relieve the miserable, our humanity would lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the
immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural
sentiments of humanity.”65
Hume is talking about rendering positive aid to those who are suffering. It is
(p. 164)
generally thought that positive duties to aid are harder to justify than negative duties to
avoid causing harm. In the case of animals, the Humean could argue that there is a duty
to avoid causing harm, even if there is no positive duty to relieve misery. In both cases,
failure to abide by norms of benevolence is evidence of a flawed character, though the
failure of the duty to avoid causing harm may be much more serious. The significance of
this should not be underestimated. For Hume, moral evaluation centers on character
evaluation. Actions are evidence of character. A failure of benevolence is a serious moral
failure. Humanity provides a kind of correction for our behavior and is of special interest
in understanding normative relations between rational beings of unequal power.
To continue the above-quoted passage: “A father knows it to be a duty to take care of his
children: But he has also a natural inclination to it. And if no human creature had that
inclination, no one cou’d lie under any such obligation.”66 Hume seems to be saying that
in order for there to be a duty to take care of children, there has to be a natural
“inclination” to do so. This inclination marks a crucial difference between the natural and
artificial. If we fail to perform actions that reflect this duty, we give evidence of immoral,
vicious motivation, the lack of “natural sentiments.” And note the example he uses—that
of a father's duty to his child. Children are another class of vulnerable beings. Humanity
requires of us that parents take care of their children, and that they treat them well. We
have this duty independent of human convention. Correspondingly, one could argue for a
duty to treat animals well, too, that exists independently of human convention. And this is
the force of his claim regarding the duty of humanity as it applies in his thought-
experiment regarding our treatment of rational, though nonhuman, beings. Far from a
cold, chilling view of duty, it is actually very expansive. We do have duties to the
vulnerable that are independent of convention. Of course, the basis for the duty is
inclination, sympathy, the propensity that we care for those who suffer. It is clear that
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Hume believes animals are covered by this duty or law, otherwise he would not appeal to
it in the thought-experiment.
This seems right to me. The Humean would note, plausibly, that the moral responsibility
for taking care of children is not merely conventional, even though there may be
conventional ways in which it is satisfied—for example, in some places by sending one's
child to school, in other places by teaching hunting techniques, and so forth. Taking care
is here a positive duty. In the case of animals that bear no connection to us, notably wild
animals, there may not be positive duties to aid them, though benevolence and good
moral character may dictate to us that we do so. In any event, there will be negative
duties to not harm them, or at least not harm them for trivial reasons.
Joyce Jenkins and Robert Shaver argue that Hume's intention is to put humanity before
justice, and in the above passage, to hold that justice can get in the way of humanity.67
For example, one might, as a matter of justice, force a hard-working, poverty-stricken
individual to pay back a small debt to a fabulously wealthy individual. This rule of justice
runs counter to benevolence, and may even run counter (p. 165) to a more expansive
sense of justice as fairness, if we think, for example, the wealthy person has less personal
merit or virtue than the poverty-stricken person. Rigid rules may be necessary when it
comes to institutionalizing property rights. However, when beings of unequal power
interact, benevolence is better realized on a case-by-case basis. They use the example of
taking a bone away from a dog when continuing to play with the bone might harm the
dog. “Justice” does nothing to help the dog in these circumstances. However, acting to
promote the dog's interests, generally, that is, acting on the dictates of humanity, will help
the dog.
Humanity might also play an important role in shoring up convention. Shaver elsewhere
argues that humanity is needed for society—indeed, that justice is not independent of
humanity, but presupposes it:
Justice presupposes humanity, where humanity is understood as the concern for

others that operates between unequals and especially between parents and
children …. If so, we have as strict an obligation to humanity as to justice, since
both obligations derive their strictness from their instrumental role in keeping
society running.68
Does this claim support Korsgaard's dim view of Hume on the moral status of animals? Do
we need animals to “keep society running?” Yet the details of how humanity supports
justice are very important. Hume held that trust is crucial to sustaining justice in a
society. Instilling trust, and trustworthiness, in one's children is a very important duty of
parents. They need to do this in order to sustain an orderly, productive society. Social
order is beneficial, thus humanity in treating one's children well coincides with interest;
the humanity underlies conditions necessary for artificial virtues to actually work. There
is a distinction to be made as well between “interest” and “private interest,” which
Page 23 of 32

