Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Switchgear and Protection
Switchgear and Protection
Prepared by
Prof.P.Paulclee
And
N.Ramchander Asst Professor
,
Department of
DEPARTMENT OF
Course Content
Prof.P.Paul Clee
Mr.N.Ramchander
Assistant Professor
3
(SYLLABUS)
Objective :
This course introduces all varieties of Circuit Breakers and Relays for protection of
Generators, Transformers and feeder bus bars from over voltages and other hazards. It
emphasis on Neutral grounding for overall protection.
Description and Operation of following types of circuit breakers: Minimum Oil Circuit
breakers, Air Blast Circuit Breakers, Vacuum and SF6 circuit breakers.
Application of relays: Over current/ Under voltage relays, Direction relays, Differential
Relays and Percentage Differential Relays.
Universal torque equation, Distance relays: Impedance, Reactance and Mho and Off-
Set Mho relays, Characteristics of Distance Relays and Comparison. Static Relays:
Static Relays verses Electromagnetic Relays.
Protection of generators against Stator faults, Rotor faults, and Abnormal Conditions.
Restricted Earth fault and Inter-turn fault Protection. Numerical Problems on % Winding
Unprotected.
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Protection of Lines: Over Current, Carrier Current and Three-zone distance relay
protection using Impedance relays. Translay Relay. Protection of Bus bars – Differential
protection.
TEXT BOOKS:
1. Switchgear and Protection – by Sunil S Rao, Khanna Publlishers
2. Power System Protection and Switchgear by Badari Ram , D.N Viswakarma, TMH
Publications
REFERENCE BOOKS:
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1. Fundamental principles of fuse and overcurrent protection and
application to feeder and motor protection.
2. Fundamental principles of distance relaying and application to
transmission system protection.
3. Fundamental principles of differential protection and application
to transformer, busbar and generator armature winding protection.
4. Role of Current and Voltage transformers in power system
protection.
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Introduction
to
Power System Protection
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INTRODUCTION
A power system is not only capable to meet the present load but also has the flexibility to
meet the future demands. A power system is designed to generate electric power in sufficient
quantity, to meet the present and estimated future demands of the users in a particular area, to
transmit it to the areas where it will be used and then distribute it within that area, on a
continuous basis.
To ensure the maximum return on the large investment in the equipment, which goes to
make up the power system and to keep the users satisfied with reliable service, the whole system
must be kept in operation continuously without major breakdowns. This can be achieved in two
ways:
• The first way is to implement a system adopting components, which should not fail and
requires the least or nil maintenance to maintain the continuity of service. By common
sense, implementing such a system is neither economical nor feasible, except for small
systems.
The second option is to foresee any possible effects or failures that may cause long-
term shutdown of a system, which in turn may take longer time to bring back the system
to its normal course. The main idea is to restrict the disturbances during such failures to a
limited area and continue power distribution in the balance areas. Special equipment is
normally installed to detect such kind of failures (also called ‘faults’) that can possibly
happen in various sections of a system, and to isolate faulty sections so that the
interruption is limited to a localized area in the total system covering various areas. The
special equipment adopted to detect such possible faults is referred to as ‘protective
equipment or protective relay’ and the system that uses such equipment is termed as
‘protection system’.
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These requirements are necessary, firstly for early detection and localization of faults,
and secondly for prompt removal of faulty equipment from service. In order to carry out the
above duties, protection must have the following qualities:
To meet all of the above requirements, protection must be reliable which means it must be:
• Dependable: It must trip when called upon to do so.
• Secure: It must not trip when it is not supposed to.
Protection of any distribution system is a function of many elements and this manual
gives a brief outline of various components that go in protecting a system. Following are
the main components of protection.
• Fuse is the self-destructing one, which carries the currents in a power circuit
continuously and sacrifices itself by blowing under abnormal conditions. These are
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• Accurate protection cannot be achieved without properly measuring the normal and
abnormal conditions of a system. In electrical systems, voltage and current measurements
give feedback on whether a system is healthy or not. Voltage transformers and current
transformers measure these basic parameters and are capable of providing accurate
measurement during fault conditions without failure.
• The measured values are converted into analog and/or digital signals and are made to
operate the relays, which in turn isolate the circuits by opening the faulty circuits. In most
of the cases, the relays provide two functions viz., alarm and trip, once the abnormality is
noticed. The relays in olden days had very limited functions and were quite bulky.
