Medieval

Jewish, Christian and Muslim Culture

Encounters
in Confluence and Dialogue

Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 www.brill.nl/me

Religious Affiliations and Political Alliances in the

Ottoman Succession Wars of 1402-1413

Dimitris J. Kastritsis
University of St Andrews

Abstract
This article examines the complex political alliances that developed during the Ottoman
civil war of 1402-1413. This civil war, which followed Timur’s defeat of the Ottomans at
Ankara and the dismemberment of Bayezid I’s empire, provided an excellent opportunity
for the many Christian powers threatened by the Ottomans to cooperate against them; but
in fact, apart from a failed attempt by Byzantium in 1409, there was little such cooperation.
Instead, the period is noteworthy for the absence of any serious attempt at a crusade, since
the interests of the main Christian powers were often at odds. It is ironic that the only large-
scale alliance involving a wide array of Christian powers was engineered in 1413 by an
Ottoman prince, Mehmed Çelebi (Sultan Mehmed I), who was thereby able to reunite the
Ottoman Empire under his rule. In fact, the story of the Ottoman civil war is one of indi-
vidual power brokers with divided loyalties trying to survive and further the interests of
their constituencies. What brought these people together in 1413 was their opposition to
Mehmed’s rival Musa Çelebi, who had revived Bayezid I’s policies of territorial expansion
and political centralization. While there is no denying the importance of Islam and Chris-
tianity both as faith systems and as rallying calls, the political scene was too complex to allow
faith alone to determine political developments. In such politically fragmented times, the
only way to survive was through shrewd diplomacy and alliance building.

Keywords
Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Interregnum, Ottoman Civil War, Mehmed I, Musa Çelebi,
Süleyman Çelebi, Byzantium, Manuel II Palaiologos, Stefan Lazarević

The Ottoman defeat at Ankara (28 July 1402) came at a critical time for
Christian-Muslim relations. Under Sultan Bayezid I (1389-1402), Otto-
man expansion in southeastern Europe had provoked widespread alarm in
the Christian world. In 1396 the Ottomans had crushed a crusader army
at Nicopolis, and since 1394 Constantinople had been subjected to its first
Ottoman siege. In the years preceding 1402, the situation of the Byzantine

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 DOI: 10.1163/157006707X194977

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 223

capital had become so dire that Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos was forced
to leave the city for several years to seek assistance in various Christian
courts. Given this situation, one might have expected news of Timur’s
crushing defeat of the Ottomans at Ankara to have united Christendom in
a new crusade to drive the Ottomans out of Europe. But neither the Otto-
man defeat at Ankara, which resulted in the death of Bayezid I and the
dismemberment of his empire, nor the ensuing decade of Ottoman dynas-
tic wars (the interregnum of 1402-1413) resulted in any significant cru-
sading activity on the part of the Ottomans’ Christian enemies. Instead,
those powers followed a defensive policy of supporting whichever of Bayezid’s
sons appeared to offer them the most advantages and pose the least danger.
It was this policy that made it possible for Mehmed I to reunite the Otto-
man Empire under his rule. In 1413, Mehmed was able to bring together
most of the regional power brokers—both Christian and Muslim—in an
alliance against his brother Musa, who like Bayezid I had pursued an
aggressive agenda of conquest and centralization. In this manner, the
Christian powers of southeastern Europe contributed to their own demise,
for during the reigns of Mehmed I (1413-1421) and Murad II (1421-
1451), the ground was laid for the conquest of Constantinople and the
establishment of the great Ottoman Empire of Mehmed II.
Given the very real threat posed by the Ottomans prior to 1402, how is
it possible to explain the neglect of the crusade during the period 1402-
1413, when the Ottomans were weak and divided? Among the obvious
explanations are the disastrous results of the Crusade of Nicopolis (1396)
and the European disunity of the time, which resulted in conflicting inter-
ests among the powers that might have organized such a crusade.1 To these
should be added also a natural complacency: after 1402 the Ottomans
no longer seemed to pose such a serious threat, and it was hoped that their
civil wars might cause them to self-destruct. However obvious these expla-
nations, the international politics of the period has received little serious

1
See, for example, Aziz S. Atiya, “The Crusade in the Fourteenth Century,” in A History
of the Crusades, ed. K. M. Setton, 6 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975),
3:25: “The downfall of the western chivalry on the field of Nicopolis marked the end of any
hope that the Ottoman empire could be destroyed by Christendom, and Turkey was
accepted as a European power. . . . . . . [T]he crusade had become an anachronism.” The
author is exaggerating somewhat when he states that “Turkey was accepted as a European
power” after Nicopolis, but there is little doubt that the defeat had a chilling effect on
European chivalry.

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examination. The present article constitutes a first attempt at tracing the

political alliances of the Ottoman civil war, whose outcome was to have
such serious repercussions for the history of the region. Such an examina-
tion is of value not only because it fills a narrative gap but also because it
contributes to the ongoing debate about the nature of the early Ottoman
state and our understanding of Balkan and Anatolian society in the late
Middle Ages.2 As we will see, during this time of fragmentation and decen-
tralization, political exigencies made it difficult for individual power bro-
kers (including the Ottomans) to reconcile their religious affiliation with
loyalties toward multiple states and constituencies. In such times, flexibility
was a virtue, but one that if carried too far could bring accusations of trea-
son. It was such accusations that led to the downfall of the Ottoman prince
Emir Süleyman in 1411. On the Christian side, the policies of Venice and
other Catholic powers contributed to the animosity many Byzantines felt
toward them on the eve of the conquest of Constantinople. Before explor-
ing these ideas in more detail, it is first necessary to provide some historical
background.
The political scene inhabited by the Ottomans and their neighbors dur-
ing this time was extremely complex. Apart from the Ottomans, the other
major power in the Balkans was Catholic Hungary. However, since 1382
Hungary had also been divided by a major succession struggle, unleashed
by the death of the Angevin King Louis I, who had died without a male
heir. Like the Ottoman succession wars, this struggle for the Hungarian
throne drew in all those who stood to gain or lose from Hungarian suprem-
acy in the region. The de facto king was Sigismund of Luxemburg, a man
who represented the strong central government of Louis I; Sigismund’s
enemies supported a rival contender, Ladislas of Naples, who was the clos-
est blood relation of the deceased Angevin king. In 1401 Sigismund was
briefly imprisoned by his own noblemen, but by 1404 his situation was
improving, so that many of these started to desert Ladislas and join Sigis-
mund’s side. Meanwhile, many local rulers in Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia,
and Bosnia had taken advantage of King Louis’s death to throw off their
vassalage to Hungary. At first they supported Ladislas, as did Venice, which
2
For the most recent installments in the debate on Ottoman origins (and detailed biblio-
graphies of the earlier ones), see Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of
the Ottoman State (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995); and
Heath Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2003). On Ottoman identity, see also Salih Özbaran, Bir Osmanlı kimlig i: 14.-17.
yüzyıllarda Rûm/Rûmi aidiyet ve imgeleri (Istanbul: Kitap, 2004).

