Table of Contents

1. BACANI V NACOCO G.R. No. L-6957, November 29, 1956...............................................................2

2. ARTURO B. PASCUAL v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, GR No. L-11959, 1959-10-31.........3
3. Calo v Fuentes...............................................................................................................................4
4. Central Bank v CA and Ablaza.........................................................................................................5
5. Zambales Chromite v. CA...............................................................................................................6
6. Malabanan v. Ramento..................................................................................................................7
7. Beautifont v. CA.............................................................................................................................8
8. Almine v CA....................................................................................................................................9
9. Qualitrans v Royal Class.................................................................................................................9
10. Industrial v CA............................................................................................................................11
11. Binamira vs. Garrucho (G.R. Nos. 91223-26)...............................................................................12
12. Sibayan v Minister of Natural Resources....................................................................................14
13. RP v Migrino...............................................................................................................................17
14. UST Faculty Union vs. NLRC........................................................................................................18
15. Madrigal v Lecaroz......................................................................................................................18
16. NAPOCOR v Presiding Judge.......................................................................................................20
17. Guilles v CA.................................................................................................................................21
18. Brett v IAC..................................................................................................................................22
19. Triste v Leyte State College.........................................................................................................24
20. Villa v Lazaro..............................................................................................................................25
21. Dimaisip v CA GR No. 89393.......................................................................................................26
22. Quisumbing v Gumban...............................................................................................................28
1. BACANI V NACOCO G.R. No. L-6957, November 29, 1956

FACTS:

Herein petitioners are stenographers in Branch VI of the CIF Manila.

In a pending civil case where the public respondents are involved, they requested for the
services of the stenographers and thereby paid them for the said transcript at the rate of P1 per
page, amounting to P714 in total.

However, upon inspecting the books of the corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the
payment of such fees and sought for the recovery of the amounts paid. Consequently, the AG
required the petitioners to reimburse the amounts invoking that the National Coconut
Corporation is a government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 which states that: “‘The Government of the Philippine Islands’ is a
term which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of
government are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective
in said Islands, whether pertaining to the central Government or to the provincial or municipal
branches or other form of local government.”, hence, exempted from the payment of the fees
in question.

ISSUE: Whether the NCC is a government entity and is exempted from the payments in
question?

RULING: The Court held No. Discussing, there are two-fold functions of the government namely:
constituent and ministrant. The constituent function refers to the bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature, while ministrant is more on public welfare like public works, education,
charity, health and safety. From such, we may infer that there are functions which our
government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed in our Constitution
and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to
promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people.

The NCC has that function because the corporation promotes certain aspects of the economic
life of the people. In short, NCC belongs to what we call the government-owned and controlled
corporation which is governed by Corporation Law.

Albeit the NCC performs governmental functions for the people’s welfare, however, it was
given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to
the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it
may exercise are concerned.
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term “Government of the Republic of the Philippines”
used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity
through which the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty,
and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether
they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government.

Therefore, NCC is not a government entity and is not exempted from the payment of fees in
question; petitioners are not subject to reimbursement.

Petition GRANTED.

2. ARTURO B. PASCUAL v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, GR No. L-

11959, 1959-10-31
G.R. No. L-11959 October 31, 1959
ARTURO B. PASCUAL, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent-appellee.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner-appellant was charged of maladministrative, abuse of authority, and usurpation of

judicial functions with the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija but the former filed a motion to
dismiss on the third charge based on the ground that said wrongful acts were committed during
his previous term of office and could not constitute as a ground for disciplining him during his
second term, however, the motion was denied. Petitioner filed a motion for consideration but
subsequently denied, hence the appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is legal to discipline an elective municipal official for a wrongful act
committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.

HELD:

The answer is No.

The Supreme Court resolved the case by resorting to American authorities and decided to deny
the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term. The Court ruled
that “offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish
cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in
proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification
from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed." The underlying
theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates
as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. "The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people."

3. Calo v Fuentes

Facts:
In a cadastral case of Calo v Fuentes, the Director of Lands rendered an opinion denying and
dismissing the former’s claim and contest against the homestead application of Fuentes and
ordered him to vacate the premises within 60 days from receipt of a copy of the opinion and
stating that, upon finality thereof, the homestead patent would be issued to Fuentes. His
request for reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands, Calo brought to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the case, who modified the opinion of the
Director of Lands, ordering Fuentes to reimburse Calo of the difference between the value of
the improvements that the latter introduced on the land in controversy and the value of the
consequential benefits derived by him therefrom.

Still dissatisfied with the opinion, Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines, but
withdrew it before the President could act thereon. He later filed in the Court of First Instance
of Agusan a petition for writs of certiorari and prohibitions with preliminary injunction praying
that the enforcement of the opinions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources be enjoined among others. For failure to state a cause of action, for lack
of jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the administrative remedies available to the petitioner
in the ordinary course of law, the Court resolves to dismiss as it hereby dismisses the herein
petition with costs against petitioner. The petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeal to the Courts
of Justice.

Held: Yes. The appellant’s contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter,
he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such
being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands, he had exhausted all the administrative
remedies, is unstable. The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is
tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal because the appeal to the
President is the last step he should take in an administrative case. Furthermore, a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when “there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”

In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resourcess to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy
available to the petitioner. Therefore, the judgment appealed from had already become final
and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed, with costs against petitioner-appellant.

