You are on page 1of 150

Padmasri Dr.B.V.

Raju Institute of Technology

Switchgear & Protection

Prepared by

Prof.P.Paulclee
And
N.Ramchander Asst Professor
,

Department of

Electrical and Electronics .Engineering


 

PADMASRI DR. B.V.RAJU INSTITUTE OF


TECHNOLOGY
 

DEPARTMENT OF

ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING


 

Course Content  
 

Switchgear and Protection


 
Prepared By 

Prof.P.Paul Clee 
  
Mr.N.Ramchander 
Assistant Professor 
   

 
3

SWITCH GEAR AND PROTECTION

(SYLLABUS)

Objective :

This course introduces all varieties of Circuit Breakers and Relays for protection of
Generators, Transformers and feeder bus bars from over voltages and other hazards. It
emphasis on Neutral grounding for overall protection.

UNIT – I Circuit Breakers-1

Circuit Breakers: Elementary principles of arc interruption, Recovery, Restriking Voltage


and Recovery voltages.- Restriking Phenomenon, Average and Max. RRRV, Numerical
Problems - Current Chopping and Resistance Switching - CB ratings and Specifications
: Types and Numerical Problems. – Auto reclosures.

UNIT –II Circuit Breakers-2

Description and Operation of following types of circuit breakers: Minimum Oil Circuit
breakers, Air Blast Circuit Breakers, Vacuum and SF6 circuit breakers.

UNIT – III Electromagnetic and Static Relays

Principle of Operation and Construction of Attracted armature, Balanced Beam,


induction Disc and Induction Cup relays.
Relays Classification: Instantaneous, DMT and IDMT types.

Application of relays: Over current/ Under voltage relays, Direction relays, Differential
Relays and Percentage Differential Relays.

Universal torque equation, Distance relays: Impedance, Reactance and Mho and Off-
Set Mho relays, Characteristics of Distance Relays and Comparison. Static Relays:
Static Relays verses Electromagnetic Relays.

UNIT – IV Generator Protection

Protection of generators against Stator faults, Rotor faults, and Abnormal Conditions.
Restricted Earth fault and Inter-turn fault Protection. Numerical Problems on % Winding
Unprotected.

EEED-BVRIT
4

UNIT –V Transformer Protection

Protection of transformers: Percentage Differential Protection, Numerical Problem on


Design of CT s Ratio, Buchholtz relay Protection.

UNIT –VI Feeder and Bus-Bar Protection

Protection of Lines: Over Current, Carrier Current and Three-zone distance relay
protection using Impedance relays. Translay Relay. Protection of Bus bars – Differential
protection.

UNIT – VII Neutral Grounding


Grounded and Ungrounded Neutral Systems.- Effects of Ungrounded Neutral on
system performance. Methods of Neutral Grounding: Solid, Resistance, Reactance -
Arcing Grounds and Grounding Practices.
UNIT – VIII Protection against over voltages

Generation of Over Voltages in Power Systems.-Protection against Lightning Over


Voltages - Valve type and Zinc-Oxide Lighting Arresters - Insulation Coordination -BIL,
Impulse Ratio, Standard Impulse Test Wave, Volt-Time Characteristics.

TEXT BOOKS:
1. Switchgear and Protection – by Sunil S Rao, Khanna Publlishers

2. Power System Protection and Switchgear by Badari Ram , D.N Viswakarma, TMH
Publications

REFERENCE BOOKS:

1. Fundamentals of Power System Protection by Paithankar and S.R.Bhide.,PHI, 2003.


2. Art & Science of Protective Relaying – by C R Mason, Wiley Eastern Ltd.
3. Electrical Power Systems – by C.L.Wadhwa, New Age international (P) Limited,
Publishers, 3nd editon
4. A Text book on Power System Engineering by B.L.Soni, Gupta, Bhatnagar,
Chakrabarthy, Dhanpat Rai & Co.

EEED-BVRIT
5

Objectives of this Course

In this course, we plan to teach the following:

1. Fundamental principles of fuse and overcurrent protection and 
application to feeder and motor protection. 
 
2. Fundamental principles of distance relaying and application to 
transmission system protection. 
 
3. Fundamental principles of differential protection and application 
to transformer, busbar and generator armature winding protection. 
 
4. Role of Current and Voltage transformers in power system 
protection. 

5.  Relay  co‐ordination  in  transmission  and  distribution  system. 


 
6.  Introduction  to  Numerical  relaying.  DSP  fundamentals  like 
aliasing,  sampling  theorem,  Discrete  Fourier  Transform  and 
application  to  current  and  voltage  phasor  estimation.
 
7.  Numerical  relaying  algorithms  for  overcurrent,  distance  and 
differential  protection  with  application  to  transmission  system, 
transformer and bus bar protection.

EEED-BVRIT
6

Introduction
to
Power System Protection

EEED-BVRIT
7

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Need for protection:

A power system is not only capable to meet the present load but also has the flexibility to
meet the future demands. A power system is designed to generate electric power in sufficient
quantity, to meet the present and estimated future demands of the users in a particular area, to
transmit it to the areas where it will be used and then distribute it within that area, on a
continuous basis.
To ensure the maximum return on the large investment in the equipment, which goes to
make up the power system and to keep the users satisfied with reliable service, the whole system
must be kept in operation continuously without major breakdowns. This can be achieved in two
ways:

• The first way is to implement a system adopting components, which should not fail and
requires the least or nil maintenance to maintain the continuity of service. By common
sense, implementing such a system is neither economical nor feasible, except for small
systems.

The second option is to foresee any possible effects or failures that may cause long-
term shutdown of a system, which in turn may take longer time to bring back the system
to its normal course. The main idea is to restrict the disturbances during such failures to a
limited area and continue power distribution in the balance areas. Special equipment is
normally installed to detect such kind of failures (also called ‘faults’) that can possibly
happen in various sections of a system, and to isolate faulty sections so that the
interruption is limited to a localized area in the total system covering various areas. The
special equipment adopted to detect such possible faults is referred to as ‘protective
equipment or protective relay’ and the system that uses such equipment is termed as
‘protection system’.

EEED-BVRIT
8

1.2. Basic requirements of protection:

A protection apparatus has three main functions/duties:


1. Safeguard the entire system to maintain continuity of supply
2. Minimize damage and repair costs where it senses fault
3. Ensure safety of personnel.

These requirements are necessary, firstly for early detection and localization of faults,
and secondly for prompt removal of faulty equipment from service. In order to carry out the
above duties, protection must have the following qualities:

• Selectivity: To detect and isolate the faulty item only.


• Stability: To leave all healthy circuits intact to ensure continuity or supply.
• Sensitivity: To detect even the smallest fault, current or system abnormalities
and operate correctly at its setting before the fault causes irreparable
damage.
• Speed: To operate speedily when it is called upon to do so, thereby minimizing
damage to the surroundings and ensuring safety to personnel.

To meet all of the above requirements, protection must be reliable which means it must be:
• Dependable: It must trip when called upon to do so.
• Secure: It must not trip when it is not supposed to.

1.3 Basic components of protection

Protection of any distribution system is a function of many elements and this manual
gives a brief outline of various components that go in protecting a system. Following are
the main components of protection.
• Fuse is the self-destructing one, which carries the currents in a power circuit
continuously and sacrifices itself by blowing under abnormal conditions. These are

EEED-BVRIT
9

normally independent or stand-alone protective components in an electrical system unlike


a circuit breaker, which necessarily requires the support of external components.

• Accurate protection cannot be achieved without properly measuring the normal and
abnormal conditions of a system. In electrical systems, voltage and current measurements
give feedback on whether a system is healthy or not. Voltage transformers and current
transformers measure these basic parameters and are capable of providing accurate
measurement during fault conditions without failure.

• The measured values are converted into analog and/or digital signals and are made to
operate the relays, which in turn isolate the circuits by opening the faulty circuits. In most
of the cases, the relays provide two functions viz., alarm and trip, once the abnormality is
noticed. The relays in olden days had very limited functions and were quite bulky.
However, with advancement in digital technology and use of microprocessors, relays
monitor various parameters, which give complete history of a system during both pre-
fault and post-fault conditions.

