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The Decline of the Ottoman Empire

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DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.22086.93763

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The Decline of the Ottoman Empire

Introduction

Islamic history has witnessed the rise and fall of many empires and dynasties, beginning with some of
the prominent empires, like the Umayyads and the Abbasids, followed by the Mamluks and the Mughal
empire. Ironically, however, most of them faded away within a cycle of three generations: commencing
with a generation of conquest, triumph and prominence; followed by its golden age; and, finally, ending
with a period of stagnation, defeat and gradual decline. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire manifested
as an exemption and lasted much longer, from its transformation in the late 13th century to its collapse
in the early 20th century. In context, the Ottoman Empire began as a small state (beyliks sing. beylik)
founded and led by the bey, Osman Gazi (d. 1326). The Ottomans, being a nomadic tribe by nature,
swiftly settled in Anatolia (Asia Minor) after escaping Central Asia as a consequence of the Mongol
offensive, in a region that was previously under Byzantine rule. For Osman, the decline of the Byzantine
Empire in the face of a persistent Seljuk offensive, and the fortified unity of the Muslim community
under the ‘warrior of the faithful’ (ghāzzīs sing. ghāzī), worked as a major advantage, consequently
expanding Ottoman rule over neighbouring territories. However, the most significant shift in military
conquests and territorial gain for the Ottomans came under the reign of the 10th Ottoman Sultan,
‘Suleiman the Magnificent’ (r. 1520-1566). Arguably, it was under Suleiman’s rule that the Ottomans
reached prominence: socially, politically and economically. As a result, Suleiman stood at the cusp of
two worlds, that of Ottoman triumph and its gradual decline. Yet, recent research has focused largely
on the latter and disregarded the intervening centuries. Therefore, this essay will primarily examine the
socio-political and economic factors – both internally and externally – that led to the decline of the
Ottoman Empire. Moreover, it will primarily analyse the empire’s situation after Suleiman’s death and,
finally, it will conclude with an examination of the Janissaries’ influence and status after Suleiman’s
death; and, the European economic war against the Ottomans.

The Decline of the Ottoman Empire

The idea of states having a rise and fall movement, and whether this theoretical framework could be
universally applied, is a question that requires a lengthy discussion and focus. However, the following
section will lay the curser on a few points. In many ways, Khaldunian1 thought has much influenced
Muslim thinking of pre-modern states having a life cycle. In terms of the Ottoman state, much Western
academia constructed a theory of an Ottoman decline in a way of rendering Muslim contribution as
insignificant in the 18th and 19th century (Kafadar, 1999). This, to some degree, focused on a 19th
century re-interpretation of European narratives of the Enlightenment; thereby placing the Muslim
world in a situation in which a linear narrative was presented of a series of Muslim failures and a series

1
See for example, The Muqaddimah by Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406). Correct pronunciation: Ibn Khallidūn,
later merged into Ibn Khaldūn for ease.

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of so-called victories of modernist trends. What the narratives didn’t show was that during this period,
European success was much based on colonialism, extreme violence, slavery, and a need to gazump
resources. In that sense, the Ottomans were not thinking in this way, and their world-view was more in
regards to what makes good governance, what justice means, and so forth. Also, unlike the European
powers, the Ottoman domains and its configuration were very different from that of the imperial
Empires, such as Britain and France. It is fair to assume that in regards to technology the Ottomans
could have been faster, but the Capitalist world order had placed the Ottomans in a tight squeeze (Inacik
and Quataert, 1997). This was also happening to the world around them, so how were they to survive
as the world was becoming far more globalised under the pretext of colonialism? It is a given that a
series of failures led to the collapse of the Ottoman world. But what is not mentioned is that this was
not a gradual linear decline, rather it was a series of peaks and troths in which it seems that the 19th
century was showing some kind of renaissance in the ‘Islamicate’ world. Therefore, declines, such as
intellectual decline, political reconstruction, social decline and cultural decline, are re-examined (see:
Kafadar, 1999; Sajdi, 2007). Nevertheless, most people are interested in the political collapse of the
Ottoman centre., which wasn't due to decline but simply a series of bad decisions and miscalculations
in the war. World War One devastated the world order, the Ottomans were not the only victims of that.
The Bolshevik revolution, the collapse of the Austrian-Hapsburg, and the loss of influence of the British
in their colonies are all indications of this. No longer do contemporary Ottoman historians mention the
idea of decline. As suggested earlier, Cemal Kafadar's work on this is arguably the most influential.
Another question worth asking is that while Ottoman academics have started to state that the decline
paradigm as it is known is problematic, how is it that Islamic studies still uphold the decline paradigm?
Indeed, it took at least 500 years of continual transformation; with a period consisting of many political
models used by the Ottomans that was the key to their success. That said, Tezcan (2010) argues that
initially there was a first son to Istanbul method, but then, once the Janissary became an institution, they
more or less chose the leader, thus calling it the Second Empire.