However, with advancement in digital technology and use of microprocessors, relays
monitor various parameters, which give complete history of a system during both pre-
fault and post-fault conditions.
• The opening of faulty circuits requires some time, which may be in milliseconds, which
for a common day life could be insignificant. However, the circuit breakers, which are
used to isolate the faulty circuits, are capable of carrying these fault currents until the
fault currents are totally cleared. The circuit breakers are the main isolating devices in a
distribution system, which can be said to directly protect the system.
• The operation of relays and breakers require power sources, which shall not be affected
by faults in the main distribution. Hence, the other component, which is vital in
protective system, is batteries that are used to ensure uninterrupted power to relays and
breaker coils. The above items are extensively used in any protective system and their
design requires careful study and selection for proper operation.
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1.4 Summary
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Dependability
Security
Reliability
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Unit-I
[Circuit Breakers –I]
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Contents
1. Overview of Power system
2. Why protect?
3. Causes and types of faults
4. Factors influencing protection system design
5. Aspects of protection system
6. Zones of protection
7. Protection types and classes
8. Important consideration while applying protection
9. ANSI reference numbers
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Contents
1. Overview of Power system
2. Why protect?
3. Causes and types of faults
4. Factors influencing protection system design
5. Aspects of protection system
6. Zones of protection
7. Protection types and classes
8. Important consideration while applying protection
9. ANSI reference numbers
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Components of a power system 15
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© 2005. T.S. Sidhu
Components of a power system 16
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Components of a power system 17
120°
240°
360°
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Components of a power system 18
Exporting power
Transmission
System
Load
AC Generator
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Step-Up Transformer Step-Down Transformer
Components of a power system 19
Transmission System
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Components of a power system 20
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Components of a power system 21
Load
Transmission
Sub Station Voltage From
Power Company
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Components of a power system 22
Generation to Load
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Components of a power system 23
Distribution connection
Utility
Transformer Load Load
Center Center
Meter Meter
Transformer
From Utility
Service
Domestic load
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Components of a power system 25
Substation SLD at
Generation
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Components of a power system 26
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Components of a power system 27
MV Indoor distribution
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Protection – Why Is It Needed ? 28
PROTECTION IS INSTALLED TO :
Detect fault occurrence and isolate the faulted equipment.
SO THAT :
Damage to the faulted equipment is limited;
Disruption of supplies to adjacent un-faulted equipment is
minimized.
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Protection – Why Is It Needed ? 29
Summary :
Protection must :
Detect faults and abnormal operating conditions;
Isolate the faulted equipment.
So as to :
Limit damage caused by fault energy;
Limit effect on rest of system.
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Power System Faults - Causes 32
Lightning
Wind
Ice and Snow storm
Flying objects
Contamination of insulators
Physical contact by animals
Human errors
Falling trees
Insulation aging
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Power System Faults - Causes 33
Underground Cables
Diggers
Overloading
Oil Leakage
Ageing
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Power System Faults - Causes 34
Overhead Lines
Lightning
Kites
Trees
Moisture
Salt
Birds
Broken Conductors
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Power System Faults - Causes 35
Machines
Mechanical
Damage
Unbalanced Load
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Types of Fault 36
a
b
Ø/E
c
e
a
b
Ø/Ø/E
c
e
a
b
Ø/Ø
c
a a
3Ø b b
c 3Ø/E c
e EEED-BVRIT
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Types of Fault 37
a a'
b b'
c
c'
e e
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Types of Fault 38
a
b
c
Fault between adjacent
e parallel Lines
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Types of Fault 39
b c
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Voltages And Currents During Faults 40
Fault
Fault Currents
5000
4000
3000
2000
Ia
1000
Ib
Amps
0
Ic
-1000
-2000 In
-3000
-4000
-5000
Time
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Voltages And Currents During Faults 41
Fault
Fault Voltages
600
400
200
Va
Volts
0 Vb
Vc
-200
-400
-600
Time
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Factors Influencing Protection System Design42
Speed
Dependability / Reliability
Security / Stability
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Factors Influencing Protection System Design43
Overlap of protections
Auxiliary supplies
Back-up protection
Cost
