STAMFORD UNIVERSITY BANGLADESH

Assignment on
Maritime boundary Dispute Between
Germany, Netherlands and Denmark
Submitted to
Khurshed Alam
Stamford University, Bangladesh

Submitted By
Ahammed Jubaer Chowdhury
ID: LMF 075 06213

Date of Submission
25/02/2021
 Maritime boundary disputes between Germany, Netherlands and
Denmark or

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases

Maritime boundary disputes between Garmany, Netherlands and Denmark also

known as The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases were a series of disputes that came
to the International Court of Justice in 1969. They involved agreements among
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands regarding the ‘delimitation’ of areas—rich
in oil and gas – of the continental shelf in the North Sea.

The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases sets out the dual requirement for the
formation of custoary international law: (1) State practice and (2) oopinio Juris. In
these cases, the Court explained the criteria necessary to establish State practice –
widespread and representative participation. It highlighted that the practices of those
States whose interests were specially affected by the custom were especially relevant
in the formation of customary law. It also held that uniform and consistent practice
was necessary to demonstrate opinio juris- opinio juris is teh belief that State practice
amounts to a legal obligation. The North Sea Continental Self Cases also dispelled the
myth that duration of the practice ( i.e the number of years) was an essential factor in
forming customary international law.

The case involved the delimitation of the continental shelf areas in the North
Sea between Germany and Denmark and Germany and Netherlands beyond t he
partial boundaries previously agreed upon by these States. The parties requested the
Court to decide the principles’ and rules of international law that are applicable to the
above delimitation because the parties disagreed on the applicable principles or rules
of delimitation. Nethrlands and Denmark relied on the principles of equidistance (the
method of determining the boundaries in such a way that every point in the boundary
is equidistance from the nearest points of the baseline from which the breath of the
territorial sea of each state is measured). Germany sought to get a decision in favor of
the notion that the delimitation of the relevant continental shelf was governed by the
principle that each coastal state is entitled to a just and equitable share (hereinafter
called just and equitable principle/method). Contrary to Denmark and Netherlands,
Germany argued that the principle of equidistance was neither a mandatory rule in
delimitation of the continental shelf nor a rule of customary international law that was
binding on Germany. The Court was not asked to delimit because the parties had
already agreed to delimit the continental shelf as between their countries, by
agreement, after the determination of the Court on the applicable principles.
Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on the equidistance
principle (A-B and C-D). An agreement on further prolongation of the boundary
proved difficult because Denmark and Netherlands wanted this prolongation to take
place based on the equidistance principle (B-E and D-E) where as Germany was of
the view that, together, these two boundaries would produce an inequitable result for
her. Germany stated that due to its concave coastline, such a line would result in her
loosing out on her share of the continental shelf based on proportionality to the length
of its North Sea coastline. The Court had to decide the principles and rules of
international law applicable to this delimitation. In doing so, the Court had to decide if
the principles espoused by the parties were binding on the parties either through treaty
law or customary international law.

Germany's North Sea coast is concave, while the Netherlands' and Denmark's
coasts are convex. If the delimitation had been determined by the equidistance
rule ("drawing a line each point of which is equally distant from each shore"),
Germany would have received a smaller portion of the resource-rich shelf relative to
the two other states. Thus Germany argued that the length of the coastlines be used to
determine the delimitation.Germany wanted the ICJ to apportion the Continental
Shelf to the proportion of the size of the state's adjacent land, which Germany found
to be 'a just and equitable share', and not by the rule of equidistance.
Article 6

1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more
States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental
shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is
justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point
of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent
States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement
between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line
is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by
application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is
measured.
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are drawn
in accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article
should be defined with reference to charts and geographical features as they
exist at a particular date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent
identifiable points on the land.

Relevant is that Denmark and The Netherlands, having ratified the 1958 Geneva
Continental Shelf Convention, whereas the Federal Republic of Germany did not,
wished that Article 6, p. 2 (equidistance principle) were to be applied.
 An important question the Court answered was if the equidistance principle
was, at the date of the ruling, a customary international law binding on all States. The
Court argued that it is indeed possible for Conventions, while only contractual in
origin, to pass into the corpus of international law, and thus become binding for
countries which have never become parties to the Convention. However, the Court
notes that 'this result is not lightly to be regarded as having been attained' For the
aforegoing to happen, it would first be necessary that the provision should be of a
fundamentally norm creating character, i.e. a general rule of law. In case, the
obligation of the equidistance method came second, after the primary obligation to
effect delimitation by agreement. The court decides this is an unusual preface for it to
be a general rule of law. Furthermore, the Court took in notion that the scope and
meaning relating to the equidistance as embodied in Article 6 remained unclear. In
para 74, the Court argues that while the passage of any considerable period of time is
not a requirement, it is an indispensable requirement that within the period in question
State practice should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of
the provision invoked.

Moreover, as stated in para 77, the practice must also, as a subjective element, stem
from a notion of opinio juris sive necessitates. In other words, the States concerned
must feel they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.

The Court ultimately urged the parties to "abat[e] the effects of an incidental special
feature [Germany's concave coast] from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment
could result." In subsequent negotiations, the states granted to Germany most of the
additional shelf it sought. The cases are viewed as an example of "equity praetors"—
that is, equity "beyond the law"—when a judge supplements the law with equitable
rules necessary to decide the case at hand