4. Central Bank v CA and Ablaza

Facts:
This is a petition made by the Central Bank which was sentenced to pay respondent Ablaza
Construction and Finance Corporation for damages for breach of contract. In this case, it
appears that after going thru the process of usual bidding, CB awarded to Ablaza a construction
contract and allowed the latter to commence work. However, on a certain date the Bank then
refused to proceed with the project unless the plans were revised and a lower price were
agreed to by Ablaza.
Now CB raises the issue that there was no perfected contract between the parties as there was
no compliance with the requirement under Section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides that:
Section 607. Certificate showing appropriation to meet contract. — Except in the case of a
contract for personal service or for supplies to be carried in stock, no contract involving an
expenditure by the National Government of three thousand pesos or more shall be entered into
or authorized until the Auditor General shall have certified to the officer entering into such
obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof. xxx
CB contends that in view of such omission and considering the provisions of Section 608 of the
same code to the effect that "a purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements
of the next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void", "no contract between the petitioner
and respondent Ablaza Construction and Finance Corporation was ever perfected because only
the first stage, that is the award of the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, was
completed."

Issue:
WON the aforementioned provisions apply to the Central Bank so as to render void the contract
entered into by CB and Ablaza. No.

Is Central Bank part of National government? No.

Ruling:
It is of the court’s view that contracts entered into by petitioner Central Bank are not within the
contemplation of Sections 607 and 608. Immediately to be noted, Section 607 specifically refers
to "expenditure(s) of the National Government" and that the term "National Government" may
not be deemed to include the Central Bank. Under the Administrative Code itself, the term
"National Government" refers only to the central government, consisting of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the government, as distinguished from local governments
and other governmental entities and is not synonymous, therefore, with the terms "The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine Government", which are the
expressions broad enough to include not only the central government but also the provincial
and municipal governments, chartered cities and other government-controlled corporations or
agencies, like the Central Bank.
To be sure the Central Bank is a government instrumentality. But it was created as an
autonomous body corporate to be governed by the provisions of its charter, Republic Act 265,
"to administer the monetary and banking system of the Republic."As such, it may acquire and
hold such assets and incur such liabilities as result directly from operations authorized by the
provisions of this Act, or as are essential to the proper conduct of such operations." It has
capital of its own and operates under a budget prepared by its own Monetary Board and
otherwise appropriates money for its operations and other expenditures independently of the
national budget. It does not depend on the National Government for the financing of its
operations; it is the National Government that occasionally resorts to it for needed budgetary
accommodations. Its prerogative to incur such liabilities and expenditures is not subject to any
prerequisite found in any statute or regulation not expressly applicable to it. For these reasons,
the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code invoked by the Bank do not apply to it.

5. Zambales Chromite v. CA

Facts:
Secretary Gozon while he was still the director of mines dismissed the case filed by herein
petitioner Zambales Chromite Mining which sought to have the petitioner declared as the
rightful and prior locator of certain mining claims.
The said decision was appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. While
the appeal was pending, Gozon was appointed as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself from exercising appellate jurisdiction over a case which
he had decided as Director of mines, he consequently affirmed the said decision. The decision
of Gozon as Secretary was then assailed by Zambales but the RTC dismissed such on the basis
that disqualification of a judge to review his own decision under the rules of court does not
apply to administrative proceedings.
Issue: WON Gozon validly decided on a case on his appellate jurisdiction which he also had
decided while he was still Director of Mines. No.
Ruling:
It was void. The rationale behind it is the same as the prohibition of a judge which was later on
promoted to the CA to decide in its appellate jurisdiction a decision he made as a trial judge.
There can be no real review of the case as being human, a person is presupposed not to admit
that he committed an error.
In this case, the petitioners were deprived of due process, which means fundamental fairness,
when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines.
6. Malabanan v. Ramento

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They
sought and were granted by tile school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to
12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a
general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the
place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second
floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture. At 10:30 A.M., the same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and
continued their rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. They continued their
demonstration, giving utterance to language severely critical of the University authorities and
using megaphones in the process. There was, as a result, disturbance of the classes being held.
Also, the non-academic employees, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the
noise created. They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable
for holding an illegal assembly.
Then on September 9, 1982, they were formed through a memorandum that they were under
preventive suspension for one academic year for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal
assembly in front of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners
both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in a petition for mandamus with damages
against private respondents.

Issue: WON the suspension of the students for 1 academic year was violative of the
constitutional rights of freedom pf peaceable assembly and free speech?

Decision: Yes. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v. Bagatsing, 6 the invocation of the
right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free
speech has likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in the concept of freedom of
expression which is Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully, any matter of
public interest without censorship or punishment and which “is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing … of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state
has a right to prevent.” 7
It would be most appropriate then, as was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, 21 for this
Court to lay down the principles for the guidance of school authorities and students alike. The
rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or involving
public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless
there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a right
to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards
displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however,
by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired
being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of
work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violations of its terms, the
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. Petition Granted. One week
suspension had been served.

7. Beautifont v. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Aura Laboratories Inc and Beautifont Inc. are domestic corporations engaged in
manufacturing cosmetics and marketing their products. Both applied with the Board of
Investments for authority to accept permissible investments of 2 American – owned firms, Avon
Products and Manila Manufacturing Co., filed in accordance with RA 5455, Permissive
Investments Law, requires approval by BOI of a foreign national in a local corporation which
would exceed 30 % outstanding capital. BOI prepared the notice of application which was
published in Official Gazette and newspapers of general circulation.

