Geed 201643 - Business Logic Instructional Material

Polytechnic University of the Philippines
STA MARIA BULACAN CAMPUS

Pulong Buhangin, Sta Maria, Bulacan
Course Code and Description – GEED 201643 – BUSINESS
LOGIC
Introduction
This course aims to develop student’s analytical and critical thinking skills in business
practice, accounting system in particular. Learning business logic is a lot like learning a reading and
comprehension in literature and learning mathematics. This course requires that student learn
certain skills – and in order to learn any skill, comprehension, analysis, critical thinking and problem
solving. This cannot be perfected in a short time but students have to practice. It is not enough
merely to come to class and read the book in the resources section of the syllabus – you have to put
in time working on your own. Towards this end, I will be assigning lots of practice problems as quiz,
discussion forum, assignment, watch videos, blog, and presentations. Students are expected to
improve reading skills, comprehension, judgment and inferences.
Learning Objectives
At the end of this course, the students will be able to:
1. Appreciate for the complexity of language, and systems in accounting

2. Establish effective methods of resolution for a variety of disagreements in accounting system
3. identify common fallacies in arguments;
4. Identify the structure of different kinds of arguments in accounting system,
5. Recognize and evaluate different kinds of arguments;
6. Apply the principles of logic to accounting reasoning in budgeting, financial analysis,
forecasting and decision making;
7. Develop some facility in symbolic manipulations,

8. Demonstrate the ability to think critically, and,
9. Demonstrate the proper use of logic as a reasonable way to solve problems in the
Accounting System.
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Course Materials
Week 1 - Lesson 1 - Introduction to Business Logic
Unit 1 - Logic as a Tool

Business logic is a representation of how a company is structured: number of divisions,
offices, employees, contractors, how they roll up, and payment terms for vendors, customers,
employees and so on. It is also important that we understand the reasons why accounting system is
a must in business.
Here are some basic scenarios:
 Budget records that are dependent on other records, key performance indicators or other
driver-based productivity data. For example, salaries of employees. Other accounts such as
loans, basic deductions (tax, Philhealth, SSS, Pagibig Fund), must be deducted and other
data like retroactive payments or underpayments might be added to the basic receivables of
the employee.
 Spread of expenses and revenues according to pre-existing spread methods
 Application of customer receivable terms and vendor payment terms to cash received and
disbursed in the correct budget periods and other logic
It’s no secret that the world of accounting is run by credits and debits. Debits and credits make a
book’s world go ‘round. It is important to run down the golden principles of accounting to brush up on
debit and credit. Debits and credits are equal but opposite entries in your accounting books. Credits
and debits affect the five core types of accounts:
 Assets: Resources owned by a business which have economic value you can convert into
cash (e.g., land, equipment, cash, vehicles)
 Expenses: Costs that occur during business operations (e.g., wages, supplies)
 Liabilities: Amounts owed to another person or business (e.g., accounts payable)
 Equity: Your assets minus your liabilities
 Income and revenue: Cash earned from sales
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It is important that we remember these basic logic in accounting:
 A debit is an entry made on the left side of an account. Debits increase an asset or expense
account or decrease equity, liability, or revenue accounts.
 A credit is an entry made on the right side of an account. Credits increase equity, liability,
and revenue accounts and decrease asset and expense accounts.
 You must record credits and debits for each transaction.
The Golden Rules of Accounting also revolve around debits and credits.
1. Debit the receiver and credit the giver

2. Debit what comes in and credit what goes out
3. Debit expenses and losses, credit income and gains
Types of Account Account to be debited Account to be credited

Assets account Increase Decrease
Liabilities account Decrease Increase
Capital account Decrease Increase
Revenue account Decrease Increase
Expenditure account Increase Decrease
Withdrawal account Increase Decrease
To make a budget useful, you need to incorporate some business logic into it. This is where
the myriad of formulas and links among the many spread sheets come into play. They must
represent the particular conditions and sequence that drive business, and the many nuances unique
to each of its company operations. We can’t just use a generic spread sheet model or any of the
various dedicated budgeting software solutions, right out of the box, and hope to be able to deliver a
meaningful and useful annual budget. We have to understand the logic behind each cells, formula,
and logical order of the spread sheet to evaluate viability and effectiveness of the system.
Unit 2 - Validity and Soundness
Validity and soundness of a statement or any claim, whether in our personal or in business
has to be proven. It is not only used in courtroom but every day of our life. Learning Validity and
soundness of statement and, or a system in business is very critical.
To illustrate:
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Argument: A business has to prove its validity and
soundness.
Premise: A business has its system.
Conclusion: Therefore, all business system has to prove its validity and soundness.
To understand further, let us understand what deductive reasoning and how it is done in business.
Deductive reasoning, also deductive logic, is the process of reasoning from one or more
statements (premises) to reach a logically certain conclusion. Deductive reasoning goes in the
same direction as that of the conditionals, and links premises with conclusions.
The example illustrated is both valid and sound.
Please consider:
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Deductive argument: involves the claim that the truth of its premises guarantees the truth of its
conclusion; the terms valid and invalid are used to characterize deductive arguments. A deductive
argument succeeds when, if you accept the evidence as true (the premises), you must accept the
conclusion.
Inductive argument: involves the claim that the truth of its premises provides some grounds for its
conclusion or makes the conclusion more probable; the terms valid and invalid cannot be applied.
Valid: an argument is valid if and only if it is necessary that if all of the premises are true, then the
conclusion is true; if all the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true; it is impossible that
all the premises are true and the conclusion is false.
Invalid: an argument that is not valid. We can test for invalidity by assuming that all the premises
are true and seeing whether it is still possible for the conclusion to be false. If this is possible, the
argument is invalid.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the
premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
Otherwise, a deductive argument is said to be invalid. A deductive argument is sound if and only if it
is both valid, and all of its premises are actually true. Otherwise, a deductive argument is unsound.
According to the definition of a deductive argument (see the Deduction and Induction), the author of
a deductive argument always intends that the premises provide the sort of justification for the
conclusion whereby if the premises are true, the conclusion is guaranteed to be true as well. Loosely
speaking, if the author’s process of reasoning is a good one, if the premises actually do provide this
sort of justification for the conclusion, then the argument is valid.
In effect, an argument is valid if the truth of the premises logically guarantees the truth of the
conclusion. The following argument is valid, because it is impossible for the premises to be true and
the conclusion nevertheless to be false:
Elizabeth owns either a Honda or a Saturn.
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Elizabeth does not own a Honda.
Therefore, Elizabeth owns a Saturn.
It is important to stress that the premises of an argument do not have actually to be true in order for
the argument to be valid. An argument is valid if the premises and conclusion are related to each
other in the right way so that if the premises were true, then the conclusion would have to be true as
well. We can recognize in the above case that even if one of the premises is actually false, that if
they had been true the conclusion would have been true as well. Consider, then an argument such
as the following:
All toasters are items made of gold.

All items made of gold are time-travel devices.
Therefore, all toasters are time-travel devices.
Obviously, the premises in this argument are not true. It may be hard to imagine these premises
being true, but it is not hard to see that if they were true, their truth would logically guarantee the
conclusion’s truth.
It is easy to see that the previous example is not an example of a completely good argument. A valid
argument may still have a false conclusion. When we construct our arguments, we must aim to
construct one that is not only valid, but sound.
A sound argument is one that is not only valid, but begins with premises that are actually true. The
example given about toasters is valid, but not sound. However, the following argument is both valid
and sound:
In some states, no felons are eligible voters, that is, eligible to vote.
In those states, some professional athletes are felons.
Therefore, in some states, some professional athletes are not eligible voters.
Here, not only do the premises provide the right sort of support for the conclusion, but the premises
are actually true. Therefore, so is the conclusion. Although it is not part of the definition of a sound
argument, because sound arguments both start out with true premises and have a form that
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guarantees that the conclusion must be true if the premises are, sound
arguments always end with true conclusions.
It should be noted that both invalid, as well as valid but unsound, arguments can nevertheless have
true conclusions. One cannot reject the conclusion of an argument simply by discovering a given
argument for that conclusion to be flawed.
Whether or not the premises of an argument are true depends on their specific content. However,
according to the dominant understanding among logicians, the validity or invalidity of an argument is
determined entirely by its logical form. The logical form of an argument is that which remains of it
when one abstracts away from the specific content of the premises and the conclusion, that is,
words naming things, their properties and relations, leaving only those elements that are common to
discourse and reasoning about any subject matter, that is, words such as “all,” “and,” “not,” “some,”
and so forth. One can represent the logical form of an argument by replacing the specific content
words with letters used as place-holders or variables.
For example, consider these two arguments:
All tigers are mammals.

No mammals are creatures with scales.
Therefore, no tigers are creatures with scales.
All spider monkeys are elephants.

No elephants are animals.
Therefore, no spider monkeys are animals.
These arguments share the same form:
All A are B;
No B are C;
Therefore, No A are C.
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All arguments with this form are valid. Because they have this form, the
examples above are valid. However, the first example is sound while the second is unsound,
because its premises are false. Now consider:
All basketballs are round.

The Earth is round.
Therefore, the Earth is a basketball.
All popes reside at the Vatican.

John Paul II resides at the Vatican.
Therefore, John Paul II is a pope.
These arguments also have the same form:
All A’s are F;

X is F;
Therefore, X is an A.
Arguments with this form are invalid. This is easy to see with the first example. The second example
may seem like a good argument because the premises and the conclusion are all true, but note that
the conclusion’s truth isn’t guaranteed by the premises’ truth. It could have been possible for the
premises to be true and the conclusion false. This argument is invalid, and all invalid arguments are
unsound.
While it is accepted by most contemporary logicians that logical validity and invalidity is determined
entirely by form, there is some dissent. Consider, for example, the following arguments:
My table is circular. Therefore, it is not square shaped.
Juan is a bachelor. Therefore, he is not married.
These arguments, at least on the surface, have the form:
x is F;
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Therefore, x is not G.
Arguments of this form are not valid as a rule. However, it seems clear in these particular cases that
it is, in some strong sense, impossible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false.
However, many logicians would respond to these complications in various ways. Some might insist–
although this is controversial–that these arguments actually contain implicit premises such as
“Nothing is both circular and square shaped” or “All bachelors are unmarried,” which, while
themselves necessary truths, nevertheless play a role in the form of these arguments. It might also
be suggested, especially with the first argument, that while (even without the additional premise)
there is a necessary connection between the premise and the conclusion, the sort of necessity
involved is something other than “logical” necessity, and hence that this argument (in the simple
form) should not be regarded as logically valid. Lastly, especially with regard to the second example,
it might be suggested that because “bachelor” is defined as “adult unmarried male”, that the true
logical form of the argument is the following universally valid form:
x is F and not G and H;

Therefore, x is not G.
The logical form of a statement is not always as easy to discern as one might expect. For example,
statements that seem to have the same surface grammar can nevertheless differ in logical form.
Take for example the two statements:
(1) Tony is a ferocious tiger.

(2) Clinton is a lame duck.
Despite their apparent similarity, only (1) has the form “x is a A that is F.” From it one can validly
infer that Tony is a tiger. One cannot validly infer from (2) that Clinton is a duck. Indeed, one and the
same sentence can be used in different ways in different contexts. Consider the statement:
(3) The King and Queen are visiting dignitaries.
It is not clear what the logical form of this statement is. Either there are dignitaries that the King and
Queen are visiting, in which case the sentence (3) has the same logical form as “The King and
Queen are playing violins,” or the King and Queen are themselves the dignitaries who are visiting
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from somewhere else, in which case the sentence has the same logical form as
“The King and Queen are sniveling cowards.” Depending on which logical form the statement has,
inferences may be valid or invalid. Consider:
The King and Queen are visiting dignitaries. Visiting dignitaries is always boring. Therefore, the King
and Queen are doing something boring.
Only if the statement is given the first reading can this argument be considered to be valid.
Because of the difficulty in identifying the logical form of an argument, and the potential deviation of
logical form from grammatical form in ordinary language, contemporary logicians typically make use
of artificial logical languages in which logical form and grammatical form coincide. In these artificial
languages, certain symbols, similar to those used in mathematics, are used to represent those
elements of form analogous to ordinary English words such as “all”, “not”, “or”, “and”, and so forth.
The use of an artificially constructed language makes it easier to specify a set of rules that
determine whether or not a given argument is valid or invalid. Hence, the study of which deductive
argument forms are valid and which are invalid is often called “formal logic” or “symbolic logic.”
In short, a deductive argument must be evaluated in two ways. First, one must ask if the premises
provide support for the conclusion by examing the form of the argument. If they do, then the
argument is valid. Then, one must ask whether the premises are true or false in actuality. Only if an
argument passes both these tests is it sound. However, if an argument does not pass these tests, its
conclusion may still be true, despite that no support for its truth is given by the argument.
Activity/Assessment 1
PRACTICE EXERCISES 1 – 5: Test the validity of each argument:

1. If I plant a tree, then I will get dirt under my nails. I didn’t get dirt under my nails. Therefore, I didn’t
plant a tree.
2. If I don’t change my oil regularly, my engine will die. My engine died. Thus, I didn’t change my oil
regularly.
3. All frogs are amphibians. All frogs have gills. Therefore, all amphibians have gills.
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4. You will meet a tall, handsome stranger or you will stay home and pick fleas
off of your cat. You didn’t meet and tall, handsome stranger. Therefore, you stayed home and picked
fleas off of your cat.
5. If I don’t tie my shoes, then I trip. I didn’t tie my shoes. Hence, I tripped.
Additional Resources
Please Watch:
1. Validity: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kdJ6aGToDlo
2. https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/terms.concepts/valid.sound.html
Soundness of Business https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3P0fUHUaZcs
3. Practice Test: https://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/tvs_quiz.html
Reference:
Logic Is a Tool for Helping Us Think | An Introduction to Formal Logic | Professor Chat: Gimbel
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0fzu8qtw6U
“Logical Consequence” in this encyclopedia. The articles on “Argument” and “Deductive and
Inductive Arguments.” Retrieved at https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
ith conclusions.
Deductive reasoning - Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org › wiki › Deductive_reasoning
Week 2 - Lesson 2 Business Apprehension
Unit 1 - The Nature of Simple Apprehensions.
Simple apprehension is the act of perceiving an object intellectually, without affirming or denying
anything concerning it. It is what the mind grasps the concept or general meaning of an object
without affirming or denying anything about it. Are all perceptions true? It may be false.
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The word simple added to apprehension emphasizes the fact that the
apprehension neither affirms nor denies the existence of the object; it affirms nothing and denies
nothing, it simply conceives the idea of the object.
To apprehend is to take hold of a thing as if with the hand; an apprehension, as an act of the mind,
is an intellectual grasping of an object. The mind cannot take an object physically into itself; but it
knows an object by taking it in intellectually, in a manner suited to its own nature; forming to itself an
intellectual image, called a species of the object. The act of forming this mental image is called
a conception, and the fruit of it, the image itself, is the concept, idea or notion of the object.
Unit 2 – Definition of Terms
Definition of words is a mental image of an object. Once an individual desires to communicate his
ideas to other men, he verbalizes the idea with a word, phrase or term.•TermTerm – the word or
phrase by which we express our idea. •A term may be defined as a word or phrase which serves as
a conventional sign of an idea.object idea term.
The Basic TERMS Used in Business Logic:
P = Major term – the predicate term of the conclusion contained in the major premise.
S = Minor Term – the subject term of the conclusion contained in the minor premise
M = Middle Term – common and found in both premises.
⋀ = used for AND: (A and B is notated A ⋀ B).
⋁ = used for OR: A or B is notated A ⋁ B
~ = used for NOT: not A is notated ~A
¬ = negation
→ = is
() = universal quantification
( ) = precedence
: ⇔ = logically equivalent, example is P :⇔ Q means P is defined to be logically equivalent to Q.
Activity/Assessment 2 –
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Week 3 and 4
Lesson 3 - Judgment
Unit 1 - Judgment and Proposition
A judgment may be defined as an act of the mind affirming or denying the agreement of two
objective ideas. The mind in judging compares two ideas, and consequently the objects represented
by those ideas, and affirms or denies that they agree with one another; e.g., 'beauty is
praiseworthy,'(objective), while, 'beauty is not worthy of praise.' (subjective). If, as in this example,
the agreement or disagreement is seen to exist by the mere consideration or analysis of the ideas
compared, the judgment is analytic; it is important to establish grounds of the definition of beauty to
rule out subjectivity., i.e., formed antecedently to experience; or pure, i.e., formed by pure reason,
not learned by sense-perception; or again, it may be called necessary,
absolute, or metaphysical; according to the obvious meanings of those terms.
But if the agreement or disagreement is discovered consequently on experience, e.g., 'beauty is not

worth the praise,' the judgment receives the opposite appellations of synthetic, a posteriori,
experimental; contingent, conditional; and physical. Definition of the argument is subjective.
If a judgment of either kind is arrived at by reasoning, it is mediately evident; if the agreement or

disagreement is seen without the aid of reasoning, the judgment is immediately evident. That 'ice
is cold,' is an immediate a posteriori judgment; that 'there is nothing without a reason for it,' is
immediately known a priori; that 'the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles,' is
known immediately a priori; the physical laws are known immediately a posteriori.
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Please watch:
Propositional Logic: Introduction https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qV4htTfow-E
Unit 2 - Categorical Proposition
A judgment expressed in words is called a proposition. The subject and predicate together are
its matter, and the affirmation or negation its form; the copula is always the verb 'to be' in the
present indicative, expressed or implied:
'I see' is equivalent to 'I am seeing,'
'He said' to 'He is one who said,' etc.
Propositions to be negative, word affect the copula. Now, it often requires some reflection to see
what word is intended to be affected by the negation:
'No criminal is a happy man' means 'A criminal is not a happy man';
'A tyrant has no peace' means 'A tyrant is not one having peace.'
In propositions it is of the highest importance for correct reasoning that we carefully attend to
the extension and the comprehension of the terms used and of the ideas for which they stand.
If we consider the extension of the subject, a proposition is styled singular,

particular, or universal; according as its subject expresses a singular, particular, or universal idea.
The form of the term expressing that idea may be misleading, the meaning must be carefully
considered.
Thus, 'a man is a creature,' 'man is a creature,' 'all men are creatures,' 'every man is a creature,'
In accounting system:
Purchases can be in cash and terms.