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 225

took advantage of the situation to increase its holdings on the Dalmatian

coast. But by 1409, Sigismund was able to take advantage of local divisions
and fear of Venetian expansion to create his own factions, eventually
emerging as the winner.3
It should be noted that the intense phase of the war for the Hungarian
throne coincided exactly with the Ottoman succession wars, which goes a
long way toward explaining why the Christian powers of the area were
unable to take unified action against the Ottomans at this time. But there
were also other important divisions within Latin Europe affecting the cru-
sading movement, such as that within the papacy itself. Crusades were
always dependent on the cooperation of secular powers with the pope,
who alone had the power to proclaim them and grant spiritual rewards to
their participants. At this time, the papacy was divided by the Great Schism
(1378-1417), which meant that there were at any given moment two rival
popes, one in Rome and another in Avignon. Both popes had supported
the Crusade of Nicopolis, but in light of its failure and the struggle for the
Hungarian throne, such unity had become increasingly difficult to pro-
cure. In 1398, during the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II’s visit to western
Europe, the Roman Pope Boniface IX (who supported Ladislas) had
preached a crusade against the Ottomans with little effect; but, in May
1400, for unknown reasons, Rome’s preaching of the crusade was com-
pletely abandoned.4 The only real crusading activity at this time was under-
taken by the French marshal Boucicault, who for this reason has been
called “a one-man crusade.”5 It was also possible to form crusading leagues
when this served the interests of powers threatened by Ottoman expan-
sion, such as the league that came into existence late in 1402, which
included Venice, Genoa, Rhodes, Naxos, and Chios.6 But such leagues

3
See John V. A. Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth
Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1987), 395-8;
Émile G. Léonard, Les Angevins de Naples (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1954);
Alessandro Cutolo, Il re Ladislao d’Angiò-Durazzo (Milan: U. Hoepli, 1936); and
K. M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, 4 vols. (Philadelphia: American
Philosophical Society, 1976), 1:342.
4
Deno Geanakoplos, “Byzantium and the Crusades, 1354-1453,” in A History of the
Crusades, 3:85-6; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1:370.
5
Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 1:371.
6
For this league which appears in Emir Süleyman’s Treaty of 1403, see E. A. Zachari-
adou, “Süleyman Celebi in Rumili and the Ottoman Chronicles,” Der Islam, 60 (1983):
268-96, esp. 274.

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were generally short-lived, especially when they included traditional ene-

mies like Venice and Genoa.
Let us now turn to the Ottomans after their defeat in 1402.7 Following
the Battle of Ankara, a large number of people fled to the straits and
attempted to cross to Europe to escape the depredations of Timur’s armies.
These included Christians and Muslims, peasants and soldiers, as well as
Ottoman princes and magnates. The influx caused problems because
members of the crusading league were prohibited from assisting Muslims,
but nevertheless the captains of many Venetian and Genoese ships sought
to profit by ferrying people across for a fee regardless of their religion.8 Two
sons of the captured Sultan Bayezid were able to cross to the main Otto-
man naval base of Gallipoli: Emir Süleyman and Isa. Süleyman was clearly
the more powerful of the two, and in the company of his advisers and the
frontier lords of the Balkans (Rumili) he immediately began peace nego-
tiations with Byzantium, Venice, Genoa, and other Christian powers.
These negotiations were delayed by the absence of Manuel II in the West
and the objections of the Ottoman frontier lords of Rumili, who were
reluctant to give up hard-won territory to the infidel.
Eventually a treaty was signed in January-February 1403, by which
Emir Süleyman made extensive territorial concessions to Byzantium
(including the important cities of Thessaloniki and Mesembria) but was
allowed to keep Gallipoli.9 Genoa was exempted from certain tributes paid
in the past, Venice gained some territory in central Greece, and both

7
Until recently, the only aspect of the period to receive systematic treatment was the
Treaty of 1403, by which the Ottoman prince Emir Süleyman made various concessions to
Byzantium and other Christian powers. See Zachariadou, “Süleyman Çelebi in Rumili”;
and George T. Dennis, “The Byzantine-Turkish Treaty of 1403,” Orientalia Christiana Peri-
odica, 33 (1967): 72-88. For a detailed treatment of the Ottoman succession wars, see
Dimitris J. Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum (1402-1413): Politics and Narratives of
Dynastic Succession,” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2005). A revised version of this
work is forthcoming from Brill with the title The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and
Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402-13.
8
The Venetian Senate reprimanded the captain of a ship belonging to the colony of
Crete, but in a letter to the Senate the captain defended himself by citing the fact that the
Genoese had broken the agreement first and that he was only doing the same as everyone
else. For this document, see Marie Mathilde Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne de Timur
en Anatolie (1402) (Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial si Imprimeriile Statului, 1942), 125-8.
9
For the text of the Treaty of 1403 and an analysis of its clauses, see Dennis, “The
Byzantine-Turkish Treaty of 1403.” See also Zachariadou, “Süleyman Çelebi in Rumili”;
and Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 67-78.

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 227

republics gained the release of prisoners captured by the Ottomans. Most

importantly, the merchant republics received guarantees that they would
be free to conduct their maritime trade unimpeded by Ottoman attacks.
This was helped by the fact that Süleyman had essentially given up control
of the straits to Byzantium and the Christian league and was only allowed
to keep a limited number of ships, which he promised not to use without
explicit permission. It is clear from the text of the treaty, which survives in
a Venetian translation, that Timur’s prolonged presence in Anatolia was
still causing concern to all parties, for Süleyman and the Christian powers
swore united action against him should he attempt to cross the straits.
Timur seems to have had no such intention, but it is interesting to note the
unity of Christendom and the Muslim Ottomans in the face of an outside
enemy.
The Treaty of 1403 was signed during Manuel II’s absence in the west
by his regent John VII and was then confirmed by Manuel upon his return
to Constantinople. Meanwhile the Venetians and Genoese had also signed
a treaty with Süleyman’s brother Isa, who was ruling at the time in the
Ottoman capital of Bursa, and Venice decided to confirm both treaties
by sending a proper embassy under Jacobo Suriano.10 Throughout the
Ottoman civil war, the Venetian Republic pursued its own interests by
signing treaties with whichever Ottoman prince happened to be in power
at a given time. Similarly, Genoa, which was under French rule, appointed
Marshal Boucicaut’s lieutenant Jean de Châteaumorand, who was taking
Manuel back to Constantinople, as envoy to the entire region including
Anatolia, with authority to negotiate with all parties.11
However willing the Italian merchant republics might have been to
negotiate with the Ottomans and other Turkish rulers in Anatolia, the
instability there following Timur’s departure made such negotiations
extremely difficult. By 18 May 1403, Isa had been replaced in Bursa by his
brother Mehmed, and by September of the same year he had apparently
died. The battles between the two Ottoman princes drew in the other
Turkish principalities of Anatolia (the beyliks), a pattern that would con-
tinue for the duration of the Ottoman civil war.12 Shortly after Isa’s death,
10
Suriano had reached the Levant by early May 1403 and was back in Venice by
September of the same year. See Zachariadou, “Süleyman Çelebi in Rumili,” 283-4.
11
Dennis, “The Byzantine-Turkish Treaty of 1403,” 73-4.
12
For Isa’s battles with Mehmed, see Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 102-44.
Zachariadou’s theory about Isa is not to be accepted, as it is based on a mistaken interpreta-
tion of confusing sources.