• The opening of faulty circuits requires some time, which may be in milliseconds, which
for a common day life could be insignificant. However, the circuit breakers, which are
used to isolate the faulty circuits, are capable of carrying these fault currents until the
fault currents are totally cleared. The circuit breakers are the main isolating devices in a
distribution system, which can be said to directly protect the system.
• The operation of relays and breakers require power sources, which shall not be affected
by faults in the main distribution. Hence, the other component, which is vital in
protective system, is batteries that are used to ensure uninterrupted power to relays and
breaker coils. The above items are extensively used in any protective system and their
design requires careful study and selection for proper operation.

EEED-BVRIT
10

1.4 Summary

Power System Protection – Main Functions


1. To safeguard the entire system to maintain continuity of supply.
2. To minimize damage and repair costs.
3. To ensure safety of personnel.
Power System Protection – Basic Requirements
1. Selectivity: To detect and isolate the faulty item only.
2. Stability: To leave all healthy circuits intact to ensure continuity of supply.
3. Speed: To operate as fast as possible when called upon, to minimize
damage, production downtime and ensure safety to personnel.
4. Sensitivity: To detect even the smallest fault, current or system
abnormalities and operate correctly at its setting.
Power System Protection – Speed is Vital!!
The protective system should act fast to isolate faulty sections to prevent:
• Increased damage at fault location. Fault energy = I2 × Rf × t, where t is time in
seconds.
• Danger to the operating personnel (flashes due to high fault energy sustaining
for a long time).
• Danger of igniting combustible gas in hazardous areas, such as methane in coal
mines which could cause horrendous disaster.
• Increased probability of earth faults spreading to healthy phases.
• Higher mechanical and thermal stressing of all items of plant carrying the fault current,
particularly transformers whose windings suffer progressive and cumulative deterioration
because of the enormous electromechanical forces caused by multi-phase faults
proportional to the square of the fault current. Sustained voltage dips resulting in motor
(and generator) instability leading to extensive shutdown at the plant concerned and
possibly other nearby plants connected to the system.

EEED-BVRIT
11

Power System Protection – Qualities

Dependability
Security
Reliability

Dependability: It MUST trip when called upon.


Security: It must NOT trip when not supposed to.

Power System Protection – Basic Components

1.Voltage transformers and current transformers: To monitor and give accurate


feedback about the healthiness of a system.
2.Relays: To convert the signals from the monitoring devices, and give
instructions to open a circuit under faulty conditions or to give alarms when
the equipment being protected, is approaching towards possible destruction.
3. Fuses: Self-destructing to save the downstream equipment being protected.
Circuit breakers: These are used to make circuits carrying enormous
currents, and also to break the circuit carrying the fault currents for a few
cycles based on feedback from the relays.
DC batteries: These give uninterrupted power source to the relays and
breakers that is independent of the main power source being protected.

EEED-BVRIT
12

Unit-I
[Circuit Breakers –I]
 

EEED-BVRIT
13

Contents
1. Overview of Power system
2. Why protect?
3. Causes and types of faults
4. Factors influencing protection system design
5. Aspects of protection system
6. Zones of protection
7. Protection types and classes
8. Important consideration while applying protection
9. ANSI reference numbers
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
14

Contents
1. Overview of Power system
2. Why protect?
3. Causes and types of faults
4. Factors influencing protection system design
5. Aspects of protection system
6. Zones of protection
7. Protection types and classes
8. Important consideration while applying protection
9. ANSI reference numbers
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Components of a power system 15

EEED-BVRIT
© 2005. T.S. Sidhu
Components of a power system 16

EEED-BVRIT
Components of a power system 17

Generating power Phase A Phase B Phase C

120°
240°
360°

EEED-BVRIT
Components of a power system 18

Exporting power

Transmission
System

Load

AC Generator

EEED-BVRIT
Step-Up Transformer Step-Down Transformer
Components of a power system 19

Transmission System

EEED-BVRIT
Components of a power system 20

Transmission & Distribution

EEED-BVRIT
Components of a power system 21

Load

Transmission
Sub Station Voltage From
Power Company

EEED-BVRIT
Components of a power system 22

Generation to Load

EEED-BVRIT
Components of a power system 23

Distribution connection

Utility
Transformer Load Load
Center Center

Meter Meter
Transformer
From Utility
Service

Overhead Service Lateral Service


EEED-BVRIT
Components of a power system 24

Domestic load

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Components of a power system 25

Substation SLD at
Generation

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Components of a power system 26

Substation SLD at load


centre

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Components of a power system 27

MV Indoor distribution

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection – Why Is It Needed ? 28

All Power Systems may experience faults at some time.

PROTECTION IS INSTALLED TO :
Detect fault occurrence and isolate the faulted equipment.

SO THAT :
‰ Damage to the faulted equipment is limited;
‰ Disruption of supplies to adjacent un-faulted equipment is
minimized.

PROTECTION IS EFFECTIVELY AN INSURANCE POLICY - AN


INVESTMENT AGAINST DAMAGE FROM FUTURE FAULTS.

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection – Why Is It Needed ? 29

Faults on power systems risk :


Severe damage to the faulted equipment :
‰ Excessive current may flow;
‰ Causes burning of conductors or equipment windings;
‰ Arcing - energy dissipation;
‰ Risk of explosions for oil - filled switchgear, or when in hazardous
environments.

Damage to adjacent plant :


‰ As the fault evolves, if not cleared quickly;
‰ Due to the voltage depression / loss of supply. EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection – Why Is It Needed ? 30

Faults on power systems risk :


Danger to staff or the public :
‰ Risk of shock from direct contact with the faulted equipment;
‰ Danger of potential (voltage) rises in exposed metalwork –
accessible to touch;
‰ Fumes released by burning insulation;
‰ Burns etc.

Disruption to adjacent plant :


‰ Prolonged voltage dips cause motors to stall;
‰ Loss of synchronism for synchronous generators / motors.
EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection – Why Is It Needed ? 31

Summary :

Protection must :
‰ Detect faults and abnormal operating conditions;
‰ Isolate the faulted equipment.

‰ So as to :
‰ Limit damage caused by fault energy;
‰ Limit effect on rest of system.

EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Power System Faults - Causes 32

‰ Lightning
‰ Wind
‰ Ice and Snow storm
‰ Flying objects
‰ Contamination of insulators
‰ Physical contact by animals
‰ Human errors
‰ Falling trees
‰ Insulation aging

EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Power System Faults - Causes 33

Underground Cables

‰ Diggers
‰ Overloading
‰ Oil Leakage
‰ Ageing

EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Power System Faults - Causes 34

Overhead Lines

‰ Lightning
‰ Kites
‰ Trees
‰ Moisture
‰ Salt
‰ Birds
‰ Broken Conductors

EEED-BVRIT
Power System Faults - Causes 35

Machines

‰ Mechanical
Damage
‰ Unbalanced Load

EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Types of Fault 36

a
b
Ø/E
c
e

a
b
Ø/Ø/E
c
e

a
b
Ø/Ø
c

a a
3Ø b b
c 3Ø/E c
e EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Types of Fault 37

Cross country fault

a a'
b b'
c
c'

e e

EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Types of Fault 38

Open circuit + ø/e

a
b
c
Fault between adjacent
e parallel Lines

EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Types of Fault 39

Changing fault in cable

b c

EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Voltages And Currents During Faults 40

Fault

Fault Currents

5000
4000
3000
2000
Ia
1000
Ib
Amps

0
Ic
-1000
-2000 In

-3000
-4000
-5000
Time

EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Voltages And Currents During Faults 41

Fault

Fault Voltages

600

400

200
Va
Volts

0 Vb
Vc
-200

-400

-600
Time

EEED-BVRIT
RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Factors Influencing Protection System Design42

‰ Types of fault and abnormal conditions to be


protected against

‰ Quantities available for measurement

‰ Types of protection available

‰ Speed

‰ Fault position discrimination

‰ Dependability / Reliability

‰ Security / Stability
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Factors Influencing Protection System Design43

‰ Overlap of protections

‰ Phase discrimination / Selectivity

‰ Instrument transformers (CTs & VTs)

‰ Auxiliary supplies

‰ Back-up protection

‰ Cost

‰ Duplication of protection

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Aspects of Protection System 44

‰ Reliability

‰ Speed

‰ Discrimination (Zones, Phases)

‰ Simplicity

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection Aspects - Reliability 45

R1 R2 R3 R4
G1 G2
F

‰ Reliability
‰ Security
‰ Dependability

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection Aspects - Reliability 46

Security Dependability

AND OR

1 2 1 2

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection Aspects - Reliability 47

R1 R2 R3 R4
G1 G2
F

‰ Reliability
‰ Dependability
‰ Security

D S

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection Aspects - Reliability 48

‰ Dependability / Reliability
‰ Protection must operate when required to
‰ Failure to operate can be extremely
damaging and disruptive
‰ Faults are rare : Protection must operate
even after years of inactivity
‰ Improved by use of : Back-up protection
and duplicate protection
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection Aspects - Reliability 49

‰ Security / Stability

‰ Protection must not operate when not

required to, e.g. due to:

‰ Load switching

‰ Faults on other parts of the system

‰ Recoverable power swings

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection Aspects - Speed 50

Speed

Milliseconds Count
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection Aspects - Speed 51

‰ Speed

Fast operation :
‰ Minimizes damage and danger

Very fast operation :


‰ Minimizes system instability
‰ Discrimination and security can be costly to
achieve as it generally involves additional
signaling / communications equipment.