Rustan Marketing Corporation and Holiday Cosmetics opposed it: 1) would conflict with the
Retail Trade Nationalisation Act, 2)would pose a clear and present danger of a monopoly in the
cosmetics industry, 3) would be made in an enterprise already adequately exploited by
Philippine national (4) were inconsistent with the Government’s Investment Priorities Plans as
well as declared national policies, and (5) would not contribute to a sound and balanced
development of the national economy. Notice of hearing published, inviting all interested
parties. At the hearing, Rustan and Holiday (R) alleged fatal jurisdictional defect in proceedings,
violation by the BOI of Section 7 of RA 5455 in that instead of requiring and causing publication
of the applications themselves, which is what in their view the cited provision directs- only
notice thereof had actually been published and posted. Officer of the Philippine Chamber of
Commerce and Industry also appeared to oppose the applications. Applications were eventually
approved, Certificate-of Authority was issued. Petitioner accepted the foreign equity
investment and transfer of stock made.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Investments has committed jurisdictional defect in
proceedings.
Ruling:

The consequent policy and practice underlying our administrative law is that of justice courts
should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no
evidence in support thereof of such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial.

The consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of justice
should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no
evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial
8. Almine v CA

FACTS: On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed an application for retention of her rice land or
for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform (MAR).

In an order dated February 13, 1986, then Minister Conrado Estrella denied petitioner's
application for retention.

On April 17, 1986, petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as to
whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his land-holdings are
appealable and could be reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian Relations and now by the
Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

ISSUE: won CA erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since under
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Held: Yes CA is vested with the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all decisions, resolutions, or
orders of quasi-judicial agencies except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.

The questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his
landholdings are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform
whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian
Relations. These cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR, now the
Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said
decision may be reviewed by the courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, as the case may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The Court of Appeals has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court
over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus.
Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals set aside and the records of the case
are remanded to said appellate court for further proceedings.

9. Qualitrans v Royal Class

Facts:
1. Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc., was the grantee of a certificate of public convenience
issued by the defunct Board of Transportation to operate a "garage (tourist) air-conditioned
service" from Manila t any point in Luzon
2. A decision by the BOT amended the certificate for garage service into one for limousine
tourist service for the transportation of all outgoing passengers of the Manila International
Airport

3. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by private respondent with Transcare, Inc., a duly
licensed limousine service operator and likewise, a holder of a certificate of public convenience.

4. By virtue of said sale, the franchise granted to Transcare, Inc. for the use of 40 units of tourist
cars was sold to private respondent.

5. On December 27, 1985, upon application filed for the approval of aforementioned sale, an
Order was issued by the Land Transportation Commission granting a provisional permit in favor
of private respondent (Annexes C and 3, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049); Annexes B and 3 CA-G.R. No.
10370-SP). The prefatory portion thereof states: The application filed in this case is for the
approval of sale made by TRANSCARE, INC., in favor of ROYAL CLASS LIMOUSINE SERVICE of the
Certificate of Public Convenience issued in Case Nos. 81-4405 and 82-415 authorizing the
operation of a TOURIST CAR (AIR-CONDITIONED) SERVICE within the New Manila International
Airport and from said place to any point in the Island of Luzon accessible to motor vehicle traffic
and vice-versa, involving the right to operate forty (40) units authorized therein. ... (Emphasis
supplied).

6. Petitioner argues that the application filed by private respondent was for the route from the
"New Manila International Airport to hotels and from said hotels to any point in Luzon
accessible to vehicular traffic and vice-versa", and not from the "New Manila International
Airport ... to any point in the Island of Luzon.”

7. Petitioner claims that respondent has been soliciting passengers from the New Manila
International Airport to transport them to any point in Luzon to the prejudice of petitioner's
business. 8. Essentially, petitioner’s main contention is that they should be the only business to
be offering that particular service. Issue: Is petitioner’s contention correct?

Held:
NO, it is not.

Ratio:

> Under the constitution, it is to the best interest of the public to have two or more companies
in the field to stimulate business and prevent monopolies pursuant to the constitutional
mandate of equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth, and regulation of
competition and prohibition of monopolies.

> the Court finds it "hard to conceive how it would be for the best interests of the public" 17, to
have one line only, "and how the public would be injured by the granting of the certificate in
question, for it must be conceded that two companies in the field would stimulate the business
> It is simply bellyaching to say that Royal Class had transcended the bounds of the certificate of
public convenience granted to it. What Qualitrans is plainly carping about is the threat the
Royal Class' certificate of public convenience poses on its foothold in the "limo" service
business. This is monopolism, plainly and simply, and we cannot tolerate it.

> There is no merit in the claims that Royal Class has been guilty of unfair competition. For
starters, its Certificate of Public Convenience has been duly issued. The CPC cannot therefore
be said to have been acquired through duress or deceit to warrant such a charge.

> Accordingly, Petitioner’s petition must be dismissed.

10. Industrial v CA

Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

FACTS:
Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. was granted a coal operating contract by the Government
through the Bureau of Energy Development for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern
Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for another coal
operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the
original two blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area."

IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal
supply-demand balance . . . the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC), which was already developing the coal deposit in
another area (Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to
MMIC. Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and
transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of
IEI's coal operating contract.

Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement
with damages against MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati.

The Trial Court ordered the rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement. In reversing the Trial
Court, the Court of Appeals held that the rendition of the summary judgment was not proper
since there were genuine issues in controversy between the parties, and more importantly, that
the Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under Presidential Decree
No. 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration,
exploitation and development of coal blocks. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission
of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks.
HELD:
No. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if
the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge
of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of
what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal
operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the
administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial
Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the
exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These
issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even
when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

11. Binamira vs. Garrucho (G.R. Nos. 91223-26)

In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of
General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been
removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure.

Facts:

In pursuant to a memorandum addressed to him by the Minister of Tourism, the petitioner

assumed office on on April 7, 1986.

On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition
of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity
as General Manager, approved by the President on the same date.

Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General
Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.

On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new
Secretary of Tourism.
On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum designating
him concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until the President can appoint a
person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.

Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this
memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently,
while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on
April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager
of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation.

Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
Philippine Tourism Authority

Held:

Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows:

SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General Manager shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless
sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as
such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)

Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold
the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority.
In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which
does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that
the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine
Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer.
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of
that discretion as an alter ego of the President.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption

being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment
and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him,
he cannot delegate his duties to another.
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer,
the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was
deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to
substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
“

The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the
Philippines when “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,” which was
true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds
that such acts shall be considered valid only if not ‘disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive,” as also happened in the case at bar.

With these rulings, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground.
His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not
acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be
and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that
could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).i•t•c-aüsl
In either case, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must be rejected.

The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was
being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister
Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at the time the designation was made. This
belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino later approved the composition of the PTA
Board of Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman because of his position
as General Manager of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the categorical
appointment required to be made by the President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism,
under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.

The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed
position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism
Authority.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.

12. Sibayan v Minister of Natural Resources

G.R. No. L-57665 July 2, 1990
ALEJA SIBAYAN VDA. DE PINEDA, et. al,petitioners,
vs.
The HON. TEODORO PEÑA, MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, et. al respondents.

CORTES, J.:

FACTS:
The "Ped" mining claim was located by Pedro Sibayan in January, 1932. After Sibayan's death,
his heirs Miguela and Aleja Sibayan executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement wherein they
waived their rights and interest over the "Ped" claim, among others, in favor of co-heir Feliza
Sibayan. Feliza then transferred said claims to Sofia Reyes.

The "Ullmann" mining claim was located by Elvira Carmelo in February, 1932, and was
subsequently transferred to Joseph Palengaoan.

In 1962, Reyes, Palengaoan and several others formed the KM. 21 Mining Association, later
converted into the KM. 21 Exploration Corporation, to which the members conveyed their
respective mining claims, including the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims. Ultimately, the claims were
assigned to the Baguio Gold Mining Company for operation.

During this time, an amended declaration of location for the "Ullmann" claim was registered.
On November 23, 1972, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. Q-17136 against Feliza Sibayan,
Sofia Reyes, KM. 21 Mining Exploration Corporation, et. al., with the Court of First Instance
claiming that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement from which private respondents derived
their ownership and possession over the "Ped" claim was maliciously falsified and prayed for
annulment of all subsequent transfers involving the mining claims.

During the pre-trial, the parties entered into an amicable settlement, agreeing, among others,
that: (1) private respondents will return to petitioners the disputed mining claims, including the
"Ped" claim (3) private respondents shall execute the necessary documents to reconvey the
mining claims to petitioners

Thus, the Court of First Instance rendered a decision on November 11, 1974 ordering the
parties to comply with the above settlement . However, petitioners filed with the Bureau of
Mines a letter-complaint against private respondents for alleged overlapping and
encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim over the "Ped" claim.

On January 10, 1977, the Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no
conflict between the "Ped" and "Ullmann" claims.

Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Development
Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the law were made applicable to
petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates compliance with certain requirements in order for
subsisting mining claims, such as the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the
Decree. Otherwise, mining rights to the claim will be lost. The requirements are embodied in
Sections 100 and 101, and Section 180 of the implementing regulations. Finding that petitioners
failed to comply with the above-cited provisions, respondent director declared its decision
against petitioners.

On appeal to the Minister of Natural Resources, petitioners argued that respondent Director
was without jurisdiction or exceeded his jurisdiction in ruling that they have lost their rights
over the "Ped" mining claim, since the case was only for overlapping or encroachment and the
question of whether they complied with the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463 was never
placed at issue in the pleadings. This was dismissed as well as petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the "Ped"
claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims

RULING:

Petitioners had filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau
of Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres. Decree No.
463].

Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural Resources, upon
recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue rules, regulations and orders
necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of the Decree. In accordance with the
statutory grant of rule-making power, the Department Secretary issued the Consolidated Mines
Administrative Order Implementing Pres. Decree No. 463.

It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies

the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies [People v. Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957); Director of Forestry v. Munoz,
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183]. In order to be valid, the administrative
regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, conform to the standards
that the law prescribes [People v. Exconde, supra, citing Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 727
(1940); Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221 (1940)], and must
relate solely to carrying into effect the general provisions of the law [U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, 29
Phil. 119 (1914)].

With these guidelines, Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as
basis for their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the
Department Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it does not
contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the coverage of the
Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to implement the general provisions of
the enabling law. It does not amend or extend the provisions of the statute [People v. Maceren,
G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450, citing University of Santo Tomas v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376 (1953)].

Neither can it be maintained that such an implementing rule results in a denial of procedural
due process, for it is axiomatic in administrative law that what the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be
heard [Catura v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-27392, January 30,1971, 37 SCRA 303,
citing De Borja v. Tan, 93 Phil. 167 (1953)]. In this case, petitioners were afforded the
opportunity to be heard on the validity of the "Ped" mining claim when they submitted rebuttal
evidence on appeal.

Section 128, being a valid implementing rule, has the force and effect of law. Thus, public
respondents were duly empowered to inquire into the validity of the mining claims involved in
the protest case, even if not raised in issue.

13. RP v Migrino

FACTS:

The New Armed Forces Anti-Graft Board (Board) under the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) recommended that private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) be
prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as
amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. The Board opposed. Private respondent filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro
Manila. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent because he is a “subordinate” of former President Marcos.
Respondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1,
2, 14 and 14-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth
beyond his legal means while Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own
alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the
petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent acted as a “subordinate” under E.O. No.1 and related
executive orders.

HELD:

NO. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. TRO was made permanent.