Purchases are not made in cash.
Therefore, all purchases are in terms.
II. If we consider the extension and the comprehension of the predicate, we have the following
rules:
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1. In an affirmative proposition the predicate is taken in its full
comprehension, but not (except in definitions) in its full extension. For instance,
'Purchases can in cash and terms' means that purchases has all the notes constituting an
asset, but not that it is every purchases. We say 'except in definitions,' for in these the
defining words, which are the predicate, must have the same extension as the thing
defined, expressed in the subject; e.g., 'purchases,'
2. In a negative proposition the reverse holds true, i.e., the predicate is taken in its full
extension, but not in its full comprehension. For instance, 'a diamond is not a metal'
denies that the diamond is contained in the whole class of metals; but it does not deny
that it has qualities in common with metals, since it is a substance, material, lustrous, etc.,
as well as metals. The extension of the subject determines the quantity of a proposition;
its quality depends on its form, i.e., on its being affirmative or negative.
3. In reasoning we must distinguish between hypothetical and categorical propositions.
Unit 3 - Hypothetical Proposition
The hypothetical proposition does not affirm or deny the agreement of subject and predicate
absolutely, but dependently on some supposition or condition, or with a possible alternative. It is
distinguished from the categorical, who directly affirms or denies the agreement between a subject
and a predicate without any condition or alternative. (https://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/etext/lamp01.htm).
Three Kinds Hypothetical Proposition
1. The conditional, consisting of two parts, one of which is declared to be the condition of the

other.
1.1 Condition or antecedent is expressing the condition - If the connection is true, the
proposition is true. Thus, 'If you know customer well, you would serve them,' is certainly
true;
1.2 Conditioned or consequent. - 'If you serve customer, you will be rich,' may be false.
To illustrate Conditional Propositions:
“If it rains this afternoon, then I will carry an umbrella” is a proposition.
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Is the proposition true or false?
 True if it rains and I carry an umbrella.
 False if it rains and I don’t carry an umbrella. –
What if it doesn’t rain?
If p and q are propositions, the proposition “if p then q” is a conditional proposition.
Denoted p → q
 p is the hypothesis or antecedent.
 p is also called a sufficient condition.
 q is the conclusion or consequent.
 q is also called a necessary condition.
 p → q is another binary operator.
2. The disjunctive, which connects incompatible clauses by the disjunctive particle 'or'; as, 'A
being is either created or uncreated.' The proposition is true, if it leaves no alternative
unmentioned.
To illustrate:
If A is true, then A and B is true (disjunctive introduction).
If you know A and B, and you know B is false, then A is true.(disjunctive elimination)
If you assume A is with B, and B arrive at A, you can conclude A and B are together.
3. The conjunctive, which denies that two things can exist or hold true, at the same time;
as, “there is no relationship between operations and accounting system.”
Unit 4 - Equivalence of Proposition
Equivalence of propositions in logic refers to the formation of a proposition from two others which

are linked by the phrase “if, and only if.”
The equivalence formed from two propositions p and q also may be defined by the statement “p

is a necessary and sufficient condition for q.” (www.britanica.com).
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Consider, for example, the proposition ‘A differs from B’. The constituents of
this proposition, if we analyze it, appear to be only A, difference, B. Yet these constituents, thus
placed side by side, do not reconstitute the proposition. The difference which occurs in the
proposition actually relates A and B, whereas the difference after analysis is a notion which has
no connection with A and B. (Russell [1903] p. 49)
To illustrate:
If you know A, and you know B, you can conclude A ∧B
If you assumed A, and you arrived at a contradiction, then you can say A is true.
Law of Syllogism:
If you know A and B, and you know B knows C, you can conclude A knows C.
Activity/Assessment 3
Translate the following proposition into the most natural equivalent statement.
Try to make the sentence as simple and as natural as possible: (M → H)∧(S →C)
Any of the following solutions (and similar) are equally valid:
“The homework is done when mathematics is easy, and camping is fun when it is sunny.” “If
mathematics is easy then the homework is done, and if it is sunny then camping is fun.”
Create a 10 equivalent statement that represent the same example.
Critical Thinking: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dItUGF8GdTw
Structured Propositions at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions-structured/
Wodarz, 2008. Conditional Propositions and Logical Equivalence. Retrieved at
https://www4.uwsp.edu/math/nwodarz/Math209Files/209-0809F-L02-Section01_02-
Conditional_Propositions_and_Logical_Equivalence-Notes.pdf
Week 5, 6, 7 ,8 and 9
Lesson 4 - Reasoning and Inferences
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Inferences are steps in reasoning, moving from premises to logical consequences; the

word infers means to "carry forward". Deduction is inference deriving logical conclusions from
premises known or assumed to be true, with the laws of valid inference being studied in logic
(Wikipedia.com)
The inference is the logical set of connections that take us from one place (the premise) to
another (the conclusion).
On the other hand, Reasoning, are a list of factors that are designed to make people aware of
the different elements involved in the process of reasoning. The Elements of Reasoning
framework is developed by the Foundation for Critical Thinking. 1 Within this framework reasoning
is understood as a process where people use data, information and assumptions to infer
conclusions from a perspective, in attempting to answer a question or solve a problem, with
consequences then resulting from the conclusions drawn.
Unit 1 - Inference and Syllogism
The Elements of Reasoning:
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1. Purpose refers to the deliberate effort to construct inferences so
as to reach justifiable conclusions that requires a degree of effort. Reasoning is a
skill. It is a skill that everyone has to some degree, but it is also a skill that everyone
can improve. In this respect effective reasoning involves; choosing significant and
realistic purposes; taking time to state one’s purpose clearly; distinguishing the given
purpose from related purposes; checking periodically to be sure one’s activities are
still aligned with the overall purpose of the reasoning process.
2. Solving Problem is a kind of mental activity that is focused in some way on solving a
problem; planning an action, studying for an exam, defending a position on a
controversial issue etc. To reason means to figure out with standards. All reasoning is an
attempt to figure something out or to resolve a question.
This involves a number of factors; taking time to clearly and precisely state the question
at issue; possibly breaking the question into subquestions; expressing the question in
several ways to clarify its meaning and scope; Identifying if the question has one right
answer, is a matter of opinion, or requires reasoning from more than one point of view.
3. Assumptions is generally reasoning function at the unconscious or subconscious level
of thinking and thus typically have not been critically examined by the thinker that needs
to be validated. Assumptions are often the grounds for prejudices, stereotypes, biases,
distortions and other errors in one’s reasoning that one would not like to be aware of.
Effective reasoning means assessing these assumptions, as well as those of others, to
determine whether those assumptions are based on sound reasoning and evidence and
if not attempting to reconstruct them so.
People must want to seek out, in their thinking, unjustifiable assumptions generated and
maintained through naive egocentric or sociocentric tendencies. To achieve high
standards in thinking one must try to clearly identify one’s assumptions and determine
whether they are justifiable. In doing this it is necessary to exercise balanced judgment in
considering how assumptions are shaping one’s point of view.
4. Information All reasoning is based on data or information of some kind. A reason is
fundamentally based on evidence given and that evidence is ultimately information of
some kind. Whenever we construct a case, whether we are a researcher, a manager, a
lawyer, or just a child wishing to obtain more pocket money from their parents, if this is
done through reasoning then it will be based on information of some kind. An argument is
only ever as good as the premise and the information contained in those premises.
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Claims should be restricted to those supported by the information
provided. Information comes in varying degrees of quality, thus it is necessary to always
ask where the information is coming from and make some assessment to its potential
validity and accuracy. Search for information that opposes one’s position as well as
information that supports it. Make sure that all information used is clear, accurate, and
relevant to the question at issue. Make sure sufficient information has been gathered to
present a balanced case.6
5. Concept Not everything can be questioned all of the time, all reasoning is based on
some assumptions. People who think critically seek a clear understanding of the
assumptions they are making and the assumptions that underlie the reasoning of others.
They are able to distinguish between assumptions that are justifiable in the context and
those that are not. It is necessary to note that assumptions generally function at the
unconscious or subconscious level of thinking and thus typically have not been critically
examined by the thinker. Assumptions are often the grounds for prejudices, stereotypes,
biases, distortions and other errors in one’s reasoning that one would not like to be aware
of. Effective reasoning means assessing these assumptions, as well as those of others,
to determine whether those assumptions are based on sound reasoning and evidence
and if not attempting to reconstruct them so.
People must want to seek out, in their thinking, unjustifiable assumptions generated and
maintained through naive egocentric or sociocentric tendencies. To achieve high
standards in thinking one must try to clearly identify one’s assumptions and determine
whether they are justifiable. In doing this it is necessary to exercise balanced judgment in
considering how assumptions are shaping one’s point of view.s
6. Point of View All reasoning is done from some point of view. The world is complex and
any given phenomena may be understood from many different dimensions. If we take
just a single individual person and try to give definition to them, one will note the many
ways in which we could do this, social, psychological, economic, biological etc. all of
which would lead to different processes of reasoning and different conclusions.
One’s reasoning will only ever be a partial account of the world and it is important to
identify what is the main point of view that we are using and make this explicit. In
identifying points of view, one can seek other perspectives and identify their strengths as
well as weaknesses. In presenting one’s point of view and assessing the perspectives of
others, inclusiveness, open-mindedness, empathy and balance of judgment are
required. In contrast with preference, which is only ever a partial subjective interpretation,
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in seeking objective reasons one is looking for a balanced
assessment or judgment of different subjective accounts while maintaining an awareness
to one’s own perspective in reconstructing and judging them.
7. Implications Reasoning leads somewhere and has implications and consequences.
Thinking that leads nowhere has no value. Reasoning starts somewhere and takes up
somewhere else; to a new conclusion on an issue and these conclusions have
implications. For human beings, our thinking governs what we say and do which in turn
have implications; when we reach new conclusions these will have new implications. If
someone constructs an argument that there are for sure aliens on a planet nearby and
convinces others, then the implication of this is that people will invest their time and
energy in search for them. If we construct an argument for history as a linear process
leading to ever greater progress then we will expect the future to be such and act
accordingly; thinking has implications.
We often construct arguments and theories that are designed specifically to achieve
certain outcomes that we desire without considering what other implications are entailed
within that reasoning, or what would happen if it was generalized to all. Being responsible
for our thinking and actions means tracing out the implications and consequences that
follow from one’s reasoning, taking things to their natural conclusions and asking would
that lead to a rational outcome for all. For example, jumping in one’s car all the time to go
places may seem rational for the individual but it often leads to irrational outcomes when
generalized, i.e. traffic jams, air pollution, excess greenhouse gasses. In tracing out the
implications of our reasoning it is important to actively search for negative as well as
positive implications in the consideration of all possible consequences.
Unit 2 - Categorical Syllogism
Watch: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KcNESCrkIiQ
The Structure of Syllogism
A categorical syllogism is an argument consisting of exactly three categorical propositions (two

premises and a conclusion) in which there appear a total of exactly three categorical terms, each
of which is used exactly twice.
There are Term Used
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1. Minor Term - as the subject term of the conclusion of the syllogism,
and we call it the of the syllogism as a whole.
2. Major Term of the syllogism is whatever is employed as the predicate term of its
conclusion.
3. Middle Term is a term in the syllogism doesn't occur in the conclusion at all, but must be
employed in somewhere in each of its premises.
The Premise of Syllogism

Term Used Premise of Syllogism
Minor Term Minor Premise is minor term and middle
Middle Term term
Major Premise is middle Term and major

Major Term
Term
Consider, for example, the categorical syllogism:

No geese are felines. (MAJOR PREMISE)
MIDDLE TERM is GEESE.
Some birds are geese. (MINOR PREMISE)
Therefore, Some birds are not felines. (MAJOR TERM - the predicate term of its conclusion),
Clearly, "Some birds are not felines" is the conclusion of this syllogism. The major term of the
syllogism is "felines" (the predicate term of its conclusion), so "No geese are felines" (the
premise in which "felines" appears) is its major premise. Simlarly, the minor term of the syllogism
is "birds," and "Some birds are geese" is its minor premise. "geese" is the middle term of the
syllogism.
Standard Form
A standard form of categorical syllogism is always begins with the premises, major first and then
minor, and then finishes with the conclusion. Thus, the example above is already in standard
form. Although arguments in ordinary language may be offered in a different arrangement, it is
never difficult to restate them in standard form. Once we've identified the conclusion which is to
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be placed in the final position, whichever premise contains its predicate term
must be the major premise that should be stated first.
The Basic categorical syllogism has three (3) TERMS:
P = Major term – the predicate term of the conclusion contained in the major premise.
S = Minor Term – the subject term of the conclusion contained in the minor premise
M = Middle Term – common and found in both premises.
⋀ = used for AND: (A and B is notated A ⋀ B).
⋁ = used for OR: A or B is notated A ⋁ B
~ = used for NOT: not A is notated ~A
¬ = negation
→ = is
() = universal quantification
( ) = precedence
: ⇔ = logically equivalent, example is P :⇔ Q means P is defined to be logically equivalent to Q.
You can remember the first two symbols by relating them to the shapes for the union and
intersection. A ⋀ B would be the elements that exist in both sets, in A ⋂ B.
Likewise, A ⋁ B would be the elements that exist in either set, in A ⋃ B.
In the previous example, the truth table was really just summarizing what we already know about
how the or statement work. The truth tables for the basic and, or, and not statements are shown
below.
Basic Truth Table:
A B A^B
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F F
A B AVB
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T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
A ~A
T F
F T
Compound Syllogism
Truth tables really become useful when analyzing more complex Boolean statements.
Create a truth table for the statement A ⋀ ~(B ⋁ C)

It helps to work from the inside out when creating truth tables, and create tables for intermediate
operations. We start by listing all the possible truth value combinations for A, B, and C. Notice
how the first column contains 4 Ts followed by 4 Fs, the second column contains 2 Ts, 2 Fs, then
repeats, and the last column alternates. This pattern ensures that all combinations are
considered. Along with those initial values, we’ll list the truth values for the innermost
expression, B ⋁ C.
A S C BVC
T T T T
T T F T
T F T T
T F T F
F T T T
F F T T
F F T F
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F F F F
Next we can find the negation of B ⋁ C, working off the B ⋁ C column we just created.
A S C BVC ~( B V C)
T T T T F
T T F T F
T F Y T F
T F F F T
F T T T F
F T F T F
F F T T F
F F T T F
F F F F T
Finally, we find the values of A and ~(B ⋁ C)

A B C B ⋁ C ~(B ⋁ C) A ⋀ ~(B ⋁ C)
T T T T F F
T T F T F F
T F T T F F
T F F F T T
T T T T F F
T T F T F F
F F T T F F
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F F F T F
F
It turns out that this complex expression is only true in one case: if A is true, B is false, and C is
false.
Mood and Figure
Medieval logicians devised a simple way of labelling the various forms in which a categorical
syllogism may occur by stating its mood and figure.
The mood of a syllogism is simply a statement of which categorical propositions:

 (A, E, I, or O) it comprises, listed in the order in which they appear in standard form.
 Thus, a syllogism with a mood of OAO has an O proposition as its major premise,
an A proposition as its minor premise, and another O proposition as its conclusion; and
 EIO syllogism has an E major premise, and I minor premise, and an O conclusion;
etc.
To simplify: E = the statement’s major premise

I = the statement’s minor premise
O = Conclusion
Since there are four distinct versions of each syllogistic mood, however, we need to supplement
this labelling system with a statement of the figure of each, which is solely determined by the
position in which its middle term appears in the two premises:
 1st figure syllogism, the middle term is the subject term of the major premise and the
predicate term of the minor premise;
 2nd figure syllogism, the middle term is the predicate term of both premises;
 3rd figure syllogism, the subject term of both premises;
 4th figure, the middle term appears as the predicate term of the major premise and the
subject term of the minor premise.
The four figures may be easier to remember as a simple chart showing the position of the terms in
each of the premises:
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M P P M M P P M
1 2 I 3 I 4 /
S M S M M S M S
All told, there are exactly 256 distinct forms of categorical syllogism: four kinds of major premise
multiplied by four kinds of minor premise multiplied by four kinds of conclusion multiplied by four
relative positions of the middle term. Used together, mood and figure provide a unique way of
describing the logical structure of each of them.
Thus, for example, the argument:

"Some merchants are pirates,
All merchants are swimmers,
so Some swimmers are pirates”
To express this in syllogism is:
IAI-3 syllogism, and any AEE-4 syllogism must exhibit the form

"All Pirates are Merchants, and
No Merchants are Swimmers,
so No Swimmers are Pirates."
OR expressed as:
"All Pirates are M, and

No M are S,
so No S are P."
Form and Validity
This method of differentiating syllogisms is significant because the validity of a categorical

syllogism depends solely upon its logical form.
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Remember our earlier definition: an argument is valid when, if its premises were true, then its
conclusion would also have to be true.
If a syllogism is valid, it is impossible for its premises to be true while its conclusion is false,
and that can be the case only if there is something faulty in its general form.
Thus, the specific syllogisms that share any one of the 256 distinct syllogistic forms must either
all be valid or all be invalid, no matter what their content happens to be.
Every syllogism of the form AAA-1 is valid, for example, while all syllogisms of the form OEE-
3 are invalid.
This suggests a fairly straightforward method of demonstrating the invalidity of any syllogism by
"logical analogy."
If we can think of another syllogism which has the same mood and figure but whose terms
obviously make both premises true and the conclusion false, then it is evident that all syllogisms
of this form, including the one with which we began, must be invalid.
Thus, for example, it may be difficult at first glance to assess the validity of the argument:
All philosophers are professors.
All philosophers are logicians.
Therefore, All logicians are professors.
But since this is a categorical syllogism whose mood and figure are AAA-3, and since all
syllogisms of the same form are equally valid or invalid, its reliability must be the same as that of
the AAA-3 syllogism:
All terriers are dogs.

All terriers are mammals.
Therefore, All mammals are dogs.
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Both premises of this syllogism are true, while its conclusion is false, so it is
clearly invalid. But then all syllogisms of the AAA-3 form, including the one about logicians and
professors, must also be invalid in any argument. Why?
This method of demonstrating the invalidity of categorical syllogisms is useful in many contexts;
even those who have not had the benefit of specialized training in formal logic will often
acknowledge the force of a logical analogy. The only problem is that the success of the method
depends upon our ability to invent appropriate cases, syllogisms of the same form that obviously
have true premises and a false conclusion.
Diagramming Syllogisms
The modern interpretation offers a more efficient method of evaluating the validity of categorical
syllogisms. By combining the drawings of individual propositions, we can use Venn diagrams to
assess the validity of categorical syllogisms by following a simple three-step procedure:
1. First draw three overlapping circles and label them to represent the major, minor, and middle
terms of the syllogism.
2. Next, on this framework, draw the diagrams of both of the syllogism's premises.
2.1 Always begin with a universal proposition, no matter whether it is the major or the minor
premise.
2.2 Remember that in each case you will be using only two of the circles in each case; ignore
the third circle by making sure that your drawing (shading or × ) straddles it.
3. Finally, without drawing anything else, look for the drawing of the conclusion. If the syllogism
is valid, then that drawing will already be done.
Since it perfectly models the relationships between classes that are at work in categorical logic,
this procedure always provides a demonstration of the validity or invalidity of any categorical
syllogism.
Consider, for example, how it could be applied, step by step, to an evaluation of a syllogism of
the EIO-3 mood and figure,
No M are P.
Some M are S.
Therefore, Some S are not P.
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First, we draw and label the three overlapping circles needed to represent all three terms
included in the categorical syllogism:
Second, we diagram each of the premises:
Since the major premise is a universal proposition, we may begin

with it. The diagram for "No M are P" must shade in the entire area in
which the M and P circles overlap. (Notice that we ignore the S circle by shading on both sides
of it.)
Now we add the minor premise to our drawing. The diagram for "Some M
are S" puts an × inside the area where the M and S circles overlap. But
part of that area (the portion also inside the P circle) has already been
shaded, so our × must be placed in the remaining portion.
Third, we stop drawing and merely look at our result. Ignoring the M
circle entirely, we need only ask whether the drawing of the conclusion "Some S are not P" has
already been drawn.
Remember, that drawing would be like the one at left, in which there is
an × in the area inside the S circle but outside the P circle. Does that
already appear in the diagram on the right above? Yes, if the premises
have been drawn, then the conclusion is already drawn.
But this models a significant logical feature of the syllogism itself: if its
premises are true, then its conclusion must also be true. Any categorical syllogism of this form is
valid.
Here are the diagrams of several other syllogistic forms. In each case, both of the premises have
already been drawn in the appropriate way, so if the drawing of the
conclusion is already drawn, the syllogism must be valid, and if it is not, the
syllogism must be invalid.
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AAA-1 (valid)
All M are P.
All S are M.
Therefore, All S are P.
AAA-3 (invalid)
All M are P.
All M are S.
Therefore, All S are P.
OAO-3 (valid)
Some M are not P.
All M are S.
EOO-2 (invalid)
No P are M.
Some S are not M.
IOO-1 (invalid)
Some M are P.
Some S are not M.
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Practice your skills in using Venn Diagrams to test the validity of Categorical
Syllogisms by using Ron Blatt's excellent Syllogism Evaluator.
Unit 3 - Reduction of the Categorical Syllogism
Reduction of the categorical syllogism is the process of expressing in the First