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Protection Aspects - Speed 52

Speed

Catastrophic
D Damage
a
m Steel
a Copper
g
e Cable

100 200 300 500


Time (ms)
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Fault Discrimination - Zones Of Protection 53

‰ Fault Position Discrimination

‰ Power system divided into PROTECTED


ZONES

‰ Must isolate only the faulty equipment or


section

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Fault Discrimination - Zones Of Protection 54

Busbar
Protection Busbar
Protection

G Trf G
Line
Protection
Generator Generator
Protection Protection

M
Motor
Protection

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Zones of Protection - Protection Overlap 55

‰ Overlap of Protections

‰ No blind spots

‰ Where possible use overlapping CTs

EEED-BVRIT
Zones of Protection - Protection Overlap 56

BBP BBP
‘1’ ‘2’

H J

‘Z’

G LP LP K L
‘H’ ‘J’

LP LP
‘K’ ‘L’

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Fault Discrimination - Phases 57

‰ Phase Discrimination

‰ Correct indication of phases involved in the

fault

‰ Important for single phase tripping and auto-

reclosing applications

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Example 1 – Dependability / Security 58

R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7 F
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4

‰ Directional relays provided as shown


‰ Breakers marked as shown
‰ Fault at F

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Example 1 – Dependability / Security 59

R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7 F
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4

‰ Resulted in operation of R1, R2, and R5, which in turn tripped their
respective breakers
‰ Was there loss of dependability or security?

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Example 1 – Dependability / Security 60

R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7 F
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4

‰ Resulted in operation of R1, R2, and R5, which in turn tripped their
respective breakers
‰ Was there loss of dependability or security?
‰ Yes, relay R5 lost its security for this fault
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Example 2 – Zone discrimination 61

R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4

‰ System as shown with relays and breakers marked

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Example 2 – Zone discrimination 62

R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4

‰ System as shown with relays and breakers marked


‰ A single fault has resulted in the operation of breakers B1, B2, B3
and B4.
‰ There was no loss of security or dependability
‰ Identify the location of the fault EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Example 2 – Zone discrimination 63

R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4

‰ Fault in the overlap zone at breaker B2 as shown

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Cost 64

‰ The cost of protection is equivalent to an insurance policy against

damage to plant, and loss of supply and customer goodwill.

‰ Acceptable cost is based on a balance of economics and technical

factors. Cost of protection should be balanced against the cost of

potential hazards.

‰ There is an economic limit on what can be spent.

‰ MINIMUM COST : Must ensure that all faulty equipment is

isolated by protection.
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Cost 65

‰ TOTAL COST should take account of :

‰ Relays, schemes and associated panels and panel wiring

‰ Setting studies

‰ Commissioning

‰ CTs and VTs

‰ Maintenance and repairs to relays

‰ Damage repair if protection fails to operate

‰ Lost revenue if protection operates unnecessarilyEEED-BVRIT


N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Cost 66

‰ DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
‰ Large numbers of switching and distribution points,
transformers and feeders

‰ Economics often overrides technical issues

‰ Protection may be the minimum consistent with statutory safety


regulations

‰ Speed less important than on transmission systems

‰ Back-up protection can be simple and is often inherent in the


main protection

‰ Although important, the consequences of mal-operation or


EEED-BVRIT
failure to operate is less serious than for transmission systems
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Cost 67

‰ TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS
‰ Emphasis is on technical considerations rather than economics
‰ Economics cannot be ignored but is of secondary importance
compared with the need for highly reliable, fully discriminative
high speed protection
‰ Higher protection costs justifiable by high capital cost of power
system elements protected
‰ Risk of security of supply should be reduced to lowest practical
levels
‰ High speed protection requires unit protection
‰ Duplicate protections used to improve reliability
‰ Single phase tripping and auto-reclose may be required to
maintain system stability EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Types of Protection 68

‰ Fuses
‰ For : LV Systems, Distribution Feeders and
Transformers, VTs, Auxiliary Supplies

‰ Direct Acting AC Trip


‰ For : LV Systems, Pole Mounted Reclosers

‰ Overcurrent and Earthfault


‰ Widely used in all Power Systems
‰ Non-Directional
‰ Voltage Dependant
‰ Directional EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Types of Protection 69

‰ Differential
‰ For : Feeders, Busbars, Transformers,
Generators, etc.
‰ High Impedance
‰ Restricted E/F
‰ Biased (or low-impedance)
‰ Pilot Wire
‰ Digital

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Types of Protection 70

‰ Distance
‰ For : Distribution Feeders and Transmission
and Sub-Transmission Circuits
‰ Also used as Back-up Protection for
Transformers and Generators

‰ Phase Comparison
‰ For : Transmission Lines

‰ Directional Comparison
‰ For : Transmission Lines
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Types of Protection 71

‰ Miscellaneous
‰ Under and Over Voltage
‰ Under and Over Frequency
‰ Special Relays for Generators, Transformers,
Motors, etc.

‰ Control Relays
‰ Auto-Reclose, Tap Change Control, etc.

‰ Tripping and Auxiliary Relays

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Classes of Protection 72

Non-Unit, or Unrestricted Protection :

No specific point downstream up to which protection will


protect

‰ Will operate for faults on the protected equipment;


‰ May also operate for faults on downstream equipment,
which has its own protection;
‰ Need for discrimination with downstream protection,
usually by means of time grading.

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Classes of Protection 73

Unit, or Restricted Protection :

Has an accurately defined zone of protection

‰ An item of power system plant is protected as a


unit;
‰ Will not operate for out of zone faults, thus no
back-up protection for downstream faults.

EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Important Considerations When Applying
74
Protection

‰ Current and Voltage Transformers


‰ These are an essential part of the protection scheme to
reduce primary current and volts to a low level suitable to
input to relay.
‰ They must be suitably specified to meet the requirements of
the protective relays.
‰ Correct connection of CTs and VTs to the protection is
important. In particular for directional, distance, phase
comparison and differential protections.
‰ VTs may be electromagnetic or capacitor types.
‰ Busbar VTs : Special consideration needed when used for
line protection. EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Instrument Transformer Circuits 75

‰ Never open circuit a CT secondary circuit, so :

‰ Never fuse CT circuits;

‰ VTs must be fused or protected by MCB.

‰ Do wire test blocks in circuit (both VT and CT) to allow


commissioning and periodic injection testing of relays.

‰ Earth CT and VT circuits at one point only;

‰ Wire gauge > 2.5mm2 recommended for mechanical


strength.
EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Auxiliary Supplies 76

‰ Required for : TRIPPING CIRCUIT BREAKERS


CLOSING CIRCUIT BREAKERS
PROTECTION and TRIP RELAYS
‰ AC AUXILIARY SUPPLIES are only used on LV and MV systems.
‰ DC AUXILIARY SUPPLIES are more secure than AC supplies.
‰ SEPARATELY FUSED SUPPLIES used for each protection.
‰ DUPLICATE BATTERIES are occasionally provided for extra security.
‰ MODERN PROTECTION RELAYS need a continuous auxiliary
supply.
‰ During un-operated (healthy) conditions, they draw a small
‘QUIESCENT’ load to keep relay circuits energized.
‰ During operation, they draw a larger current which increases due to
operation of output elements. EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
Relay Outputs 77

‰ TRIP OUTPUT CONTACTS :


‰ Check that these are rated sufficiently to make and carry
the circuit breaker trip coil current. If not, a heavier duty
tripping relay will be needed.
‰ Use a circuit breaker normally open (52a) contact to
interrupt trip coil current. This extends the life of the
protection relay trip contacts.