RATIO:

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is – [w]here general
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held
as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
The term “subordinate” as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate
family member, relative, and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business
associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O. No. 2.

The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private
respondent, without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate
prosecution agency.

14. UST Faculty Union vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 89885 August 6, 1990

Facts: Professor Tranquilina Marino was a member of the Faculty of Pharmacy of UST, upon
reaching the age of 65, UST allowed her to continue teaching for the school years 1986-1987
and 1987-1989. However, UST denied her extension of tenure for the school year 1988-1989.
Several other professors from other colleges of UST were also denied extension of tenure upon
reaching the age of 65.
The UST Faculty Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and against UST with the NLRC,
alleging that it violated Sec. 1, Article XII of the CBA, entered into in 1986, which provides
among others: a) that upon reaching the age of 65 years they may be granted extension of
tenure unless they are manifestly inefficient or incompetent or are otherwise removed for
cause; and that b) they shall continue to enjoy the usual benefits and privileges until the
extension of their tenure is validly denied by the university in consultation with the Union or
until they are separated from service. The NLRC dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Union
filed an appeal which was also denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON UST committed ULP in denying the extension of service of Prof. Marino.

Held: No. It is important to state that upon the compulsory retirement of an employee of
official in the public or private service his employment is deemed terminated. The matter of
extension of service of such employee or official is addressed to the sound discretion of the
employer. It is a privilege only the employer can grant.
The required consultation with the Union as provided in the CBA should be interpreted to mean
as one which is advisory in character and as such, the opinion of the Union is not binding on the
UST authorities. The final say as to the denial of extension of a retiree still rests with the
employer, UST.

15. Madrigal v Lecaroz

FACTS: On November 25, 1971, public respondents abolished petitioner-appellant Joventino

Madrigal's position as a permanent construction captain in the office of the Provincial Engineer
from the annual Roads Bridges Fund Budget for fiscal year 1971-1972 by virtue of Resolution
No. 204. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province and it
appearing that his position was not essential. Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service
Commission. He transmitted a follow-up letter to the Commission regarding his appeal. On
January 7, 1974, the Commission in its 1st Indorsement declared the removal of Madrigal from
the service illegal. On August 4, 1975, Madrigal sent a letter to the Provincial Board requesting
implementation of the resolution of the Commission and consequently, reinstatement to his
former position. However, the Provincial Board, denied Madrigal's request for reinstatement
because his former position no longer exists.

Madrigal then filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Marinduque against public
respondents for mandamus and damages seeking restoration of his abolished position in the
Roads and Bridges Fund Budget of the Province, reinstatement to such position; and payment
of his back salaries plus damages. The trial court issued an order dismissing the petition on the
ground that Madrigal's cause of action was barred by laches. Hence, this petition.

Madrigal alleges that the one (1) year period prescribed in an action for quo warranto is not
applicable in an action for mandamus because Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not provide
for such prescriptive period. The declaration by the trial court that the pendency of
administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the period of one (1) year within which to
file the petition for mandamus, should be confined to actions for quo warranto only. On the
contrary, he contends that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition sine qua non
before one can petition for mandamus.On the part of public respondents, they aver that it has
become an established part of our jurisprudence, being a public policy repeatedly cited by the
courts in myriad of mandamus cases, that actions for reinstatement should be brought within
one year from the date of dismissal, otherwise, they will be barred by laches. The pendency of
an administrative remedy before the Commission does not stop the running of the one (1) year
period within which a mandamus case for reinstatement should be filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may still be entitled to reinstatement

HELD: NO, he is already barred by laches.

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto
and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date
the petitioner is ousted from his position.

The Court noted that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be
instituted within the period of one year. This has been the law in the island since 1901, the
period having been originally fixed in Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190).The Court finds this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that
persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed should immediately
take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they
shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. There are weighty
reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for
persons claiming rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so
that public business may (sic) be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to
positions in the service must be discouraged.
The fatal drawback of Madrigal's cause is that he came to court out of time. As aforestated, it
was only after four (4) years and twenty (20) days from the abolition of his position that he file
the petition for mandamusand damages. This single circumstance has closed the door for any
judicial remedy in his favor.

And this one (1) year period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any administrative remedy
(Torres v. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436). Actually, the recourse by Madrigal to the Commission was
unwarranted. It is fundamental that in a case where pure questions of law are raised, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be
resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer of
orders involving questions of law would be an exercise in futility since administrative officers
cannot decide such issues with finality (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Drilon, et al.,
G.R. No. 82849, August 2, 1989, citing Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466;
Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143). In the present case, only a legal question is to be resolved,
that is, whether or not the abolition of Madrigal's position was in accordance with law.

16. NAPOCOR v Presiding Judge

NAPOCOR vs. PRESIDING JUDGE

Gr. No. 72477, October 16, 1990
FACTS:
The Province of Misamis Oriental filed a complaint with the RTC against NAPOCOR for the
collection of real property tax and special education fund tax in the amounts of P11,105,008.10
and P11,104,658.10, respectively, covering the period 1978 to 1984. NAPOCOR filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that PD 242 dated July 9, 1973 provides that disputes between
agencies of the government including GOCCs shall be administratively settled or adjudicated by
the Secretary of Justice. The petition to dismiss was denied. Respondent municipal corporations
relied on PD 464, entitled "THE REAL PROPERTY TAX CODE”. It was stated therein that in a
collection of real property tax through the courts, the delinquent real property tax shall
constitute a lawful indebtedness of the taxpayer to the province or city and collection of the tax
may be enforced by civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction. NAPOCOR filed before
the SC a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the civil case.