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Süleyman crossed the straits with a large army and took from Mehmed
all of Ottoman Anatolia except for the Tokat-Amasya area, which was
Mehmed’s base.13 The long stalemate that ensued ended in 1409 with the
appearance of a fourth brother named Musa in the Black Sea–Danubian
region of the Balkans. This event was the product of concerted action on
the part of Mehmed, the beyliks of Karaman and Isfendiyar, the Voyvoda
of Wallachia Mircea the Elder, and probably also the Byzantine Emperor.
The eventual result was Süleyman’s death and the transfer of power in the
Ottoman Balkans (Rumili) to Musa. This juncture in the civil war deserves
to be examined in greater detail, for it reveals the policies of the various
Christian powers toward the Ottomans at that time. But to do so, it is first
necessary to go back a few years.
In 1404 King Sigismund of Hungary wrote the following words to the
Duke of Burgundy:

Be informed that certain agreements have been concluded between me and my brother
Wenceslas, King of the Romans and of Bohemia; that I have made peace and an alli-
ance with Ostoja, the King of Bosnia, and turned Stefan [Lazarević], the Duke of
Rascia, into my vassal; and that I have applied great force against the Turks and reported
some victories, sending strong auxiliary forces to join the Emperor of Constantinople
and the Voyvoda of Wallachia in carrying out some noble deeds against them.14

This passage provides some badly needed information on the actual situa-
tion in the Balkans following the Treaty of 1403. Three of the rulers men-
tioned by Sigismund were major Christian players in the Ottoman civil
war: Stefan Lazarević, Mircea the Elder (the Voyvoda of Wallachia), and of
course the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos. Manuel Palaiologos

13
On Süleyman’s crossing to Anatolia and his battles with Mehmed, see Kastritsis, “The
Ottoman Interregnum,” 145-54.
14
Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, Documente privitóre la Istoria Românilor (Bucharest, 1890),
429, doc. cccliii (my translation). See also Maria Matilda Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru,
“Les relations du prince de Valachie Mircea l’ancien avec les émirs seldjoukides d’Anatolie
et leur candidat Musa au trône Ottoman,” Tarih Arastirmalari Dergisi, 6, nos. 10-11 (1968):
113-25, esp. 115. Since this is a rare publication, I am also providing the original text:
“Noueritis, inter me ac fratrem meum Venceslaum, Romanorum et Bohemiae Regem, cer-
tas quasdam pactiones esse factas; me cum Ostoja, Rege Bosnae, pacem ac foedus inisse,
Stephanum, Ducem Rasciae, mihi se subiecisse; et contra Turcos magna potentia profec-
tum, victorias aliquas reportasse, Constantinopolitanum Imperatorem ac Vaiuodam Vala-
chiae contra eosdem Turcos pulchra facinora gerere, meque illis magna misisse auxilia.”

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 229

has already been discussed and we will return to his actions in a moment,
but let us first discuss the other two.
Stefan Lazarević was the son of King Lazar of Serbia, who was killed in
the Battle of Kosovo (1389); following that battle, Sultan Bayezid married
Stefan’s sister, and Stefan became one of the Ottoman Sultan’s more
important Balkan Christian vassals. After the Battle of Ankara, in which he
fought valiantly, Stefan Lazarević escaped to Constantinople, where the
Byzantine regent John VII granted him the prestigious title of despot, thus
making him at least nominally a Byzantine vassal. Shortly thereafter, Stefan
also became a vassal of Sigismund (as suggested in the letter quoted above),
who granted him the region of Mačva on the Danube, including the impor-
tant city of Belgrade.15 But Stefan also remained an Ottoman vassal, and
his position as such is recognized in the Treaty of 1403. Thus, we see that
Stefan was considered a vassal by three major powers (Byzantium, Hun-
gary, and the Ottoman Empire) representing the main religious divisions
of the fifteenth-century Balkans (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Islam). To
further complicate matters, Stefan Lazarević and his brother Vuk were also
involved in a feud with the rival Serbian clan of the Brankovici: in Novem-
ber 1402, in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Ankara, Stefan and
his brother defeated the forces of George Branković, which included troops
provided by Süleyman.16 Such events (more of which will be examined
below) demonstrate the interconnectedness of the politics of the period,
which demanded a political calculus of Machiavellian proportions.
Let us turn now to another ruler mentioned in Sigismund’s letter, the
Wallachian Voyvoda Mircea the Elder (Mircea cel Bătrân). This man was an
old enemy of the Ottomans, having invaded their territory in the Balkans
leading up to the Battle of Rovine or Argeș (17 May 1395). There is evi-
dence of alliances dating back to that time between Mircea and several
Anatolian beyliks, especially that of Isfendiyar, and as we will see these come
into play again during Musa’s rise to power.17 Another important factor is

15
Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans, 500-3.
16
Konstanin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarevic, trans.
Maximilian Braun, Slavo-Orientalia, no. 1 (The Hague: Mouton, 1956): 23-6. See also
Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans, 500-2; Zachariadou, “Süleyman Çelebi in Rumili,” 289-
90; and Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 75-8. While in Constantinople, Stefan
Lazarević apparently tried to persuade John VII to imprison George Branković upon his
return from Ankara.
17
See Alexandrescu, “Les relations du prince de Valachie Mircea,” 116.