‰ TYPE OF CONTACTS :
Make (M) / Normally Open (NO) Close when energised, typically
used for tripping.

Break (B) / Normally Closed (NC) Close when de-energised.

Changeover (C/O) Can be break before make


(BBM) or make before break
EEED-BVRIT
(MBB).
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
ANSI Reference Numbers 78

2 Time Delay 59 Overvoltage


21 Distance 60 Voltage or Current Balance
25 Synchronising Check 64 Instantaneous Earth Fault
27 Undervoltage (High Impedance)
30 Annunciator 67 Directional Overcurrent
32 Directional Power 67N Directional Earthfault Alarm
37 Undercurrent or Under 79 Auto-Reclose
Power 81 Frequency
40 Field Failure 85 Signal Receive
46 Negative Sequence 86 Trip / Lock-Out
49 Thermal 87 Differential
50 Instantaneous Overcurrent
51 Time Delayed Overcurrent
51N Time Delayed Earthfault
52 Circuit Breaker
52a Auxiliary Switch - Normally
Open
52b Auxiliary Switch - Normally
Closed EEED-BVRIT
N.RAMCHANDER-BVRIT
79

1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

WHAT IS PROTECTIVE RELAYING?

We usually think of an electric power system in terms of its more impressive parts–the big
generating stations, transformers, high-voltage lines, etc. While these are some of the basic
elements, there are many other necessary and fascinating components. Protective relaying
is one of these.
The role of protective relaying in electric-power-system design and operation is explained
by a brief examination of the over-all background. There are three aspects of a power
system that will serve the purposes of this examination. These aspects are as follows:
A. Normal operation
B. Prevention of electrical failure.
C. Mitigation of the effects of electrical failure.
The term “normal operation” assumes no failures of equipment, no mistakes of personnel,
nor “acts of God.” It involves the minimum requirements for supplying the existing load
and a certain amount of anticipated future load. Some of the considerations are:
A. Choice between hydro, steam, or other sources of power.
B. Location of generating stations.
C. Transmission of power to the load.
D. Study of the load characteristics and planning for its future growth.
E. Metering
F. Voltage and frequency regulation.
G. System operation.
E. Normal maintenance.
The provisions for normal operation involve the major expense for equipment and
operation, but a system designed according to this aspect alone could not possibly meet
present-day requirements. Electrical equipment failures would cause intolerable outages.
There must be additional provisions to minimize damage to equipment and interruptions
to the service when failures occur.
Two recourses are open: (1) to incorporate features of design aimed at preventing failures,
and (2) to include provisions for mitigating the effects of failure when it occurs. Modern

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING 1


EEED-BVRIT
80
power-system design employs varying degrees of both recourses, as dictated by the
economics of any particular situation. Notable advances continue to be made toward
greater reliability. But also, increasingly greater reliance is being placed on electric power.
Consequently, even though the probability of failure is decreased, the tolerance of the
possible harm to the service is also decreased. But it is futile-or at least not economically
justifiable-to try to prevent failures completely. Sooner or later the law of diminishing
returns makes itself felt. Where this occurs will vary between systems and between parts of
a system, but, when this point is reached, further expenditure for failure prevention is
discouraged. It is much more profitable, then, to let some failures occur and to provide for
mitigating their effects.
The type of electrical failure that causes greatest concern is the short circuit, or “fault” as
it is usually called, but there are other abnormal operating conditions peculiar to certain
elements of the system that also require attention. Some of the features of design and
operation aimed at preventing electrical failure are:
A. Provision of adequate insulation.
B. Coordination of insulation strength with the capabilities of lightning arresters.
C. Use of overhead ground wires and low tower-footing resistance.
D. Design for mechanical strength to reduce exposure, and to minimize the likelihood of
failure causable by animals, birds, insects, dirt, sleet, etc.
E. Proper operation and maintenance practices.
Some of the features of design and operation for mitigating the effects of failure are:
A. Features that mitigate the immediate effects of an electrical failure.
1. Design to limit the magnitude of short-circuit current.1
a. By avoiding too large concentrations of generating capacity.
b. By using current-limiting impedance.
2. Design to withstand mechanical stresses and heating owing to short-circuit currents.
3. Time-delay undervoltage devices on circuit breakers to prevent dropping loads
during momentary voltage dips.
4. Ground-fault neutralizers (Petersen coils).
B. Features for promptly disconnecting the faulty element.
1. Protective relaying.
2. Circuit breakers with sufficient interrupting capacity.
3. Fuses.
C. Features that mitigate the loss of the faulty element.
1. Alternate circuits.
2. Reserve generator and transformer capacity.
3. Automatic reclosing.

2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING


EEED-BVRIT
81
D. Features that operate throughout the period from the inception of the
fault until after its removal, to maintain voltage and stability.
1. Automatic voltage regulation.
2. Stability characteristics of generators.
E. Means for observing the electiveness of the foregoing features.
1. Automatic oscillographs.
2. Efficient human observation and record keeping.
F. Frequent surveys as system changes or additions are made, to be sure that the foregoing
features are still adequate.
Thus, protective relaying is one of several features of system design concerned with
minimizing damage to equipment and interruptions to service when electrical failures
occur. When we say that relays “protect,” we mean that, together with other equipment, the
relays help to minimize damage and improve service. It will be evident that all the
mitigation features are dependent on one another for successfully minimizing the effects
of failure. Therefore, the capabilities and the application requirements of protective-relaying
equipments should be considered concurrently with the other features.2 This statement is
emphasized because there is sometimes a tendency to think of the protective-relaying
equipment after all other design considerations are irrevocably settled. Within economic
limits, an electric power system should be designed so that it can be adequately protected.

THE FUNCTION OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

The function of protective relaying is to cause the prompt removal from service of any
element of a power system when it suffers a short circuit, or when it starts to operate in any
abnormal manner that might cause damage or otherwise interfere with the effective
operation of the rest of the system. The relaying equipment is aided in this task by circuit
breakers that are capable of disconnecting the faulty element when they are called upon
to do so by the relaying equipment.
Circuit breakers are generally located so that each generator, transformer, bus,
transmission line, etc., can be completely disconnected from the rest of the system. These
circuit breakers must have sufficient capacity so that they can carry momentarily the
maximum short-circuit current that can flow through them, and then interrupt this
current; they must also withstand closing in on such a short circuit and then interrupting
it according to certain prescribed standards.3
Fusing is employed where protective relays and circuit breakers are not economically
justifiable.
Although the principal function of protective relaying is to mitigate the effects of short
circuits, other abnormal operating conditions arise that also require the services of
protective relaying. This is particularly true of generators and motors.
A secondary function of protective relaying is to provide indication of the location and
type of failure. Such data not only assist in expediting repair but also, by comparison with

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING 3


EEED-BVRIT
82
human observation and automatic oscillograph records, they provide means for analyzing
the effectiveness of the fault-prevention and mitigation features including the protective
relaying itself.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

Let us consider for the moment only the relaying equipment for the protection against
short circuits. There are two groups of such equipment–one which we shall call “primary”
relaying, and the other “back-up” relaying. Primary relaying is the first line of defense,
whereas back-up relaying functions only when primary relaying fails.

PRIMARY RELAYING

Fig. 1. One-line diagram of a portion of an electric power system illustrating primary relaying.