Duplication of protection
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Aspects of Protection System 44
Reliability
Speed
Simplicity
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Protection Aspects - Reliability 45
R1 R2 R3 R4
G1 G2
F
Reliability
Security
Dependability
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Protection Aspects - Reliability 46
Security Dependability
AND OR
1 2 1 2
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Protection Aspects - Reliability 47
R1 R2 R3 R4
G1 G2
F
Reliability
Dependability
Security
D S
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Protection Aspects - Reliability 48
Dependability / Reliability
Protection must operate when required to
Failure to operate can be extremely
damaging and disruptive
Faults are rare : Protection must operate
even after years of inactivity
Improved by use of : Back-up protection
and duplicate protection
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Protection Aspects - Reliability 49
Security / Stability
Load switching
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Protection Aspects - Speed 50
Speed
Milliseconds Count
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Protection Aspects - Speed 51
Speed
Fast operation :
Minimizes damage and danger
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Protection Aspects - Speed 52
Speed
Catastrophic
D Damage
a
m Steel
a Copper
g
e Cable
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Fault Discrimination - Zones Of Protection 54
Busbar
Protection Busbar
Protection
G Trf G
Line
Protection
Generator Generator
Protection Protection
M
Motor
Protection
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Zones of Protection - Protection Overlap 55
Overlap of Protections
No blind spots
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Zones of Protection - Protection Overlap 56
BBP BBP
‘1’ ‘2’
H J
‘Z’
G LP LP K L
‘H’ ‘J’
LP LP
‘K’ ‘L’
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Fault Discrimination - Phases 57
Phase Discrimination
fault
reclosing applications
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Example 1 – Dependability / Security 58
R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7 F
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4
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Example 1 – Dependability / Security 59
R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7 F
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4
Resulted in operation of R1, R2, and R5, which in turn tripped their
respective breakers
Was there loss of dependability or security?
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Example 1 – Dependability / Security 60
R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7 F
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4
Resulted in operation of R1, R2, and R5, which in turn tripped their
respective breakers
Was there loss of dependability or security?
Yes, relay R5 lost its security for this fault
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Example 2 – Zone discrimination 61
R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4
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Example 2 – Zone discrimination 62
R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4
R6
R3 R4
B6 R2
R1
B3 B5
R7
B1 B2 R5
B7
B4
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Cost 64
potential hazards.
isolated by protection.
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Cost 65
Setting studies
Commissioning
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS
Large numbers of switching and distribution points,
transformers and feeders
TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS
Emphasis is on technical considerations rather than economics
Economics cannot be ignored but is of secondary importance
compared with the need for highly reliable, fully discriminative
high speed protection
Higher protection costs justifiable by high capital cost of power
system elements protected
Risk of security of supply should be reduced to lowest practical
levels
High speed protection requires unit protection
Duplicate protections used to improve reliability
Single phase tripping and auto-reclose may be required to
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Types of Protection 68
Fuses
For : LV Systems, Distribution Feeders and
Transformers, VTs, Auxiliary Supplies
Differential
For : Feeders, Busbars, Transformers,
Generators, etc.
High Impedance
Restricted E/F
Biased (or low-impedance)
Pilot Wire
Digital
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Types of Protection 70
Distance
For : Distribution Feeders and Transmission
and Sub-Transmission Circuits
Also used as Back-up Protection for
Transformers and Generators
Phase Comparison
For : Transmission Lines
Directional Comparison
For : Transmission Lines
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Types of Protection 71
Miscellaneous
Under and Over Voltage
Under and Over Frequency
Special Relays for Generators, Transformers,
Motors, etc.
Control Relays
Auto-Reclose, Tap Change Control, etc.
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Classes of Protection 72
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Classes of Protection 73
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Important Considerations When Applying
74
Protection
TYPE OF CONTACTS :
Make (M) / Normally Open (NO) Close when energised, typically
used for tripping.
We usually think of an electric power system in terms of its more impressive parts–the big
generating stations, transformers, high-voltage lines, etc. While these are some of the basic
elements, there are many other necessary and fascinating components. Protective relaying
is one of these.
