1. Rebusquillo vs. Spouses Gualvez (G.R No.

204029, June 4, 2014)

FACTS: On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador
Orosco (Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 2002 before the court a
quo. In it, petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio) and
Victoria Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by his wife Victoria, six
legitimate children, and one illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo, petitioner
in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco, the mother of petitioner Salvador; (3) Rosalino
Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5) Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham Abarientos; and (7) Carlos
Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30, 1983.

On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City consisting of two
thousand eight hundred sixty-nine(2,869) square meters, more or less, which was covered by
Tax Declaration ARP No. (TD) 0141.

In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her daughter Emelinda
Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in
this case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only
in 2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.

As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them, Avelina sought the
intervention of the RTC to declare null and void the two (2) documents in order to reinstate TD0141
and so correct the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.

In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
and the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling of the subject property. Paragraph 9
of their Answer reads:

Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the other heirs of Eulalio Abarientos
brought out the idea to [respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez to have the property described in
paragraph 8 of the complaint registered under the Torrens System of Registration. To facilitate the
titling of the property, so that the same could be attractive to prospective buyers, it was agreed that
the property’s tax declaration could be transferred to [respondents] Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez
and Domingo Gualvez who will spend all the cost of titling subject to reimbursement by all other heirs
in case the property is sold; That it was agreed that all the heirs will be given their corresponding
shares on the property; That pursuant to said purpose Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo with the
knowledge and consent of the other heirs signed and executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact, [petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was
given an advance sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) by [respondent] spouses and all
the delinquent taxes paid by [respondents]. 3

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina on the grounds that (1)
with regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and
was not therefore solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, Avelina did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to
facilitate the titling of such property.

trial court’s decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the CA arguing that the Deed of Sale
cannot be annulled being a public document that has for its object the creation and transmission of
real rights over the immovable subject property. The fact that Avelina’s testimony was not offered in
evidence, so respondents argued, the signature on the adverted deed remains as concrete proof of
her agreement to its terms. Lastly, respondents contended that the Complaint filed by
petitioners Avelina and Salvador before the RTC is not the proper remedy provided by law for
those compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of their inheritance

Pending the resolution of respondents’ appeal, Avelina died intestate on September 1, 2009 leaving
behind several living heirs  including respondent Emelinda.
5
In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted the appeal and reversed and set
aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication simply on petitioners’ allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio,
considering that issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings,
not in an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute
Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of
regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

ISSUE: WON there is a need for Separate Special proceeding to determine heirship in this
case.

HELD: NO. has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that
recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there
is a good and compelling reason for such recourse.  Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions
6

to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial.

in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending
parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense
with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole
heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court that
they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner
Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land. As confirmed by the RTC
in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby admitted the veracity of the following
facts during the pre-trial:

IV – UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in the Pre-Trial Order)

A. x x x

B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted the following facts:

1. Identity of the parties;

2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and be sued;

3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only surviving heir of deceased

spouses Eulalio and Victoria Abarientos;

4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a portion of the subject property;

5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina Abarientos;

6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a daughter of [petitioner] Avelina A.

Rebusquillo;

7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10, 1923;

8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate of the Deceased and Deed of

Absolute Sale executed by [petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo on the subject
property.  (emphasis supplied)
9

In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason that a resort to
special proceeding will be but an unnecessary superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly
rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed
out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of
the decedent. The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear
that self-adjudication is only warranted when there is only one heir:

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. –– x x x If there is only one

heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office
of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by
respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of representation of his mother.
Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is "the
only daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS AND VICTORIA
VILLAREAL."  The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the
10

inheritance left by her father invalid. The RTC did not, therefore, err in granting Avelina’s
prayer to declare the affidavit null and void and so correct the wrong she has committed.

In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of respondents was correctly
nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute
ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject to partition. Avelina, in fine,
did not have the absolute ownership of the subject property but only an aliquot portion. What she
could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent
from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to
transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of
Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.

2. Solinap vs. Locsin, Jr. GR. No. 146737, December 10, 2011)

DOCTRINE: A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of
which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, if there are material discrepancies
between them, the one entered in the Civil Registry General prevails.

FACTS: on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. 1 died
intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration" (docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased. He alleged, among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C.
Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned personal properties which include
undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided
mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin,
Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of
the decedent.

On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on January
13, 1992, which order was duly published, 2 thereby giving notice to all persons who may have
opposition to the said petition.

Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of
Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the
deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of administration. They
averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin,
who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name.

On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the
late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of
the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by
prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its
appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an
appearance and opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan
C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and
the deceased.

Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.

To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled
to be appointed administrator of the intestate estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked
as Exhibit "D")3 of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth records in
the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that
respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein,
as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent presented
Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court the
bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is
included.

Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C") 4 showing him and his mother,
Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph,
respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the
deceased.

In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is
spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil
Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8", 5 indicating that the birth of respondent was
reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the
late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on
October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live
Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand,
Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This scenario
dearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas,
a handwriting expert. He testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries.
He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the
bound volume of birth records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.

ISSUE: WON the Birth Certificates are Genuine

HELD: No. The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents — Certificate of
Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.