4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING


EEED-BVRIT
83

Figure 1 illustrates primary relaying. The first observation is that circuit breakers are
located in the connections to each power element. This provision makes it possible to
disconnect only a faulty element. Occasionally, a breaker between two adjacent elements
may be omitted, in which event both elements must be disconnected for a failure in either
one.
The second observation is that, without at this time knowing how it is accomplished, a
separate zone of protection is established around each system element. The significance of
this is that any failure occurring within a given zone will cause the “tripping” (i.e.,
opening) of all circuit breakers within that zone, and only those breakers.
It will become evident that, for failures within the region where two adjacent protective
zones overlap, more breakers will be tripped than the minimum necessary to disconnect
the faulty element. But, if there were no overlap, a failure in a region between zones would
not lie in either zone, and therefore no breakers would be tripped. The overlap is the lesser
of the two evils. The extent of the overlap is relatively small, and the probability of failure
in this region is low; consequently, the tripping of too many breakers will be quite
infrequent.
Finally, it will be observed that adjacent protective zones of Fig. 1 overlap around a circuit
breaker. This is the preferred practice because, for failures anywhere except in the overlap
region, the minimum number of circuit breakers need to be tripped. When it becomes
desirable for economic or space-saving reasons to overlap on one side of a breaker, as is
frequently true in metal-clad switchgear the relaying equipment of the zone that overlaps
the breaker must be arranged to trip not only the breakers within its zone but also one or
more breakers of the adjacent zone, in order to completely disconnect certain faults. This
is illustrated in Fig. 2, where it can be seen that, for a short circuit at X, the circuit breakers
of zone B, including breaker C, will be tripped; but, since the short circuit is outside zone
A, the relaying equipment of zone B must also trip certain breakers in zone A if that is
necessary to interrupt the flow of short circuit current from zone A to the fault. This is not
a disadvantage for a fault at X, but the same breakers in zone A will be tripped
unnecessarily for other faults in zone B to the right of breaker C. Whether this unnecessary
tripping is objectionable will depend on the particular application.

Fig. 2. Overlapping adjacent protective zones on one side of a circuit breaker.

BACK-UP RELAYING

Back-up relaying is employed only for protection against short circuits. Because short
circuits are the preponderant type of power failure, there are more opportunities for failure
in short primary relaying. Experience has shown that back-up relaying for other than short
circuits is not economically justifiable.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING 5


EEED-BVRIT
84
A clear understanding of the possible causes of primary-relaying failure is necessary for a
better appreciation of the practices involved in back-up relaying. When we say that primary
relaying may fail, we mean that any of several things may happen to prevent primary
relaying from causing the disconnection of a power-system fault. Primary relaying may fail
because of failure in any of the following:
A. Current or voltage supply to the relays.
B. D-c tripping-voltage supply.
C. Protective relays.
D. Tripping circuit or breaker mechanism.
E. Circuit breaker.
It is highly desirable that back-up relaying be arranged so that anything that might cause
primary relaying to fail will not also cause failure of back-up relaying. It will be evident that
this requirement is completely satisfied only if the back-up relays are located so that they
do not employ or control anything in common with the primary relays that are to be
backed up. So far as possible, the practice is to locate the back-up relays at a different
station. Consider, for example, the back-up relaying for the transmission line section EF of
Fig. 3. The back-up relays for this line section are normally arranged to trip breakers A, B,
I, and J. Should breaker E fail to trip for a fault on the line section EF, breakers A and B are
tripped; breakers A and B and their associated back-up equipment, being physically apart
from the equipment that has failed, are not likely to be simultaneously affected as might
be the case if breakers C and D were chosen instead.

Fig. 3. Illustration for back-up protection of transmission line section EF.

The back-up relays at locations A, B, and F provide back-up protection if bus faults occur
at station K. Also, the back-up relays at A and F provide back-up protection for faults in the
line DB. In other words, the zone of protection of back-up relaying extends in one direction
from the location of any back-up relay and at least overlaps each adjacent system element.
Where adjacent line sections are of different length, the back-up relays must overreach
some line sections more than others in order to provide back-up protection for the longest
line.
A given set of back-up relays will provide incidental back-up protection of sorts for faults in
the circuit whose breaker the back-up relays control. For example, the back-up relays that
trip breaker A of Fig. 3 may also act as back-up for faults in the line section AC. However,

6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING


EEED-BVRIT
85
this duplication of protection is only an incidental benefit and is not to be relied on to the
exclusion of a conventional back-up arrangement when such arrangement is possible; to
differentiate between the two, this type might be called “duplicate primary relaying.”
A second function of back-up relaying is often to provide primary protection when the
primary-relaying equipment is out of service for maintenance or repair.
It is perhaps evident that, when back-up relaying functions, a larger part of the system is
disconnected than when primary relaying operates correctly. This is inevitable if back-up
relaying is to be made independent of those factors that might cause primary relaying to
fail. However, it emphasizes the importance of the second requirement of back-up relaying,
that it must operate with sufficient time delay so that primary relaying will be given enough
time to function if it is able to. In other words, when a short circuit occurs, both primary
relaying and back-up relaying will normally start to operate, but primary relaying is
expected to trip the necessary breakers to remove the short-circuited element from the
system, and back-up relaying will then reset without having had time to complete its
function. When a given set of relays provides back-up protection for several adjacent system
elements, the slowest primary relaying of any of those adjacent elements will determine the
necessary time delay of the given back-up relays.
For many applications, it is impossible to abide by the principle of complete segregation of
the back-up relays. Then one tries to supply the back-up relays from sources other than
those that supply the primary relays of the system element in question, and to trip other
breakers. This can usually be accomplished; however, the same tripping battery may be
employed in common, to save money and because it is considered only a minor risk. This
subject will be treated in more detail in Chapter 14.
In extreme cases, it may even be impossible to provide any back-up protection; in such
cases, greater emphasis is placed on the need for better maintenance. In fact, even with
complete back-up relaying, there is still much to be gained by proper maintenance. When
primary relaying fails, even though back-up relaying functions properly, the service will
generally suffer more or less. Consequently, back-up relaying is not a proper substitute for
good maintenance.

PROTECTION AGAINST OTHER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS

Protective relaying for other than short circuits is included in the category of primary
relaying. However, since the abnormal conditions requiring protection are different for
each system element, no universal overlapping arrangement of relaying is used as in short
protection. Instead, each system element is independently provided with whatever relaying
is required, and this relaying is arranged to trip the necessary circuit breakers which may
in some cases be different from those tripped by the short-circuit relaying. As previously
mentioned, back-up relaying is not employed because experience has not shown it to be
economically justifiable. Frequently, however, back-up relaying for short circuits will
function when other abnormal conditions occur that produce abnormal currents or
voltages, and back-up protection of sorts is thereby incidentally provided.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING 7


EEED-BVRIT
86
FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

SENSITIVITY, SELECTIVITY, AND SPEED

“Sensitivity,” “selectivity” and “speed” are terms commonly used to describe the functional
characteristics of any protective-relaying equipment. All of them are implied in the
foregoing considerations of primary and back-up relaying. Any relaying equipment must
be sufficiently sensitive so that it will operate reliably, when required, under the actual
condition that produces the least operating tendency. It must be able to select between
those conditions for which prompt operation is required and those for which no
operation, or time-delay operation, is required. And it must operate at the required speed.
How well any protective-relaying equipment fulfills each of these requirements must be
known for each application.
The ultimate goal of protective relaying is to disconnect a faulty system element as quickly
as possible. Sensitivity and selectivity are essential to assure that the proper circuit breakers
will be tripped, but speed is the “pay-off.” The benefits to be gained from speed will be
considered later.

RELIABILITY

That protective-relaying equipment must be reliable is a basic requirement. When


protective relaying fails to function properly, the allied mitigation features are largely
ineffective. Therefore, it is essential that protective-relaying equipment be inherently
reliable, and that its application, installation, and maintenance be such as to assure that
its maximum capabilities will be realized.
Inherent reliability is a matter of design based on long experience, and is much too
extensive and detailed a subject to do justice to here. Other things being equal, simplicity
and robustness contribute to reliability, but they are not of themselves the complete
solution. Workmanship must be taken into account also. Contact pressure is an important
measure of reliability, but the contact materials and the provisions for preventing contact
contamination are fully as important. These are but a few of the many design
considerations that could be mentioned.
The proper application of protective-relaying equipment involves the proper choice not
only of relay equipment but also of the associated apparatus. For example, lack of suitable
sources of current and voltage for energizing the relays may compromise, if not jeopardize,
the protection.
Contrasted with most of the other elements of an electric power system, protective relaying
stands idle most of the time. Some types of relaying equipment may have to function only
once in several years. Transmission-line relays have to operate most frequently, but even
they may operate only several times per year. This lack of frequent exercising of the relays
and their associated equipment must be compensated for in other ways to be sure that the
relaying equipment will be operable when its turn comes.
Many electric utilities provide their test and maintenance personnel with a manual that
experienced people in the organization have prepared and that is kept up to date as new

8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING


EEED-BVRIT
87
types of relays are purchased. Such a manual specifies minimum test and maintenance
procedure that experience has shown to be desirable. The manual is prepared in part from
manufacturers’ publications and in part from the utility’s experience. As a consequence of
standardized techniques, the results of periodic tests can be compared to detect changes
or deterioration in the relays and their associated devices. Testers are encouraged to make
other tests as they see fit so long as they make the tests required by the manual. If a better
testing technique is devised, it is incorporated into the manual. Some organizations
include information on the purpose of the relays, to give their people better appreciation
of the importance of their work. Courses may be given, also. Such activity is highly
recommended. Unless a person is thoroughly acquainted with relay testing and
maintenance, he can do more harm than good, and he might better leave the equipment
alone.
In some cases, actual field tests are made after installation and after careful preliminary
testing of the individual relays. These field tests provide an excellent means for checking
the over-all operation of all equipment involved.
Careful maintenance and record keeping, not only of tests during maintenance but also of
relay operation during actual service, are the best assurance that the relaying equipment is
in proper condition. Field testing is the best-known way of checking the equipment prior
to putting it in service, but conditions may arise in actual service that were not anticipated
in the tests. The best assurance that the relays are properly applied and adjusted is a record
of correct operation through a sufficiently long period to include the various operating
conditions that can exist. It is assuring not only when a particular relaying equipment trips
the proper breakers when it should for a given fault but also when other relaying
equipments properly refrain from tripping.