The role of protective relaying in electric-power-system design and operation is explained
by a brief examination of the over-all background. There are three aspects of a power
system that will serve the purposes of this examination. These aspects are as follows:
A. Normal operation
B. Prevention of electrical failure.
C. Mitigation of the effects of electrical failure.
The term “normal operation” assumes no failures of equipment, no mistakes of personnel,
nor “acts of God.” It involves the minimum requirements for supplying the existing load
and a certain amount of anticipated future load. Some of the considerations are:
A. Choice between hydro, steam, or other sources of power.
B. Location of generating stations.
C. Transmission of power to the load.
D. Study of the load characteristics and planning for its future growth.
E. Metering
F. Voltage and frequency regulation.
G. System operation.
E. Normal maintenance.
The provisions for normal operation involve the major expense for equipment and
operation, but a system designed according to this aspect alone could not possibly meet
present-day requirements. Electrical equipment failures would cause intolerable outages.
There must be additional provisions to minimize damage to equipment and interruptions
to the service when failures occur.
Two recourses are open: (1) to incorporate features of design aimed at preventing failures,
and (2) to include provisions for mitigating the effects of failure when it occurs. Modern
The function of protective relaying is to cause the prompt removal from service of any
element of a power system when it suffers a short circuit, or when it starts to operate in any
abnormal manner that might cause damage or otherwise interfere with the effective
operation of the rest of the system. The relaying equipment is aided in this task by circuit
breakers that are capable of disconnecting the faulty element when they are called upon
to do so by the relaying equipment.
Circuit breakers are generally located so that each generator, transformer, bus,
transmission line, etc., can be completely disconnected from the rest of the system. These
circuit breakers must have sufficient capacity so that they can carry momentarily the
maximum short-circuit current that can flow through them, and then interrupt this
current; they must also withstand closing in on such a short circuit and then interrupting
it according to certain prescribed standards.3
Fusing is employed where protective relays and circuit breakers are not economically
justifiable.
Although the principal function of protective relaying is to mitigate the effects of short
circuits, other abnormal operating conditions arise that also require the services of
protective relaying. This is particularly true of generators and motors.
A secondary function of protective relaying is to provide indication of the location and
type of failure. Such data not only assist in expediting repair but also, by comparison with
Let us consider for the moment only the relaying equipment for the protection against
short circuits. There are two groups of such equipment–one which we shall call “primary”
relaying, and the other “back-up” relaying. Primary relaying is the first line of defense,
whereas back-up relaying functions only when primary relaying fails.
PRIMARY RELAYING
Fig. 1. One-line diagram of a portion of an electric power system illustrating primary relaying.
Figure 1 illustrates primary relaying. The first observation is that circuit breakers are
located in the connections to each power element. This provision makes it possible to
disconnect only a faulty element. Occasionally, a breaker between two adjacent elements
may be omitted, in which event both elements must be disconnected for a failure in either
one.
The second observation is that, without at this time knowing how it is accomplished, a
separate zone of protection is established around each system element. The significance of
this is that any failure occurring within a given zone will cause the “tripping” (i.e.,
opening) of all circuit breakers within that zone, and only those breakers.
It will become evident that, for failures within the region where two adjacent protective
zones overlap, more breakers will be tripped than the minimum necessary to disconnect
the faulty element. But, if there were no overlap, a failure in a region between zones would
not lie in either zone, and therefore no breakers would be tripped. The overlap is the lesser
of the two evils. The extent of the overlap is relatively small, and the probability of failure
in this region is low; consequently, the tripping of too many breakers will be quite
infrequent.
Finally, it will be observed that adjacent protective zones of Fig. 1 overlap around a circuit
breaker. This is the preferred practice because, for failures anywhere except in the overlap
region, the minimum number of circuit breakers need to be tripped. When it becomes
desirable for economic or space-saving reasons to overlap on one side of a breaker, as is
frequently true in metal-clad switchgear the relaying equipment of the zone that overlaps
the breaker must be arranged to trip not only the breakers within its zone but also one or
more breakers of the adjacent zone, in order to completely disconnect certain faults. This
is illustrated in Fig. 2, where it can be seen that, for a short circuit at X, the circuit breakers
of zone B, including breaker C, will be tripped; but, since the short circuit is outside zone
A, the relaying equipment of zone B must also trip certain breakers in zone A if that is
necessary to interrupt the flow of short circuit current from zone A to the fault. This is not
a disadvantage for a fault at X, but the same breakers in zone A will be tripped
unnecessarily for other faults in zone B to the right of breaker C. Whether this unnecessary
tripping is objectionable will depend on the particular application.