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that while Mircea was primarily a Hungarian vassal, as an Orthodox Chris-

tian he also had a close connection to Byzantium. It is important to remem-
ber that at this time the Orthodox Christians of the Balkans were generally
divided between pro-Ottoman and pro-Catholic factions; Mircea and
Manuel Palaiologos both stood on the pro-Catholic side of this divide.
While the Ottomans were preoccupied with the Battle of Ankara, Mircea
had taken advantage of their weakness and invaded their territory in an
attempt to restore his rule over his old Transdanubian possessions in the
Dobrudja, apparently leading to a separate treaty between Mircea and Sül-
eyman.18 But this treaty did not prevent further hostilities; by 1406, if not
sooner, Mircea had occupied the Dobrudja and its main city of Silistria.19 It
is probably to this sort of activity that Sigismund is referring in his letter.
Seen in this light, it should come as no surprise to learn that Musa’s rise
to power in Rumili resulted from concerted action on the part of several
Christian and Muslim powers. Although such an interpretation has been
overshadowed by Musa’s anti-Christian policies following his rise to power,
in fact all evidence points in that direction. The role of Mircea is recog-
nized by Ottoman and Byzantine sources as well as modern scholarship;
that of Manuel Palaiologos, on the other hand, has been ignored, despite
the existence of several contemporary sources pointing in that direction.
The most important of these is the historical oration of Symeon, the arch-
bishop of Thessaloniki, who describes Musa’s accession as follows:

Not long after that, another evil spawn of that deadly viper, that Payiazit [Bayezid],
rose up against us. He was the infidel Moses [Musa], whom the pious basileus Manuel
invited and honored with much attention, providing him with copious provisions and
competent aides and ferrying him across to Wallachia. He took refuge there with the
assistance of the local Christian ethnarch, who conforming with the royal orders, cared
for that snake during the winter, who after creeping out of poverty and receiving
sufficient warmth from Christians, gaining from them even the power to rule, attacked
us Christians violently and murderously.20

18
See Zachariadou, “Süleyman Çelebi in Rumili,” 272-4.
19
Alexandrescu, “Les relations du prince de Valachie Mircea,” 115-18; and P. Ş. Na sturel,
“Une victoire du Voévoda Mircea l’Ancien sur les Turcs devant Silistria (c. 1407-08),” Stu-
dia et Acta Orientalia, 1 (1957): 239-47. For a detailed discussion of the evidence, see
Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 182-3.
20
Politico-historical works of Symeon, Archbishop of Thessalonica (1416/17 to 1429): Critical
Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary, ed. David Balfour (Vienna: Verl. d. Österr.
Akad. d. Wiss., 1979), 48.

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 231

Despite the fact that Symeon (writing in 1427 or 1428) was probably pres-
ent in Constantinople at the time he is describing, his editor David Balfour
dismisses his allegation that Manuel was behind the rise of Musa, attribut-
ing it to the author’s Byzantine “imperialist prejudice.”21 But a Byzantine
short chronicle confirms Symeon’s allegation, stating that in January of
1410 “Musa came from the land of the Tatars [i.e., the northern Black Sea
coast] and subjected himself (!"#$%&'() to the basileus Kyr Manuel.”22
The short chronicle’s editor Peter Schreiner also dismisses Manuel’s role
on the grounds that by that time Musa was already attacking, Byzantium
and the Byzantines were supporting his brother Süleyman. But it is clear
that during the Ottoman civil wars the Byzantine policy was to support
rival parties in an effort to crush the Ottomans once and for all. Let us take
a closer look at how this policy was applied.
As we have seen, after the Battle of Ankara, Byzantium and other Chris-
tian powers were eager to make peace with Süleyman and the other Otto-
man princes in an effort to make immediate gains and avoid a possible
crossing of Timur’s armies to Europe. But following Isa’s elimination and
Süleyman’s crossing to Anatolia, it seemed likely that Süleyman would
eliminate his brother Mehmed and reunite all remaining Ottoman terri-
tory under his rule. Such an event had to be avoided at all costs. Seen in
this light, Manuel’s desire to cooperate with Mircea in supporting a rival
claimant to the Ottoman throne seems natural.
This claimant was Musa Çelebi, a young Ottoman prince who had
ended up in Mehmed’s court after the disaster of 1402 and whom Mehmed
decided to release and send to the Balkans to create a diversion, forcing
Süleyman to turn his attention away from Anatolia. Such a diversion was
also in the interest of Byzantium, which hoped to see an all-out Ottoman
civil war break out around the straits in which at least one of the Ottoman
princes would be crushed. To profit as much as possible from this scenario,
Manuel contacted the Venetian Senate and proposed an anti-Turkish
alliance. The Senate’s answer, dated 10 January 1410, is preserved in the
Venetian archives.23 According to this document, Manuel informed Venice
21
Politico-historical works of Symeon, 123-4.
22
Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, ed. Peter Schreiner, 3 vols. (Vienna: Verl. d. Österr.
Akad. d. Wiss., 1975), 1:97; 2:397.
23
Acta Albaniae Veneta saeculorum XIV. et XV., ed. Giuseppe Valentini (Palermo: Typis
Josephi Tosini, 1967-), 4:1-3. This document is summarized by Nicolae Iorga (editor) in
Notes et extraits pour servir à l’histoire des Croisades au XV e siècle, in Revue de l’Orient Latin,
4 (1896): 311-12. See also Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 190-1.

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 232 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242

that the time was ripe for a decisive strike against the Ottomans because of
the ongoing conflict between “those two brothers, who are rulers of the
Turks.” Manuel further urged the Venetians to send him eight galleys,
which together with two of his own could block the straits “in order to
obstruct transit from Turkey to Greece and vice versa, [and thereby] doom
them.” If the Venetians decided to help him, Manuel was sure that other
Christian rulers in the area would follow; but if he did not receive assis-
tance, he would have no other choice but to make peace with the Otto-
mans. The Venetian Senate politely refused Manuel’s offer, stating that the
Byzantine ruler should first secure the agreement of the other local powers
and that if they agreed, the Republic would also do its part.
After Venice’s refusal to cooperate in an anti-Muslim league, Manuel
was forced to do what he could on his own. Meanwhile, Musa Çelebi,
regardless of any support that he had received in the past from Manuel
Palaiologos, quickly turned against Byzantium and besieged Mesembria.24
Mesembria, on the Black Sea, was one of the towns returned to Byzantium
by Süleyman in the Treaty of 1403, so Musa’s action was probably moti-
vated by a desire to please his popular base, which included many Muslim
raiders (akıncı, gazi) disaffected with Süleyman’s peaceful policies toward
the Christians.25 Apparently, Musa had also made deals with Stefan
Lazarević and other Serbian leaders; we learn this from Stefan’s biographer
Konstantin the Philosopher, who states that “Musa showed himself upon
first appearance to the entire population in the neighboring regions as
mild and liberal, as if he wanted, as a model of piety, to pacify [the coun-
try]. Later, however, he showed himself to all those [people] to be more
bitter than gall, even for those who had served him.”26
While Musa was busy taking over Süleyman’s territory in the Ottoman
Balkans (Rumili) and returning to the aggressive policies of Bayezid I,

24
The siege took place between September 1409 and January 1410, as attested by a
short chronicle in Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, 1:215.
25
For Musa’s support among the raiders, see !Āșik"pașazāde, Die altosmanische Chronik
des !Āșik"pașazāde, ed. F. Giese (Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1929), 73; and Konstantin the
Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 31. The tovıca mentioned by
!Āșik"pașazāde were timar-holding (military fief-holding) officers of the akıncı. See Halil
İnalcık, “Notes on N. Beldiceanu’s translation of the K.anūnnāme, fonds turc ancien 39,
Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris,” Der Islam, 43 (1967): 139-57. For a more detailed discus-
sion, see Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 185-6.
26
Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 31 (my
translation from Braun’s German).