ARE PROTECTIVE PRACTICES BASED ON THE


PROBABILITY OF FAILURE?

Protective practices are based on the probability of failure to the extent that present-day
practices are the result of years of experience in which the frequency of failure
undoubtedly has played a part. However, the probability of failure seldom if ever enters
directly into the choice of a particular type of relaying equipment except when, for one
reason or another, one finds it most difficult to apply the type that otherwise would be
used. In any event, the probability of failure should be considered only together with the
consequences of failure should it occur. It has been said that the justification for a given
practice equals the likelihood of trouble times the cost of the trouble. Regardless of the
probability of failure, no portion of a system should be entirely without protection, even if
it is only back-up relaying.

PROTECTIVE RELAYING VERSUS A STATION OPERATOR

Protective relaying sometimes finds itself in competition with station operators or


attendants. This is the case for protection against abnormal conditions that develop slowly
enough for an operator to have time to correct the situation before any harmful
consequences develop. Sometimes, an alert and skillful operator can thereby avoid having

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING 9


EEED-BVRIT
88
to remove from service an important piece of equipment when its removal might be
embarrassing; if protective relaying is used in such a situation, it is merely to sound an
alarm. To some extent, the preference of relying on an operator has a background of some
unfortunate experience with protective relaying whereby improper relay operation caused
embarrassment; such an attitude is understandable, but it cannot be supported logically.
Where quick and accurate action is required for the protection of important equipment, it
is unwise to rely on an operator. Moreover, when trouble occurs, the operator usually has
other things to do for which he is better fitted.

UNDESIRED TRIPPING VERSUS FAILURE TO TRIP WHEN


DESIRED

Regardless of the rules of good relaying practice, one will occasionally have to choose
which rule may be broken with the least embarrassment. When one must choose between
the chance of undesired or unnecessary tripping and failure to trip when tripping is
desired, the best practice is generally to choose the former. Experience has shown that,
where major system shutdowns have resulted from one or the other, the failure to trip–or
excessive delay in tripping-has been by far the worse offender.

THE EVALUATION OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

Although a modern power system could not operate without protective relaying, this does
not make it priceless. As in all good engineering, economics plays a large part. Although
the protection engineer can usually justify expenditures for protective relaying on the basis
of standard practice, circumstances may alter such concepts, and it often becomes
necessary to evaluate the benefits to be gained. It is generally not a question of whether
protective relaying can be justified, but of how far one should go toward investing in the
best relaying available.
Like all other parts of a power system, protective relaying should be evaluated on the basis
of its contribution to the best economically possible service to the customers. The
contribution of protective relaying is to help the rest of the power system to function as
efficiently and as effectively as possible in the face of trouble.2 How protective relaying does
this is as foIlows. By minimizing damage when failures occur, protective relaying
minimizes:
A. The cost of repairing the damage.
B. The likelihood that the trouble may spread and involve other equipment.
C. The time that the equipment is out of service.
D. The loss in revenue and the strained public relations while the equipment is out of
service.
By expediting the equipment’s return to service, protective relaying helps to minimize the
amount of equipment reserve required, since there is less likelihood of another failure
before the first failure can be repaired.

10 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING


EEED-BVRIT
89
The ability of protective relaying to permit fuller use of the system capacity is forcefully
illustrated by system stability. Figure 4 shows how the speed of protective relaying
influences the amount of power that can be transmitted without loss of synchronism when
short circuits occur.4 More load can be carried over an existing system by speeding up the
protective relaying. This has been shown to be a relatively inexpensive way to increase the
transient stability limit.5 Where stability is a problem, protective relaying can often be
evaluated against the cost of constructing additional transmission lines or switching
stations.
Other circumstances will be shown later in which certain types of protective-relaying
equipment can permit savings in circuit breakers and transmission lines.

Fig. 4. Curves illustrating the relation between relay-plus-breaker time and the maximum
amount of power that can be transmitted over one particular system without loss
of synchronism when various faults occur.

The quality of the protective-relaying equipment can affect engineering expense in


applying the relaying equipment itself. Equipment that can still operate properly when
future changes are made in a system or its operation will save much future engineering and
other related expense.
One should not conclude that the justifiable expense for a given protective-relaying
equipment is necessarily proportional to the value or importance of the system element to
be directly protected. A failure in that system element may affect the ability of the entire
system to render service, and therefore that relaying equipment is actually protecting the
service of the entire system. Some of the most serious shutdowns have been caused by
consequential effects growing out of an original failure in relatively unimportant
equipment that was not properly protected.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING 11


EEED-BVRIT
90
HOW DO PROTECTIVE RELAYS OPERATE?
Thus far, we have treated the relays themselves in a most impersonal manner, telling what
they do without any regard to how they do it.
This fascinating part of the story of protective relaying will be told in much more detail
later. But, in order to round out this general consideration of relaying and to prepare for
what is yet to come, some explanation is in order here.
All relays used for short-circuit protection, and many other types also, operate by virtue of
the current and/or voltage supplied to them by current and voltage transformers
connected in various combinations to the system element that is to be protected. Through
individual or relative changes in these two quantities, failures signal their presence, type,
and location to the protective relays. For every type and location of failure, there is some
distinctive difference in these quantities, and there are various types of protective-relaying
equipments available, each of which is designed to recognize a particular difference and
to operate in response to it.6
More possible differences exist in these quantities than one might suspect. Differences in
each quantity are possible in one or more of the following:
A. Magnitude.
B. Frequency.
C. Phase angle.
D. Duration.
E. Rate of change.
F. Direction or order of change.
G. Harmonics or wave shape.
Then, when both voltage and current are considered in combination, or relative to similar
quantities at different locations, one can begin to realize the resources available for
discriminatory purposes. It is a fortunate circumstance that, although Nature in her
contrary way has imposed the burden of electric-power-system failure, she has at the same
time provided us with a means for combat.

Fig. 5. Illustration for Problem 2.

12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING


EEED-BVRIT
91
PROBLEMS
1. Compare protective relaying with insurance.
2. The portion of a power system shown by the one-line diagram of Fig. 5, with generating
sources back of all three ends, has conventional primary and back-up relaying. In each
of the listed cases, a short circuit has occurred and certain circuit breakers have tripped
as stated. Assume that the tripping of these breakers was correct under the
circumstances. Where was the short circuit? Was there any failure of the protective
relaying, including breakers, and if so, what failed? Assume only one failure at a time.
Draw a sketch showing the overlapping of primary protective zones and the exact
locations of the various faults.
Case Breakers Tripped
a 4, 5, 8
b 3, 7, 8
c 3, 4, 5, 6
d 1, 4, 5, 6
e 4, 5, 7, 8
f 4, 5, 6

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING 13


EEED-BVRIT
92

Arc Extinguishers

A common method used to extinguish an arc.


In general, it confines, divides and cools the arc.