BACK-UP RELAYING
Back-up relaying is employed only for protection against short circuits. Because short
circuits are the preponderant type of power failure, there are more opportunities for failure
in short primary relaying. Experience has shown that back-up relaying for other than short
circuits is not economically justifiable.
The back-up relays at locations A, B, and F provide back-up protection if bus faults occur
at station K. Also, the back-up relays at A and F provide back-up protection for faults in the
line DB. In other words, the zone of protection of back-up relaying extends in one direction
from the location of any back-up relay and at least overlaps each adjacent system element.
Where adjacent line sections are of different length, the back-up relays must overreach
some line sections more than others in order to provide back-up protection for the longest
line.
A given set of back-up relays will provide incidental back-up protection of sorts for faults in
the circuit whose breaker the back-up relays control. For example, the back-up relays that
trip breaker A of Fig. 3 may also act as back-up for faults in the line section AC. However,
Protective relaying for other than short circuits is included in the category of primary
relaying. However, since the abnormal conditions requiring protection are different for
each system element, no universal overlapping arrangement of relaying is used as in short
protection. Instead, each system element is independently provided with whatever relaying
is required, and this relaying is arranged to trip the necessary circuit breakers which may
in some cases be different from those tripped by the short-circuit relaying. As previously
mentioned, back-up relaying is not employed because experience has not shown it to be
economically justifiable. Frequently, however, back-up relaying for short circuits will
function when other abnormal conditions occur that produce abnormal currents or
voltages, and back-up protection of sorts is thereby incidentally provided.
“Sensitivity,” “selectivity” and “speed” are terms commonly used to describe the functional
characteristics of any protective-relaying equipment. All of them are implied in the
foregoing considerations of primary and back-up relaying. Any relaying equipment must
be sufficiently sensitive so that it will operate reliably, when required, under the actual
condition that produces the least operating tendency. It must be able to select between
those conditions for which prompt operation is required and those for which no
operation, or time-delay operation, is required. And it must operate at the required speed.
How well any protective-relaying equipment fulfills each of these requirements must be
known for each application.
The ultimate goal of protective relaying is to disconnect a faulty system element as quickly
as possible. Sensitivity and selectivity are essential to assure that the proper circuit breakers
will be tripped, but speed is the “pay-off.” The benefits to be gained from speed will be
considered later.
RELIABILITY
Protective practices are based on the probability of failure to the extent that present-day
practices are the result of years of experience in which the frequency of failure
undoubtedly has played a part. However, the probability of failure seldom if ever enters
directly into the choice of a particular type of relaying equipment except when, for one
reason or another, one finds it most difficult to apply the type that otherwise would be
used. In any event, the probability of failure should be considered only together with the
consequences of failure should it occur. It has been said that the justification for a given
practice equals the likelihood of trouble times the cost of the trouble. Regardless of the
probability of failure, no portion of a system should be entirely without protection, even if
it is only back-up relaying.
Regardless of the rules of good relaying practice, one will occasionally have to choose
which rule may be broken with the least embarrassment. When one must choose between
the chance of undesired or unnecessary tripping and failure to trip when tripping is
desired, the best practice is generally to choose the former. Experience has shown that,
where major system shutdowns have resulted from one or the other, the failure to trip–or
excessive delay in tripping-has been by far the worse offender.
Although a modern power system could not operate without protective relaying, this does
not make it priceless. As in all good engineering, economics plays a large part. Although
the protection engineer can usually justify expenditures for protective relaying on the basis
of standard practice, circumstances may alter such concepts, and it often becomes
necessary to evaluate the benefits to be gained. It is generally not a question of whether
protective relaying can be justified, but of how far one should go toward investing in the
best relaying available.
Like all other parts of a power system, protective relaying should be evaluated on the basis
of its contribution to the best economically possible service to the customers. The
contribution of protective relaying is to help the rest of the power system to function as
efficiently and as effectively as possible in the face of trouble.2 How protective relaying does
this is as foIlows. By minimizing damage when failures occur, protective relaying
minimizes:
A. The cost of repairing the damage.
B. The likelihood that the trouble may spread and involve other equipment.
C. The time that the equipment is out of service.
D. The loss in revenue and the strained public relations while the equipment is out of
service.
By expediting the equipment’s return to service, protective relaying helps to minimize the
amount of equipment reserve required, since there is less likelihood of another failure
before the first failure can be repaired.