The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal 7 does not apply when there appears in the
record of the case some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been overlooked,
or the significance of which have been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of the
case.8 Here, the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that would have altered its
conclusion.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons preferred who are entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

"Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in

the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or
a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
 neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of a person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select." (Emphasis ours)

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person, thus:

"Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of

administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)

An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. 9 Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.10 In Gabriel v. Court of
Appeals,11 this Court held that in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of
the one to be appointed administrator.

Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse. In his
petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged
natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested person in the estate and is
considered as next of kin. But has respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural
son of the deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:

"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition;
it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely
tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment." 12 (Emphasis ours)

Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased, presented to the trial court his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of
the deceased.

Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D", the trial court made the following
findings, affirmed by the Appellate Court:

"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 in the name of Juan
E. Locsin, Jr., the original having been testified to by Rosita Vencer, exists in the files of the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of
an acknowledged natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with his mother was
summoned to attend to the burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the coffin of
the deceased with petitioner and his mother in the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial
that the standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in public document and may
also be called questioned document whereas in the certificate of live birth No. 477, the
signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was the original or primary evidence. The anomalous and
suspicious characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate of live birth as alleged by
oppositors was found was testified to and explained by Rosita Vencer of the office of the
Local Civil Registrar that they run out of forms in 1957 and requisitioned forms. However, the
 forms sent to them was the 1958 revised form and that she said their office usually paste the
pages of the bound volume if destroyed. All the doubts regarding the authenticity and
genuineness of the signatures of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious
circumstances of the bound volume were erased due to the explanation of Rosita Vencer."

This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.

Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the records of births from all
cities and municipalities in the Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil
Registrar General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover
several decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the Civil
Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a
regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any of these
employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record
originating from the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo City.

With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus,
in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial
court should have been presented by respondent.

The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature of Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the
testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.

The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's birth which
took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that
time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly
made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general
impressions of the existing records in that Office.

When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from
those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil
Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this
regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.

Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958
revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded,
Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so
the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." 13

The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain
how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or
almost (2) years earlier.

Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro
Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is
logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a
1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.

There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957 bound
volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound
volume, not sewn like the other entries.

The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the
alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein are typewritten,
while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other
certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion,
race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the
child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father,
but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.

When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to
state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder." As to why Exhibit "D" was not sewn or
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document, Exhibit "D", was merely
pasted with the volume.

Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the anomalous circumstances
surrounding Exhibit "D", she actually highlighted the suspicious circumstances surrounding its
existence.

The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not
respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and credence by the courts below.

The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of registrable
certificates and documents presented to them for entry to the Civil Registrar General, thus:

"Duties of Local Civil Registrar. — Local civil registrars shall (a) file registrable certificates
and documents presented to them for entry; (b) compile the same monthly and prepare and
send any information required of them by the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or
copies of any document registered upon payment of proper fees; (d) order the binding,
properly classified, of all certificates or documents registered during the year; (e) send to the
Civil Registrar-General, during the first ten days of each month, a copy of the entries made
during the preceding month, for filing; (f) index the same to facilitate search and identification
in case any information is required; and (g) administer oaths, free of charge, for civil register
purposes"15 (Emphasis ours)

In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by the Local Civil Registrar to the
Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept
by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not
identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals and
should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a spurious document.

Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother. In the same Exhibit
"8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that
he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.

In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar16 that:

"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly
prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth
certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any
information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the
information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed
only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child."
(Emphasis ours)

The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of
Appeals17 where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no
hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."

A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth
certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all
the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.

At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring
discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the
genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8"
recorded in the Civil Registry General.

Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin
cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,19 lest we recklessly set a very dangerous
precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate
of the deceased.

3. Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr. G.R No. 166520, March 14, 2008)

FACTS: Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001,
private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of
Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need
for a special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be
resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that
none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are
not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same
familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was
already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.

On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives
to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix

submission will be done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court as above-required. 3

More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents’ Urgent Ex-

parte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of
Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order 4 appointing
Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate, the fallo of which states:

Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby
GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special Administrator and shall
immediately take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon his
filing of a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court. 5

Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that
petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly
next of kin of the deceased.

On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC Executive
Judge, issued an Order6 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. 1avvphi1

ISSUE: WON petitioners should be declared administrator.

HELD: NO.

The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the
selection of a special administrator.13 The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of
Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is
not appealable.14

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.15

We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special
administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided against her appointment for the following reasons:

Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma
Tan in the latter’s capacity as de fact[o] administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the court
all money and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to the estate within five
days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to deposit in the same
account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the decedent. She was
likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background of the cash on hand, if any,
the expenses incurred in the course of her administration. The directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo
on March 18, 2002 or more than a year ago. On May 23, 2003, this Court, acting on the urgent
ex parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma Tan another ten days to comply with
the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all heirs be
that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not
satisfy the requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially
administer the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs .16 (Emphases
supplied.)

Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as special
administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as special
administrator of Gerardo’s estate, the latter’s appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of
judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.
On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the
court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 17 The Court of Appeals could not have
reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.
Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-petitioner
Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice to serve as the special
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare assertions, both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial
requirements after the lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against her
appointment.