EEED-BVRIT
93

•An
An Arc Extinguisher is the component of
the circuit breaker that extinguishes an arc
when the contacts are opened
opened.
•An arc is a discharge of electric current
crossing a gap between two contacts
contacts.
• Circuit breakers must be designed to
control them because arcs cannot be
prevented.
•There are four techniques to extinguish an
arc and there are several arc control
methods.
methods
EEED-BVRIT
94

EEED-BVRIT
95

What is an Arc?
„ Do you ever recall pulling a plug from a
wall socket and seeing what appeared to
be sparks?
„ What you were observing,
observing on a very small
scale, was an attempt at arc formation
between
bet ee tthee wall
a cocontacts
tacts a
andd tthe
ep plug
ug
contacts in your hand.
„ For the sake of this discussion,, let's
define an arc as a discharge of electric
current crossing a gap between two
contacts.
EEED-BVRIT
96

EEED-BVRIT
97
„ Arcs are formed when the contacts of a circuit
breaker are opened
p under a load.
„ Arcs can be very destructive and vary greatly in
size and intensity.
„ The size of the arc depends on the amount of
current present when the contacts are pulled
apart.
„ F example,
For l an arc th thatt fforms when
h normall
load current is broken is insignificant compared
t th
to the arc th
thatt fforms when
h a shorth t circuit
i it iis
broken.
„ Because arcs cannot be prevented, circuit
breakers must be designed to control them.
EEED-BVRIT
98

„ The heat associated with an arc creates an


i i d gas environment.
ionized i t
„ The more ionization, the better the
conditions are for an arc to be maintained
and grow.
„ The bigger the arc, the more heat created,
which increases ionization.
„ Arcing is a condition that must be dealt
with quickly and effectively by a circuit
breaker.

EEED-BVRIT
99

„ The important thing to remember here is


that the ability of the circuit breaker to
control the arc is the key to its short
circuit interrupting capability. This is a
critical factor for selecting circuit breakers
breakers.
„ A short circuit is the most devastating
overcurrent condition.
condition

EEED-BVRIT
100

„ Current Zero or Zero Point is a very


important
p aspect
p to arc extinguishing.
g g At
current zero, conditions are optimal for
preventing
p g an arc from continuing.g The
current is said to be "Current Zero" when
0°, 180°
the sine curve is at 0° 180° and 360°
360°.

EEED-BVRIT
101

EEED-BVRIT
102

„ Voltage is also a very important


consideration because it is the pressure
that keeps the current moving.
„ L ft unchecked,
Left h k d voltage lt will
ill keep
k pushing
hi
the current through current zero and give
new liflife tto th
the arc.
„ Voltage does not take kindly to being
stopped in its tracks during the
extinguishing of an arc.
„ If it reignites, it can damage the whole
electrical system.
y

EEED-BVRIT
103
„ Circuit breakers take this process into account
by simultaneously opening the contacts and
extinguishing the arc.
arc
„ The successful extinguishing of the arc depends
on the Dielectric Strength of the gap between
the contacts.
„ The dielectric strength is the maximum voltage a
dielectric can withstand without breaking down.
„ A Dielectric is any insulating material between
two conductors
conductors.
„ In these discussions, the circuit breaker contacts
are the conductors and the insulating material
can be air, gas or a vacuum.
„ If the dielectric strength is greater than the
voltage trying to re
re--ignite the arc, the arc
extinguishing will be successful.
EEED-BVRIT
104

„ The invention of a device called DE-


DE-ION®
arc extinguisher in the early 1900s by
Westinghouse was a revolutionary
advance in arc interruption.
„ Improved versions were used for years
with a majority of circuit breakers and
continue to be used today with low
voltage circuit breakers.

EEED-BVRIT
105

EEED-BVRIT
106

A c Cont
Arc Control
ol Techniques
Techniq es

„ Each approach has made improvements to


its initial concept
p in an effort to extinguish
g
arcs more efficiently.
„ Arc control methods utilize one or more of
the following general techniques:

EEED-BVRIT
107

St t hi A
Stretching Arc

The arc is produced when the contacts part.


As the gap widens,
widens the arc is stretched and
cooled to the point where it is extinguished
EEED-BVRIT
108

B ki Arc
Breaking A into
i t Smaller
S ll Pieces
Pi

The arc is produced when the contacts part.

The arc moves up into the arc divider and


splits, cools and is extinguished EEED-BVRIT
109

Blowing
g Out Arc

In this method,
a high-
high-pressure
gas blows the
arc into an arc
divider to be
extinguished

EEED-BVRIT
110

Enclosing Contacts

„ In this method, the contacts are housed in


an oxygen-
yg -free enclosure with a dielectric
oxygen
such as a vacuum, gas or cooling oil.
„ Without oxygen,
oxygen the arc cannot sustain
itself and the arc is extinguished.

EEED-BVRIT
111

Enclosing Contacts

In this method,
method the contacts are housed in an oxygen
oxygen--
free enclosure with a dielectric such as a vacuum, gas or
cooling oil.
Without oxygen, the arc cannot sustain itself and the
arc is extinguished. EEED-BVRIT
112

Arc
A c Control
Cont ol Methods

„ There are six methods used around the


world todayy to deal with arc control.
„ The two most commonly used methods
are arc chute and vacuum interrupter.
interrupter
„ The other four methods are SF6, minimum
oil magnetic coil and puffer.
oil, puffer

EEED-BVRIT
113

A c chute
Arc ch te method
„ The arc chute method only uses the Breaking
Arc into Smaller Pieces technique.
„ Arc chutes are normally associated with low
voltage circuit breakers due to efficiency and
cost
cost.
„ In general, an arc chute will confine, divide and
cooll an arc, resulting
lti ini the
th arc being
b i unable bl to
t
sustain itself.
„ There is one arc chute for each set of contacts.
EEED-BVRIT
114

EEED-BVRIT
115

Vacuum
Vac m Interrupter
Inte pte Method
„ The vacuum interrupter
p method uses the Enclosing
g
Contacts technique to extinguish arcs.
„ The vacuum enables the contacts to be smaller and
eliminates the divider,
divider making this method the most
cost effective and efficient above 1000V.
„ One vacuum interrupter is provided for each set of
contacts.
t t

EEED-BVRIT
116
Arcing takes place
within a sealed
evacuated enclosure.
The contacts are
located inside and
arcing occurs when the
contacts are separated.
Because the
environment inside the
interrupter envelope is
a vacuum, an arc
cannot be easily
easil
sustained. It will not
reach the intensity
possible with an arch
chute. EEED-BVRIT
117

SF6 method
„ The SF6 method also uses the Enclosing Contacts
technique.
„ It was a precursor to the vacuum interrupter and used
SF6 gas as the dielectric.
„ The heat energy
gy created byy the arc works to break
apart the SF6 molecules.
„ The larger the arc, the greater the breakdown of the
gas which aids in extinguishing the arc.
„ The technology is related more to European
manufacturers of medium and higher voltage circuit
breakers.
EEED-BVRIT
118

EEED-BVRIT
119

minimum
minim m oil method
„ The minimum oil method also uses Enclosing Contacts
with oil as the dielectric.
„ The arc energy is absorbed as it rips hydrogen away
from the oil molecule.
„ The oil itself also helps
p to cool the arc.
„ As current zero is approached, more oil is drawn into
the system, further cooling and Deionizing the arc.
„ It is used today in low voltage situations and
potentially explosive environments where an arc chute
is not desirable.
EEED-BVRIT
120

EEED-BVRIT
121

magnetic coil method

„ The magnetic coil method uses the


Breaking g Arc into Smaller Pieces
technique.
„ It is very similar to the arc chute method
method.
„ The natural movement of an arc is
upward in this instance,
upward, instance into an arc chute.
chute
„ A coil, called a blowout coil, is located in
th center
the t off th
the arc chute.
h t
EEED-BVRIT
122

„ The arc is broken into two.


„ The arcs are lengthened and cooled as
they rise higher.
„ The cooling reduces the rate of ionization
„ When the ionization drops below the level
necessary to sustain the arcs, they
extinguish at current zero
zero.
„ Prior to vacuum interrupter technology
becoming the method of choice with
medium voltage power breakers for
extinguishing arcs
arcs, the magnetic coil
method served well for many years.
EEED-BVRIT
123

p ffe method
puffer

„ The puffer method uses the Blowing Out


Arc and Enclosingg Contacts techniques.
q
„ It uses SF6 gas as the dielectric. It is the
most efficient and cost effective method
above 38 kV.

EEED-BVRIT
124

„ This type interrupter is basically a pair of


separable contacts, a piston and a
cylinder, mounted in a reservoir of gas.
„ As the contacts part, the piston moves up
to drive the g gas through
g the arc to
interrupt it.
„ It also utilizes coils and takes advantage
of natural magnetic affects to create a
force sufficient to extinguish the arc.