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 233

Süleyman was informed of his brother’s actions and hastened to Rumili to

confront him while there was still time. At first Manuel appears to have
adhered to his original plan. According to a Ragusan report dated 30 May
1410:

[N]ow a certain ship captain sailing near those coasts, who returned from Avlona on
the 28th of the present month, reported to us that an ambassador of Lord Mirchxe
[Mircea] disembarked at Avlona from Constantinople on the 15th, saying that the
emperor of Constantinople captured Gallipoli with its fortifications, with the excep-
tion of the citadel, and surrounded [the city] by land as well as by sea with eight ships,
and that a truce has been declared, and [the city] is thought to have been secured. And
that Celopia [Süleyman] has appeared with many men on the coast and has been
diverted, asking the emperor and the Genoese to ferry him across, which was honor-
ably denied to him, and has had to go back on account of the trouble of his brother
Crespia [Kyritzes, i.e., Mehmed]. Avarnas [Evrenos] and six barons of Celopia who
had come to the Gallipoli area plotting [lit., “murmuring”] were captured by Musace-
lopia [Musa Çelebi].27

The contents of this report suggest that in May of 1410, Manuel Palaio-
logos and Mircea (a Hungarian vassal) were still trying to find a way to
exploit the Ottoman predicament, at a time when the Ottomans were split
between no fewer than three rival princes. It seems that the Byzantine
Emperor had succeeded in partially capturing the main Ottoman naval
base of Gallipoli (which remained Ottoman in the end) perhaps with the
help of the Genoese, who are mentioned in the document.28
Apart from the Ragusan report cited above, these events are not attested
in any other source. By 15 June 1410 (the date of the Battle of Kosmid-
ion), Manuel was once again supporting Süleyman, whose army crossed

27
Diplomatarium relationum Reipublicae Ragusanae cum regno Hungariae, ed. Jozsef
Gelcich and Lajos Thalloczy (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1887), 195. As
the text is somewhat convoluted, I also give the original: “[H]odie vero ad hec littora navi-
gans quidam brigantinus, qui die XXVIII. presentis de Avalona recesserat, nobis retulit
ambassiatorem domini Mirchxe a partibus Constantinopolis in diebus XV. descendisse ad
Valonam, narrantem Constantinopolitanum imperatorem Gallipoli cum fortiliciis, dempta
magistra turri, cepisse, eandemque circuisse per terram et galeis octo per mare, datisque
induciis creditur nunc adepta; Celopiam vero cum magno gencium apparatu ad littora
declinasse, petentem ab imperatore et Januensibus paregium, cui honesto modo denega-
tum fuit, et propter Crespie fratris molestias retrocessit. Avarnas et sex baronos Celopie, qui
ad partes Galipolis susurantes venerant, a Musicelopia detinentur captivos.”
28
To the best of my knowledge, this brief and partial conquest of Gallipoli by the Byz-
antines has never before been reported in modern scholarly literature.

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 234 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242

the straits to Constantinople on board Byzantine ships.29 The Byzantine

Emperor’s decision to support Süleyman was probably motivated by the
immediate danger posed by Musa, who two weeks earlier had captured
Hagios Phokas (a suburb of Constantinople, modern Ortaköy) from a
force loyal to Süleyman.30 There are also references in Ottoman and Byz-
antine chronicles to renewed concessions from Süleyman to Byzantium
and even to a marriage alliance with the family of Manuel Palaiologos.31
Whatever his reasons, Manuel agreed to support Süleyman against
Musa, and the ensuing Battle of Kosmidion was fought right outside the
land walls of Constantinople within sight of the Byzantine palace of Blach-
ernae. According to Konstantin the Philosopher, Süleyman and his army
“flowed out of the walls of Constantinople,” and Manuel had readied ships
to rescue them if necessary, which were burned by Musa before the battle.
Stefan Lazarević and his brother Vuk took part on opposite sides (Vuk had
deserted to Süleyman on the eve of the battle); after Musa lost and was
routed, Stefan entered Constantinople on board Byzantine ships, so that

29
See “Una inedita cronaca bizantina (dal Marc. Gr. 595),” ed. Elpidio Mioni, Rivista
di Studi Bizantini e Slavi, 1 (1980): 71-87, esp. 75, 82. Peter Schreiner was unable to
include this important short chronicle in his collection, as he was unaware of its existence.
30
“Una inedita cronaca bizantina,” 75, 82. The chronicle states that Musa fought this
battle “with Paschainoi” ( )*+, -./0.12&2), an otherwise unknown term possibly related
to the Turkish baskın (raid), which would then refer to Musa’s popular base among the
raiders of Rumili. I am indebted to Professor Elizabeth Zachariadou for this observation.
31
A contemporary Ottoman chronicle of the Interregnum states that Süleyman renewed
his alliance with Manuel Palaiologos “by promising him some regions.” This chronicle was
composed in the court of Mehmed Çelebi and survives in two later compilations, those of
Neșri and Oxford Anonymous. See Franz Taeshner, Gihānnümā: Die altosmanische Chronik
des Mevlana Mehemmed Neschri, vol. 1: Einleitung und Text des. Cod. Menzel (Leipzig: O.
Harrassowitz, 1951); and F. R. Unat and M. A. Köymen, Kitâb-ı Cihan-nümâ: Neșrî tarihi,
critical ed. in 2 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1949-57). For the Oxford
Anonymous chronicle, see Halil Erdoğan Cengiz and Yașar Yücel, “Rûhî Târîhi,” Belgeler,
14-18 (1989-92): 359-472, as well as unnumbered facsimile folia. A new edition and trans-
lation of the chronicle is available in Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 313-448
(publication forthcoming in Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures). For the marriage
alliance between Manuel and Süleyman, see J. W. Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391-
1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statemanship (New Brunswick, N.J., 1968), 253 n. 88.
The anonymous chronicle in Codex Barberinus Grecus 111 and Pseudo-Phranzes identify
this princess as the daughter of Manuel’s deceased brother Theodore, while Chalkokon-
dyles states that she was the daughter of Hilario Doria, Manuel’s son-in-law through his
illegitimate daughter Zampia. A daughter of the same Doria was supposedly married to
Küçük Mustafa in 1422; this fact could account for the confusion in Chalkokondyles.