elsewhere Hume notes in contrast to justice. Because of his views on human nature, and
our universal capacity for sympathy, “interest” should be understood broadly.
If this is the case, and we take “interest” broadly, then it is in the “interest” of members
of society to treat each other well, according to norms of benevolence, in order that
conditions amenable to artificial justice take root. This situation spills over into our
relations with animals, which constitute another vulnerable category of beings with whom
adult humans interact. Thus, for animals that have a connection with us, there are
positive duties to aid.
Animals that exist “intermingled” with humans are owed humanity in spite of their mental
inferiority because the general concern for humanity—the general concern for the
vulnerable—is important to keep society running smoothly. Annette Baier noted that in
Hume we see that natural virtues such as kindness, and kindness to the vulnerable, are
important to sustaining society.69 True, only some animals figure into human households.
However, Hume often noted that our minds worked according to general principles, and
in my view he would be, or at least should be, friendly to the thought that we respond
sympathetically to animals as well as people. We owe animals humanity, and virtuous
individuals treat animals well, even when those animals do not pose a threat to them and
even when there is no point (p. 166) to negotiating with them because they lack the
necessary cognitive capacities. What is not owed to animals is respect for property rights,
which are the sorts of artificial consideration that are of no concern to them.
Conclusion
Hume is often credited with a radically different view of animals that departed
significantly from previous writers. I have argued that this claim is not entirely true,
because many writers before Hume clearly attributed mentation to animals and
vociferously disagreed with Descartes on this issue, often anticipating central claims
made by Hume. However, the details of Hume's account are distinctive in his theory of a
continuum of rational and affective capabilities between animals and human beings. This
theory led him to a view of animals that depicted them as having moral status as sensitive
but intellectually vulnerable creatures. If one mistreats an animal, one has not violated a
norm of justice, in his view, but the norms of justice are understood so narrowly that this
fact does not pose a problem for the claim that animals deserve moral consideration
through a duty of humanity.
Acknowledgments
Page 24 of 32

I would like to thank Tom Beauchamp and Yashar Saghai for their comments on drafts of
this chapter.
Suggested Reading
BAIER, ANNETTE. “Knowing our Place in the Animal World.” In Postures of the Mind, pp.
139–56. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.
BEAUCHAMP, TOM L. “Hume on the Nonhuman Animal.” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
24 (1998): 322–35.
BRADIE, MICHAEL. “The Moral Status of Animals in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy.”

In Biology and the Foundation of Ethics, edited by Jane Maienschein and Michael Ruse,
pp. 32–51. New York: Cambridge University Press.
(p. 171) DE WAAL, FRANS B. M. “On the Possibility of Animal Empathy.” In Feelings and
Emotions: the Amsterdam Symposium, edited by A. S. R. Manstead, Nico H. Frijda, and
Agneta Fischer, pp. 381–98. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
FLACK, JESSICA, and FRANS B. M. DE WAAL. “ ‘Any Animal Whatever’: Darwinian Building Blocks
of Morality in Monkeys and Apes.” In Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross-disciplinary
Perspectives, edited by Leonard Katz, pp. 1–30. Bowling Green, Ohio: Imprint Academic,
2000.
GOSLING, SAMUEL, and OLIVER JOHN. “Personality Dimensions in Nonhuman Animals: A Cross-
Species Review.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 8 (1999): 69–75.
JENKINS, JOYCE, and ROBERT SHAVER. “Mr. Hobbes Could Have Said No More.” In Feminist
Interpretations of David Hume, edited by Anne Jaap Jacobson, pp. 137–155. University
Park: Penn State University Press, 1992.
KORSGAARD, CHRISTINE. “Just Like All the Animals of the Earth.” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 36
(2008), available online at http://www.hds.harvard.edu/news/bulletin_mag/articles/
36-3/korsgaard.html.
KUFLIK, ARTHUR. “Hume on Justice to Animals, Indians and Women.” Hume Studies 24
(1998): 53–70.
PITSON, ANTONY. “The Nature of Humean Animals.” Hume Studies 19 (1993): 301–16.
—— . “Hume on Morals and Animals.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11
(2003): 639–55.
SHAVER, ROBERT. “Hume on the Duties of Humanity.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 30
(1992): 545–56.
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A Humean Account of the Status and Character of Animals

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Abstract and Keywords

Subscriber: University of Adelaide; date: 29 April 2018

Subscriber: University of Adelaide; date: 29 April 2018

Background: Against Human Exceptionalism

The exceptionalist view is based on a flawed methodology in which a biased sample of

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Subscriber: University of Adelaide; date: 29 April 2018

The other Sentimentalists also viewed animals as possessing mental states.

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(p. 149) Hume on Animal and Human Psychology

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Subscriber: University of Adelaide; date: 29 April 2018

Subscriber: University of Adelaide; date: 29 April 2018

Much of the contemporary work on animal metacognition has focused on the

attitude of uncertainty. In human beings, we understand uncertainty to consist in a failure

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In order to engage in reflective endorsement, a kind of self-approval that involves

Psychologists have speculated that metacognitive capabilities evolved so that animals

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all of these cognitive capacities.32 These domain-general capacities are important

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Subscriber: University of Adelaide; date: 29 April 2018

Hume's view of the significance of animals’ resemblance to humans contrasts sharply

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Moral Sense and Moral Standing

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Subscriber: University of Adelaide; date: 29 April 2018

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Subscriber: University of Adelaide; date: 29 April 2018

Justice presupposes humanity, where humanity is understood as the concern for

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BRADIE, MICHAEL. “The Moral Status of Animals in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy.”

Subscriber: University of Adelaide; date: 29 April 2018

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