Fig. 4. Curves illustrating the relation between relay-plus-breaker time and the maximum
amount of power that can be transmitted over one particular system without loss
of synchronism when various faults occur.
Arc Extinguishers
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•An
An Arc Extinguisher is the component of
the circuit breaker that extinguishes an arc
when the contacts are opened
opened.
•An arc is a discharge of electric current
crossing a gap between two contacts
contacts.
• Circuit breakers must be designed to
control them because arcs cannot be
prevented.
•There are four techniques to extinguish an
arc and there are several arc control
methods.
methods
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What is an Arc?
Do you ever recall pulling a plug from a
wall socket and seeing what appeared to
be sparks?
What you were observing,
observing on a very small
scale, was an attempt at arc formation
between
bet ee tthee wall
a cocontacts
tacts a
andd tthe
ep plug
ug
contacts in your hand.
For the sake of this discussion,, let's
define an arc as a discharge of electric
current crossing a gap between two
contacts.
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Arcs are formed when the contacts of a circuit
breaker are opened
p under a load.
Arcs can be very destructive and vary greatly in
size and intensity.
The size of the arc depends on the amount of
current present when the contacts are pulled
apart.
F example,
For l an arc th thatt fforms when
h normall
load current is broken is insignificant compared
t th
to the arc th
thatt fforms when
h a shorth t circuit
i it iis
broken.
Because arcs cannot be prevented, circuit
breakers must be designed to control them.
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Circuit breakers take this process into account
by simultaneously opening the contacts and
extinguishing the arc.
arc
The successful extinguishing of the arc depends
on the Dielectric Strength of the gap between
the contacts.
The dielectric strength is the maximum voltage a
dielectric can withstand without breaking down.
A Dielectric is any insulating material between
two conductors
conductors.
In these discussions, the circuit breaker contacts
are the conductors and the insulating material
can be air, gas or a vacuum.
If the dielectric strength is greater than the
voltage trying to re
re--ignite the arc, the arc
extinguishing will be successful.
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A c Cont
Arc Control
ol Techniques
Techniq es
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St t hi A
Stretching Arc
B ki Arc
Breaking A into
i t Smaller
S ll Pieces
Pi
Blowing
g Out Arc
In this method,
a high-
high-pressure
gas blows the
arc into an arc
divider to be
extinguished
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Enclosing Contacts
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Enclosing Contacts
In this method,
method the contacts are housed in an oxygen
oxygen--
free enclosure with a dielectric such as a vacuum, gas or
cooling oil.
Without oxygen, the arc cannot sustain itself and the
arc is extinguished. EEED-BVRIT
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Arc
A c Control
Cont ol Methods
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A c chute
Arc ch te method
The arc chute method only uses the Breaking
Arc into Smaller Pieces technique.
Arc chutes are normally associated with low
voltage circuit breakers due to efficiency and
cost
cost.
In general, an arc chute will confine, divide and
cooll an arc, resulting
lti ini the
th arc being
b i unable bl to
t
sustain itself.
There is one arc chute for each set of contacts.
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Vacuum
Vac m Interrupter
Inte pte Method
The vacuum interrupter
p method uses the Enclosing
g
Contacts technique to extinguish arcs.
The vacuum enables the contacts to be smaller and
eliminates the divider,
divider making this method the most
cost effective and efficient above 1000V.
One vacuum interrupter is provided for each set of
contacts.
t t
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Arcing takes place
within a sealed
evacuated enclosure.
The contacts are
located inside and
arcing occurs when the
contacts are separated.
Because the
environment inside the
interrupter envelope is
a vacuum, an arc
cannot be easily
easil
sustained. It will not
reach the intensity
possible with an arch
chute. EEED-BVRIT
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SF6 method
The SF6 method also uses the Enclosing Contacts
technique.
It was a precursor to the vacuum interrupter and used
SF6 gas as the dielectric.
The heat energy
gy created byy the arc works to break
apart the SF6 molecules.
The larger the arc, the greater the breakdown of the
gas which aids in extinguishing the arc.
The technology is related more to European
manufacturers of medium and higher voltage circuit
breakers.
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minimum
minim m oil method
The minimum oil method also uses Enclosing Contacts
with oil as the dielectric.
The arc energy is absorbed as it rips hydrogen away
from the oil molecule.
The oil itself also helps
p to cool the arc.