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 235

“victors and defeated came into the imperial city together.”32 The Battle of
Kosmidion is thus a prime example of the involvement of Christian pow-
ers in the Ottoman civil war.
This involvement continued in the months following Kosmidion and
was essential to Musa’s eventual seizure of power in Rumili. After his vic-
tory, Süleyman returned to the throne in Edirne, while Mehmed rushed in
to fill the power vacuum created in Anatolia by Süleyman’s departure.
Musa fled to his main power base in the northeastern Balkans, where he
continued to enjoy the support of his Muslim raiders and Christian allies.
According to Konstantin the Philosopher, after his victory Süleyman pun-
ished Stefan Lazarević for supporting Musa by sending his brother Vuk to
seize his lands, but Vuk was captured by one of Musa’s pashas along with
his nephew Lazar Branković. The two Serbs were brought to Musa, who
had Vuk executed but kept Lazar for use in bargaining with his powerful
older brother George Branković. Stefan Lazarević was indebted to Musa
and continued to support him in his struggle against Süleyman, but Lazar
failed to deliver and was executed after Musa failed again to seize power
from his brother at the Battle of Edirne (11 July 1410).33 Thus, we see
that the Ottoman civil strife in the Balkans at this time is directly con-
nected to the power struggles between rival Serbian lords, especially Stefan
Lazarević (who supported Musa) and George Branković (who remained
loyal to Süleyman).
Thanks to the support of Stefan Lazarević and his own loyal raiders,
Musa survived into the winter of 1410-11, when he was finally able to kill
Süleyman and seize from him the throne in Edirne. According to a Byzan-
tine short chronicle, Süleyman “had taken to bathing and was drinking
one glass after another, the lords and grandees got fed up, and the armies
left and started to desert to Musa Beg. When Emir Süleyman heard this,
he was afraid and tried to escape, but was caught in the area of Bryse and
strangled on 17 February [1411], which was a Tuesday.”34 There is no need
to dwell here on this event, which is recounted in different ways in several
sources. Suffice it to say that Süleyman fell from power because he had

32
Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 33-5.
33
Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 35-8.
For a more detailed treatment of the events surrounding the Battle of Edirne, see Kastritsis,
“The Ottoman Interregnum,” 200-1.
34
Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, 1:637 (96/7). Brysē corresponds to the modern
village of Pınarhisar between Kırklareli and Vize.

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 236 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242

followed peaceful policies toward his Christian neighbors, which had alien-
ated those of his subjects whose livelihood depended on war (such as the
akıncı and their leaders, who had joined Musa). When he was apprehended
and strangled, Süleyman was on his way to Constantinople.35
With Musa’s accession to the Ottoman throne in Rumili, Christian-
Muslim relations in the Balkans entered a new phase. Musa refused to accept
Süleyman’s concessions to Byzantium and the other Christian powers there
and unleashed his raiders onto their territory. In so doing, he was returning
to the aggressive imperialist policies of his father, Bayezid I, which aimed to
create a seamless and expanding Ottoman domain. Musa’s first attacks
appear to have been against Stefan Lazarević’s Serbia. The Byzantine chron-
icler Laonikos Chalkokondyles blames these attacks on Stefan’s abandon-
ment of Musa during the Battle of Kosmidion, while Stefan’s biographer
Konstantin the Philosopher (who is of course biased in his favor) blames
them solely on Musa’s duplicity.36 The fact is that in addition to being a loyal
Ottoman vassal, Stefan Lazarević was also a vassal of the Hungarian king
and controlled territory that stood in the way of Ottoman expansion in the
Balkans. For this reason alone, he had to be eliminated and his territory
assimilated into the centralized Ottoman land-tenure system (timar).37
After the souring of relations between the two men, Stefan Lazarević
made the first strike by occupying the town of Pirot (Şehirköy). Musa
responded by ravaging the surrounding area, capturing three towns and
massacring their inhabitants and besieging Smederovo in Stefan’s north-
ernmost province of Mačva.38 According to an Ottoman source, Musa also
attacked Vidin (which had revolted), Provadia (Pravadi) on the Black Sea,
and the Serbian town of Koprian (Köprülü), commanding “raids in every

35
For a detailed discussion of this event and the political significance of its representa-
tion in the sources, see Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 202-8.
36
Chalkokondyles, Laonici Chalcocandylae historiarum demonstrationes, ed. Jenö Darkó,
(Budapest: Acad. Litterarum Hungaricae, 1922-27), 165; Konstantin the Philosopher,
Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 42-3.
37
See Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” Studia Islamica, 2 (1954): 103-29.
38
Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 43;
Politico-historical works of Symeon, 48, 124-5; Doukas, Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341-1462),
ed. Vasile Grecu (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Populaire Romîne, 1958),
English trans. in Harry J. Magoulias, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman
Turks (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1975), chap. 19, sec. 8. I am referring to
chapters and sections rather than page numbers, so that the reader may use any edition or
translation.

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 237

direction so that his lands were filled [with spoils] and became rich.”39
Raids were also carried out in Albania and southern Greece.40 But in
peripheral regions, following common Ottoman practice, Musa was not
averse to forming alliances with local lords in an effort to gain new vassals
and extend Ottoman influence. By 1413 he had formed such an alliance
with Carlo Tocco of Cephalonia against Tocco’s Albanian enemies, the
Zenevesi, which was sealed by Musa’s marriage to Tocco’s daughter, who
was supposedly illegitimate.41
But no such alliance was possible with Byzantium, which stood in the
way of Ottoman expansion, had supported Süleyman, and continued to
harbor an Ottoman pretender in the person of Süleyman’s son Orhan. In
the summer of 1411, Musa besieged Thessaloniki, Constantinople, and
Selymbria. Thessaloniki was an obvious choice, since it was the most
important city Süleyman had returned to the Byzantines in the Treaty of
1403. Constantinople was besieged both by land and by sea, and many
Byzantines and Turks were killed in sallies outside the city walls.42 To relieve
the imperial city, Manuel II sent the pretender Orhan to Selymbria, thereby
forcing Musa to move his main siege operations to that town.43 When he
went to the siege of Selymbria, Musa took with him George Branković,
apparently trying to poison him along the way; but the Serb survived the
poisoning thanks to an antidote and took refuge within the walls of the