We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as
regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as
special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally
administer Gerardo’s estate.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule
78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may
take over administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a regular
administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in
granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the
event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any
cause.18 The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate
until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors
and heirs.19

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a
special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with
the directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner
Vilma were still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has
been brought about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials.
Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives
of the RTC to deposit with the court the income of Gerardo’s estate and to provide an
accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardo’s estate had no income. This defense is clearly
specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma’s non-compliance. If the estate truly did not
have any income, petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of
continuing to disregard the court’s orders.

Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is no longer any need
to discuss petitioners’ arguments regarding the denial by the appellate court of their prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

4. Silverio, Jr. vs. CA, GR No. 178933, September 16, 2009)

FACTS: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz
Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for
the settlement of her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 entitled In Re:
Estate of the Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al. pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC).

On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to
remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November 22,
2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.
as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.

On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio,
Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.

On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.

On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person
to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz
Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court. 3
Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order 4 affirming its Order dated January 3,
2005 and denying private respondent’s motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC
also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his
duties as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-
Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the order.

Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005.

On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15, 2005 5 of the
Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005, which was
received by private respondent on December 22, 2005.

Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005 6 also recalled its previous order
granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio
and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.

From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC also
allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to
partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. Among the
properties authorized to be sold was the one located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. 7

Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5,
20068 from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January 20,
20069 was filed on January 23, 2006.

Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution 10 against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the
Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order 11 denying the appeal on the ground that it was not
perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises of
the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of execution was later issued
on April 17, 200712 and a Notice to Vacate13 was issued on April 19, 2007 ordering private respondent
to leave the premises of the subject property within ten (10) days.

ISSUE: WON Nelia had authority to take possession over the estate.
HELD: NO. In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on
the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the
issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in
mind that until the estate is partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the
estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. 22 (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is
part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to
note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver
properties of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of
the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after the payment of
the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by
the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties
included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator
may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of
the Court.

In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured
from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had
any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.
As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and,
therefore, not subject to an appeal. 1avvphi1

Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. 23

The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary
period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case.
This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order
of the RTC.

5. Manungas vs. Loreto, G.R No. 193161, August 22, 2011)

FACTS: Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children. Instead,
they adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate
on May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. 4 Avila was survived by his wife
Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.

Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix.
There, she stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas
except for herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son
of Florentino Manungas.5 Meanwhile, Avila’s widow executed a Waiver of Rights and
Participation on October 29, 1980, renouncing her rights over the separate property of her
husband in favor of Engracia Manungas. Thereafter, a Decree of Final Distribution was issued in
the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia
Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving heirs. 6

On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreño, the niece of Engracia
Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent aunt. 7

Engracia Manungas, through Parreño, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the
spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed
that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas. However, the answer was filed
beyond the reglementary period and was not considered by the MTC. Thus, the MTC issued a
summary judgment in favor of Engracia Manungas, ordering the spouses to vacate the premises and
to restore possession to Engracia Manungas. The Decision was appealed by the spouses Salinas to
the RTC of Tagum, Davao City which affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC. 8 On appeal to this
Court, defendants’ petition was denied for having been filed out of time in a Resolution which became
final on April 20, 1998.9

Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before
the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. 10 The petition was opposed by Margarita
Avila Loreto (Loreto) and Parreño alleging that Diosdado was incompetent as an administrator of the
Estate of Manungas claiming that he was not a Manungas, that he was not an heir of Engracia
Manungas, he was not a creditor of Engracia Manungas or her estate and that he was in fact a
debtor of the estate having been found liable to Engracia Manungas for PhP 177,000 by virtue of a
Decision issued by the MTC in Civil Case No. 5196-96. On May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order
appointing Parreño as the administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
ISSUE: WON the RTC was correct when it ruled to annul the appointment of petitioner as judicial
administrator and reinstating the appointment of Perrnio as special administrator. (NO)

HELD: The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he
is entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.

Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion of
the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, 24 it was stated that:

It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the
appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to
causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2,
Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x x x As the law does not
say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have,
the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must
be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation
omitted.)

This principle was reiterated in the Ocampo case, where the Court ruled that:

While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their
appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the appointment.
It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the
rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its
discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness and the
application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as would be proper in the case of a
regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and
is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted.25 (Emphasis supplied.)

While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate,
such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and legal
principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special administrator is to
preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec. 2, Rule 80 of the
Rules:

Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. — Such special administrator shall take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and
preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may
commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property
as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased
unless so ordered by the court. 1avvphi1

Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to the
heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that would
effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart from such
reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the estate and
otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia Manungas’
estate:

In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreño as Special
Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdado’s contention that he is the illegitimate
child of the late Florentino Manangus. The evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not
related to the late Engracia and so he is not interested in preserving the latter’s estate . On the
other hand, Florencia, who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who
is also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of her late aunt
Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise administration of the decedent’s
estate. Hence, the Order of the lower court revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila
Parreño as special administrator constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower
court exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.26 (Emphasis supplied.)

To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be
remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings
that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the issuance of a
Decree of Final Distribution. 27 With the termination of the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia
Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a
debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint
him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing
Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the
November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.