HELD:
P.D. 242 is a general law which deals with administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes,
claims and controversies between or among government offices, agencies and
instrumentalities, including GOCCs. The coverage is broad and sweeping, encompassing all
disputes, claims and controversies. P.D. 464 on the other hand, governs the appraisal and
assessment of real property for purposes of taxation by provinces, cities and municipalities, as
the levy, collection and administration of real property tax. It is a special law which deals
specifically with real property taxes. It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a
general law and a special law, the special law prevails. Here, the issue is clearly a legal one i.e.
which law applies. The conflict in the provisions on jurisdiction between P.D. 242 and P.D. 464
should be resolved in favor of the latter law, since it is a special law and of later enactment. P.D.
242 must yield to P.D. 464 on the matter of who or which tribunal or agency has jurisdiction
over the enforcement and collection of real property taxes. Therefore, respondent court has
jurisdiction to hear and decide the civil case.

17. Guilles v CA

Facts:
On September 2, 1980, the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision
declaring and recognising the preferential rights of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to explore,
develop and exploit and lease the area covered by her “MAMAKAR” mining claims situated at
Sitio Palasaan, Benguet. This decision was appealed by respondent to the Ministry of Natural
Resources. On October 6, 1982, respondent Minister of Natural Resources dismissed the
appeal. From this dismissal, heirs of John and Maria Guilles interposed an appeal on November
4, 1982 to the Office of the President, docketed therein as MNR Case No. 5096, but failed to
prosecute the same. Private respondents later filed their respective motions for reconsideration
which however, proved to be belated as the decision of respondent Minister had already
become final and executory. The finality of decision of respondent.

Minister of Natural Resources rendered another decision in the same MNR case number
5096 on June 25, 1984 reversing and setting aside the decision of October 6, 1982 and declaring
petitioner’s “MAMAKAR” claims as null and void ab initio.

On July 25, 1984, petitioner sought the reconsideration of the decision and prayed for a
statuesque order. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the Minister of
Natural Resources issued the status quo order on August 20,1984 and directed the respondents
to answer the motion within five days from the receipt of the order. However, none of the
respondents complied therewith.

On February 19, 1985, with the motion for reconsideration still unresolved, petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, before
this Court, docketed as G.R. no. 69937, for the nullification of the decision of respondent
Minister of Natural Resources dated June 25, 1984 and to restrain public respondent from
further proceeding in the said case. Petitioner contended that respondent Minister acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the respondent Court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s original action for
certiorari on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Held:
Yes. It is true that in our jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by law or required by
public interest, before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of justice, all remedies of
administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at the level should first
be exhausted by the aggrieved party. It is likewise true, however, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. Foremost among the exceptions is when the
assailed act, order or decision is patently illegal or was performed or issued without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court ruled that the decision in question, datedJune
25, 1984, is of such a defective nature. The decision it superseded, dated October 6, 1982, was
already final and executory, the belated motions for reconsideration by all the private
respondents in G.R. no. 74223 being patently time-barred. The heirs of Guilles did file a timely
appeal but they likewise failed to prosecute the same. It is obvious and indisputable, therefore,
that respondent Minister Pena gravely abuse his discretion in reversing his original decision
which precisely prompted June Prill Brett to forthwith invoke the jurisdiction of the courts.

18. Brett v IAC

FACTS:
On September 2, 1980, the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision declaring
and recognizing the preferential right of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to explore, develop,
exploit and lease the area covered by her "MAMAKAR" mining claims situated at Sitio Palasaan,
Barrio Suyoc, Municipality of Mankayan, Benguet. This decision was appealed by private
respondents to the then Ministry of Natural Resources.

On October 6, 1982, respondent Minister of Natural Resources dismissed the appeal. From this
dismissal, private respondents heirs of John and Maria Guilles interposed an appeal on
November 4, 1982 to the Office of the President, docketed therein as MNR Case No. 5096, but
failed to prosecute the same. Private respondents later filed their respective motions for
reconsideration which, however, proved to be belated as the decision of respondent Minister
had already become final and executory.

The finality of the decision notwithstanding, respondent Minister of Natural Resources

rendered another decision in the same MNR Case No. 5096 on June 25, 1984, reversing and
setting aside the decision of October 6, 1982 and declaring petitioner's "MAMAKAR" claims as
null and void ab initio.

On July 25, 1984, petitioner sought the reconsideration of the decision and prayed for a status
quo order. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the Minister of Natural
Resources issued the status quo order on August 20, 1984 and directed the respondents to
answer the motion within five (5) days from receipt of the order. However, none of the
respondents complied therewith.
On February 19, 1985, with the motion for reconsideration still unresolved, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, before this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 69937, for the nullification of the decision of respondent Minister
of Natural Resources dated June 25, 1984 and to restrain public respondent from further
proceeding in said case. Petitioner contended that respondent Minister acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering said decision.
On February 27, 1985, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals (then
Intermediate Appellate Court) for determination. On March 7, 1985, respondent court initially
dismissed the petition for being premature inasmuch as petitioner had an unresolved motion
for reconsideration pending in the Office of the Minister of Natural Resources.

On March 27, 1985, petitioner prayed for the reconsideration of the dismissal and informed
respondent court that her motion for reconsideration had been denied by the Minister of
Natural Resources on January 31, 1985, notice of which she received only on February 25, 1985.
Petitioner also filed with this Court on March 1, 1985 an addendum to the petition giving the
same information, not knowing that said petition had been referred to respondent court.
On April 10, 1985, respondent court reconsidered its decision dismissing the petition.
Nevertheless, it thereafter ruled against petitioner, holding that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and for which the petition must be dismissed. It cited Section 50,
Presidential Decree No. 463, as authority for its ruling, as follows: "Sec. 50. Appeals - Any party
not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may within five (5) days from receipt
thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are likewise appealable within five
(5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the President of the Philippines whose
decision shall be final and executory."