39
This source is preserved in two chronicles: Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken:
Tevârîh-i Âl-i !Osmān, ed. Friedrich Giese, 2 vols. (Breslau: Im Selbstverlage Breslau XVI,
1922), 1:51; Die altosmanische Chronik des !Āșik"pașazāde, 74.
40
Freddy Thiriet, Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise concernant la Romanie,
vol. 2:1364-1463 (Paris: Mouton, 1958-61): 98, 106. The citizens of Nauplion complained
that they were suffering greatly from Turkish raids that they were unable to predict, and the
Venetian Senate advised the recruitment of spies to observe Turkish movements in the area.
41
See Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di anonimo, ed. Giuseppe Schirò (Rome: Acca-
demia nazionale dei Lincei, 1975), 360-2. It is possible that the chronicle’s author is down-
playing the whole affair by claiming that Tocco’s daughter was illegitimate.
42
Chalkokondyles, Laonici Chalcocandylae historiarum demonstrationes, 166, states that
Musa attempted to blockade Constantinople by sea but was defeated by Manuel, “the bas-
tard son of the emperor John,” in a naval battle. Doukas, 19:9, informs us that the son of
Manuel II’s interpreter Nicholas Notaras was captured outside the city walls and executed
by Musa. On this incident, see also A. Acconcia Longo, “Versi di Ioasaf ieromonaco e
grande protosincello in morte di Giovanni Notaras,” Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici,
14-16 (1977-79): 249-79.
43
Thanks to the Ottoman-Venetian treaty signed at this time (see below), we know that
Musa was outside the walls of Constantinople by 12 August 1411, but that by 3 September

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 238 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242

besieged city. Still fearing for his life, Branković began negotiations with
his uncle and rival Stefan Lazarević through the intercession of his mother,
who was Stefan’s sister.44 Thus, we see that, less than a year after his acces-
sion, Musa’s hostility was already causing his enemies to overcome their
differences and band together against him. It was precisely that trend that
led to Musa’s eventual overthrow by his brother Mehmed I. Musa alienated
many people, not all of them Christian; his enemies also included power-
ful Ottoman frontier lords (uc begleri) like Evrenos and Mihal-oğlı
Mehmed, who escaped from Selymbria to Mehmed in Anatolia via Con-
stantinople.45 The uc begleri were alienated by Musa’s centralizing policies,
which aimed at undermining their power and replacing them with his own
men, who were often slaves of the Porte (kul ).46
Let us turn now to the position of Venice. As we have seen above,
throughout the Ottoman Interregnum the main concern of the Serenis-
sima was to preserve and enlarge its network of maritime bases and to
guarantee the safety of its merchants. Promises to cooperate with other
Christian powers against the infidel Ottomans were only carried out when
otherwise convenient and took second place to Venice’s main goals, which
were essential to its survival. After the Treaty of 1403, which had been
renewed in 1409, Venice had been at peace with the Ottomans of Rumili
in exchange for the payment of various annual tributes. But following
Süleyman’s death and Musa’s accession to the throne in Edirne, the situa-
tion had changed and the old treaties were no longer valid, resulting in the
capture of some Venetian ships along with their crews and merchandise.
The Venetian Senate was anxious to resolve the situation as soon as pos-
sible. After rejecting a motion to seize Gallipoli from the Ottomans, the
Senate (which had already instructed its bailo in Constantinople to assure

he had moved to Selymbria. For the release of Orhan, see Politico-historical works of Symeon,
49, 125. It has been suggested (Colin Imber, Encyclopedia of Islam, new ed., s.v. “Mūsā
Čelebi”) that Orhan was released immediately upon Musa’s accession, but this is unlikely
as there is no such mention in the sources and Musa would have had to deal with the
challenge immediately.
44
Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 43-4;
see also Stanoje Stanojević, “Die Biographie Stefan Lazarević’s von Konstantin dem Phi-
losophen als Geschichtsquelle,” Archiv für Slavische Philologie, 18 (1896): 409-72, esp. 445.
45
On Mihal-oğlı Mehmed’s defection, see Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbesch-
reibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 44-5.
46
See Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken, 1: 49-50.

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 239

the new Ottoman ruler of the Republic’s goodwill toward his regime)
decided to send an ambassador to negotiate a new treaty.47 On 4 June
1411, the Senate provided its ambassador Giacomo Trevisan with instruc-
tions for his upcoming embassy to Musa.
These instructions are preserved in the Venetian archives and provide a
fascinating glimpse into Venetian policy and the complex situation in
Rumili at the time.48 Due to recent events (propter novitates factas), Trev-
isan was advised to use his own judgment in reaching the person of Musa
and attaining his mission’s objectives. Once he reached the Ottoman ruler,
he was to remind him of the good relations that had existed between Ven-
ice and his predecessors. He was to hint at the fact that various “princes and
communities” had proposed to Venice alliances against Musa based on the
perception that his position was weak, but that the Republic paid no heed
to such proposals, preferring instead to conclude a treaty. The treaty would
guarantee the safety of all Venetian possessions, including those given by
Süleyman in 1403. To attain the success of his mission, Trevisan was given
authority to bribe one of Musa’s “baroni” (i.e., uc begleri), preferably Mihal-
oğlı Mehmed, with an annual tribute of up to one hundred ducats. He was
also to ascertain the relative power in the new regime of the uc begleri Evre-
nos and Pașa Yiğit (with whom the Republic had dealt in the past) to
determine which of them would be most useful in protecting Albania from
the incursions of Balša and other enemies, and bribe them each accord-
ingly. If Trevisan was able to obtain a treaty, he was to ensure its application
by obtaining orders to the relevant Ottoman authorities; if not, he was to
attempt to conclude a truce of one year. If Musa refused to concede to
either a treaty or a truce, Trevisan was to depart for Constantinople, where
he was to inform Venice of the situation as soon as possible. He should
then obtain an audience with the Byzantine Emperor by showing a letter
of credentials provided for that purpose and begin negotiations with him
for joint action against Musa in the name of Christendom. Trevisan was
also provided with a letter of credentials for Musa’s brother Mehmed, in
case in the meantime he had succeeded in seizing power in Rumili.
Trevisan’s embassy was successful. On 12 August 1411, a treaty was drawn
up outside the besieged city of Constantinople (al fanari de Constanti-
nopol ), where Musa was at the time. But because of some disagreements,

47
Thiriet, Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise, 2:98-9.
48
Acta Albaniae Veneta saeculorum XIV. et XV., 6:151-62. For a more detailed English
summary of the text, see Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 226-35.