As current zero is approached, more oil is drawn into
the system, further cooling and Deionizing the arc.
It is used today in low voltage situations and
potentially explosive environments where an arc chute
is not desirable.
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p ffe method
puffer
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CIRCUIT BREAKERS
The circuit breaker is the most important and
p
complicated of all types
yp of power
p circuit interruption
p
equipment. This is due to its highly important
p y of interrupting
capability p g the ppowerful short circuit
current, over and above its normal role of
g, isolatingg and interrupting
conducting, p g nominal load
currents.
Circuit Breakers have two basic functions
•Switching
• F lt interruption
Fault i t ti
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Arcing Chamber
• It is a closed volume containing a fixed contact,
a moving contact and the interrupting medium.
medium
• An arc is created when the contacts part. The
i t
interrupting
ti medium
di i
is responsible
ibl f
for
quenching the arc and establishing the nominal
l l off isolation
level i l ti between
b t th open contacts.
the t t
• Several chambers may be connected in series to
serve higher voltage levels. In this case a grading
capacitor is installed in parallel with each chamber
to balance the voltage across the contacts when
parting.
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Insertion resistor
• The sudden modification of circuit
characteristics,, when circuit breakers operate,
p ,
produces peak voltage impulses where the level
is determined byy the circuit characteristics.
These impulses may reach very high levels and
must be reduced. A well-known method is
closing or opening in two or three steps on
resistors.
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Operating Mechanism
• The operating mechanism is where the needed
energy to part the contacts and to extinguish the
arc is developed.
developed
• The most common operating mechanisms in
circuit
i it breakers
b k are
• Spring operated
• Hydraulically operated
• Pneumatically operated.
operated
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Control
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Functioning Characteristics
• Correct function
• The circuit breaker control must ensure correct
closing action, whatever the closing current value,
and ensure breaking (opening) at the required
moment by releasing,
releasing by mechanical action or via a
relay, the energy stored in the accumulators.
• Operation cycles
• The circuit breaker has to be capable of executing
different operation cycles and achieve fast breaking
of short circuit currents -- the faster, the better for
the network.
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• A circuit
i i breaker
b k h
has to interrupt
i weak k
capacitive or inductive currents, up to high
short
h t circuit
i it currentst and, d as a result,lt tot
extinguish powerful electric arcs. The main
problem
bl i then,
is th essentially,
ti ll an arcing
i problem.
bl
Another problem is over voltage impulses; this
i related
is l t d to
t the
th nature
t off the
th circuit
i it where
h it is
i
installed.
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Interrupting Medium
• Mineral oil
• Compressed air
• Sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)
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Fault Current
PLOT
Graph additional
IFAULT VFAULT
+35 information
peak 32 pu
annotations (41 kA) line
thickness
I [pu], V [pu]
+12.5
Fault
Inception
US
CL
UN U1 U2
US
Fault!
IS 10
UN
rated current 5
Us 0 US
Fault! -5
-10
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 t [ms]
US
CL
UN U1 U2
US
Fault!
IS 10
UN
rated current 5
Us 0 US
Fault! -5
-10
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 t [ms]
US
CL
UN U1 U2
US
Fault!
IS 10
UN
rated current 5
Us 0 US
Fault! -5
-10
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 t [ms]
US
CL
UN U1 U2
US
Fault!
IS 10
UN
rated current 5
Us 0 US
Fault! -5 1
f =
2 ⋅ π ⋅ LLCL
-10
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 t [ms]
1 2
t [µs]
10 A Residual Current US
Transient Recovery
Voltage (TRV)
1 2
t [µs]
10 A US
1 2
t [µs]
10 A Residual US
Current
Transient
New Current Rise
Recovery
Voltage (TRV)
Moving Contact
Voltage Collapse
Moving Contact
Dielectric Strength
insufficient Voltage Collapse
CB: modeling
• Mechanical delay time
(from command to contact separation): min 10...20 ms
w “opening time” = contact separation
w current interruption: default at zero crossing
• Arcing time: 1...5 cycles
w depending on CB type and current wave form
w include arcing time in “opening time”
• Arc modeling
w Arc voltage – current relationship highly complex
(parameters: CB design, thermodynamics)
generic models mostly insufficient – special modeling necessary
w zero arcing voltage for high voltage systems
w constant value (10...100 V) for low voltage systems