EEED-BVRIT
125

EEED-BVRIT
126

CIRCUIT BREAKERS
The circuit breaker is the most important and
p
complicated of all types
yp of power
p circuit interruption
p
equipment. This is due to its highly important
p y of interrupting
capability p g the ppowerful short circuit
current, over and above its normal role of
g, isolatingg and interrupting
conducting, p g nominal load
currents.
Circuit Breakers have two basic functions
•Switching
• F lt interruption
Fault i t ti
EEED-BVRIT
127

• Close the current path and carry the steady


state load current without overheating.
• Maintain sufficient contact pressure when closed
to prevent a high resistance path between contacts.
• Rapidly open the contacts under fault condition so
that current interruption does not resulting
excessive burning of the contacts.
• Always
Al provide
id adequate
d t phase
h andd phase
h tto
ground insulation.

EEED-BVRIT
128

ARC Phenomena in Circuit


Breakers
• When the contacts are being separated arcing is possible
even when the circuit emf is considerably below the minimum
cold electrode breakdown voltage,
voltage because of large local
increase in voltage due to the circuit self inductance.

• The arc is extinguished every time the current passes


through zero and can restrike only if transient recovery voltage
across the electrode already separated and continuing to
separate reaches a sufficiently high value know as breakdown
voltage.

EEED-BVRIT
129

Arcing Chamber
• It is a closed volume containing a fixed contact,
a moving contact and the interrupting medium.
medium
• An arc is created when the contacts part. The
i t
interrupting
ti medium
di i
is responsible
ibl f
for
quenching the arc and establishing the nominal
l l off isolation
level i l ti between
b t th open contacts.
the t t
• Several chambers may be connected in series to
serve higher voltage levels. In this case a grading
capacitor is installed in parallel with each chamber
to balance the voltage across the contacts when
parting.
EEED-BVRIT
130

Insertion resistor
• The sudden modification of circuit
characteristics,, when circuit breakers operate,
p ,
produces peak voltage impulses where the level
is determined byy the circuit characteristics.
These impulses may reach very high levels and
must be reduced. A well-known method is
closing or opening in two or three steps on
resistors.

EEED-BVRIT
131

• On trip: the voltage impulse levels are


generally acceptable when interrupting nominal
or short circuit currents,
currents but they can be
dangerously high when interrupting small
capacitive or inductive currents.
• On close: sudden energizing of a circuit always
generates voltage impulses with moderate levels
levels,
with the exception of closing or reclosing on long
unloaded lines where the impulses,
impulses function of the
line length, instant of closing or reclosing and
discrepancy of the three poles,
poles can reach extremely
high levels.
EEED-BVRIT
132

Operating Mechanism
• The operating mechanism is where the needed
energy to part the contacts and to extinguish the
arc is developed.
developed
• The most common operating mechanisms in
circuit
i it breakers
b k are
• Spring operated
• Hydraulically operated
• Pneumatically operated.
operated

EEED-BVRIT
133

Control

• Closing and tripping coils


• Control relaying system
• Pressure switches and gauges
• Surveillance and alarm system
g system
• Re-inflating y to restore the
energy spent on the operation.

EEED-BVRIT
134

Functioning Characteristics
• Correct function
• The circuit breaker control must ensure correct
closing action, whatever the closing current value,
and ensure breaking (opening) at the required
moment by releasing,
releasing by mechanical action or via a
relay, the energy stored in the accumulators.
• Operation cycles
• The circuit breaker has to be capable of executing
different operation cycles and achieve fast breaking
of short circuit currents -- the faster, the better for
the network.
EEED-BVRIT
135

Classification Depending Upon


the interrupting medium

• A circuit
i i breaker
b k h
has to interrupt
i weak k
capacitive or inductive currents, up to high
short
h t circuit
i it currentst and, d as a result,lt tot
extinguish powerful electric arcs. The main
problem
bl i then,
is th essentially,
ti ll an arcing
i problem.
bl
Another problem is over voltage impulses; this
i related
is l t d to
t the
th nature
t off the
th circuit
i it where
h it is
i
installed.
EEED-BVRIT
136

Interrupting Medium

• Mineral oil
• Compressed air
• Sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)

EEED-BVRIT
137

Fault Current
PLOT
Graph additional
IFAULT VFAULT
+35 information
peak 32 pu
annotations (41 kA) line
thickness
I [pu], V [pu]

+12.5
Fault
Inception

label and unit


Fault
notes section -10 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1Interruption
Time (Sec)

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
138

Circuit Breakers (CB)


• CB: interrupting highest short circuit currents
needs sophisticated arcing chamber technology

UR [kV] IB [kA] Type


36 160 SF6
36 275 Air Blast
245 63 Oil
362 50 SF6 (one chamber)

• Load switch: load currents – routinely switching


• Disconnector: very small currents – safety switch

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
139

Live Tank HV breaker

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
140

Dead Tank HV breaker

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
141

Breaker with Switching Resistors

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
142

Short Circuit Interruption (1)


Equivalent Circuit
RL LL
IS Fixed Contact Moving Contact

US
CL
UN U1 U2

US
Fault!
IS 10

UN
rated current 5

Us 0 US

Fault! -5

-10
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 t [ms]

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
143

Short Circuit Interruption (2)


Equivalent Circuit
RL LL
IS Fixed Contact Moving Contact

US
CL
UN U1 U2

US
Fault!
IS 10

UN
rated current 5

Us 0 US

Fault! -5

-10
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 t [ms]

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
144

Short Circuit Interruption (3)


Equivalent Circuit
RL LL
IS Fixed Contact Moving Contact

US
CL
UN U1 U2

US
Fault!
IS 10

UN
rated current 5

Us 0 US

Fault! -5

-10
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 t [ms]

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
145

Short Circuit Interruption (4)


Equivalent Circuit
RL LL
IS Fixed Contact Moving Contact

US
CL
UN U1 U2

US
Fault!
IS 10

UN
rated current 5

Us 0 US

Fault! -5 1
f =
2 ⋅ π ⋅ LLCL
-10
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 t [ms]

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
146

Curent Zero: Current Interruption

Current Fixed Contact

Arcing Voltage 100 V

1 2
t [µs]
10 A Residual Current US

Transient Recovery
Voltage (TRV)

Arc allways extinguishes at current zero Moving Contact


(voltage peak),
enegy dissipation high enough
--> Arc cease conducting – high resistivity
--> Current interruption - TRV
e Power System Transients
EEED-BVRIT
147

Curent Zero: No Current Interruption

Current Fixed Contact

Arcing Voltage 100 V

1 2
t [µs]
10 A US

Arc allways extinguishes at current zero Moving Contact


(voltage peak),
but contact distance is too small
--> Arc keeps conducting
--> Current continous to flow undisturbed
Power System Transients
EEED-BVRIT
148

Curent Zero: Thermal Re-Ignition

Current Fixed Contact

Arcing Voltage 100 V

1 2
t [µs]
10 A Residual US
Current
Transient
New Current Rise
Recovery
Voltage (TRV)

Moving Contact
Voltage Collapse

Loosing the „Thermal Race“


The TRV causes a residual current which heats up the arc plasma
=> arc gains conductivity => voltage collapses => current rises again

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT
149

Curent Zero: Dielectric Re-Ignition

Current Fixed Contact


Current stops flowing!

Arcing Voltage 100 V


NOTE: time scale!
10 20
t [µs]
50 A Residual US
Current
Transient
Recovery New Current Rise
Voltage (TRV)

Moving Contact
Dielectric Strength
insufficient Voltage Collapse

The TRV reaches a value which causes a dielectric breakdown


of the (still opening) contact gap
Power System Transients
EEED-BVRIT
150

CB: modeling
• Mechanical delay time
(from command to contact separation): min 10...20 ms
w “opening time” = contact separation
w current interruption: default at zero crossing
• Arcing time: 1...5 cycles
w depending on CB type and current wave form
w include arcing time in “opening time”
• Arc modeling
w Arc voltage – current relationship highly complex
(parameters: CB design, thermodynamics)
generic models mostly insufficient – special modeling necessary
w zero arcing voltage for high voltage systems
w constant value (10...100 V) for low voltage systems

Power System Transients


EEED-BVRIT

You might also like