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 240 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242

the treaty was not signed until 3 September, by which time Musa had
moved to Selymbria and was besieging that town as well. Needless to say,
the Byzantines were angered that Venice would dare to negotiate and sign
a treaty with the infidel while he was besieging Christian cities. In May
1412, the Senate defended its actions to an ambassador of Manuel II by
stating that it was only natural to sign the treaty in Selymbria, since that
was where the Sultan was at the time, and that Byzantium could also have
benefited from such a treaty.49
But by that time, Byzantium was committed to its own policy of replac-
ing Musa with a rival Ottoman pretender. By the winter of 1411-12, Musa
was faced with a multitude of challenges on several different fronts. The
Byzantines sent Süleyman’s son Orhan from Selymbria to Thessaloniki;
Orhan started a campaign for the Ottoman throne in the surrounding
Ottoman regions, apparently gaining a fair amount of support before
being betrayed by one of his lords and strangled.50 Around the same time,
the Byzantines also sent George Branković to Thessaloniki on board a
ship belonging to the Venetian colony of Crete, an event that caused con-
sternation to the Republic because it threatened the recently signed treaty
with Musa.51 Leaving Thessaloniki, George Branković was eventually
able to join up with his former enemy Stefan Lazarević, who had with
him the Ottoman lords Pașa Yiğit and Yusuf and another Ottoman
pretender known as the “son of Savcı.”52 This prince was apparently
the son of Murad I’s son Savcı, who in 1373 had joined the Byzantine
prince Andronikos in a rebellion against their respective fathers.53 Finally,

Acta Albaniae Veneta saeculorum XIV. et XV., 6:139-40.

49

Orhan issued a document between 26 January and 4 February 1412. See Vančo
50

Boškov, “Ein Nišān des Prinzen Orh#an, Sohn Süleymān Çelebis, aus dem Jahre 1412 im
Athoskloster Sankt Paulus,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 71 (1979):
127-52. See also Chalkokondyles, Laonici Chalcocandylae historiarum demonstrationes, 166-7;
and Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 50.
51
Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević, 46;
Thiriet, Régestes des délibérations du Sénat de Venise, 104-5. Apparently the ship was
forced by the Byzantines to convey George Branković to Thessaloniki despite a Venetian
prohibition.
52
For these events, see Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Ste-
fan Lazarević, 46-7; Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 238-40.
53
See The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, s.v. “Savcı Beg.” Apparently Timur had granted
Bursa to the “son of Savcı” immediately after the Battle of Ankara, but he was quickly replaced
there by Isa. According to a contemporary observer, after Timur’s army destroyed the city on
3 August, Timur gave it to “a nephew of Bayezid who was the son of his blind brother.”

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 D. J. Kastritsis / Medieval Encounters 13 (2007) 222-242 241

Mehmed Çelebi’s first failed campaign against Musa which resulted in the
Battle of Inceğiz can probably also be placed in the fall of 1411 or spring
of 1412. Mehmed was supported by the Byzantines, who ferried him and
his army across the straits to Constantinople in exchange for oaths of peace
and mutual assistance.54 Mehmed lost the battle and took refuge in the
walls of Constaninople—the resemblance to the Byzantines’ treatment of
Süleyman at the Battle of Kosmidion is obvious.
By the summer of 1413, the alliances between Musa’s many Christian
and Muslim enemies finally bore fruit, and Musa was defeated and stran-
gled by his brother Mehmed on the battlefield of Çamurlu near Sofia
(5 July 1413). In the buildup to this decisive battle, which is described in
detail in a number of sources and immortalized in an Ottoman epic poem,
Mehmed relied on the assistance of the Anatolian tribal confederacy of
Dulkadır, the Byzantines in Constantinople and Thessaloniki, the discon-
tented Ottoman frontier lords of Rumili, and a host of Serbs and other
Hungarian vassals under the leadership of Stefan Lazarević, including the
Bosnian lord Sandalj.55
In conclusion, while the Ottoman succession wars of 1402-1413 might
have provided an excellent opportunity for Byzantium, Hungary, and
other Christian powers opposed to Ottoman expansion to unite against
the Ottomans and force them out of Europe, this did not happen. On the
contrary, Byzantium and Stefan Lazarević with his fellow Hungarian vas-
sals proved essential to the reunification of the Ottoman realm under
Mehmed I, who repaid the favor by pursuing relatively peaceful policies
toward his former allies until his death in 1421. During the course of the
succession wars, the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II had attempted to coop-
erate with King Sigismund of Hungary, Voyvoda Mircea of Wallachia, and

See the account of Gerardo Sagredo in Alexandrescu, La campagne de Timur en Anatolie,

130. According to the Ottoman chronicle of the Interregnum Ah" vāl-i Sult"ān Meh" emmed, a
man named Ali who was “the son of Savcı” (S"avcı-og$lı) attacked Mehmed Çelebi in the
winter of 1402-3 near Ankara. See Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 100-1.
54
Doukas, 19:10; Konstantin the Philosopher, Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan
Lazarević, 45; and Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 235-7.
55
For a detailed account of the buildup to the Battle of Çamurlu and its sources, see
Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Interregnum,” 247-57. For the Ottoman epic poem, see Abdülvāsi!
Çelebi, Hâlilname, ed. Ayhan Güldaș (Ankara: T. C. Kültür Bakanlığı, 1996), 254-78;
Ayhan Güldaș, “Fetret Devri’ndeki Şehzadeler Mücadelesini Anlatan Ilk$ Manzum Vesika,”
Türk Dünyası Araștırmaları, 72 (June 1991): 99-110; and Kastritsis, “The Ottoman Inter-
regnum,” 451-68 (English trans.).

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the Venetian Senate to destroy the Ottomans; in the end, however, his
efforts had only resulted in the replacement of the relatively friendly Süley-
man with the much more aggressive Musa. This ruler had to be removed at
all costs, hence the support of virtually everyone for his brother Mehmed,
who was proclaimed sole Ottoman Sultan in 1413.
A detailed examination of the period’s politics reveals the important role
of regional power brokers, which transcended their often dubious religious
affiliations: these included Serbian and other Balkan noblemen and the
Ottoman lords of the marches (uc begleri). In a time of political uncer-
tainty and fragmentation, the major powers of the Balkans (the Ottomans,
Hungary, and to a much lesser extent, Byzantium) attempted to assert
their power over regional power brokers by claiming rights of vassalage,
while Venice stayed informed about which of them were most powerful in
order to bribe them. But despite their great power, these men played a
dangerous game, for their loyalties were always shifting so that they might
find themselves owing allegiance to more than one master at the same
time. Finally, the Ottoman succession wars and the strategic position of
Constantinople on the straits allowed Byzantium to develop a policy of
harboring and unleashing Ottoman pretenders to the throne. It was that
policy that enabled Byzantium to survive until 1453. But the opportunity
provided in 1402 for the Ottomans’ Christian enemies to unite and crush
them once and for all had been lost, never to come again.

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