Figure syllogism that are validly expressed in the other figures.
Logicians considered the First Figure as the perfect figure and the others as the imperfect ones.
According to the Encyclopedia Britanica, Reduction, in syllogistic, or traditional, logic,

 method of rearranging the terms in one or both premises of a syllogism, or argument form,
 express it in a different figure; the placement of the middle, or repeated, term is altered,
usually to a preferred pattern. Aristotle took as primary the first figure, in which the middle
term (M) is in the pattern.
Unit 4 - Hypothetical Syllogism
In propositional logic, the following statement must be observed to understand:
hypothetical syllogism is the name of a valid rule of inference = HS

(often abbreviated HS and sometimes also called the chain argument, chain rule, or the principle
of transitivity of implication). Hypothetical syllogism is one of the rules in classical logic that is not
34
always accepted in certain systems of non-classical logic.[example needed]
The rule may be stated:
This means that,

Hypothetical syllogism is closely related and similar to disjunctive syllogism, in that it is also type
of syllogism, and also the name of a rule of inference.
Activity/Assessment 4 - Try these exercises using the logic language
1. All M are A 2. All A are M 3. All M are A

All B are M No M are B No M are B
All B are A All B are A All B are M.
An Introduction to Business Logic Systems. Retrieved at https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=dMxUP6HQHHM
Elements of Reasoning. Retrieved at https://systemsinnovation.io/reasoning-elements/
The Ladder of Inference. Retrieved at https://thesystemsthinker.com/the-ladder-of-inference/
Categorical Argument https://www.stetson.edu/artsci/philosophy/media/G.%20%20Chapter
%206.pdf
Week 10 – Mid-Term Examination

Please see Attached for the
Appendix A for the Rubric – this is how students will be graded.
Appendix B – Midterm Examination
Week 11 and 12
Lesson 5 - Induction and Fallacies
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Unit 1 - Nature of Induction
Inductive reasoning moves from the specific to the general. Beginning with the evidence of specific
facts, observations, or experiences, it moves to a general conclusion. Inductive conclusions are
considered either reliable or unreliable instead of true or false. An inductive conclusion indicates
probability, the degree to which the conclusion is likely to be true. Inductive reasoning is based on a
sampling of facts. An inductive conclusion is held to be reliable or unreliable in relation to the
quantity and the quality of the evidence supporting it. Induction leads to new truths and can support
statements about the unknown on the basis of what is known.” (Wilson, Forensic Procedures for
Boundary and Title Investigation, p. 51.)
Fallacy of Exclusion and Suppressed Evidence
Important evidence which would undermine an inductive argument is excluded from consideration.
“In an induction, the total relevant information needs to be examined. The fallacy occurs when
relevant evidence which would undermine an inductive argument is excluded from consideration.
The requirement that all relevant information be included is called the principle of total evidence.”
(Chhanda, Logic: Informal, Symbolic, and Inductive, p. 48.)
Evidence which would change the outcome of an inductive argument is excluded from
consideration.
Example:
1. "When someone makes an argument but leaves out a particular fact that would contradict
the conclusion, they commit the Fallacy of Exclusion. This was committed on a grand scale
by a 2004 Oxford study on the abortion-breast cancer link. Considered by many pro-abortion
groups as the 'end-all' study on the matter, it consisted of a comprehensive review of over 50
studies on the possible link of abortion to breast cancer. While the conclusion was that no
such link existed, the study's lead author, Valarie Beral, admitted to the Washington Post that
they excluded many studies that had found a link and contradicted their conclusion, citing
only an unproven belief that women with breast cancer 'are more likely then healthy women
to reveal they had an abortion, leading to the conclusion that there are more abortions
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among this group.' The failure to include data that compromised the
desired conclusion is evidence of a Fallacy of Exclusion." (Nowak, Guerilla Apologetics for
Life Issues, pp. 14-5.)
2. "The police found a dead body with three bullet wounds. It would be a safe, albeit not
mathematically certain, conclusion that the person found by the police died because of his
gunshot wounds — that is, unless we also knew that the body was missing its head.
Although it is still possible that the victim died of gunshot wounds and that the decapitation
was inflicted postmortem, it is equally possible that the manner of his death was decapitation
and someone administered the bullet wounds postmortem for some other purpose. The
fallacy of exclusion forces the decision maker into reaching a false conclusion owing to lack
of relevant alternative evidence. (Pedneault, Rudewicz, Silverstone, Sheetz, Forensice
Accounting and Fraud Investigation for Non-Experts (John Wiley & Sons: 2012), pp. 215-6)
False and Imperfect Analogies
In an analogy, two objects or events, A and B, are supposed to be similar. Then, it is argued that
since A has property P, B must also have property P. An analogy is false when A and B are
materially different such that B doesn’t possess property P. 2) An imperfect analogy may succeed in
predicting property P in B, but in B the property is possessed differently or only partially. So,
analogies fail either by seeing an analogy where none exists, or by overestimating the value or
significance of the analogy. However, determining whether an analogy is good, false, or imperfect is
as much an art as a science. Accordingly, the examples provided below are not necessarily false or
imperfect analogies. We leave that judgment to you. Furthermore, even a good analogy is not a
proof and at most provides probabilistic or inductive evidence.
The two objects or events being compared are relevantly dissimilar.

Example:
1. "'A good marriage is like a game of baseball. In baseball, if a player follows the rules, the
game will be a success. Likewise, in marriage, if the players stick to the rules the partners
accept, the marriage will flourish.' ... Marriage and baseball may have a few surface
similarities, but marriage is much more complex than baseball. The relationship between 'the
rules' and 'success' is infinitely more intricate in marriage than it is in baseball."
(Rozakis, The Complete Idiot's Guide to Public Speaking, p. 96.)
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2. Just as a map is a guide, not a literal copy, of the terrain to which it
refers, the mind's eye is like an imperfect map of the external world. Though what we see
may have some resemblance to the world itself, we do not see the world itself.
3. A common prolife argument draws this analogy. A hunter who sees movement in the brush is
not permitted to fire at will. Rather, he is expected to positively identify his target as a deer or
foul, and not another hunter or hiker. When human life is at stake, we must err on the side of
caution. Likewise, even if we cannot determine with certainty that a fetus is a human person,
we should err on the side of caution and never abort.
Hasty Generalization and Secundum Quid
The size of the sample is too small to support the conclusion. “[This] type of argument [goes] under
varied terms for the fallacy like over-generalization, glittering generality, accident, converse accident,
or secundum quid (neglect of qualifications). Typically, however, two types of fallacies are
emphasized. One is an inductive fallacy that occurs in statistical reasoning from a selected sample
to a wider population. The other has to do with overlooking qualifications to a defeasible
generalization.” (Douglas N. Walton, Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligence in Law, p. 39)
The sample is too small to support an inductive generalization about a population.
Example:
1. "After only one year the alternator went out in Mr. O'Grady's new Chevrolet. Mrs. Dodson's
Oldsmobile developed a transmission problem after six months. The obvious conclusion is
that cars made by General Motors are just a pile of junk these days." (Hurley, Logic, 1991: p.
142)
2. "Iraq boasts quite a long history of intermarriage and intercommunal cooperation. But a few
years of this hateful dialectic soon succeeded in creating an atmosphere of misery, distrust,
hostility, and sect-based politics. Once again, religion had poisoned everything."
(Hitchens, god is not Great: p. 27. Emphasis in original.)
3. "[Y]our opponent might argue that her client's future lost profits are $2 million, based on
profits from one prior year. But if that year's profits were unusually high, her generalization is
based on data that is deficient in both quantity (only one instance) and quality (an atypical
year)." (Waicukauski, Sandler, and Epps, The Winning Argument: p. 50)
38
4. "Madame Luna predicted in 1980 the fall of Russian communism; so,
Madame Luna is a reputable psychic. The argument can be revised as: One observed
prediction of Madame Luna has come true; so, all of Madame Luna's predictions must come
true." (Holowchack, Critical Reasoning and Philosophy, p. 80.)
"[W]e may expose a fallacy in generalization by proving: 1) That the relative size of the unobserved
part of the class is so large as to discredit the generalization. 2) That the members observed are not
fair examples of the class. 3) That there are exceptions to the general rule or statement. 4) That it is
highly improbably that such a general rule or satement is true." (Foster, Argumentation and
Debating, 1908, p. 146.)
Note: in some cases, a formal proof would require a mathematical calculation. This is the subject of
probability theory. More often, common sense should suffice.
Slothful Induction and Ad Hoc Escapism
Slothful induction, also known as the a priori fallacy, is the failure or refusal to see or concede the
most likely inference from the evidence. The failure to infer is rarely due to sloth. It demonstrates an
unwillingness to follow the evidence wherever it may lead due to stupidity, dogma, or vested
interests. Usually it is a red flag that someone is not principally interested in the truth of a matter.
And, because inductive arguments are at best probabilistic, someone can always hold out against
the preponderance of evidence. Nevertheless, there are times when it is appropriate to resist the
inference of even a good inductive argument, namely, when there are countervailing reasons that
support the contrary conclusion. For example, when new evidence appears against a well-
established scientific theory, it can be appropriate to retain the current theory until the evidence to
the contrary is sufficiently strong. In such cases an ad hoc hypothesis may be introduced to explain
how the established thesis may still be true in spite of the implications of this new inductive
evidence.
Example:
From Thick Headedness
1. "The second fitness-enhancing cognitive capacity is the tendency to recognize that things
that are similar to each other with respect to their observed properties are likely to be similar
with respect to their unobserved properties... This capacity is advantageous because the
principle it is centered around is true, and failure to reason in accordance with the principle
39
can be deadly. Failure to infer that these round, shiny, bright berries are
likely to be poisonous from the fact that those other round, shiny, bright red berries produced
frothing at the mouth and then death in one's companion yesterday may well lead to trouble
for oneself today." (Wielenberg, God and the Reach of Reason, p. 90.)
2. "Smith believes an open flame can ignite gasoline (he uses matches to light bonfires, etc.),
and Smith believes the match he now holds has an open flame (he would not touch the tip,
etc.), and Smith is not suicidal. Yet Smith decides to see whether a gasoline tank is empty by
looking inside while holding the match nearby for illumination. Similar stories often appear in
newspapers; this is approximately how one of Faulkner's characters, Eck Snopes, dies
in The Town." (Cherniak, Minimal Rationality, p. 57.) » See the Darwin Awards for more
inductive failures of this sort.
From Vested Interests

3. As the scientific evidence linking lung cancer to smoking mounted in the 1950s and
following, tobacco companies consistently resisted and repudiated the evidence. For
example, the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation stated: "It is our opinion that the
repeated assertion without conclusive proof that cigarettes cause disease — however well-
intentioned — constitutes a disservice to the public." And, the Tobacco Institute of Hong
Kong: "The view that smoking causes specific diseases remains an opinion or a judgment,
and not an established scientific fact." (Agin, Junk Science, p. 89.) » Here we have a clear
case where economic interests prevented the admission of an overwhelmingly probable
conclusion. Notice how these statements capitalize on the nature of inductive arguments,
that they are at best probabilistic and never, strictly speaking, conclusive.
4. In political campaigns, as the election nears, even when a candidate is clearly behind in all
the polls, if asked, the candidate or his or her representatives will invariably deny the almost
inevitable outcome. This response is understandable and pragmatic. If said candidate's
supporters lose hope, they are less likely to trouble themselves to cast their vote on election
day, and the outcome will be even more lopsided and the slim chance for an upset slips even
further out of reach.
The conclusion of an inductive argument is denied despite strong evidence.
Unrepresentative Sample
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The sample used in an inductive inference is relevantly different from the
population as a whole. Sample size does not overcome sample bias. “Sampling is a technique used
by pollsters. It is a device for gathering information about an entire population from a small subset —
a sample. A representative sample is one in which whatever features in the overall population
deemed relevant to the issue at hand are represented in roughly the same proportions as these
features are found in the population.” (Johnson & Blair, Logical Self-Defense, p. 71.) [To Add: 2)
Tautological Sampling 3) Tendentious Sampling]
Example;
1. To see how Canadians will vote in the next election we polled a hundred people in Calgary.
This shows conclusively that the Reform Party will sweep the polls. (People in Calgary tend
to be more conservative, and hence more likely to vote Reform, than people in the rest of the
country.)
2. The apples on the top of the box look good. The entire box of apples must be good. (Of
course, the rotten apples are hidden beneath the surface.)
3. "When Puerto Rico was hit by a recent hurricane, there were 10,000 claims by residents for
hurricane damage. The US Government decided to base its total grant aid on finding the
total of claims in the first 100 applications and then multiplying by 100. A colleague was
involved in the difficult task of persuading the US government that the first 100 applications
need not necessarily constitute a representative sample! Small claims are likely to come in
first as they need less preparation." (Chatfield, Problem Solving, p. 16.)
4. "The Alfred Kinsey reports on male sexual habits are an example. Although he did not
employ a sampling design, he interviewed only a small sample of Americans. Hence his
results were a sample of the whole, and from them he reached some pretty striking
conclusions. Kinsey found that one in ten men were homosexual, one in two had committed
adultery, and one in six had been victimized by or had victimized another family sexually.
Recent research into his data has discovered that his sample included prisoners and hospital
patients in considerably larger numbers than their proportion of the actual population."
(Hoffer, The Historians' Paradox, p. 83.)
The sample is unrepresentative of the sample as a whole.
41
Source: The Logic primer from https://afterall.net/illogic/inductive/fallacy-of-
exclusion-and-suppressed-evidence/
Unit 2 – Fallacy
Argument Form: The form of an argument is consists of its MOOD + FIGURE o MOOD: the
arrangement of AEIO sentences; for example AEO is the mood of a syllogism with an A sentence at
the major premise, an E sentence as the minor premise and O sentence as the conclusion.
Logical Fallacies
All of these definitions come from the Handout developed by Kimberly Moekle) originated also from
“Stephen’s Guide to the Logical Fallacies,” located at http://datanation.com/fallacies/index.htm,
where you can find further information on all of the fallacies listed below. Stephen Downes is a
Senior Researcher for the National Research Council of Canada, where he currently works as an
“information architect,” and has become a leading voice in the areas of learning objects and
metadata, as well as the emerging field of weblogs in education and content syndication.
Fallacies of Distraction
 False Dilemma: two choices are given when in fact there are three options
 From Ignorance: because something is not known to be true, it is assumed to be false
 Slippery Slope: a series of increasingly unacceptable consequences is drawn
 Complex Question: two unrelated points are conjoined as a single proposition
Appeals to Motives in Place of Support |
 Appeal to Force: the reader is persuaded to agree by force

 Appeal to Pity: the reader is persuaded to agree by sympathy
 Consequences: the reader is warned of unacceptable consequences
 Prejudicial Language: value or moral goodness is attached to believing the author
 Popularity: a proposition is argued to be true because it is widely held to be true
Changing the Subject
 Attacking the Person:
42
1. the person's character is attacked
2. the person's circumstances are noted
3. the person does not practice what is preached
 Appeal to Authority:
1. the authority is not an expert in the field
2. experts in the field disagree
3. the authority was joking, drunk, or in some other way not being serious
 Anonymous Authority: the authority in question is not named
 Style Over Substance: the manner in which an argument (or arguer) is presented is felt to
affect the truth of the conclusion
Inductive Fallacies
 Hasty Generalization: the sample is too small to support an inductive generalization about a
population
 Unrepresentative Sample: the sample is unrepresentative of the sample as a whole
 False Analogy: the two objects or events being compared are relevantly dissimilar
 Slothful Induction: the conclusion of a strong inductive argument is denied despite the
evidence to the contrary
 Fallacy of Exclusion: evidence which would change the outcome of an inductive argument is
excluded from consideration
Fallacies Involving Statistical Syllogisms
 Accident: a generalization is applied when circumstances suggest that there should be an

exception
 Converse Accident : an exception is applied in circumstances where a generalization should
apply
Causal Fallacies
 Post Hoc: because one thing follows another, it is held to cause the other
 Joint effect: one thing is held to cause another when in fact they are both the joint effects of
an underlying cause
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 Insignificant: one thing is held to cause another, and it does, but it is
insignificant compared to other causes of the effect
 Wrong Direction: the direction between cause and effect is reversed
 Complex Cause: the cause identified is only a part of the entire cause of the effect
Missing the Point
 Begging the Question: the truth of the conclusion is assumed by the premises
 Irrelevant Conclusion: an argument in defense of one conclusion instead proves a different
conclusion
 Straw Man: the author attacks an argument different from (and weaker than) the opposition's
best argument
Fallacies of Ambiguity
 Equivocation: the same term is used with two different meanings

 Amphiboly: the structure of a sentence allows two different interpretations
 Accent: the emphasis on a word or phrase suggests a meaning contrary to what the
sentence actually says
Category Errors
 Composition: because the attributes of the parts of a whole have a certain property, it is
argued that the whole has that property
 Division: because the whole has a certain property, it is argued that the parts have that
property
Non Sequitur
 Affirming the Consequent: any argument of the form: If A then B, B, therefore A

 Denying the Antecedent: any argument of the form: If A then B, Not A, thus Not B
 Inconsistency: asserting that contrary or contradictory statements are both true
Syllogistic Errors
 Fallacy of Four Terms: a syllogism has four terms
44
 Undistributed Middle: two separate categories are said to be connected
because they share a common property
 Illicit Major: the predicate of the conclusion talks about all of something, but the premises
only mention some cases of the term in the predicate
 Illicit Minor: the subject of the conclusion talks about all of something, but the premises only
mention some cases of the term in the subject
 Fallacy of Exclusive Premises: a syllogism has two negative premises
 Fallacy of Drawing an Affirmative Conclusion From a Negative Premise: as the name implies
 Existential Fallacy: a particular conclusion is drawn from universal premises
Fallacies of Explanation
 Subverted Support (The phenomenon being explained doesn't exist)

 Non-support (Evidence for the phenomenon being explained is biased)
 Untestability: (The theory which explains cannot be tested)
 Limited Scope (The theory which explains can only explain one thing)
 Limited Depth (The theory which explains does not appeal to underlying causes)
Fallacies of Definition
 Too Broad (The definition includes items which should not be included)

 Too Narrow (The definition does not include all the items which should be included)
 Failure to Elucidate (The definition is more difficult to understand than the word or concept
being defined)
 Circular Definition (The definition includes the term being defined as a part of the definition)
 Conflicting Conditions (The definition is self-contradictory)
Categorical Fallacies
 Illicit Terms: A valid standard form categorical syllogism must contain exactly, and only,
three class terms.
 Illicit Minor: In a valid standard form categorical syllogism, if the minor term is distributed in
the conclusion, it must be distributed in the minor premise.
 Illicit Major: In a valid standard form categorical syllogism, if the major term is distributed in
the conclusion, it must be distributed in the major premise.
45
 Illicit Middle: In a valid standard form categorical syllogism, the middle
term must be distributed in at least one premise.
 Illicit Quality: In a valid standard form categorical syllogism, the conclusion must be negative
if there is a negative premise.
 The Existential Fallacy: In a valid standard form categorical syllogism, the conclusion cannot
be existential if both premises are universal.
 Two Negatives: A valid standard form categorical syllogism can't have two negative
premises. The
Three Step Venn diagram Test for Validity
Step One: Draw three interlocking circles and label each one with an uppercase letter designating
one of the classes in the argument being tested.
Step Two: Diagram the major and the minor premises but never diagram the conclusion. It does not
matter which premise you diagram first, unless one of the premises is a existential proposition and
the other one is a universal proposition. In this case, always diagram the universal proposition first .
Step Three: Examine the diagram to see if it contains a diagram of the conclusion of the syllogism
you are testing. If it does, then the argument is valid; if it doesn't, the argument is invalid.
Valid Forms:
Figure 1 AAA EAE AII EIO;
Figure 2 EAE AEE EIO AOO
Figure 3 IAI AII OAO EIO Figure 4 AEE IAI EIO
Traditionally Valid Forms