Corollarily, respondent court declared that it had no authority to grant petitioner's prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the questioned
decision as it is precluded from doing so by Presidential Decree No. 605, thus: "SECTION 1. No
court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the
issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the
proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents or public grants
of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or
development of the natural resources of the Philippines."
Hence, the instant petition

ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent court erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari of
the heirs of John Guilles, Sr.

RULING: Even conceding that the pleading filed by the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. with this Court
was only a manifestation and not a petition to annul the order of Minister Maceda, it is of
record that said heirs have a perfected and pending appeal with the Office of the President.
Whether the appeal was perfected by filing a formal notice of appeal or a mere unsworn and
unsubscribed personal letter is of no moment. The fact is that the Office of the President has
taken cognizance of the case as one for its appellate review and has in fact ordered the parties
to file their respective memoranda therein. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts
cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of
the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact and where a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered. (Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service, Et Al., G.R.
Nos. 79886-87, November 22, 1989). Applying the principle in the case at bar, respondent court
correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari of the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. on the ground that
there is a pending appeal filed by said heirs in the Office of the President. Indeed, the award of
mining claims is more of an executive, and less of a judicial, function. Also, the issue as to the
validity of the authority under which then respondent Minister Ernesto Maceda issued the
order of June 10, 1986, which reversed the void decision of June 25, 1984, can be competently
determined by the executive department at the initial stage of the quasi-judicial proceeding
therein.

19. Triste v Leyte State College

Facts: For two (2) years, Petitioner discharged her duties and functions as vice-president of the
college. However, from the time when Magdalena S. Remo retired as President of the college,
there was a total revamp in the composition of the Board of Trustees. Dr. Purificacion M. Flores
was designated officer-in-charge and later appointed as the new College President. Anticipating
moves to replace her as vice-president, petitioner submitted to the Board of Trustees a position
paper, asserting that the Board could not appoint a vice-president because the position was not
vacant, the vice-president's term was not co-terminous with that of the recommending
president who had retired, and the incumbent was not replaceable at the pleasure of the
Board. In fact, she stated therein that she is qualified for the college presidency. Petitioner’s
apprehension were proved right by later development. She received a letter from President
Flores assigning her to another position. Alleging that the appointment of Dr. Crescencia V.
Chan-Gonzaga to the position of vice-president in effect eased her out of said position. She
contended that her constitutional and legal rights to security of tenure had been violated. She
alleged therein that since her ouster as vice-president, she had been demoted to the position of
Director of Research and that the 20% salary increase granted to all academic personnel of
government schools was not given to her because under the plantilla approved by the Office of
Budget and Management, her salary was reduced by one step since she was no longer the
college vice-president. She argued that she was terminated and stripped of her rank and status
without legal cause and due process. Private respondent Dr. Gonzaga and public respondent Dr.
Flores contend that petitioner was merely "designated" and not "appointed" to the college
vice-presidency. They aver that petitioner's "designation" to said position was "purely an
internal arrangement which does not require the approval or confirmation by the Civil Service
Commission." 19 They maintain that petitioner's term of office being co-terminous with that of
the retired college president, petitioner may not complain that she was illegally dismissed from
the vice-presidency.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was merely designated or permanently appointed
Held: While in a line of cases, the term “APPOINT” applied to the nomination or designation of
an individual. Common usage, however oftentimes puts a distinction in such that
“APPOINTMENT” connotes permanency, while “DESIGNATION” implies temporariness.
A public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional duties while he
perform the functions of his permanent office; or in some cases, a public officer may be
“designated” to a position in an acting capacity
However in this case, The court ruled that the laws contemplate of a duly appointed vice
president. As such, petitioner could be removed only for justifiable reason and such and after
she was accorded due process.

Executive Order No. 17 was issued by the President on May 28, 1986 "to obviate unnecessary
anxiety and demoralization among the deserving officials and employees, particularly in the
career civil service“
Section 1 thereof provides that separation or replacement of officers and employees shall be
made "only for justifiable reasons". For its purposes, a state college is considered a ministry.
"SEC. 3. The following shall be the grounds for separation/replacement of personnel:
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as
determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or
his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service."

WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED and the IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of
petitioner with backwages to the position of vice-president of the Leyte State College is hereby
ordered.

20. Villa v Lazaro

ANITA VILLA vs. MANUEL LAZARO G.R. No. 69871 August 24, 1990

FACTS:
Anita Villa was granted a building permit to construct a funeral parlor at Santiago Boulevard in
Gen. Santos City. The permit was issued by the City Engineer, that the "project was in
consonance with the Land Use Plan of the City and within the full provision of the Zoning
Ordinance". Villa commenced construction of the building.

As the funeral parlor was nearing completion, a suit for injunction was brought against Villa by
Dr. Jesus Veneracion, the owner of St. Elizabeth Hospital, alleging that the construction is
violative of the Zoning Ordinance. Veneracion's complaint was dismissed. Veneracion did not
appeal from this adverse judgment which therefore became final. Instead, he brought the
matter up with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. He lodged a complaint with
that commission praying "that the funeral parlor be relocated because it was near the St.
Elizabeth Hospital and Villa failed to secure the necessary locational clearance".
Two months after the rendition of the judgment against Veneracion, Villa received a telegram
from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, requesting transmittal of proof of
locational clearance granted by the office regarding the on going construction of a funeral
parlor. Villa sent Dizon a reply telegram the certification from the City Planning and
Development Coordinator. Villa received a "Show Cause" Order requiring her to show cause
why a fine should not be imposed on her or a cease-and-desist order issued against her for her
failure to show proof of locational clearance. The order made no reference whatever to the
documents she had already sent by registered mail. The following day Villa sent a telegram that
she has mailed the documents.