The ‘Political’ and ‘Economic’ Factors

Amongst the many factors that steered the Ottoman Empire towards decline was its political and
economic retrogression. This is evident from the decentralisation of governmental power, the
unresolved problem of succession and incompetent leadership. Since the very transformation of the
Ottoman state, the sultan was given complete autonomy and jurisdiction over all governmental and
political roles (Palmer, 1992). This included overlooking the military, organising governmental
meetings, and the designation of job roles in government. Most importantly, the sultan, himself, would
lead military campaigns and partake in battles alongside the army. Furthermore, within the first 300
years of the Empire, the sultans would fulfil their duties with great pride and determination, since they
believed that they were ‘warriors of the faithful’. However, after Suleiman’s death, the sultans distant

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themselves from military and governmental tasks (Johnson, 2016). They gave preference to spending
time in consuming the luxuries and bliss of the palaces, and disregarded more important duties, like the
state and policy. This downfall began from Selim II (d. 1574) and, eventually, in 1683, Murad IV
became the last sultan to lead his army in battle. As a substitute, sultans appointed other members of
the military instead. Coinciding this, there remained a major drawback with regards to ‘succession’.
Traditionally, the next in line to the throne would have to compete amongst themselves to be chosen
after their father passed away. At times, ended in lengthy and bloody civil wars, which would have
harmful implications on the Empire’s stability. At other times, these skirmishes would be easily
avoided, as the father would himself appoint his successor. Eventually, Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-1617)
attempted to resolve this problem by coining a new apparatus of succession. Previous to Ahmed, the
sons of the sultan were given posts as regional governors until their father’s demise. Subsequently, this
experience would provide them with the appropriate and necessary skills to successfully rule the empire
after the sultan’s demise (Fieldhouse, 2006). However, Sultan Ahmed put an end to this pivotal training
process and tradition by restricting the potential candidates (sons) to the confinement and luxuries of
the palaces in Istanbul. Even though Ahmed’s scheme seemed plausible, it nevertheless had major
repercussions. As a result, the sultans, who would now come to rule, were inexperienced and
incompetent about government and policy. In addition, they became increasingly unaware and
neglectful of what it really meant to be a sultan, and the responsibilities that came with such a major
task. This was due to the time spent in the palaces enjoying its luxuries and pleasures. Besides all this,
the sultans were still in charge of public affairs and state policy. This, in turn, became a detrimental
factor to the empire’s stability, as the sultans would now make decisions based on lack of education and
training on how to correctly run an empire. Furthermore, this resulted in political destabilisation and
corruption. Concurrently, ministers (Viziers) were left without adequate leadership and instruction
(Lewis, 1968). Therefore, a state of ‘decentralisation’ started, with individual municipal authorities
taking precedence over the main government in Istanbul. This gave increasingly less revenue and
authority to the central government of Istanbul, whilst European countries were in the rapid process of
political and economic growth (Alkhateeb, 2017).

Another factor that led the empire to decline was its economic breakdown, or ‘modes of production’.
Throughout the empire’s history, the primary source of wealth and income was gained through
conclusive victories on the battlefield and from the large amounts of spoils of war taken from these
conquests (Duranoglu and Okutucu, 2009). However, as the borders of the empire grew, it became
increasingly difficult to gain more territory and, simultaneously, maintain and ensure that the state’s
economy remains on high ground. As a result, it did not take long till the empire’s main source of
economic income came to a complete halt. For the Ottomans, its technological advantage gave them
increased chances and greater power over their enemies to win battles. For example, the Ottoman
military was the first to use huge cannons to break through fortified city walls, and they soon developed

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transportable weapons, like rifles, which gave them the extra edge and decisive power. However, this
crucial advantage did not remain with the Ottomans for long, as Europe began to develop similar
weapons and technology. Further adding to this downfall was the Janissary brigade. Previously, the
Janissaries2 played a pivotal role in the Ottoman army; however, later on, corruption and bureaucracy
took precedence over them, which resulted in reduced effectiveness of the brigade during the 17th
century (Alkhateeb, 2017). The weakness and failure of the Ottoman army became apparent on three
accounts: firstly, during the 1592 siege of Vienna, whereby they were forced to return unsuccessful;
secondly, during the second siege attempt of Vienna in 1683; and, finally, during the treaty of Karlowitz
in 1699. Subsequently, the incapability of the Ottoman army to win further battles had a major impact
on the empire’s economy. Besides, it was the militaristic nature and legacy of the Ottomans that enabled
them to develop both economically and socially during 1300 to mid-1500s. Adding to the political and
economic decline was yet another aspect of inflation. In the 1500s, European countries, like England,
France and Spain, began to explore new sources of economic revenue from across the Atlantic, in the
lands of South America. As a result, these conquests brought for Europe a huge influx of gold and silver
(Fanani, 2013). Eventually, this impacted the Ottoman economy and, thus, resulted in a drastic increase
of inflation and devalued currency. Consequently, the Ottomans were weakening from three ends: the
end of Ottoman conquests and expansion of territory; European economic war against the empire; and,
the rise of an industrial revolution in Europe. As the Ottomans weakened socially, economically and
politically, they resorted to an alternative source of income. Eventually, in the 17th to 18th century, the
Ottoman Empire was forced into a series of agreements, primarily with the French: also, known as
‘capitulations’. In doing so, the Ottomans formed alliances and agreements with European nations. This
was due to the industrial revolution in Europe, and the ever-growing control over the economic industry.
These agreements were conducted based on the pretext of diplomatic and economic support. However,
soon afterwards, these agreements had negative implications for the Ottoman trade industry. In addition,
these agreements meant that French sovereignty and influence was overpowering the Ottoman lands in
all facets of life. For example, the Ottomans were deprived of the right and jurisdiction to enforce laws
on French citizens, even if they were to be within their territory. Later on, these series of agreements
came to be known as ‘Sick Man of Europe’ (Duranoglu and Okutucu, 2009).

Reform Attempts and the European economic war against the Empire

So far, this paper has mainly focused on the political and economic stagnation. The following section
will focus on an additional factor that contributed to the decline of the Ottoman Empire, reform and
nationalism. As the Ottomans went on a steep decline in the face of a powerful and growing European
nation, the Ottomans sensed that the key to success now only remains in complete emulation of

2
The Janissary corps consisted of Christian and Jewish boys; mainly from Caucasian origin race who
were converted to Islam, and eventually given important roles in the empire’s army and other
prestigious posts.

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European ideas and norms in all facets of life (Fromkin, 2009). Therefore, the age of a modernisation
and Tanzimat began. The Tanzimat system was a sequence of laws that attempted to modernise the
empire in the 19th century and was inaugurated by Mahmud II (r. 1808 – 1839), who began to manipulate
the state socially, politically and economically. He started with a cleansing of the well-established
Janissary corps, and then replaced them with a novel recruitment, known as the Niẓām-ı Cedīd, which
was formed primarily by Turkish citizens. Furthermore, the Ottoman traditional clothing changed to
Europe-style dress code. In essence, the reformist began to eradicate to religion from state in an attempt
to once again rescue the empire from decline (Lewis, 1958). That said, the Tanzimat reached its peak
and climax in the reign of sultan Abdülmecid (d. 1861), which finally dominated shariah-based law.
Ironically, in 1876, Abdülmecid II was not totally for the Tanzimat, and emphasised a Muslim
worldview of state reform.

Conclusion

To conclude, the decline of the Ottoman Empire was the gradual outcome of a complex and centuries-
long series of miscalculations, wrong decisions, and intellectual and technological stagnation. In
addition, there existed several more factors that led to the decline of the Ottoman Empire. From its
political and economic retrogression and corruption, to the issue of succession and governmental
decentralisation, both included corruption on a social and political level. Moreover, the stoppage of
military conquests and decisive victories in the battle put an end to the modes of production and the
main source of economic income. Likewise, the industrial revolution in Europe shifted state investment
from army and taking taxes to the private sector and factories. Thus, expansion of territory came to a
halt, with major defeat and loss over at the Mediterranean front. Ironically, all this occurred primarily
after Suleiman the Magnificent’s death. Nonetheless, as alluded to earlier, there still remains a large
gap in recent academic studies on Ottoman civilisation.

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