Figure 1: AAI; EAO
Figure 2: AEO; EAO
Figure 3: AAI; EAO
Figure 4: AEO; EAO; AAI
1. All Examples in Unit 1 of Lesson 5 must be translated in an, Argument, premise and
Conclusion.
2. Analyze the statements in the given examples provided in Lesson 5 - Unit 1.
46
3. Apply the Fallacies learned in Unit 2.
4. Submit assignment in the agreed submission Bin.
Conspiracy Theory: http://web.stanford.edu/~jonahw/PWR1/LogicalFallacies.htm

The Logic primer and catalog at https://afterall.net/illogic/inductive/
Week 13 and 14
Lesson 6 - Truth-Functional Logic

This lesson will discuss about the class of classical logic connectives (e.g. &, →) used in the
construction of formulas is truth-functional. Their values for various truth-values as argument are
usually given by truth tables. Truth-functional propositional calculus is a formal system whose
formulae may be interpreted as either true or false.
Unit 1 - Simple and Compound Proposition
TRUTH-VALUES formula is also known as sentential logic. We have already learned how the basic
expressions of sentential logic combine, in accordance with the syntactic rules, to form compound
formulae. The syntactic rules thus allow us to determine, for any particular expression, whether or
not that expression constitutes a grammatical formula of sentential logic.
Similarly, the semantic rules for sentential logic will allow us to determine the truth-value of any
formula, given that we know the truth-values of all the atomic formulae involved.
Assignment of truth-values to atomic formula is, appropriately enough, known as a TRUTH-VALUE

ASSIGNMENT.
A sentence consists of an assignment of a truth-value (either true or false) to every atomic sentence

of sentential logic. This means that we can determine the truth-value of any sentence (formula) of
sentential logic, relative to a given truth-value assignment.
47
All we need to do is to see what truth-value it has been assigned in order to
determine what its truth-value.
. What about compound formula? You may recall that we've mentioned that the logical connectives
are all TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL.
A truth functional table shows how the truth or falsity of a compound statement depends on

the truth or falsity of the simple statements from which it's constructed. So we'll start by looking
at truth tables for the five logical connectives.
Here's the table for negation: This table is easy to understand.
This table is easy to understand. If P is true, its negation is false. If P is false, then is true.
should be true when both P and Q are true, and false otherwise:
is true if either P is true or Q is true (or both --- remember that we're using
"or" in the inclusive sense). It's only false if both P and Q are false.
Here's the table for logical implication:
48
To understand why this table is the way it is, consider the following example:
"If you get an A, then I'll give you a dollar."
The statement will be true if I keep my promise and false if I don't.
Suppose it's true that you get an A and it's true that I give you a dollar. Since I kept my promise, the
implication is true. This corresponds to the first line in the table.
Suppose it's true that you get an A but it's false that I give you a dollar. Since I didn't keep my
promise, the implication is false. This corresponds to the second line in the table.
What if it's false that you get an A? Whether or not I give you a dollar, I haven't broken my promise.
Thus, the implication can't be false, so (since this is a two-valued logic) it must be true. This explains
the last two lines of the table.
means that P and Q are equivalent. So the double implication is true if P and Q are
both true or if P and Q are both false; otherwise, the double implication is false.
You should remember --- or be able to construct --- the truth tables for the logical connectives. You'll
use these tables to construct tables for more complicated sentences. It's easier to demonstrate what
to do than to describe it in words, so you'll see the procedure worked out in the examples.
Remark. (a) When you're constructing a truth table, you have to consider all possible assignments
of True (T) and False (F) to the component statements. For example, suppose the component
statements are P, Q, and R. Each of these statements can be either true or false, so there
are possibilities.
When you're listing the possibilities, you should assign truth values to the component statements in
a systematic way to avoid duplication or omission. The easiest approach is to use lexicographic
49
ordering. Thus, for a compound statement with three components P, Q, and R,
I would list the possibilities this way:
(b) There are different ways of setting up truth tables. You can, for instance, write the truth values
"under" the logical connectives of the compound statement, gradually building up to the column for
the "primary" connective.
I'll write things out the long way, by constructing columns for each "piece" of the compound
statement and gradually building up to the compound statement. Any style is fine as long as you
show enough work to justify your results.
Example. Construct a truth table for the formula .

First, I list all the alternatives for P and Q.
Next, in the third column, I list the values of based on the values of P. I use the truth table for
negation: When P is true is false, and when P is false, is true.
In the fourth column, I list the values for . Check for yourself that it is only false ("F") if P is
true ("T") and Q is false ("F").
The fifth column gives the values for my compound expression . It is an "and" of
(the third column) and (the fourth column). An "and" is true only if both parts of the "and"
are true; otherwise, it is false. So I look at the third and fourth columns; if both are true ("T"), I put T
in the fifth column, otherwise I put F.
50
A tautology is a formula which is "always true" --- that is, it is true for every assignment of truth
values to its simple components. You can think of a tautology as a rule of logic.
The opposite of a tautology is a contradiction, a formula which is "always false". In other words, a
contradiction is false for every assignment of truth values to its simple components.
Example. Show that is a tautology.
I construct the truth table for and show that the formula is always true.
The last column contains only T's. Therefore, the formula is a tautology.
Example. Construct a truth table for
You can see that constructing truth tables for statements with lots of connectives or lots of simple
statements is pretty tedious and error-prone. While there might be some applications of this (e.g. to
51
digital circuits), at some point the best thing would be to write a program to
construct truth tables (and this has surely been done).
The point here is to understand how the truth value of a complex statement depends on the truth
values of its simple statements and its logical connectives. In most work, mathematicians don't
normally use statements which are very complicated from a logical point of view.
Example. (a) Suppose that P is false and is true. Tell whether Q is true, false, or its truth
value can't be determined.
(b) Suppose that is false. Tell whether Q is true, false, or its truth value can't be
determined.
(a) Since is true, either P is true or is true. Since P is false, must be true. Hence,
Q must be false.
(b) An if-then statement is false when the "if" part is true and the "then" part is false.
Since is false, is true. An "and" statement is true only when both parts are
true. In particular, must be true, so Q is false.
To READ:
Truth Functional Connectives at https://courses.umass.edu/phil110-gmh/text/c02.pdf
Further discussion:
Truth Table Tutorial - Discrete Mathematics Logichttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wRMC-ttjhwM
Truth Tables, Tautologies, and Logical Equivalences at http://sites.millersville.edu/bikenaga/math-

proof/truth-tables/truth-tables.html#:~:text=A%20truth%20table%20shows%20how,table%20is
%20easy%20to%20understand.
1. Jack and Jill are coworkers.
2. Tom is a fireman and a father.
3. Ringo Starr and John Lennon were bandmates.
4. Lucy loves steak and onion sandwiches.
5. Cameron Dias has had several relationships, although she has never married.
52
6. Bob and Sally kissed.
7. A person who plays both mandolin and guitar is a multi- instrumentalist.
8. No one has ever contracted rabies and lived.
9. Jack and Jill are cowboys.
10. Josiah is Amish; nevertheless, he is also a drug dealer.
11. The Tigers are the best baseball team in the state, but they are not as good as the Yankees.
12. Bob went to the beach to enjoy some rest and relaxation.
13. Lauren isn’t the fastest runner on the team; still, she is fast enough to have made it to the
national championship.
14. The ring is beautiful, but expensive.
15. It is sad, but true that many Americans do not know where their next meal will come from.
Source: Propositional Logic and the Four basic Truth Functional Connectives
https://human.libretexts.org/Bookshelves/Philosophy/Book
%3A_Introduction_to_Logic_and_Critical_Thinking_(van_Cleave)/02%3A_Formal_Methods_of_Eval
uating_Arguments/2.02%3A_Propositional_Logic_and_the_Four_Basic_Truth_Functional_Connecti
ves
Truth About Functional Logic https://www.erpelstolz.at/gateway/TruthTable.html
Truth calculator: Server –side processing: https://www.erpelstolz.at/gateway/formular-uk-zentral.html
Truth table Calculator: https://web.stanford.edu/class/cs103/tools/truth-table-tool/
Week 15 and 16
Lesson 7 - Method of Deduction
From the Stanford Encyclopedia Britanica, discussed that the observations we make are able to
justify some expectations or predictions about observations we have not yet made, as well as
general claims that go beyond the observed. For example, the observation that bread of a certain
appearance has thus far been nourishing seems to justify the expectation that the next similar piece
of bread I eat will also be nourishing, as well as the claim that bread of this sort is generally
nourishing. Such inferences from the observed to the unobserved, or to general laws, are known as
“inductive inferences”.
53
In summary, conclusions can be deduced from the Five premises of the Original
Argument (Elementary Argument):
1. Argument
2. Premise
3. Hypothetical Syllogism (HS)
4. Modus Tollens (MT)
5. Disjuctive Syllogism (DS) or the rules of inference
Example:
If Anderson is nominated, then she went to Boston.
If she went to Boston, then she campaign there.
If she campaigned there, she met Douglas.
Anderson did not meet Douglas.
Either Anderson was nominated or someone more eligible was elected.
Therefore, someone more eligible was selected.
The validity of this Argument is obvious, but let us consider the matter of proof. This will be done by
translating this argument into symbolism as:
The original source of what has become known as the “problem of induction” is in Book 1, part iii,
section 6 of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, published in 1739. In 1748, Hume gave a
shorter version of the argument in Section iv of An enquiry concerning human understanding.
Throughout this article we will give references to the Treatise as “T”, and the Enquiry as “E”.
Hume asks on what grounds we come to our beliefs about the unobserved on the basis of inductive
inferences. He presents an argument in the form of a dilemma which appears to rule out the
possibility of any reasoning from the premises to the conclusion of an inductive inference. There are,
he says, two possible types of arguments, “demonstrative” and “probable”, but neither will serve. A
demonstrative argument produces the wrong kind of conclusion, and a probable argument would be
circular. Therefore, for Hume, the problem remains of how to explain why we form any conclusions
that go beyond the past instances of which we have had experience (T. 1.3.6.10). Hume stresses
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that he is not disputing that we do draw such inferences. The challenge, as he
sees it, is to understand the “foundation” of the inference—the “logic” or “process of argument” that it
is based upon (E. 4.2.21). The problem of meeting this challenge, while evading Hume’s argument
against the possibility of doing so, has become known as “the problem of induction”.
Hume’s argument is one of the most famous in philosophy.
 A number of philosophers have attempted solutions to the problem, but a significant number
have embraced his conclusion that it is insoluble.
 There is also a wide spectrum of opinion on the significance of the problem. Some have
argued that Hume’s argument does not establish any far-reaching skeptical conclusion,
either because it was never intended to, or because the argument is in some way
misformulated.
 Yet many have regarded it as one of the most profound philosophical challenges imaginable
since it seems to call into question the justification of one of the most fundamental ways in
which we form knowledge. Bertrand Russell, for example, expressed the view that if Hume’s
problem cannot be solved, “there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity”
(Russell 1946: 699).
The Hume’s Problem
Hume introduces the problem of induction as part of an analysis of the notions of cause and effect.
Hume worked with a picture, widespread in the early modern period, in which the mind was
populated with mental entities called “ideas”. Hume thought that ultimately all our ideas could be
traced back to the “impressions” of sense experience. In the simplest case, an idea enters the mind
by being “copied” from the corresponding impression (T. 1.1.1.7/4). More complex ideas are then
created by the combination of simple ideas (E. 2.5/19). Hume took there to be a number of relations
between ideas, including the relation of causation (E. 3.2; for more on Hume’s philosophy in general,
see Morris & Brown 2014).
For Hume, the relation of causation is the only relation by means of which “we can go beyond
the evidence of our memory and senses”. Suppose we have an object present to our senses: say
gunpowder. We may then infer to an effect of that object: say, the explosion. The causal relation
links our past and present experience to our expectations about the future.
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Hume argues that we cannot make a causal inference by purely a priori means.
Rather, he claims, it is based on experience, and specifically experience of constant conjunction.
We infer that the gunpowder will explode on the basis of past experience of an association between
gunpowder and explosions.
Hume wants to know more about the basis for this kind of inference. If such an inference is made by
a “chain of reasoning”, he says, he would like to know what that reasoning is.
In general, Hume’s claimed that the inferences depend on a transition of the form:
 I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I
foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar
effects. (E. 4.2.16)
In the Treatise, Hume says that
If Reason determined us, it would proceed upon that principle that instances, of which we have had
no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of
nature continues always uniformly the same. (T. 1.3.6.4)
For convenience, we will refer to this claim of similarity or resemblance between observed and
unobserved regularities as the “Uniformity Principle (UP)”. Sometimes it is also called the
“Resemblance Principle”, or the “Principle of Uniformity of Nature”.
Hume then presents his famous argument to the conclusion that there can be no reasoning behind
this principle. The argument takes the form of a dilemma. Hume makes a distinction between
relations of ideas and matters of fact. Relations of ideas include geometric, algebraic and arithmetic
propositions, “and, in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain”.
“Matters of fact”, on the other hand are empirical propositions which can readily be conceived to be
other than they are. Hume says that
All reasonings may be divided into two kinds:
1. Demonstrative Reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and

2. Moral Reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence. (E. 4.2.18)
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Hume considers the possibility of each of these types of reasoning in turn, and
in each case argues that it is impossible for it to supply an argument for the Uniformity Principle.
First, Hume argues that the reasoning cannot be demonstrative, because demonstrative reasoning
only establishes conclusions which cannot be conceived to be false. And, he says,
it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object seemingly like
those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. (E. 4.2.18)
It is possible, he says, to clearly and distinctly conceive of a situation where the unobserved case
does not follow the regularity so far observed (E. 4.2.18, T. 1.3.6.5/89).
Second, Hume argues that the reasoning also cannot be “such as regard matter of fact and real
existence”. He also calls this “probable” reasoning. All such reasoning, he claims, “proceed upon the
supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past”, in other words on the Uniformity
Principle (E. 4.2.19).
Therefore, if the chain of reasoning is based on an argument of this kind it will again be relying on
this supposition, “and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question”. (E. 4.2.19, see
also T. 1.3.6.7/90). The second type of reasoning then fails to provide a chain of reasoning which is
not circular.
In the Treatise version, Hume concludes
Thus, not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of causes and effects,
but even after experience has inform’d us of their constant conjunction, ’tis impossible for us to
satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou’d extend that experience beyond those particular
instances, which have fallen under our observation. (T. 1.3.6.11/91–2)
The conclusion then is that our tendency to project past regularities into the future is not
underpinned by reason. The problem of induction is to find a way to avoid this conclusion, despite
Hume’s argument.
After presenting the problem, Hume does present his own “solution” to the doubts he has raised (E.
5, T. 1.3.7–16). This consists of an explanation of what the inductive inferences are driven by, if not
reason. In the Treatise Hume raises the problem of induction in an explicitly contrastive way. He
asks whether the transition involved in the inference is produced
by means of the understanding or imagination; whether we are determin’d by reason to make the
transition, or by a certain association and relation of perceptions? (T. 1.3.6.4)
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And he goes on to summarize the conclusion by saying
When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of
another, it is not determin’d by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas
of these objects, and unite them in the imagination. (T. 1.3.6.12)
Thus, it is the imagination which is taken to be responsible for underpinning the inductive inference,
rather than reason.
In the Enquiry, Hume suggests that the step taken by the mind,
which is not supported by any argument, or process of the understanding … must be induced by
some other principle of equal weight and authority. (E. 5.1.2)
That principle is “custom” or “habit”. The idea is that if one has seen similar objects or events
constantly conjoined, then the mind is inclined to expect a similar regularity to hold in the future. The
tendency or “propensity” to draw such inferences, is the effect of custom:
… having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold,
have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind
is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe, that such a quality does exist and will
discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of of placing the mind in
such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to
feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these
operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and
understanding is able, either to produce, or to prevent. (E. 5.1.8)
Hume argues that the fact that these inferences do follow the course of nature is a kind of “pre-
established harmony” (E. 5.2.21). It is a kind of natural instinct, which may in fact be more effective
in making us successful in the world, than if we relied on reason to make these inferences.
Reconstruction of Hume’s Version
Hume’s argument has been presented and formulated in many different versions. There is also an
ongoing lively discussion over the historical interpretation of what Hume himself intended by the
argument. It is therefore difficult to provide an unequivocal and uncontroversial reconstruction of
Hume’s argument. Nonetheless, for the purposes of organizing the different responses to Hume’s
problem that will be discussed in this article, the following reconstruction will serve as a useful
starting point.
58
Hume’s argument concerns specific inductive inferences such as:
All observed instances of A have been B.
The next instance of A will be B.
Let us call this “inference I”. Inferences which fall under this type of schema are now often referred
to as cases of “simple enumerative induction”.
Hume’s own example is:
All observed instances of bread (of a particular appearance) have been nourishing.
The next instance of bread (of that appearance) will be nourishing.
Hume’s argument then proceeds as follows (premises are labeled as P, and subconclusions and
conclusions as C):
 P1.There are only two kinds of arguments: demonstrative and probable (Hume’s fork).
 P2.Inference I presupposes the Uniformity Principle (UP).
1st horn:
 P3.A demonstrative argument establishes a conclusion whose negation is a contradiction.
 P4.The negation of the UP is not a contradiction.
 C1.There is no demonstrative argument for the UP (by P3 and P4).
2nd horn:
 P5.Any probable argument for UP presupposes UP.
 P6.An argument for a principle may not presuppose the same principle (Non-circularity).
 C2.There is no probable argument for the UP (by P5 and P6).
 C3.There is no argument for the UP (by P1, C1 and C2).
Consequences:
 P7.If there is no argument for the UP, there is no chain of reasoning from the premises to the
conclusion of any inference that presupposes the UP.
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 C4.There is no chain of reasoning from the premises to the conclusion of
inference I (by P2, C3 and P7).
 P8.If there is no chain of reasoning from the premises to the conclusion of inference I, the
inference is not justified.
 C5.Inference I is not justified (by C4 and P8).
There have been different interpretations of what Hume means by “demonstrative” and “probable”
arguments. Sometimes “demonstrative” is equated with “deductive”, and probable with “inductive”
(e.g., Salmon 1966). Then the first horn of Hume’s dilemma would eliminate the possibility of a
deductive argument, and the second would eliminate the possibility of an inductive argument.
However, under this interpretation, premise P3 would not hold, because it is possible for the
conclusion of a deductive argument to be a non-necessary proposition. Premise P3 could be
modified to say that a demonstrative (deductive) argument establishes a conclusion that cannot be
false if the premises are true. But then it becomes possible that the supposition that the future
resembles the past, which is not a necessary proposition, could be established by a deductive
argument from some premises, though not from a priori premises (in contradiction to conclusion C1).
Another common reading is to equate “demonstrative” with “deductively valid with a priori premises”,
and “probable” with “having an empirical premise” (e.g., Okasha 2001). This may be closer to the
mark, if one thinks, as Hume seems to have done, that premises which can be known a priori cannot
be false, and hence are necessary. If the inference is deductively valid, then the conclusion of the
inference from a priori premises must also be necessary. What the first horn of the dilemma then
rules out is the possibility of a deductively valid argument with a priori premises, and the second
horn rules out any argument (deductive or non-deductive), which relies on an empirical premise.
However, recent commentators have argued that in the historical context that Hume was situated in,
the distinction he draws between demonstrative and probable arguments has little to do with
whether or not the argument has a deductive form (Owen 1999; Garrett 2002). In addition, the class
of inferences that establish conclusions whose negation is a contradiction may include not just
deductively valid inferences from a priori premises, but any inferences that can be drawn using a
priori reasoning (that is, reasoning where the transition from premises to the conclusion makes no
appeal to what we learn from observations). It looks as though Hume does intend the argument of
the first horn to rule out any a priori reasoning, since he says that a change in the course of nature
cannot be ruled out “by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning a priori” (E. 5.2.18). On
this understanding, a priori arguments would be ruled out by the first horn of Hume’s dilemma, and
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empirical arguments by the second horn. This is the interpretation that I will
adopt for the purposes of this article.
In Hume’s argument, the UP plays a central role. As we will see in section 4.2, various authors have
been doubtful about this principle. Versions of Hume’s argument have also been formulated which
do not make reference to the UP. Rather they directly address the question of what arguments can
be given in support of the transition from the premises to the conclusion of the specific inductive
inference I. What arguments could lead us, for example, to infer that the next piece of bread will
nourish from the observations of nourishing bread made so far? For the first horn of the argument,
Hume’s argument can be directly applied. A demonstrative argument establishes a conclusion
whose negation is a contradiction. The negation of the conclusion of the inductive inference is not a
contradiction. It is not a contradiction that the next piece of bread is not nourishing. Therefore, there
is no demonstrative argument for the conclusion of the inductive inference. In the second horn of the
argument, the problem Hume raises is a circularity. Even if Hume is wrong that all inductive
inferences depend on the UP, there may still be a circularity problem, but as we shall see in section
4.1, the exact nature of the circularity needs to be carefully considered. But the main point at present
is that the Humean argument is often formulated without invoking the UP.
Since Hume’s argument is a dilemma, there are two main ways to resist it. The first is to tackle the
first horn and to argue that there is after all a demonstrative argument –here taken to mean an
argument based on a priori reasoning—that can justify the inductive inference. The second is to
tackle the second horn and to argue that there is after all a probable (or empirical) argument that
can justify the inductive inference. We discuss the different variants of these two approaches in
sections 3 and 4.
There are also those who dispute the consequences of the dilemma.
For example, some recent commentators on Hume interpret him as drawing only conclusion
C4, and not the normative conclusion
C5 (we discuss these interpretations in section 5.1).
There are also approaches which take issue with premise P8 and argue that providing a chain of
reasoning from the premises to the conclusion is not a necessary condition for justification of an
inductive inference (sections 5.2 and 5.3). Finally, there are some philosophers who do accept the
skeptical conclusion C5 and attempt to accommodate it. For example, there have been attempts to
argue that inductive inference is not as central to scientific inquiry as is often thought (section 6). It is
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also possible to argue that even though Hume’s argument does establish that
inductive inferences are not justified in the sense that we have reasons to think their conclusions
true, nonetheless a weaker kind of justification is possible. This is based on the idea that we can
establish that following inductive procedures is a means to certain epistemic ends. We examine the
tradition associated with this approach in section 7.
3. Tackling the First Horn of Hume’s Dilemma
The first horn of Hume’s argument, as formulated above, is aimed at establishing that there is no
demonstrative argument for the UP. A number of philosophers have thought that this does not
definitively rule out the possibility of a justification of inductive inferences based on a demonstrative
argument. There are two main potential escape routes from the first horn of Hume’s dilemma. The
first is to deny premise P3, which amounts to admitting the possibility of synthetic a
priori propositions. The second is to accept the conclusion C1, that there is no demonstrative
argument for the UP, but to argue that such an argument is not necessary for justification. Indeed,
one could say that it is not even necessary to have a demonstrative argument for the conclusion of
the inductive inference. Rather, the thought is, it will be sufficient for justification to have an
argument to the proposition that the conclusion of the inductive inference is probable. We address
each of these approaches in the next two sections.
3.1 Synthetic a priori
As we have seen in section 1, Hume takes demonstrative arguments to have conclusions which are
“relations of ideas”, whereas “probable” or “moral” arguments have conclusions which are “matters
of fact”. Hume’s distinction between “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact” anticipates the
distinction drawn by Kant between “analytic” and “synthetic” propositions (Kant 1781). A classic
example of an analytic proposition is “Bachelors are unmarried men”, and a synthetic proposition is
“My bike tyre is flat”. For Hume, demonstrative arguments, which are based on a priori reasoning,
can establish only relations of ideas, or analytic propositions. The association between a prioricity
and analyticity underpins premise P3, which states that a demonstrative argument establishes a
conclusion whose negation is a contradiction.
One possible response to Hume’s problem is to deny premise P3, by allowing the possibility that a
priori reasoning could give rise to synthetic propositions. Kant famously argued in response to Hume
that such synthetic a priori knowledge is possible (Kant 1781, 1783). He does this by a kind of
reversal of the empiricist programme espoused by Hume. Whereas Hume tried to understand how
the concept of a causal or necessary connection could be based on experience, Kant argued
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instead that experience only comes about through the concepts or “categories”
of the understanding. On his view, one can gain a priori knowledge of these concepts, including the
concept of causation, by a transcendental argument concerning the necessary preconditions of
experience. A more detailed account of Kant’s response to Hume can be found in de Pierris and
Friedman 2013.
Arguing for a Probable Conclusion
The first horn of Hume’s dilemma implies that there cannot be a demonstrative argument to the
conclusion of an inductive inference because it is possible to conceive of the negation of the
conclusion. For instance, it is quite possible to imagine that the next piece of bread I eat will poison
me rather than nourish me. However, this does not rule out the possibility of a demonstrative
argument that establishes only that the bread is highly likely to nourish, not that it definitely will.
There are several approaches that attempt to produce a demonstrative argument that the conclusion
of an inductive inference is probable, though not certain. If this succeeds, a chain of reasoning
based on demonstrative arguments from the premises of inference I to the proposition that the
conclusion is probable is not ruled out by Hume’s argument. One might then challenge premise P8,
by saying that it is not necessary for justification of an inductive inference to have a chain of
reasoning from its premises to its conclusion. Rather it would suffice if we had an argument from the
premises to the claim that the conclusion is probable or likely. Then an a priori justification of the
inductive inference would have been provided.
The Nomological-Explanatory solution
The first of these approaches is the “Nomological-explanatory” solution, which has been put forward
by Armstrong, BonJour and Foster (Armstrong 1983; BonJour 1998; Foster 2004). This solution
appeals to Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), which says that we should infer that the
hypothesis which provides the best explanation of the evidence is probably true. Proponents of this
approach take Inference to the Best Explanation to be a mode of inference which is distinct from the
type of “extrapolative” inductive inference that Hume was trying to justify. They also regard it as a
type of inference which although non-deductive, is justified a priori. For example, Armstrong says
“To infer to the best explanation is part of what it is to be rational. If that is not rational, what is?”
(Armstrong 1983: 59).
The a priori justification is taken to proceed in two steps. First, it is argued that we should recognize
that certain observed regularities require an explanation in terms of some underlying law. For
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example, if a coin persistently lands heads on repeated tosses, then it becomes
increasingly implausible that this occurred just because of “chance”. Rather, we should infer to the
better explanation that the coin has a certain bias. Saying that the coin lands heads not only for the
observed cases, but also for the unobserved cases, does not provide an explanation of the
observed regularity. Thus, mere Humean constant conjunction is not sufficient. What is needed for
an explanation is a “non-Humean, metaphysically robust conception of objective regularity” (BonJour
1998), which is thought of as involving actual natural necessity (Armstrong 1983; Foster 2004).
Once it has been established that there must be some metaphysically robust explanation of the
observed regularity, the second step is to argue that out of all possible metaphysically robust
explanations, the “straight” inductive explanation is the best one, where the straight explanation
extrapolates the observed frequency to the wider population. For example, given that a coin has
some objective chance of landing heads, the best explanation of the fact that m/nm/n heads have
been so far observed, is that the objective chance of the coin landing heads is m/nm/n. And this
objective chance determines what happens not only in observed cases but also in unobserved
cases.
The Nomological-Explanatory solution relies on taking IBE as a rational, a priori form of inference
which is distinct from inductive inferences like inference I. However, one might alternatively view
inductive inferences as a special case of IBE (Harman 1968), or take IBE to be merely an alternative
way of characterizing inductive inference (Henderson 2014). If either of these views is right, IBE
does not have the necessary independence from inductive inference to provide a non-circular
justification of it.
One may also object to the Nomological-Explanatory approach on the grounds that regularities do
not necessarily require an explanation in terms of necessary connections or robust metaphysical
laws. The viability of the approach also depends on the tenability of a non-Humean conception of
laws. There have been several serious attempts to develop such an account (Armstrong 1983;
Tooley 1977; Dretske 1977), but also much criticism (see J. Carroll 2016).
Another critical objection is that the Nomological-Explanatory solution simply begs the question,
even if it is taken to be legitimate to make use of IBE in the justification of induction. In the first step
of the argument we infer to a law or regularity which extends beyond the spatio-temporal region in
which observations have been thus far made, in order to predict what will happen in the future. But
why could a law that only applies to the observed spatio-temporal region not be an equally good
explanation? The main reply seems to be that we can see a priori that laws with temporal or spatial
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restrictions would be less good explanations. Foster argues that the reason is
that this would introduce more mysteries:
For it seems to me that a law whose scope is restricted to some particular period is more
mysterious, inherently more puzzling, than one which is temporally universal. (Foster 2004)
Bayesian solution
Another way in which one can try to construct an a priori argument that the premises of an inductive
inference make its conclusion probable, is to make use of the formalism of probability theory itself.
At the time Hume wrote, probabilities were used to analyze games of chance. And in general, they
were used to address the problem of what we would expect to see, given that a certain cause was
known to be operative. This is the so-called problem of “direct inference”. However, the problem of
induction concerns the “inverse” problem of determining the cause or general hypothesis, given
particular observations.
One of the first and most important methods for tackling the “inverse” problem using probabilities
was developed by Thomas Bayes. Bayes’s essay containing the main results was published after
his death in 1764 (Bayes 1764). However, it is possible that the work was done significantly earlier
and was in fact written in direct response to the publication of Hume’s Enquiry in 1748 (see Zabell
1989: 290–93, for discussion of what is known about the history).
We will illustrate the Bayesian method using the problem of drawing balls from an urn. Suppose that
we have an urn which contains white and black balls in an unknown proportion. We draw a sample
of balls from the urn by removing a ball, noting its color, and then putting it back before drawing
again.
Consider first the problem of direct inference. Given the proportion of white balls in the urn, what is
the probability of various outcomes for a sample of observations of a given size? Suppose the
proportion of white balls in the urn is θ=0.6θ=0.6. The probability of drawing one white ball in a
sample of one is then p(W;θ=0.6)=0.6p(W;θ=0.6)=0.6. We can also compute the probability for other
outcomes, such as drawing two white balls in a sample of two, using the rules of the probability
calculus (see section 1 of Hájek 2011). Generally, the probability that nwnw white balls are drawn in
a sample of size N, is given by the binomial distribution:
p(nw;θ=x)=(Nnw)xnw(1−x)(1−nw)p(nw;θ=x)=(Nnw)xnw(1−x)(1−nw)
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This is a specific example of a “sampling distribution”, p(E∣H)p(E∣H), which
gives the probability of certain evidence E in a sample, on the assumption that a certain
hypothesis H is true. Calculation of the sampling distribution can in general be done a priori, given
the rules of the probability calculus.
However, the problem of induction is the inverse problem. We want to infer not what the sample will
be like, with a known hypothesis, rather we want to infer a hypothesis about the general situation or
population, based on the observation of a limited sample. The probabilities of the candidate
hypotheses can then be used to inform predictions about further observations. In the case of the
urn, for example, we want to know what the observation of a particular sample frequency of white
balls, nwNnwN, tells us about θθ, the proportion of white balls in the urn.
The idea of the Bayesian approach is to assign probabilities not only to the events which constitute
evidence, but also to hypotheses. One starts with a “prior probability” distribution over the relevant
hypotheses p(H)p(H). On learning some evidence E, the Bayesian updates the prior p(H)p(H) to the
conditional probability p(H∣E)p(H∣E). This update rule is called the “rule of conditionalisation”. The
conditional probability p(H∣E)p(H∣E) is known as the “posterior probability”, and is calculated using
Bayes’ rule:
p(H∣E)=p(E∣H)p(H)p(E)p(H∣E)=p(E∣H)p(H)p(E)
Here the sampling distribution can be taken to be a conditional probability p(E∣H)p(E∣H), which is

known as the “likelihood” of the hypothesis H on evidence E.
One can then go on to compute the predictive distribution for as yet unobserved data E′E′, given
observations E. The predictive distribution in a Bayesian approach is given by
p(E′∣E)=∑Hp(E′∣H)p(H∣E)p(E′∣E)=∑Hp(E′∣H)p(H∣E)
where the sum becomes an integral in cases where H is a continuous variable.
For the urn example, we can compute the posterior probability p(θ∣nw)p(θ∣nw) using Bayes’ rule,
and the likelihood given by the binomial distribution above. In order to do so, we also need to assign
a prior probability distribution to the parameter θθ. One natural choice, which was made early on by
Bayes himself and by Laplace, is to put a uniform prior over the parameter θθ. Bayes’ own rationale
for this choice was that then if you work out the probability of each value for the number of whites in
the sample based only on the prior, before any data is observed, all those probabilities are equal.
Laplace had a different justification, based on the Principle of Indifference. This principle states that
if you don’t have any reason to favor one hypothesis over another, you should assign them all equal
probabilities.
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With the choice of uniform prior, the posterior probability and predictive
distribution can be calculated. It turns out that the probability that the next ball will be white, given
that nwnw of N draws were white, is given by
p(w∣nw)=nw+1N+2p(w∣nw)=nw+1N+2
This is Laplace’s famous “rule of succession” (1814). Suppose on the basis of observing 90 white
balls out of 100, we calculate by the rule of succession that the probability of the next ball being
white is 91/102=0.8991/102=0.89. It is quite conceivable that the next ball might be black. Even in
the case, where all 100 balls have been white, so that the probability of the next ball being white is
0.99, there is still a small probability that the next ball is not white. What the probabilistic reasoning
supplies then is not an argument to the conclusion that the next ball will be a certain color, but an
argument to the conclusion that certain future observations are very likely given what has been
observed in the past.
Overall, the Bayes-Laplace argument in the urn case provides an example of how probabilistic
reasoning can take us from evidence about observations in the past to a prediction for how likely
certain future observations are. The question is what kind of solution, if any, this type of calculation
provides to the problem of induction. At first sight, since it is just a mathematical calculation, it looks
as though it does indeed provide an a priori argument from the premises of an inductive inference to
the proposition that a certain conclusion is probable.
However, in order to establish this definitively, one needs to argue that all the components and
assumptions of the argument are a priori and this requires further examination of at least three
important issues.
First, the Bayes-Laplace argument relies on the rules of the probability calculus. What is the status
of these rules? Does following them amount to a priori reasoning? The answer to this depends in
part on how probability itself is interpreted. Broadly speaking, there are prominent interpretations of
probability according to which the rules plausibly have a priori status and could form the basis of a
demonstrative argument. These include the classical interpretation originally developed by Laplace
(1814), the logical interpretation which had its heyday in the work of Keynes (1921), Johnson (1921),
Jeffreys (1939), and Carnap (1950), and the subjectivist interpretation of Ramsey (1926), Savage
(1954), and de Finetti (1964). Attempts to argue for a probabilistic a priori solution to the problem of
induction have been primarily associated with these interpretations.
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Secondly, in the case of the urn, the Bayes-Laplace argument is based on a
particular probabilistic model—the binomial model. This involves the assumption that there is a
parameter describing an unknown proportion θθ of balls in the urn, and that the data amounts to
independent draws from a distribution over that parameter. What is the basis of these assumptions?
Do they generalize to other cases beyond the actual urn case—i.e., can we see observations in
general as analogous to draws from an “Urn of Nature”? There has been a persistent worry that
these types of assumptions, while reasonable when applied to the case of drawing balls from an urn,
will not hold for other cases of inductive inference. Thus, the probabilistic solution to the problem of
induction might be of relatively limited scope. At the least, there are some assumptions going into
the choice of model here that need to be made explicit.
Thirdly, the Bayes-Laplace argument relies on a particular choice of prior probability distribution.
What is the status of this assignment, and can it be based on a priori principles? Historically, the
Bayes-Laplace choice of a uniform prior, as well as the whole concept of classical probability, relied
on the Principle of Indifference. This principle has been regarded by many as an a priori principle.
However, it has also been subjected to much criticism on the grounds that it can give rise to
inconsistent probability assignments (Bertrand 1888; Borel 1909; Keynes 1921). Such
inconsistencies are produced by there being more than one way to carve up the space of
alternatives, and different choices give rise to conflicting probability assignments. One attempt to
rescue the Principle of Indifference has been to appeal to explanationism, and argue that the
principle should be applied only to the carving of the space at “the most explanatorily basic level”,
where this level is identified according to an a priori notion of explanatory priority (Huemer 2009).
The quest for an a priori argument for the assignment of the prior has been largely abandoned. For
many, the subjectivist foundations developed by Ramsey, de Finetti and Savage provide a more
satisfactory basis for understanding probability. From this point of view, it is a mistake to try to
introduce any further a priori constraints on the probabilities beyond those dictated by the probability
rules themselves. Rather the assignment of priors may reflect personal opinions or background
knowledge, and no prior is a priori an unreasonable choice.
So far, we have considered probabilistic arguments which place probabilities over hypotheses in a
hypothesis space as well as observations. There is also a tradition of attempts to determine what
probability distributions we should have, given certain observations, from the starting point of a joint
probability distribution over all the observable variables. One may then postulate axioms directly on
this distribution over observables, and examine the consequences for the predictive distribution.
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Much of the development of inductive logic, including the influential programme
by Carnap, proceeded in this manner (Carnap 1950, 1952).
This approach helps to clarify the role of the assumptions behind probabilistic models. One
fundamental assumption that one can make about the observations is that they are “exchangeable”.
This means that the joint distribution of the random variables is invariant under permutations.
Informally, this means that the order of the observations does not affect the probability. For instance,
in the urn case, this would mean that drawing first a white ball and then a black ball is just as
probable as first drawing a black and then a white. De Finetti proved a general representation
theorem that if the joint probability distribution of an infinite sequence of random variables is
assumed to be exchangeable, then it can be written as a mixture of distribution functions from each
of which the data behave as if they are independent random draws (de Finetti 1964). In the case of
the urn example, the theorem shows that it is as if the data are independent random draws from a
binomial distribution over a parameter θθ, which itself has a prior probability distribution.
The assumption of exchangeability may be seen as a natural formalization of Hume’s assumption
that the past resembles the future. This is intuitive because assuming exchangeability means
thinking that the order of observations, both past and future, does not matter to the probability
assignments.
However, the development of the programme of inductive logic revealed that many generalizations
are possible. For example, Johnson proposed to assume an axiom he called the “sufficientness
postulate”. This states that outcomes can be of a number of different types, and that the conditional
probability that the next outcome is of type i depends only on the number of previous trials and the
number of previous outcomes of type i (Johnson 1932). Assuming the sufficientness postulate for
three or more types gives rise to a general predictive distribution corresponding to Carnap’s
“continuum of inductive methods” (Carnap 1952). This predictive distribution takes the form:
p(i∣N1,N2,…Nt)=Ni+kN1+N2+⋯+Nt+ktp(i∣N1,N2,…Nt)=Ni+kN1+N2+⋯+Nt+kt
for some positive number k. This reduces to Laplace’s rule of succession when t=2t=2 and k=1k=1.
Generalizations of the notion of exchangeability, such as “partial exchangeability” and “Markov
exchangeability”, have been explored, and these may be thought of as forms of symmetry
assumption (Zabell 1988; Skyrms 2012). As less restrictive axioms on the probabilities for
observables are assumed, the result is that there is no longer a unique result for the probability of a
prediction, but rather a whole class of possible probabilities, mapped out by a generalized rule of
succession such as the above. Therefore, in this tradition as in the Bayes-Laplace approach, we
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have moved away from producing an argument which produces a unique a
priori probabilistic answer to Hume’s problem.
One might think then that the assignment of the prior, or the relevant corresponding postulates on
the observable probability distribution, is precisely where empirical assumptions enter into inductive
inferences. The probabilistic calculations are empirical arguments, rather than a priori ones. If this is
correct, then the probabilistic framework has not in the end provided an a priori solution to the
problem of induction, but it has rather allowed us to clarify what could be meant by Hume’s claim
that inductive inferences rely on the Uniformity Principle.
Some think that although the problem of induction is not solved, there is in some sense a partial
solution, which has been called a “logical solution”. Howson, for example, argues that “Inductive
reasoning is justified to the extent that it is sound, given appropriate premises” (Howson 2000: 239,
his emphasis). According to this view, there is no getting away from an empirical premise for
inductive inferences, but we might still think of Bayesian conditioning as functioning like a kind of
logic or “consistency constraint” which “generates predictions from the assumptions and
observations together” (Romeijn 2004: 360). Once we have an empirical assumption, instantiated in
the prior probability, and the observations, Bayesian conditioning tells us what the resulting
predictive probability distribution should be.
Combinatorial approach
An alternative attempt to use probabilistic reasoning to produce an a priori justification for inductive
inferences is the so-called “combinatorial” solution. This was first put forward by Donald C. Williams
(1947) and later developed by David Stove (1986).
Like the Bayes-Laplace argument, the solution relies heavily on the idea that straightforward a
priori calculations can be done in a “direct inference” from population to sample. As we have seen,
given a certain population frequency, the probability of getting different frequencies in a sample can
be calculated straightforwardly based on the rules of the probability calculus. The Bayes-Laplace
argument relied on inverting the probability distribution using Bayes’ rule to get from the sampling
distribution to the posterior distribution. Williams instead proposes that the inverse inference may be
based on a certain logical syllogism: the proportional (or statistical) syllogism.
The proportional, or statistical syllogism, is the following:
1. Of all the things that are M, m/nm/n are P.

2. a is an M
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Therefore, a is P, with probability m/nm/n.
For example, if 90% of rabbits in a population are white and we observe a rabbit a, then the
proportional syllogism says that we infer that a is white with a probability of 90%. Williams argues
that the proportional syllogism is a non-deductive logical syllogism, which effectively interpolates
between the syllogism for entailment
1. All Ms are P
2. a is an M
Therefore, a is P.
And the syllogism for contradiction
1. No M is P
2. a is M
Therefore, a is not P.
This syllogism can be combined with an observation about the behavior of increasingly large
samples. From calculations of the sampling distribution, it can be shown that as the sample size
increases, the probability that the sample frequency is in a range which closely approximates the
population frequency also increases. In fact, Bernoulli’s law of large numbers states that the
probability that the sample frequency approximates the population frequency tends to one as the
sample size goes to infinity. Williams argues that such results support a “general over-all premise,
common to all inductions, that samples ‘match’ their populations” (Williams 1947: 78).
We can then apply the proportional syllogism to samples from a population, to get the following
argument:
1. Most samples match their population
2. S is a sample.
Therefore, S matches its population, with high probability.
This is an instance of the proportional syllogism, and it uses the general result about samples
matching populations as the first major premise.
The next step is to argue that if we observe that the sample contains a proportion of m/nm/n Fs,
then we can conclude that since this sample with high probability matches its population, the
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population, with high probability, has a population frequency that approximates
the sample frequency m/nm/n. Both Williams and Stove claim that this amounts to a logical a
priori solution to the problem of induction.
A number of authors have expressed the view that the Williams-Stove argument is only valid if the
sample S is drawn randomly from the population of possible samples—i.e., that any sample is as
likely to be drawn as any other (Brown 1987; Will 1948; Giaquinto 1987). Sometimes this is
presented as an objection to the application of the proportional syllogism. The claim is that the
proportional syllogism is only valid if a is drawn randomly from the population of Ms. However, the
response has been that there is no need to know that the sample is randomly drawn in order to
apply the syllogism (Maher 1996; Campbell 2001; Campbell & Franklin 2004). Certainly if you have
reason to think that your sampling procedure is more likely to draw certain individuals than others—
for example, if you know that you are in a certain location where there are more of a certain type—
then you should not apply the proportional syllogism. But if you have no such reasons, the
defenders claim, it is quite rational to apply it. Certainly it is always possible that you draw an
unrepresentative sample—meaning one of the few samples in which the sample frequency does not
match the population frequency—but this is why the conclusion is only probable and not certain.
The more problematic step in the argument is the final step, which takes us from the claim that
samples match their populations with high probability to the claim that having seen a particular
sample frequency, the population from which the sample is drawn has frequency close to the
sample frequency with high probability. The problem here is a subtle shift in what is meant by “high
probability”, which has formed the basis of a common misreading of Bernouilli’s theorem. Hacking
(1975: 156–59) puts the point in the following terms. Bernouilli’s theorem licenses the claim that
much more often than not, a small interval around the sample frequency will include the true
population frequency. In other words, it is highly probable in the sense of “usually right” to say that
the sample matches its population. But this does not imply that the proposition that a small interval
around the sample will contain the true population frequency is highly probable in the sense of
“credible on each occasion of use”. This would mean that for any given sample, it is highly credible
that the sample matches its population. It is quite compatible with the claim that it is “usually right”
that the sample matches its population to say that there are some samples which do not match their
populations at all. Thus one cannot conclude from Bernouilli’s theorem that for any given sample
frequency, we should assign high probability to the proposition that a small interval around the
sample frequency will contain the true population frequency. But this is exactly the slide that
Williams makes in the final step of his argument. Maher (1996) argues in a similar fashion that the
last step of the Williams-Stove argument is fallacious. In fact, if one wants to draw conclusions about
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the probability of the population frequency given the sample frequency, the
proper way to do so is by using the Bayesian method described in the previous section. But, as we
there saw, this requires the assignment of prior probabilities, and this explains why many people
have thought that the combinatorial solution somehow illicitly presupposed an assumption like the
principle of indifference. The Williams-Stove argument does not in fact give us an alternative way of
inverting the probabilities which somehow bypasses all the issues that Bayesians have faced.
4. Tackling the Second Horn of Hume’s Dilemma
So far we have considered ways in which the first horn of Hume’s dilemma might be tackled. But it is
of course also possible to take on the second horn instead.
One may argue that a probable argument would not, despite what Hume says, be circular in a
problematic way (we consider responses of this kind in section 4.1). Or, one might attempt to argue
that probable arguments are not circular at all (section 4.2).
Inductive Justifications of Induction
One way to tackle the second horn of Hume’s dilemma is to reject premise P6, which rules out
circular arguments. Some have argued that certain kinds of circular arguments would provide an
acceptable justification for the inductive inference. Since the justification would then itself be an
inductive one, this approach is often referred to as an “inductive justification of induction”.
First we should examine how exactly the Humean circularity supposedly arises. Take the simple
case of enumerative inductive inference that follows the following pattern (X):
Most observed Fs have been Gs
Therefore: Most Fs are Gs.
Hume claims that such arguments presuppose the Uniformity Principle (UP). According to
premises P7 and P8, this supposition also needs to be supported by an argument in order that the
inductive inference be justified. A natural idea is that we can argue for the Uniformity Principle on the
grounds that “it works”. We know that it works, because past instances of arguments which relied
upon it were found to be successful. This alone however is not sufficient unless we have reason to
think that such arguments will also be successful in the future. That claim must itself be supported
by an inductive argument (S):
Most arguments of form X that rely on UP have succeeded in the past.
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Therefore, most arguments of form X that rely on UP succeed.
But this argument itself depends on the UP, which is the very supposition which we were trying to
justify.
As we have seen in section 2, some reject Hume’s claim that all inductive inferences presuppose
the UP. However, the argument that basing the justification of the inductive inference on a probable
argument would result in circularity need not rely on this claim. The circularity concern can be
framed more generally. If argument S relies on something which is already presupposed in
inference X, then argument S cannot be used to justify inference X. The question though is what
precisely the something is.
Some authors have argued that in fact S does not rely on any premise or even presupposition that
would require us to already know the conclusion of X. S is then not a “premise circular” argument.
Rather, they claim, it is “rule-circular”—it relies on a rule of inference in order to reach the conclusion
that that very rule is reliable. Suppose we adopt the rule R which says that when it is observed that
most Fs are Gs, we should infer that most Fs are Gs. Then inference X relies on rule R. We want to
show that rule R is reliable. We could appeal to the fact that R worked in the past, and so, by an
inductive argument, it will also work in the future. Call this argument S*:
Most inferences following rule R have been successful
Therefore, most inferences following R are successful.
Since this argument itself uses rule R, using it to establish that R is reliable is rule-circular.
Some authors have then argued that although premise-circularity is vicious, rule-circularity is not
(Cleve 1984; Papineau 1992). One reason for thinking rule-circularity is not vicious would be if it is
not necessary to know or even justifiably believe that rule R is reliable in order to move to a justified
conclusion using the rule. This is a claim made by externalists about justification (Cleve 1984). They
say that as long as R is in fact reliable, one can form a justified belief in the conclusion of an
argument relying on R, as long as one has justified belief in the premises.
If one is not persuaded by the externalist claim, one might attempt to argue that rule circularity is
benign in a different fashion. For example, the requirement that a rule be shown to be reliable
without any rule-circularity might appear unreasonable when the rule is of a very fundamental
nature. As Lange puts it:
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It might be suggested that although a circular argument is ordinarily unable to
justify its conclusion, a circular argument is acceptable in the case of justifying a fundamental form
of reasoning. After all, there is nowhere more basic to turn, so all that we can reasonably demand of
a fundamental form of reasoning is that it endorse itself. (Lange 2011: 56)
Proponents of this point of view point out that even deductive inference cannot be justified
deductively. Consider Lewis Carroll’s dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise (Carroll 1895).
Achilles is arguing with a Tortoise who refuses to perform modus ponens. The Tortoise accepts the
premise that p, and the premise that p implies q but he will not accept q. How can Achilles convince
him? He manages to persuade him to accept another premise, namely “if p and p implies q, then q”.
But the Tortoise is still not prepared to infer to q. Achilles goes on adding more premises of the
same kind, but to no avail. It appears then that modus ponens cannot be justified to someone who is
not already prepared to use that rule.
It might seem odd if premise circularity were vicious, and rule circularity were not, given that there
appears to be an easy interchange between rules and premises. After all, a rule can always, as in
the Lewis Carroll story, be added as a premise to the argument. But what the Carroll story also
appears to indicate is that there is indeed a fundamental difference between being prepared to
accept a premise stating a rule (the Tortoise is happy to do this), and being prepared to use that rule
(this is what the Tortoise refuses to do).
Suppose that we grant that an inductive argument such as S (or S*) can support an inductive
inference X without vicious circularity. Still, a possible objection is that the argument simply does not
provide a full justification of X. After all, less sane inference rules such as counterinduction can
support themselves in a similar fashion. The counterinductive rule is CI:
Most observed As are Bs.
Therefore, it is not the case that most As are Bs.
Consider then the following argument CI*:
Most CI arguments have been unsuccessful
Therefore, it is not the case that most CI arguments are unsuccessful, i.e., many CI arguments are
successful.
This argument therefore establishes the reliability of CI in a rule-circular fashion (see Salmon 1963).
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Argument S can be used to support inference X, but only for someone who is
already prepared to infer inductively by using S. It cannot convince a skeptic who is not prepared to
rely upon that rule in the first place. One might think then that the argument is simply not achieving
very much.
The response to these concerns is that, as Papineau puts it, the argument is “not supposed to do
very much” (Papineau 1992: 18). The fact that a counterinductivist counterpart of the argument
exists is true, but irrelevant. It is conceded that the argument cannot persuade either a
counterinductivist, or a skeptic. Nonetheless, proponents of the inductive justification maintain that
there is still some added value in showing that inductive inferences are reliable, even when we
already accept that there is nothing problematic about them. The inductive justification of induction
provides a kind of important consistency check on our existing beliefs.
4.2 No Rules
It is possible to go even further in an attempt to dismantle the Humean circularity. Maybe inductive
inferences do not even have a rule in common. What if every inductive inference is essentially
unique? Okasha, for example, argues that Hume’s circularity problem can be evaded if there are “no
rules” behind induction (Okasha 2005a,b). Norton puts forward the similar idea that all inductive
inferences are material, and have nothing formal in common (Norton 2003).
Proponents of such views have attacked Hume’s claim that there is a UP on which all inductive
inferences are based. There have long been complaints about the vagueness of the Uniformity
Principle (Salmon 1953). The future only resembles the past in some respects, but not others.
Suppose that on all my birthdays so far, I have been under 40 years old. This does not give me a
reason to expect that I will be under 40 years old on my next birthday. There seems then to be a
major lacuna in Hume’s account. He might have explained or described how we draw an inductive
inference, on the assumption that it is one we can draw. But he leaves untouched the question of
how we distinguish between cases where we extrapolate a regularity legitimately, regarding it as a
law, and cases where we do not.
Nelson Goodman is often seen as having made this point in a particularly vivid form with his “new
riddle of induction” (Goodman 1955: 59-83). Suppose we define a predicate “grue” in the following
way. An object is “grue” when it is green if observed before time t and blue otherwise. Goodman
considers a thought experiment in which we observe a bunch of green emeralds before time t. We
could describe our results by saying all the observed emeralds are green. Using a simple
enumerative inductive schema, we could infer from the result that all observed emeralds are green,
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that all emeralds are green. But equally, we could describe the same results by
saying that all observed emeralds are grue. Then using the same schema, we could infer from the
result that all observed emeralds are grue, that all emeralds are grue. In the first case, we expect an
emerald observed after time t to be green, whereas in the second, we expect it to be blue. Thus the
two predictions are incompatible. Goodman claims that what Hume omitted to do was to give any
explanation for why we project predicates like “green”, but not predicates like “grue”. This is the “new
riddle”, which is often taken to be a further problem of induction that Hume did not address.
One moral that could be taken from Goodman is that there is not one general Uniformity Principle
that all probable arguments rely upon (Sober 1988; Norton 2003; Okasha 2001, 2005a,b). Rather
each inductive inference presupposes some more specific empirical presupposition. A particular
inductive inference depends on some specific way in which the future resembles the past. It can
then be justified by another inductive inference which depends on some quite different empirical
claim. This will in turn need to be justified—by yet another inductive inference. The nature of Hume’s
problem in the second horn is thus transformed. There is no circularity. Rather there is a regress of
inductive justifications, each relying on their own empirical presuppositions (Sober 1988; Norton
2003; Okasha 2001, 2005a,b).
One way to put this point is to say that Hume’s argument rests on a quantifier shift fallacy (Sober
1988; Okasha 2005a). Hume says that there exists a general presupposition for all inductive
inferences, whereas he should have said that for each inductive inference, there is some
presupposition. Different inductive inferences then rest on different empirical presuppositions, and
the problem of circularity is evaded.
What will then be the consequence of supposing that Hume’s problem should indeed have been a
regress, rather than a circularity? Here different opinions are possible. On the one hand, one might
think that a regress still leads to a skeptical conclusion. So although the exact form in which Hume
stated his problem was not correct, the conclusion is not substantially different (Sober 1988).
Another possibility is that the transformation mitigates or even removes the skeptical problem. For
example, Norton argues that the upshot is a dissolution of the problem of induction, since the
regress of justifications benignly terminates (Norton 2003). And Okasha more mildly suggests that
even if the regress is infinite, “Perhaps infinite regresses are less bad than vicious circles after all”
(Okasha 2005b: 253).
Any dissolution of Hume’s circularity does not depend only on arguing that the UP should be
replaced by empirical presuppositions which are specific to each inductive inference. It is also
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necessary to establish that inductive inferences share no common rules—
otherwise there will still be at least some rule-circularity. Okasha suggests that the Bayesian model
of belief-updating is an illustration how induction can be characterized in a rule-free way, but this is
problematic, since in this model all inductive inferences still share the common rule of Bayesian
conditionalisation. Norton’s material theory of induction more genuinely promises a rule-free
characterization of induction, but it is not clear whether it really can avoid any role for general rules
(Achinstein 2010; Worrall 2010).
5. The Necessary Conditions for Justification
Hume is usually read as delivering a negative verdict on the possibility of justifying inference I, via a
premise such as P8. There are however some who question whether Hume is best interpreted as
drawing a conclusion about justification of inference I at all (we will discuss these interpretations
in section 5.1). There are also those who question in different ways whether premise P8 really does
give a valid necessary condition for justification of inference I (sections 5.2 and 5.3).
5.1 Interpretation of Hume’s Conclusion
Some scholars have denied that Hume should be read as invoking a premise such premise P8 at
all. The reason, they claim, is that he was not aiming for an explicitly normative conclusion about
justification such as C5. Hume certainly is seeking a “chain of reasoning” from the premises of the
inductive inference to the conclusion, and he thinks that an argument for the UP is necessary to
complete the chain. However, one could think that there is no further premise regarding justification,
and so the conclusion of his argument is simply C4: there is no chain of reasoning from the
premises to the conclusion of an inductive inference. Hume could then be, as Don Garrett and David
Owen have argued, advancing a “thesis in cognitive psychology”, rather than making a normative
claim about justification (Owen 1999; Garrett 2002). The thesis is about the nature of the cognitive
process underlying the inference. According to Garrett, the main upshot of Hume’s argument is that
there can be no reasoning process that establishes the UP. For Owen, the message is that the
inference is not drawn through a chain of ideas connected by mediating links, as would be
characteristic of the faculty of reason.
There are also interpreters who have argued that Hume is merely trying to exclude a specific kind of
justification of induction, based on a conception of reason predominant among rationalists of his
time, rather than a justification in general (Beauchamp & Rosenberg 1981; Baier 2009). In particular,
it has been claimed that it is “an attempt to refute the rationalist belief that at least some inductive
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arguments are demonstrative” (Beauchamp & Rosenberg 1981: xviii). Under
this interpretation, premise P8 should be modified to read something like:
 If there is no chain of reasoning based on demonstrative arguments from the premises to the
conclusion of inference I, then inference I is not justified.
Such interpretations do however struggle with the fact that Hume’s argument is explicitly a two-
pronged attack, which concerns not just demonstrative arguments, but also probable arguments.
The question of how expansive a normative conclusion to attribute to Hume is a complex one. It
depends in part on the interpretation of Hume’s own solution to his problem. As we saw in section 1,
Hume attributes the basis of inductive inference to principles of the imagination in the Treatise, and
in the Enquiry to “custom”, “habit”, conceived as a kind of natural instinct. The question is then
whether this alternative provides any kind of justification for the inference, even if not one based on
reason. On the face of it, it looks as though Hume is suggesting that inductive inferences proceed on
an entirely arational basis. He clearly does not think that they do not succeed in producing good
outcomes. In fact, Hume even suggests that this operation of the mind may even be less “liable to
error and mistake” than if it were entrusted to “the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow
in its operations” (E. 5.2.22). It is also not clear that he sees the workings of the imagination as
completely devoid of rationality. For one thing, Hume talks about the imagination as governed
by principles. Later in the Treatise, he even gives “rules” and “logic” for characterizing what should
count as a good causal inference (T. 1.3.15). He also clearly sees it as possible to distinguish
between better forms of such “reasoning”, as he continues to call it. Thus, there may be grounds to
argue that Hume was not trying to argue that inductive inferences have no rational foundation
whatsoever, but merely that they do not have the specific type of rational foundation which is rooted
in the faculty of Reason.
All this indicates that there is room for debate over the intended scope of Hume’s own conclusion.
And thus there is also room for debate over exactly what form a premise (such as premise P8) that
connects the rest of his argument to a normative conclusion should take. No matter who is right
about this however, the fact remains that Hume has throughout history been predominantly read as
presenting an argument for inductive skepticism.
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5.2 Postulates and Hinges
Even if one does attribute a normative conclusion to Hume, one may question his argument by
asking whether premise P8 is true. This can prompt general reflection on what is needed for
justification of an inference in the first place, and what Hume is even asking for.
For example, Wittgenstein raised doubts over whether it is even meaningful to ask for the grounds
for inductive inferences.
If anyone said that information about the past could not convince him that something would happen
in the future, I should not understand him. One might ask him: what do you expect to be told, then?
What sort of information do you call a ground for such a belief? … If these are not grounds, then
what are grounds?—If you say these are not grounds, then you must surely be able to state what
must be the case for us to have the right to say that there are grounds for our assumption….
(Wittgenstein 1953: 481)
One might not, for instance, think that there even needs to be a chain of reasoning in which each
step or presupposition is supported by an argument. Wittgenstein took it that there are some
principles so fundamental that they do not require support from any further argument. They are the
“hinges” on which enquiry turns.
Out of Wittgenstein’s ideas has developed a general notion of “entitlement”, which is a kind of
rational warrant to hold certain propositions which does not come with the same requirements as
“justification”. Entitlement provides epistemic rights to hold a proposition, without responsibilities to
base the belief in it on an argument. Crispin Wright (2004) has argued that there are certain
principles, including the Uniformity Principle, that we are entitled in this sense to hold.
Some philosophers have set themselves the task of determining a set or sets of postulates which
form a plausible basis for inductive inferences. Bertrand Russell, for example, argued that five
postulates lay at the root of inductive reasoning (Russell 1948). Arthur Burks, on the other hand,
proposed that the set of postulates is not unique, but there may be multiple sets of postulates
corresponding to different inductive methods (Burks 1953, 1955).
The main objection to all these views is that they do not really solve the problem of induction in a
way that adequately secures the pillars on which inductive inference stands. As Salmon puts it,
“admission of unjustified and unjustifiable postulates to deal with the problem is tantamount to
making scientific method a matter of faith” (Salmon 1966: 48).
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5.3 Ordinary Language Dissolution
Rather than allowing undefended empirical postulates to give normative support to an inductive
inference, one could instead argue for a completely different conception of what is involved in
justification. Like Wittgenstein, later ordinary language philosophers, notably P.F. Strawson, also
questioned what exactly it means to ask for a justification of inductive inferences (Strawson 1952).
This has become known as the “Ordinary language dissolution” of the problem of induction.
Strawson points out that it could be meaningful to ask for a deductive justification of inductive
inferences. But it is not clear that this is helpful since this is effectively “a demand that induction shall
be shown to be really a kind of deduction” (Strawson 1952: 230). Rather, Strawson says, when we
ask about whether a particular inductive inference is justified, we are typically judging whether it
conforms to our usual inductive standards. Suppose, he says, someone has formed the belief by
inductive inference that All f’s are g. Strawson says that if that person is asked for their grounds or
reasons for holding that belief,
I think it would be felt to be a satisfactory answer if he replied: “Well, in all my wide and varied
experience I’ve come across innumerable cases of f and never a case of f which wasn’t a case of g”.
In saying this, he is clearly claiming to have inductive support, inductive evidence, of a certain kind,
for his belief. (Strawson 1952)
That is just because inductive support, as it is usually understood, simply consists of having
observed many positive instances in a wide variety of conditions.
In effect, this approach denies that producing a chain of reasoning is a necessary condition for
justification. Rather, an inductive inference is justified if it conforms to the usual standards of
inductive justification. But, is there more to it? Might we not ask what reason we have to rely on
those inductive standards?
It surely makes sense to ask whether a particular inductive inference is justified. But the answer to
that is fairly straightforward. Sometimes people have enough evidence for their conclusions and
sometimes they do not. Does it also make sense to ask about whether inductive procedures
generally are justified? Strawson draws the analogy between asking whether a particular act is legal.
We may answer such a question, he says, by referring to the law of the land.
But it makes no sense to inquire in general whether the law of the land, the legal system as a whole,
is or is not legal. For to what legal standards are we appealing? (Strawson 1952: 257)
According to Strawson,
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It is an analytic proposition that it is reasonable to have a degree of belief in a
statement which is proportional to the strength of the evidence in its favour; and it is an analytic
proposition, though not a proposition of mathematics, that, other things being equal, the evidence for
a generalisation is strong in proportion as the number of favourable instances, and the variety of
circumstances in which they have been found, is great. So to ask whether it is reasonable to place
reliance on inductive procedures is like asking whether it is reasonable to proportion the degree of
one’s convictions to the strength of the evidence. Doing this is what “being reasonable” means in
such a context. (Strawson 1952: 256–57)
Thus, according to this point of view, there is no further question to ask about whether it is
reasonable to rely on inductive inferences.
The ordinary language philosophers do not explicitly argue against Hume’s premise P8. But
effectively what they are doing is offering a whole different story about what it would mean to be
justified in believing the conclusion of inductive inferences. What is needed is just conformity to
inductive standards, and there is no real meaning to asking for any further justification for those.
The main objection to this view is that conformity to the usual standards is insufficient to provide the
needed justification. What we need to know is whether belief in the conclusion of an inductive
inference is “epistemically reasonable or justified in the sense that …there is reason to think that it is
likely to be true” (BonJour 1998: 198). The problem Hume has raised is whether, despite the fact
that inductive inferences have tended to produce true conclusions in the past, we have reason to
think the conclusion of an inductive inference we now make is likely to be true. Arguably,
establishing that an inductive inference is rational in the sense that it follows inductive standards is
not sufficient to establish that its conclusion is likely to be true. In fact Strawson allows that there is a
question about whether “induction will continue to be successful”, which is distinct from the question
of whether induction is rational. This question he does take to hinge on a “contingent, factual matter”
(Strawson 1952: 262). But if it is this question that concerned Hume, it is no answer to establish that
induction is rational, unless that claim is understood to involve or imply that an inductive inference
carried out according to rational standards is likely to have a true conclusion.
6. Living with Inductive Skepticism
So far we have considered the various ways in which we might attempt to solve the problem of
induction by resisting one or other premise of Hume’s argument. Some philosophers have however
seen his argument as unassailable, and have thus accepted that it does lead to inductive
skepticism, the conclusion that inductive inferences cannot be justified. The challenge then is to find
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a way of living with such a radical-seeming conclusion. We appear to rely on
inductive inference ubiquitously in daily life, and it is also generally thought that it is at the very
foundation of the scientific method. Can we go on with all this, whilst still seriously thinking none of it
is justified by any rational argument?
One option here is to argue, as does Nicholas Maxwell, that the problem of induction is posed in an
overly restrictive context. Maxwell argues that the problem does not arise if we adopt a different
conception of science than the ‘standard empiricist’ one, which he denotes ‘aim-oriented empiricism’
(Maxwell 2017).
Another option here is to think that the significance of the problem of induction is somehow restricted
to a skeptical context. Hume himself seems to have thought along these lines. For instance he says:
Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning
whatsoever. Though we should conclude, for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all
reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind, which is not supported by any
argument or process of the understanding; there is no danger, that these reasonings, on which
almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by such a discovery. (E. 5.1.2)
Hume’s purpose is clearly not to argue that we should not make inductive inferences in everyday
life, and indeed his whole method and system of describing the mind in naturalistic terms depends
on inductive inferences through and through. The problem of induction then must be seen as a
problem that arises only at the level of philosophical reflection.
Another way to mitigate the force of inductive skepticism is to restrict its scope. Karl Popper, for
instance, regarded the problem of induction as insurmountable, but he argued that science is not in
fact based on inductive inferences at all (Popper 1935 [1959]). Rather he presented a deductivist
view of science, according to which it proceeds by making bold conjectures, and then attempting to
falsify those conjectures. In the simplest version of this account, when a hypothesis makes a
prediction which is found to be false in an experiment, the hypothesis is rejected as falsified. The
logic of this procedure is fully deductive. The hypothesis entails the prediction, and the falsity of the
prediction refutes the hypothesis by modus tollens. Thus, Popper claimed that science was not
based on the extrapolative inferences considered by Hume. The consequence then is that it is not
so important, at least for science, if those inferences would lack a rational foundation.
Popper’s account appears to be incomplete in an important way. There are always many
hypotheses which have not yet been refuted by the evidence, and these may contradict one
another. According to the strictly deductive framework, since none are yet falsified, they are all on an
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equal footing. Yet, scientists will typically want to say that one is better
supported by the evidence than the others. We seem to need more than just deductive reasoning to
support practical decision-making (Salmon 1981). Popper did indeed appeal to a notion of one
hypothesis being better or worse “corroborated” by the evidence. But arguably, this took him away
from a strictly deductive view of science. It appears doubtful then that pure deductivism can give an
adequate account of scientific method.
7. Means-ends Solutions
Hume’s argument might be taken as having definitively ruled out the kind of justification for inductive
inferences that he was looking for. That is, it may preclude a justification which gives reason to
believe the conclusion of a particular inductive inference is correct, or even likely to be correct.
However, it is also possible to move away from the focus on justifying particular inductive
inferences, and to consider inductive methods more generally. In simple cases of enumerative
induction, the “inductive method”, or “inductive principle”, as it is sometimes called, is a rule for how
to extrapolate from the observed instances. For example, it might be the rule that one should infer to
a universal generalization, after a certain number of positive instances and reject the universal
generalization after observation of a counter-instances. Or it might be formulated as the so-called
“straight rule”, which says that one should project the observed frequency of an attribute to the
population as a whole, including future instances. Might it be the case that the general properties of
an inductive method give grounds for employing that method, even when we have no reason to think
that the method will result in a correct answer in any particular application? Given a particular
inductive problem, we can look for an optimal method, or means, for providing a solution. Such a
means-ends argument may then form the basis for following the method, even in the absence of
reasons to believe in its success in particular instances.
7.1 Pragmatic Vindication
One of the main early attempts in this direction was the “pragmatic” approach of Reichenbach (1938
[2006]). Reichenbach did think Hume’s argument unassailable, but nonetheless he attempted to
provide a weaker kind of justification for induction. In order to emphasize the difference from the kind
of justification Hume sought, some have given it a different term and refer to Reichenbach’s solution
as a “vindication”, rather than a justification of induction (Feigl 1950; Salmon 1963).
According to this approach, we have a certain aim in making inductive inferences. Even if we cannot
be sure we can achieve the aim, we can still argue that if the aim can be met, it will be by following
the usual principles of inductive inference. This provides a reason for making those usual inductive
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inferences. Reichenbach makes a comparison to the situation where a man is
suffering from a disease, and the physician says “I do not know whether an operation will save the
man, but if there is any remedy, it is an operation” (Reichenbach 1938 [2006: 349]). This provides
some kind of justification for operating on the man, even if one does not know that the operation will
succeed.
Reichenbach applied the strategy to a general form of “statistical induction” in which we observe the
relative frequency fnfn of a particular event in n observations and then form expectations about the
frequency that will arise when more observations are made. The “inductive principle” then states that
if after a certain number of instances, an observed frequency of m/nm/n is observed, for any
prolongation of the series of observations, the frequency will continue to fall within a small interval
of m/nm/n. Cases such as Hume considered are a special case of this principle, where the observed
frequency is 1. For example, in Hume’s bread case, suppose bread was observed to nourish n times
out of n (i.e. an observed frequency of 100%), then according to the principle of induction, we expect
that as we observe more instances, the frequency of nourishing ones will continue to be within a
very small interval of 100%. Following this inductive principle is also sometimes referred to as
following the “straight rule”. The problem then is to justify the use of this rule.
Reichenbach argued that even if Hume is right to think that we cannot be justified in thinking for any
particular application of the rule that the conclusion is likely to be true, for the purposes of practical
action we do not need to establish this. We can instead regard the inductive rule as resulting in a
“posit”, or statement that we deal with as if it is true. We posit a certain frequency f on the basis of
our evidence, and this is like making a wager or bet that the frequency is in fact f.
The aim of inductive inference, according to Reichenbach, is “to find series of events whose
frequency of occurrence converges towards a limit” (1938 [2006: 350]). It is possible that the world is
so disorderly that we cannot construct series with such limits. But if there is a limit, there is some
element of a series of observations, beyond which the principle of induction will lead to the true
value of the limit. Although the inductive rule may give quite wrong results early in the sequence, as
it follows chance fluctuations in the sample frequency, it is guaranteed to eventually approximate the
limiting frequency, if such a limit exists. Therefore, the rule of induction is justified as an instrument
of positing because it is a method of which we know that if it is possible to make statements about
the future we shall find them by means of this method (Reichenbach 1949: 475). This justification is
taken to be a pragmatic one, since though it does not supply knowledge of a future event, it supplies
a sufficient reason for action (Reichenbach 1949: 481).
85
There are several problems with this pragmatic approach. One concern is that
the kind of justification it offers is too much tied to the long run, while allowing essentially no
constraint on what can be posited in the short-run. Yet it is in the short run that inductive practice
actually occurs and where it really needs justification (BonJour 1998: 194; Salmon 1966: 53).
Related to this is the worry that the justification is weak in the sense that it applies to many other
rules of inference as well as the so-called “straight rule” (Salmon 1966: 53). It applies, in fact, to any
method which converges asymptotically to the straight rule. An easily specified class of such rules
are those which add to the inductive rule a function cncn in which the cncn converge to zero with
increasing n.
Reichenbach makes two suggestions aimed at avoiding this problem. On the one hand, he claims,
since we have no real way to pick between methods, we might as well just use the inductive rule
since it is “easier to handle, owing to its descriptive simplicity”. He also claims that the method which
embodies the “smallest risk” is following the inductive rule (Reichenbach 1938 [2006: 355–356]).
Another problem is whether Reichenbach has really established that there could not be a better rule
than the straight rule. For instance, for all that has been said, there might be a soothsayer or psychic
who is able to predict future events reliably. Here Reichenbach argues that by using induction we
could recognize the reliability of the alternative method, by examining its track record. This thought
was later picked up and developed into the suggestion that a “meta-inductivist” who applies
induction not only at the “object” level to observations, but also to the success of others’ methods,
might by those means be able to do as well predictively as the alternative method (Schurz 2008;
see section 7.3 for more discussion of meta-induction).
One might also question whether a pragmatic argument can really deliver an all-purpose, general
justification for following the inductive rule. Surely a pragmatic solution should be sensitive to
differences in pay-offs that depend on the circumstances. For example, Reichenbach offers the
following analogue to his pragmatic justification:
We may compare our situation to that of a man who wants to fish in an unexplored part of the sea.
There is no one to tell him whether or not there are fish in this place. Shall he cast his net? Well, if
he wants to fish in that place, I should advise him to cast the net, to take the chance at least. It is
preferable to try even in uncertainty than not to try and be certain of getting nothing. (Reichenbach
1938 [2006: 362–363])
As Lange points out, the argument here “presumes that there is no cost to trying”. In such a
situation, “the fisherman has everything to gain and nothing to lose by casting his net” (Lange 2011:
86
77). But if there is some significant cost to making the attempt, it may not be so
clear that the most rational course of action is to cast the net. Similarly, whether or not it would make
sense to adopt the policy of making no predictions, rather than the policy of following the inductive
rule, may depend on what the practical penalties are for being wrong. A pragmatic solution may not
be capable of offering rationale for following the inductive rule which is applicable in all
circumstances.
7.2 Formal Learning Theory
As we saw above, one of the problems for Reichenbach was that there are too many rules which
converge in the limit to the true frequency. Which one should we then choose in the short-run? It is
possible to broaden Reichenbach’s general strategy by considering what happens if we have other
epistemic goals besides long-run convergence. Might other goals place constraints on which
methods should be used in the short-run? The field of formal learning theory has developed answers
to these questions (Kelly 1996; Schulte 1999; also see Schulte 2017).
In particular, formal learning theorists have considered the goal of getting to the truth as efficiently,
or quickly, as possible, as well as the goal of minimizing the number of mind-changes, or retractions
along the way. It has then been shown that the usual inductive method, which is characterized by a
preference for simpler hypotheses (Occam’s razor), can be justified since it is the unique method
which meets the standards for getting to the truth in the long run as efficiently as possible, with a
minimum number of retractions (Schulte 1999).
Formal learning theory can be regarded as a kind of extension of the Reichenbachian programme. It
does not offer justifications for inductive inferences, in the sense of giving reasons why they should
be taken as likely to produce a true conclusion. Rather it offers reasons for following particular
methods based on their optimality in achieving certain desirable epistemic ends, even if there is no
guarantee that at any given stage of inquiry the results they produce are at all close to the truth.
Recently, however, Steel (2010) has suggested that formal learning theory offers more, and does
provide a solution to the problem of induction. This claim is based on a rather restrictive
interpretation of “Hume’s problem” as the problem: “What is the justification for making inductive
generalizations at all?” (2010: 182), rather than as the problem of giving the grounds for a given
inductive inference. Steel’s claims have been disputed by Colin Howson (2011).
7.3 Meta-induction
Another approach to pursuing a broadly Reichenbachian programme is to move to the level of meta-
induction. We can draw a distinction between applying inductive methods at the level of events—so-
87
called “object-level” induction, and applying inductive methods at the level of
competing prediction methods—so-called “meta-induction”. Whereas object-level inductive methods
make predictions based on the events which have been observed to occur, meta-inductive methods
make predictions based on aggregating the predictions of different available prediction methods
according to their success rates. Here, the success rate of a method is defined according to some
precise way of scoring success in making predictions.
The question is then whether there can be a meta-inductive method which is “predictively optimal” in
the sense that following that method succeeds best in predictions among all competing methods, no
matter what data is received. Gerhard Schurz has highlighted results from the regret-based learning
framework of Cesa-Bianchi that there is a meta-inductive strategy that is predictively optimal among
all predictive methods that are accessible to an epistemic agent (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi 2006;
Schurz 2008, forthcoming). This meta-inductive strategy, which Schurz calls “wMI”, predicts a
weighted average of the predictions of the accessible methods, where the weights are
“attractivities”, which measure the difference between the method’s own success rate and the
success rate of wMI.
The main result is that the wMI strategy is long-run optimal in the sense that it converges to the
maximum success rate of the accessible prediction methods. Worst-case bounds for short-run
performance can also be derived. The optimality result forms the basis for an a priori means-ends
justification for the use of wMI. Namely, the thought is, it is reasonable to use wMI, since it achieves
the best success rate possible in the long run out of the given methods.
Schurz also claims that this a priori justification of wMI, together with the contingent fact that
inductive methods have so far been much more successful than non-inductive methods, gives rise
to an a posteriori justification of induction. Since wMI will achieve in the long run the maximal
success rate of the available prediction methods, it is reasonable to use it. But as a matter of fact,
the maximal success rate is achieved by inductive methods. Therefore, since it is a priori justified to
use wMI, it is also a priori justified to use the maximally successful method at the object level. Since
it turns out that that the maximally successful method is induction, then it is reasonable to use
induction.
Schurz’s theorems on the optimality of wMI apply to the case where there are finitely many
predictive methods. One point of discussion is whether this amounts to an important limitation on its
claims to provide a full solution of the problem of induction (Eckhardt 2010).
88
Unit 1 - Rule of Inference
A proof is an argument from hypotheses (assumptions) to a conclusion. Each step of the

argument follows the laws of logic. In mathematics, a statement is not accepted as valid or correct
unless it is accompanied by a proof. This insistence on proof is one of the things that sets
mathematics apart from other subjects.
Writing proofs is difficult; there are no procedures which you can follow which will guarantee
success. The patterns which proofs follow are complicated, and there are a lot of them. You can't
expect to do proofs by following rules, memorizing formulas, or looking at a few examples in a book.
For this reason, I'll start by discussing logic proofs. Since they are more highly patterned than most
proofs, they are a good place to start. They'll be written in column format, with each step justified
by a rule of inference. Most of the rules of inference will come from tautologies. Since a tautology is
a statement which is "always true", it makes sense to use them in drawing conclusions.
Like most proofs, logic proofs usually begin with premises --- statements that you're allowed to
assume.
The conclusion is the statement that you need to prove. The idea is to operate on the premises
using rules of inference until you arrive at the conclusion.
Rule of Premises. You may write down a premise at any point in a proof.
The second rule of inference is one that you'll use in most logic proofs. It is sometimes
called modus ponendo ponens, but I'll use a shorter name.
Modus Ponens. If you know P and , you may write down Q.
In the rules of inference, it's understood that symbols like "P" and "Q" may be replaced
by any statements, including compound statements. I'll say more about this later.
Here is a simple proof using modus ponens:
89
The statements in logic proofs are numbered so that you can refer to them, and
the numbers go in the first column. The actual statements go in the second column. The third
column contains your justification for writing down the statement.
Thus, statements 1 (P) and 2 ( ) are premises, so the rule of premises allows me to write
them down. Modus ponens says that if I've already written down P and --- on any earlier
lines, in either order --- then I may write down Q. I did that in line 3, citing the rule ("Modus ponens")
and the lines (1 and 2) which contained the statements I needed to apply modus ponens.
As I noted, the "P" and "Q" in the modus ponens rule can actually stand for compound statements ---
they don't have to be "single letters".
For example:
There are several things to notice here.

First, is taking the place of P in the modus ponens rule, and is taking the place of Q.
That is, and are compound statements which are substituted for "P" and "Q" in modus
ponens.
Notice also that the if-then statement is listed first and the "if"-part is listed
second. It doesn't matter which one has been written down first, and long as both pieces have
already been written down, you may apply modus ponens.
Finally, the statement didn't take part in the modus ponens step. Perhaps this is part of a bigger
proof, and will be used later. The fact that it came between the two modus ponens pieces
doesn't make a difference.
As usual in math, you have to be sure to apply rules exactly. For example, this is not a valid use of
modus ponens:
90
Do you see why? To use modus ponens on the if-then statement
, you need the "if"-part, which is . You only have P, which is just part of the "if"-part. That's
not good enough.
Double Negation. In any statement, you may substitute P for or for P (and write down
the new statement).
For example, in this case I'm applying double negation with P replaced by :
You can also apply double negation "inside" another statement:
Double negation comes up often enough that, we'll bend the rules and allow it to be used
without doing so as a separate step or mentioning it explicitly. I'll demonstrate this in the
examples for some of the other rules of inference.
Modus Tollens. If you know and , you may write down .
This is a simple example of modus tollens:
In the next example, I'm applying modus tollens with P replaced by C and Q replaced
by :
In the next example, I'm applying modus tollens with P replaced by C and Q replaced
by :
91
The last example shows how you're allowed to "suppress" double
negation steps. Do you see how this was done? If I wrote the double negation step
explicitly, it would look like this:
When you apply modus tollens to an if-then statement, be sure that you have
the negation of the "then"-part. The following derivation is incorrect:
To use modus tollens, you need , not Q.
This is also incorrect:
This looks like modus ponens, but backwards. There is no rule that allows you to do this:
The deduction is invalid.
Disjunctive Syllogism. If you know and , you may write down Q.
Here's a simple example of disjunctive syllogism:
In the next example, I'm applying disjunctive syllogism with replacing P and D
replacing Q in the rule:
In the next example, notice that P is the same as , so it's the negation of .
92
This is another case where I'm skipping a double negation step. Without skipping the step,
the proof would look like this:
DeMorgan's Law. In any statement, you may substitute:
1. for .
2. for .
3. for .
4. for .
As usual, after you've substituted, you write down the new statement.
DeMorgan's Law tells you how to distribute across or , or how to factor out
of or . To distribute, you attach to each term, then change to or to . To
factor, you factor out of each term, then change to or to .
Note that it only applies (directly) to "or" and "and". We'll see how to negate an "if-then"
later.
Here's DeMorgan applied to an "or" statement:
Notice that a literal application of DeMorgan would have given . I changed

this to , once again suppressing the double negation step.
Conditional Disjunction. If you know , you may write down .
If you know , you may write down .
Here's the first direction:

93
And here's the second:
The first direction is key: Conditional disjunction allows you to convert "if-then"
statements into "or" statements.
We'll see below that biconditional statements can be converted into pairs of conditional
statements. Together with conditional disjunction, this allows us in principle to reduce the
five logical connectives to three (negation, conjunction, disjunction). But DeMorgan
allows us to change conjunctions to disjunctions (or vice versa), so in principle we could
do everything with just "or" and "not". The reason we don't is that it would make our
statements much longer: The use of the other connectives is like shorthand that saves us
writing.
In additional, we can solve the problem of negating a conditional that we mentioned

earlier.
We've derived a new rule! Let's write it down.
Negating a Conditional. If you know , you may write down .
If you know , you may write down .
The first direction is more useful than the second. Personally, I tend to forget this rule and
just apply conditional disjunction and DeMorgan when I need to negate a conditional. But
you may use this if you wish.
Constructing a Conjunction. If you know P and Q, you may write down .
Think about this to ensure that it makes sense to you. If is true, you're saying that P
is true and that Q is true. So on the other hand, you need both P true and Q true in order to
say that is true.
94
Here's an example. Notice that I put the pieces in parentheses to group
them after constructing the conjunction.
Rule of Syllogism. If you know and , then you may write down .
The Rule of Syllogism says that you can "chain" syllogisms together. For example:
Definition of Biconditional. If you know , you may write down and you
may write down . If you know and , you may write down .
First, a simple example:
By the way, a standard mistake is to apply modus ponens to a biconditional (" ").
Modus ponens applies to conditionals (" "). So this isn't valid:
With the same premises, here's what you need to do:
Decomposing a Conjunction. If you know , you may write down P and you may
write down Q.
This rule says that you can decompose a conjunction to get the individual pieces:
95
Note that you can't decompose a disjunction!
What's wrong with this? If you know that is true, you know that one of P or Q must be true.
The problem is that you don't know which one is true, so you can't assume that either one in
particular is true.
On the other hand, it is easy to construct disjunctions.
Constructing a Disjunction. If you know P, and Q is any statement, you may write down .
This says that if you know a statement, you can "or" it with any other statement to construct a
disjunction.
Notice that it doesn't matter what the other statement is! Once you know that P is true, any "or"
statement with P must be true: An "or" statement is true if at least one of the pieces is true.
The next two rules are stated for completeness. They are easy enough that, as with double
negation, we'll allow you to use them without a separate step or explicit mention.
Commutativity of Conjunctions. In any statement, you may substitute for (and

write down the new statement).
Commutativity of Disjunctions. In any statement, you may substitute for (and write
down the new statement).
Here is commutativity for a conjunction:
Here is commutativity for a disjunction:
96
Before I give some examples of logic proofs, I'll explain where the rules of inference come from.
You've probably noticed that the rules of inference correspond to tautologies. In fact, you can start
with tautologies and use a small number of simple inference rules to derive all the other inference
rules.
Three of the simple rules were stated above: The Rule of Premises, Modus Ponens, and
Constructing a Conjunction. Here are two others. We've been using them without mention in some
of our examples if you look closely.
Equivalence You may replace a statement by another that is logically equivalent. (Recall that P and
Q are logically equivalent if and only if is a tautology.)
For instance, since P and are logically equivalent, you can replace P with or with
P. This is Double Negation. As I mentioned, we're saving time by not writing out this step.
Substitution. You may take a known tautology and substitute for the simple statements.
This amounts to my remark at the start: In the statement of a rule of inference, the simple
statements ("P", "Q", and so on) may stand for compound statements. "May stand for" is the same
as saying "may be substituted with". We've been doing this without explicit mention.
Here's an example. The Disjunctive Syllogism tautology says
Suppose you have and as premises. Here's how you'd apply the simple
inference rules and the Disjunctive Syllogism tautology:
97
Notice that I used four of the five simple inference rules: the Rule of Premises,
Modus Ponens, Constructing a Conjunction, and Substitution. In line 4, I used the Disjunctive
Syllogism tautology by substituting
(Some people use the word "instantiation" for this kind of substitution.)
The advantage of this approach is that you have only five simple rules of inference. The
disadvantage is that the proofs tend to be longer. With the approach I'll use, Disjunctive Syllogism is
a rule of inference, and the proof is:
The approach I'm using turns the tautologies into rules of inference beforehand, and for that reason
you won't need to use the Equivalence and Substitution rules that often. But you are allowed to use
them, and here's where they might be useful. Suppose you're writing a proof and you'd like to use a
rule of inference --- but it wasn't mentioned above. Write down the corresponding logical statement,
then construct the truth table to prove it's a tautology (if it isn't on the tautology list). Then use
Substitution to use your new tautology.
If you go to the market for pizza, one approach is to buy the ingredients --- the crust, the sauce, the
cheese, the toppings --- take everything home, assemble the pizza, and put it in the oven. Using
tautologies together with the five simple inference rules is like making the pizza from scratch. But
you could also go to the market and buy a frozen pizza, take it home, and put it in the oven. Using
lots of rules of inference that come from tautologies --- the approach I'll use --- is like getting the
frozen pizza.
Here are some proofs which use the rules of inference. In each case, some premises --- statements
that are assumed to be true --- are given, as well as a statement to prove. A proof consists of using
the rules of inference to produce the statement to prove from the premises.
98
Source: Valid Argument
https://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/5909/6050951/MyLogicLab_ebook/MLL_Copi_13e_
Ch09/0136141390_Ch09.pdf
1. Rewrite the following arguments listing the premise(s) first and the conclusion last. Each line
should be a single statement written as a complete sentence. Feel free to modify the
sentences as you deem necessary, without changing their basic meaning. (after all you want
to be restating this argument, not writing a new one!) Label the premise(s) P¹, P², P³, etc.
and the conclusion C. Leave out any indicator words and any fluff (i.e., sentences which are
neither the conclusion nor a premise). 10 points each.
Example:
Cats with long hair shed all over the house so you should not get a long-haired cat.
I have heard that they also have lots of fleas.
P¹ Long-haired cats shed all over the house
P² Long-haired cats have a lot of fleas
C You should not get a long haired cat
1. Fairdale will win the championship because they have the best team.
2. Since the housing market is depressed and interest rates are low, it's a good time to buy a home.
3. China is guilty of extreme human rights abuses. Further, they refuse to implement democratic
reforms. Thus, the U.S. should refuse to deal with the present Chinese government.
4. The revocation of the 55 mph speed limit has resulted in an increased number of auto fatalities.
We must alleviate this problem with stricter speed limit enforcement.
99
5. We may infer that the U. S. military is both capable and competent from the
results of the Persian Gulf War.
6. Scientific discoveries are continually debunking religious myths. Further, science provides the
only hope for solving the many problems faced by humankind. Hence, science provides a more
accurate view of human life than does religion.
7. Jesse is one year old. Most one-year-olds can walk. It follows that Jesse can walk.
8. I deserve a raise. I'm very good at my job.
ASSIGNMENT 2:
Write out two arguments you have encountered in the course of your day. First write them as you
encountered them, then re-write in the format you practiced in assignment 1. Make sure
they are arguments, with premises and conclusions. You'll get more practice distinguishing between
arguments and other passages in the next lesson. For now just make sure there is a conclusion and
at least one premise and you'll do fine. (10 points each.)
Watch Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8DW0K3mnc-0

Follow link: http://sites.millersville.edu/bikenaga/math-proof/rules-of-inference/rules-of-inference.html
Stanford University, 2018. The Problem of Induction, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-
problem/
Methods of Deduction at
https://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/5909/6050951/MyLogicLab_ebook/MLL_Copi_13e_Ch0
9/0136141390_Ch09.pdf
Week 17 – Case Study Presentation
1. Look at how you will succeed in this tasks, how you will be graded. Rubric is included in
this Instructional Materials, just after this instruction;
100
2. Select an Accounting System
3. Identify the ideas, terms, and syllogism of the accounting system
4. Establish the Argument, Premise and Conclusion
5. Discuss your analysis.
6. Submit a written Case Analysis following the following:
6.1 Type of Accounting System
6.2 Description of the Accounting System
6.3 Identify the Terms
6.4 Review the Argument, Premise and Conclusion
6.5 Establish Validity and Invalidity
6.6 Establish Categorical Syllogism
6.7 Emphasize the Reasoning and Inference
7. Submit a video of your presentation (save in google drive and share to
dchan2662@gmail.com
Competency 4 3 2 1 0
Comparing & The student The student The student The student No
Contrasting includes all includes the excludes some uses trivial judgment
important most important critical elements elements to can be
characteristics but not all on which the compare or made.
on which the characteristics items should be contrast the
items should be on which the compared or items.
compared or items should be contrasted.
contrasted. compared or
contrasted.
Analyzing The student The student The student The student No

Relationships identifies the identifies the addresses does not judgment
main main some of the address the can be
(superordinate) (superordinate) features of the main made.
pattern running pattern running main (superordinate)
through the through the (superordinate) pattern running
information information. pattern running through the
along with all through the information.
minor information but
(subordinate) excludes some
patterns. critical aspects.
101
The student The student The student The student No
Classifying organizes the organizes the organizes the organizes the judgment
items into items into items into items into can be
meaningful meaningful categories that categories that made.
categories and categories but are not very are illogical or
describes the does not meaningful but trivial.
defining thoroughly address some
characteristics describe the of the important
of each defining characteristics
category. characteristics of the items.
of the
categories.
Argumentation The student The student The student The student’s No

provides a well- provides a well- presents an argument judgment
articulated and articulated but argument that makes no clear can be
detailed not detailed makes a point point or has so made.
argument argument but is not well many errors in
containing no containing no articulated or logic that it is
errors in logic. errors in logic. contains some invalid.
significant
errors in logic.
Induction The student The student The student The student No

constructs a constructs a constructs a does not judgment
valid valid generalization construct a can be
generalization generalization that has some generalization made.
and clearly but does not relationship to or constructs
articulates the clearly articulate the specifics one that is not
logic of this the logic that have been at all supported
generalization underlying that identified; by the
based on the generalization. however, the specifics.
specifics that specifics do not
have been totally support
identified. the
generalization.
Deduction The student The student The student The student No

generates a generates a generates a does not judgment
valid prediction valid prediction prediction or generate a can be
or conclusion or conclusion conclusion that prediction or made.
and accurately but does not is only partially conclusion or
articulates the completely supported by generates one
relationship articulate the the premise or that is not at all
between the relationship rule that was supported by
102
prediction or between the used. the premise or
conclusion and prediction or rule that was
the principle or conclusion and used.
premise that the principle or
was used. premise that
was used.
Experimental The student The student The student The student No

Inquiry designs and designs and designs and does not design judgment
conducts an conducts an conducts an and conduct an can be
experiment that experiment that experiment that experiment or made.
adequately tests adequately is related to but designs one
a well- tests a well- does not that has no
articulated articulated adequately test relationship to
hypothesis. hypothesis but the hypothesis. the hypothesis.
When the does not
experiment is completely
completed, the explain the
student fully and results in light of
accurately the hypothesis.
explains the
results in light of
the hypothesis.
Investigation The student The student The student The student’s No

thoroughly and thoroughly and presents a description of judgment
accurately accurately partial what is known can be
identifies what identifies what description of about the made.
is known about is known about what is known subject of the
the subject of the subject of about the investigation is
the investigation the investigation subject of the severely
and presents a but does not investigation. flawed.
well-articulated fully address
solution to the the confusions
confusions or or
contradictions contradictions
associated with associated with
the situation. the situation.
Problem The student The student The student The student No

Solving selects the selects the selects a selects a judgment
solution that is solution that is solution that solution that can be
the most the most overcomes the does not made.
effective for effective for obstacle or overcome the
overcoming the overcoming the constraint but is obstacle or
103
obstacle or obstacle or not the most constraint.
constraint and constraint but effective
accurately does not solution given
explains why it completely the options.
is the most explain why it is
effective of the the most
possible effective of the
solutions. possible
solutions.
Decision The student The student The student The student No

Making uses relevant uses relevant uses criteria uses criteria judgment
criteria to select criteria to select that are related that are can be
the most the most to the situation unrelated to the made.
appropriate appropriate but not the most situation.
option. The option but does relevant, or the
student explains not completely student selects
why the option explain why the an option that is
selected is the option selected not the most
most is the most appropriate
appropriate. appropriate. given the
criteria.
97-100% 93-96% 79-92% 78-75% 74-below
Week 18 – Final Examination
Final Examination will be announced by the Professor based on the University Calendar.
104

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Polytechnic University of the Philippines

STA MARIA BULACAN CAMPUS

At the end of this course, the students will be able to:

1. Appreciate for the complexity of language, and systems in accounting

7. Develop some facility in symbolic manipulations,

Week 1 - Lesson 1 - Introduction to Business Logic

Unit 1 - Logic as a Tool

Here are some basic scenarios:

1. Debit the receiver and credit the giver

Types of Account Account to be debited Account to be credited

Unit 2 - Validity and Soundness

The example illustrated is both valid and sound.

Elizabeth owns either a Honda or a Saturn.

All toasters are items made of gold.

For example, consider these two arguments:

All tigers are mammals.

All spider monkeys are elephants.

These arguments share the same form:

All basketballs are round.

All popes reside at the Vatican.

These arguments also have the same form:

All A’s are F;

My table is circular. Therefore, it is not square shaped.

Juan is a bachelor. Therefore, he is not married.

These arguments, at least on the surface, have the form:

x is F and not G and H;

(1) Tony is a ferocious tiger.

(3) The King and Queen are visiting dignitaries.

PRACTICE EXERCISES 1 – 5: Test the validity of each argument:

Week 2 - Lesson 2 Business Apprehension

Unit 1 - The Nature of Simple Apprehensions.

Unit 2 – Definition of Terms

The Basic TERMS Used in Business Logic:

But if the agreement or disagreement is discovered consequently on experience, e.g., 'beauty is not

If a judgment of either kind is arrived at by reasoning, it is mediately evident; if the agreement or

Unit 2 - Categorical Proposition

'I see' is equivalent to 'I am seeing,'

'He said' to 'He is one who said,' etc.

If we consider the extension of the subject, a proposition is styled singular,

Purchases can be in cash and terms.

3. In reasoning we must distinguish between hypothetical and categorical propositions.

Unit 3 - Hypothetical Proposition

Three Kinds Hypothetical Proposition

1. The conditional, consisting of two parts, one of which is declared to be the condition of the

To illustrate Conditional Propositions:

“If it rains this afternoon, then I will carry an umbrella” is a proposition.

Unit 4 - Equivalence of Proposition

Equivalence of propositions in logic refers to the formation of a proposition from two others which

The equivalence formed from two propositions p and q also may be defined by the statement “p

If you know A, and you know B, you can conclude A ∧B

Inferences are steps in reasoning, moving from premises to logical consequences; the

Unit 1 - Inference and Syllogism

The Elements of Reasoning:

Unit 2 - Categorical Syllogism

A categorical syllogism is an argument consisting of exactly three categorical propositions (two

There are Term Used

The Premise of Syllogism

Minor Term Minor Premise is minor term and middle

Middle Term term

Major Premise is middle Term and major

Consider, for example, the categorical syllogism:

The Basic categorical syllogism has three (3) TERMS:

Basic Truth Table:

Create a truth table for the statement A ⋀ ~(B ⋁ C)