She received an Order of Commissioner Dizon imposing on her a fine of P10,000.00 and
requiring her to cease operations until further orders from his office. Commissioner Dizon
denied the reconsideration. Villa then filed an appeal with "the Commission Proper, which
denied.

ISSUE: Whether Villa was denied due process

HELD:
Yes. There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held out as an administrative
proceeding against Villa without informing her of the complaint which initiated the case; for
conducting that inquiry in the most informal manner by means only of communications
requiring submission of certain documents, which left the impression that compliance was all
that was expected of her and with which directives she promptly and religiously complied;
assuming that one of the documents thus successively submitted had been received, but given
the fact that on at least two occasions, their transmission had been preceded by telegrams
announcing that they would follow by mail, for failing to call Villa's attention to their non-
receipt or to make any other attempt to trace their whereabouts; for ruling against Villa on the
spurious premise that she had failed to submit the documents required; and for maintaining to
the very end that pretense of lack of compliance even after being presented with a fourth set of
documents and the decision in the court case upholding her right to operate her funeral parlor
in its questioned location.

Petitioner is plainly the victim of either gross ignorance or negligence or abuse of power, or a
combination of both. All of the foregoing translate to a denial of due process against which the
defense of failure to take timely appeal will not avail.

The Court will not permit the result of an administrative proceeding riddled with the serious
defects already pointed out to negate an earlier judgment on the merits on the same matter
regularly rendered by competent court.

21. Dimaisip v CA GR No. 89393

Facts: Petitioner was tried for and convicted of illegal possession of marijuana. The CA admitted
in evidence the marijuana seized from him and affirmed his conviction.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may object to the admissibility of the evidence against him
during this appeal.

Ruling: No. Objections of the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility of the
evidence obtained thereby were deemed waived when no objection to the legality of the
search warrant was raised during the trial of the case nor to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained through said warrant.

Decision appealed from is affirmed.

Dimaisip v CA

FACTS:

The late Geronimo Destacamento filed his application for a fishpond permit on 01 April 1927.
Before his death, Destacamento, without the knowledge and consent of the Director of
Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in gavor of Seragin Villanueva –
an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the permit granted him. Nevertheless, the
Director of Forestry requested Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots, but
the latter neglected and failed to do so.

Gaudencio Demaisip then filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit
application for the same lots. He complied with all the prerequisites necessary for the issuance
of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting a surety bond in the
sum of P350. When said fishpond permit was ready to be issued to Demaisip, Villanueva
executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favour of Luis Buenaflor who started to
occupy the land and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a big dam.
The Director of Fish and Game Administration decided that Demaisip be given due course upon
payment of an additional rental of P16 which is 1% of the value of improvements assessed at
P1,600. However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the said
decision. Demaisip then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over the said case, due to the fact that
Demaisip had not exhausted all administrative remedies before approaching the judiciary.

HELD:

It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agreculture and
Natural Resources to the President, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking
court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of
the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of
the President, unless disapproved by the latter. It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff’s
action should not be entertained.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that there is interference of the courts with the acts of executive
officers for such defense might only be valid in special civil actions – this is not one – wherein
the petitioner must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.

22. Quisumbing v Gumban

G.R. No. 85156 February 5, 1991

HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, et. al, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LUIS GUMBAN, et. al, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

FACTS:

On or before 1979, private respondent Esther B. Yap was appointed District Supervisor of the
Bureau of Public Schools and assigned to the District of Glan, South Cotabato. On 1987,then
Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing issued a Memorandum Order, directing Regional Director Teofilo
E. Gomez to reassign or transfer Esther B. Yap to another district. The latter in turn issued a
Memorandum Order to the principals and headteachers of different public schools at Glan
informing them of his assumption of office. However, private respondent Esther B. Yap defied
the orders of her superiors and she continued to perform the functions of public school district
supervisor of Glan.

On February 20, 1987, Yap filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction/restraining order with the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City against the Hon.
Lourdes R. Quisumbing, et al. who filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, which was denied by
respondent Judge Manuel Luis Gumban in his order. On August 25, 1987, said Judge issued
another order granting the Writ of Preliminary injunction and denied Quisumbing et al.'s
motion for reconsideration. Quisumbing, et al. assailed the aforesaid orders on the ground that
Esther B. Yap failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies. On the other hand, Yap
argued that the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable to the
case at bar as the Memorandum Order issued by the petitioners, Lourdes Quisumbing and
Teofilo Gomez dated February 11, 1987 and February 12, 1987, respectively, would readily
show that the basis for the issuance of the orders are the unverified demands of alleged
concerned citizens without the benefit of investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in the case
at bar.

RULING:

The answer is NO.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that the appointment of private
respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which
does not indicate a specific station. As such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not
entitled to stay permanently at any specific station. Finally, the lower court did not err in taking
cognizance of the case. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and
fact rule. It has been repeatedly held that the requiring previous exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one: where the
controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction; where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter; where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; or where the respondent has acted in utter
disregard of due process. The rule does not apply where insistence on its observance would
result in nullification of the claim being asserted; and when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy.

In the instant case We deem it more felicitous and expedient to resolve the same on the merits
to avoid multiplicity of suits since after all the circumstances warrant a final disposition of this
petition, namely the granting thereof because private respondent had previously been
appointed as district supervisor, without indicating any specific place as her permanent station.
Her status was therefore akin to that of a district supervisor at large. Her transfer was neither
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious.