(Japan Research Monograph) George Ehrhardt_ Axel Klein_ Levi McLaughlin_ Steven R. Reed - Kōmeitō_ Politics and Religion in Japan-Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley (2

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Japanese Research Monograph 18

Kōmeitō: Politics and Religion in Japan
George Ehrhardt, Axel Klein, Levi McLaughlin,
and Steven R. Reed, editors
ISBN-13: 978-1-55729-162-2 (electronic)

ISBN-13: 978-1-55729-111-0 (print)
ISBN-10: 1-55729-111-X (print)
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May 2015
Kōmeitō
Japan Research Monograph 18
Center for Japanese studies
Kōmeitō
Politics and Religion in Japan
Edited by
George Ehrhardt, Axel Klein,
Levi McLaughlin, and Steven R. Reed
A publication of the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Komeito : politics and religion in Japan / George Ehrhardt, Axel Klein,

Levi McLaughlin, and Steven R. Reed, eds.
pages cm. — (Japan research monograph ; 18)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-55729-111-0 (alk. paper) — ISBN 1-55729-111-X (alk. paper)
1. Komeito. 2. Soka Gakkai. 3. Religion and politics—Japan. 4. Japan—
Politics and government—1945– I. Ehrhardt, George, author, editor
of compilation. II. Klein, Axel, 1968– author, editor of compilation.
III. McLaughlin, Levi, 1972– author, editor of compilation. IV. Reed,
Steven R., 1947– author, editor of compilation.
JQ1698.K6K554 2014
324.252’084—dc23 2014035304
Copyright © 2014 by the Regents of the University of California.

Printed in the United States of America.
All rights reserved.
Cover design: Axel Klein and Mindy Chen.

Photograph by Axel Klein.
Contents
List of Abbreviations vii

Preface and Acknowledgments ix
Part I: Introduction
1. Kōmeitō: The Most Understudied Party of Japanese Politics 3

George Ehrhardt, Axel Klein, Levi McLaughlin, and Steven R. Reed
Part II: The Context
2. Religious Groups in Japanese Electoral Politics 25

Axel Klein and Steven R. Reed
Part III: The History
3. Electioneering as Religious Practice:

A History of Sōka Gakkai’s Political Activities to 1970 51
Levi McLaughlin
4. Kōmeitō’s Uncertain Decades between Religion and Politics 83
Yuki Abe and Masahisa Endo
Part IV: The Structure
5. How Kōmeitō Politicians Get Elected 113

George Ehrhardt
6. Party Ideals and Practical Constraints in Kōmeitō
Candidate Nominations 139
Daniel M. Smith
7. Kōmeitō, Sōka Gakkai, and Money in Japanese Politics 163
Matthew Carlson
8. Housewife Voters and Kōmeitō Policies 187
George Ehrhardt
Part V: The Way to Power
9. Anti-Kōmeitō Countermobilizations 215

10. Kōmeitō in Coalition 240
Linda Hasunuma and Axel Klein
Part VI: Conclusion
11. Kōmeitō: Politics and Religion in Japan 269

George Ehrhardt, Axel Klein, Levi McLaughlin, and Steven R. Reed
List of Contributors 277

Index 279
Abbreviations
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan

DSP Democratic Socialist Party
HRP Happiness Realization Party
JCP Japan Communist Party
JSP Japan Socialist Party
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
LP Liberal Party
MMD Multi-member district
MMM Mixed member majoritarian system
NCP New Conservative Party
NFP New Frontier Party
PFCL Political Funds Control Law
PKO Peace Keeping Operation
PR Proportional representation
RKK Risshō Kōseikai
SDF Self-Defense Forces
SGI Sōka Gakkai International
SMD Single-member district
SNTV Single non-transferable vote
Preface and Acknowledgments
Anyone who studies politics in contemporary Japan will eventually come

across the tense relationship that persists in the country between politics
and religion. Students of modern Japanese politics usually encounter the
topic of religion in occasional references to prewar State Shinto, or when
they learn that the 1947 Constitution guarantees a legal separation of state
and religious organizations—a guarantee born initially of fear that state
support of religious enterprises could enable a return to reverence for a
divine emperor. Considerations of this aspect of Japan’s constitution gen-
erally conclude with discussions of the most commonly documented in-
stance of perceived transgressions of the politics/religion divide, namely,
the periodic visits by Japanese prime ministers to the controversial war
memorial Yasukuni Shrine, which routinely results in condemnation by
Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean governments. Further discussions tend
to move toward intra–East Asian conflict and away from Japan’s domestic
political and religious spheres. Resulting investigations of the religious
dimensions of this conflict almost always take students backward in time
to learn about the wartime legacy of State Shinto, thereby veering them
away from contemporary interactions of politics and religion.
Because the issue of religion and politics has been framed as a consti-
tutional and regional issue, political scientists have largely ignored the
most prominent example of their intersection within contemporary Japan:
Kōmeitō, the “Clean Government Party,” and its origins in the lay Bud-
dhist organization Sōka Gakkai. Kōmeitō should be an obvious topic for
any student of Japanese politics: the party has served as the third-largest
party in the Diet for most years since the late 1960s, it has operated in
coalition with the Liberal Democratic Party since 1999, and its representa-
tives occupy thousands of seats in regional legislatures across the coun-
try. On a topical level, Kōmeitō should interest students concerned with
debates surrounding politics and religion because it stands as the only
example of a party founded by a religious organization that has found a
x Preface and Acknowledgments
lasting and influential place at all political levels in Japan. Kōmeitō has ris-
en to prominence in the face of considerable public ambivalence and, not
infrequently, outright hostility. Due to its size, its influence on the course
of postwar Japanese politics, and its distinctive identity as the Japanese
Diet’s only originally religious party, we assert that one can neither un-
derstand Japanese politics nor contemporary Japanese religion without
coming to some level of understanding of Kōmeitō.
However, despite Kōmeitō’s obvious importance, there has not yet
been a single reliable book-length treatment, in any language, that pres-
ents scholarly, nonpartisan investigations of how Kōmeitō took shape and
how it operates as a political party. This is just such a book. The pages that
follow detail reasons for the glaring lacuna to date in research on Kōmeitō
and other politically active religious groups. Put simply, conducting re-
search on this topic has meant confronting multiple taboos: (1) digging
into the history and contemporary grassroots-level activities of Sōka Gak-
kai and several other controversial new religious movements; (2) docu-
menting the inner workings of institutional apparatuses and electoral
practices that straddle the fraught politics/religion divide; (3) searching
through documents on seldom studied religious groups; (4) unearthing
details surrounding some of the most scandal-ridden episodes in postwar
Japanese political history; and (5) collating information from a wide va-
riety of sources, often of uncertain reliability, to reveal gaps between the
rhetoric employed by political organizations—of all types—and the real-
ity of how politics operates on a day-to-day level.
Perhaps surprisingly, rather than encountering resistance from indi-
viduals or organizations that may have been nervous about long-standing
taboos surrounding our research, we have enjoyed a heartening degree of
support from fellow scholars in the fields of politics and religion. Addi-
tionally, people situated at all levels of Kōmeitō, Sōka Gakkai, and several
other religious groups were willing to consult with us extensively. Over
the several years during which this project took shape, the authors of this
book—eight political scientists and one religious studies scholar—have
been able to attend Kōmeitō events and Sōka Gakkai meetings, interview
politicians at the national and regional levels, acquire difficult-to-find
published documents related to Kōmeitō’s past, and otherwise gain access
to heretofore inaccessible sources of information on Kōmeitō. The enthu-
siasm with which our endeavor was received by fellow scholars in Japan
and overseas, by Kōmeitō politicians and their supporters, and even by
Kōmeitō’s political and religious rivals, indicates to us that many people
share our conviction that scholarly attention to Kōmeitō is long overdue.
This collection was born at a fortuitous meeting of the editors at the
German Institute of Japanese Studies (Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien,
Preface and Acknowledgments xi
DIJ) in Tokyo in 2008, where we discovered that we were all indepen-

dently pursuing research on the connection between religion and politics.
Later in 2008, Axel Klein, then senior research fellow at the DIJ, organized
a symposium on Kōmeitō at which the editors of this volume and several
of our authors presented papers on our work to date. The DIJ effectively
became our base of operations from that point onward, and several other
meetings sponsored by the institute followed. These included a sympo-
sium in 2010 that brought together numerous Japanese scholars of religion
and politics, and a meeting in the same year at which the volume’s authors
were able to speak extensively with the veteran Kōmeitō politician Ueda
Isamu. Generous additional financial support from the Faculty of Policy
Studies of Chūō University, the home institution of our editor Steven R.
Reed, provided us with valuable research assistance at this juncture. Fur-
ther interviews with Kōmeitō politicians followed. We were also fortunate
to have Ian Reader from Lancaster University and Erica Bafelli, now at
the University of Manchester, conduct a workshop at the DIJ on their 2012
special issue of the Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, to which Axel Klein
and Levi McLaughlin contributed Kōmeitō-related research findings. This
workshop is one more example of the interdisciplinary cooperation that
has helped to improve the chapters of this book.
We wish to thank Hirasawa Katsuei, Hirohashi Takashi, Kajimoto Akira,
Katō Kōichi, Nagaoka Tōru, Ōe Yasuhiro, Ōta Akihiro, Sakaguchi Chika-
ra, Satomura Eiichi, Shirahama Kazuyoshi, Shirakawa Katsuhiko, Takagi
Yōsuke, Tanaka Junkō, Takemura Masayoshi, Tōyama Kiyohiko, and,
above all, Ueda Isamu for meeting sometimes more than once with our
authors to provide invaluable insight into Kōmeitō and related topics. Our
thanks also go to Nishiyama Shigeru, from Tōyō University, Tsukada Ho-
taka, now at Kokugakuin University, Mark Mullins, now at the University
of Auckland, and Saitō Jun, formerly at Yale University, for presenting
information to our authors at crucial early stages of the project. Addition-
ally, George Ehrhardt and Levi McLaughlin wish to thank members of
Sōka Gakkai, who must remain anonymous for the sake of academic in-
tegrity, for generously allowing them to attend meetings at their homes
and for letting them accompany members undertaking electioneering ac-
tivities. Steve Reed wishes to thank Annette Yoshiko Reed for running him
through basic training in religious studies, without which he would have
never considered participating in this project. Axel Klein is grateful to Flo-
rian Coulmas, then director of the DIJ, for supporting the project from the
very beginning.
Researching and writing this book has truly been a group effort, with
all authors assisting each other in several ways, and the editors are grate-
ful for the additional support our authors have contributed beyond
xii Preface and Acknowledgments
composing their individual chapters. This cooperation may be one rea-

son why it has taken us six years to publish this volume. As it turns out,
however, there was a very welcome side effect to this prolonged process.
Additional support—incisive comments from two anonymous review-
ers; tremendous encouragement from Keila Diehl and Katherine Lawn
Chouta, managing editors at Berkeley’s Institute of East Asian Studies;
and hard work from our copyeditors Alexandra Davydova, Stan Eber-
lein, Chris Pitts, and Ann Rives enabled us to publish this volume just in
time for the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of Kōmeitō in November
2014. A Junior Faculty Development Award from the College of Humani-
ties and Social Sciences at North Carolina State University provided funds
that allowed Ann Rives to complete our index, and a publication subven-
tion grant from the Triangle Center for Japanese Studies made possible by
funds from the Japan Foundation went to another round of copyediting
that sped the final push toward publication. All remaining errors are the
responsibility of the editors.
We are aware that this volume does not represent a definitive account
of either Kōmeitō or religion and politics in Japan, but we are confident
that the chapters, which survey a wide variety of fields associated with
this fraught relationship, will stimulate further research into this under-
studied complex of topics.
Part I: Introduction
One
Kōmeitō
The Most Understudied Party of Japanese Politics

and Steven R. Reed
Why This Book?

When the Japanese lay Buddhist movement Sōka Gakkai (literally, the
“Value Creation Study Association”) founded the political party Kōmeitō
in 1964, it did so with the declared intention of bringing “Buddhist de-
mocracy” (buppō minshushugi) to the country. According to Ikeda Dai-
saku, then third president of Sōka Gakkai, Kōmeitō was to promote social
welfare, humanistic socialism, and pacifism through a political program
rooted in a combination of the Buddha’s Dharma and the best of the
Euro-American philosophical tradition (McLaughlin 2009, 94–95; Kōmeitō
1964; see also chapter 3 of this volume). To many observers at that time,
however, Kōmeitō did not represent a socially progressive new political
force fighting for the good of the Japanese people; rather, it was seen as a
dangerous, constitution-violating fusion of religion and politics. For most
of its critics, Kōmeitō was a poorly disguised attempt by a suspicious new
religious group to take control of the country by manipulating democratic
processes to usher in theocratic rule.
Despite controversy surrounding its institutional continuity with an
expansionist religious sect, Kōmeitō enjoyed increasing electoral success
until the end of the 1960s. In 1970, Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō cut all of-
ficial organizational ties following a series of scandals involving attempts
by Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō leaders to forestall published critiques of
the Gakkai and then president Ikeda. Thereafter, the party removed all
religious content and language from its political programs. Reformed and
nominally independent, the party lost much of its founding vigor. Its era
of spectacular growth had ended, but Kōmeitō maintained its powerful
4 George Ehrhardt, Axel Klein, Levi McLaughlin, and Steven R. Reed
organizational base, which allowed it to retain an influential presence in

electoral politics. Indeed, from the 1990s on the party operated as a power
broker in the middle of every political turning point at the national level,
shifting back and forth between ally and opponent of Japan’s major politi-
cal players. Kōmeitō played a key role in defeating the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP; Jimintō) in the 1993 general election. It was key to the short-
lived success of the New Frontier Party (NFP; Shinshintō), and it was also
key to the NFP’s ultimate failure (see chapter 5). It was subsequently in-
strumental in sustaining the LDP-led coalition government between 1999
and 2009, and it continued its partnership with the LDP in opposition from
2009 until December 2012, when the LDP and Kōmeitō were once again
elected to government. Thus, because of Kōmeitō’s role in these pivotal
events, and in others, one cannot understand Japanese postwar politics
without understanding Kōmeitō.
However, in spite of its influence, Kōmeitō has remained opaque.
Scholarship to date on Japan’s political system does not reflect the par-
ty’s significance, and the relatively small quantity of extant literature on
Kōmeitō, in Japanese and in English, tends to rely on newspaper articles
and outdated sources in concise attempts to explain the party. Some well-
regarded academic studies of Japanese politics all but ignore the party en-
tirely. It is this neglect of Kōmeitō and the resulting gap in our knowledge
that spurred us to write this book.
This volume, however, is not only meant to shed light on a long-ignored
part of Japan’s political system. We also hope to make Kōmeitō more ac-
cessible to comparative political science. After a long period during which
religion was rarely found on the political science research agenda, it was
pushed back into the limelight by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and
subsequent cases of religiously motivated extremism. Since then, a large
portion of political science research on religion has dealt with Islam and
terrorism.1 Many other studies have used a Western- and Christian-based
approach that does not necessarily fit well with political realities outside
Europe and North America.
That Japan has featured rarely in international comparative studies is,
for a number of reasons, no surprise. Controversy surrounding visits by
politicians to Yasukuni, a Shinto shrine and war memorial at which the
spirits of convicted war criminals are revered, frequently inspires discord
between the Japanese government and its Asian neighbors. This site of
religious and political antagonism is of primary interest to those investi-
gating the way in which former wartime enemies deal with their past and
1
According to Kettell (2012), 40 percent of all articles on religion and politics deal with this
topic. See also Wald et al. (2005) and Philpott (2009).
Kōmeitō 5
how international relations are affected by this process. The field of reli-
gious studies also deals with the Yasukuni issue, but published findings
from this area have yet to capture attention from comparative political
science research.
However, when it comes to religiously motivated terrorism—the most
common target of international comparative studies—Japan offers only
one recent instance, in the form of Aum Shinrikyō’s violence that culmi-
nated in its coordinated attack on the Tokyo subways in March 1995. Oth-
erwise, there are few obvious Japanese religious or political affairs that are
likely to grab headlines overseas: there is no contemporary violent conflict
between Japanese religious organizations, only a tiny proportion of the
Japanese population is Muslim or Christian, and the 1947 Constitution
guarantees a clear separation of religion and state. Still, Kōmeitō’s status
as a religious party that plays a pivotal role in local- and national-level
politics clearly merits the attention of comparative political science. As
the search continues for meaningful theories on how religion and politics
interact, this volume provides an unprecedented amount of additional in-
formation on the Japanese case that will inform theoretical investigations.
What Has Been Written Thus Far about Kōmeitō?

Not enough. Extant research on Kōmeitō is largely handicapped in one or
two ways: (1) most publications favor cursory macrolevel overviews of
the party that omit attention to microlevel details that reveal how Kōmeitō
functions, and (2) there is very little work published in the last few de-
cades that comes from sustained academic attention to Kōmeitō. Scholar-
ship on Kōmeitō is often inspired by the party’s most prominent feature:
its relationship with Sōka Gakkai. Consequently, studies tend to deal with
the costs and benefits of the Kōmeitō-Gakkai alliance, with electoral mobi-
lization of Gakkai members being the favorite topic, or they tend to focus
on the question of the separation of state and religion. The result of this
singularity of focus is that important aspects of studying party politics
tend to take a backseat in research on Kōmeitō.
In addition, sectors of the Japanese news media have remained eagerly
interested in capitalizing on negative images of New Religions, includ-
ing Sōka Gakkai, creating an environment within which Kōmeitō is au-
tomatically linked to scandal and intrigue. Some weekly magazines and
tabloid press outlets run stories on religious groups alongside celebrity
gossip and other lurid topics.2 They regularly publish negative reports
2
For established national newspapers, the question of when and how to report on reli-
gious groups is difficult. A number of large religious organizations have become important
customers, as they regularly take out expensive ads and, in the case of Sōka Gakkai’s daily
on new religious movements (for example, title stories were published

in Shūkan Daiyamondo, 12 September 2009, and Sapio, 10 February 2010,
25 August 2010, 9 March 2011), on the relationship between religion and
politics (Shūkan Posuto, 26 November 2010), or on religious organizations
and money (Shūkan Daiyamondo, 13 November 2010). Given the prurient
nature of most of these publications, it comes as no surprise that their
reporting is often biased and that they tend to ignore standards of sub-
stance and veracity. It is predominantly this part of Japan’s mass media
that perpetuates popular interpretations of Kōmeitō as a sinister plot by
Sōka Gakkai to transform postwar Japan into a system designed to install
its honorary president Ikeda Daisaku as Japan’s unquestioned ruler.
In addition to journalists who write books about Sōka Gakkai and
Kōmeitō (Yamada 2004; Hirano 2005a, 2005b, 2008), there is another major
source of publications that nourish this negative image: disgruntled for-
mer administrators and leaders of the religion or party who parted ways
with their organizations in the midst of scandals or conflicts with Ikeda
Daisaku. In particular, numerous publications by Yamazaki Masatomo, a
former legal counsel for Sōka Gakkai who left the religion in 1980, were
the most heated and widely read critiques of all matters related to the
Gakkai and Ikeda, including Kōmeitō.3 Harashima Takashi, Takeiri Yo-
shikatsu, and Yano Jun’ya, all key figures in Sōka Gakkai’s immediate
postwar development and among the first members to take office and lead
Kōmeitō, also ended up leaving the party and Sōka Gakkai after acrimoni-
ous conflict. Each has released exposés vilifying the party, its religious par-
ent, and Ikeda.4 Sōka Gakkai, and to a lesser degree Kōmeitō, have tried
newspaper Seikyō Shinbun, even rent the printing facilities of major dailies. This business
relationship has apparently affected decision making within editorial departments and the
actions of reporters (see Watanabe 2000).
3
In addition to many articles published in Japanese magazines and tabloid newspapers,
examples of Yamazaki’s vigorous criticisms of Sōka Gakkai, Kōmeitō, and Ikeda Daisaku
include Sōka Gakkai/Kōmeitō no hanzai hakusho (White paper on Sōka Gakkai/Kōmeitō crimes;
2001); Zange no kokuhatsu: Watashi dake ga shitteiru Ikeda Daisaku/Sōka Gakkai no shōtai to inbō
(Confession of repentance: The true character and conspiracy of Ikeda Daisaku/Sōka Gakkai
that only I know; 1994); “Gekkan Pen” jiken: Umoreteita shinjitsu (The “Gekkan Pen” incident:
The buried truth; 2001), a book that digs into the monthly magazine Gekkan Pen’s reporting
on Ikeda Daisaku’s josei mondai (woman problem) and the resulting lawsuits that ended in
Sōka Gakkai’s favor; and Sōka Gakkai to “Suikokai kiroku” (Sōka Gakkai and the “Suiko As-
sociation Record”; 2004), which discusses plans formulated by Ikeda and others in the 1950s
among Sōka Gakkai’s elite inner circle surrounding the second Sōka Gakkai president Toda
Jōsei.
4
Yano Jun’ya has recently been the most active former Kōmeitō leader on the publication
front. He has published numerous books on the organizations in which he held leadership
positions for decades; for instance, in 2009 he came out with “Kuroi techō”: Saiban zen kiroku
(“Black Book”: Complete record of lawsuits), which chronicles his court battles with Sōka
Kōmeitō 7
to counter this tendency with their own media output, much of which dis-
avows or downplays obvious abiding relationships between Kōmeitō and
devoted Gakkai adherents who mostly continue to treat vote-gathering
for Kōmeitō and coalition allies as a regular part of their religious prac-
tice. Accounts from the likes of Harashima, Takeiri, Yamazaki, and Yano
may be motivated by bitter opposition to Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai, yet
they nonetheless provide invaluable insights into the inner workings of
the organizations and the details of how both Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō
took shape during crucial historical junctures. As architects of Kōmeitō’s
founding, these writers provide us with descriptions of unmatched detail
and offer vivid explanations of why the lay Buddhist organization Sōka
Gakkai moved into electoral politics. They also bring to life challenges
they faced building Kōmeitō into a fully realized political organization.
However, tracking the story of Kōmeitō’s development by moving
between the binary division of virulent critiques—however useful they
may be—and party-line defenses that dominate published coverage of
Kōmeitō reveals significant gaps. For instance, critiques of Kōmeitō fail
to account for the marked absence of attempts by the party to foment a
religious takeover, even during years of coalition government rule with
the LDP when Kōmeitō, presumably, would have been in a position to
push its plan to secure hegemonic rule. In contrast, the Kōmeitō party line
proclaiming clear institutional divisions between itself and Sōka Gakkai
mostly overlooks the party’s origins as a means of realizing Nichiren Bud-
dhist objectives and neglects to analyze the obvious fact that almost all
of its politicians and its most proactive voters are adherents of its parent
religious group. Neither of these perspectives provides sufficient insight
into complexities surrounding Kōmeitō’s historical development and the
ways it works as a political party in government and in opposition.
Within the armada of negative publications, it is not easy to identify the
small number of balanced studies. Academics and journalists who investi-
gated Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō in the 1960s clearly enjoyed easier access
to the two organizations than is the norm today, and books on Kōmeitō
written in this period, even those that critiqued Sōka Gakkai’s political
activities, provide a wealth of persuasive information about the workings
of the religion and the party drawn from careful research. Examples of
helpful publications from this era include Murakami Shigeyoshi’s Sōka
Gakkai=Kōmeitō (1967), a study that draws extensively on rare Sōka Gakkai
Gakkai; in 2010 he released “Kuroi techō”: Sōka Gakkai “Nihon senryō keikaku” no zen kiroku
(“Black Book”: Complete record of Sōka Gakkai’s “Japan Occupation Plan”). In 2010 he also
teamed up with religion writer Shimada Hiromi to publish Sōka Gakkai: Mō hitotsu no Nippon
(Sōka Gakkai: Another Japan).
primary sources to paint a vivid picture of the religion’s early entry into
electoral politics; Suzuki Hiroshi’s Toshiteki sekai (The urban world; 1970),
which relies on surveys carried out in Fukuoka on Sōka Gakkai members
mobilized for Kōmeitō candidates; and the journalist Hori Yukio’s book
Kōmeitō-ron (On Kōmeitō; 1973), an account that brings in a wealth of ma-
terial he accumulated through investigations carried out during the 1960s.5
As McLaughlin discusses in detail in chapter 3, the official Sōka
Gakkai–Kōmeitō split in May 1970 was fomented by furor surrounding
the publication of a book by Fujiwara Hirotatsu called Sōka Gakkai o kiru (I
denounce Sōka Gakkai; 1969). This book and the massive political scandal
it inspired marked the beginning of a sharp decline in academic work on
Sōka Gakkai’s political engagement. After the Gakkai-Kōmeitō separa-
tion, few researchers delved deeply into Kōmeitō’s inner workings. The
study of Kōmeitō from this point onward was regarded as taboo within
the Japanese academy; researchers clearly feared the possibility of legal
or professional ramifications of associating themselves too closely with
a “hot” political topic and a “suspicious” religious organization, so they
mostly stayed away. As a result, research carried out in Japan on Kōmeitō
grew more polarized and less meticulous from the 1970s onward.
Only a few scholarly publications shed light on the political organiza-
tion’s development after its split with Sōka Gakkai. The journalist Kiu-
chi Hiroshi’s Kōmeitō to Sōka Gakkai: Sono kiseki to senryaku (Kōmeitō and
Sōka Gakkai: Their trajectory and tactics; 1974) provides detailed cover-
age of how both organizations operated immediately after their official
separation, and while Kiuchi is harshly critical of both groups he makes
exhaustive use of Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō publications to detail their
numerous conflicts with rival political parties and the press, thereby pro-
viding useful material for researchers today. Of particular note is the fi-
nal portion of Shichiri Washō’s Sōka Gakkai wa doko e iku (Where is Sōka
Gakkai headed?; 1980), which relies on careful readings of Sōka Gakkai
and Kōmeitō publications to trace ways the two institutions developed
after they divided. The journalist Kawada Takashi’s Shin Kōmeitō-ron
(New Kōmeitō discussion; 1980) provides an approachable discussion of
Kōmeitō’s founding, its split from Sōka Gakkai in 1970, and its complex
relationships with other parties in the ensuing decade (see chapter 4 of this
volume for further analysis). Tonari no Sōka Gakkai (Sōka Gakkai next door;
1995), a multiauthor journalistic investigation of the ordinary lives of Sōka
5
For closer readings of the books by Suzuki and Hori, see chapter 3. In addition to these
sources, most Japanese-language publications on Sōka Gakkai’s postwar development in-
clude discussions of Kōmeitō and the early Sōka Gakkai policy of ōbutsu myōgō, or the “har-
monious fusion of government and politics.” For an overview of books and articles in Japa-
nese on Sōka Gakkai, see Shimada (2001) and McLaughlin (2009).
Kōmeitō 9
Gakkai members, published by Takarajima, includes a few short sections

on electioneering. A sympathetic account, Dare mo shiranai Sōka Gakkai no
senkyo (The Sōka Gakkai electoral campaign that no one knows; 1995), was
published by Kitagawa Kōyō and Gokatsukai, a group consisting mostly
of Sōka Gakkai members, who describe the “sweat and tears” of the or-
ganization’s rank-and-file members.6 A few other subsequent journalistic
treatments, including AERA Henshūbu’s Sōka Gakkai kaibō (Anatomy of
Sōka Gakkai; [1996] 2000), Sōka Gakkai Mondai Kenkyūkai’s Sōka Gakkai
Fujinbu: Saikyō shūhyō gundan kaibō (Sōka Gakkai Married Women’s Divi-
sion: Dissection of the strength of the strongest vote-winning group; 2001),
and Takarajima’s Ikeda Daisaku naki ato no Sōka Gakkai (Sōka Gakkai after
Ikeda Daisaku; 2007) are some of a few collections that include accounts of
Sōka Gakkai members’ activities on behalf of Kōmeitō.
There is, however, a conspicuous absence of a recent book in Japanese
by researchers of any type simply on Kōmeitō—where the party came
from, how it developed, and how its various levels function. Etō Shunsuke
and Shichiri Washō’s volume Jimintō/Sōka Gakkai/Kōmeitō (Liberal Demo-
cratic Party/Sōka Gakkai/Kōmeitō; 2003) accounts for the origins of the
party, Sōka Gakkai’s fraught political relationships, and how Kōmeitō
joined the LDP in coalition, yet it is a relatively short and focused account
that centers almost exclusively on the leadership level (see Ehrhardt 2008).
It does, however, employ reliable citations, a feature that is all but com-
pletely absent in the books produced by the most recently prolific writer
on Kōmeitō, the former Japan Women’s University professor of religion
Shimada Hiromi. Shimada is perhaps best known for losing his academic
position after publicly defending Aum Shinrikyō shortly before the group
attacked the Tokyo subways in March 1995 and revelations about Aum’s
extended history of mass murder came to light.7 The many books he has
published since then are clearly aimed at generating sales from a mass
audience, yet as an accomplished scholar of Japanese New Religions Shi-
mada is well informed about Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō, subjects he re-
turns to frequently. His recent books that deal with Kōmeitō include Sōka
Gakkai (2004), Sōka Gakkai no jitsuryoku (Sōka Gakkai’s true strength; 2006),
Kōmeitō vs. Sōka Gakkai (2007), and Minzokuka suru Sōka Gakkai (Ethnicized
Sōka Gakkai; 2008). These books and some of his other publications cover
many historical and current events surrounding the party and include
valuable information, some of which the authors of this volume use.
6
The Gogatsukai (May Society) was a response to the anti-Gakkai Shigatsukai (April So-
ciety); see chapter 9.
7
Shimada describes this event himself (2001), and the storied relationship between Aum
and academics is discussed in Baffelli and Reader (2012).
However, Shimada’s tendency to omit documentation undermines the

academic legitimacy of his enterprise, and most of his theoretical claims
about Kōmeitō remain undeveloped.8
Japanese political science has produced many volumes that mention
Kōmeitō. Numerous Japanese-language studies—including introductory
textbooks—that deal with topics such as voter behavior, Upper and Lower
House elections, the party system, and coalition governments include dis-
cussions of Kōmeitō as a matter of course. Still, the discipline has largely
failed to assign Kōmeitō a place in its research agenda that corresponds to
the party’s relevance. Publications that appeared from the mid-1990s on
had reason enough to deal with Kōmeitō more thoroughly than they did,
as the party had already been part of two coalition governments (in 1993
and 1994). However, we do not find this significance reflected in Japa-
nese scholarship. For example, Miyake Ichirō (1995) includes Kōmeitō in
some of his voter surveys, but mostly as part of the category “opposi-
tion parties.” Other than that, he dedicates only two pages to describing
how many Japanese would never vote for the minor parties Kōmeitō and
the Japan Communist Party (JCP; Kyōsantō). Yamaguchi Jirō and other
authors in his 1997 edited volume on coalition politics ignore Kōmeitō al-
most completely, as do Uchida, Hayano, and Sone in their earlier volume
(1994). Like many other political scientists at that time they focused on the
questions of how the LDP fared in opposition and how the new parties
would perform. Studies that include discussions of the short-lived New
Frontier Party reduce their interest in things Kōmeitō mostly to the so-
called Ichi-Ichi Line, the relationship between NFP leader Ozawa Ichirō
and Kōmeitō’s then secretary general Ichikawa Yūichi (see, e.g., Kusano
1999; Ichikawa 2014). The second point of interest of this time was the vot-
ing behavior of Sōka Gakkai members and the question of whether they
would support NFP candidates who did not originally belong to Kōmeitō.
However, as Ōtake demonstrates by devoting only two pages to this topic
in his 1997 edited volume, Kōmeitō itself did not emerge as a topic of con-
cern for political scientists.
After the NFP broke up, Kōmeitō appeared even less often in political
science studies. It was widely neglected in textbooks: the 2001 volume
8
Two others with relatively widely distributed recent publications that include discus-
sions of Kōmeitō are Tamano Kazushi, whose Sōka Gakkai no kenkyū (Sōka Gakkai research;
2008) briefly surveys Sōka Gakkai’s entry into politics and Kōmeitō’s experiences in the Diet;
and Yamada Naoki, whose Sōka Gakkai to wa nani ka (What is Sōka Gakkai?; 2004) portrays
the Gakkai as working through its affiliated political party to leverage power through the
LDP–Kōmeitō government. Tamano approaches the topic as a disinterested sociologist and
Yamada as a tabloid journalist, yet both of their books suffer from the same weakness of not
providing citations.
Kōmeitō 11
on Japanese politics by Muramatsu, Itō, and Tsujinaka fails to refer to the

party. When Kōmeitō joined the coalition with the LDP in 1999, the new
alliance was widely criticized for being a product of opportunism and lack
of political principles, and for about two years some Liberal Democrats
fought the new partner (see chapter 9). While this controversy attracted
some attention among political scientists, their written output on this issue
never went beyond the occasional contribution to a daily newspaper or
monthly magazine. Over the next eight years, we again find publications
on elections that mention Kōmeitō, and some policy studies that also note
the party, especially with regard to the dispatch of Self-Defense Forces (see
chapter 10), though rarely on other issues.9 Yet there is not enough to dem-
onstrate that Kōmeitō earned a relevant place on the research agenda of
Japanese political scientists. In the meantime, the JCP published two vol-
umes criticizing Kōmeitō (2001, 2002). Two former members of parliament
also added their views: helped by journalist Okkotsu Masao, Fukumoto
Jun’ichi has retaliated in print against his former party, which in 2007 had
refused his candidacy for another term as an Upper House member.10
Democrat Hirano Sadao owed his successful entry into politics in 1992 to
support from Kōmeitō, but after the end of his time in parliament in 2004
he also published three books (2005a, 2005b, 2008) criticizing the party.
Thus, as we write this introduction at the beginning of 2014, only a few
months before the fiftieth anniversary of Kōmeitō’s founding, there has
still not been a single book on Kōmeitō as a ruling party originating from
Japanese political science. In sum, the field of publications on Kōmeitō in
Japan has been left mostly to polemicists, tabloid profiteers, and writers
marginalized after falling victim to the vagaries of Japanese politics or
popular antipathy to New Religions.11
By contrast, English-language literature on Kōmeitō suffers far less
from a bias in favor of or against the interaction of religion and politics.
There is no comparable market outside Japan for the kind of tabloid re-
portage on Kōmeitō that appears constantly in Japan.12 It also appears to
9
An exception is Suzuki (2008).
10
Okkotsu has made his living as a strong critic of both Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō and,
with others, teamed up with former Kōmeitō lawmaker Ōhashi Toshio, who was expelled
from the party in 1988.
11
For an examination of the state of research on Japanese religion following 1995, see
the special issue of the Japanese Journal of Religious Studies titled Aftermath: The Impact and
Ramifications of the Aum Affair (2012), which includes extensive discussions of the effects of
this event on Japanese politics. The volume Religion and Social Crisis in Japan: Understanding
Japanese Society through the Aum Affair, edited by Robert J. Kisala and Mark R. Mullins (2001),
also includes discussions related to this issue.
12
A documentary produced by Julian Pettifer for the British Broadcasting Corporation
and aired on 14 October 1995 is a notable exception. “The Chanting Millions,” part of the
be easier to study the party and its main support group without dealing
with the presuppositions regarding Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai that domi-
nate Japanese society. To be sure, Sōka Gakkai has published extensively
in a number of languages as part of its campaign to proselytize all over the
world.13 However, publications by Sōka Gakkai after 1970 mostly avoid
discussing Kōmeitō.14
Outside Japan, interest in Kōmeitō is found mostly among academ-
ics who have produced a limited quantity of work on the party. James
White’s book The Sōkagakkai and Mass Society (1970) stands as the most
comprehensive treatment of Kōmeitō written to date in English, and it
remains an essential source for information on the early years of the party.
Another scholar writing around the same time worth mentioning in this
regard is the Christian missionary James Allen Dator (1965, 1967, 1972),
whose articles on Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō provide an informative look
at the organization’s grassroots-level activities.
However, despite differences in academic milieu, English-language
scholarship on Kōmeitō, like its Japanese-language counterpart, drops
off in quantity and quality from the 1970s onward. Historian of religion
Daniel Métraux, probably the most prolific author on the topic outside of
Japan and a visiting fellow at Sōka University in 1992, has published nu-
merous books and articles on Sōka Gakkai (1994, 1999, 2001, 2005), some
of which cover aspects of Kōmeitō. While he has enjoyed access to a num-
ber of Kōmeitō politicians and many opportunities to engage with Sōka
Gakkai members, his work generally remains on a descriptive level when
it comes to the party (an example of this is Métraux 1999). In addition, his
numerous publications on Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō hardly deal with the
more controversial—and important—episodes in the entangled history of
the religion and the political party.
Discussions of Kōmeitō in English-language introductory textbooks
dedicated to the political system of Japan have tended to be brief. Over
the past few decades, Hrebenar ([1988/1992] 2000), Curtis (1988, 1999),
BBC’s “Assignment” series, portrays Sōka Gakkai as a sinister plot to enthrone Ikeda Dai-
saku and includes discussions of Kōmeitō and the NFP.
13
An intriguing historical artifact reveals the pre-1970 picture, quite literally: a bilingual
Japanese-English pictorial publication called Nichiren Shōshū Sōkagakkai Photographic, vol. 6
(Nichiren Shōshū Sōkagakkai 1966) concludes with an eleven-page photo spread document-
ing Kōmeitō members debating the government in the Diet and the Tokyo Metropolitan
Assembly, and out in public engaged in social welfare initiatives.
14
Exceptions can be found. For instance, Sōka Gakkai’s 2000 Annual Report, which sur-
veys the year Kōmeitō joined the Liberal Democratic Party, includes a section reaffirming
Sōka Gakkai’s policy of “separating politics and religion” (seikyō bunri) and clarifying the
parameters of its role as Kōmeitō’s “support organization” (shiji dantai) (see Sōka Gakkai
2000, 12–18).
Kōmeitō 13
Neary (2002), Stockwin ([1982] 2008), Baerwald ([1974] 2010), and Ka-
bashima and Steel (2010) have produced well-received volumes that men-
tion the party. All of these authors stress the ties between Sōka Gakkai and
Kōmeitō, the active mobilization of Sōka Gakkai members at election time,
and the problematic image of both organizations in the Japanese public,
but apart from this standard narrative there is little further analysis. In an
introductory volume Governing Japan (2008), for example, Stockwin dis-
cusses Kōmeitō in less than a page, referring only to the first edition of his
own Governing Japan from 1982 and James White’s seminal work (1970).
Rosenbluth and Thies (2010) relegate Kōmeitō discussion to little more
than one page in a subchapter on “Other Opposition Parties,” referring
only to Hrebenar (1992). The citation list in Hrebenar’s textbook includes
only one source on Kōmeitō, and that is from 1982.15
Three English-language political science texts distinguish themselves
by explaining opposition politics during the period of LDP dominance
(1955–1993) and its immediate aftermath. In Stephen Johnson’s Opposition
Politics in Japan (2000) we find a number of paragraphs explaining Kōmeitō
policies and strategies over the years, but compared to analyses of the So-
cialist Party and the Communist Party, Kōmeitō takes a back seat. Besides
newspaper articles and two interviews, his sources are Hori (1973, 1979)
and Kiuchi (1974). Ray Christensen published Ending the LDP Hegemony:
Party Cooperation in Japan in 2000, which draws on a similar mix of sources,
and Ethan Scheiner’s Democracy without Competition in Japan (2005) refers
only to newspaper articles in its treatment of Kōmeitō.16 While these books
deal with Kōmeitō more extensively than other English-language publi-
cations do, they focus on electoral politics and interparty relations, not
Kōmeitō on its own terms.
The 2011 volume edited by Roy Starrs titled Politics and Religion in Mod-
ern Japan: Red Sun, White Lotus includes a brief yet useful chapter by Erica
Baffelli on Sōka Gakkai’s founding of Kōmeitō and the religion’s ethic of
“Buddhist politics.” The most recent book-length contribution to Kōmeitō
research is Anne Mette Fisker-Nielsen’s study of Sōka Gakkai youth and
their attitude toward the party (2012). This book provides valuable on-
the-ground perspectives on how Gakkai youth mobilize for Kōmeitō dur-
ing elections, even as they express occasional discontent with the party’s
policies and decisions in government. As a primarily ethnographic study
15
Kishimoto Kōichi’s widely read book Politics in Modern Japan ([1977/1982/1988] 1997)
included less than two pages on Kōmeitō and no list of references.
16
In his 1992 dissertation titled “The Significance of the Opposition in Japanese Politics:
The Case of Electoral Coalitions in Japan,” Christensen draws upon three monographs from
the early 1970s, a few articles from monthly Japanese magazines, and five interviews with
national (three) and local (two) politicians of the party.
of a specific Sōka Gakkai demographic, it does not cover those aspects of

Kōmeitō that are crucial to our endeavor.17
This review demonstrates that there are omissions in the academic lit-
erature on Kōmeitō. There is very little published on how the party formu-
lates policy, selects candidates to run for office, operates in opposition and
in coalition, and other salient issues. This glaring lack of studies on these
topics, despite the fact that Kōmeitō has been around for half a century,
speaks to lacunae in knowledge about this important organization, and
therefore critical gaps in our knowledge of the postwar Japanese politi-
cal system.
Organization of This Book

We approach Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai using a variety of methodologies
in order to fill gaps in understanding the organizations. What motivated
Kōmeitō’s founding? Why did a religious organization enter electoral pol-
itics, and how did its party survive and thrive, both in opposition and in
government? And, perhaps most importantly, how does Kōmeitō work?
Four of our chapters offer insights from fieldwork inside contemporary
Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai. Two of our authors, George Ehrhardt and Levi
McLaughlin, have spent long periods embedded as nonmember research-
ers in grassroots Sōka Gakkai activity, giving them a perspective that the
current political science literature lacks. Our other contributors have con-
ducted fieldwork during election campaigns, interviewed Kōmeitō poli-
ticians, analyzed Kōmeitō campaign finance records and other archival
sources that are difficult to obtain, and synthesized data from Japanese-
language newspapers and other publications that present understandings
of how Kōmeitō developed and how it operates today.
We have arranged the nine chapters that follow this introduction along
three principle lines of inquiry: (1) Kōmeitō’s history, (2) its inner work-
ings, and (3) its way to power. To establish a context for nonspecialists,
chapter 2, by Axel Klein and Steven Reed, discusses the role religion plays
in Japanese electoral politics, how religious identification influences vot-
ing behavior, and how religious groups support candidates and parties.
This chapter summarizes the role of religion within postwar Japanese
politics and compares the Japanese case to situations in other countries.
17
Another English-language study of Kōmeitō worth mentioning is Bhoopender S. Da-
lal’s BJP and Kōmeitō: Religion and Politics in India and Japan (2002), a published dissertation
that presents a comparative study of political parties founded by religious organizations in
non-Western democracies; the comparison is informative, yet the author’s inability to read
Japanese limits his analysis.
Kōmeitō 15
Chapters 3 and 4 turn to the history of Kōmeitō, from its founding up to

the early 1990s. Levi McLaughlin explores in chapter 3 how Sōka Gakkai’s
second president, Toda Jōsei, and third president, Ikeda Daisaku, drew on
medieval Japanese Buddhism to inspire Gakkai followers to produce an
energetic mass political movement in the 1950s. McLaughlin employs eth-
nography and primary source evidence to address why Sōka Gakkai en-
tered politics by locating Sōka Gakkai’s earliest political campaigns in the
mandates of Nichiren Shōshū, the branch of Japanese temple-based Bud-
dhism in which Sōka Gakkai began as a lay association. He then describes
the people who drove proselytizing and political campaigns during the
1960s and the founding of Kōmeitō in 1964 by outlining the demographic
makeup of the early Gakkai membership, and concludes by examining
fallout from the tumultuous series of events that led to the official split in
1970 between Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō.
Yuki Abe and Masahisa Endo continue the narrative in chapter 4 by
following the reformed Kōmeitō in its new existence as a party officially
separated from its religious founder that faced new existential and practi-
cal dilemmas. The period from 1970 until the 1990s, when the party en-
tered government, is a pivotal time in Kōmeitō’s development. In these
decades, the party experimented with policy stances and electoral practic-
es as it groped toward an independent identity. Abe and Endo trace how
events during these decades shaped Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai members’
activities. They also offer important insights into connections between
the religious mother organization and the political party, a relationship
that at times—and quite contrary to widespread belief—was far from
harmonious.
In chapter 5, George Ehrhardt begins our inquiry into Kōmeitō’s inner
workings as he employs data from fieldwork carried out during the July
2010 Upper House election to explore Kōmeitō campaigns from the inside.
He describes vote-getting techniques in detail and traces how the politi-
cal party and religious organization integrate their activities. This chapter
also places Kōmeitō campaign activity in the context of the extensive po-
litical science literature on electoral behavior and determines that Kōmeitō
electioneering practices, though they are arguably the most controversial
regular activities in Japanese electoral politics, are surprisingly close to
methods employed by political parties in the Japanese mainstream.
Chapter 6, by Dan Smith, examines the party’s candidate recruitment
and nomination processes. The chapter addresses not only how the nomi-
nation process works within Kōmeitō, but also who tends to get nomi-
nated, as well as where and why. Based on quantitative data on Kōmeitō
candidates for the Diet from 1980 to 2013 and qualitative data obtained
through personal interviews with Kōmeitō politicians, Smith evaluates

the balance between Kōmeitō’s guiding principles and ideals in candidate
selection—including those influenced by its relationship to Sōka Gakkai—
as well as the constraints imposed on the party by its limited support base
and the Japanese electoral system.
Matthew Carlson turns to money in chapter 7. Campaign finance is a
key issue for Kōmeitō, as the nature of the party’s financing mechanisms
has long been an object of controversy. In his contribution, Carlson sheds
as much light as possible on the amount of money Kōmeitō members raise
and spend, and compares his results to data on other political parties. As
Sōka Gakkai’s finances are not publicly disclosed and the religion remains
a key conduit of funding for Kōmeitō, Carlson relies on difficult-to-obtain
official sources by reviewing and updating the scant research on this im-
portant topic and highlighting the limits of existing studies.
In chapter 8, Ehrhardt employs data from his participant observation
and interviews with grassroots-level Sōka Gakkai adherents to argue for
a political explanation of local-level Kōmeitō electioneering. When set-
ting its policy preferences, Kōmeitō answers to the housewives of Sōka
Gakkai because they make up the party’s single largest bloc of support-
ers and they are the most active electoral campaigners in Japan. Ehrhardt
determines that local-level Kōmeitō electioneering is not mobilized by
religious doctrine or Sōka Gakkai leaders’ dictates per se, yet these influ-
ences filter through the everyday life experiences and policy preferences
of housewives.
The final part of the book looks at Kōmeitō’s way to power. In chapter
9, Axel Klein and Steven Reed portray the evolution of Kōmeitō from a pa-
riah party into a coalition partner by following four countermobilizations
that Kōmeitō triggered. All were based on Sōka Gakkai’s entrance into the
political arena, an event that permanently transformed the relationship
between religion and politics in Japan by dividing those who opposed
the creation of a religious political party from those who accepted it. The
confrontation between the camps proved to be a tremendous impediment
for Kōmeitō on its way to power, yet Kōmeitō eventually became part of
Japan’s political mainstream; Klein and Reed illuminate the political ob-
stacles Kōmeitō overcame to achieve this status.
Linda Hasunuma and Axel Klein in chapter 10 provide an analysis of
Kōmeitō’s first stint as junior coalition partner of the LDP (1999–2009).
By looking at office allocations, policies, and the internal dynamics of
the alliance, the authors argue that Kōmeitō was not obedient to the LDP
but instead acted autonomously, as junior coalition partners in other de-
mocracies routinely do. While the party had to give up some of its ide-
als, Kōmeitō was still able to successfully push some of its core policies,
Kōmeitō 17
especially in the field of social welfare. In sum, Hasunuma and Klein con-
clude that the alliance between Kōmeitō and the LDP was, and still is, a
natural choice for both parties.
Writing on Japanese politics in the first edition of Japan’s Parliament: An
Introduction, Hans Baerwald concluded his overview of opposition par-
ties by stating that “it remains to be seen whether it is the Kōmeitō or the
JCP which has been the proverbial flash in the pan” (1974, 44). History
has shown that neither party has disappeared, and four decades of elec-
toral success at every level of Japanese government and years of coalition
rule tell us that Kōmeitō has proven its credentials as a bona fide political
party. Kōmeitō is surely worthy of a far higher level of attention than it has
received so far. In sum, it is important to understand Kōmeitō as a politi-
cal party, not simply as a political tactic employed to expand the power of
Sōka Gakkai. When one does so, one finds that Kōmeitō is a surprisingly
“normal” party, a point that we shall discuss in more detail in chapter 11,
our conclusion.
It is clear that Kōmeitō has been neglected by academics for too long.
The fieldwork, archival research, and analyses from political science and
religious studies that we combine allow a deeper, more up-to-date look at
this understudied party than was previously available, and we are confi-
dent that the information provided in the pages that follow will be of use
not only to Japan specialists but also to readers interested in the intersec-
tion of religion and politics across the globe.
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Complete record of lawsuits]. Tokyo: Kōdansha.
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Periodicals
Sapio is a semimonthly magazine published by Shogakukan. The
publisher promotes Sapio as an “International Information Magazine.”
Average circulation in 2008/2009 was 120,000. Available at www.
digital-zasshi.jp/info/sapio. Accessed January 2014.
Shūkan Daiyamondo is a weekly magazine focusing on business- and
work-related issues. According to the ABC Report, circulation
was a little over 100,000 in 2011. Available at http://mediadata.
diamond.ne.jp/static/admin/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/
DWmediadata20122.pdf. Accessed January 2014.
Shūkan Posuto is a weekly gossip magazine that contains stories
about politics, celebrities, sport, sex, and more. It is published by
Shogakukan in Tokyo. Reliable information on the magazine’s
circulation is difficult to obtain; estimates run from 300,000 to 500,000.
Part II: The Context
Two
Religious Groups in Japanese

Electoral Politics
Introduction
The key to electoral success is the ability to organize and mobilize people.
Religious groups are well designed to perform these tasks. One should
thus not be surprised to learn that some of the most successful parties in
Western Europe have been Christian Democratic parties (Kalyvas 1996;
Kselman and Buttigieg 2003). In the case of Japan, however, Toyoda and
Tanaka observe that “religion in contemporary postwar Japanese society
is viewed by most observers to be politically irrelevant or, at most, on
the political periphery” (2002, 269). The standard wisdom among political
scientists is that Japan has no religious cleavage. Watanuki states the case
best: “Of the four types of social cleavages usually associated with vot-
ing behavior—regional or ethnic divisions, religious divisions, agrarian-
industrial divisions, and class divisions—Japan was basically exempt from
the first two and has been so throughout the modern period” (1991, 49).
Furthermore, “in addition to the limited number of believers, there is no
sharp cleavage between those that believe in some religion and those who
do not” (75). We find no reason to doubt the standard wisdom with re-
spect to voting behavior. There is no religious cleavage in Japanese voting
behavior, let alone anything analogous to the Catholic-Protestant cleavage
that has played such a large role in Western European electoral politics.
With respect to political parties, however, Kōmeitō challenges the stan-
dard wisdom. Since its first general election in 1967, it has been one of sev-
eral small opposition parties in a party system dominated by the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and, in that sense, Kōmeitō might have been con-
sidered peripheral during that period. However, even during the era of
LDP dominance, the party won around 10 percent of the vote and was no
more peripheral than the Japan Communist Party (JCP; Nihon Kyōsantō)
26 Axel Klein and Steven R. Reed
or the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP; Minshū Shakaitō). At least since

the 1990s, however, Kōmeitō has become a pivotal player in Japanese poli-
tics. One cannot understand Japanese politics after 1993 without under-
standing Kōmeitō. However, Kōmeitō is the only religious party to chal-
lenge the standard wisdom. Only one other religious party, Ittōen, has
ever won a single seat in a national election, and that party won one seat in
1947 and withdrew from electoral politics soon thereafter. Religious par-
ties are indeed peripheral, except for Kōmeitō.
With respect to supporting candidates nominated by other parties,
the standard wisdom seriously underestimates the influence of religious
groups in electoral politics. Religious groups have long been important
sources of what politicians call the “organized vote” (soshikihyō) (Hori
1985; Klein 2012). The vote-mobilization capacity of religious groups is
greater than the construction industry, the medical professions, and ag-
ricultural cooperatives, each of which is usually considered a powerful
actor in Japanese politics. Religious groups have thus played a much
bigger role in politics than the standard wisdom suggests, though that
participation has taken a low-visibility mode. Again, however, Kōmeitō
towers over other groups. Sōka Gakkai, the religious group that forms the
electoral base of Kōmeitō, mobilizes three or four time more votes than
all other religious groups taken together and is by far the largest single
source of organized votes in Japan.
Religious Political Parties

We define a religious party as a party whose primary organizational and
voting support comes from a religious group. We define a religious group
simply as any group registered with the government as a “religious cor-
poration” (shūkyō hōjin). The criteria for official assignment of this legal
status are laid down in the Religious Corporations Law (Shūkyō Hōjinhō).
It defines “religious groups” (shūkyō dantai) as those whose main purpose
is to spread a “religious creed” (kyōgi), “conduct ceremonies” (gishiki), and
“educate believers” (kyōka ikusei). If such a group also has a place of wor-
ship, it can apply for the status of shūkyō hōjin. So defined, it has proven
difficult to study religious parties in Japan. Most have been small and
ephemeral, attracting little attention from political scientists or the press.
Some have not advertised their religious affiliations, possibly to avoid the
stigma of the involvement of religion in politics noted in chapter 1. Openly
admitting to be supported by a religious organization carries the danger
of losing votes from those that oppose the mixing of religion and politics.
The best place to look for religious parties is the upper tier of the Up-
per House (House of Councilors), the national election that attracts the
Religious Groups in Japanese Electoral Politics 27
largest number of ephemeral parties. In this tier, the electoral threshold

(the minimum required to win one seat) is only about 1 percent of the
vote nationwide. This tier is home to a large number of parties that field
candidates despite having no realistic hope of winning a seat, though sev-
eral clearly harbored unrealistically high expectations of victory. Many of
these parties are nothing more than a vehicle for a single candidate. Oth-
ers are dedicated to spreading a single message. Messages include world
peace, environmental protection, and gay rights. The need to protect the
peace constitution is as well represented as the need to respect the emperor
and revise the constitution. Others think it crucial that voters understand
the importance of education, welfare, or UFOs. Farmers, women, and the
elderly are all represented. Some seem designed to promote their busi-
ness interests. Lawyers, doctors, and hotel managers are well represented.
Those parties that continue fielding candidates in the face of repeated and
dismal failures are obviously running for some purpose other than gain-
ing votes, seats, or influence over policy, the set of goals political scientists
normally attribute to political parties (Müller and Strøm 1999). One might
thus call them “nonelectoral political parties.”
Sifting through the myriad minor parties that have run in the upper tier
of the Upper House between the first postwar elections in 1947 and 2013,
we have been able to identify ten religious parties other than Kōmeitō.
We will first introduce all of the groups for which we were able to find
sufficient information. We will then discuss three newer parties that have
run primarily in the Lower House (House of Representatives). Viewed
from the perspective of the political parties usually studied by political
scientists, the religious parties we introduce may seem very strange in-
deed. In the context of the other ephemeral parties that run in the upper
tier of the Upper House, however, the religious parties do not seem at all
out of place.
The Women’s Party (Joseitō; known as the Atarashii Jidai o tsukurutō
from 1993 to 1996 and not to be confused with the Japan Women’s Party,
Nihon Joseitō) gives no public indication of its religious character. Most
people (including ourselves) are surprised to learn of the religious group
that backs it (Wahōtai no kai, founded by one-time Sōka Gakkai member
Nishiyama Eiichi) and further surprised to learn that the group runs a ho-
tel and a cosmetics company (Aisutaa) (AERA, 7 August 1995, 15). Many
of the party’s candidates list their occupation as “employee of a cosmetics
firm.” The group seems to combine door-to-door sales with campaign-
ing both for votes and for converts. Though campaigning has not won
them many votes, the synergy among these three activities seems clear.
The Women’s Party, organized around cosmetics firms, thus seems similar
to the Liberal Alliance (Jiyū Rengō), which was based on a nationwide
network of hospitals and clinics (Weiner 2003). The party won only one
seat, but their organizational base allowed them to run candidates nation-
wide. Most Liberal Alliance candidates listed their occupations as doctor
or nurse.
Nishida Tenkō, the founder of Ittōen (mentioned earlier), a religious
group based on Pure Land Buddhism (Jōdo Shinshū) and devoted to a
form of self-cultivation, won a seat in the first Upper House election in
1947 (Asahi, 27 May 2007). He ran again when his term was up in 1953 but
lost with less than half of his previous vote. One loss convinced the group
that politics was not for them. The religious group continues to function
but no longer participates in elections. This party does not appear to be
particularly important, but no religious party other than Kōmeitō has won
a seat in any national election since 1947. In this narrow sense, Ittōen is the
second most successful religious party in postwar Japanese politics.
Single-candidate parties are common in the upper tier of the Upper
House and some of them have a religious tint. Some religious parties have
served as vehicles for a single candidate with a message. For example, Itō
Yoshitaka, a Buddhist priest from Honganji (Jōdo Shinshū), ran unsuc-
cessfully three times between 1956 and 1962 for a Buddhist party. Another
such party was the Japan Christian Party (Nihon Kirisutokyōtō) founded
by Mutō Tomio, a Manchurian bureaucrat purged after the war. His candi-
dacy in 1977 caused some confusion because the Christian Political Union
(Kirisutosha Seiji Renmei) was supporting a Socialist candidate at the time
(Asahi, 22 April 1977, evening edition).
Several religious parties have been more persistent, if no more success-
ful. The Society to Develop True Constitutionalism (Rikken Yōseikai) bears
some resemblance to Sōka Gakkai. It was founded by Tanaka Chigaku and
was based on his ideas of Nichiren Buddhism. The party was also banned
in the prewar period (Kokushi Daijiten 1995, 562). It enjoyed some success
at the local level but has never come close to winning a seat at the national
level. The World Spirit Cleansing Society (Seikai Jōreikai) ran candidates
for the national tier of the Upper House between 1983 and 1995 and has
fielded candidates in the prefectural constituencies as well. It seems clear
that their purpose was less to win votes than to win converts (through
candidate questionnaires; Asahi, 30 June 1986). Before the 1998 election,
however, public subsidies were cut and the election deposit was raised,
making it more costly for small parties to run. The World Spirit Cleansing
Society was one of several that dropped out of electoral politics due to the
increased cost of running (Chūnichi, 17 July 1995).
In the 2001 election, Shirakawa Katshuhiko formed the New Party Free-
dom and Hope (Shintō Jiyū to Kibō). Shirakawa had just left the LDP after
fighting against the coalition with Kōmeitō since 1999 (see chapter 5) and
losing his seat in Niigata in the 2000 general election. As an anti-Kōmeitō

activist and campaigning as the only party to fight “Sōka Gakkai’s politi-
cal power,” he acquired the support of Sōka Gakkai’s religious rival, the
Risshō Kōseikai (RKK). Although RKK endorsed (suisen) him, the group’s
support was not exclusive (Yomiuri, 4 February 2001). RKK also endorsed
a democratic candidate, leaving too few votes to secure Shirakawa’s elec-
toral victory in the 2001 Upper House election.1 Although from RKK’s
perspective the group was endorsing a candidate from another party,
RKK was the primary organizational support for the party. The New Par-
ty Freedom and Hope thus fits our definition of a religious party. It also
shared the fate of most other religious parties as it won no seats and dis-
banded immediately after the 2001 election.
Another religious party of some note is the one formed by Aum
Shinrikyō. Aum established Shinritō (Truth Party) shortly before the 1990
general election. Shinritō ran eighteen candidates in Tokyo and seven in
neighboring prefectures. The party’s campaign was focused on Tokyo’s
fourth district, whence ran the group’s founder, Asahara Shōkō. His elec-
tion campaign featured campaigners dressed in yellow-red elephant cos-
tumes with wings, singing the “Guru March” (“Sonshi māchi”) and lis-
tening to Asahara declaring that in order to establish the Land of Utopia
soon, religious salvation had to be accompanied by political reform. In
other districts, the campaign consisted of little more than posters of candi-
dates that carried their religious names in huge characters.
None of the candidates came close to winning a seat. Asahara gained
less than 3 percent of the vote (2.69%). The party had gathered only a little
more than six thousand votes in total (Shūkan Asahi, 31 July 2009, 30). The
rumor was nurtured within the group that authorities had tampered with
the votes and stolen Asahara’s victory.2 Electoral failure is believed to have
been one factor that led Aum to change tactics and implement the terrorist
attack on Tokyo’s subway system in 1995. Eight of the party’s candidates
and Asahara were accused in 1996 of having planned and/or participated
in the attack (Asahi, 20 April 1996). Police also discovered plans for a coup
d’état (Asahi, 24 May 1995, evening edition; see Hughes 2001).
Finally, a new religious party was founded in May 2009. Ōkawa Ryūhō,
the spiritual leader and founder of the Science of Happiness (Kōfuku
no Kagaku), established the Happiness Realization Party (HRP; Kōfuku
Jitsugentō). The religious group had been supporting LDP candidates but
the North Korean missile that flew over Japanese territory in early 2009
1
Personal interview with Shirakawa Katsuhiko, 28 September 2010, Tokyo.
2
Interview with Aum’s former spokesperson Joyu Fumihiro in Shūkan Gendai (12 Sep-
tember 2009).
triggered the establishment of its own party.3 The HRP ran in two elec-
tions in July 2009, the Sendai mayoral election and the Tokyo prefectural
assembly elections. In Sendai, the party’s candidate won 0.75% of the
vote. In Tokyo, the HRP campaigned on the slogan that those voters who
wanted to become poor should vote for the LDP, those who wanted to be
killed by North Korean missiles should vote for the oppositional Demo-
cratic Party of Japan (DPJ; Minshutō), and those who wanted to go to hell
should vote for Kōmeitō (Shūkan Asahi; 31 July 2010). The HRP nominated
ten candidates, all of whom finished last in their respective districts, gain-
ing a total of 13,401 votes (0.73%).4
Such dismal results did not prevent the party from finding 337 members
willing to run in the general election of August 2009, only three months
after the party’s formation. Ōkawa himself joined the race at the top of the
party’s proportional list in the Kinki bloc. In spite of a massive financial
investment and mobilizing a huge number of volunteers, the party did not
win a single seat. Political observers concluded from the one million votes
the party had won that the Science of Happiness claim of having eleven
million members was wildly exaggerated. Although religious groups (and
political parties) regularly exaggerate their membership, few religious
groups are able to mobilize their followers. In addition, HRP politicians
stress the fact that, in contrast to Sōka Gakkai, they would not put pres-
sure on the members of their religious mother organization to vote for the
HRP (Klein 2011).5
The HRP also ran candidates in the 2010 and 2013 Upper House elec-
tions as well as in the 2012 Lower House election but on average won
only about one-fifth of the votes needed to gain a seat. In April 2010 it
temporarily secured one seat when Ōe Yasuhiro, a former Liberal Demo-
crat, former Democrat, and former member of the Reform Club (Kaikaku
Kurabu), joined the HRP. After only six months, however, Ōe left the party
again because of differences regarding the HRP’s stance on the governor’s
election in Okinawa.6 While Ōe had suggested supporting the conserva-
tive candidate Nakaima Hirokazu in his race against socialist Iha Yoishi,
HRP leaders insisted on fielding their own candidate (who then won 2
percent of the votes). But despite this and other unsuccessful attempts to
gain some political relevance, the HRP has displayed remarkable staying
power and continues to field candidates in most elections.
3
Personal interview with Satomura Eiichi, 7 October 2010, Tokyo.
4
Tokyo Metropolitan Government website: www.senkyo.metro.tokyo.jp/data/data01.
html#h21togisen (accessed Jan. 2014).
5
Personal interview with Tanaka Junkō, 20 October 2009, Tokyo.
6
Personal interview with Ōe Yasuhiro, 15 February 2011, Tokyo.
In short, except for Sōka Gakkai, religious groups have not had much
success with their own political parties. Except for Kōmeitō, religious po-
litical parties are indeed peripheral to Japanese politics. Sōka Gakkai, on
the contrary, has been hugely successful, with Kōmeitō often capturing
over 10 percent of the vote in national elections and becoming the third-
largest political party in Japan. It has been one of the few minor parties
to survive the new two-party system that has evolved after the political
reform of 1994, and it is the most successful of those survivors (Reed 2013).
In 1999, Kōmeitō joined a coalition government with the LDP, providing
the LDP with both the seats needed to control the Upper House and the
votes needed to win a majority of the single-member districts in the fol-
lowing general elections. With the exception of the period of DPJ rule from
2009 to 2012, a religious party has thus been part of the government coali-
tion until the present day.
Supporting Candidates Running for Other Political Parties

With the exception of Sōka Gakkai, religious groups have not founded
successful political parties. What religious groups have done, however, is
support candidates nominated by other parties. From a political party’s
point of view, religious groups are a potential “organized vote.” Instead
of campaigning for the votes of individual voters, one vote at a time, the
party seeks the support of an organization in the hope that it will deliver a
bloc of votes. Organizational support ranges from simple endorsements,
in which the organization expresses a preference for one candidate or
party, to sponsorship, in which the organization takes responsibility for
electing a particular candidate. Sponsored candidates are the easiest to
analyze so we shall begin with examples of this extreme case of electoral
support.
Sponsoring Candidates from Other Parties

The strategy of using an organization to sponsor a candidate was pio-
neered by the British Labour Party. When it was building its party orga-
nization from scratch, the party hit upon the idea of having a particular
union sponsor a particular candidate. If the district party branch chose
a candidate from the union, usually an official of that union, the union
would help finance the candidate and her campaign (Muller 1977). In Brit-
ain, the campaign was run by the constituency party organization. In Ja-
pan, however, sponsoring a candidate means that the party subcontracts
the election campaign to the sponsoring organization. Japanese socialist
parties and the DPJ also subcontract campaigns to labor unions and the
LDP subcontracts to a wide variety of groups, including religious groups.
Again the strategy is clearest in the upper tier of the Upper House. For
example, doctors, dentists, nurses, and pharmacists have sponsored and
usually elected a candidate from their respective organizations under the
LDP label. Although the electoral threshold is only 1 percent of the vote
nationwide, that translated into 127,000 votes in 1947 and 642,000 votes
in 1980. Thus, only very large groups can contemplate sponsoring a can-
didate. For those groups, however, sponsorship is an attractive mode of
participating in electoral politics.
First, sponsoring a candidate allows the group to campaign primarily,
or even exclusively, among its own members. Second, the group can spon-
sor one of its own and take pride in the fact that it has members in the
Diet. Both labor unions and religious groups have used sponsorship in a
national election as a step in their internal promotion system. Vote mobi-
lization also tends to be easier with inside candidates. Finally, whether a
member of the group or not, the elected politician provides a direct voice
into the policy-making process. For example, Shinshūren, the umbrella or-
ganization of most New Religions, stopped sponsoring candidates when
the electoral system used in the upper tier of the Upper House changed
to force voters to vote for parties instead of candidates but found that it
had trouble getting its voice heard in the policy-making process without a
sponsored candidate to speak for the group (Shinshūkyō, 25 February 2007).
The group started running candidates again after the electoral system was
re-reformed to allow voters to vote for candidates as well as for parties.
Sponsored candidates also offer several advantages to researchers
because information on them and their party affiliation is more readily
available. First, the topic of “the organized vote” is part of the standard
mass media story line for Upper House elections, and religious groups are
covered with as much detail as any other type of group. Second, whereas
religious candidates and religious groups usually keep a low profile, it is
hard to sponsor a candidate in secret. Most obviously, one must let group
members know whom the group supports. In some cases it is possible
to get reliable information from the groups’ own newsletters. Thus, we
can describe several of the groups that successfully sponsored candidates.
Though it is easier to analyze candidates who are sponsored than those
who are merely endorsed, the line between the two categories is not al-
ways clear. We have tried to restrict the analysis to clear cases of spon-
sorship and to include all cases of sponsorship, but our data should be
considered no more than a first step in the direction of a more accurate
classification.
Tenrikyō sponsored candidates from the first Upper House election in
1947 through 1960. None of these candidates ran for a major party but
rather as independents or for nonparty groups like the Green Breeze
Society (Ryokufūkai). About half of their candidates were elected, but

some of their campaigns got in trouble for election law violations. The
group concluded that “running candidates in elections necessarily pro-
duces contradictions” (Asahi, 22 December 1977) and withdrew from poli-
tics after the 1968 election.
Jōdo Shinshū started backing candidates in the first election of 1947
with a fifty-fifty success rate through 1953. In the three elections between
1956 and 1962 Itō Yoshitaka, a priest from Nishi Honganji, the head tem-
ple of the sect Jōdo Shinshū Honganji-ha, ran unsuccessfully for a Bud-
dhist Party (Bukkyō Minwatō). With the founding of the LDP, two Jōdo
Shinshū groups, Higashi (Eastern) and Nishi (Western) Honganji, each
sponsored candidates, electing 78 percent of them between 1956 and 1968.
Their candidates were all clerical officials from inside their respective or-
ganizations. In 1968, the vote was badly skewed in favor of one of the
two candidates, leaving the second candidate without a seat. In 1971, the
group backed a single candidate, the loser from 1968, but the total group
vote dropped by over half and proved insufficient to elect him. Another
candidate lost almost as badly in 1974. The group then decided to support
an outside candidate, Fujii Hirohisa from the Ministry of Finance, who
was duly elected in 1977 and again in 1983. These events are clearly visible
in the aggregate data but were not covered by the national newspapers or
in the party newsletters. Other information, perhaps from interviews with
knowledgeable insiders, would be required to understand these events.
Jōdo Shinshū stopped backing candidates between 1986 and 1998, pre-
sumably due to the introduction of the electoral system that forced voters
to choose a party instead of a candidate. Once the system was changed to
open-list proportional representation in 2001, allowing voters to vote for
either a candidate or a party, the group started sponsoring clerical officials
as candidates again and with great success. The only black mark on their
record occurred in 2007 when they backed two candidates and elected
only one. The newcomer from the DPJ won while the incumbent from the
LDP lost.
Another relatively successful group was Seichō no Ie. It campaigned
to revise the constitution to make the emperor the state’s chief executive,
to outlaw abortion, and to abandon the Western calendar for the years
of the emperor’s reign (Asahi, 8 January 1979). The group was the major
voice opposing abortion, its councilor debating with a doctor elected to
the Upper House by the obstetrics professional association, both elected
on the LDP ticket (Norgren 2001). From 1962 through 1998, the group sup-
ported LDP candidates, 60 percent of whom were elected. This calculation
is, however, somewhat misleading because the group split its vote among
three different candidates in 1974, all of whom lost. If the group could
have run only two candidates, they might have elected both, and they
clearly mobilized enough votes to elect at least one. None of our sources,
primarily newspapers and newsletters, provide any information on these
events. If we ignore the 1974 election, however, 75 percent of their candi-
dates were elected and many of them finished near the top of the list. Most
of these were internal, usually group officials. The group withdrew from
electoral politics after the 1998 election.
RKK sponsored an LDP candidate in most elections between 1965 and
1998. Only two individuals were so sponsored over this period, neither
of them internal. Between them they won 75 percent of their elections.
Shinshūren, of which RKK is the largest member group, also sponsored
a candidate for the LDP who won three elections starting in 1965 but
lost in 1983. In the three elections between 2001 and 2007, the RKK and
Shinshūren successfully sponsored five candidates all running for the DPJ.
Between 1956 (the first Upper House election fought by the LDP) and
2004, candidates sponsored by religious organizations other than Sōka
Gakkai accounted for an average of just over two LDP seats per election.
This puts religious groups on a par with agriculture and the construction
industry, each group also electing two LDP candidates each. Political sci-
entists may have overlooked the electoral potential of religious groups,
but LDP politicians did not. As the best available measure of how many
votes a group can mobilize is the ability to elect sponsored candidates
to the upper tier of the Upper House, it is clear from figure 2.1 that Sōka
Gakkai elects three or four times more PR (proportional representation)
candidates than all other religious groups combined.
Kōmeitō is vastly more successful than any other religious political par-
ty. It is also significantly more effective in sponsoring and endorsing can-
didates from other parties. Between 1956 and 1962, before the founding
of Kōmeitō, Sōka Gakkai sponsored sixteen candidates, running with no
party affiliation, electing fourteen for a success rate of 87.5%. In 1959, they
elected five, and in 1962, they elected seven. Kōmeitō first ran in the 1965
election, nominating nine candidates and electing them all. This perfect
record was maintained through 1980. With the introduction of closed-list
proportional representation in 1983, Kōmeitō began running seventeen
candidates but with no expectation of electing them all, so the success rate
of under 50% should not be counted as failure.7 Under this electoral sys-
tem, they elected an average of a little over seven candidates suggesting
a success rate of slightly more than 80%. The election rate of candidates
7
The 1983 Upper House election was the first in which voting for individual candidates
in a nationwide electoral district (zenkokuku) had been replaced by voting for a fixed party
list. Kōmeitō, to attract as many voters as possible to its list, ran six candidates who were not
party members but either enjoyed a certain amount of popularity or had had a position at
the top of an organization.
Figure 2.1 Candidates elected to the Upper House by religious group

Note: Kōmeitō candidates include independent and New Frontier candidates sponsored
by Sōka Gakkai and those nominated by Kōmeitō. Other includes candidates sponsored
by religious groups other than Sōka Gakkai. The figures for other religious groups should
be considered rough estimates because it is difficult to identify all sponsored candidates.
Because of changes in the electoral system over this period, it is not possible to estimate the
number of votes mobilized.
sponsored by other religious groups hovered around 75%. Kōmeitō elects

more sponsored candidates with greater efficiency than any other reli-
gious group, but those other religious groups are at least as effective in
sponsoring candidates as economic and professional groups.
(QGRUVLQJ&DQGLGDWHVIURP2WKHU3DUWLHV
Information on candidate endorsements (suisen) is difficult to find. In
most cases of endorsement, neither the group nor the candidate has an
incentive to publicize the fact. As noted previously, reports or rumors
about this kind of electoral support may turn away those who oppose the
involvement of religious groups in politics. If a candidate wants to win
broad support, religious backing is better kept low-key. What information
we have been able to gather, however, indicates that candidate endorse-
ment has long been as important as official sponsorship, especially in the
upper tier of the Upper House. For example, in the 1977 Upper House
election the LDP ran twenty-two candidates in the national district. Of
these, fourteen were supported by religious groups, eleven of whom won

seats. Of the fourteen, however, only four were directly sponsored by a
religious group.
The importance of religious groups sometimes rises to the surface.
For example, in the 1979 general election in Tokyo’s 2nd district, Ishihara
Shintarō (at the time a popular novelist who had entered politics and who
later was elected governor of Tokyo) lost almost forty thousand votes from
the previous 1976 election, though still managed to win re-election. The ex-
planation given in the media was that the PL Kyōdan religious group had
switched from exclusive support for Ishihara to supporting both Ishihara
and Socialist newcomer Ueda Tetsu, a well-known journalist who had
made his name pursuing (former) Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s cor-
ruption scandals (Asahi, 16 September 1979). Part of the reason this event
made the news was that the story line on Tokyo 2nd already included the
topic of religion in politics because it was the site of the “religious war”
between Kōmeitō and Ōuchi Keigo, a candidate from the Democratic So-
cialist Party who was endorsed by RKK.
Such stories are not uncommon but once again stories about the im-
portance of Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō support in determining election
outcomes are both far more common and far more impressive. Espe-
cially since the introduction of the new electoral system featuring single-
member districts, it is common to find statements to the effect that the key
to victory in a particular district lies with Kōmeitō voters. Lower House
member Hirasawa Katsuei, for example, estimated Sōka Gakkai support
for LDP candidates in single-member districts in 2009 to be worth on aver-
age twenty thousand votes.8
Kōmeitō did not run under its own label in the 1996 election, having
joined several other parties in forming the New Frontier Party (NFP). In
that election, exit polls reveal that the most loyal NFP voters came from
former Kōmeitō supporters, over 91% voting for NFP. Kōmeitō thus
played its assigned role as the solid base vote for the NFP. The other com-
ponents of the NFP could not do as well. In 1993, only 64% of supporters
of Ozawa Ichirō’s Japan Renewal Party (Shinseitō) voted for the NFP as
did 46% of the former Japan New Party (Nihon Shintō) supporters and
35% of former DSP supporters (Yomiuri, 5 November 1996). After the NFP
dissolved Kōmeitō re-emerged as an independent party, now calling itself
“New Kōmeitō.” Since the 2000 election, the party has endorsed LDP can-
didates. Kōmeitō supporters have again proved more loyal to LDP can-
didates than were LDP supporters (Yomiuri, 12 September 2005 and 14
September 2009; see fig. 9.2). By all accounts, Sōka Gakkai can mobilize a
8
Personal interview with Hirasawa Katsuei, 11 November 2010, Tokyo.
large number of votes not only for Kōmeitō candidates but also for candi-
dates from other parties.
A recent example of Kōmeitō organizational capacity comes from the
2010 Upper House election in Yamanashi Prefecture. The incumbent was
Koshi’ishi Azuma, the leader of the DPJ in the Upper House. Koshi’ishi’s
primary organizational support is Nikkyōso, the Japan Teachers’ Union,
where he started his career. Nikkyōso is a powerful organization in its
own right, long a mainstay of the Japan Socialist Party, now supporting
the DPJ. The LDP fielded a thirty-year-old female teacher to run against
the seventy-four-year-old Koshi’ishi in an effort to split the Nikkyōso
organized vote. The DPJ countered this strategy in various ways, one of
which was to seek support from Kōmeitō. The DPJ bartered Kōmeitō vot-
ers to Koshi’ishi in the prefectural district for DPJ voters to Kōmeitō in the
proportional representation tier. Such barters have been common between
Kōmeitō and the LDP (Yomiuri, 14 July 2010; cf. chapter 10 of this volume),
but the LDP-Kōmeitō coalition had been defeated in the 2009 general elec-
tion. The LDP had also angered Kōmeitō by running a well-known and
Yamanashi-born former baseball manager in the proportional representa-
tion tier, thus reducing the number of LDP voters who might otherwise
have voted for Kōmeitō in the proportional representation tier. The party
thus declared a “free vote,” formally supporting no candidate, but was
rumored to have directed enough votes to Koshi’ishi to ensure his victory
(Yomiuri, 14 July 2010, Yamanashi edition). Discussions of the organized
vote often refer to similar vote-trading bargains, but Kōmeitō bargains ap-
pear to be the most reliable.
Stories like these lead to charges that Kōmeitō voters are like robots: one
word from above and they all move in perfect unison. Such claims are eas-
ily refuted. First and most simply, exit polls reveal that Kōmeitō support
never reaches 100%. Second, Kōmeitō dislikes snap elections. As Ehrhardt
describes in chapter 5, the party has an elaborate procedure for mobilizing
their voters that takes several months to complete. More than most other
groups and political parties, Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō mobilize voters
through grassroots campaigns that feature interpersonal contact. For ex-
ample, a poll by the daily newspaper Asahi (30 August 2010) asked voters
whether they had given weight to the request of an acquaintance in decid-
ing their vote in the 2010 Upper House election. While 16% of DPJ voters
and 19% of LDP voters answered in the affirmative, the figure was 69% for
Kōmeitō voters.
This result also fits in nicely with the findings of an international study
according to which religious groups in Japan are more likely to send polit-
ical messages to their members than in other countries. In a 2007 survey of
the intermediation of various groups, including religious groups, Bellucci,
Maraffi, and Segatti looked at Bulgaria, Greece, Hong Kong, Uruguay, the
United States, Chile, Italy, Spain, Hungary, and Japan. Among these coun-
tries, Japanese religious groups stand out as particularly political, with
65% of their members reporting to get information about the upcoming
election from the group. This is over twice as high as the figure for any
other country in the study. Furthermore, 63% report that the message in-
cluded support for a particular political party. At the same time, the small
number of Japanese who belong to a religious group means that only 3%
of voters received political information from religious groups. The United
States is at the opposite extreme. Whereas only 23% of the members of
religious groups received political messages from that group, they repre-
sented 12% of all respondents (Bellucci et al. 2007, 157–160).
A final and particularly convincing refutation of the robot claim is the
fact that it took at least three elections after the LDP–Kōmeitō coalition
was formed before Kōmeitō support in all districts was directed toward
the LDP. In 2003, three DPJ candidates were disciplined for instructing
their supporters to vote for Kōmeitō in the proportional representation
tier while others maintained some Kōmeitō support in less visible ways
(Yomiuri, 3 December 2003). Many of the decisions are made at the local
level based on relationships developed with particular candidates and
cannot be changed rapidly in response to national party directions (see
Fisker-Nielsen 2012).
Which Candidates and Parties Do Religious Groups Support?

There is no significant religious cleavage among Japanese voters as
a whole, but religious groups themselves are divided along two major
cleavages: first, evaluation of the prewar legacy of State Shinto symbol-
ized by the Yasukuni Shrine and, second, the opposition of many groups
to the direct intervention of Sōka Gakkai in the political arena represented
by the founding of Kōmeitō.
The Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo serves both as a symbol of prewar mili-
tarism and as the national shrine for honoring those who died fighting for
their emperor since the Meiji period, though the majority of the almost 2.5
million dead remembered there are soldiers who died during World War
II.9 The shrine became a major political and very controversial issue after
the souls of fourteen culprits who were convicted as class A war crimi-
nals at the Tokyo Trials (1946–1948) were also enshrined here (1978). From
that time on, politicians visiting Yasukuni and praying there have always
9
The shrine’s official website states that 2.466 million “sacrificed their precious lives in
order to protect the country” (www.yasukuni.or.jp/history/index.html; accessed Jan. 2014).
drawn criticism for their alleged disregard of Japan’s war aggressions and
the unconstitutional mingling of religion and state.
But the controversy surrounding Yasukuni is not only about different
attitudes toward Japan’s war history and the related constitutional issue,
but also about the status and standing of religions in Japan. Jinja Honchō,
the umbrella organization for Shinto groups, and Shintō Seiji Renmei
(Shinseiren), the political arm of Jinja Honchō, support Yasukuni and con-
tributed to the (unsuccessful) attempts by some Liberal Democrats to turn
the shrine into a state-run memorial. Many Buddhist groups, in contrast,
not only disagree with this particular attitude toward Japanese history but
are also uncomfortable with the increase in Shinto’s role in public life.
The Yasukuni issue has, in fact, occasionally prevented cooperation
among religious groups. In the late 1970s, an enterprising Upper House
member and former vice-chair of the policy affairs division of Seichō no
Ie, Tamaki Kazuo, attempted to unify Seichō no Ie, RKK, PL Kyōdan, Jinja
Honchō, and several other religious groups behind the LDP to counterbal-
ance the influence of Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō (Asahi, 22 December 1977).
This effort failed because he was unable to bridge the gap between the
Shinto and Buddhist groups over the Yasukuni issue (Asahi, 2 May 1983).
His Study Group for Religion and Politics (Shūkyō Seiji Kenkyūkai),
which officially had been formed to “cultivate politics based on religious
ethics,” fell apart after Tamaki’s death in January 1987 (Asahi, 5 February
1987).10 Yet the Yasukuni Shrine issue does not prevent religious groups
on opposite sides from supporting the same party. Religious groups other
than Sōka Gakkai all supported LDP candidates, though not necessarily
the LDP as a party, during the LDP’s long period of dominance. Since the
2000 election, Sōka Gakkai has also supported the LDP, thus supporting
the same candidates as religious groups on the opposite side of the Yasu-
kuni issue.
The second issue that mobilizes religious groups concerns attitudes to-
ward Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō. When Sōka Gakkai created a political
party it violated a standard interpretation of the separation of religion and
politics. Religious organizations (including Sōka Gakkai until it founded
Kōmeitō) have rejected the idea of supporting a political party but ap-
prove the idea of supporting individual candidates, though the candi-
dates were in fact mostly Liberal Democrats. We analyze this cleavage in
detail in chapter 5. Here we will merely note that RKK was vehemently
10
Tamaki’s legacy reappeared in the person of the previously mentioned Ōe Yasuhiro (see
the section titled “Religious Political Parties” in this chapter). Ōe had served as Tamaki’s
secretary and claimed that his experience enabled him to understand the needs of religious
organizations when he joined the Happiness Realization Party in 2010. Ōe left the HRP again
after six months and eventually returned to the LDP.
opposed to the formation of a religious party. The “religion and politics”

cleavage thus sets Sōka Gakkai against RKK, with most other groups sid-
ing with RKK with varying degrees of enthusiasm. When Kōmeitō joined
the LDP in coalition, Sōka Gakkai’s rivals shifted their support to the DPJ,
though again to varying degrees.
Our data on endorsements comes from the newsletters of several reli-
gious groups, which sometimes report to their members on the candidate
endorsements. We were able to find the winning candidates supported by
the Shinseiren for the 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2009 elections, and the same
data from RKK for 2000, 2003, and 2005. The Jōdo Shinshū newsletter re-
ported on candidates supported and group members running before the
election. Adding candidates formally supported by Kōmeitō, which is
public information reported in newspapers, we can ask which candidates
and parties each group supported.
Please note, first, that these data are about group endorsements, not
individual voting behavior. We have no way of estimating how many
votes are mobilized by these endorsements, though we have good reason
to believe that the number is significant. Second, these are not particularly
good data. We would like to know who the group supported, whether
the candidate won or lost, and we would like to have the same data for
each group. Third, both the source and nature of the data for Kōmeitō
differs from that for the other groups. These data concern the political
party Kōmeitō, not the religious group Sōka Gakkai. As official data they
are more complete than the data for other groups but may also be less
meaningful. Official Kōmeitō support for an LDP candidate covered a
wide range of actual relationships and did not necessarily mean avid sup-
port by Kōmeitō or Sōka Gakkai. Of course, the same may hold for the
endorsements of other religious groups. Ideal data not being available, we
will analyze the data we have.
We begin the analysis by asking whether groups support the same can-
didates or different candidates. The entries in table 2.1 are gamma cor-
relation coefficients. A positive entry indicates that the two groups tend
to support the same candidates while a negative entry indicates that they
support different candidates. Based on the Yasukuni cleavage, we would
expect to see negative correlations between Shinseiren and the Buddhist
groups, but the correlations with both Kōmeitō and Jōdo Shinshū are posi-
tive. Most notable is the high correlation between Shinseiren and Kōmeitō.
The two groups not only disagree on Yasukuni but Shinseiren also op-
posed the participation of Kōmeitō in government. The two groups take
opposing positions on many other issues as well. Though divided on the
issues, both groups support the LDP. Kōmeitō joined the coalition with the
LDP despite the fact that the two parties disagree on many issues. As part
Table 2.1 Do religious groups support the same candidates?
Shinseiren Kōmeitō
Kōmeitō 0.80
Jōdo Shinshū 0.23 0.56
RKK −0.24 −0.65
Note: Entries are gamma coefficients. The n for each coefficient

varies due to the data available for each group. Data for Shin
seiren, Jōdo Shinshū, and Kōmeitō cover the 2000 through 2009
general elections. Data for RKK covers only 2003 through 2005.
of the political bargain, Kōmeitō wound up supporting candidates who

take issue positions opposed by both the party and Sōka Gakkai. Simi-
larly, Shinseiren opposed the formation of Kōmeitō but supports the same
candidates because Shinseiren opposes many of the policy positions of the
DPJ. Most notably, Shinseiren opposes giving foreigners the vote in local
elections (a policy long supported by Kōmeitō) and allowing women to
keep their maiden names after marriage. In this case, bargains struck with
the LDP overrode policy differences.
Based on the religion and politics issue, one would expect negative cor-
relations between Kōmeitō support and all other groups. What we see
instead is positive correlations for all but RKK. Jōdo Shinshū is much less
concerned than RKK about the religion and politics issue and thus sup-
ports many LDP candidates despite opposing the coalition with Kōmeitō.
Moreover, the negative coefficient between Kōmeitō and RKK is smaller
than one would expect from the mass media’s portrayal of a “religious
war” between the two groups. Such stories may sell newspapers, but they
do not reflect the complete picture of religious groups’ involvement in
politics.
Our data on candidate issue positions comes from the Asahi Shinbun–
Tokyo University survey of candidate issue position in the 2003 and 2005
elections (Kabashima and Yamamoto 2005, 2008). The survey asked sev-
eral questions relevant to our topic. First, the issues of defense and Ya-
sukuni define the cleavage that divides those who evaluate the prewar
legacy positively and those who evaluate it negatively. The defense ques-
tion (“Japan should strengthen its defense,” with 1 being “agree” and 5
being “disagree”) captures an important aspect of this cleavage. The Yasu-
kuni question (“Should the prime minister visit Yasukuni Shrine?,” with
1 being “agree” and 5 being “disagree”) captures the religious aspect of
Table 2.2 Candidate issue positions and support by religious groups
Shinseiren Kōmeitō Jōdo Shinshū
Defense LDP+DPJ −0.31 −0.42 −0.05
LDP −0.05 −0.15 0.00
DPJ – – −0.02
Yasukuni LDP+DPJ −0.42 −0.69 0.15
LDP −0.05 0.27 0.29
DPJ – – 0.44
Foreign Voting LDP+DPJ 0.46 0.42 0.11
LDP 0.18 −0.15 0.04
DPJ – – 0.20
Note: Entries are gamma coefficients.
the issue but, unfortunately, was asked only in 2005. Finally, both sur-
veys asked whether foreign residents should be allowed to vote in local
elections (with 1 being “agree” and 5 being “disagree”). Sōka Gakkai and
Kōmeitō have long supported this proposal while Shinseiren finds the
idea unacceptable.
We first analyze LDP and DPJ candidates together to determine wheth-
er issue positions explain the choice of which party to endorse and then
analyze the LDP and DPJ separately to determine whether issue positions
explain the choice of candidates within party. The results are reported in
table 2.2.
Analyzing the LDP and DPJ candidates together leads to the conclu-
sion that both Kōmeitō and Shinseiren support candidates who favor a
stronger defense and the prime minister visiting Yasukuni, and who op-
pose local voting rights for foreigners. These stances are consonant with
Shinseiren issue positions but violate the stated positions of Sōka Gakkai
and Kōmeitō. Kōmeitō thus supports LDP candidates, even those who
take opposing issue positions, but, when choosing from among LDP
candidates, the party is somewhat less likely to support LDP candidates
who favor prime ministers visiting Yasukuni. The coalition with the LDP
takes priority over policy considerations but policy makes some difference
when choosing which LDP candidates to support.
RKK appears to oppose the positions of Shinseiren and Kōmeitō but

that is simply because RKK supports more DPJ than LDP candidates. RKK
does not appear to have a consistent position on Yasukuni or foreign vot-
ing, but this is due primarily to prioritizing the religion and politics cleav-
age over those issues. Jōdo Shinshū endorses both LDP and DPJ candi-
dates and thus appears to take no stance on any issue but, within the LDP
and particularly within the DPJ, the group tends to endorse candidates
who oppose the prime minister visiting Yasukuni.
The interaction between policy preferences and party support is com-
plex, but our data clearly indicate that, for Kōmeitō, Shinseiren, or RKK,
the candidates’ party affiliation is more important than their policy po-
sitions. The issue of Yasukuni does indeed divide Shinto from Buddhist
groups but in neither case does it serve as a litmus test for endorsement.
Similarly, the issue of religion and politics does indeed divide Sōka Gakkai
and RKK but few other religious groups take this cleavage as seriously as
does RKK. Issues play a role in deciding which candidate to support but
the decision of a group to endorse a candidate never means that the group
agrees with each and every issue position taken by that candidate or the
candidate’s party. Rather, it means that the group and the candidate agree
on enough to commit to a relationship. That relationship will involve both
agreement and disagreement but, more importantly, trust and compro-
mise. Thus, when Kōmeitō first entered the government in August 1993 as
part of the short-lived Hosokawa coalition, it was flexible enough to agree
to the list of policies set up by Hosokawa as a precondition for participa-
tion and apparently never put forward any original policy proposal of its
own while in the coalition.11 When Kōmeitō entered into coalition with the
LDP, it again committed to supporting candidates whose issue positions
differed significantly from its own.
In sum, we find that neither of the cleavages that systematically divides
religious groups from each other prevents them from supporting the same
party or the same candidate. Politics involves compromise. Many religious
groups, including Sōka Gakkai, prove remarkably adept at compromise.
Those groups, religious or otherwise, which find it difficult to compromise
either remain small and irrelevant or soon exit the political arena.
Why Do Religious Groups Get Involved in Electoral Politics?

Political parties and candidates want the support of religious groups be-
cause they hope to receive a reliable organized vote. But why do religious
11
Personal interview with Takemura Masayoshi, 18 May 2010, Tokyo. For the view of
Kōmeitō, see Ichikawa 2014.
groups want to be involved in electoral politics? Our investigations have

uncovered three major sets of goals: (1) to influence public policy, (2) to
defend organizational interests from the state or political opponents, and
(3) to maintain or strengthen the organization itself.
Some groups are concerned with public policy. Seichō no Ie was clearly
concerned with the abortion issue and represented the main voice pro-
moting that issue in Japanese politics for many years. Shinseiren is deeply
worried that the future of the nation is in danger if non-Japanese are given
the right to vote in local elections or if Japanese women are allowed to
keep their maiden names after marriage. Since these are policies support-
ed by the DPJ, Shinseiren supports only LDP candidates. RKK is clearly
motivated by the religion and politics issue, though it was involved in
politics long before this became salient. The problems of suicide, school
bullying, and North Korea’s aggressive military actions seem to have mo-
tivated the Science of Happiness. Several of the older peripheral religious
parties also focused on certain single issues. In each of these cases, policy
preferences are a major incentive to get involved in elections. In contrast,
it is hard to pinpoint a particular policy issue that motivates Sōka Gakkai
or many other religious groups. These groups do, of course, have policy
positions, but policy does not appear to be the primary motivation behind
their involvement in politics. This is indicated most clearly in their will-
ingness to compromise and support candidates who do not share their
policy preferences.
A second motivation is the defense of the group’s organizational inter-
ests. Religious groups are, after all, interest groups like any other. This mo-
tivation has a long pedigree. The first Christian parties in Western Europe
were founded to combat the liberal governments that were attacking the
privileges of the Catholic Church (Kalyvas 1996). In Japan, the only issue
with the proven potential to mobilize and unite most religious actors is the
protection of their legal privileges. After Aum Shinrikyō’s terrorist attack
in March 1995, the LDP government began discussing a revision of the law
on religious organizations that immediately drew protest from religious
groups across the spectrum (Klein 2012).
Political activity can also be used to enhance the group’s public image.
Especially for groups with negative public images, friends in government
can help prevent or at least soften criticism. The Unification Church support
of conservative politicians seems motivated by such aims (Sakurai 2010).
Finally, political scientists have overlooked one of the most important
sets of reasons for a religious group to get involved in politics, because this
set of motivations is not concerned with electoral politics. All organiza-
tions need to maintain group cohesion and to keep their members actively
involved. Supporting a candidate running for public office can thus be
analogous to sponsoring a festival, collecting money for disaster relief, or

conducting a study group. Strengthening group cohesion was one of the
most prominent reasons given when religious groups were surveyed by
the daily newspaper Asahi (6 June 1971). This motivation is not limited to
religious groups. Consumer groups have also been known to demonstrate
with no hope of influencing policy in order to strengthen group solidarity
(Maclachlan 2002, 134).
As a side effect, each of these activities offers local group leaders an
opportunity to check on members’ willingness to participate and to take
measures if turnout appears low. Positions of prestige such as official
nominee in an election, member of the local assembly, or member of the
Diet become important steps in the group’s hierarchy, strengthening its
organizational cohesion. Finally, as McLaughlin demonstrates in chapter
3, election campaigning in itself is regarded as a religious activity with-
in Sōka Gakkai, and this holds for other religious groups as well. Seikai
Jōreikai, for example, seemed less interested in winning votes than in win-
ning converts. The Women’s Party seems to be simultaneously using its
door-to-door activities for campaigning, sales, and proselytizing.
Amending the Standard Wisdom

The standard wisdom suggests that religion is peripheral to Japanese
politics and that generalization needs no revision with respect to voting
behavior. With respect to religious political parties and religious groups
as an organized voting bloc that supports candidates from other parties,
however, the standard wisdom is in need of some revision.
First, the standard wisdom holds for most religious political parties but
no longer applies to Kōmeitō. Since 1993, no case can be made for consid-
ering Kōmeitō peripheral to Japanese politics. A religious political party
currently plays a pivotal role in Japanese politics.
Second, the standard wisdom is simply wrong when it comes to the
organized vote. Religious groups, including Sōka Gakkai, have been in-
timately involved in electoral politics for many decades, acting as an or-
ganized vote for candidates nominated by other parties. Even excluding
Sōka Gakkai, religious groups have been as influential as, for example,
the construction industry or agricultural cooperatives. In addition, Sōka
Gakkai’s organized votes are around four or five times larger than all oth-
er religious groups combined. Sōka Gakkai represents by far the largest
and most reliable organized bloc of voters in Japan today. While the size
and unity of the union movement, agricultural cooperatives, and indus-
try groups have declined in recent years, Sōka Gakkai and other religious
groups have declined little if at all.
Speaking of Japanese historians, Sheldon Garon notes, “Book after book

describes the struggle of the few hundred thousand workers and tenant
farmers who formed unions. Curiously enough, historians have writ-
ten little about what was unquestionably the largest and fastest growing
popular movement in interwar Japan: the so-called new religions” (1986,
273). Political scientists studying Japanese elections have been making
the same error. If one removes one’s modernization theory and political
economy blinders, politically and financially powerful religious groups
come into view. These religious groups are at least as powerful as the eco-
nomic groups given pride of place in political economic theory, and it is
the economic groups more than the religious groups that face declining
effectiveness.
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University/Asahi Shimbun survey of politicians codebook]. Nihon Seiji
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———. 2008. “2005-nen Tōkyō Daigaku/Asahi Shimbunsha kyōdō seijika

chōsa kōdo bukku” [The 2005 Tokyo University/Asahi Shimbun
survey of politicians codebook]. Nihon Seiji Kenkyū 5:283–297.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1996. The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Ithaca,
Klein, Axel. 2011. “Wenn Religionsgemeinschaften zur politischen
Reformation ansetzen. Der Fall der japanischen ‘Kōfuku no kagaku’”
[When religious organizations take on political reformation: The case
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Contemporary Asia 119 (April): 9–26.
———. 2012. “Twice Bitten, Once Shy: Religious Organizations and
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Representation in the British House of Commons, 1874–1975. Atlantic
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Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Cambridge:
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Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.
Sakurai, Yoshihide. 2010. “Geopolitical Mission Strategy: The Case of the
Unification Church in Japan and Korea.” Japanese Journal of Religious
Studies 37:17–334.
Toyoda, Maria A., and Aiji Tanaka. 2002. “Religion and Politics in Japan.”
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Periodicals
AERA, first published in 1988, is a weekly magazine published by the
Asahi Shinbun with a circulation of about 134,000 in 2012. Nihon zasshi
kyōkai, available at www.j-magazine.or.jp/magadata/index.php?mo
dule=list&action=list&cat1cd=1&cat3cd=2&period_cd=17. Accessed
Jan. 2014.
Asahi (Shinbun) is one of five national newspapers in Japan. As of 2013 its
circulation (morning edition: 7.6 million; evening edition: 2.7 million)
was second only to that of the Yomiuri Shinbun. Available at http://
adv.yomiuri.co.jp/yomiuri/busu/busu01.html. Accessed Jan. 2014.
Chūnichi (Shinbun) is a regional daily newspaper published by the
Chūnichi group in Nagoya, which also publishes the Tōkyō Chūnichi
Shimbun. Total circulation of the Chūnichi Shinbun, which is sold in
the prefectures Nagano, Shizuoka, Aichi, Gifu, Shiga, and Mie, was
2.6 million in 2013. Available at www.tokyo-np.co.jp/approach/.
Accessed Jan. 2014.
Shinshūkyō (Shinbun) is the weekly newspaper of the umbrella
organization of Japan’s New Religions.
Shūkan Asahi, first published in 1922, is a weekly magazine published by
the Asahi Shinbun with a circulation of about 215,000 in 2012. Nihon
zasshi kyōkai, available at www.j-magazine.or.jp/magadata/index.
php?module=list&action=list&cat1cd=1&cat3cd=2&period_cd=17.
Accessed Jan. 2014.
Shūkan Gendai is a weekly magazine published by Kodansha, the largest
publishing house in Japan. It usually contains a mixture of news,
gossip, and scandals from fields as diverse as politics, celebrities, golf,
cooking, and sex. Weekly circulation in 2012 was about 550,000. Nihon
Accessed Jan. 2014.
Yomiuri (Shinbun) is one of five national newspapers in Japan. As of
2013 its circulation (morning edition: 9.9 million; evening edition: 3.4
million) was larger than that of any other Japanese daily. Available at
http://adv.yomiuri.co.jp/yomiuri/busu/busu01.html. Accessed Jan.
2014.
Part III: The History
Three
Electioneering as Religious Practice

A History of Sōka Gakkai’s Political Activities to 1970
Levi McLaughlin
Introduction
Sōka Gakkai, though it is Japan’s largest active religion, is only one of
thousands of new religious groups that flourished in Japan after the Sec-
ond World War, and, as Klein and Reed outlined in the previous chapter,
one of several that has engaged in postwar electoral politics. However,
only Sōka Gakkai has succeeded in establishing a prominent and lasting
place for itself in the Japanese political system, and only Kōmeitō has en-
dured as an influential party founded to satisfy religious motives.
Kōmeitō emerged as a component of Sōka Gakkai’s eschatological
mission to realize the vision of the medieval Buddhist reformer Nichiren
(1222–1282). Nichiren’s vision was to deliver salvation for Japan by con-
vincing all people to embrace the Lotus Sūtra and reject all other teachings,
including other forms of Buddhism, as false and misleading. At the out-
set of Sōka Gakkai’s foray into politics, gathering votes and gaining seats
in regional and national legislatures in themselves were not the principal
aims within the group’s mission. Instead, political victories were merely
steps toward the more profound religious victory of salvation for Japan
through realizing doctrinally mandated objectives. It is not an exaggera-
tion to state that even today, more than forty years after Sōka Gakkai of-
ficially abandoned political objectives, many ordinary members still con-
sider Kōmeitō campaigning to be as integral to their practice as chanting
the Lotus Sūtra and seeking to convert nonbelievers to their faith.
Why did Sōka Gakkai’s leaders steer the religion into electoral politics,
and how did Sōka Gakkai leaders convince millions of people in Japan to
fuse religious propagation with political activism? In order to understand
how Kōmeitō operates, and in order to make sense of its constituents and
52 Levi McLaughlin
their actions, I will situate the party in a context that is largely unfamiliar
to those who study Japanese politics: electioneering as religious mission.
In this chapter, I address the question of why Sōka Gakkai entered politics
by tracing the origins of the group’s political campaigns in the mandates
of Nichiren Shōshū, the lineage of medieval Japanese Buddhism in which
Sōka Gakkai began as a lay association. I then discuss key events from
the 1950s and 1960s that shaped Sōka Gakkai as a politically engaged re-
ligious movement. After this, I briefly describe the people who drove the
religious and political campaigns during the 1960s by outlining the demo-
graphic makeup of Sōka Gakkai membership in that era. Finally, I exam-
ine the series of events that led to the official split in 1970 between Sōka
Gakkai and Kōmeitō, and I reflect on the costs and the benefits accrued by
Sōka Gakkai when it conflated its religious objectives with political goals.
Sōka Gakkai’s Prewar Origins and Postwar Development:

Challenging Traditional Boundaries of Buddhism
Today, Sōka Gakkai claims a membership of 8.27 million households in
Japan and more than 1.5 million adherents in 192 countries abroad under
its overseas umbrella organization Sōka Gakkai International (SGI). Re-
cent scholarship confirms that these figures—like those supplied by other
religious groups—are certainly inflated.1 However, it can be surmised that
Sōka Gakkai members make up approximately 2 percent of the Japanese
population.2 There is little doubt that Sōka Gakkai is not only Japan’s larg-
est active religion but is most likely the largest independent Japanese orga-
nization of any kind. No other organization of any type in Japanese history
has matched Sōka Gakkai’s success in building a centrally administered
1
Happy Science (Kōfuku no Kagaku), for instance, claims eleven million Japanese adher-
ents, a figure that potentially tops Sōka Gakkai’s membership and makes Ōkawa Ryūhō’s
organization Japan’s largest New Religion. However, taking into account Happy Science’s
inability to elect all but one of the hundreds of candidates who have run for its political
party (Happiness Realization Party; Kōfuku Jitsugentō) since 2009, and the relatively modest
number of facilities the group maintains in Japan compared with thousands of Sōka Gakkai
buildings, suggests that Happy Science makes membership claims that are excessive even
by the inflationary standards of Japan’s religious community. See Shimada (2009); Shūkan
Daiyamondo (12 September 2009); and chapter 2 in this volume.
2
The most detailed sources for Sōka Gakkai membership numbers are the group’s web-
site (see www.sokanet.jp/info/gaiyo.html; accessed June 2012) and its own Seikatsu hōkoku
(Annual report) issued by the Sōka Gakkai Office of Public Affairs at the organization’s head-
quarters in Shinanomachi, Tokyo. For a discussion of difficulties associated with assessing
Sōka Gakkai’s membership in Japan and sources for ascertaining membership numbers, see
McLaughlin (2009, 2012); for a reliable recent assessment of numbers of affiliates in all Japa-
nese religious groups, including Sōka Gakkai, see Roemer (2009).
Electioneering as Religious Practice 53
group of active participants with committed members in every commu-

nity, at every socioeconomic level, and in every vocational sphere.
Sōka Gakkai marks its founding as 18 November 1930, when Maki-
guchi Tsunesaburō (1871–1944), the first president of the group’s prewar
incarnation Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai (Value Creation Education Study Asso-
ciation), published the first volume of Sōka kyōikugaku taikei (System of
value-creating educational study), a four-volume series of essays that
dealt primarily with educational reform. The group began as a small as-
sociation of schoolteachers and intellectuals who gathered in Tokyo to
discuss philosophy and publish periodicals that put forward ideas related
to education and society. Along with his disciple and fellow elementary
school teacher Toda Jōgai (later Jōsei) (1900–1958), Makiguchi converted
to the Buddhist sect Nichiren Shōshū in 1928 and turned thereafter to lay
Buddhist activism. It was not until the late 1930s that Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai
adopted an explicitly Nichiren Buddhist character, when the group’s lead-
ers turned toward absolute religious commitment.3
Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai began as a lay association under the temple Bud-
dhist denomination Nichiren Shōshū, or “Nichiren True Sect,” a minor-
ity lineage that follows the teachings of Nichiren (1222–1282). Like many
clerics in thirteenth-century Japan, Nichiren was trained primarily in the
Tendai tradition, yet he broke away from established Buddhist teachings
to preach that only faith in the Lotus Sūtra, held to be the historical Bud-
dha Śākyamuni’s final teaching, and the practice of chanting the title of
the Lotus in the seven-syllable formula namu-myōhō-renge-kyō (known as
the daimoku) were effective means of achieving salvation in the degraded
“Latter Days of the Buddha’s Dharma,” known in Japanese as mappō. Since
Nichiren himself, followers of Nichiren Buddhism have combined sote-
riological vision with political engagement: according to Nichiren, Japan
was a nation that “slandered the Dharma,” and only drastic measures by
all people in Japan, particularly those in the Kamakura Bakufu (military
government), to reject all other teachings in favor of exclusive embrace of
the Lotus Sūtra would save Japan from calamity. Nichiren drew the ire of
the authorities of his day when he lambasted other Buddhist schools as
“false sects” led by “evil monks” whose teachings perpetuated Japan’s
degradation in the depths of mappō. He petitioned the military govern-
ment in Kamakura to abandon support of Tendai, Shingon, Pure Land,
3
For a more detailed treatment of Sōka Gakkai’s historical development, see McLaughlin
(2009, 2012). The following account of Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō in the early postwar years
is taken from Higuma (1971), Murata (1969), Nakaba (1968), Nishino (1985), Saeki (2000),
Shimada (2004), Sōka Gakkai Yonjū Shūnenshi Hensan Iinkai (1970), Sōka Gakkai Nenpyō
Hensan Iinkai (1976), Tamano (2008), Tōkyō Daigaku Hokekyō Kenkyūkai (1962, 1975), and
other primary and secondary sources cited later in this chapter.
54 Levi McLaughlin
and other temples, and he otherwise challenged the established order of

his day, leading the Kamakura government to exile him twice and attempt
to execute him once.4
Since the thirteenth century, Nichiren has served as a model of selflessly
persevering against corrupt worldly authority in defense of a divine mis-
sion. Nichiren’s exploits, particularly his episodes of kokka kangyō—“re-
monstrating the state” for supporting heterodox teachings—have provid-
ed clerics and lay followers alike with a biographical example of triumph
over adversity and the benefits of adhering to one’s beliefs. Generations of
Nichiren Buddhists have followed in their founder’s footsteps, contribut-
ing to a thriving, centuries-long tradition of Nichiren-based challenges to
government authority. The tradition’s mandate to spread exclusive devo-
tion to the Lotus has consistently necessitated political engagement: be-
cause Nichiren Buddhism demands the rejection of such long-standing
Japanese conventions as temples tolerating their parishioners patronizing
other religious organizations and sects cooperating with one another to
offer services to the state, promoting orthodox Nichiren Buddhist doctri-
nal objectives requires challenges to the political status quo. At different
points throughout the centuries, Nichiren Buddhists have distinguished
themselves as political actors. For instance, from 1532, in Japan’s Sengoku
(Warring Provinces) period, the imperial capital, Kyoto, was controlled
for four years by Nichiren Buddhist–affiliated militias, which battled rival
sectarian forces for control of the city.5 And, at the very beginning of the
Tokugawa era (1600–1867), a group of Nichiren Buddhists who came to be
known as the Fuju Fuse were some of the very few non-Christian religious
practitioners to be driven underground for running afoul of the Tokugawa
government.6
4
For the most comprehensive treatment in English of Nichiren’s life and teachings, see
Stone (1999, 239–355). For an authoritative yet accessible treatment of Nichiren and Nichiren
Buddhism in Japanese, see Nakao (2009).
5
For an account of events associated with the period known as the Tenbun Hokke Ikki
(Lotus Uprising) and its end in sectarian violence that resulted in the fiery destruction of
much of Kyoto, see Imatani (1989) and Stone (1994).
6
Fuju Fuse, literally “Give Not, Receive Not,” was a branch within Nichiren Buddhism
that upheld a purist doctrinal stance of forswearing the giving to or receiving of alms from
those deemed slanderers of the Dharma—a designation that came to include the new
Tokugawa government. The group was declared illegal in 1630 after decades of contending
with government forces. Sect priests and practitioners went deep underground and devel-
oped secret practices to protect their doctrines and communities as they continued to endure
official persecution throughout the Tokugawa era, suffering censure, exile, and martyrdom.
It was not until after the ban was lifted in 1876 that the sect finally emerged from hiding. For
a detailed investigation of Fuju Fuse’s origins and its founder, Nichiō, see Miyazaki (1969).
The period since the end of the nineteenth century in particular has
seen Nichiren Buddhism appeal to a wide constituency as Japan trans-
formed from a semifeudal order into a modern nation-state that offered
new opportunities for political participation. Many of Japan’s most promi-
nent New Religions, primarily lay-centered groups founded in the last
two hundred years, are based in Nichiren Buddhism. These groups, which
include Honmon Butsuryūshū, Kokuchūkai, Reiyūkai, Risshō Kōseikai,
Nichiren Shōshū Taisekiji Kenshōkai, Nipponzan Myōhōji, and of course
Sōka Gakkai, have numbered among modern Japan’s most politically ac-
tive religious organizations.7
Given this history, it is perhaps fitting that Sōka Gakkai began as an or-
ganization that resisted government authority. During the Second World
War, the Japanese government required all religions to uphold State Shin-
to mandates by enshrining talismans from the Grand Shrine at Ise as a
dedication to Amaterasu Ōmikami, the sun goddess and celestial ancestor
of the emperor. However, Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai members unrepentantly
defended their exclusive commitment to Nichiren’s teachings and refused
to enshrine the State Shinto talismans. A total of twenty-one Sōka Kyōiku
Gakkai leaders, including Makiguchi and Toda, were arrested in July 1943
under the provisions of the Peace Preservation Law. Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai
dispersed after the arrests, and only Makiguchi and Toda refused to recant
their position. While the other group members were released, Makigu-
chi and Toda were incarcerated at Tokyo’s Sugamo Prison, where Maki-
guchi died of malnutrition on 18 November 1944. Were it not for Maki-
guchi’s and Toda’s conversion to Nichiren Shōshū Buddhism, the Value
Creation Education Study Association would likely be remembered as an
unremarkable footnote in twentieth-century Japanese intellectual history.
It was the conflation of modern educational thought with Japanese Bud-
dhism that brought the group official scrutiny, and it was Makiguchi and
Toda’s battle with wartime government authority that set the stage for
Sōka Gakkai’s postwar political developments.
After his release on 3 July 1945, weeks before Japan’s surrender to the
Allied forces, Toda reformed the organization. In May 1946 he renamed
it Sōka Gakkai, and the group grew quickly in the immediate postwar
years. From the early 1950s Sōka Gakkai rapidly gained a reputation as a
religion of the poor; its converts at this time were primarily drawn from
the millions of impoverished and socially displaced Japanese moving
into urban areas seeking employment. Converts were quickly organized
into a sophisticated administrative hierarchy that emulated military and
7
For more on the political engagements of Nichiren Buddhism–based modern groups
that preceded Sōka Gakkai and contend with it today, see chapter 9 of this volume.
56 Levi McLaughlin
pedagogical models familiar to those emerging from wartime-era Japan.

Young Men’s and Young Women’s Division members mustered in butai
(corps) under butaichō (corps commanders), and all other adherents were
organized by age, gender, location, and activity. The grassroots member-
ship, in turn, initiated new activities offering avenues of expression and
social advancement not otherwise available to many who had survived
wartime devastation—women, the uneducated, the sick, the displaced,
and other disenfranchised people. Sōka Gakkai leaders encouraged mem-
bers to chant namu-myōhō-renge-kyō to achieve tangible goals, including
curing illness, making money, and relief from social conflict. Critics of the
group denigrated members’ explicit quest for material gain as crass, while
Sōka Gakkai members themselves pointed to the realization of material
objectives as proof that their practice was effective.
From the outset of its growth as a mass movement, Sōka Gakkai en-
gaged its members in a wide variety of activities that exceeded param-
eters commonly associated with religion. Members combined Buddhism
with pursuits that were much more closely allied with the group’s ori-
gins in pedagogy and self-cultivation. Grassroots-level members gathered
regularly in homes in meetings called zadankai (discussion sessions), an
adaptation from the seikatsu kakushin jikken shōmei zadankai (meetings for
discussing proof of experiencing lifestyle innovation) convened within
Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai under Makiguchi. Toda Jōsei drew on his life of
teaching school and pursuing other educational enterprises as he created
doctrinal study programs based on standardized systems employed in
Japanese schools.8 Beginning in 1954, Sōka Gakkai organized Sports Day
events for members that served as the model for later stadium events.
Much larger, more visually impressive events followed as Sōka Gakkai
gained in numbers. From the late 1950s, these developed into enormous
“culture festivals” (bunkasai) held at stadiums across Japan, featuring casts
of thousands performing songs and dances extolling the glories of Sōka
Gakkai and its leaders. In the 1950s, members also began to undertake ini-
tiatives in the arts, media, and other spheres. They founded the Sōka Gak-
kai newspaper Seikyō Shimbun in April 1951, established marching bands
for the Young Men’s and Young Women’s divisions from 1954, founded
vocational suborganizations meeting the needs of workers in all occupa-
tions, and otherwise urged their fellow adherents to expand Sōka Gakkai
activities into all aspects of everyday life. Therefore, beyond its relevance
to the group’s doctrinal motivations, Sōka Gakkai’s move into electoral
politics was apprehended by its members as a natural progression; politi-
8
The most detailed analysis of Toda Jōsei and his conflation of pedagogy and Nichiren
Buddhism is Higuma (1971).
cal activity was simply one other quotidian pursuit to be reframed within
a Sōka Gakkai context.
Doctrinal Mandates as Political Goals: A “National Ordination

Platform” Becomes an Electoral Objective
Sōka Gakkai expanded its membership in large part through the practice
of shakubuku, the technique of proactive conversion. Shakubuku might be
translated as “to break and subdue [attachment to inferior teachings],”
and it was promoted by Nichiren as the only practice appropriate for
countries, such as Japan, that “slander the Dharma” by embracing hetero-
dox beliefs.9 Under Toda’s leadership, members were instructed to con-
vert their friends, neighbors, and family, and they were aided in this task
by Sōka Gakkai publications filled with techniques to persuade people
to abandon other religions, such as the Shakubuku kyōten (Handbook of
conversion).10 From 1951, members embarked on the “Great March of
Shakubuku” (Shakubuku Daikōshin), a massive conversion campaign
with the aim of ultimately realizing the Nichiren Buddhist goal of kōsen
rufu, literally “declaring [the Lotus Sūtra] far and wide,” or the mission
of converting all people to Sōka Gakkai. Thanks to the hard-sell shaku-
buku approach taken by adherents under Toda’s leadership, Sōka Gakkai’s
membership grew tremendously through the years of the Great March of
Shakubuku to eclipse that of all other Nichiren-based groups and indeed
all other active Japanese religions. Sōka Gakkai began with approximately
five thousand adherents in 1951; its membership surpassed one million
households by the end of 1958, the year of Toda’s death.
As Sōka Gakkai expanded, Toda focused on the realization of the san-
dai hihō, or Nichiren’s “Three Great Secret Dharmas.” These are, one, the
daimoku, the title of the Lotus chanted as namu-myōhō-renge-kyō. Two, the
daigohonzon, a calligraphic mandala with the daimoku at its center inscribed
by Nichiren on the twelfth day of the tenth month of 1279, which Nichi-
ren Shōshū followers revere as the most sacred object for the salvation of
humankind. Membership in Sōka Gakkai is confirmed by the conferral
of a gohonzon, a replica of the daigohonzon that members enshrine in their
9
For a discussion of shakubuku’s doctrinal origins, see Stone (1999, 255–256). Sōka Gakkai
members commonly refer to passages in Nichiren’s 1272 treatise Kaimokushō (On the opening
of the eyes) to confirm shakubuku as a compassionate act of salvation. See Shinpen Nichiren
Daishōnin gosho zenshū (hereafter Gosho zenshū), 252.
10
Sōka Gakkai published Shakubuku kyōten from November 1951 to May 1969. It is im-
portant to note that the group ceased publishing this highly polemical manual exactly when
Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai separated into officially independent institutions. For more on
the importance of Shakubuku kyōten to Sōka Gakkai in the 1950s and 1960s, see Itō (2004) and
McLaughlin (2009, 2012).
58 Levi McLaughlin
homes. And three, the honmon no kaidan, a “true ordination platform” to be

constructed at a site resembling Sacred Vulture Peak, the place where the
historical Buddha Śākyamuni delivered his final teaching, the Lotus Sūtra.
There the daigohonzon will be enshrined and worshipped by the chant-
ing of the daimoku upon the realization of kōsen rufu, or the conversion of
all people to Nichiren’s Buddhism.11 In Nichiren’s time, an “ordination
platform” was a state-sponsored facility at an influential temple site at
which monks upheld Buddhist precepts. Jacqueline Stone concludes that
while there are no uncontested sources that provide specific explanations
as to what Nichiren’s ideal ordination platform might look like or how
it might function, Nichiren most likely called for the establishment of a
“state-sponsored center for the dissemination of the Lotus Sūtra, which
would in turn presume official recognition of his teaching.”12
The first two of the Three Great Secret Dharmas, the daimoku and the
daigohonzon, had been realized in Nichiren’s lifetime, yet the ordination
platform to be constructed after conversion of the populace remained a
goal beyond the institutional capacities of Nichiren-based organizations
for centuries after the passing of their founder. However, as Sōka Gakkai
gathered hundreds of thousands of new adherents in the first years of its
Great March of Shakubuku, celebrating the conversion of the population
by building an ordination platform emerged as a realistic objective.
There is ample evidence that Toda envisioned Sōka Gakkai entering
electoral politics almost immediately after he began reforming the orga-
nization in the postwar era, and that, from the start, Sōka Gakkai political
activity emerged in the interest of securing the complete conversion of the
populace by constructing the ordination platform, thereby realizing the
final of the Three Great Secret Dharmas. Toda’s disciple Ikeda Daisaku
(b. 1928), now honorary president of Sōka Gakkai and the group’s un-
questioned authority, wrote that by early 1949 Toda postulated that kōsen
rufu would not be possible without political engagement by Sōka Gakkai
11
Ideas regarding the national ordination platform rely on a passage in the Sandai hihō
honjō ji, an essay otherwise known as the Sandai hihōshō (Treatise on the Three Great Se-
cret Dharmas), a document attributed to Nichiren. In this essay, Nichiren proclaims that
“when the ruler’s dharma (ōbō) becomes one with Buddha-Dharma (buppō) and the Buddha-
Dharma is united with the ruler’s dharma, so that the ruler and his ministers all uphold the
three great secret Dharmas of the original teaching . . . then surely an imperial edict and a
shogunal decree will be handed down, to seek out the most superlative site, resembling the
Pure Land of Sacred Vulture Peak, and there to erect the ordination platform.” A full transla-
tion is available in Stone (1999, 289–290).
12
See Stone (1999, 289). It should be noted that controversy over the veracity of texts on
this issue form the center of some of the most heated debates over religion and politics in the
Nichiren Buddhist tradition.
(Ikeda 1971–1994).13 The following year saw Toda publish on electoral pol-
itics for the first time; he briefly discussed the idea of ōbutsu myōgō, “the
harmonious unity of government and Buddhism,” in an editorial for the
monthly Sōka Gakkai study magazine Daibyaku renge (Great white lotus) of
March 1950.14 By January 1952, Toda was reportedly telling members that
Sōka Gakkai would have to take part in elections, but it was not until two
years later that Toda explicitly linked Sōka Gakkai’s mission of proselytiz-
ing with electioneering (Nakaba 1968). The 1 January 1954 issue of Sōka
Gakkai’s newspaper Seikyō Shimbun featured an editorial by Toda Jōsei
titled “Until the Day of Constructing the National Ordination Platform”
in which he urged members to regard 1954 as a year of preparation for the
complete conversion of all people in Japan to worship of the daigohonzon,
an objective that would ideally be realized within twenty-five years. The
conversion of the populace to Sōka Gakkai, Toda wrote, would be marked
a quarter century hence by the construction of an ordination platform de-
creed by a majority within the Lower House (House of Representatives).15
From 1 August 1956, Toda issued an essay titled “Ōbutsu myōgō ron,”
“On the Harmonious Union of Government and Buddhism,” as a serial in
Daibyaku renge. In this essay, Toda (1956, 204) wrote that “we [Sōka Gak-
kai] are concerned with politics because of the need to realize kōsen rufu,
the spreading of the sacred phrase namu-myōhō-rengekyō, one of the Three
Great Sacred Dharmas. In other words, the only purpose of our going into
politics is the erection of the kokuritsu kaidan.”
Toda described the honmon no kaidan in terms of a “national ordination
platform,” or kokuritsu kaidan, a modern revision of the Nichiren Buddhist
idea that appears in the teachings of Tanaka Chigaku (1861–1939), found-
er of Kokuchūkai, an ultra-nationalist Nichirenist group.16 In an essay
titled “Shūmon no ishin” (Restoration of the sect), Tanaka ([1901] 1919)
13
Ikeda relays his mentor’s words in Ningen kakumei 3:156–157, and he indicates that Toda
had made similar comments as early as 1948. Discussed in White (1970, 133).
14
Toda’s essay, titled “Ōbō to buppō,” from 10 March 1950 is available in Toda Jōsei zenshū
1:26–29. Cited in Stone (2003a, 217) and analyzed in Shimada (2004, 76–77). Ōbutsu myōgō
derives from the Sandai hihō honjōji; see note 11. Sōka Gakkai members turn to the Nichiren
document in Gosho zenshū, 1062. For a full translation of this passage and a discussion of
controversy surrounding the Sandai hihō honjōji, see Stone (1999, 444–445n213; 2003a, 196).
15
Seikyō Shimbun (1 January 1954), reproduced and discussed in Kawada (1980, 14–15).
16
Though Kokuchūkai never grew to dominate the Japanese religious world in the man-
ner of Sōka Gakkai, Tanaka wielded influence through his many publications, energetic
proselytizing, lecturing across the Japanese empire, and through his disciples, including the
author and critic Takayama Chogyū (1871–1902); famed writer Miyazawa Kenji (1896–1933);
and the Imperial Japanese Army officer Ishiwara Kanji (1889–1949), who is most renowned
for his role in the 1931 Mukden Incident that led to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria. For de-
tailed discussions of Tanaka Chigaku and Kokuchūkai, see Ōtani (2001) and Iguchi (2006).
60 Levi McLaughlin
had urged that all Nichiren Buddhists unite as one tradition to dominate
the nation’s economy and infrastructure. The mandate for the ordination
platform was to come from the Imperial Diet; by converting a majority of
the Japanese population to Nichiren Buddhism, both Diet houses would
be able to vote in a kokuritsu kaidan, a national ordination platform that
would serve as the seat of power in a “great Dharma battle,” after which
the whole nation would embrace the Lotus and the establishment of the
honmon no kaidan, the “true ordination platform,” would be announced.
Toda appears to have been influenced by Tanaka’s modernist revisions of
the Nichiren Buddhist ordination platform, despite the fact that neither he
nor his mentor Makiguchi counted among Tanaka’s followers; indeed, as
a victim of wartime Japanese nationalist authority, Toda was opposed to
Tanaka’s vision of conflating Buddhist and imperial rule through ōbutsu
myōgō.17 Toda adopted Tanaka’s terminology ōbutsu myōgō and kokuritsu
kaidan, and he promoted the ideal of erecting a nationally sponsored ordi-
nation platform following a majority vote in the National Diet. However,
Toda’s modern take on Nichiren’s utopian vision omitted Tanaka’s ultra-
nationalist ideology of conflating the Lotus Sūtra with the person of the
emperor and Japan’s kokutai, or “national essence.”18
When Toda ascended to the position of second Sōka Gakkai presi-
dent on 3 May 1951, he urged members to hold themselves personally
responsible for realizing Nichiren’s ideal of absolute orthodoxy. In his in-
augural address, Toda stated, “Today, kōsen rufu means that each of you
must grapple with false teachings and convert the people in this coun-
try through shakubuku one by one, having everyone receive the gohonzon.
Only then will the true ordination platform be established.”19 However,
as Sōka Gakkai candidates began to score election victories, Toda’s vision
of circumstances surrounding the construction of the kaidan became more
pragmatic. During a question-and-answer session held after a study meet-
ing at the Nichiren Shōshū head temple Taisekiji, in response to a query
17
Makiguchi attended several lectures by Tanaka in 1916 at the Kokuchūkai headquarters
in Tokyo, yet he never joined the group. In contrast to his disciple, Makiguchi was not con-
cerned with constructing a “national ordination platform,” but in one Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai
pamphlet from 1935 Makiguchi made a passing reference to the honmon no kaidan, the “true
ordination platform,” avoiding Tanaka’s nationalist revision of this Nichiren Buddhist objec-
tive. See Shimada (2004, 84).
18
For discussions of how Toda’s views of the ordination platform issue contrasted with
those of Tanaka Chigaku, see Nishiyama (1975) and Stone (2003a, 2003b).
19
Toda Jōsei Zenshū Henshū Iinkai, ed., Toda Jōsei zenshū, 3:430. Translation adapted from
Stone (2003a, 205–206). The “shogunal decree” (mikyōsho), understood in Nichiren’s time as a
written pronouncement issued by the Kamakura Shogun’s government, was interpreted by
modern Nichiren Buddhists such as Tanaka Chigaku and Toda Jōsei as a document issued
by Japan’s National Diet.
from a member in regards to why Sōka Gakkai was fielding candidates

in the 1956 Upper House election, Toda referred to the “Treatise on the
Three Great Secret Dharmas,” noting that the “imperial edict and shogu-
nal decree” to construct the ordination platform would mean permission
from elected officials in the National Diet. This is not a matter of wait-
ing until everyone in Japan chants namu-myōhō-rengekyō, Toda cautioned.
“No matter how sincerely you say you’ve carried out kōsen rufu, Chris-
tianity and Amidism [Pure Land Buddhism] will not have disappeared
completely . . . it is only through an ‘imperial edict and shogunal decree’
that we must mobilize in response to Great Sage Nichiren’s commands, so
it is good if the true ordination platform is built” (Toda 1963, 189). In this
way, Toda departed from orthodox Nichiren Buddhist interpretations that
require the complete conversion of the populace to Lotus worship as a pre-
condition for the construction of the kaidan; he was, in effect, calling for the
construction of the ordination platform before the realization of kōsen rufu.
As the leader of history’s largest-ever association of Nichiren Buddhists, a
religious group that was navigating uncharted territory in Japanese par-
liamentary politics, Toda was proposing new and pragmatic concessions
that challenged Nichiren Buddhist doctrinal orthodoxy.
Toda’s promotion of political engagement based on Nichiren Buddhist
doctrinal mandates fed into a growing popular perception that Sōka Gak-
kai was at odds with the norms of postwar democratic Japanese society,
and that the group sought to impose theocratic rule rather than embrace
the guarantees of a strict division of religion and government called for in
the 1947 Constitution. Article 20 of the Constitution states, “No religious
organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any
political authority” and “The State and its organs shall refrain from reli-
gious education or any other religious activity.” Additionally, Article 89
reads: “No public money or other property shall be expended or appro-
priated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or
association or for any charitable, educational benevolent enterprises not
under the control of public authority.”
Sōka Gakkai’s entrée into electoral politics was widely interpreted as
a direct violation of Article 20’s prohibition of the exercise of political au-
thority by a religious organization, despite the existence of constitutional
guarantees of freedom of association and religious belief. Second, Sōka
Gakkai’s objective to mark the conversion of Japan to Lotus worship by
establishing a “national ordination platform” by Diet decree appeared to
threaten protections outlined by Article 89, which prevents the Japanese
state from funding any religious enterprise.
By the time Toda died, Sōka Gakkai was climbing steadily toward a
membership of one million households, and there was no end of growth
62 Levi McLaughlin
in sight. Toda Jōsei battled serious illness from January 1957, and he died
at Nihon University hospital of liver disease on 2 April 1958 at fifty-eight
years of age. An official funeral was held on 20 April in Aoyama, Tokyo,
and an estimated 250,000 members of Sōka Gakkai lined the streets of To-
kyo to mourn their leader as his hearse passed. Sōka Gakkai’s political
importance was great enough by this time to compel the nation’s leading
politicians to pay their respects to Toda: Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke
and Minister of Education Matsunaga Tō offered incense at the Aoyama
Funeral Home to Sōka Gakkai’s deceased leader.
Transcendence through Politics: Early Sōka Gakkai Electoral

Campaigns and the “Osaka Incident”
Sōka Gakkai initially framed political engagement as a form of “cultural
activities” (bunka katsudō), a mode of interfacing with mainstream soci-
ety in ways that were not immediately related to Buddhist practice. Sōka
Gakkai established a Culture Division (Bunkabu) on 22 November 1954,
which it presented as a necessary supplement to shakubuku activities. In
a Seikyō Shimbun article, Sōka Gakkai announced that the Culture Divi-
sion would serve the same role that Makiguchi Tsunesaburō’s research
into education had done in supplementing Nichiren Buddhist practice in
the previous era.20 Under Toda’s pragmatic leadership, “culture activities”
meant “political activities.” The Culture Division mobilized grassroots
members to support candidates affiliated with Sōka Gakkai, mostly senior
members of the organization’s administration who were running for office
in several local races in 1955. Sōka Gakkai initially forswore the creation of
a Sōka Gakkaitō, a “Sōka Gakkai Party,” urging members to instead sup-
port group administrators running for office, no matter if they ran for the
Socialist Party (Shakaitō), Liberal Party (Jiyūtō), or the Democratic Party
(Minshutō). Even if they support Sōka Gakkai candidates running for the
Communist Party (Kyōsantō), a Seikyō Shimbun article declared, election
activities of members do not support politics simply for the sake of politics
but politics for the sake of kōsen rufu.21 “It is only by placing Gakkai mem-
bers in the Diet that the government will reach a consensus to construct a
national ordination platform.”22
20
Seikyō Shimbun (28 November 1954), reproduced in Hori (1999, 11).
21
Reproduced in Hori (1999, 21). In the first local elections in 1955, six Gakkai candidates
ran in local councils: five for the Japanese Democratic Party (Nippon Minshutō), and one
for the left-wing Uha Shakaitō, the precursor to the Socialist Party. See Shimada (2007, 36).
Further details appear in Hori (1999, 21–32).
22
Seikyō Shimbun (3 April 1955), in Hori (1999, 14–15).
However, for the election held on 8 July 1956, Sōka Gakkai abandoned
the strategy of seeding other political parties and mobilized the Culture
Division in support of six Sōka Gakkai administrators running as inde-
pendent candidates for the Tokyo and Osaka Upper House by-elections
and in the fourth election of the Upper House of the National Diet, three
of whom were successfully elected.23 Despite election successes, the first
few years of Sōka Gakkai’s political career were beset with difficulties. Be-
cause engagements with electoral politics were conceived as part of a tran-
scendent religious mission, Sōka Gakkai’s leaders imbued their electoral
campaigns with profound religious significance, and local-level members
engaged in politics with the same zeal that they brought to their pros-
elytizing. Members were propelled by the conviction that electioneering
contributed directly to the establishment of the ordination platform and
the realization of kōsen rufu.
Gakkai members first faced indictment in June 1956, charged with
soliciting support for Gakkai candidates through “house-to-house cam-
paigning” (kobetsu hōmon), an activity forbidden by Japanese election law.
The Asahi Shimbun and other newspapers reported on this scandal on suc-
cessive days, adding to the rising negative public image in the press re-
garding the “dangers” of the “newly arisen religion” (shinkō shūkyō) Sōka
Gakkai.24 Reports of this nature fed the high-pitched rhetoric employed
by the mainstream media describing Sōka Gakkai’s successful campaigns,
such as the declaration “masa ka” ga jitsugen (the “unspeakable” has come
true) as a headline announcing Sōka Gakkai official Shiraki Gi’ichirō’s
victory in the 1956 Osaka Upper House by-election.25 In an interview, a
veteran Sōka Gakkai adherent who took part as a youth in this campaign
for Shiraki described how ordinary members treated electioneering as an
extension of their intense shakubuku proselytizing. “It [electioneering] was
religious activity. We carried out shakubuku as we shouted ‘Shiraki! Shi-
raki!’ right up to the election. Within Sōka Gakkai at this time, members
23
Shimada (2007, 36–38). Sōka Gakkai candidates garnered more than 990,000 votes na-
tionally, while the organization itself only claimed approximately 420,000 members. See Su-
zuki (1970, 270).
24
See Asahi (28 June 1956) for a list of charges laid on Sōka Gakkai members in Aomori,
Miyagi, Saitama, and other prefectures. Around the same time, the Asahi reported that
groups of Sōka Gakkai members traveled through neighborhoods from May 1956 distribut-
ing osatsu (name tags or paper talismans) displaying the name of the group’s administrator
running for office. Campaigning members reportedly instructed people receiving the candi-
date name talismans to enshrine them as offerings in their home Buddhist or Shinto altars
and to be sure to vote for the candidates; if you fail to support the Sōka Gakkai candidates,
the members told them, you will become ill. See Asahi (25 June 1956).
25
Reproduced in Ikeda Daisaku no kiseki Henshū Iinkai, ed., Ikeda Daisaku no kiseki, 1:11.
64 Levi McLaughlin
engaged ceaselessly in Buddhism-related activities, such as shakubuku,

lectures on Nichiren’s writings, and study sessions . . . we worked elec-
tioneering (senkyo katsudō) into shakubuku.”26 The shakubuku style of vote
gathering yielded electoral success and brought in new converts; how-
ever, this approach also led to the rise of Sōka Gakkai’s reputation as a
group transgressing constitutionally mandated divides between religion
and government.
In an effort to counter negative public sentiment, Sōka Gakkai whole-
heartedly urged its members to embrace an ethic of “clean elections” (kōmei
senkyo) as they engaged in support for their candidates in 1957 campaigns.
Kōmei senkyo and the adjective kōmei (clean) remained central slogans in
Sōka Gakkai politics when the group inaugurated the Clean Government
Political Assembly (Kōmei Seiji Renmei) in 1962 and the Clean Govern-
ment Party (Kōmeitō) in 1964.27 However, it appears as though not all
members immediately adopted the “clean elections” principle. In an event
since dubbed the “Osaka Incident” (Ōsaka jiken), a total of forty-five Sōka
Gakkai members were indicted in June and July 1957 by the Osaka Public
Prosecutor’s Office for violating the public elections law in the campaign
for Nakao Tatsuyoshi, who was running in an Osaka by-election for a seat
in the Upper House. Late on the night before the 23 April 1957 by-election,
a group of Young Men’s Division members spread out over an Osaka
neighborhood to distribute packs of cigarettes and caramels at several
hundred supporters’ residences. Each box contained a 100-yen bill and a
note urging support for Nakao. These members were charged with house-
to-house canvassing and also with attempting to buy votes.28 The Osaka
public prosecutors secured confessions from some of those indicted who
claimed that their actions had been directed by the central Sōka Gakkai
leadership in Tokyo, and they used these confessions as grounds to arrest
Koizumi Takashi, Sōka Gakkai’s rijichō (head of the Board of Directors),
and Ikeda Daisaku, who, as Youth Division chief of staff, was responsible
for the young men.29 Koizumi was detained in Osaka on 2 July 1957, and
Ikeda was jailed on 3 July. Both men were held and interrogated by Osaka
prosecutors until their release on 17 July. While the young leaders were
in prison, Sōka Gakkai organized massive rallies in their support; tens of
26
Interview with a female veteran adherent, Osaka, 28 November 2007. All interviewees
in this chapter are anonymous.
27
The official translation of Kōmei Seiji Renmei, commonly known as Kōseiren, was
“League of Fair Statesmen.” See White (1970, 133–134).
28
Asahi (3, 4, and 7 June 1957).
29
The Seikyō Shimbun of 21 July 1957 includes an essay by Hōjō Hiroshi, future fourth
president and then Sōka Gakkai’s shunin sanbō (chief officer) decrying the actions of the
young Sōka Gakkai men who were arrested.
thousands of members gathered on 17 July 1957 in the pouring rain out-

side the Osaka Kōkaidō, a public hall where the assembled membership
celebrated their young members’ release from jail and their triumph over
what they characterized as an attempt by sinister forces in the government
to suppress Sōka Gakkai’s religious mission. Koizumi and Ikeda were in-
dicted on 29 July 1957 for violating election law. Ikeda appeared in Osaka
court forty-eight times before he was cleared of all charges on 25 January
1962, after the court found no material evidence that he had ordered mem-
bers to carry out the house-to-house visits.30
The arrests, rather than stifling Sōka Gakkai’s political ambitions, served
to galvanize the organization to greater efforts in electoral campaigning
and proselytizing. Gakkai members continue to draw inspiration from the
example put forward by Ikeda of boldly facing down opponents. Since
Ikeda’s ascendance to the Sōka Gakkai presidency in May 1960, the group
has portrayed the events surrounding the Osaka Incident not as a litany of
legal difficulties but as a shining example of the heroism of Sōka Gakkai
and Ikeda Daisaku.31 In Ningen kakumei, or The Human Revolution, a dra-
matic, twelve-volume novelization of Sōka Gakkai history that members
treat as a text possessing de facto scriptural authority, Ikeda (as the novel’s
protagonist Yamamoto Shin’ichi) is compared to the Count of Monte Cris-
to and is confirmed in the account of the Osaka Incident as the sole and
rightful heir to Toda Jōsei (Ikeda 1971–1994).32 Additionally, Sōka Gakkai
maintains a small yet highly prized exhibition at its Osaka headquarters
called the Onshi Kinenshitsu (Revered Teacher’s Commemoration Room)
that preserves items collected from the courthouse where Ikeda appeared
on 3 July 1957. Part of the iron door to the cell where Ikeda was held, the
chair where he sat facing the judge, the witness stand where he declared
his innocence, the microphone into which he spoke, the leather shoes
he wore on 3 July 1957, and even light fixtures from the courthouse and
the marble sign that was affixed to the front of the building (the Ōsaka
Kōchisho, or Osaka Detention Center)—in other words, all salvageable
30
Ikeda and Koizumi were the only members to be cleared of charges. In all, twenty mem-
bers were given fines of between 3,000 and 10,000 yen; of these, ten also had their civil (vot-
ing and electioneering) rights suspended for three years, and seven for two years (see Yomi-
uri, 25 January 1962). The sentence was also reported on the front page of the Seikyō Shimbun
on 27 January 1962, under the headline “Mujitsu no tsumi hareru: Sabakareta kenryoku no
ōbō” (False charges cleared: Tyranny of oppressive power indicted).
31
Ikeda served as the third president of Sōka Gakkai from May 1960 until April 1979,
when conflicts between him and the Nichiren Shōshū priesthood resulted in his stepping
down to take the titles Honorary President of Sōka Gakkai and President of Soka Gakkai
International, posts he holds today.
32
In particular, see Ikeda, Ningen kakumei, 11:311.
66 Levi McLaughlin
items connected in some fashion with Ikeda Daisaku’s person—appear

alongside a dramatic account of the Osaka rally in the exhibition’s text.33
This exhibition and other means by which Sōka Gakkai memorializes
the Osaka Incident demonstrate that as Sōka Gakkai members politicized
their religious mission in the 1950s, they also imbued their political activi-
ties with transcendent religious meaning. For members, Ikeda’s arrest was
not a mundane matter of legal wrangling; it was an opportunity to cel-
ebrate their leader as the rightful heir to Toda Jōsei and his mentor Maki-
guchi Tsunesaburō, who proved themselves as inheritors of Nichiren’s
legacy when they persevered against government tyranny in Sugamo
Prison. When members take part in a Kōmeitō campaign today, they can
turn to the Osaka Incident to connect their seemingly modest activities to
a model of Nichiren Buddhist martyrdom that transcends the concerns of
a specific candidate or election.
The Founding of Japan’s First Successful Religious Political Party

The 1957 Osaka Incident and Toda’s death in 1958 did nothing to stall
Sōka Gakkai’s political development. On 3 May 1960, Ikeda Daisaku was
declared the organization’s third president, and under his leadership
Sōka Gakkai continued to expand its political activities. In November
1961, Sōka Gakkai established the Kōmei Seiji Renmei, commonly known
as Kōseiren, which successfully ran nine candidates for the Upper House
in the January 1962 election, bringing the total number of Sōka Gakkai
politicians in the Upper House to nineteen. These councilors formed the
Kōmeikai (Clean Government Association) within the Upper House in
July 1962. Though Sōka Gakkai maintained that Kōseiren was an inde-
pendent political organization, Kōseiren politicians and publications an-
nounced that they considered their activities to be part of Sōka Gakkai’s
mission to convert Japan. In October 1962, Kōseiren published the inaugu-
ral installment of a periodical called Kōmei. The issue began with an essay
by Ikeda extolling Kōseiren as the promise of salvation for the Japanese
people from factional strife in the Diet, and included a transcript of an ad-
dress to the first Kōseiren general assembly by its chief, Harashima Kōji
(1909–1964), who stated that “we were able to achieve a glorious victory in
the Upper House election to serve as the beginning of kōsen rufu.”34
Kōseiren turned out to be a stepping-stone to a more high profile and
lasting political entity. On 3 May 1964, Ikeda Daisaku abolished the politics
33
Author observations from 18 June 2008.
34
Harashima, “Daiikkai taikai ni nozomu.” Kōmei, October 1962, 6. Kōmei preceded the
party newspaper Kōmei shimbun, which continues to serve as Kōmeitō’s principal media
outlet.
department of the Culture Bureau at Sōka Gakkai’s twenty-seventh gen-

eral meeting. At this meeting, Ikeda also announced that henceforth Sōka
Gakkai would become a “purely religious organization” devoted to Bud-
dhist activities and proselytizing; politics would be left to Kōmei politi-
cians who would operate freely, while Sōka Gakkai would serve as an or-
ganization dedicated to their support and promotion (Nakano 2003, 179).
On 17 November, at a ceremony held at the hall Nippon Kōdō in Tokyo,
Ikeda Daisaku officially announced the dissolution of Kōseiren and the
establishment of Kōmeitō, or the “Clean Government Party.” In his in-
augural speech, Ikeda quoted from Nichiren’s Risshō ankokuron (Treatise
on establishing the right [teaching] and bringing peace to the land)—a
memorial that Nichiren submitted in 1260 to the Hōjō regency, the politi-
cal authorities in Kamakura—as he declared Kōmeitō a party “founded
in the principles of a harmonious fusion of Buddhism and government
(ōbutsu myōgō) and Buddhist democracy (buppō minshūshugi).”35 Sōka Gak-
kai’s imperative to realize Nichiren Buddhist objectives through its new
political party are stressed in Kōmeitō’s official founding statement:
Now, when the world is in a state of chaos, tensions are rising to the
highest state. Meanwhile, the nation remains in the doldrums, and ir-
responsible politicians who are indifferent to the wishes of the people are
elected time and again. Shall we leave this situation unattended? Japan
is a nation that is profoundly anxious about being sacrificed in a fierce
confrontation between East and West. As Great Sage Nichiren, the great
enlightened thinker born to the world in Japan, wrote in Risshō ankokuron:
“After all, a world at peace and tranquility in the lands of the country are
what sovereign and commoner alike desire, and the country’s prosperity
depends on the Dharma, which is revered by all people.” We hold the
firm conviction that it is only through the singular path of the Buddhist
philosophy of absolute pacifism—that is, the superior ideal of a harmoni-
ous fusion of government and Buddhism [ōbutsu myōgō]—that the world
will attain salvation from the horror of war. Here, we announce to all
present and to everyone beyond the founding of the Clean Government
Party. The Clean Government Party, through founding ideals of a har-
monious fusion of government and Buddhism and Buddhist democracy
[buppō minshūshugi], will fundamentally cleanse Japan’s political world,
confirm the basis of government by parliamentary democracy, put down
deep roots in the masses, and realize the well-being of the common peo-
ple. Furthermore, from the broad position of world nationalism [wārudo
35
Shimada (2007, 58). Nichiren delivered Risshō ankokuron to the regent Hōjō Tokiyori
(1227–1263), then the most powerful figure in the Kamakura military government. In this
treatise, Nichiren warns that miseries will befall Japan unless it protects the True Dharma,
the Lotus Sūtra. Risshō ankokuron has historically been invoked by Nichiren Buddhists seek-
ing an alliance between Buddhism and the state (see Stone 1999, 249–251).
68 Levi McLaughlin
nashonarizumu], we solemnly pledge to the people of the nation that it is

our ultimate ambition to fight bravely to establish an institution for eter-
nal peace in the world.36
Kōmeitō prepared to run candidates in both the Upper and the Low-
er House in the Japanese Diet. Up to this point, Ikeda had maintained
Toda’s line on electoral politics, insisting that Sōka Gakkai would only
engage in elections as part of a larger campaign to build support for its re-
ligious mission. “We will not get into the Lower House,” Ikeda promised
on 3 May 1961, when he announced the expansion of political activities
with the elevation of the Culture Division (Bunkabu) to a Culture Bureau
(Bunkakyoku). “We will send out people to the Upper House and local
legislatures—the areas which have no political color.”37 Ikeda’s pledge
was echoed by Sōka Gakkai politicians; in April 1963, Kōseiren leader Ryū
Toshimitsu declared, “We are at present not in the least interested in run-
ning for the Lower House.”38 The founding of the separate political party
Kōmeitō perhaps functioned in part as a means of working around earlier
promises that Sōka Gakkai itself would not become involved in the Lower
House. Also, by May 1964 Sōka Gakkai claimed in excess of 3.8 million
households, arguably a large enough constituency to demand representa-
tion at all levels of government (Sōka Gakkai Yonjū Shūnenshi Hensan
Iinkai 1970, 325). In the January 1967 general election, Kōmeitō ran one
candidate in each of thirty-two multiple-member constituencies. Twenty-
five were elected, making Kōmeitō the third-largest opposition party in
the Diet. By June 1969, Kōmeitō had 2,088 members in city councils, pre-
fectural legislatures, and other local governments.
Who Were the Early Kōmeitō Voters?

Who joined Sōka Gakkai, and what led people to take part in the organiza-
tion’s political campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s? In the late 1960s,
several scholars undertook surveys of Gakkai members and Kōmeitō sup-
porters to address these questions in order to learn about demographic
characteristics and motivations of Gakkai converts. The most persuasive
quantitative data on local-level Gakkai adherents in the 1960s were pre-
sented by three researchers. The first was Japanese sociologist Suzuki Hi-
roshi, who analyzed survey data gathered in 1962 on Sōka Gakkai mem-
bers in Fukuoka, first in several articles and finally in a chapter in his 1970
36
Transcript of Kōmeitō’s inauguration, 17 July 1964. The ambiguous notion of “world
nationalism” also appeared in Ikeda’s writings on politics from the 1960s.
37
Reproduced in Murata (1969, 164).
38
Mainichi (19 April 1963), quoted in White (1970, 136).
book Toshiteki sekai (The urban world). The second was American sociolo-
gist James W. White, who, in his 1970 book The Sōkagakkai and Mass Society,
relied to some extent on Suzuki’s findings, which he combined with data
gleaned from other surveys and his own research on members and Sōka
Gakkai leaders. The third was Hori Yukio, who wrote Kōmeitō ron (On
Kōmeitō), first published in 1973 and then reissued in 1999. Hori was a re-
porter for the newspaper Mainichi Shimbun who based his book to a large
extent on survey data gathered in February 1969 throughout Tokyo at the
request of the Japanese government by Central Research Services (Chūō
Chōsajo).
In a more recent article, Sōka University sociologist of religion Na-
kano Tsuyoshi synthesizes data from these early sources and identifies
key features that emerge in these important early studies of Sōka Gakkai/
Kōmeitō participants (Nakano 2010). First, the people who took part in
Sōka Gakkai’s massive religious and political mobilization up through the
1960s fit a specific demographic profile: the typical member was born in
rural Japan, poorly educated, socially adrift in urban Japan before joining
Sōka Gakkai, and likely to be a woman in her thirties or forties. Second,
the data from these 1960s surveys revealed that there was a considerable
socioeconomic gap between the largely disenfranchised Sōka Gakkai
membership and the rest of the Japanese populace, and that there were
also identifiable class differences within the religion itself. The majority of
the membership may have been poor, middle-aged women raised in the
countryside, yet Sōka Gakkai leaders were mostly young, and they, along
with Kōmeitō politicians, were almost exclusively men with a higher level
of education than the Sōka Gakkai average.
One of the most striking aspects of Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō has been
the persistence of the gender profile established in the religion’s forma-
tive years. The Sōka Gakkai leadership has continually characterized its
Young Men’s and Young Women’s divisions as the vanguard of the group;
today, the Sōka Gakkai website lists YMD and YWD numbers below the
tally for its entire membership and does not give figures for any other
subdivision.39 However, as I have observed in over a decade of fieldwork
with ordinary members, and as Ehrhardt explores in chapter 8, it is the
Fujinbu, the Married Women’s Division, that consistently powers Sōka
Gakkai today. The data in the studies by Suzuki, White, and Hori dem-
onstrate that, even in its nascent stages, Sōka Gakkai depended primarily
on the dedication of women adherents. The prosperity of adherents has
improved overall since the 1960s, yet the female membership continues
39
Information available on the Sōka Gakkai homepage (www.sokanet.jp/info/gaiyo.
html; accessed Oct. 2011).
70 Levi McLaughlin
to occupy a markedly lower educational and socioeconomic bracket than

that of the group’s administrative leaders. Additionally, Sōka Gakkai con-
tinues to bar women from almost all leadership positions beyond the local
level and posts in the Young Women’s and Married Women’s Divisions:
of the more than five hundred Sōka Gakkai vice presidents, not one is a
woman. Nakano notes that socioeconomic and gender gaps between lead-
ers of Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō and their supporters have not narrowed;
in fact, they have increased.40
Suzuki surveyed several hundred members in Fukuoka between July
and September of 1962, a window of time in the midst of Sōka Gakkai’s
explosive growth, just after the formulation of a coherent political iden-
tity through the founding of Kōseiren. He found that women outnum-
bered men by a factor of three to two, and that more than 30 percent of the
respondents were in their forties; women between thirty and forty-nine
were particularly numerous. Suzuki noted that while scholars and jour-
nalists tended to project an image of Sōka Gakkai as a religion of young
laborers, the data he gathered in Fukuoka indicated that they were largely
women employed in low-wage occupations.41 Based on respondents’ an-
swers to questions regarding their birthplace, education, occupation, and
other key demographic identifiers, Suzuki concluded that Sōka Gakkai of
the 1960s, despite its prevailing popular image as an organization of the
urban poor, could be more accurately characterized as a religion of people,
primarily women, born in small agricultural communities who moved to
the city to work mainly in home-based businesses or small companies in
the service, manufacturing, or retail sectors.
White confirmed Suzuki’s appraisal: “They are the mobile, the de-
prived, the voiceless; the ones who suffered in defeat and struggled un-
successfully during reconstruction, and who have failed to win a share of
the new affluence” (1970, 61). He found that Sōka Gakkai families of the
mid-1960s earned approximately 40% less than the national average and
40
Nakano (2010, 120). Nakano supplements his account of data gathered in the 1960s
with surveys of Sōka Gakkai members undertaken in the mid-2000s by Nishiyama Shigeru
and Ōnishi Katsuaki, which indicate a measurable trend toward downward social mobility
among ordinary adherents. This is determined by factors such as young members in the
2000s tending to gain university entrance and lucrative employment at a lower rate than
their parents. For a detailed analysis of these data, see Ōnishi (2009), especially chap. 5.
41
Suzuki (1970, 270–274). Suzuki contradicted statements made by Saki Akio and Oguchi
Iichi, whose (1957) book Sōka Gakkai: Sono shisō to kōdō was the first monograph-length schol-
arly account of Sōka Gakkai; Saki and Oguchi contended that, unlike other New Religions,
whose members tend to come from upper-class backgrounds, Sōka Gakkai was primarily
poor, young, and male. Suzuki also challenged the results of an Asahi Shimbun survey con-
ducted after the 1962 Upper House election in which respondents characterized Sōka Gakkai
as mostly male laborers in their twenties to their forties. See Asahi (4 July 1962).
were most likely to live in lower-class neighborhoods. In the nine surveys

that he analyzed, White found that the mean proportions for the member-
ship in the 1960s were 42% men and 58% women, compared with 49%
men and 51% women for Japan as a whole. He cited a 1967 survey carried
out by the newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun in which Sōka Gakkai members
were among the least educated constituency: 55% had completed their ed-
ucation with junior high school, and only 4% had attended college, while
a survey of Kōmeitō voters found that 65% had stopped at junior high
school, and none had completed postsecondary education. White pointed
out that the few well-educated members tended to be male and in leader-
ship positions: 70% of the young leaders in the late 1960s had completed
college, along with a majority of the Kōmeitō representatives in the Diet
(White 1970, 65). Hori’s analysis of survey data gathered in Tokyo under-
lined the social and geographical displacement of Sōka Gakkai members
and Kōmeitō supporters in the 1960s. When they were asked about their
parents’ occupation, the largest percentage (just fewer than 40%) of re-
spondents were found to have come from farming and fishing families.
More than 60% of Kōmeitō supporters in Tokyo had come to the city from
rural areas such as Tōhoku, Kyūshū, and Hokuriku (Hori 1999, 190–191).
As Nakano emphasizes, Sōka Gakkai emerged as something more
complex than an urban phenomenon. It can more accurately be described
as an organization of “lower class citizens born in farming villages who
flowed into the cities” (2010, 117). The strong implication of these find-
ings is that Sōka Gakkai provided a crucial support network to a large
constituency of the new urban poor. Bereft of the social infrastructure and
family ties that provided them stability in their youth, Sōka Gakkai mem-
bers relied on the solidarity fostered within the religion’s social networks
and tightly organized subgroups. In the 1960s, poorly educated women
and men in their thirties and forties would have been the people in Ja-
pan most deeply affected by World War Two and its grueling aftermath.
They had been denied an education during Japan’s mobilization for total
war in the 1930s. Because of their sex, their lack of schooling, or their up-
bringing outside the metropole, they had missed out on opportunities to
contribute to and benefit from Japan’s miraculous postwar recovery. For
them, Sōka Gakkai was a venue in which to realize not only transcendent
goals but also this-worldly educational, economic, and political aspira-
tions. As one veteran member, a widow of a city assembly-level Kōmeitō
politician near Osaka summarized for me, with a wistful mix of pride
and defensiveness: “castaways made Sōka Gakkai” (suterareta hito wa Sōka
Gakkai o tsukutta).42
42
Interview with widow of Kōmeitō politician, Osaka, 25 November 2007.
72 Levi McLaughlin
Yet even as Sōka Gakkai inspired its early postwar converts with the
promise of improving their lives through religious and political participa-
tion, the organization did little to address inequality within its own ranks,
choosing instead to replicate gender and educational imbalances that pre-
vailed in Japanese society. The stark division of women as Sōka Gakkai’s
stalwart grassroots activists and men as its elevated administrators, poli-
ticians, and religious visionaries was a pattern set in the mid-twentieth
century that endures to this day.
From Doctrinal Ideals to Political Realities:

The I Denounce Sōka Gakkai Scandal
In the Upper House elections of 1956, 1959, 1962, 1965, and 1968, Sōka
Gakkai candidates captured 3.5%, 8.5%, 11.5%, 13.7%, and 15.5% of the
popular vote.43 As Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō made these rapid political
gains, the religion’s doctrinal justifications for entering electoral politics
became increasingly problematic. Toda’s writings on ōbutsu myōgō, the
“harmonious fusion of government and Buddhism,” and his call for the
construction of a kokuritsu kaidan, a “national ordination platform,” ap-
peared highly idealistic when he first put them forward in the mid-1950s.
However, a mere ten years after Sōka Gakkai’s initial foray into electoral
politics, the specific goals to build a kokuritsu kaidan and transform Japan
into a “Buddhist democracy” burgeoned as real possibilities. Given the
rise in voter support with each successive election, Sōka Gakkai in the late
1960s could project support for the kaidan from a majority in the Diet to a
year perhaps not so distant from the target of 1979 put forth by Toda Jōsei
on New Year’s Day, 1954.
As Sōka Gakkai came to dominate Japan’s religious landscape and es-
tablish Kōmeitō as a major player in the Diet, it also solidified its status
in the popular Japanese imagination as one of the country’s most sinister
threats to postwar democracy. To counter this negative image, Ikeda be-
gan to redefine some key terms in its Nichiren Buddhist lexicon and play
down some of the absolutist rhetoric he and Toda had promoted in the
early stages of Sōka Gakkai’s growth. From the mid-1960s, Ikeda began
to caution members to avoid excesses in their shakubuku efforts. On 3 May
1966, Ikeda announced a downward reassessment of Sōka Gakkai’s to-
tal membership from 5.6 million to 5 million households to make up for
overestimations made by members who had been overly hasty in bring-
ing in new converts who quickly abandoned their faith; by February 1968
Ikeda was describing shakubuku as “a heartwarming interflow of trust and
43
Detailed data on Sōka Gakkai voter support during the 1950s and 1960s is available in
White (1970, 310–321, appendix D).
mutual understanding” that emerges between a Sōka Gakkai adherent

and a potential convert, a far cry from the assault on “false teachings”
called for during the Great March of Shakubuku.44
At the same time, Ikeda began to qualify the parameters of kōsen rufu,
the imperative to “declare far and wide the spread of the Dharma.” Un-
der Toda, kōsen rufu was a straightforward idea: convert all people in Ja-
pan to Sōka Gakkai. When Sōka Gakkai began to attract millions of new
converts, and especially when Kōmeitō began to make steady gains, the
exact definition of kōsen rufu took on a practical religious and political sig-
nificance that it had not possessed previously. In July 1965, in a speech to
the Youth Division, Ikeda announced the new theory of kōsen rufu called
Shae no san’oku, or “three hundred thousand of Śrāvastī,” a phrase de-
rived from the Chinese Buddhist classic Dazhidulun (Treatise on liberation
through great wisdom). According to this text, Śākyamuni preached for
twenty-five years in the Indian kingdom of Śrāvastī, at the end of which
as many as three hundred thousand of the nine hundred thousand people
in the kingdom had never heard of or seen the Buddha. If one-third of
Japan converted to Sōka Gakkai, another third supported Kōmeitō, and
the remaining third opposed both organizations, Ikeda maintained, the
practical equivalent of kōsen rufu would be achieved. Despite tremen-
dous gains, Sōka Gakkai was nowhere near converting all of Japan, and
Kōmeitō was not in a position to secure a majority in the Diet to call for a
state-sponsored construction of the honmon no kaidan.
Ikeda’s reevaluation based on Buddhist principles is a clear indication
of the complete interpenetration of Sōka Gakkai’s religious and political
activities at this time. This conflation of Buddhist and political aspirations
that shaped Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō in the 1960s is also apparent in Ike-
da’s writings from that decade. After Kōmeitō’s founding, Ikeda reinter-
preted ōbutsu myōgō in a manner consistent with the priorities of the post-
war internationalist order. In 1965, he published a book later reissued in
extended form in 1969 called Seiji to shūkyō (Politics and religion) in which
he declared that ōbutsu myōgō would not be an act of Sōka Gakkai impos-
ing its will on the Japanese state to install Nichiren Shōshū Buddhism as
the national creed. Sōka Gakkai, through Kōmeitō, would instead guide
Japan to a new, democratic world order, a “Buddhist democracy” (buppō
minshu shugi) combining the Dharma with the best of the Euro-American
philosophical tradition to focus on social welfare and humanistic social-
ism. In an age of nuclear proliferation, we must not focus on nation versus
nation, Ikeda cautioned. We must instead foster all of humanity within a
single, unified “world nationalism” (wārudo nashonarizumu; Ikeda 1969).
44
Reproduced in Murata (1969, 164).
74 Levi McLaughlin
The year 1969, when Seiji to shūkyō was republished, was a heady one in
Japan. The country was in the midst of a meteoric rise in economic pros-
perity and industrial development, and it was being rocked by the kinds
of rapid social change that were sweeping through the United States, Eu-
rope, and other parts of the world at that time. Young Japanese people
were moved to take up new ideas and participate in new movements
through a spirit of revolution. Students, socialists, and other demonstra-
tors closed down the campuses of the University of Tokyo and Waseda
University to protest the impending renewal of the U.S.–Japan Security
Treaty and the Japanese government’s complicity with the American in-
vasion of Vietnam. Sōka Gakkai leaders capitalized on this groundswell
of social consciousness to mobilize members and recruit new devotees to
the group’s religious practices and political campaigns. On 3 May 1969,
Ikeda Daisaku stood before members to announce Sōka Gakkai’s protests
of the renewal of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty as a “third way” (daisan no
michi); Sōka Gakkai, which Ikeda projected would grow from 7.2 million
to 7.5 million households by May 1970, would smash through barriers be-
tween the left and the right, and the group’s Student Division (Gakuseibu)
would lead as a “third power” (daisan seiryoku) overcoming Japan’s politi-
cal and social imbalances.45 On 19 October 1969, Sōka Gakkai launched the
Shin Gakusei Undō (New Student Alliance), or Shingakutō, as the orga-
nization’s answer to Japan’s Student Movement. Sōka Gakkai’s Student
Division organized a gathering of more than seventy thousand members
representing students from 168 universities in Tokyo’s Yoyogi Park, who
rallied against the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, against Prime Minister Satō
Eisaku, and for the repatriation of Okinawa (Yomiuri, 20 October 1969;
Sōka Gakkai Yonjūnenshi Henshū Iinkai 1970, 481). Later that year, Ikeda
Daisaku appeared at the head of a rally for Sōka Gakkai’s Student Divi-
sion wearing the combat helmet and neck towel that had been adopted as
the commonly accepted uniform of Japanese student protestors.46
Ikeda was no doubt enjoying his status as leader of Japan’s largest mass
movement. In 1961, one year after Ikeda became third president, Sōka Gak-
kai had reached two million households, and only a year later it reached
three million, the target he had set for 1964. Kōmeitō fielded seventy-six
candidates in the December 1969 Lower House election, and forty-seven
were elected; Sōka Gakkai’s party claimed 10.9% of the popular vote, and
Kōmeitō moved into the spot of third-biggest party in the Diet. In Janu-
ary 1970, Sōka Gakkai announced that its worldwide membership stood
45
Covered in Yomiuri (4 May 1969).
46
Interview with veteran Gakkai member and Shingakutō organizer, Tokyo, 3 September
2007.
at 7.55 million, ahead of Ikeda’s prediction the previous year. The growth
in total membership appeared to be tapering off slightly at this point, but
at the beginning of 1970 the group could still claim giant leaps in Young
Men’s and Young Women’s Division membership, a record 1.85 million
members of its Doctrine Division, and considerable advances in its mem-
bership overseas.47 At the end of the 1960s, Sōka Gakkai appeared to be
riding an unstoppable wave, exerting itself as a dominant force in religion,
government, and social change.
However, the end of this decade marked an abrupt halt to Sōka Gak-
kai’s stratospheric rise. Matters came to a head in 1969 with events sur-
rounding the publication of a book titled Sōka gakkai o kiru, which came
out one year later in English as I Denounce Sōka Gakkai. The fiasco has since
been labeled genron shuppan bōgai mondai, or “problem over obstructing
freedom of expression and the press.”48 Unsurprisingly, I Denounce Sōka
Gakkai is a venomous condemnation of Sōka Gakkai’s perceived aspira-
tions to dominate Japan, autocratic control of the group by Ikeda, and
the political ambitions of Kōmeitō. The author, Fujiwara Hirotatsu (1921–
1999), was a well-known left-leaning Meiji University professor and radio
and television commentator. He compared Sōka Gakkai to the Nazis and
the Italian Fascists and otherwise painted a lurid portrait of Sōka Gakkai
as a menace to Japanese democracy.
This book would most likely have been relegated to historical obscurity
as yet another addition to the quickly growing pile of anti–Sōka Gakkai
literature were it not for measures taken by the highest echelons of Sōka
Gakkai and Kōmeitō to attempt to forestall its release. News of this attempt
first broke in the Japanese Communist Party newspaper Akahata, and Fuji-
wara subsequently publicized a number of attempts to dissuade him from
publishing his book, including multiple anonymous threatening phone
calls and a visit by a Kōmeitō politician named Fujiwara (no relation),
who put forward a request that he remove all mention of Ikeda Daisaku
from the manuscript.49 Before the book went on sale in November 1969,
47
These developments are chronicled in detail in McLaughlin (2009, 2012).
48
This incident is covered in Fujiwara (1972), Tōkyō Daigaku Hokekyō Kenkyūkai (1975),
Sugimori (1976), Murakami (1978), Shimada (2007), Tamano (2008), and most other sources
from the 1970s onward that discuss Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō history.
49
I Denounce Sōka Gakkai was not the first book that Sōka Gakkai sought to block. Prior
to the Fujiwara scandal, Japanese Communist Party (JCP) leader Miyamoto Kenji brought
another case to the attention of the Diet: he charged that in May 1969 Hōjō Hiroshi, then
assistant Kōmeitō party chief, had urged publishers of the author Naitō Kunio’s new book
Kōmeitō no sugao: Kono kyodai na shinja shūdan e no gimon (The true face of Kōmeitō: Some
doubts about this giant group of believers) to refrain from advertising the book, and that
pressure from Kōmeitō had prevented all but its limited release. In August 1969, Tsukamoto
Saburō of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) charged that Kōmeitō representatives had
76 Levi McLaughlin
Fujiwara Hirotatsu released a statement claiming that he had received an

early morning telephone call from a “famous politician” who passed on a
strong request from Takeiri Yoshikatsu (b. 1926), then leader of Kōmeitō,
that he, Fujiwara, pull Sōka gakkai o kiru from publication. Though this
famous politician never gave his name, Fujiwara claimed that he recog-
nized him through his voice as Tanaka Kakuei (1918–1993), then secretary
general (kanjichō) of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and later prime
minister of Japan. Kōmeitō spokespeople flatly denied Fujiwara’s claims
at the time, yet statements in later years reveal that Takeiri did indeed
avail himself of what was then a deepening relationship with Tanaka and
the LDP to seek help in convincing Fujiwara to cease plans to publish I
Denounce Sōka Gakkai and to prevent the issue from being discussed on the
floor of the Diet.50
Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō suffered greatly from the scandal, and their
opponents made gains. Fujiwara and his publisher, Nisshin Hōdō, took
full advantage of the publicity the scandal inspired to sell one million cop-
ies of Sōka gakkai o kiru within a year of its publication. Sōka Gakkai’s
grassroots members were accused by the media of being agents seeking
to install a theocracy led by Ikeda Daisaku, and shakubuku attempts by
members in local areas were rebuffed by potential converts even more
strongly than before. On 3 May 1970, the tenth anniversary of his appoint-
ment as third Sōka Gakkai president, Ikeda devoted a portion of his ad-
dress to the thirty-third general meeting of the religion to a formal apol-
ogy to the people of Japan for the trouble that the incident caused. He also
used the occasion to announce a new policy of seikyō bunri, or the “separa-
tion of politics and religion.” Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō were declared to
be separate organizations. The religion renounced its plans to construct a
broken into the Nagoya offices of his publisher and defaced the manuscript for his new book
Kōmeitō o shakubuku shiyō (Let us shakubuku Kōmeitō), and then pressured the DSP to forestall
its publication. These confrontations led JCP and DSP Diet members to come together to
form the “Panel for Freedom of Expression and Publication” (Genron/Shuppan no Jiyū ni
Kan Suru Kondankai). The formation of this panel is regarded by many scholars and jour-
nalists as the official beginning of genron shuppan bōgai mondai (see Yomiuri, 17 January 1970).
However, Fujiwara and his book received the most public attention, and events surrounding
I Denounce Sōka Gakkai fomented the official split between Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō.
50
In a 1998 interview with the newspaper Asahi, Takeiri expressed his lifelong gratitude
to Tanaka for intervening on his behalf with Fujiwara. The statements appear in a serialized
interview in the Asahi Shimbun on 26 August and 18 September 1998. Friendship between
Takeiri and Tanaka deepened in subsequent years, and Takeiri joined Tanaka Kakuei in the
early 1970s after the LDP leader became prime minister in visits to the People’s Republic of
China to take part in negotiations that led to normalized China-Japan diplomatic relations in
September 1972. Journalistic investigations later revealed that Tanaka intervened on Takei-
ri’s behalf in gratitude for the Kōmeitō politician’s aid in deflecting attention away from a
growing scandal surrounding Tanaka’s affairs outside marriage (see Etō 2003, 98–102).
national ordination platform and eliminated the the terms kokuritsu kai-
dan and ōbutsu myōgō from its lexicon. A new set of internal regulations
for Kōmeitō were also drawn up in which all Buddhist doctrinal termi-
nology was eliminated and replaced with a pledge to uphold the 1947
Constitution. Furthermore, Kōmeitō members resigned from all positions
within Sōka Gakkai, and Sōka Gakkai removed itself from administering
Kōmeitō and renounced decision-making capacities for the party’s per-
sonnel, finances, and candidacy.
Conclusion: The Costs and Benefits of Religious Political Activism

After the official separation from Kōmeitō, Sōka Gakkai members contin-
ued to engage enthusiastically in elections—a practice that has endured
unabated up to today. However, the fallout from the 1970 incident was
a blow to the party’s fortunes in the polls. As Abe and Endō detail in the
next chapter, Kōmeitō dropped from forty-seven to twenty-nine elected
Diet representatives in the 1972 elections, and the party slipped to fourth
place in the Diet. The party regained its position as Japan’s third party
with fifty-six elected officials in 1976, and by 1983 it had gained fifty-nine
seats, the largest number it has ever held. However, Kōmeitō never again
experienced the massive swell in support that it enjoyed during the first
five years after it was founded.
One reason why Sōka Gakkai rose to unprecedented growth as a reli-
gious movement, and a key reason that it expanded to dominate Japan’s
religious world, was the distinctive appeal of its political mission to the
socially disenfranchised. In the 1950s and 1960s, Sōka Gakkai was an or-
ganization made up primarily of poor and marginalized women and men
hungry for material success and social legitimacy. As both a religious and
political movement, Sōka Gakkai afforded people who had been subject
to the deprivations of war and whims of government authority the chance
to shape political power to their advantage as they pursued both Buddhist
objectives and this-worldly goals. No other organization proved as attrac-
tive as Sōka Gakkai in promising religious transcendence and upward so-
cial mobility, and the explosive growth of Sōka Gakkai after it began its
political activities speaks to the compelling nature of its fused aspirations.
Sōka Gakkai lost more than power among the electorate when it sev-
ered official ties with Kōmeitō and renounced goals to build a national
ordination platform, it lost its momentum as a mass movement. It must be
noted that Sōka Gakkai’s growth in membership was already beginning
to slow by the end of the 1960s. However, when it moved away from its
initial objective of converting all of Japan and constructing the national
ordination platform, Sōka Gakkai suddenly lost much of the energy that
78 Levi McLaughlin
had driven its combined religious and political dynamism up to 1970. The
group claimed over 7.5 million households in 1970, a ten-fold jump from
thirteen years earlier. After 1970, Sōka Gakkai made only modest gains.
The group reached 7.62 million in 1974, and since the early 1980s, it has
claimed a membership that hovers just above eight million households.
Thus 1970 marks a watershed moment in Sōka Gakkai’s history, the point
when the group began to shift from a headlong rush toward the goal of na-
tional dominance and international expansion into a new era of conserv-
ing its gains and turning to the needs of the families of adherents it had
attracted in the first decades after the war. Just as Japan’s postwar baby
boom generation was turning to the needs of its children who were be-
ginning to come of age in the early 1970s, Sōka Gakkai also began to look
inward toward cultivating the wave of children born into the movement.
The 1970 split brought about an existential crisis for Kōmeitō. The clash-
es of the late 1960s that forced Sōka Gakkai to forswear its ordination plat-
form goal and accompanying links to government called Kōmeitō’s raison
d’être into question. As the next chapter describes, from 1970 Kōmeitō es-
sentially wandered in a political wilderness, spending years shifting from
one troubled alliance to another at all extremes of Japan’s political spec-
trum, and it was only in the 1990s that the party found a comparatively
solid political footing.
Today, when a Kōmeitō electoral campaign begins, be it a race for a Diet
seat or a local city assembly, Sōka Gakkai members near and far volunteer
countless hours to contact hundreds of friends, relatives, coworkers, and
distant acquaintances to get out the vote. All other Sōka Gakkai activi-
ties—such as local zadankai (study meetings), practices for the Ongakutai
(Music Corps), and doctrinal study sessions—are demoted to secondary
importance as members encourage one another to devote themselves fully
to electioneering, especially during races for the Lower or Upper Hous-
es. At any local meeting, information about a Kōmeitō candidate may be
shared and help solicited from attendees to take part in home visits and
phone campaigns. In other words, even though Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō
officially parted ways in 1970, ordinary members of the religion continue
to include political activism as a priority within their regular religious
practice. This continued conflation of political and religious goals is a
legacy inherited from the exuberant period of Sōka Gakkai’s explosive
growth in the 1950s and ’60s, and members today continue to look back
on this period as a golden age. While its early political activism inspired
controversies and culminated in abandoned plans to usher in a new Bud-
dhist political order, Sōka Gakkai’s initial fusion of religion and politics
also inspired millions of people to commit themselves to an organization
that grew into Japan’s largest-ever mass movement.
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Periodicals
Akahata (Shimbun) is the daily newspaper of the Japan Communist Party.
Its circulation has decreased considerably over the last few years and
was about 240,000 in 2013. Available at http://sankei.jp.msn.com/
politics/news/130811/stt13081107000000-n1.htm. Accessed Jan. 2014.
Asahi (Shimbun) is a daily newspaper with a circulation of 7.7 million per
day, the second-highest circulation in Japan. Available at http://adv.
yomiuri.co.jp/m-data/english/mediadata/circulation01.html#tab1.
Accessed Jan. 2014.
Daibyaku renge [Great White Lotus] is Sōka Gakkai’s monthly study
magazine. The organization claims a circulation of 2.8 million copies
per month. See Sōka Gakkai Annual Report (2012), 20.
Kōmei was a short-lived periodical that preceded Kōmei Shimbun.
Kōmei Shimbun is the daily party newspaper of Kōmeitō with a
circulation of 800,000. Editors’ communication with newspaper
headquarters in June 2013.
Mainichi (Shimbun) is one of five national newspapers in Japan. As of
2013 its circulation (morning edition: 3.4 million; evening edition:
1.0 million) was third in Japan, following Yomiuri and Asahi Shimbun.
Available at http://adv.yomiuri.co.jp/yomiuri/busu/busu01.html.
Accessed Jan. 2014.
Seikyō Shimbun is Sōka Gakkai’s newspaper with a circulation of 5.5
million. Available at www.seikyoonline.jp/seikyo/index.html.
Accessed Jan. 2014.
Shūkan Daiyamondo is a weekly magazine focusing on business- and
work-related issues. According to the ABC Report, circulation
was a little over 100,000 in 2011. Available at http://mediadata.
diamond.ne.jp/static/admin/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/
DWmediadata20122.pdf. Accessed Jan. 2014.
Yomiuri = Yomiuri Shimbun is a daily newspaper with a circulation of
9.9 million per day, the highest circulation in Japan. Available at
http://adv.yomiuri.co.jp/m-data/english/mediadata/circulation01.
html#tab1. Accessed Jan. 2014.
Four
Kōmeitō’s Uncertain Decades between

Religion and Politics
Yuki Abe and Masahisa Endo
Introduction
After 1970, Kōmeitō found itself lost with no clear purpose or direction.1
As McLaughlin described in the previous chapter, Kōmeitō began as little
more than an organizing structure for Sōka Gakkai political action. Public
outcry over Sōka Gakkai’s use of political influence to suppress publica-
tion of anti-Gakkai books led Kōmeitō to cut ties with its religious parent
and declare itself ostensibly secular and independent. The abandonment
of Sōka Gakkai theocratic goals left Kōmeitō with political power, yet
without a clear set of goals to pursue.
Fast-forward twenty-three years and Kōmeitō found itself a member of
the anti–Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ruling coalition; another six years
and Kōmeitō joined its old enemy, the LDP, in government. How did these
changes come about? From 1970 until 1993, the party struggled to estab-
lish a clear and compelling identity. Those twenty-three years were the
party’s crucial formative period, an era that might be termed Kōmeitō’s
adolescence, when the party learned its place in the secular political
world. Understanding Kōmeitō’s actions today requires a firm grasp of
what happened in the 1970s and 1980s.
Studies to date offer little insight into these formative years. Although
there was a great deal of research undertaken in the late 1960s in response
to Kōmeitō’s explosive growth, relatively few studies explore the party
after 1970. In addition, when research on Kōmeitō resumed to an extent
in the 1990s, it focused on Kōmeitō’s role in government, not its transfor-
mations throughout the preceding decades. In this chapter, we examine
Kōmeitō’s historical record to shed light on the party’s time in the “wil-
derness,” its formative years in the 1970s and 1980s, to uncover the story
1
We would like to thank Aiji Tanaka for his invaluable comments on earlier drafts.
84 Yuki Abe and Masahisa Endo
of a party struggling to find its political way. This is a story marked by

a process of evolution, as Kōmeitō first leaned toward one political di-
rection, then toward another, first cooperated with one party, then with
another. During the 1970s, Kōmeitō sought a coalition with other “pro-
gressive” opposition parties, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the
Japan Socialist Party (JSP)—to both wipe out the public distrust caused by
Sōka Gakkai scandals and establish a new image as a defender of the com-
mon people. At that time, not only did Kōmeitō stress social welfare, but
it also made advances toward labor unions to expand its support base be-
yond Sōka Gakkai, while simultaneously questioning the legal basis of the
Japan Self-Defense Forces (Jieitai). From the late 1970s onward, however,
Kōmeitō made an abrupt turn to the political right, adopting more prag-
matic views on security and defense issues, such as officially acknowledg-
ing the legitimacy of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.
This rightward turn was a critical decision the party leadership made
to ensure Kōmeitō’s survival.2 Three factors, we argue, played a crucial
role in this policy reorientation. First, the changing power balance in par-
liamentary politics in the late 1970s led Kōmeitō leaders to adjust their
policies rightward to secure their political survival. Despite long-standing
negotiations, opposition party cooperation came to a standstill due to ir-
reconcilable views held by the DSP and the JSP. At the same time, the rul-
ing LDP approached Kōmeitō offering a possible coalition, as the LDP’s
dominance was waning. Facing both a stalemate and an opportunity,
Kōmeitō leaders gradually moved closer to the LDP by redefining its se-
curity and defense policy.
Second, Kōmeitō was about to reach the limit of possible voter mobi-
lization, as Sōka Gakkai membership peaked in the mid-1970s. Struck by
this internal problem, the party elites sought a place outside the religious
context where they could enjoy governing status and thereby attract more
support from non-Sōka Gakkai voters.
Third, the changing socioeconomic background of Sōka Gakkai mem-
bers gave party elites room to maneuver in policy space. Traditionally,
Sōka Gakkai members were characterized by a somewhat fuzzy duality in
their preferences, attracted by socialist policies as lower-income workers
but also to conservative policies as migrants from the countryside. How-
ever, by the time Kōmeitō made its right turn, the living conditions of Sōka
2
Although Kōmeitō’s politicians and supporters may not identify themselves within the
ideological categories of left or right, we use them when discussing its security policy. Be-
cause security policy had long divided Japanese parties in the postwar era (Otake 1999), ap-
plying this categorization enables us to trace how Kōmeitō defined its position in relation to
other parties and how it evolved. Concerning Kōmeitō’s nuanced views not only on security,
but also on economy and welfare, see chapter 10 of this volume.
Kōmeitō’s Uncertain Decades between Religion and Politics 85
Gakkai members had improved, and these improved material conditions

diluted their attraction to socialist ideas. Changing demographics of Sōka
Gakkai members thus mitigated a backlash from the party’s grassroots
supporters.
In the following five sections, we trace Kōmeitō’s gradual evolution
away from its origins as an explicitly religious party. In the first section,
we discuss how the leaders’ early estimates of its chances of survival in
the Diet led them leftward to cooperate with the DSP and the JSP. The
second section explores the three key reasons behind Kōmeitō’s rightward
shift: (1) the party elites’ interaction with other parties in the Diet, (2) the
limits of Kōmeitō’s religious base, and (3) Sōka Gakkai members’ chang-
ing socioeconomic profile. Using all of these observations, the third sec-
tion traces Kōmeitō’s parliamentary history of reshuffling its cooperation
strategy, while the fourth section elucidates how the leveled-off Sōka Gak-
kai membership shaped the party leaders’ future prospects. By analyzing
the demographics of Sōka Gakkai members, the fifth section shows how
this policy change led to a long-term shift toward the LDP in both policy
and electoral terms. Based upon the implications drawn from this chapter,
the concluding section considers Kōmeitō’s steering in the turbulent years
of the 1990s and the rocky relationship between politics and religion in-
herent within the Kōmeitō–Sōka Gakkai connection.
Kōmeitō as a “People’s Party”

Kōmeitō Leans toward the Left
After the official split from Sōka Gakkai, the eighth National Convention
of Kōmeitō, in June 1970, removed all explicitly religious terms appearing
in the party program (see chapter 3). Instead, the party declared its inten-
tion to become a “people’s party” (kokumin seitō) based on the principle of
“centrism” or “middle path-ism” (chūdō shugi). The notion of centrism had
first been used somewhat vaguely in 1965 by Ikeda Daisaku, then third
president of Sōka Gakkai, reflecting a Buddhist principle of taking the
middle path (Ikeda 1965). However, after religious goals were disavowed,
Kōmeitō had to fill these terms with policy content.
Kōmeitō was initially without allies in the Japanese Diet after the split,
and it endured severe criticism from political rivals provoked by the scan-
dals surrounding Sōka Gakkai. Wiping out this public distrust was the
first task for Party Chief Takeiri Yoshikatsu and Secretary General Yano
Jun’ya. At that moment, they decided to tilt the course of the party from
the middle to the center-left to redefine the party’s position as progressive
and opposed to the LDP. They siezed the opportunity to do this when
DSP Chairman Nishimura Eiichi suggested that Kōmeitō could join an
opposition coalition formed by his own party and the JSP.3 For Nishimura,
who was even considering a possible unification of the DSP with Kōmeitō,
this would have been a significant step toward political realignment. For
Kōmeitō, which was seeking a way to restart as an independent party in
the Diet, the progressive coalition with other opposition parties was a de-
sirable objective to pursue.
Kōmeitō’s first forays into secular policy correspondingly emphasized
social welfare.4 Moreover, in line with what the party called “the most
important agenda after the separation of politics and religion” (Yomiuri,
4 May 1972), Kōmeitō looked to labor unions in order to stretch the spec-
trum of its voters beyond Sōka Gakkai members and thus establish the
public image of a people’s party supported by a broad range of voters
(Yomiuri, 2 May 1972). To show sympathy toward the labor movements,
the party leaders participated in traditional organized-labor May Day ac-
tivities for the first time in 1972 (Kōmei Shimbun, 2 May 1972).
Moreover, with regard to foreign policy—an important fault line be-
tween left and right in postwar politics in Japan—Kōmeitō also made
its progressive identity clear. In contrast to conservatives, at its eleventh
National Convention, in 1973, Kōmeitō questioned the legality of Japan’s
Self-Defense Forces and instead promoted the idea of “Territorial Defense
Guards” (Kokudo Keibitai). Furthermore, the party shifted leftward on
the issue of whether Japan should continue its alliance with the United
States, strengthening its position from “the abrogation by gradual stages”
of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty to “immediate abrogation” (Kōmei Shim-
bun, 5 September 1973).
One of the policies in this progressive line is Kōmeitō’s activity in the
normalization of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China,
in which the Japan Socialist Party originally had been actively involved.
Kōmeitō decided to adopt a One China policy, thus recognizing the Com-
munist Party of China as the only legitimate government, and renounced
recognition of the Treaty of Taipei in 1971. Takeiri flew to Beijing in con-
sultation with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei to meet Chinese officials in
June of that year. As he built diplomatic relations, he became more en-
thusiastic about this agenda, traveling to China again amidst the Upper
House election in 1971 and sometimes going further in his close relations
with the Chinese government than Tanaka, who had to come to terms
3
Takeiri revealed that it was Sōka Gakkai, as well as Kōmeitō, that approached the DSP
secretly to start these negotiations in order to recover from the Sōka Gakkai scandals in 1970.
From an interview with Takeiri on 3 September 1998, published as part of a serial featured in
the Asahi Shimbun between 26 August and 18 September 1998.
4
Social welfare had been one of its main policies since its creation (see, e.g., Kōmeito
1964), but the party brought it to the fore after its separation from Sōka Gakkai.
with pro-Taiwan LDP members (see Shimada and Yano 2010, 142–152; in-
terview with Takeiri in Asahi, 9–12 September 1998; Hori 1999, 116–129).
Eventually his conversations with Zhou Enlai, premier of the Chinese
Communist Party, led to the so-called Takeiri memorandum, which be-
came the basis of the official announcement of Japan-China diplomatic
normalization in September 1972.
As shown earlier, when Kōmeitō attempted to locate itself in the politi-
cal realm without official religious ties during the early 1970s, it moved to-
ward the progressive camp, finding hope in the DSP’s call for a rally to op-
pose the giant LDP. Kōmeitō set forth concrete policies along this line as it
struggled to establish its foothold within the Diet as an independent party.
Political Objectives versus Religious Objectives
Normalizing Japan-China diplomatic relations not only represented the
party’s leaning toward the progressive camp, but also illustrated the
growing distance between Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai. It gradually became
evident that Kōmeitō’s independent action as a political entity could cause
friction with Sōka Gakkai because their interests diverged.
The party’s diplomatic success became a cause of disagreement between
Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō over whether the credit should go to Ikeda or
Takeiri. The idea of normalization itself was initially broached by Ikeda at
a meeting of the Sōka Gakkai Student Division on 8 September 1968 as an
ideal way to build a cooperative relationship between Japan and China,
although Ikeda’s readiness to relinquish ties with Taiwan was unclear.
Negotiations with China, however, required a pragmatic approach that
included abandoning Taiwan. Takeiri publicly denied Ikeda’s influence
on forming the principle of the separation of politics and religion, which
contributed to growing tension between the religious and political leaders
(Shimada and Yano 2010, 145).
Potentially conflicting with Sōka Gakkai, Kōmeitō’s position was
still constrained by its religious organization. In 1972, the first Lower
House election after the split from its religious organization reminded
Kōmeitō leaders of the importance of religious support. The election re-
sult devastated Kōmeitō, and its seats in the Diet declined from forty-
seven to twenty-nine. Secretary General Yano explained that this was
due less to the damage caused by the Sōka Gakkai scandals two years
earlier and more to the lukewarm mobilization of Sōka Gakkai members
in the election campaign (Asahi, 11 December 1972). The separation of
politics and religion cooled the commitment of Sōka Gakkai adherents to
political engagement, and even triggered discussion of a gradual with-
drawal of Kōmeitō from the Diet. Confronted with this dismal election
result, Kōmeitō leaders had to beg Sōka Gakkai for its support in future
elections (Shimada and Yano 2010, 122–124, 131–132). At the same time,
however, they also felt compelled to expand the scope of their target vot-
ers so that they could expect solid support irrespective of Sōka Gakkai’s
opinions.
The tension between the political party and the religious organization
peaked when the “Accord on Agreement in Views” between Sōka Gakkai
and the Japanese Communist Party became public. Without consulting
the party headquarters, Sōka Gakkai had concluded a secret accord with
the JCP agreeing to mutual noninterference for the next ten years. This
accord was established in December 1974 and officially made public in
July 1975. At the time, Sōka Gakkai stated that the accord “was meant
to put an end to head-on battles [between party members] on the street
in every election” (Asahi, 30 July 1975). Meanwhile, others speculated
that “Ikeda sought an understanding with the JCP in order to facilitate
Sōka Gakkai’s future expansion into Communist countries [such as] the
People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union” (Hrebenar 1992, 178).
In an interview published in 2010, however, Yano offered yet another ac-
count: Ikeda wanted to improve Sōka Gakkai’s position relative to its
parent religious authority Nichiren Shōshū, which Ikeda thought benefit-
ed unfairly from Sōka Gakkai’s financial contributions.5 He thus sought a
ceasefire with the JCP so that he could focus on his religious objectives. In
any event, the JCP’s relentless criticism during the publicizing of the se-
cret accord became a lesson for Ikeda to avoid unnecessary conflict with
the JCP when engaging in other sensitive issues (Shimada and Yano 2010,
158–173).6
This accord shocked Kōmeitō leaders, who had been kept in the dark
until it was concluded, and they resisted it vehemently not only because
“Kōmeitō ha[d] taken a firm anti-communist stance as one of its funda-
mental principles,” but also because Kōmeitō and the JCP had competed
for the same constituency, namely “lower-class urban voters” (Hrebenar
1992, 160; Matsumoto 1981, 41; Watanuki 1977, 83–84).7 In fact, one of the
reasons the party sought cooperation with the DSP and the JSP was to
5
On Ikeda’s attempt to promote Sōka Gakkai over Nichiren Shōshū at this juncture, see
Shimada (2007, 112–114) and McLaughlin (2012).
6
Concerning Sōka Gakkai’s independence from Nichiren Shōshū, Ikeda’s attempt ended
in failure and, taking the responsibility for this, he stepped down as president in 1979, when
he was inaugurated as Sōka Gakkai’s honorary president. During a second conflict with
the Nichiren Shōshū priesthood from late 1990 into 1991, Sōka Gakkai gained full indepen-
dence when it was excommunicated from Nichiren Shōshū. See Shimada (2007, 145–146) and
McLaughlin (2012).
7
Contrary to the JCP, other left parties were backed by labor organizations of civil ser-
vants, as well as teachers (JSP supporters) and workers for big companies (DSP supporters).
exclude the JCP from the opposition alliance and keep it isolated in the
Diet (Hori 1980, 87).
Kōmeitō leaders utilized the principle of the separation of politics and
religion as a rationale to unilaterally declare that Sōka Gakkai had nothing
to do with party policy. After intense negotiations between Sōka Gakkai
and Kōmeitō,8 the two organizations issued a joint statement, made by
Yano and Sōka Gakkai’s vice president (later fifth president) Akiya Eino-
suke, saying that the accord promoted only “coexistence” between Sōka
Gakkai and the JCP, not a “joint struggle,” and that therefore the religion
would not affect Kōmeitō’s policy (Asahi, 29 July 1975; also see Matsumoto
1981, 41). In Takeiri’s words, Kōmeitō was able to “virtually eviscerate”
the political significance of the accord (Asahi, 17 September 1998). The ac-
cord was canceled four years later, in 1979, when Sōka Gakkai’s wiretap
on the house of JCP Chairman Miyamoto Kenji was discovered (see Hre-
benar 1992, 159).
Kōmeitō and the JCP are both mass parties that rely on mobilizing their
supporters in elections. The Sōka Gakkai–JCP accord, however, clearly
shows a difference between the two parties: the JCP has its own inter-
nal organization while Kōmeitō relies upon support from a group that
is administratively and, to an increasing extent, ideologically separate.
Kōmeitō, despite its dependence upon its parent organization, acted au-
tonomously based on political rather than religious considerations.
Policy Adjustment for Survival in the Diet:

An Abrupt Turn to the Right
During the late 1970s, Kōmeitō made a sudden turn to the right. At its
fifteenth national convention, held in January 1978, Party Chairman Takei-
ri announced the party’s support for the maintenance of the U.S.–Japan
Security Treaty and recognized the legality of the Self-Defense Forces,
thereby reversing Kōmeitō’s earlier policy. Both policies were officially
adopted during the nineteenth national convention in 1981. Dropping
some of its core progressive policies, the party thus moved closer to the
LDP. Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo welcomed this decision and even sent
a congratulatory telegram to the Kōmeitō headquarters (Asahi, 25 March
1978), while LDP Secretary General Ōhira Masayoshi called Kōmeitō a
“friendly party” (Yomiuri, 11 January 1978). Furthermore, Takeiri visited
Seoul in August 1981 and stated that South Korea under the Chun Doo-
Hwan military regime had “incomparably greater freedom than North
8
A detailed description of how Sōka Gakkai members were troubled by strong resistance
from Kōmeitō is given by Matsumoto Seichō (1980), a famous novelist who also mediated
the Sōka Gakkai–JCP accord.
Korea” (quoted in Kunigami 1981, 252). After Takeiri’s return, the party
joined the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union, to which the LDP and
the DSP already belonged. This marked a departure from alliance with the
JSP, which maintained ties with North Korea.
What made Kōmeitō leaders steer the party closer to the LDP?9 The
first key to understanding this change in course lies in the Kōmeitō elites’
strategic interaction with national-level politics from the mid-1970s on-
ward. The progressive alliance was failing due to irreconcilable views be-
tween the DSP and the JSP. At the same time, the possibility of a coalition
with the LDP was opening as the LDP searched for ways to extend its
dominance.
The second key is the party leaders’ insight that the number of votes
it could rely upon Sōka Gakkai members to attract was limited. Kōmeitō
leaders had already witnessed the end of the dramatic increase in Sōka
Gakkai membership—meaning that as long as the party relied solely on a
religious support base, it was destined to be a small party, at best having
around fifty to sixty lawmakers in the Lower House. They reasoned that
by becoming a governing party the organization would gain a chance to
attract a broader range of voters—not only Sōka Gakkai members and
nonmember supporters—and allow it to become a true “people’s party.”
The last key to understanding Kōmeitō’s political shift is understand-
ing why their supporters accepted this reorientation. As their living con-
ditions improved in the 1980s, survey data reveal that the preferences of
Kōmeitō supporters (understood primarily to mean Sōka Gakkai mem-
bers) regarding security and defense issues had become more diverse, al-
lowing Kōmeitō flexibility in choosing a political direction.
It was these three key elements that facilitated Kōmeitō’s relatively
swift move toward the political right, one that proceeded without signifi-
cant backlash from its constituents. The following sections explore each of
these three key elements in detail.
Stuck in the Left, Pulled from the Right

Kōmeitō’s shift in policy was an elite-driven enterprise aimed at political
survival. In the early 1970s, Kōmeitō and the DSP both nurtured connec-
tions with the JSP, based on personal relationships between Kōmeitō sec-
retary General Yano, vice chairman of the DSP Sasaki Ryōsaku, and Eda
Saburō, a moderate socialist from the JSP. These three set up an interparty
group called “Visions of a New Japan” (Atarashii Nihon o Kangaeru kai)
in 1976, with a view to facilitating anti-LDP cooperation. However, the
9
Kōmeitō’s rightward turn in the 1970s and 1980s can also be substantiated through con-
tent analysis of legislative speeches (Procksh, Spalin, and Thies 2011).
cooperation ended before it produced results. In December 1976, their JSP

partner Eda lost his seat in the election, which triggered an eruption of
fierce criticisms from socialist members and supporters of his “centrist”
approach. Eda left the JSP in disappointment and organized the Social-
ist Citizen’s Federation; however, he passed away soon after this, in May
1977. His death made negotiations for cooperation among the opposition
parties more difficult, since the main JSP leaders stuck to their cooperation
with the JCP (Maeda 1995, 152, 162).
Furthermore, it became evident that it was difficult to bridge ideologi-
cal divisions between the DSP and the JSP—the former upheld the U.S.–
Japan Security Treaty and the legal status of the Self-Defense Forces, while
the latter denied both of them and instead supported unarmed neutral
diplomacy (Hori 1980, 89).
The 1980 double election of the Upper and Lower Houses became a
critical moment for Kōmeitō, as Takeiri concluded that confrontation be-
tween these two socialist parties ruined their chances of defeating the LDP
(interview in Asahi, 2 September 1998; also see 5 May 1981). Kōmeitō’s
seats were reduced from fifty-five to thirty-three in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Although this loss was due more to the unpreparedness for this
snap election and Prime Minister Ōhira’s sudden death, which inspired
LDP members to campaign together, Takeiri argued that ongoing mutual
criticisms between the DSP and the JSP over security and defense issues
added to the LDP’s landslide victory. He described this experience as ac-
cruing what he called “high tuition fees” that he wished “never to pay
again” (Asahi, 5 May 1981). After this election, the opposition cooperative
lost momentum.
The situation in the conservative camp also facilitated Kōmeitō’s policy
shift. The long-term downturn of LDP votes in the late 1970s led the LDP
to consider a possible coalition with Kōmeitō. After the Lockheed bribery
scandals in 1976, the LDP lost seats in the election of that year, and again
in the 1979 election. Internal discord within the LDP intensified after the
1979 election as a considerable number of LDP members called for Prime
Minister Ōhira’s resignation for the defeat, initiating a period know as the
“forty-days’ struggle.” Confronted by enormous pressure from factions
within his own party, Ōhira approached Kōmeitō chairman Takeiri with
an informal coalition proposal in late 1979 (Asahi, 27 August 1998).10 They
did not reach agreement—not only because Ōhira found it difficult to con-
vince his party to accept Kōmeitō’s demand for a ban on corporate dona-
tions, but also because Takeiri realized that differences between the two
10
Since Fukuda was prime minister and Ōhira was secretary general, they had talks with
Kōmeitō as well as the DSP for partial coalition. See Asahi (24 February 1979).
parties were too great to allow them to form a coalition, particularly one
concerning sensitive issues such as security and defense (interview with
Takeiri in Asahi, 27 August 1998). After the 1980 election, Takeiri made the
offer from Ōhira public, announcing that “it is not reasonable for Kōmeitō
to stay in opposition permanently” and “we will not miss the next chance
[to join a government]” (Asahi, 5 May 1981).
At the local level, Kōmeitō had already partnered with the LDP in the
Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly since 1979; through this experience, the
party realized the potential of a partnership with the ruling LDP at the
national level. Working with the LDP in the 1981 metropolitan assembly
election in Tokyo, which took place one year after Kōmeitō’s massive de-
feat in the national elections, Kōmeitō won all seats for its candidates. This
result demonstrated that the status of a ruling party “made it easy to gain
support from various interest groups” and that, if the same scenario were
to be repeated at the national level, “it would help their election campaign
significantly” (Asahi, 8 September 1981). In addition, as Hori (1982, 217–
218) argues, it seemed that local Kōmeitō politicians working with the
LDP wanted the party to redress the uncomfortable situation of maintain-
ing the progressive cooperation at the national level and, simultaneously,
forming an LDP-Kōmeitō cooperation at the local level.
Kōmeitō cooperation with the LDP was a nationwide trend in
prefectural-level politics. From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, Kōmeitō
expanded its support for governors who were also supported by the
LDP.11 Figure 4.1 shows to what extent Kōmeitō and other opposition par-
ties supported the same governors that the LDP supported. The figure
reveals that Kōmeitō had been antagonistic to the LDP in the early 1970s.
However, in 1978, after Takeiri shifted position on the role of the U.S.–
Japan Security Treaty and the legality of the Self-Defense Forces, the party
began to cooperate with the LDP.
The DSP, which stood closer to the LDP than any other opposition par-
ty, had been more or less working with the LDP since the early 1970s. The
JSP, because of Kōmeitō’s subsequent shift, was left with no other option
but to follow suit. Instead of fielding its own candidates, who had little
chance of winning, the JSP adopted the “balanced ticket” (ainori) strategy
for gubernatorial elections.
Kōmeitō’s shift to the right changed the political landscape of the Diet.
The party contended that its policy was redefined for the purpose of be-
coming a reliable alternative to the LDP, but obviously it was considering
11
The governors’ partisanship data were collected and edited by Sunahara Yosuke, and
published on his website (www.geocities.jp/yosuke_sunahara/; accessed Jan. 2014). We
would like to thank him for sharing these data.
Figure 4.1 The percentage of governors supported by the LDP and Kōmeitō
(1969–1993)
Source: Data taken from the governors’ partisanship data as published by Sunahara Yosuke
on www.geocities.jp/yosuke_sunahara/ (accessed Nov. 2013).
Note: 100% in the figure means that a party supported all of the governors backed by the LDP.
a possible coalition. Major obstacles between Kōmeitō and the DSP were
removed since the two parties shared virtually the same positions on se-
curity and defense policy, which culminated in the issue of the “vision of
a middle path coalition government” (chūdō rengō seiken kōsō) in December
1979. JSP leaders approached Kōmeitō from fear of isolation and reiterated
their desire for cooperation in January 1980. However, Kōmeitō leaders
no longer needed JSP cooperation, except for preventing it from moving
closer to the JCP (Matsumoto 1981, 44). Kōmeitō came to occupy the me-
dian position in the Diet, commanding attention from both conservatives
and progressives.
7KH&RVWVDQG%HQHÀWVRID5HOLJLRXV%DVH
The benefit of having religious roots was that the party could rely on solid
support from its parent religious group, but a downside was that its reli-
gious affiliation made it difficult to collect non–Sōka Gakkai votes—much
Figure 4.2 Kōmeitō’s seats in the Lower House (1967–1993)

Source: Data taken from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Statistics Bureau
(2006).
more so from those with an antipathy to Sōka Gakkai. Dealing with this
trade-off became a challenge for Kōmeitō leaders, particularly after the
Sōka Gakkai’s rapid growth ended.
In the late 1970s, party leaders realized that the rise in Sōka Gakkai
membership had slowed down. The membership reached 7.62 million
households in 1974 and eight million in the early 1980s.12 Since the ex-
pansion of Sōka Gakkai resulted chiefly from the incorporation of rural
migrants new to urban areas, the increase in new party members was also
blunted by the end of rapid urbanization and economic growth (Shima-
da 2009, 82; Nakano 2010). Therefore, although Kōmeitō gained fifty-five
seats in the election of the Lower House in 1976, its political leaders were
aware that the party was nearing its maximum number of votes based
on Sōka Gakkai mobilization (Matsumoto 1981, 42). Historical records
confirm the deadlock of Kōmeitō’s seats in the Lower House, where the
increase stopped just before reaching sixty (see figure 4.2). The percentage
of Kōmeitō voters among all eligible voters in the nationwide constitu-
ency (the Proportional Representative [PR] system from 1983) of the Up-
per House provides a more reasonable indicator of this point (see figure
4.3). The party’s gain stopped after peaking at 10.1% in 1968. Thus, when
stagnant growth became obvious, the challenge of extending the scope
of its voters beyond those mobilized by its religious base became a more
serious problem than ever before. Party leaders sought to free Kōmeitō
12
See chapter 3 in this volume. Also see Hrebenar (1992, 156).
Figure 4.3 Percentage of eligible voters casting their ballot for Kōmeitō in the
National Constituency/PR tier of the Upper House (1956–1992)
Source: Data taken from Ishikawa and Yamaguchi (2010, appendix).
from its limitations as a religious party, and thereby increase the number
of non–Sōka Gakkai votes, by gaining access to government. Yano stated:
“Kōmeitō’s seats had hit a peak [from 1980 to 1985]. Shady rumors about
the lack of separation of politics and religion and the monopoly of the
party (by Sōka Gakkai) would disappear if the party integrated into a co-
alition government” (Asahi, 19 May 1989).13 That is to say, party leaders
consciously chose the avenue of a coalition with the LDP in order to ex-
pand their constituency.
Takeiri and Yano intervened in an LDP party leader election in 1984,
supporting its vice president Nikaidō Susumu in order to prevent Prime
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s re-election. The so-called Nikaidō incident
started when some LDP politicians, including former Prime Minister Su-
zuki Zenkō, plotted to bring down the incumbent leader. Suzuki talked
to Takeiri, who was upset for religious reasons by Nakasone’s visit to the
Yasukuni Shrine, and asked for cooperation in establishing a Nikaidō
13
Parenthetical comment in the original. Also see Asahi (8 September 1981).
government; Suzuki anticipated a need for help from Kōmeitō, as a split

in the LDP would be inevitable following the unseating of Nakasone. Af-
ter careful contemplation, Kōmeitō leaders decided to unofficially support
Nikaidō, in spite of Takeiri’s close relationship with Tanaka Kakuei, who
was behind Nakasone.14
For Kōmeitō, this change in support had a special meaning beyond Su-
zuki’s speculation. Yano accounted for the party’s decision for two rea-
sons: one was simply to “bring a breath of fresh air” into LDP-dominated
politics, while the other was to “regenerate the party” by forming a coali-
tion (Yano 1993, 96). As Takeiri also emphasized at that time, “in order to
dilute the Sōka Gakkai tinge [of the party], a coalition was necessary” (in
Yano 1993, 105). Cooperation with the LDP would have allowed Kōmeitō
to expand its opportunities while reducing its dependence on Sōka Gak-
kai voters.
This coup failed, however, because Nikaidō and his associates could
not collect enough votes within the LDP, as they were blocked by such
influential figures as Tanaka and Gotōda Masaharu. This incident should
be understood against the backdrop of the power struggle within the LDP;
nevertheless, Kōmeitō had its own take on the situation. Yano recalled:
“We made various attempts to split the LDP because otherwise we could
not join the government; but, after all, it did not split” (Shimada and Yano
2010, 249).
Reactions from the Support Base

Evolving Kōmeitō Demographics
Kōmeitō’s rightward turn was accepted by the party’s loyal supporters.
Neither the religious leaders nor the believers raised strong objections
to the party’s abrupt changes in policy or its new political alliances. The
Sōka Gakkai cadre acquiesced in this reorientation even though the new
Kōmeitō alignment contradicted the party’s founding pacifist worldview.15
One possible explanation for this acquiescence is the fact that Sōka Gak-
kai was occupied with its own problems from the mid-1970s to the early
1980s. Notable among these were the confrontation with Nichiren Shōshū
from 1977 to 1979; the revealed wiretap of the JCP chairman’s house; al-
legations of Ikeda’s personal affairs with women that were disclosed by
a monthly journal called Gekkan Pen and followed by lengthy libel suits
from 1976 to 1984; land transaction problems in the city of Fujinomiya
14
Interview with Takeiri in Asahi (29 August 1998); also see Yano (1993) as well as Shimada
and Yano (2010, 249).
15
Concerning questions about the pacifist worldview of Sōka Gakkai adherents, see
Kisala (1999).
(Shizuoka Prefecture) in the late 1970s to 1980s; and allegations of corrupt

internal affairs within Sōka Gakkai made by its former lawyer Yamazaki
Masatomo, who parted company with Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō in 1977.16
The rightward shift did cause some friction with grassroots-level sup-
porters. Objections were raised, mainly by the Youth Division of Sōka
Gakkai, which had begun leading antiwar and pacifist activities in the
1970s. These “rebels” formed a voluntary group to oppose Kōmeitō’s po-
litical shift, but it did not gain momentum throughout the organization,
and their voices soon faded (Hori 1982, 218).
The supporters’ consent to the party elites’ decision can be explained
by the upward mobility in the socioeconomic profile of Sōka Gakkai mem-
bers. Nationwide random sample surveys reveal that until the mid-1970s,
Sōka Gakkai members remained mostly rootless city residents with lower
levels of education, very much in accord with the prevailing image of the
Sōka Gakkai community (see table 4.1).17 In 1976, Sōka Gakkai members
were more likely to be women, people of low education, and city residents
who were less likely than the average to be permanent residents. The fam-
ily income among Sōka Gakkai members was slightly below average, al-
though the difference is not statistically significant.
Seven years later, in 1983, most of the once distinctive demographic
and socioeconomic factors—gender, education, and the size of residential
city—no longer characterized Sōka Gakkai membership. The tendencies
remained but could not be confirmed statistically. Socioeconomically, Sōka
Gakkai members had almost caught up with people outside the religious
16
On Sōka Gakkai’s scandals during the 1970s, see, for example, Hori (1981, 33), Hrebenar
(1992, 159–160), and Shimada and Yano (2010, 168).
17
Few studies relied on survey data based on a national random sample in investigating
the background and behavior of Sōka Gakkai members. Hori (1999) introduced the results
of a survey conducted by Center Research Services (Chuō Chōsa Sha) in 1969; however, this
was conducted only in Tokyo. For a review of studies on Sōka Gakkai based on surveys, see
Nakano (2010, appendix). In the current study, we utilize three national election surveys:
the JABISS conducted in 1976, JES in 1983, and JES II in 1993 to 1996. We thank the principal
investigators of these three surveys, the Leviathan Data Bank, and G-COE GLOPE II project
at Waseda University for making the data available to us. The former two surveys contain
responses to a question asking to which religious group respondents belonged. Although
the number of respondents who expressed their faith in Sōka Gakkai might be too small for
analysis, it is still worthwhile to explore who Sōka Gakkai members were based on these
nationwide random-sampled surveys. In 1973, 3.0% of all respondents (40 out of 1,332) said
they were Sōka Gakkai members. In 1983, 3.6% of respondents said so (64 out of 1,769). The
Sōka Gakkai membership of around 3% corresponds with the figure in Nakano’s review
(2010, appendix). This figure suggests that Sōka Gakkai is an influential denomination in
Japan, taking into account that, in both 1976 and 1983, only 9% of the sample (9.3% and 9.8%,
respectively) answered that they were affiliated with any religious groups. Sōka Gakkai thus
occupied about one-third of self-identified religious group membership in Japan.
Table 4.1 Demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds of Sōka Gakkai members
1976 1983
Sōka Gakkai Non-SG Sōka Gakkai Non-SG
Sex**
Male 20.0% 42.3% 43.8% 48.9%
Female 80.0% 57.7% 56.3% 51.1%
Age
20-29 17.5% 20.4% 12.5% 14.8%
30-39 27.5% 24.1% 15.6% 24.6%
40-49 20.0% 22.5% 28.1% 22.8%
50-59 10.0% 16.6% 17.2% 17.6%
60-69 17.5% 11.1% 17.2% 12.0%
70-79 7.5% 4.6% 7.8% 7.0%
80 or Older 0.0% 0.7% 1.6% 1.2%
Education**
Junior High School 70.0% 46.1% 48.4% 38.6%
High School 27.5% 40.2% 37.1% 41.7%
College 2.5% 13.6% 14.5% 18.6%
Occupation
Employee 32.5% 30.1% 39.1% 42.8%
Self Management 2.5% 17.5% 9.4% 16.6%
Family Business 5.0% 9.7% 3.1% 6.5%
Student 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 1.1%
Housewife 45.0% 30.7% 31.3% 20.4%
Not Working 15.0% 9.4% 15.6% 12.4%
Other 0.0% 0.8% 1.6% 0.4%

1976 1983
Sōka Gakkai Non-SG Sōka Gakkai Non-SG
Family Income
First Quantile 34.5% 28.6% 31.9% 27.5%
Second Quantile 37.9% 27.5% 34.0% 33.4%
Third Quantile 17.2% 21.1% 23.4% 21.5%
Fourth Quantile 10.3% 22.8% 10.6% 17.6%
Community Size**
Large Cities 27.5% 18.0% 18.8% 18.5%
Cities (More than 0.1M residents) 50.0% 33.4% 48.4% 33.8%
Cities (Fewer than 0.1M residents) 12.5% 20.7% 15.6% 18.1%
Villages and Towns 10.0% 27.9% 17.2% 29.6%
Length of Residence**
Fewer than 3 years 27.5% 14.2% 17.2% 9.7%
Fewer than 10 years 27.5% 24.6% 21.9% 18.7%
Fewer than 15 years 7.5% 6.9% 10.9% 10.8%
More than 15 years 32.5% 28.5% 42.2% 35.2%
Since birth 5.0% 25.8% 7.8% 25.6%
Note: ** = statistically significant at the .05 level by the chi-square test.

Sources: JABISS (1976) and JES (1983).
community by the 1980s. The only exception is the length of residence, as

Sōka Gakkai members still tended to stay in the same place for a shorter
period than the national average.
Policy Preferences of Supporters
Ambiguous policy preferences among Kōmeitō supporters allowed the
party to alter its strategies. Ideologically, Kōmeitō supporters perceived
themselves as the moderate left—positioned between the JSP and the DSP
1983:
1993:
Figure 4.4 Ideological positions of party supporters

Sources: JES (1983) and JES II (1993).
in 1983, they moved even further left in their self-identified locations when
surveyed in 1993 (see figure 4.4).18 In general, for Kōmeitō’s supporters,
the JSP, the second leftist party, was closest to them in the Diet in 1983 and
1993. However, these self-identified ideological locations do not match the
policy shifts of Kōmeitō toward the right, in particular with regard to na-
tional security issues. An investigation of specific policy positions reveals
a more nuanced picture of party alignment during this period.
In postwar Japanese party politics, security issues rather than social
welfare issues shaped the ideological spectrum (Otake 1999). In particu-
lar, there is a line between conservative and progressive stances concern-
ing the two prominent security policies regarding the Self-Defense Forces
and the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. The attitudes toward these two issues
should correlate if policy preferences were formed along ideological lines.
However, Kōmeitō supporters had inconsistent preferences with regard to
national security: they were on the left regarding the Self-Defense Forces
and on the right regarding the U.S.–Japan security issue (see figure 4.5).19
18
Questions on the respondents’ ideological position were included in the JES data in
1983 and JES II data in 1993, but not in the 1976 survey. Figure 4.4 shows the averages of
self-identified ideological positions among each party’s supporters on a five-point scale. The
spectrum encompasses the JCP on the left side and the LDP on the right. Kōmeitō was mod-
erate left (2.68) in 1983 and then moved leftward (2.22) in 1993. In 1993, the answers to the
question were mapped on a ten-point scale, but were remapped on a five-point scale for
easier comparison.
19
The surveys in 1976 and 1983 featured the same questions on a variety of policies. With
regard to the topic of security, the respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed
with the statements that “Japan’s defense force should be strengthened” and that “Japan
should strengthen the U.S.–Japan security arrangement.” In 1993, with regard to Japan’s in-
ternational contribution, the respondents were asked which of the following two statements
Probing for specific policy questions in surveys revealed that, with regard
to Japan’s defense force policy, Kōmeitō supporters moved left. Kōmeitō
supporters who stood on the moderate left position along with the DSP
in 1976 moved even further toward the left, almost sharing the JSP’s posi-
tion (marked “A” in figure 4.5). At the same time, with regard to the U.S.–
Japan security issue, Kōmeitō supporters took a step to the right, although
only a slight one (marked “B” in figure 4.5). Interestingly, in 1976 Kōmeitō
supporters were on the center-left position, hoping for a strengthening of
the U.S.–Japan security alliance even more than DSP supporters, where-
as in 1983 they moved to the center-right position and thus closer to the
LDP. These two policy preferences are contradictory and demonstrate that
Kōmeitō supporters were not consistent ideologues.
The foreign policy issues that emerged after the end of the Cold War
also reflect the inconsistency of Kōmeitō supporters’ preferences concern-
ing security. As for Japan’s international contribution, Kōmeitō support-
ers were more likely in 1993—even more likely than LDP members—to
subscribe to the idea that Japan would need to be involved with military
matters in order to make an effective international contribution (marked
with a “C” in figure 4.5).
Because of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, sending the Self-
Defense Forces overseas, especially to places where it might be involved
in military actions, was a sensitive issue in Japanese politics. Kōmeitō and
the DSP cooperated with the LDP, which at the time lost its majority in
the Upper House, in order to pass the PKO (Peacekeeping Operation) Co-
operation Bill in June 1992. The law allows the government to send the
Self-Defense Forces overseas to engage in United Nations peacekeeping
operations, but only in places where the Self-Defense Forces would not
need to use firearms. This legislative behavior of the leaderships might
have led Kōmeitō and DSP supporters to take positive positions. Their
opinions, however, were beyond the policy position of leaders, who were
not willing to accept having the Japan Self-Defense Forces be involved in
military operations.
These analyses of policy preferences suggest that Kōmeitō supporters
failed to form ideologically consistent positions, in particular with regard
to security issues. The party’s dovish rhetoric, rooted in Sōka Gakkai
principles, might have made Kōmeitō supporters perceive themselves as
standing on a position close to the leftist parties. However, when it came
was closer to their own opinion: (1) “If Japan sticks to only nonmilitary matters, I don’t think
it is possible to make a significant international contribution” and (2) “Even if Japan limits
itself to only nonmilitary matters, I think it is possible to make a significant international
contribution.”
A. Japan’s defense forces should be strengthened (1 = “Disagree”; 5 = “Agree”)
1976:
1983:
B. Japan should strengthen the U.S.–Japan security arrangement (1 = “Disagree”;

5 = “Agree”)
1976:
1983:
C. Japan’s International Contribution (1 = “Should stick to nonmilitary matters”;

4 = “Should not”).
Figure 4.5 Policy positions in security of party supporters

Sources: JABISS (1976), JES (1983), and JES II (1993).
to security issues, including the U.S.–Japan security alliance and interna-

tional contributions, they did not share opinions with socialists and com-
munists, and instead joined the right-wing camp. This inconsistency con-
cerning policy positions on security widened the range of party strategies,
allowing party elites to move Kōmeitō to the right.
Kōmeitō Voters’ Partisanship
Examining the structure of Kōmeitō supporters’ partisanship reveals that
the party’s rightward movement was not a mass-driven phenomenon. Al-
though Kōmeitō leaders considered the possibility of forming a coalition
with the LDP in the 1980s, Kōmeitō supporters clearly preferred the DSP
and the JSP (see table 4.2).20 During the period between 1976 and 1993,
Kōmeitō supporters reported the highest levels of sympathy with the DSP,
while in the 1990s they grew distant from the JSP. Consistent with party
behavior, Kōmeitō supporters had shown the least degree of attachment
to the JCP throughout this period. From the late 1970s to early 1990s, the
governing LDP became more unpopular among Kōmeitō supporters.
This structure of party support among Kōmeitō supporters—that is,
supportive of the DSP and JSP, and opposed to the LDP and JCP—becomes
even clearer when one looks at the survey question on “a party you would
never support” (kyohi seitō). Table 4.3 shows that very few Kōmeitō sup-
porters rejected the DSP and that the rejection of the JSP reached only to
around 10 percent at most, while the LDP and JCP, already unpopular
among Kōmeitō supporters in the 1970s, became even more unpopular
in the 1980s and 1990s.21 This trend of having more antagonistic attitudes
toward the LDP even after the party’s policy shift clearly contradicted the
mass-driven perspective, which emphasized the support base’s role in
guiding the party’s rightward turn in policies. It was the elite, not the sup-
port base, that drove the policy shift.
Another striking finding here is the rapid increase in respondents who
refused to support the JCP. In the 1980s and 1990s, two-thirds said that the
JCP was the last party they would support.22 This structure of partisanship
20
Derived from the Feeling Thermometer method, table 4.2 shows the averages of “feel-
ing” among Kōmeitō supporters toward other parties. The respondents were asked to rate
their affect toward parties on a scale ranging from 0 (the coldest feeling) to 100 (the warmest
feeling), with 50 being neutral. The higher values on the table indicate higher levels of attach-
ment toward another party.
21
The respondents could choose multiple parties.
22
In turn, Kōmeitō was unpopular both among other party supporters and among in-
dependents, with JCP supporters disliking it most. This tendency can be confirmed for the
mid-1990s (see Kabashima and Reed 2000). The proportion of JCP supporters who would
never support Kōmeitō increased from 18% in 1976 to 38.3% in 1983 and to 46.9% in 1993.
Table 4.2 Feeling thermometer degrees toward

other parties among Kōmeitō supporters
(average)
1976 1983 1993
LDP 36.4 33.3 25.2
JSP 42.5 40.4 30.3
DSP 44.0 47.1 41.4
JCP 23.3 20.1 16.3
Table 4.3 “A party you would never support”

among Kōmeitō supporters
1976 1983 1993
LDP 23.4% 26.7% 29.4%
JSP 0.0% 9.3% 8.3%
DSP 0.0% 2.7% 2.8%
JCP 38.3% 62.7% 67.0%
reflects the fate of the Sōka Gakkai–JCP accord in the 1970s. From the 1970s
to the 1990s, Kōmeitō came into serious conflict with the JCP. As discussed
earlier, the Sōka Gakkai–JCP accord was made public and then rejected
by Kōmeitō leaders in 1975. Kōmeitō could not accept the accord since in
their electoral campaigns Sōka Gakkai members were competing against
the JCP organization for common target votes. However, the revelation of
the Sōka Gakkai–JCP accord in 1975 did not seem to trigger antagonism
among JCP supporters. The reason might be that even after the unilat-
eral abandonment on the Sōka Gakkai–Kōmeitō side, the JCP refrained
from criticizing Sōka Gakkai until 1979 (Shimada and Yano 2010). In 1976,
Kōmeitō supporters disliked the JCP but to a relatively low degree, while
JCP supporters did not show strong antagonism. In 1983, however, they
quarreled harshly with each other due to the wiretap scandal in 1979. Af-
ter this revelation, the JCP launched political attacks against Sōka Gakkai
and Kōmeitō, and since then supporters of the two parties have expressed
public loathing of each other, making cooperation impossible.
Kōmeitō’s rightward turn brought the attempt to gain governing status
to fruition in 1993, when it became one of the ruling parties for the first
time in its history. This non-LDP eight-party coalition was formed as a
consequence of several groups of LDP politicians having left the party
while making an agreement with other opposition parties, except for the
JCP, to set up a new government. For Kōmeitō, which had associated with
some like-minded LDP members since the 1980s, the LDP split posed a
chance to bring about a change in the Diet, more or less as it had con-
ceived, while keeping the JCP out of the government.
Conclusion
The current public image of Kōmeitō rests upon two pillars: it is a reli-
gious outsider party and a coalition partner of the LDP. The former image
dates back to the 1960s, when Kōmeitō was under direct control by the
Sōka Gakkai leadership and maintained a clear religious goal and am-
biguous political objectives. The second image developed four decades
later, when the then outsider took a seat of power as a good friend of the
long-term governing LDP. This turnabout becomes comprehensible when
light is shed on how Kōmeitō, after the split from its religious parent orga-
nization, Sōka Gakkai, gradually adjusted its political strategies between
1970 and 1993.
This chapter has investigated how Kōmeitō, which dropped its reli-
gious goals after declaring a separation of politics and religion in 1970,
evolved its political strategies through a search for its raison d’être in
politics. At the outset, the party headed for a progressive alliance with
the DSP and the JSP in an attempt to redefine itself as a people’s party in
opposition to the LDP and an effort to recover from the public distrust
caused by Sōka Gakkai’s scandals. However, these attempts did not bear
fruit because Kōmeitō failed to coordinate with other opposition partners.
Kōmeitō then turned to the right in hope of creating a possible coalition
with the LDP—an arrangement that would allow the party to exert influ-
ence over debates in the Diet. Given that Sōka Gakkai membership had
hit a ceiling and that Kōmeitō therefore could not expect a drastic increase
in supporters mobilized by Sōka Gakkai members, this was a reasonable
decision for the party to make. A rightward shift could allow it to play a
decisive role in policymaking, and the upward mobility of Sōka Gakkai
members worked in favor of Kōmeitō’s political steering.
The party’s move to the right not only brought about informal coopera-
tion with the LDP and the DSP from 1989 to 1993 but also contributed to
their being in power as part of the non-LDP eight-party coalition, in which

the JSP on the left and the Renewal Party (RP; Shinseitō) on the right co-
existed. After the coalition’s collapse in 1994, Kōmeitō sought a way of
adapting to the new electoral system, a combination of the single-member
districts and the proportional representative system, and thus established
the New Frontier Party (NFP; Shinshintō), a merger of other small parties
including the RP, the Japan New Party, and the DSP, for the purpose of
becoming an alternative to the LDP in the anticipated two-party system.23
However, due to internal divisions, the NFP divided in 1997 and Kōmeitō
returned thereafter to the Diet.24
In 1999, Kōmeitō regained government status by entering into coali-
tion, this time with the LDP and the Liberal Party (Jiyutō). Evolving elec-
toral cooperation kept the LDP-Kōmeitō coalition in power until 2009,
and the LDP-Kōmeitō coalition was reelected to government (without any
other parties) in December 2012. Since critics strongly condemned what
they called the party’s greedy desire for power while reinvoking its inex-
tricable connection with Sōka Gakkai, this generated an impression that
Kōmeitō jumped for this opportunity to gain ministerial posts. Neverthe-
less, taking Kōmeitō’s past activities into account reveals that the party
had been gearing up for a coalition with the LDP since the 1980s. Cer-
tainly, the fact that it was founded originally as a religious and antisystem
party necessitated a long transformation process. Kōmeitō’s participation
in government in 1999 did not occur all of a sudden but should be seen
against the backdrop of Kōmeitō’s decades-long track record.
From the 1970s to the mid-1990s, Kōmeitō not only reworked its policy
positions but also transformed fundamentally from a branch of a reli-
gious organization to a political party backed by a religious organization.
Kōmeitō’s development in the 1970s and 1980s provides insight into how
political logic deviates from religious logic. As the instance of the “Accord
on Agreement in Views” concluded between Sōka Gakkai and the JCP il-
lustrates, religious interests are not always compatible with political goals
and, when they collided, Kōmeitō utilized the principle of a division be-
tween politics and religion to reject its parent organization’s interventions.
23
After the collapse of this non-LDP regime, the party reorganized itself as New Party
Kōmei (Shintō Kōmei) and immediately participated in the New Frontier Party in December
1994 under Ozawa Ichirō’s initiatives, while setting up a party known as Kōmei only for
local politicians as well as for Upper House members who had uncontested seats over the
upcoming election.
24
The NFP’s dissolution led former Kōmeitō members to create a party called New Party
Peace (Shintō Heiwa) for Lower House members and the Reimei Club for Upper House
members. The reunion of all parties descended from former Kōmeitō was delayed until late
1998 when they launched New Kōmeitō.
For the two Kōmeitō party founders, Takeiri and Yano, contention be-
tween political and religious leadership eventually became irreconcilable.
In a serialized interview published in Asahi Shimbun, Takeiri complained
outspokenly that “more than 80 percent of my energy was consumed in
addressing Sōka Gakkai’s demands. The relation between Kōmeitō and
Sōka Gakkai was not one that connected each through a loop line, but one
that radiated unilaterally [from Sōka Gakkai]” (interview with Takeiri in
Asahi, 17 September 1998). This statement ignited furious criticism from
Sōka Gakkai against Takeiri, who was labeled an “idiot” and “swindler”
in Gakkai publications.25 Finally, the relationship ended with Takeiri’s ex-
communication from the religious organization. Yano took a similar path,
making critical remarks about Sōka Gakkai in the media after his retire-
ment from Kōmeitō. Ultimately, he voluntarily left the religious organiza-
tion and filed several lawsuits against it.26 Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai’s
case thus reveals that friction ensues when politics and religion are associ-
ated closely.
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2014.
Part IV: The Structure
Five
How Kōmeitō Politicians Get Elected
George Ehrhardt
Introduction
Though many Japanese religious groups have entered politics, none have
succeeded like Sōka Gakkai. As recounted in chapter 2, groups such as
Tenrikyō and Shinshūren have sponsored the election of individual politi-
cians under the umbrella of a major political party, but none have created
a viable political party. Kōmeitō’s success in parlaying Sōka Gakkai sup-
port into its position as the third-largest party in the Diet, and a swing bloc
on key issues, deserves an explanation. How do they do it?
Predictably, this success has engendered a backlash, not only from oth-
er religious groups (see chapter 9), but from writers as well, and this ques-
tion of how Kōmeitō mobilizes votes is a key point in the debate. While
legally separate, rank-and-file Sōka Gakkai members connect Kōmeitō
partisanship to their religious beliefs, and Kōmeitō electioneering to their
religious practice (see chapter 3). Critics argue that this invocation of re-
ligious beliefs for political mobilization violates believers’ freedom of
choice: members of Sōka Gakkai vote Kōmeitō because they are unable to
do anything else (Etō 2003; Yamada 2004, 134).
Journalists writing about Sōka Gakkai are prone to hyperbolic accusa-
tions of mind control, but even cooler-headed academic writers have little
to offer on this point. Initial analyses claimed that Sōka Gakkai members
reliably voted Kōmeitō because they had subsumed their identity into
an isolated mass movement, but White (1970) had disproved this by the
end of the 1960s. Contemporary English-language textbooks like Curtis’s
(1999) and Hrebenar’s (2000) assert that Sōka Gakkai members support
Kōmeitō but don’t explore why. In the Japanese-language literature, Hori
(1985) asserts that religious leaders determine followers’ votes by asking
them to sign party registration cards—as if that is all that one needs to
know in order to explain their actual vote. What’s missing in the literature
114 George Ehrhardt
is any sense of process—how, exactly, does Sōka Gakkai membership lead

one to support Kōmeitō?
In the wider world of comparative politics outside Japan, however,
scholars have looked at diverse examples of successful religiously ori-
ented political mobilization. Some well-known examples include Chris-
tian Democratic parties in Western Europe, black churches’ role in the
U.S. civil rights movement, Islamic parties in Algeria and Turkey, and the
success of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu party in India. One theme
in this research is the importance of organization. Religious organizations
give members the opportunity to practice the skills of political life; they
strengthen social networks, they maintain efficient channels for distribut-
ing information, and they facilitate political participation. Applied to the
Japanese case, the comparative literature disenchants the Sōka Gakkai–
Kōmeitō connection and demands we look at actual organizational behav-
ior to understand how Kōmeitō politicians get elected.
To do that, this chapter provides an inside look at the party’s Upper
House campaign of 2010. That summer, I observed campaigns by Kōmeitō
candidates in Tokyo (Takeya Toshiko) and Saitama (Nishida Makoto). My
observation included both party activity and separate Sōka Gakkai orga-
nizational activity. This time allowed for lengthy, albeit informal, discus-
sions with Kōmeitō party officials, campaign staff, and volunteers, which
supplemented my earlier fieldwork with Sōka Gakkai in 2007.
Both candidates ran in prefectural multimember districts. Takeya, a
first-time candidate, was one of twenty-four candidates (eight from major
parties) competing for five seats, while Nishida, an incumbent, was one
of ten (eight from major parties) running for three seats. One consequence
of these numbers was the near absence of LDP-Kōmeitō electoral coopera-
tion. In Tokyo especially, where the LDP was trying to win two of the five
seats, it lacked the votes to send any to Kōmeitō candidates. Only one LDP
candidate ran in Saitama, but even so, according to campaign staff I spent
time with, there was no official cooperation. They suggested there might
be occasional cases of cooperation at a local level, but nothing at a party
level. In the end, both Takeya and Nishida secured seats in the Diet with
second-place finishes.1
Based on this experience, I argue that Kōmeitō’s success is not just a
matter of the Sōka Gakkai’s commitment or size. It is a function of how
efficiently Sōka Gakkai social networks are integrated into Kōmeitō elec-
tioneering. Considered separately, neither Kōmeitō nor Sōka Gakkai is
unique: Kōmeitō campaigns like a “normal” political party, and many
1
In another case of competition between Kōmeitō and the JCP, Takeya’s victory was ac-
companied by the defeat of the JCP’s incumbent, Koike Akira.
How Kōmeitō Politicians Get Elected 115
other religious groups encourage political participation. Considered to-

gether, however, they reveal the potential synergies between a political
party and a religious organization.
Electoral law forces Kōmeitō to structure its electioneering like that of
other Japanese parties: three-week-long campaigns and a near-prohibition
on advertising make it impossible to treat issues in any great depth during
the election, or even do little more than meet as many voters as possible.
This divides the campaign into two distinct stages: a long preelection pe-
riod during which the party and candidates attempt to persuade voters to
become partisans, and a short but intense official campaign season when
they attempt to mobilize their supporters.
This conceptual division comes from studies of American politics.
Research suggests that early campaigning has little effect on turnout or
vote shares independent of partisanship, but it does appear to build par-
tisanship and make it relevant (Finkel 1993; Gelman and King 1993). This
stage (persuasion) is primarily one-way: parties provide voters with in-
formation. This makes it easier for voters to participate in politics because
it takes less effort to learn about the candidates, but it also tilts them in
the direction of what the party wants them to know, rather than what a
wholly rational voter should know. However, as the election nears and
attitudes harden, campaigns lose their ability to create new partisans and
focus instead on mobilizing supporter turnout (Shaw 1999; Holbrook and
McClurg 2005).
While the structure of Kōmeitō electioneering resembles that of other
parties, its integration with Sōka Gakkai creates three noteworthy differ-
ences. First, the party’s connection to Sōka Gakkai means that its persua-
sion and mobilization efforts are not only integrated with the religious
organization, they are to a large extent “outsourced” to that group. Sec-
ond, Kōmeitō’s party-centered structure produces changes in campaign
staffing and participation. The last effect of integration is perhaps the most
interesting: some Kōmeitō practices are driven by their usefulness for pro-
moting and monitoring Sōka Gakkai religious activity, not by their effec-
tiveness in winning political office.
The next two sections of this chapter follow the chronology of Japanese
campaigns—an analysis of Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō persuasion first,
then a look at mobilization.
Persuasion
Persuasion is an attempt to alter voters’ perceptions of a party or candi-
date (Huber and Arceneaux 2007). While some voters are committed to a
particular party, others “float” between parties, offering them an incentive
116 George Ehrhardt
to reach beyond their base to secure new voters at election time. In mass
media campaigns like those in the United States or Western Europe, this
involves identifying images or strengths the party can advertise, trying to
create a positive impression among voters (Smith 2009). Political actors
can also change the weights voters assign to different preferences, con-
vincing them to prioritize issues on which the candidate has a favorable
reputation—a process called “priming.” In Japan, however, campaign re-
strictions, particularly the stringent limits on advertising, force parties to
reach out in different ways from those in the United States.
Japanese parties rely primarily on social networks to spread their mes-
sage, not the mass media, and Kōmeitō is no exception. It uses these to
give its messages the credibility to make listeners consider it, and Sōka
Gakkai does the same through its official communications with members.
In the months leading up to the election, the two organizations’ persua-
sive work generally runs on separate tracks. There is some cooperation,
such as how the party provides promotional material for Sōka Gakkai use,
and high-level coordination on future mobilization activities, but we can
say that during this stage, Sōka Gakkai primes its members for Kōmeitō
partisanship, while Kōmeitō reaches out to persuade nonmembers.
Kōmeitō Persuasive Activity
For aspiring national politicians, the real campaign begins as much as a
year before the “official” campaign does. During this period Japanese can-
didates leave their loudspeaker trucks in the garage, but that does not
mean they are less active. Their most important goal is lining up endorse-
ments from companies and political associations, while their staff pre-
pares for the frenzy of the official campaign.
One crucial difference between candidate-centric politicians in the LDP
and DPJ and Kōmeitō politicians is the composition of their staff. LDP
politicians draw their staff from their personal support networks (kōenkai).
Some may work for a wage, others may volunteer during the campaign
season, but all are personally linked to the candidate. For LDP and DPJ
politicians, outside help is usually limited to that provided by senior poli-
ticians with assistants to spare, either because their district is safe or they
have the money to pay for more staff, and staff dispatched by sympathetic
companies or organizations. Kōmeitō candidates, in contrast, rely on par-
ty headquarters for their staff.2 Candidate Takeya’s office, for example,
2
Hori (1985) suggests that this has not always been the case: the national railway work-
ers union (Kokurō) endorsed Kōmeitō in the 1984 Lower House elections, and some of its
members volunteered at Kōmeitō offices, though they reported feeling out of place in the
heavy environment of Sōka Gakkai.
was entirely staffed by party officials. According to the workers I talked to

there, none of them had followed Takeya from her previous career. Since
she was a public accountant (CPA) before entering politics, one might ex-
pect her to bring her own accountant, but even that person came from
party headquarters.
This example shows the contrast between how LDP politicians get elect-
ed and how their Kōmeitō counterparts get elected. Recalling the work of
Curtis and others on LDP campaigns, it is clear that LDP politicians run
on the strength of their own social networks. These networks may be resi-
due from a prior career (in construction or in agriculture, for example), or
they might be a legacy of their father’s career (for second/third generation
politicians), but either way they represent a network with the politician
at the center. Kōmeitō campaigns are different. The candidate is part of
a larger network, not the hub of a wheel. No one I talked to (up to the
level of local assemblyman and national Diet member personal assistants)
could explain why or how Takeya had been selected to run in Tokyo. They
all sounded pleased with the pick, but it seemed obvious that if the party
had selected someone else, they would have accepted that person, too.3
From what I saw of Takeya’s and Nishida’s campaigns, they rode the
social networks of local politicians, not those of the candidate.4 In Ameri-
can political parlance, Kōmeitō wins or loses on the strength of its “ground
game”: over three thousand active local politicians—city, ward, and pre-
fectural assemblymen—recruiting their supporters for the candidate, and
an equal number of retired politicians bringing their own experience and
contacts to their campaign volunteer work. While the headquarters staff
slowly prepares to move into high gear during the official election, these
local politicians are busy reaching out to potential supporters. Since the
religious organization is taking care of its own members, Kōmeitō politi-
cians are free to spend their time recruiting nonmembers, just like LDP or
DPJ politicians do. These can be voters with relevant policy concerns or
those with connections to local Kōmeitō politicians.
These local politicians have their own contacts among their district’s
social and professional organizations, in some cases dating back decades.
In Takeya’s case, for example, her campaign manager Ishii Yoshinobu had
been a Tokyo prefectural assemblyman for more than forty years, until his
recent retirement. During the persuasion stage, the local politicians’ first
responsibility is to make contact with political associations (seiji dantai)
in their district and bring them on board with the campaign. As it turned
3
See chapter 6 for more detail on Kōmeitō candidate selection.
4
Scholars have noted the importance of local politicians to the LDP as well as for deter-
mining voter turnout (see Asano 1998, 2003).
118 George Ehrhardt
out, the Tokyo Association of Bus Companies is located in Ishii’s former

territory, and he went to its director and asked for a letter indicating the
organization’s support. Armed with that letter, he traveled to the offices
of the association’s members—in this case the respective bus companies—
and informed them that their political lobbying arm had decided to sup-
port Kōmeitō, asking the companies’ managers to spread the word to their
employees. In Takeya’s case, Ishii was not her only pillar of support—the
wall of her campaign office was plastered with letters like this from dif-
ferent organizations. As a working CPA, for example, Takeya was able to
gather support from the national CPA association. Besides recommenda-
tions from professional associations, local assemblymen reach out to indi-
vidual companies in hopes they will urge their employees to vote Kōmeitō.
In conversation, several local politicians privately acknowledged that the
bulk of these company endorsements came from small businesses that are
owned by members of Sōka Gakkai.
The ratio of Sōka Gakkai support to non–Sōka Gakkai support for
Kōmeitō politicians is a perennial question, and anecdotes about in-
dividual companies or industry groups do not provide a clear answer.
Nishida’s campaign staff estimated that they would need 650,000 votes to
win, of which they could count on only 400,000 from Sōka Gakkai voters
(as mentioned earlier, they did not expect votes from the LDP organiza-
tion). In light of the impressive apparatus for member turnout monitoring
described in this chapter, the source seems credible. In the end, Nishida
received 594,678 votes (18.4%), which implies that approximately a third
of his support came from non-Sōka Gakkai members. Given the lack of
LDP electoral cooperation in the Saitama election, this result supports ear-
lier findings (Ehrhardt 2009) that, in general, Kōmeitō politicians derive
almost half of their votes from sources outside Sōka Gakkai.
Once associations and companies are on board with a Kōmeitō candi-
date, two things happen before the campaign officially begins. If schedul-
ing permits, the candidate herself visits the company, using the manager
or owner’s explicit approval to win over employees. Second, the party
takes the names of individuals who agree to be contacted later by the
party. Collecting these lists is important because it allows Kōmeitō to call
them legally during the official campaign. At this point, the party does
not attempt to mobilize those voters; it only attempts to create a favorable
impression of voting Kōmeitō.
It is important to recognize, though, that not all external support comes
from such personal or workplace connections. Kōmeitō does draw sup-
port for policy reasons in the same way as other parties. A surprising ex-
ample of this appeared in the 2010 campaign, as newspapers noted that
the Kōmeitō candidate in Saitama polled surprisingly well in rural areas
(Mainichi, 5 July 2010). Saitama is primarily an urban prefecture, a bed-

room prefecture for those commuting to Tokyo, but some farmers remain.
The principal obstacles to farming in the prefecture are taxes; property
taxes jump for land located in regions designated for residential use, and
death taxes can force rural families to sell their land to developers in order
to pay off the estate. As a party, though, Kōmeitō has pushed to allow
farmers to keep their land taxed at agricultural rates as long as they con-
tinue to farm it, and to suspend death taxes as long as the children of the
deceased continue to farm the land. Accordingly, the local Japan Agricul-
ture Federations (Nōkyō) and other agricultural organizations asked their
members to support Nishida, much as the Tokyo Bus Association asked its
members to support Takeya.5
Nor is that the only example. After several years in which Kōmeitō
politicians had filled the position of minister of land and transport, the
Saitama Construction Association—a former pillar of LDP support—also
began to endorse Kōmeitō (Yomiuri, 20 June 2004; Asahi, 22 November
2006, Saitama edition).
Sōka Gakkai Persuasive Activity
Meanwhile, the religious organization is reaching out to its members, pre-
paring them for the Kōmeitō messages they’ll hear during the campaign.
Religious voters have diverse and often contradictory concerns, just like
secular voters, and there is no way to know in advance which set of issues
will rise to the top as they consider whom to vote for (Gelman and King
1993). “Priming” is an attempt to manipulate that selection of issues by
raising a particular issue’s profile in advance (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994). A
candidate with a reputation for being tough on crime, for example, might
want to encourage the media to discuss the rising murder rate, because if
that issue is foremost in a voter’s mind he would likely support the can-
didate, even if he disagreed on other issues. Sōka Gakkai does the same,
using its several private channels to raise issues that favor Kōmeitō.6
The most obvious way for the leadership of Sōka Gakkai to prime mem-
bers is by coordinating the content of the speeches they give at meetings.
For regular members, these meetings typically include weekly divisional
meetings (divided by age and sex) and monthly zadankai, gatherings of all
members in the neighborhood. Leaders stay busy attending the zadankai
of neighborhoods within their jurisdiction, which give them opportunities
to close the meeting with a ten- to twenty-minute speech. Normally these
5
See also www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/sangiin/2010/jyosei/jyoban/ye11.htm (accessed
Aug. 2013).
6
The following discussion is based on material published in Ehrhardt (2009).
120 George Ehrhardt
speeches feature a mix of morality and theology, but they can also prime
members by raising political issues.
For example, uncertainty about the 2009 Lower House election timing
led Sōka Gakkai to begin priming its members in December of 2007, while
I was attending meetings. At the time, Kōmeitō was under a cloud for
its cooperation with the ruling LDP, and its complicity in the loss of 50
million government pension (social security) accounts. The oppositional
Democratic Party was naturally raising these issues in the media, hoping
voters would focus on the LDP’s malfeasance when it came time to vote.
To resist this, Sōka Gakkai leaders raised the profile of political corruption
and illegal contributions; each speaker I heard phrased the issues slightly
differently, but they all shared a common theme.
This choice of issues was no coincidence. One of Kōmeitō’s accomplish-
ments in the preceding years had been convincing the LDP to place more
stringent reporting requirements on political funds—requiring receipts
down to every last yen. When election season finally arrived, Kōmeitō
candidates emphasized that accomplishment and criticized the other par-
ties for taking illegal funds. That message activated the primed sentiments
of Gakkai members, encouraging them to support Kōmeitō for that rea-
son, even though they were unhappy with other aspects of Kōmeitō’s per-
formance. In short, the two organizations coordinate like tag-team sales-
men, with Sōka Gakkai warming voters up, and Kōmeitō coming in to
close the deal.
Another channel Sōka Gakkai uses to prime voters is its publications.
In addition to the organization’s daily paper (Seikyō Shimbun), the Sōka
Gakkai publishing arm puts out several periodicals: some of these (e.g.,
Daibyaku Rengei) are theological study magazines, but others (e.g., Ushio,
Daisan Bunmei) include articles on public policy. While there is no system-
atic study relating the themes of Sōka Gakkai policy articles with later
Kōmeitō campaign messages, anecdotal evidence suggests a connection.
Consider this example from Daisan Bunmei in the July 2007 issue, just be-
fore that year’s Upper House election (Daisan Bunmei, July 2007, 45). The
magazine included an editorial about the “two-party system” that begins
by describing an LDP flyer claiming Democratic Party leader Kan Naoto
is responsible for the disastrous state of Japan’s public pension system,
and then it describes a proposed DPJ flyer claiming the LDP wants to
steal pension money. The editorial insists the DPJ went overboard in its
counterattack, portraying the two major parties as doing little more than
mudslinging for votes, losing track of the real issues. In particular, the ar-
ticle continues, the real guilty one here is DPJ leader Ozawa Ichirō. If this
continues, the editors argue, Japanese politics will be swayed by words
and performances, not policy. At the very end they ask: “What party is
carrying out politics that is responsible to the Japanese people?” There

is no overt encouragement to vote Kōmeitō, and if we didn’t follow the
party’s campaign rhetoric we might miss its main point. Kōmeitō’s elec-
tion slogan that year was “the responsible (sekinin) party.” The Sōka Gak-
kai magazine primes its readers to respond positively to messages about
being responsible, knowing that Kōmeitō politicians will hit the stumps
with rhetoric about how they alone are responsible.
This focus on implicit priming does prevent Sōka Gakkai from explic-
itly promoting Kōmeitō in the course of its normal operation. One way
it does so is by inviting individuals that Kōmeitō has singled out to run
in upcoming elections to visit Sōka Gakkai meetings, much like other re-
ligious organizations do. These serve a dual purpose: they increase the
candidates’ name recognition among Sōka Gakkai members, but they also
support the party’s argument that it “listens to the people” more than
other parties.7 Attendance at meetings does offer constituents the oppor-
tunity to share their views with candidates, but it also primes them to
respond positively to a Kōmeitō campaign message.
Another form of campaign outreach that Kōmeitō uses to prime mem-
bers of Sōka Gakkai in the months leading up to campaign season is show-
ing party videos at divisional meetings. The videos I have been able to
watch are similarly structured. They center on a salient policy issue, ex-
plaining why it is a problem and how Kōmeitō is working to solve it. For
example, in the 2007 election when the pension issue was on everyone’s
mind, Kōmeitō argued that the real source of a pension system’s strength is
having enough young workers paying in, and this is the party’s specialty.
Kōmeitō politicians talked about their signature achievement—monthly
payments to anyone raising small children (jidoteate). The 2008 video was
similar, but focused on medical care rather than pensions. It took its cue
from recent cases where patients died after hours in an ambulance looking
for a hospital that would admit them, plugging the Kōmeitō’s policy goal
of replicating Tokyo’s emergency information center in every prefecture.
The format is different, but the strategy is the same: highlight a particular
problem as the issue voters should consider during the election, then let
Kōmeitō explain how it’s the best party to deal with that particular issue.
Surprisingly, the political message of Sōka Gakkai avoids identity poli-
tics. It would have been trivial for the video editors to include subtle ref-
erences in any of the videos I saw, such as a quote from Sōka Gakkai’s
honorary president Ikeda Daisaku, a testimonial from a celebrity known
7
For example, the Kōmeitō 3000 campaign in 2010 conveyed the image that Kōmeitō has
the largest network of local politicians feeding information from constituents up to national
politicians.
122 George Ehrhardt
to be a member of Sōka Gakkai, or a building of the religious organization

in the visual background, but none of these appeared. When authority
figures are filmed to buttress Kōmeitō arguments, they tend to use experts
from outside Sōka Gakkai, like professor-turned–cabinet minister Take-
naka Heizō. Nor was there mention of Sōka Gakkai–specific issues, like
freedom of religion, which could serve as code words for a Sōka Gakkai
social identity. Whereas conversation with members reveals that, when
asked, they admit to seeing Kōmeitō politicians as “like us,” those identity
ties are not used to justify Sōka Gakkai’s mobilization efforts.8
Although researchers have not been privy to top-level strategy discus-
sions, my suspicion is that the organizations’ leaders recognize the con-
tradiction between an identity-based claim and the central justification
for supporting Kōmeitō. A 2009 survey found that the number one rea-
son members of Sōka Gakkai gave for supporting Kōmeitō was that “it
works for the common people instead of special interests like the other
parties” (Ehrhardt 2009). In other words, Sōka Gakkai members’ sense of
Kōmeitō’s worth is rooted in their feeling that the religion is not an ex-
clusive group with its own particular interest. This, obviously, makes it
self-destructive for Kōmeitō politicians to claim that they will push for a
Sōka Gakkai identity-based interest, or for Sōka Gakkai leaders to recom-
mend Kōmeitō support for simple identity reasons.9 Whatever justifica-
tion political leaders use to encourage new partisans, however, partisan-
ship alone will not win elections.
At this point in the campaign timeline, there is little visible contact be-
tween Kōmeitō politicians and Sōka Gakkai leaders. The two organiza-
tions split responsibilities, with Kōmeitō performing external outreach
while Sōka Gakkai solidifies its members’ support. One area where it does
happen regularly, however, is in planning for events during the official
campaign. These rallies—short outdoor speeches during the day and lon-
ger indoor speeches at night—are aimed at a Sōka Gakkai audience, and,
according to the party officials I talked to, candidate staff rely on Sōka
Gakkai leaders to provide suitable times and locations within their area of
8
On the other side, Kōmeitō campaign rallies use endorsements from media stars who
are openly members of Sōka Gakkai.
9
This raises an interesting point about Kōmeitō support. In general, representation can
be geographical (e.g., US-American election districts) or functional (e.g., European propor-
tional representation parties like the Greens). The former suppresses cleavages within the
district, the latter uses them. On the surface, Kōmeitō looks like a functional party that oper-
ates along religious cleavages. Inside the party’s support base, however, it portrays itself as
a geographic party, insisting that religious cleavages are irrelevant to its policies. I suspect
this mismatch between external expectations and internal justification lies behind perennial
Kōmeitō complaints of being misunderstood by secular voters and the media.
responsibility. Not only does this promote attendance, it also allows local
Sōka Gakkai leaders to organize their members to volunteer at the rallies.
Mobilization
Democracy measures popular support by how many citizens vote for a
candidate or party, which means that no matter how persuasive a cam-
paign is, its reservoir of popular support means nothing unless it con-
vinces its supporters to vote. Turning support into votes is referred to as
mobilization. To do this, campaign managers have an array of techniques:
telephone calls, door-to-door canvassing, door hangers, direct mail, chauf-
feuring voters to the polling booth, candidate appearances, email broad-
casts, ostensibly nonpartisan vote-promotion events like the “rock-the-
vote” concerts held in the United States, and others. While each of these
works differently, research consistently supports several general proposi-
tions about mobilization:
• Personal contact spurs citizens to vote, as shown in an extensive lit-
erature documenting the strength of this effect (see Gosnell 1927).10
• While not as effective as personal contact, candidate appearances
late in a race may increase partisan turnout (Jones 1998; Herr 2002).
• Parties tend to engage in more mobilization in closer races and
more in single-member districts than in proportional representa-
tion contests, because it appears to matter more in those situations
(Cox 1999; Karp et al. 2008).
• Parties direct their mobilization efforts at known partisans. For this
reason, parties prize lists of current and past supporters, but when
those are unavailable parties can target their efforts at sympathetic
regions or demographics (Holbrook and McClurg 2005).
None of these results should be a surprise to anyone who has studied
Kōmeitō politics. In fact, if one were to design organizations from the
ground up to mobilize votes based on this literature, it would look much
like Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai.
The important difference between Kōmeitō mobilization campaigns
and those in the United States is the way Japanese election law sharply
restricts candidates’ activity (McElwain 2008). Unlike American poli-
ticians, Japanese candidates cannot use political commercials on TV or
radio freely, or even pass out yard signs and bumper stickers. The law
10
The following articles offer overviews of the literature: Kramer (1973), Rosenstone and
Hansen (2002), Gerber and Green (2000), Nickerson (2005), and Alvarez et al. (2010).
124 George Ehrhardt
regulates how many leaflets they are allowed to print, along with when
and where they are allowed to hand them out. Posters are limited to publi-
cally erected poster boards, on which each candidate gets one poster. Call
centers must rely on volunteers; payment is illegal. There is also a ban on
door-to-door canvassing by supporters, something that got Sōka Gakkai
into trouble in the 1950s (see chapter 3). Candidates are only allowed to
contact the public in highly formalized ways, principally by cruising a
district in loudspeaker vans and standing outside train stations bowing
to commuters. The law even restricts the number of rallies and other cam-
paign appearances candidates can attend. As a whole, these restrictions
essentially forbid U.S.–style campaigns based on the mass media and pro-
fessional staff.
Kōmeitō Mobilization Activity
During the campaign, Kōmeitō candidates act the same as those of other
parties. They follow a grueling schedule of traveling the district with their
loudspeaker vans, giving public speeches at train stations or other crowd-
ed places, visiting companies whose management supports the candidate,
and holding rallies at night. At this point in the campaign, there is little
time for persuasion—often the speeches literally amount to no more than
repeating their name and thanking the listeners. Instead of trying to per-
suade undecided voters, candidates use these practices to put themselves
in front of friendly partisans, activating their interest in the election and
encouraging them to vote.
The key to understanding how Kōmeitō activities differ from other
campaigns is seeing how they mesh with Sōka Gakkai activism. While
Kōmeitō does pursue its own independent mobilization efforts with non–
Sōka Gakkai entities as described earlier, it also integrates Kōmeitō activi-
ties into members’ political participation. The most visible form of this is
at outdoor rallies (gaitō enzetsu), which usually find Japanese politicians
standing outside of train stations with megaphones, trying to reach busy
housewives and tired commuters. Sometimes this is an endless drone of
“My name is X, thank you for your support. My name is . . .” and other
times it features a ten- to fifteen-minute speech by the candidate and an-
other by a friendly politician. Sōka Gakkai involvement, though, makes a
Kōmeitō rally a very different experience from that of most other parties.
Near the beginning of my 2010 fieldwork I arrived early for one of these
Kōmeitō outdoor rallies at Kyodo station in Tokyo’s western suburbs, only
to find that a socialist candidate was staging one first. By any standard, it
was a failure: a couple of monotone speakers, dog-eared placards con-
demning U.S. military bases, three people (trying to) hand out pamphlets,
and no one paying them any attention. My attention flagged, and looking
around to guess where Takeya would speak, I saw a group of formally

dressed men standing by their cars in the station’s no-parking zone.
Drifting in that direction, I saw that they all wore armbands with “Staff”
written by hand. Not long afterward, a group of young women in orange
polo shirts appeared (orange was Takeya’s campaign color) and huddled
with the men. With twenty minutes to go before the candidate’s appear-
ance, people had begun to cluster in front of a supermarket, where the
young men and women were standing. One older lady appeared to take
the orange-clad young women in hand and give them directions. About
ten minutes before the candidate arrived, the young women began pass-
ing out leaflets in the form of orange-colored fans. Unlike the socialists,
these women had little trouble handing their material out. In fact, some of
the waiting ladies took several and passed them on to their friends. Soon
the growing crowd was a mass of fluttering orange. I estimated that be-
tween two-thirds and three-fourths were women (similar to other daytime
Kōmeitō rallies I attended), which is to be expected given the rally was at
noon when more men would be at work. The socialists looked incongru-
ous, lecturing to the orange-marked women around them.
Standing at the back, I was surprised when one of the white-shirted
men I had spotted earlier appeared at the back of the crowd with a roll of
finish line tape taken from a track meet. By this time the crowd of several
hundred people had covered a third or so of the station plaza’s arc, block-
ing one station exit and the supermarket.11 With bows and apologies, the
man began packing the crowd toward the street, away from the supermar-
ket. Across the plaza, other men were doing the same by the station and
crosswalks. Once the crowd had cleared a path, he unspooled his tape,
working with the other men to enclose the crowd and keep it from block-
ing transit. Watching this process, I was struck by how many in the crowd
seemed to know the men (and each other). Finally the candidate arrived,
to much excitement among the older ladies around me.
Kōmeitō outdoor rallies share a common pattern. The warm-up act
is a local politician, a town or prefectural assembly member who intro-
duces the candidate. Ideally, that person is followed by a famous media
personality active in Sōka Gakkai, but one is not always available.12 After
that, the candidate speaks for ten minutes or so, giving a standard stump
speech about his or her qualifications. For the rest of the half-hour slot a
sitting Diet member would take the microphone and close out the event
11
Takeya’s campaign budgeted six hundred fan/leaflets for each outdoor rally. From
what I saw, they were able to hand them all out at major locations (there appeared to be a
shortage at Ikebukuro Station, for example), but not at the smaller ones.
12
At one rally in Saitama I attended much of the crowd hung around after the candidate
left, apparently knowing in advance that pop singer Yamamoto Linda would appear.
126 George Ehrhardt
while the candidate climbed down from the loudspeaker van and moved
across the crowd shaking hands. When time was up, the candidate would
return to the van, give the crowd a final thank-you, and head off to his or
her next appearance. The crowd would slowly break up, as the listeners
tended to stay around and chat with each other before leaving.
There is much we can learn from these events, but the integration be-
tween Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai stood out most of all. On the surface,
there was little to link the two organizations. None of the speakers re-
ferred to Sōka Gakkai, there was no visible paraphernalia or any use of
the tri-color Sōka Gakkai insignia. When I commented to the lady who
organized the orange-clad leaflet distributors that Takeya drew quite a
crowd, she simply noted, “Yes, she has lots of fans, doesn’t she.” When I
asked the man in charge of the crowd control brigade about his affiliation,
he insisted that he was a “Kōmeitō volunteer,” and that “word comes from
Kōmeitō headquarters to do crowd control at a given time and place.”
In reality, though, he and the other men are members of a group within
the Sōka Gakkai that receives training in security and crowd control, and
watch over Sōka Gakkai’s facilities. Later in my fieldwork, when I had es-
tablished greater rapport, other members of that group who participated
in similar activities would freely admit that the instructions came from the
Sōka Gakkai leadership, not the party headquarters, so it is interesting to
note how those two refused to make any connection with the Sōka Gakkai.
There is more coordination behind the scenes as well. According to the
director of a Sōka Gakkai facility I met during the campaign, party offi-
cials consult with leaders like him about when and where to hold rallies,
relying on Sōka Gakkai to get word about the event out to its members.
It is no exaggeration to say that Kōmeitō outdoor rallies are actually Sōka
Gakkai events, at which Kōmeitō provides the speakers.
Not all candidates use them in equal proportion, of course; one of the
surprising things I observed in the 2010 election was diversity in campaign
styles among Kōmeitō candidates. Where Takeya in Tokyo did not hold
large rallies at night, Hamada in neighboring Kanagawa prefecture did.
Whereas Nishida’s campaign moved its headquarters regularly, Takeya’s
kept hers in one location throughout the campaign. In conversation with
those working in each campaign, they did not seem aware of what exactly
neighboring prefectures were doing. In retrospect, there were logical rea-
sons for each difference, but it does suggest a more decentralized party
organization than the monolithic entity that appears in the contemporary
literature.
Another example of Kōmeitō campaign diversity was Hamada Masay-
oshi’s activities in Kanagawa. While I did not follow his campaign close-
ly, he stood as a Kōmeitō candidate in the proportional representation
constituency. In practice, however, he focused his campaign on win-

ning votes in Yokohama and surrounding Kanagawa prefecture. On the
ground, his campaign used very different tactics from those of his coun-
terparts in Tokyo and Saitama. In contrast to the mass rallies in those dis-
tricts, his outdoor rallies looked more like the socialists at Kyodo. When
he spoke at Sakuragi Plaza—a central location in Japan’s second-largest
city—he drew little more than the few old ladies that came and sat next to
me at the pie shop along one edge of the plaza. Where Takeya’s volunteers
managed to hand out hundreds of orange fans at her rallies, Hamada’s
volunteers struggled even to catch the eyes of passing commuters. Those
few who did take a leaflet were encouraged to shake the candidate’s hand,
and there were never enough to form a line.
That night, however, his campaign staged a much more successful
event—with Sōka Gakkai assistance. Unlike Takeya and Nishida, Hama-
da held nighttime rallies that were open to the public, instead of private
visits to companies or organizations, and I was able to attend one. Forty-
five minutes before it was scheduled to start, young men with green staff
badges (Hamada’s campaign color was green) stood scattered around the
facility grounds, much like the crowd control at Takeya’s rallies. Inside the
door, a cluster of young women in pastel suits (a sure sign of Sōka Gakkai
activity) stood taking tickets. After establishing my bona fides, they al-
lowed me into the hall, where other women escorted guests to their seats,
trying to fill the hall from the front. When I sat, a lady asked me to move
back a row because I was seated in a row with an even number of seats
and the guests would come in groups of two. This seemed odd at first,
but it turned out to be an important detail. What I had taken as just an-
other Sōka Gakkai–only rally turned out to be a way to integrate Kōmeitō
politicians into Sōka Gakkai efforts to win “friends.” Guests came in pairs
because each member (guest with a ticket) was expected to bring a friend.
As the member sitting next to me explained, the lady with her was her
best friend, who had agreed to come to the rally out of respect for their
friendship. As we waited for the event to begin, most of the conversations
around me focused on politics—the DPJ’s faults were a common theme;
there were more people talking about politics simultaneously than I’ve
heard in a career studying Japanese politics. When Hamada finally took
the stage after a series of introductions, his speech was longer and more
detailed than Takeya’s stump speech, as befits an incumbent with a seated
audience in an air-conditioned hall.13 On the surface, this event was quite
13
The policy content is outside this chapter’s focus, but two points are worth noting. First,
he did very well talking about the small-scale concrete ways he had improved government
policy, but he was less convincing talking about larger narratives (like President Bush Sr., he
128 George Ehrhardt
different from Takeya’s outdoor rallies, but it had the same purpose—rally
the faithful, both members and their closest friends, the nonmembers most
likely to be Kōmeitō supporters. In staging these varied events, however,
the party and the religion have different purposes.
Kōmeitō is mobilizing its core constituency. Other political parties try
to gather crowds like these, but can only manage it by bringing headline
speakers—the prime minister or party leader, or nationally known char-
ismatic speakers—normal candidates meet the same apathy I saw for the
socialist candidate who spoke at Kyodo before Takeya’s rally. For a candi-
date, large crowds are important as a mobilization opportunity; the goal
is to bring out a partisan crowd, not to catch passers-by (Jones 1998; Herr
2002; Holbrooke and McClurg 2005). With only two weeks before the elec-
tion, new information about the candidate is unlikely to change voters’
minds—the struggle is to get partisans to the polls. The problem with mo-
bilization work, however, is that one can never be sure how voters will act
once they have the ballot in hand. Smart campaigners, then, seek to mobi-
lize their partisans, not the electorate in general. This is especially true for
smaller parties, like Kōmeitō, who might find it counterproductive to en-
courage random commuters to vote. In other words, Kōmeitō is not trying
to impress outsiders with the large rallies (as I originally hypothesized),
it is “firing up” Sōka Gakkai members who attend to hear the candidates.
An anecdote to illustrate this: one morning during the election I re-
ceived an email from a Kōmeitō official saying that the Tokyo district was
“safe,” but hours later I heard his boss tell a crowd that Takeya was in dan-
ger. From a persuasive standpoint this doesn’t make sense—to tell uncom-
mitted passers-by that a candidate lags in popularity—but from a partisan
mobilization it makes perfect sense—insisting that the candidate can win,
but only if the partisans turn out.
The mobilization effect goes beyond the immediate election, however.
As Kōmeitō politicians like to repeat, the party stands candidates in lo-
cal elections all over Japan, and wins many of them. Even if a national
candidate loses, the campaign mobilization may carry over to later local
elections.
Sōka Gakkai’s organizational motives for staging Kōmeitō events are
similar. It does hope for more Kōmeitō votes, but that isn’t the whole pic-
ture. As I discuss in the next section, Sōka Gakkai uses political campaign-
ing to encourage and measure members’ religious activity. In the same
had trouble with the “vision thing”), which I think is common to Kōmeitō rhetoric. Second,
he disagreed with Takeya and Nishida on whether to support Prime Minister Kan’s call for
a sales tax hike (they strongly opposed it; he said it could be a good idea if done correctly).
This is interesting because we don’t normally think about policy divides within Kōmeitō.
way as I’ve heard LDP candidates use speech attendance as a crude poll
of their support in a neighborhood, I’ve heard Sōka Gakkai leaders claim
their organization uses political participation as one measure of a region’s
religious activism.
Sōka Gakkai Mobilization Activity
There is no doubt that Sōka Gakkai’s mobilization techniques are effec-
tive. As we show in chapter 8, members’ level of political participation
is far higher than the national average. Its actions confirm comparative
research suggesting that religious organizations that place demands on
members’ time cannot sustain political activism indefinitely, but do cre-
ate the networks and social capital to enable short periods of participa-
tion (Putnam 2001). Before the official campaign period, the organization
primes members for upcoming Kōmeitō messages, and member prefer-
ences filter upward through both organizations’ hierarchies, but little is
expected of members. Once the official campaign starts, however, Sōka
Gakkai political participation kicks into a “short burst of intense activity”
(Campbell 2004). Members’ activity can be classified into three broad cate-
gories: (1) volunteering for Kōmeitō directly, (2) ensuring internal turnout,
and (3) gathering external votes.
The first type appears in the previous section on Kōmeitō activity, play-
ing support roles at Kōmeitō events. According to the director of a Sōka
Gakkai regional facility that I interviewed, higher-ups in the religion ar-
range with Kōmeitō for the sites and times of rallies, but the schedule
remains flexible. Some members I talked to identified a prefectural-level
Sōka Gakkai election committee (senkyo taisaku iinkai) as the source of this
planning, but no one would describe it clearly. A day or two before a rally
actually happens, the local Sōka Gakkai organization is notified and asked
to provide a certain number of volunteers.14 If the three 2010 campaigns I
witnessed are any indication, this tends to be limited to the younger divi-
sions, in part because they are more likely to have the flexible schedules
necessary to volunteer. The Young Men’s Division provides security and
crowd control, while the Young Women’s Division provides greeters (i.e.,
receptionists and leaflet distributors). Interestingly, when I asked about
the Married Women’s Division’s (Fujinbu) role at Kōmeitō events, no
one gave a clear answer—they seemed to be the largest portion of the
14
Not all the staff at events were volunteers, but armbands proved to be an efficient way
of distinguishing them. Individuals whose armbands included the characters for “Kōmeitō”
above the word “Staff” tended to be local politicians, while those with generic or hand-
lettered armbands tended to be volunteers from Sōka Gakkai. The men in suits who hang
around the loudspeaker truck tend to be either local politicians or Kōmeitō party staff.
130 George Ehrhardt
audience, and highly active in the other two categories of Sōka Gakkai
activity, but not volunteering at outdoor rallies.
Over the decades since Kōmeitō entered politics, scholars have noted
that its partisans tend to have a high turnout rate, meaning that the party
does better when overall turnout is low and poor when the general public
is highly interested in an election. There may also be theological reasons
for this, but one clear explanation is the intense internal campaign that
the religious organization puts on, referred to as “internal confirmation”
(naibu kakunin)—the Married Women’s Division’s specialty.
Naibu kakunin uses Sōka Gakkai’s fine-grained division of responsibil-
ity. Unlike the LDP, for example, which uses only prefectural-level and
local-level (shibu, organized around a particular politician) offices, the
leadership structure of Sōka Gakkai extends from prefectural-level of-
ficers down to the “block,” which may be only two or three families.15
Not all these families are active; only 20 to 30 percent of official members
regularly attend meetings (Ehrhardt 2009). Ensuring that active members
vote is easy enough, but the nonactive members are harder to reach. Be-
fore the campaign officially starts, the region’s Married Women’s Division
prepares lists for all the block leaders, including the names and addresses
of each member in their geographic area of responsibility, active or not.
Armed with that list, block leaders are expected to visit each member at
home and confirm his or her vote. Since each area will have a leader for
each gender division, two or more leaders might visit each household.
Meanwhile, Married Women’s Division members regularly buttonhole the
leaders, quizzing them about their progress in confirming their divisional
members’ votes. The best examples of the relentlessness of this campaign
came from two well-placed officials, one with Sōka Gakkai and one on
the staff of a Kōmeitō national politician. On separate occasions, both ex-
pressed their disbelief at how often Married Women’s Division members
asked if they had voted yet. “It’s my job!” the latter said, shaking his head.
The introduction of early voting in 2003 transformed naibu kakunin,
allowing the leaders to ask members whether they had voted, instead of
whether they planned to vote. For the first few elections with early bal-
lots, voters had to assert an excuse why they could not vote on the official
election date, but that requirement was dropped, and in the 2010 election,
11.9% of voters cast their ballots early (Asahi, 12 July 2010). This means
that the entire three-week official campaign period resembles election day
“get out the vote” (GOTV) efforts in America, with active members vol-
unteering to drive nonvoters to the polls whenever they find convenient.
15
The frontline organization above the block is roughly the following: a chiku is two or
three blocks, a shibu is two or three chiku, and a honbu is usually three shibu.
Block leaders regularly report how successful they have been—how many
names they have crossed off their list—to their chiku leaders, who report
that to shibu leaders, and so on up the ladder, giving the higher levels of
Sōka Gakkai a fine-grained real-time picture of the organization’s activity
and turnout.
Nevertheless, this goes largely unnoticed by outsiders, whose knowl-
edge of Sōka Gakkai politics is limited to the final category of campaign
activity—gathering external votes. In an earlier article (2009), I explore
how members mix religious proselytization and Kōmeitō electioneering
in their everyday contacts with nonmembers, exploring the concept of
winning voters as “friends” (f-tori). During the official campaign, howev-
er, contacts with nonmembers tend to be shorter and more direct appeals
for Kōmeitō support. During the 2010 election, I was able to participate
with a group of Sōka Gakkai members and gain a sense of how this activ-
ity proceeds.
There are two types of outreach during the campaign, deliberate and
opportunistic. The latter is for people whom Sōka Gakkai members do
not know, but come across in their social interactions, like shopkeepers,
and typically consists of a simple one-sentence request to vote Kōmeitō.
For Sōka Gakkai members who travel to different prefectures to help cam-
paign, this is often the most they could do. The 2010 campaign in Saitama,
for example, became a cause célèbre for the whole organization, which
led to a flood of members coming into the prefecture who did not have a
network of friends or neighbors to contact. This left them little choice but
to seize any opportunity they could. One member I talked to recounted
mentioning Kōmeitō to a restaurant owner in Saitama and being told that
he had already heard it twenty times and didn’t want to hear it any more.
Another group I was campaigning with ate lunch at Yoshinoya, part of a
large restaurant chain. Before we went in, our leader mentioned that the
chain’s head office had recommended its Saitama branches support Nishi-
da, a successful example of preelection Kōmeitō efforts to secure endorse-
ments from business managers. The members planned to approach the
clerks with this endorsement, asking them to support Kōmeitō (in the end,
they decided the restaurant was crowded enough that they’d only end up
embarrassing the staff). Nevertheless, these opportunistic contacts are a
sideshow to the real efforts—working their social networks for Kōmeitō
support.
This is a complex activity, and there are different ways to approach it.
Put simply, the religious organization pressures its members to contact ev-
eryone they know and urge them to vote Kōmeitō. During the 2010 election
I spent several days campaigning with members in Saitama and saw how
the contacts followed a common pattern. Each active member would have a
132 George Ehrhardt
list of people they could contact, with their name, address, and relationship.
Either alone or with a small group, members would visit a neighborhood,
stopping at each of the houses on the list, usually without calling ahead of
time.16 If a resident answered the doorbell, the member would explain his
identity in terms of the relationship, and ask to talk to his or her “friend”
(I campaigned with the Young Men’s Division, and usually their target’s
mother would answer the doorbell). If that person were there, they would
then identify themselves and ask the person to vote Kōmeitō. If not, they
would give their campaign pitch to whomever was there. Many residents
did not open the door, limiting the conversation to the intercom. As the
research cited earlier predicts, very little persuasion occurred during these
contacts. In my time campaigning, I witnessed only one conversation that
lengthened into policy discussions and explanations of why one should
vote Kōmeitō—every other contact was pure mobilization, just an urging
to go vote, followed by a (typically noncommittal) response. Depending on
the member, this can mean contacting literally hundreds of people.
To many nonmembers, it’s an annoying habit—how can they claim to
be friends if they call only at election time, I have heard people ask. Crit-
ics see the lengths members go to as an exercise in futility, as if someone
will change their vote because their son’s preschool classmate from twen-
ty years ago asks them. Inside Sōka Gakkai, opinion is divided: I heard
opinions ranging from those who insisted (albeit diplomatically) that it is
a waste of time, to those who fiercely enjoy it, to those who say it is useful
for stimulating religious activity, regardless of its political effects. For ac-
tive members, though, it is an all-consuming task during the election, one
that deserves careful study.
Comparing Sōka Gakkai’s activity to political mobilization around the
world suggests that it is not unique, or even unusual. There is a history
of experimental research into the effectiveness of voter contact like Sōka
Gakkai’s—especially in the United States and United Kingdom, but also
in continental Europe, which suggests that it can be a candidate’s most
powerful tool for increasing voter turnout (Gerber and Green 2000; Nick-
erson 2005; Alvarez et al. 2010). Put briefly, these studies find that while
socioeconomic factors are the best predictors of whether a voter will actu-
ally cast his or her ballot, personal contact by someone the voter knows
is the most influential thing a campaign can do to stimulate turnout. In
fact, this literature also suggests that Sōka Gakkai’s practice of contacting
“friends” to mobilize recruits is actually the norm, not the outlier, because
16
The group nature of the activity made it a site for passing on civic skills, as I watched
older members coaching younger members in how to approach and mobilize voters, or sub-
tler skills, like how to estimate whether someone was home by how fast their electric meter
was spinning.
personal contact works best when the target knows the contactor (Fenno
1978; Rosenstone and Hansen 2002; Verba et al. 1995). At some basic level,
then, we can explain Sōka Gakkai outreach by pointing to extensive re-
search showing that it works. I believe, though, that we can say more than
this, and I came away from my fieldwork thinking about Sōka Gakkai
voter outreach in two ways: tactical and instrumental.
It may sound surprising, but I think the most salient fact about this
outreach is that it is legal. Chapter 3 describes the scarring effect of Sōka
Gakkai’s early encounters with election law; Ikeda Daisaku’s brief impris-
onment for allegedly organizing illegal door-to-door canvassing remains
vividly alive in Sōka Gakkai’s historical memory. This creates a contradic-
tion between its fear of breaking election law and its evangelical drive to
mass outreach. Sōka Gakkai wants door-to-door campaigning to be legal
for evangelical reasons, but also because it could give Kōmeitō, who could
take advantage of Sōka Gakkai volunteers, an electoral advantage. Until
the law is repealed, social networks—however distant—are a useful tactic
to get around the law. Knowing someone from a nonpolitical context gives
Sōka Gakkai members a legitimate excuse to visit their house and ask for
Kōmeitō support. Observers who focus on the weakness of these social
connections miss the point. For members who have lived in an area for a
long time, this means that they can legally campaign door-to-door in their
neighborhood. In fact, many of the people I visited with Sōka Gakkai cam-
paigners during the 2010 election mentioned how other members had al-
ready approached them, showing how much canvassing the tactic allows.
While these social connections are not the only (or even primary) fea-
ture of Sōka Gakkai mobilization, that doesn’t mean they are irrelevant.
Political scientists have long argued that social connections establish
a campaign worker’s bona fides and, depending on the degree of con-
nection, compel the target to listen respectfully (Sabato 1989; Rosenstone
and Hansen 2002). The truth of this observation struck me most strongly
as I listened to a Kōmeitō phone campaign, calling voter lists submitted
by supportive small businessmen (described previously). The standard
script began with the caller identifying himself as a Kōmeitō supporter,
to which the recipient would almost always respond with a noncommit-
tal monosyllable. The next step in the script was mentioning the name of
whomever had recommended Kōmeitō call—usually a business owner or
upper-level executive. Whether the listeners changed their vote I do not
know, but the change in voice tone was unmistakable. Mentioning the re-
ferrer’s name increased listener interest and engagement in the call. Seen
this way, the practice of contacting “friends” is not a religious oddity; it is
a standard political mobilization tactic, albeit with unusual terminology.
There is also an instrumental aspect to Sōka Gakkai’s political outreach,
regardless of whether it produces votes or not. Previous research suggests
134 George Ehrhardt
that campaign work does more than just increase vote totals; it also rein-
forces social ties and creates a feedback loop that legitimizes the activities
and the politicians it supports (Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978). Anecdotal-
ly, I did hear from members who had drifted away from religious practice,
but returned to the fold after invitations to join in political volunteer work
recreated their social bonds with other members. In light of this, it was
no surprise to hear on the 2010 campaign trail that the pro-campaigning
faction inside Sōka Gakkai uses its impact on membership as justification,
claiming that regions that campaign for a district candidate (as opposed
to generic proportional representation voting) tend to see a subsequent
increase in religious activity.17
Campaign activity is also useful for the organization as a measure of
member activity. It is difficult to count members of a religious organiza-
tion, because numbers on paper may not reflect the numbers of actual par-
ticipants. In Sōka Gakkai’s case, it uses subscriptions to its publications
Seikyō Shimbun and Daibyaku renge to count members and active members
respectively, but election results add a snapshot of how committed those
members are. Local organizers are certainly aware of this: at one rally I
attended in Saitama, for example, local politicians performed crowd con-
trol instead of the usual Sōka Gakkai volunteers. When I asked why, the
chief organizer (a city assemblyman from a neighboring town) said that
high-ranking officials were watching the Saitama campaign and the lo-
cal contingent needed to demonstrate its commitment in their eyes. On
a larger scale, Japanese tabloids published rumors that the 2010 Upper
House campaign in Osaka was a test of whether Ikeda Hiromasa—son
of Ikeda Daisaku and recently appointed to a top leadership position in
Osaka—was qualified to lead Sōka Gakkai after his father’s death (Take-
tomi 2010). Unfortunately, personnel decisions in Kōmeitō and Sōka Gak-
kai remain opaque, even to middle-ranking officials of both organizations,
so it is impossible to know the truth of these assessments.
Conclusion
Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai make a useful case study in religion and politics.
On the surface, the pair looks like an anomalous situation, in which reli-
gion intrudes into and distorts political behavior. Looking below the sur-
face, however, reveals that Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai political activity fol-
low the same logic as secular campaigns throughout the democratic world.
While Kōmeitō’s party-centered campaigns and close integration
with a single support group make its electioneering different from other
17
Hori (1985) points out that other religious organizations value election campaigning
for the same reason.
parties, it does follow the same logic they do. All Japanese parties spend
the months leading up to the three-week election period persuading voters,
particularly by gathering endorsements that will help make their appeal
more credible, such as industry associations or social network leaders.
Kōmeitō politicians are no exception, and their focusing on parlaying lo-
cal assemblymen’s connections into support for the party’s national can-
didates is no different from what their LDP or DPJ counterparts do. Once
the official campaign starts, Kōmeitō candidates ride their “campaign car”
just like other politicians, stopping occasionally to give speeches. The dif-
ference comes in how integration with Sōka Gakkai makes this standard
repertoire more effective, by gathering voters so candidates can mobilize
them more efficiently, for example, or providing candidates with informa-
tion about voters, or providing volunteers.
Veteran observers of Japanese politics might also note that Sōka Gak-
kai’s organizational behavior is not unusual. In fact, other “organized
vote” associations, like Japan Agriculture or the Special Postmasters, use
the same practices, such as the way the Retired Postmasters Association
rapidly disseminates election information, or postmasters consciously at-
tempt to parlay their nonpolitical contacts into political requests (cf. Mac
lachlan 2004). In the same way, religious organizations like Sōka Gakkai
have the institutional capacity to efficiently mobilize voters, using the
same techniques as secular organizations.
The empirical similarity between the activities of Sōka Gakkai and those
of secular interest groups suggest that Sōka Gakkai’s connection between
religion and politics is not what it first seemed. Originally, observers wor-
ried that Sōka Gakkai would overwhelm democratic politics, imposing its
beliefs and suppressing discourse with uncompromising faith. When that
danger passed after 1970, the concern switched to the potential suppres-
sion of individual freedoms among members, as in the books cited at the
beginning of this chapter. Based on this evidence from actual Sōka Gakkai
campaign practice, however, we conclude that there is no more reason to
fear a loss of political agency among members of Sōka Gakkai than among
farmers or special postmasters.
What the evidence does raise is a question about the effect of politi-
cal mobilization on the religious organization itself. Over the past fifty
years, Sōka Gakkai has allowed demands from political mobilization to
shape its form and activities. While campaigning does strengthen intra-
group bonds, it also takes time away from other forms of religious prac-
tice, something I have heard members express ambivalence about. One
must also wonder to what extent the aversion to Sōka Gakkai that many
Japanese express stems from its political activities— members’ relent-
less canvassing for votes and the memory of more extreme actions in the
136 George Ehrhardt
1960s—and how much that aversion affects Sōka Gakkai’s other activities.
This book is about Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō’s place in Japanese politics,
but future research into the place of politics in twenty-first century Sōka
Gakkai might prove valuable.
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Six
Party Ideals and Practical Constraints in

Kōmeitō Candidate Nominations
Daniel M. Smith
Introduction
Candidate selection is a fundamental part of the delegation and account-
ability relationship between voters and political parties in modern repre-
sentative democracies (Strøm 2000). In most parliamentary democracies,
parties play the greatest role in recruiting (screening) and selecting can-
didates for office, so the processes and outcomes of candidate selection
can confer a great deal of information about a party’s organization and
its priorities in terms of key personnel (Schattschneider 1942; Crotty 1968;
Ranney 1981; Rahat 2007; Hazan and Rahat 2010).
However, the candidate selection process within parties is often opaque.
In many parties, the internal process of selecting candidates is guarded
with secrecy, and details about specific nomination decisions are rarely
discussed publicly. Thus, only a few comparative studies have examined
the internal recruitment processes and priorities of parties (e.g., Gallagher
and Marsh 1988; Katz and Mair 1992; Norris 1997; Narud et al. 2002; Lun-
dell 2004; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). This is no doubt a reflection
of the difficulty in obtaining such “insider” information from parties—in
contrast to more readily available data, such as electoral results.
In Japan, there are few legal constraints imposed on eligibility for office.
According to Article 10 of the Public Offices Election Law, a candidate for
I thank the Japan-U.S. Educational Commission (Fulbright Japan Program) for financial sup-
port, and the University of Tokyo Institute of Social Science and Yukio Maeda for hosting
me during the 2010-2011 academic year. I owe additional gratitude to Ellis Krauss, Robert
Pekkanen, and Steven Reed for generously sharing their data, Tomonori Sugimoto for re-
search assistance, and Steven Reed, Levi McLaughlin, and two anonymous reviewers for
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Lastly, I gratefully acknowledge the cooperation of the
Kōmeitō politicians I interviewed.
140 Daniel M. Smith
the Lower House must be at least twenty-five years old at the time of the
election, while a candidate for the Upper House must be at least thirty.
Aside from additional restrictions on individuals with a criminal history,
any Japanese citizen who meets these basic age requirements is eligible to
run for office. In practice, however, each party has different methods and
criteria for screening and selecting candidates (Shiratori 1988; Fukui 1997;
Smith 2013). The structure of opportunity for candidacy is not universally
equal, and there is considerable variation across parties in terms of pro-
cess, and in the extent of involvement by local versus national party lead-
ers. Parties also differ in the types of candidates they recruit—for example,
with regard to their age, gender, occupational backgrounds, or relation-
ships with various interest groups in society.
Although some important research has advanced our understanding of
the process and outcomes of candidate selection in the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) (e.g., Asano 2006; Smith 2012; Tsutsumi 2012; Smith 2013),
and in the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) (Miura et al. 2005; Weiner 2011;
Hamamoto 2011; Smith et al. 2013), extant studies of Japanese parties have
largely ignored the candidate selection process within Kōmeitō, despite
the party’s status until 2012 as Japan’s third largest, and its decade-long
experience in government as the LDP’s junior coalition partner. The most
thorough existing English-language account of Kōmeitō candidate re-
cruitment policies consists of just a few pages analyzing the 1983 elections,
and is thus over thirty years out of date (Shiratori 1988, 178–180). Very
little is known about how Kōmeitō recruitment and nomination practices
have evolved over time, let alone what types of personal characteristics
Kōmeitō candidates tend to exhibit.
My aim in this chapter is to confront this serious gap in our under-
standing of Kōmeitō with an examination of the party’s candidate recruit-
ment and nomination processes, and the patterns in Kōmeitō candidates’
social and career backgrounds over the past thirty years. The chapter will
address not only the question of how the nomination process works within
Kōmeitō, but also who tends to get nominated, as well as where and why.
My analysis makes use of quantitative data on Kōmeitō candidates for the
Diet from 1980 through 2013,1 as well as qualitative data obtained through
personal interviews with Kōmeitō politicians, to evaluate the balance
between the Kōmeitō’s guiding principles and ideals in candidate selec-
1
Lower House candidate background data from 1980 through 2009 were collected from
various sources (including Asahi Shimbun, Seikan Yōran, and Seiji Handbook) for Ellis Krauss
and Robert Pekkanen’s Japan Legislative Organization Database (J-LOD); the 2012 data are
based on Yomiuri Shimbun candidate biographies provided by Michael Thies and coded by
the author. Upper House data were collected by the author from digitally archived Asahi
Shimbun newspaper and CD-ROM records.
Party Ideals and Practical Constraints 141
tion—including those influenced by its relationship to Sōka Gakkai—and

the constraints imposed on the party by its limited support base and the
Japanese electoral system.2
I will show how Kōmeitō candidate nomination decisions are largely
shaped by the party’s relationship to Sōka Gakkai—in terms of the screen-
ing and selection of candidates loyal to the religious organization’s mis-
sion, as well as the strategic nomination of candidates where Sōka Gakkai
membership is strong enough to assure their election. Sōka Gakkai has
functioned as a reliable arena for screening potential candidates, though
in recent decades, the party organization itself has taken over much of this
role. However, the party has also been limited through its relationship
with Sōka Gakkai to nominating candidates in urban areas where both
Sōka Gakkai membership and district magnitude are large. The introduc-
tion of single-member districts (SMD) in 1994 has further constrained the
party’s electoral opportunities. At the national level, Kōmeitō survives to-
day predominantly through the proportional representation (PR) tier of
the Lower House electoral system, and through its coalition with the LDP.
Kōmeitō as a “Small Mass” Party

Kōmeitō was founded in 1964 as a political offshoot of the Nichiren Bud-
dhist organization Sōka Gakkai, with the mission of infusing government
with the harmonious virtues of Buddhism (see chapter 3). Although the
party officially severed all formal ties to Sōka Gakkai in 1970, the par-
ty’s core organization and support base in the electorate continue to be
nearly coterminous with the religious movement (Baerwald 1986; Curtis
1999; Hrebenar 2000). Organizationally, Kōmeitō thus resembles the clas-
sic mass (democratic integration) party model of early Western European
class-based and religious parties (Duverger 1954; Neumann 1956; Worley
2009), albeit with a much smaller extra-parliamentary “mass.”3
2
The two chambers of Japan’s Diet use different electoral systems. The more impor-
tant Lower House reformed its electoral system in 1994 from a single non-transferable vote
(SNTV) in multi-member districts (MMD) ranging in magnitude (seats) from three to six,
to a mixed-member majoritarian system (MMM) that elects 300 members in single-member
districts (SMD), and an additional 180 members, reduced from 200, through proportional
representation (PR) in eleven regional districts. The Upper House electoral system combines
SNTV in prefectural districts that range in magnitude from one to five, with a national tier
that used SNTV until 1980, closed-list PR from 1983 through 1998, and open-list PR since
2001.
3
The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and former Japan Socialist Party (JSP) also fit
this model nicely. In contrast, the two main political parties in Japan, the LDP and the DPJ,
instead resemble “catch-all” parties, or at times even “cartel” parties (for a discussion of the
different party models, see Katz and Mair 1995).
142 Daniel M. Smith
The typical mass party can be thought of as one that is organized around
“pre-defined and well-defined social groups, membership in which is
bound up in all aspects of an individual’s life” (Katz and Mair 1995, 6).
The party is an agent of these groups, through which members partici-
pate in political life and articulate their policy demands. The more the
party’s extra-parliamentary base is concentrated among distinct target so-
cial groups, the more it can be expected to select candidates who represent
these groups, and the more it will rely on various screening mechanisms
in these selection efforts (Müller 2000). Kōmeitō’s origins and its enduring
relationship to Sōka Gakkai make it an ideal example of such a mass party.
Due to solid organizational foundations in the electorate, electoral poli-
tics for mass parties is often “less about differential rates of conversion
than it is about differential rates of mobilization” (Katz and Mair 1995, 7).
Although Kōmeitō has tried to project some independence from its extra-
parliamentary base and expand its support beyond Sōka Gakkai mem-
bers—and has perhaps been more successful at attracting new Kōmeitō
voters than Sōka Gakkai has been at converting new followers—this as-
pect of mass parties is also evident in the mobilization practices of the
party (Ehrhardt 2009; see also chapter 5). Party leaders know, roughly,
how many Kōmeitō voters reside in a given electoral district, and the
party’s candidates work predominantly towards mobilizing these core
supporters.
As a “small mass” party, the candidate recruitment and nomination
decisions within Kōmeitō today are thus shaped as much by the party’s
ideals and organizational relationship with Sōka Gakkai as they are by
constraints imposed on the party by its limited support base and the Japa-
nese electoral system, particularly since the 1994 electoral reform of the
Lower House. The relationship with Sōka Gakkai provides Kōmeitō with
several organizational advantages, including a reliable arena for screen-
ing potential new candidates, and a benchmark of support (Sōka Gakkai
membership and past results) in the electorate on which to base electoral
expectations. However, the party’s limited appeal beyond Sōka Gakkai
members also means that Kōmeitō nomination decisions must carefully
take into account the practical constraints embedded in the mechanics of
the electoral system, and that mobilization of supporters at election time is
of utmost importance to realizing the party’s electoral goals.
The Candidate Selection Process in Kōmeitō

Kōmeitō’s official party by-laws state that potential candidates for office
are evaluated by the party’s Election Strategy Committee, which then
makes recommendations to the party’s Central Executive Committee (or
Central Secretariat) for final approval.4 The Central Secretariat is typically

composed of the chief representative (party president), the chairman of
the national representatives, the acting chief representative (deputy presi-
dent), several vice presidents, the secretary general, the policy affairs re-
search committee chair, and several senior members.5 Within the Central
Secretariat, the party president and secretary general are the most influen-
tial party leaders. Kōmeitō’s Central Secretariat plays a much more direct
role in candidate selection decisions, and the centralization of the process
is much greater, than in the two largest political parties in Japan, the LDP
and the DPJ, or in the former Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which was the
main opposition party prior to 1994. Organizationally, the party is most
similar to the highly centralized Japanese Communist Party (JCP).
Before an election, the Central Secretariat, in consultation with the
party’s Election Strategy Committee, considers which candidates to
nominate. Even for local (municipal and prefectural) elections, the recom-
mendations of the local candidate selection committees must ultimately
be approved by the central party leadership, and it is not uncommon for
national leaders to overrule or disregard the recommendations of local
party organizations. The central party leadership also decides the ranking
of candidates in the closed-list PR districts, as well as the prefectures in
which candidates for the national open-list PR district of the Upper House
will concentrate their campaigns in order to optimize mobilization activi-
ties and efficiently distribute the party’s vote (this mobilization strategy
will be revisited later in the chapter).
Like most other parties, incumbents are often given priority unless
they have exceeded the party’s age limit (sixty-six) for candidates, though
there are exceptions to this rule. Between 1980 and 1993, 70% of Kōmeitō
candidates in Lower House elections were incumbents. Since the 1994
electoral reform, between 80% and 90% of SMD candidates have been in-
cumbents. However, the proportion of incumbent candidates in the Up-
per House prefectural district races has been lower, at just 60% from 1980
through 2013.
In contrast to the LDP and DPJ, where new candidates often approach
the party directly or, more recently, apply to become candidates through
an open recruitment (kōbo) process (Tsutsumi 2012; Smith et al. 2013; Smith
2013), Kōmeitō candidates often have no prior ambitions for public of-
fice until they are contacted by a party leader asking them to run. As one
4
Kōmeitō By-laws, Article 53 (available at www.komei.or.jp/komei/about/agreement.
html; accessed Jan. 2014).
5
In 2011, the total membership of the Central Secretariat was thirty-five members, in-
cluding twenty-four incumbent Diet members.
144 Daniel M. Smith
veteran Kōmeitō representative puts it, the nomination philosophy of the

party can best be characterized as “Detai hito yori dashitai hito” (Rather
than people who want to run, [we nominate] people who the party wants to
run).6 Individual politicians often view their candidacy as part of a duty
to the party, or public service to society (kōboku), rather than as a personal
calling or vehicle for higher political aspirations.7
Party leaders claim to weigh three basic ideals (or criteria) in screen-
ing and selecting new candidates for office. The party must evaluate (1)
a potential candidate’s alignment with the spirit of Kōmeitō’s ideals and
principles; (2) his or her demonstrated or potential personal ability or in-
sight into society and politics; and, lastly, (3) the candidate’s capability of
successfully gathering votes and winning in a given district.8 The first two
criteria indicate the continued relevance of the Sōka Gakkai organization
and beliefs to Kōmeitō party organization. While nearly all candidates are
also members of Sōka Gakkai, the party seeks in principle to nominate
individuals from all walks of life who are working hard and succeeding
in their chosen profession.9 This sentiment coincides with Sōka Gakkai’s
teaching that a “happy person” is someone who “maximizes his poten-
tial in his chosen sphere of life and who helps others maximize theirs”
(Métraux 1996, 370). Such candidates also represent promising agents for
elevating Kōmeitō’s public image and appeal to voters, and thereby also
contribute to Sōka Gakkai’s goals of institutional expansion.
The third criterion for selection, however, hints at the real constraints
facing the party, in terms of both electoral strength and party resources. As
a small mass party dependent on a relatively bounded core support base
of Sōka Gakkai members, Kōmeitō is careful not to squander its resourc-
es running candidates in unwinnable districts, especially since the party
typically pays many of its candidates’ campaign expenses (Fukui 1997,
103; see also chapter 7). Moreover, the unconditional support of Sōka Gak-
kai members cannot be taken for granted (chapter 5), so the party exerts
considerable effort to satisfy and mobilize its core supporters. In districts
where the party leadership believes it has a chance to win, candidates
are often carefully selected to meet the electoral and representational de-
mands of supporters in those districts.
6
Personal interview with Lower House member and chair of Party Electoral Strategy
Committee Takagi Yōsuke, 8 June 2011.
7
This sentiment was expressed by multiple interview subjects, though no doubt there
are some candidates who seek out their nominations.
8
Personal interview with former Lower House member and former party president Ōta
Akihiro, 21 June 2011.
9
Personal interview with Takagi Yōsuke, 8 June 2011.
Party Ideals in Candidate Selection

Beyond the strong organizational link with Sōka Gakkai, the party does
not have direct ties to interest groups in society from which it recruits
new candidates. Nearly all Kōmeitō candidates are thus also members
of Sōka Gakkai. In recent years, only two Kōmeitō Diet members were
not members of Sōka Gakkai: Ikenobō Yasuko (Lower House), and Ku-
sakawa Shōzō (Upper House), who retired before the 2012 and 2013 elec-
tions, respectively. When the national tier of the Upper House changed to
closed-list PR in 1983, the party also nominated a few non–Sōka Gakkai
intellectuals to the party list (Asahi Shimbun 1983; Shiratori 1988, 179), but
this practice did not last beyond a few elections.10 It is not clear whether
this shift was because of a lack of supply of interested non–Sōka Gakkai
candidates or because of a change in party strategy.11
Potential Kōmeitō candidates are often screened and recommended to the
party leadership by influential leaders of the Sōka Gakkai organization,
professors from Sōka University, or local party branches. Sōka Gakkai and
its daily newspaper, the Seikyō Shimbun (founded in 1951), have also at
times been important arenas for the screening of potential Kōmeitō can-
didates, particularly in the early years of Kōmeitō’s electoral activities.
However, these days there is very little direct personnel overlap between
the two organizations (table 6.1).12 In recent years, the party has recruited
more heavily from its own employees, as well as from the official Kōmeitō
newspaper, Kōmei Shimbun (first published in 1962). Newspaper reporters
are often considered to be knowledgeable in the workings of Nagatachō,
the area of Tokyo where the Diet and prime minister’s office are located.
A background as a newspaper reporter thus also satisfies the party leader-
ship’s second recruitment criterion for an insightful candidate. Moreover,
recruiting candidates from the Kōmeitō or Sōka Gakkai organizations, or
the two organizations’ newspapers, decreases the chance of agency prob-
lems—working for the party-affiliated organizations is a strong signal
that a candidate is in agreement with the basic philosophical and political
goals of the party and spiritual movement.
10
The non–Sōka Gakkai candidates included Fushimi Kōji, Nakanishi Tamako, Takakuwa
Eimatsu, Wada Kyōmitsu, Iida Takao, Hironaka Wakako, and Tsuzuki Kunihiro.
11
It could be that non–Sōka Gakkai members are less effective at mobilizing supporters
to vote, and with the switch to open-list PR for the national tier in 2001, such mobilization by
individual candidates has become more important.
12
This observation was confirmed in a personal interview with Upper House member
and party vice-president Shirahama Kazuyoshi, 31 May 2011. Shirahama himself was re-
cruited from the Sōka Gakkai organization after the previous Kōmeitō incumbent was em-
broiled in a bribery scandal and the party wanted to avoid any further problems of moral
hazard.
Table 6.1 Percentage of first-time Kōmeitō candidates for the Lower House with a background in the party and Sōka Gakkai
organizations, 1980–2012
Party Kōmei Sōka Gakkai Seikyō

District Type Year Organization Newspaper Organization Newspaper Sōka University N
MMD 1980 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 2

MMD 1983 0% 0% 8% 8% 0% 12
MMD 1986 25% 0% 0% 25% 0% 4
MMD 1990 13% 20% 13% 20% 27% 15
MMD 1993 4% 4% 0% 0% 13% 24
SMD 33% 0% 33% 0% 0% 3
1996
PR 33% 0% 0% 0% 33% 6
PR 2000 56% 15% 0% 0% 18% 34
PR 2003 70% 25% 10% 5% 40% 20
PR 2005 64% 18% 0% 0% 45% 11
PR 2009 73% 33% 0% 0% 33% 15
SMD 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 3
2012
PR 39% 17% 0% 0% 57% 23
Total 39% 15% 3% 4% 27% 172
Source: Adapted from J-LOD and 2012 Yomiuri Shimbun candidate biographies.
Notes: Categories are not mutually exclusive. Values for 1996 represent Kōmeitō-affiliated candidates from the New Frontier Party (NFP).
There were no first-time SMD candidates in the 2000–2009 elections.
Table 6.1 shows the proportion of new (first-time) Kōmeitō candidates

for the Lower House recruited since 1980 who had a background in the
party organization (excluding the Kōmei Shimbun), the Kōmei Shimbun, the
Seikyō Shimbun, and the Sōka Gakkai organization (excluding the Seikyō
Shimbun). Also shown is the proportion of new candidates who were
graduates of Sōka University, an additional signal of commitment to the
Sōka Gakkai system of beliefs. The university was founded in 1971, but its
graduates did not regularly appear as Kōmeitō candidates until the 1990s.
Since then, it has been increasingly responsible for the education of new
candidates. Roughly half of all new candidates since 1980 have been active
in at least one of these five organization-based activities. Experience as a
Kōmeitō representative at the local level (a powerful screening mecha-
nism and signal of both service to the party and political preparedness)
was also common prior to 1994, but has decreased rapidly since the 1994
electoral reform (table 6.2).
In addition to candidates with experience in the news media or local
politics, Kōmeitō has frequently nominated individuals with experience
working in private sector businesses (20%), as lawyers (12%), or as Diet
member (MP) secretaries, medical professionals, educators, or bureau-
crats (5% to 7% each). Similar patterns in career backgrounds can be ob-
served in Kōmeitō’s candidates for the Upper House, though the party
nominates fewer candidates in elections to that chamber. In contrast to
the LDP, candidates who come from a political dynasty (so-called legacy
candidates) have been rare—less than 4% in recent elections (Smith 2013).13
The party also does not prioritize local connections to a district when mak-
ing its nomination decisions (table 6.3). Only about half of new Kōmeitō
candidates have been born in the prefecture where they ran, compared
to roughly 65% and 75%, respectively, of new DPJ and LDP candidates
(Smith 2013). These patterns indicate that a candidate’s local connec-
tions or personal name recognition in a district are only a minor factor in
Kōmeitō nomination decisions (and such attributes are also likely to be
only marginally relevant to most Kōmeitō voters).
Practical Constraints on Nomination Decisions

As a small mass party with limited appeal beyond Sōka Gakkai mem-
bers, Kōmeitō faces several challenges under the electoral systems used in
Japan. Although nearly three thousand Kōmeitō politicians are routinely
13
Only five Kōmeitō candidates for the Lower House between 1980 and 2012 were related
to a previous Diet member. However, not one of them directly succeeded his or her predeces-
sor, as is common in the LDP—where nearly half of all new candidates came from political
dynasties in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Smith 2012).
Table 6.2 Career backgrounds of all Kōmeitō candidates for the Lower House, 1980–2012
District MP Local Private

Type Year Secretary Bureaucracy Politics Sector Law Medicine Education Media N
MMD 1980 3% 2% 42% 17% 3% 5% 6% 17% 64
MMD 1983 3% 3% 42% 15% 7% 5% 8% 20% 59
MMD 1986 3% 5% 41% 13% 8% 5% 10% 21% 61
MMD 1990 5% 5% 26% 14% 14% 5% 7% 28% 58
MMD 1993 7% 7% 15% 22% 19% 6% 2% 26% 54
SMD 7% 4% 19% 30% 19% 7% 0% 22% 27

1996
PR 6% 11% 11% 14% 17% 3% 9% 23% 35
SMD 6% 11% 11% 22% 33% 11% 0% 11% 18

2000
PR 9% 9% 7% 27% 5% 9% 14% 29% 56
SMD 10% 10% 10% 30% 20% 10% 0% 20% 10

2003
PR 13% 7% 4% 24% 9% 4% 9% 24% 45
SMD 11% 11% 11% 22% 22% 11% 0% 22% 9

2005
PR 9% 7% 2% 26% 12% 5% 9% 21% 43
SMD 0% 13% 0% 25% 25% 13% 0% 25% 8
2009
PR 7% 7% 5% 21% 12% 2% 9% 23% 43
SMD 0% 33% 11% 0% 22% 0% 0% 11% 9

2012
PR 2% 4% 9% 20% 9% 0% 0% 16% 45
Total 6% 7% 20% 20% 12% 5% 7% 23% 644
Notes: Based on all candidates in each election year. Categories are not mutually exclusive. Individual candidates can have more than one
career background, and minor career categories are excluded, so row values do not total 100%. Observations for 1996 represent Kōmeitō-
affiliated candidates from the New Frontier Party (NFP). MP secretaries are the private or public secretaries of incumbent politicians.
Bureaucracy includes only national-level civil servants. Local politics refers only to municipal and prefectural assemblies, as there have been
no candidates who were former mayors or governors. Private sector employment includes any position as a company employee or executive.
Law means practicing lawyers. Medicine includes doctors, nurses, and other occupations in the health care industry. Education includes teach-
ers, professors, researchers, and school administrators. Media includes Komei Shimbun and Seikyo Shimbun, as well as any other newspaper.
Table 6.3 Social demographics of all Kōmeitō candidates for the Lower House,
1980–2012
District Mean Local College Graduate

Type Year Age Female Birth Degree Degree N
MMD 1980 50 0% 47% 77% 6% 64
MMD 1983 51 0% 44% 75% 7% 59
MMD 1986 53 0% 47% 77% 7% 61
MMD 1990 52 2% 43% 83% 10% 58
MMD 1993 47 4% 56% 96% 13% 54
SMD 49 4% 65% 93% 4% 27

1996
PR 50 9% 64% 91% 17% 35
SMD 52 6% 50% 83% 11% 18

2000
PR 51 27% 75% 89% 13% 56
SMD 54 0% 50% 100% 20% 10

2003
PR 49 13% 63% 93% 13% 45
SMD 56 0% 56% 100% 22% 9

2005
PR 51 14% 67% 93% 16% 43
SMD 59 0% 50% 100% 25% 8

2009
PR 52 9% 67% 98% 16% 43
SMD 50 0% 56% 100% 44% 9

2012
PR 49 9% 56% 100% 22% 45
Total 51 7% 55% 86% 13% 644
Notes: Observations for 1996 represent Kōmeitō-affiliated candidates from the New Frontier
Party (NFP). Local birth means that the candidate’s birthplace was in the prefecture
containing the district.
elected to local assemblies, the party has historically only been able to
secure between thirty and fifty seats in the Lower House, and twenty to
thirty seats in the Upper House. If one looks at the Upper House national
PR vote as a proxy for the party’s core national support, the total number
of Kōmeitō voters has remained relatively stable at between seven and
eight million votes (13% to 15% of voters) since the 1980s. Kōmeitō voters
are located throughout the country, but are most concentrated in urban
areas. The party must determine where to run candidates, as well as how
to successfully organize and mobilize their supporters, whose automatic
support and turnout at election time cannot be taken for granted. These
concerns have only grown more important with the introduction of SMDs
in Lower House elections after 1994 and the necessity of a preelectoral
coalition with another party in order to win any SMD races.
Plurality-Rule District Nominations
The number of core Kōmeitō voters in a given district is closely related
to the number of Sōka Gakkai members residing there. This regularity
gives the party a strategic advantage in terms of estimating its candi-
dates’ chances of success in a given electoral district, but its supporters
are not numerous enough to assure election in all districts. For example,
under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts
(MMD) electoral system used for the Lower House from 1947 through
1993, district magnitude ranged mostly from three to five seats. Over half
of Kōmeitō’s candidates during this period were nominated in the more
populous districts with five seats. The party’s support was strong enough
to successfully run candidates in such districts, where high district magni-
tude and multiple candidates from other parties meant that the threshold
for gaining a seat was often as low as 15% of the vote. Kōmeitō candidates
during this period won, on average, between 14% and 18% of the vote in
districts where they ran, thus frequently securing their seats.
Kōmeitō generally has not nominated a candidate in a district where it
did not expect to have enough votes to get him or her elected. In fact, from
1980 to 1993, forty-eight of fifty-seven (84%) first-time Kōmeitō candidates
for the Lower House were successfully elected, as were roughly 82% of
all the party’s candidates during the same period. In the Upper House,
the percentage of prefectural district candidates from 1980 through 2010
who won their elections is also 82%. In comparison, the average success
rate for JSP candidates for the Lower House from 1980 through 1993 was
70%, while for the JCP it was only 17%. The LDP’s official success rate
was also around 84%, but drops to 75% if LDP-affiliated independents are
included. Under the SNTV/MMD system, conservative politicians who
were refused the official LDP nomination often ran as independents, and
152 Daniel M. Smith
would be given an ex-post nomination (tsuika kōnin) if they were success-

ful. The effective nomination policy of the LDP was “Kateba, Jimintō” (If
you win, you are LDP) (Reed 2009). In contrast, Kōmeitō’s nomination
strategy might be described as “Kōmeitō nara, kateru” (If Kōmeitō is run-
ning someone, they can win).
Since the electoral reform of 1994, success rates in SMDs have become
more volatile for all parties, including Kōmeitō, which has won 61% of
its SMD races (compared to a similar 61% success rate for the LDP, but
just 34% for the DPJ prior to 2012). The introduction of SMDs has im-
posed new constraints on Kōmeitō’s candidate nomination decisions. On
its own, the party is not strong enough to win an SMD contest without the
electoral cooperation of a coalition partner.14 Thus, since 1994 it has been
necessary for Kōmeitō to seek cooperation from other parties in order to
field its candidates in SMD contests, a process that has required tremen-
dous effort and negotiation (see chapter 9).
For the 1996 Lower House election, Kōmeitō merged with several other
parties to form the New Frontier Party (NFP), which nominated Kōmeitō-
affiliated candidates in twenty-seven SMD races—fourteen of whom won.
The NFP disbanded after the election, and Kōmeitō—refounded as “New
Kōmeitō”—decided to enter a coalition arrangement with the LDP. For
the 2000 Lower House election, Kōmeitō negotiated an additional four
SMD races with the LDP (for a total of eighteen), of which it won half. The
party later added one additional SMD to those nine (Tokyo 12th District
in 2003), while ceasing to run in two other districts after losing (Okinawa
1st District and Saitama 6th District). The party lost in all eight SMD races
in 2009, but regained them all plus an additional seat (Hokkaido 10th Dis-
trict) in 2012 (Klein 2013).
The SMDs where Kōmeitō has successfully negotiated stand-down
agreements are generally areas where the party’s support is high, and the
LDP (or NFP founder parties) did not have an especially strong candi-
date (Reed and Shimizu 2009). The amount of raw Kōmeitō support in
an SMD can reasonably be estimated using the average of the party’s
municipal-level votes in elections for the national PR tier of the Upper
House from 1998 to 2010 (where there is no coalition coordination) aggre-
gated to the SMD boundaries of the Lower House.15 Across all SMDs, the
average Kōmeitō support rate is about 7.84% (minimum 4.28%, maximum
14
Since 1975, the party has never nominated a candidate to contest a by-election, either,
which would require winning a plurality of votes. A Kōmeitō candidate has only appeared
in the following by-elections for the Upper House: Hyōgo (1972), Kyōto (1974), Kōchi (1974),
and Aichi (1975). The first and only by-election for the Lower House contested by Kōmeitō
was in Fukuoka (1973).
15
Many thanks to Steven Reed for providing this measure.
Figure 6.1 Kōmeitō support and patterns in Lower House SMD nominations and
electoral success, 1996–2012
Source: Author’s calculations using district-level party support data provided by
Steven Reed.
Note: The 1996 values represent Kōmeitō-affiliated candidates from the New Frontier Party
(NFP).
15.61%). In 1996, three of the four Kōmeitō-affiliated NFP candidates who

ran in districts where Kōmeitō’s support was below this average lost their
races. In 2000, all three candidates whose districts had less than average
Kōmeitō support lost, and by 2003, all Kōmeitō candidates were running
in districts with higher than average Kōmeitō support. The average sup-
port rate in districts where Kōmeitō candidates have run since 2003 is
around 11% (figure 6.1).
Although the merger with the NFP in 1994 and the LDP coalition part-
nership since 1999 have allowed Kōmeitō to contest a limited number of
SMD elections, the party now primarily depends on its strength in the
Upper House and among PR candidates in the Lower House in order to
remain a viable national party. Perhaps the only positive effect of the elec-
toral reform for Kōmeitō in terms of candidate selection has been the trend
toward nominating more female candidates for the Lower House, thanks
154 Daniel M. Smith
to the PR tier (table 6.3). The party still has a poor record when it comes to
nominating women in SMDs.
Proportional Representation List Nominations
Kōmeitō is equally aware of the limits to its potential in the PR tiers of the
Upper and Lower House, and these limits are subsequently reflected in
its nomination decisions. For example, in the Upper House national tier
(which utilized closed-list PR from 1983 through 1998, and open-list PR
since 2001), the party has a general idea of how many candidates it can get
elected given prior experience and the number of Sōka Gakkai members
nationwide. The same is true for the eleven regional PR districts of the
Lower House. In each election, the party thus nominates a number of “se-
rious” candidates roughly equal to the number of past incumbents (plus
one if party leaders believe there might be a chance to expand). The party
then fills the remaining list positions with party employees and other low-
priority individuals. For the Upper House national open-list PR tier, the
party has consistently nominated seventeen candidates, and elected six to
eight of them (table 6.4); in the eleven Lower House PR districts, the party
nominates only one to three candidates beyond the number it expects to
elect in each district.
Like the JCP, but unlike other small parties, Kōmeitō covers most of its
candidates’ campaign expenses (Fukui 1997, 103; see also chapter 7), in-
cluding the election deposit (Harada and Smith 2014). Each candidate for
an SMD race in a Lower House election (or a prefectural district race in an
Upper House election) must pay 3,000,000 yen as a deposit, or 6,000,000
yen if the candidate is dual-listed on the PR tier (the same amount is re-
quired for each “pure PR” candidate). For SMD candidates, the deposit is
returned if the candidate secures one-tenth of the vote, while 12,000,000
yen are returned for each PR candidate who is elected. By nominating
only a few more candidates than it expects to elect in the PR tier, the party
can recuperate most of its deposit expenses.
Since the adoption of open-list PR in the Upper House national tier,
the party leadership has designated specific prefectural “turf” for each
candidate so as to efficiently distribute votes geographically to each seri-
ous candidate whom the party has a reasonable expectation to elect. In
addition to numerical considerations for evenly dividing Kōmeitō votes
among candidates, the party leadership also considers a candidate’s own
connections to a geographical area or its interests when assigning cam-
paign territory to candidates, though, as in the Lower House, local birth
is not a main priority. For example, in addition to the main campaign turf
of Yamanashi, Tokyo, and Shizuoka prefectures, national-list candidate
Table 6.4 Efficient distribution of Kōmeitō candidate preference votes for the
Upper House national open-list PR tier
Election year 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Average difference (percentage 1.41 3.42 3.13 1.60 2.15

points) in preference vote shares
between top vote-earners
Difference (percentage points) 10.33 12.08 4.54 10.20 12.16

between last top-earner and next
candidate on the list
Number of serious candidates 8 6 7 7 6
Total number of candidates elected 8 8 7 6 7
Total number of candidates 17 17 17 17 17
Source: Author’s calculations based on vote results from the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(Sōmusho).
Notes: Preference vote shares were calculated with the total number of preference votes cast
as the denominator, not the total number of preference votes and party votes combined
(many Kōmeitō voters simply cast party votes without using the preference vote option,
thus leaving the ranking of candidates up to other voters). The lower difference in 2007
was the result of a rare coordination failure. Prior to that election, incumbent Kusakawa
Shōzō had decided to retire. When he changed his mind and asked to be placed on the list,
the party had already finalized its coordination strategy. Thus, the votes he got might be
thought of as his own “rogue” personal votes. One other candidate, Yoshimoto Masafumi,
also received extra votes to a lesser extent, and the highest earner, Yamamoto Kanae,
did exceptionally well compared to the other serious candidates, increasing the average
difference between top-earners. The difference between the last “serious” candidate and
the next truly “nonserious” candidate if Kusakawa and Yoshimoto are removed from the
picture is 5.31 percentage points.
Tōyama Kiyohiko (who has a Ph.D. in peace studies and speaks English
fluently) was also assigned to distant Okinawa, where his professional
expertise in international relations and peace studies was considered to be
an attractive quality for representing the interests of voters in the prefec-
ture, where many U.S. military bases are located.16
This attention to geographical representation among national-list can-
didates is quite different from the prevailing patterns in the LDP and
16
Personal interview with Lower House member Tōyama Kiyohiko, 29 June 2011.
156 Daniel M. Smith
DPJ, whose national-tier candidates tend to earn votes based on personal

name recognition or association with core interest groups in society (la-
bor unions, doctors’ and dentists’ associations, etc.). The geographical al-
location of Kōmeitō candidates is important for two reasons: it provides
Kōmeitō supporters in each prefecture with an identifiable representative
in the Upper House (even where the party does not run a prefectural can-
didate), and it helps manage the regional party mobilization responsibili-
ties of each candidate.
The party and its national-level candidates have proven quite success-
ful at the latter. As noted earlier, the electoral success of mass parties is
often more dependent on the mobilization of core supporters than on the
conversion of new adherents (Katz and Mair 1995, 7). With the introduc-
tion of intraparty preference voting for the Upper House national tier in
2001, individual Kōmeitō candidates appear to have worked hard to se-
cure the “personal votes” of their geographically allocated constituents—
an effort that has in turn increased the party’s overall vote mobilization.
In fact, following the switch to open-list PR in 2001, the party’s overall
vote in the national PR tier increased by about 439,500 votes from 1998,
to a level that was also 1.2 million votes more than the average from 1983
through 1998, while closed-list PR was in use. However, the vote increased
on average by approximately 10,000 votes in prefectures where the party
did not run a candidate in the prefectural district tier in either election; in
contrast, in the five prefectures where the party had a history of running a
candidate in the prefectural tier, the party’s vote increased by only about
4,500 votes, as party strongholds Tokyo and Osaka actually witnessed a
decrease in votes. Obviously, other contextual factors of individual elec-
tions, candidates, and prefectures have an impact on mobilization and
support, but the difference between the two types of prefectures could be
interpreted to mean that the average turnout “bonus” to Kōmeitō from
individual national-list candidates’ mobilization efforts might have been
around 5,500 extra party votes per prefecture.
The distribution of candidate preference votes is also extremely effi-
cient (Köllner 2002, 129–132). For example, in the national PR tier for the
2010 Upper House election, it is clear that the party expected to win seven
seats. This is evident by the distribution of the top candidates’ preference
votes. While the average difference in each candidate’s share of prefer-
ence votes between the top seven vote-earners (six of whom were suc-
cessfully elected) was only 1.6 percentage points, the difference between
the seventh-highest vote-earner and the eighth-highest vote earner was
10.2 percentage points. The remaining candidates’ preference votes each
accounted for less than 1% of the total number of preference votes cast,
compared to an average of 14% each for top vote earners.17 Combined,

the “serious” candidates’ preference votes accounted for 98% of all pref-
erence votes cast within the party list. Similar coordination is evident in
the results of other recent Upper House elections (table 6.4). Moreover,
in 1980, when the national tier of the Upper House still used the SNTV/
MMD electoral system, all nine Kōmeitō candidates won their contests,
each with between 10% and 12% of the total Kōmeitō vote. The average
difference between their vote totals was just 15,700 votes, or less than 1%
of the total party vote.
In the eleven regional PR districts of the Lower House, the party can
similarly estimate the number of candidates it has a chance to elect based
on past experience and the number of Sōka Gakkai members in the region.
These numerical constraints have an impact on the types of candidates
that Kōmeitō can convince to run. Particularly for PR candidates in mar-
ginal positions, giving up a career for candidacy can be a difficult decision
if success is not guaranteed and the prospects for returning to a former
job are low. This explains why many Kōmeitō candidates in marginal list
positions come from backgrounds with relatively flexible employment,
such as law or from the party organization or newspaper, where they can
presumably be hired again without much difficulty (table 6.2), and why
party employees nearly always fill the hopeless list positions.18
It also explains why the party (like the JCP, but unlike the DPJ and
LDP) has rarely utilized the dual-listing provision of the mixed member
electoral system. SMD races have been carefully negotiated with much
effort and careful attention to incumbent strength, local support, and
“winnability.”19 Moreover, the incumbents and serious new candidates of
the PR tier are important candidates for the party in their own right, and
would not want to be bumped out of one of the few safe PR positions
by a dual-listed candidate who failed in his or her SMD contest.20 Since
resources and votes are limited, and expectations for success are carefully
calculated in all nomination decisions, there are few “low-priority” win-
ners among Kōmeitō incumbents.
17
In recent elections, about 45% of Kōmeitō voters have chosen to vote simply for the
party in the national PR tier, rather than expressing a preference for a particular candidate.
It is unclear how these voters are different from those who express a preference, or why they
choose not to indicate a preference (they may be less committed to the party, or may be LDP
supporters who have been asked to vote Kōmeitō as part of the coalition coordination agree-
ment). By not using a preference vote, they are essentially leaving the ranking of candidates
up to other Kōmeitō voters to decide.
18
Personal interview with Tōyama Kiyohiko, 29 June 2011.
19
Personal interview with Ōta Akihiro, 21 June 2011.
20
Personal interview with Takagi Yōsuke, 8 June 2011.
158 Daniel M. Smith
Conclusion
Kōmeitō was created as the political arm of Sōka Gakkai much in the way
that many early mass parties in Western European democracies emerged
out of class or religious movements. My analysis in this chapter illustrates
how Kōmeitō candidate nomination decisions are highly shaped by the
party’s historical and organizational relationship to Sōka Gakkai—not
only in terms of the candidate screening and selection process, but also
in terms of the constraints imposed on the party given the mechanics of
the electoral system and the party’s limited ability to extend its support
beyond Sōka Gakkai members.
The religious affiliation of candidates within Kōmeitō has remained
relatively constant, as has the top-down process of candidate recruitment
and selection. However, the path to nomination has evolved. In the early
decades after the party’s founding, the Sōka Gakkai organization itself
functioned as an important arena for screening potential candidates. But
in recent decades, this role has shifted largely to the party organization—
an indication that the party itself has grown more institutionalized, per-
haps in an effort to distinguish itself from Sōka Gakkai, or perhaps as part
of a natural evolution toward becoming a “religious party” rather than
simply the “party of a religion.”
In addition, although Kōmeitō’s limited appeal beyond Sōka Gakkai
members constrains its electoral opportunities, the stable benchmark of
Sōka Gakkai support also enables the party to be highly strategic in its
nomination decisions and coalition negotiations with the LDP. However,
it is important to note that the party does not take for granted that all Sōka
Gakkai members will vote for it. Sōka Gakkai itself is a religious move-
ment more than a political movement (cf. Ingram 1969), and its members
can and do sometimes hold diverse political opinions. Many Sōka Gakkai
members were upset by Kōmeitō’s decision to support the LDP-sponsored
Peace-Keeping Operations Bill in 1992 (Métraux 1996, 388), and other poli-
cy concessions that have resulted from the LDP-Kōmeitō coalition, includ-
ing elderly-care pensions and child allowance policies (e.g., Yamada 2004;
Etō 2003; Hirano 2005; see also chapter 10). Kōmeitō politicians work tire-
lessly to explain these compromises to Sōka Gakkai voters, and the party
keeps careful track of fluctuations in its vote share for signs of dissatisfac-
tion. Even candidates who are given “safe” list positions must work dili-
gently to mobilize supporters during elections (chapter 5), as abstention
by enough Sōka Gakkai voters can easily cost the party a seat.
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Seven
Kōmeitō, Sōka Gakkai, and Money

in Japanese Politics
Matthew Carlson
Introduction
The pervasive use of money in Japanese politics was a predominant fea-
ture of the “1955 system” where the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was
the dominant ruling party and continues to be important in one of the
world’s most expensive political systems (Nassmacher 2009). Money
flowed freely from big business to LDP coffers, which helped sustain one-
party dominance. It also greased the corners of the “iron triangle”—the
three-legged relationship of politicians, bureaucrats, and big business—
and was linked to a vicious cycle of political corruption scandals. Money
also played a significant yet understudied role in the emergence of some
of Japan’s New Religions and their involvement in politics.1 The purpose
of this chapter is to examine some of the money-collecting methods of
Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai and to consider some of the efforts of Kōmeitō
to advocate for more transparent politics when it joined the ruling coali-
tion government from 1999 to 2009.
In this chapter, several questions are considered. How much money
do Kōmeitō members raise and spend compared to those of other par-
ties in Japan’s Lower House, the more powerful chamber of the bicameral
parliament? And, what are the money-collecting methods of Kōmeitō and
Sōka Gakkai? While the fund-raising efforts of Kōmeitō in recent years
have relied heavily on the government subsidy for political parties, Sōka
Gakkai’s finances have been officially separate from those of the party
since its creation in 1964.2 However, the division and the financial ties
1
The term New Religion (shinshūkyō) primarily refers to lay-centered groups founded in
the last two hundred years (see chapter 3).
2
See also chapters 3 and 4, and Kōmeitō’s official explanation titled “New Kōmeitō’s
Views on Politics and Religion in Japan,” available at www.komei.or.jp/en/about/view.
html (accessed Jan. 2014).
164 Matthew Carlson
between these two organizations are not absolute as ordinary Sōka Gak-
kai members help finance the party and similar fund-raising practices are
employed. Because existing research on the financial underpinnings of ei-
ther or both organizations has been extremely limited, discussion of these
broader questions are necessary and in order.
One reason for the lack of research is the difficulty in accessing relevant
data on the financial situation of both organizations. To build upon this
shortcoming, this chapter makes use of official campaign finance reports
disclosed to the Japanese government. Campaign finance reforms initi-
ated in 1994 have introduced greater transparency and have made it easier
for scholars and journalists to study and examine the flow of official funds
in the political system. My focus is a comparison of Kōmeitō to other po-
litical parties, which I use to highlight the argument that Kōmeitō is not
so different from other parties in the realm of money collection. The em-
pirical section of the chapter examines and compares Kōmeitō by looking
at several different levels of party organizations: the party headquarters
of major parties in Tokyo and the main party organizations for parties in
each of Japan’s forty-seven prefectures, as well as the aggregate picture
of finances linked to individual politicians in the Lower House. The em-
phasis here is considering Kōmeitō and its money-gathering efforts as a
political party that operates in the electoral realm and also considering its
role in campaign finance reform.
Unlike political parties that are required to file annual reports, the finan-
cial practices of Sōka Gakkai are much more challenging to evaluate with
any great certainty because they are not publicly disclosed. This makes it
difficult to examine the extent that ordinary Sōka Gakkai members con-
tribute to Kōmeitō and also to compare Sōka Gakkai with religious groups
in general. Nonetheless, I try to discuss its money-collecting methods by
reviewing and updating some of the scant research on this important
topic. This will include the research done by James White in 1970, whose
book on Sōka Gakkai is one of the most important in political science,
along with the more recent writings of the controversial Japanese scholar
Shimada Hiromi.3 Both offer important insights into money-collecting
practices while highlighting the limits of existing studies.
One argument in the literature is that the current money-collecting
methods pursued by Sōka Gakkai have gradually evolved over the last
several decades and may not be so different from those pursued by oth-
er religious groups. In the fourth section of this chapter, Sōka Gakkai is
shown to rank first among religious groups in 2003 in terms of its profit-
making enterprises, which is largely based on its vast publishing empire.
3
See chapter 1 for more information on White and Shimada.
Kōmeitō, Sōka Gakkai, and Money in Japanese Politics 165
I hope that the preliminary efforts of this chapter to clarify the money-
gathering strategies of Kōmeitō, Sōka Gakkai, and other political and re-
ligious organizations will encourage additional research on the broader
topic of religion and money in politics as well as comparisons of Kōmeitō
with other politically active religious groups in Japan.
The remainder of this chapter is presented in five sections. The fol-
lowing, second section examines the finances and sources of income for
Kōmeitō with comparisons to other major Japanese political parties. The
third section looks more closely at Kōmeitō by examining the campaign
finance reports filed by individual politicians as well as the party’s role in
recent efforts to reform the campaign finance system. The fourth section
explores the money-collecting methods of Sōka Gakkai based on accounts
from the scholarly literature. The fifth and final section summarizes the
main findings.
The Money-Collecting Methods of Kōmeitō

In contrast to the veil of secrecy cast over the finances of Sōka Gakkai, the
finances of Japan’s political parties are much more transparent, which has
occurred through repeated revisions to the Political Funds Control Law
(Seiji Shikin Kiseihō). Enacted in 1948, the PFCL is the main set of regula-
tions in Japan that deals with the financing of political activities. When it
was first introduced, the law was largely ineffective at regulating politi-
cal finances. However, major revisions of the PFCL occurred in the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s typically after the exposure of major political scandals.
The more recent 1994 reforms went a step further by introducing a public
subsidy system for political parties, which requires parties to disclose and
provide detailed accounting for how they raise and spend public funds.
A few caveats about the financial disclosure reports should be mentioned.
First, most of what we know about party finances is limited to the
amounts that are officially reported. It is difficult if not impossible to know
whether and to what extent some funds have been concealed. Second, it
is difficult to compare the funding sources of parties across time because
of the multiple changes to the PFCL. This is unfortunate in the case of
Kōmeitō because it would be useful to have accurate and detailed infor-
mation about how the money-gathering strategies have evolved over time.
Despite these limitations, however, the official reports will be used to cap-
ture some of the major money-gathering methods used by Kōmeitō—both
as a national party organization and in terms of its individual members—
since the 1990s.
The major pattern that emerges is that Kōmeitō is the third-wealthiest
political party in Japan largely because it adopts some of the successful
166 Matthew Carlson
fund-raising strategies employed by Sōka Gakkai, namely, the creation of

a successful newspaper and gathering donations from individual support-
ers at the prefectural level. A second pattern that emerges is that Kōmeitō
legislators in the Lower House are neither excessively extravagant nor re-
source poor in terms of money. In contrast to the LDP’s traditional reliance
on big business, Kōmeitō politicians rely more heavily on party sources of
funds as well as political contributions to support their yearly activities.
Revenue from National Party Headquarters
The amounts of annual revenue collected by Kōmeitō and three of Ja-
pan’s most important political parties are reported in table 7.1. Among
the parties represented, Kōmeitō averages the third-highest revenue after
the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the LDP. When the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) was in power from 2009 to 2012, Kōmeitō’s lead over
the DPJ narrowed and was surpassed, placing Kōmeitō in fourth place.
Much of the income generated from the JCP is from the publication of
the daily newspaper Akahata (Red flag), whereas the LDP has tradition-
ally relied upon donations from corporate Japan. The DPJ, in contrast, has
relied upon contributions as well as loans and the political party subsidy
that has been available since 1995. Kōmeitō and the LDP also rely on the
subsidy for a considerable portion of their income, but this is not the case
for the JCP, which argues that the subsidy is unconstitutional since Japa-
nese taxpayers are effectively forced to finance parties with which they
may disagree.
The party revenues are also relatively stable for most of the years with
only a few exceptions that warrant brief mention. For Kōmeitō, it is impor-
tant to note that the party actually disappeared in 1994 when it dissolved
and became part of the New Frontier Party (NFP) until it split apart in
1997. Thus, the report for 1994 represents the amount of income when
the party officially dissolved itself. The reports for 1995 to 1997 are for
part of the party, renamed Kōmei, which consisted of a smaller contingent
of Upper House members and local politicians. Consequently, the figures
for Kōmeitō do not capture the entire picture for when its finances were
merged with the NFP. The other exception is the small amount of income
collected by the LDP in 1994, which can be explained in the context of the
LDP’s loss of power in the 1993 Lower House election where many LDP
politicians left to join or establish other parties.
Beyond the broader patterns of party revenues, it is useful to examine
the specific sources of income that has been collected by Kōmeitō since
1990. Thus far, there have been four major sources: publication-related
revenues, the party subsidy that has been available since 1995, party
membership fees paid by party supporters, and revenues from other
Table 7.1 Party revenues
Kōmeitō LDP DPJ JCP

1990 ¥13,490 ($93.0) ¥30,844 ($212.7) – ¥32,058 ($221.1)
1991 ¥12,567 ($93.1) ¥29,285 ($216.9) – ¥32,148 ($238.1)
1992 ¥15,693 ($123.6) ¥25,517 ($200.9) – ¥33,636 ($264.9)
1993 ¥14,462 ($130.3) ¥26,854 ($241.9) – ¥32,319 ($291.2)
1994 ¥11,864 ($116.3) ¥12,692 ($124.4) – ¥32,999 ($323.5)
1995 ¥13,417 ($142.7) ¥23,549 ($250.5) – ¥31,104 ($330.9)
1996 ¥13,107 ($120.2) ¥26,074 ($239.2) – ¥30,405 ($278.9)
1997 ¥13,334 ($110.2) ¥24,562 ($203.0) – ¥30,874 ($255.2)
1998 ¥19,720 ($150.5) ¥28,929 ($220.8) ¥9,486 ($72.4) ¥30,853 ($235.5)
1999 ¥16,941 ($148.6) ¥25,020 ($219.5) ¥8,452 ($74.1) ¥30,239 ($265.3)
2000 ¥15,907 ($147.3) ¥27,110 ($251.0) ¥10,990 ($101.8) ¥32,781 ($303.5)
2001 ¥17,217 ($141.1) ¥24,428 ($200.2) ¥11,053 ($90.6) ¥34,289 ($281.1)
2002 ¥15,384 ($123.1) ¥22,926 ($183.4) ¥10,661 ($85.3) ¥33,429 ($267.4)
2003 ¥17,409 ($150.1) ¥25,697 ($221.5) ¥11,442 ($98.6) ¥30,710 ($264.7)
2004 ¥16,202 ($150.0) ¥26,415 ($244.6) ¥14,137 ($130.9) ¥30,068 ($278.4)
2005 ¥16,134 ($146.7) ¥26,229 ($238.4) ¥14,075 ($128.0) ¥28,415 ($258.3)
2006 ¥14,439 ($124.5) ¥26,161 ($225.5) ¥12,502 ($107.8) ¥28,197 ($243.1)
2007 ¥15,096 ($127.9) ¥25,294 ($214.4) ¥13,148 ($111.4) ¥26,408 ($223.8)
2008 ¥14,520 ($140.3) ¥30,813 ($297.8) ¥14,213 ($137.4) ¥24,961 ($241.2)
2009 ¥13,513 ($143.7) ¥19,728 ($209.8) ¥16,305 ($173.5) ¥24,621 ($261.9)
2010 ¥14,339 ($162.9) ¥15,231 ($173.1) ¥20,690 ($235.1) ¥23,746 ($269.8)
2011 ¥12,707 ($158.8) ¥13,955 ($174.4) ¥20,232 ($252.9) ¥23,416 ($292.7)
2012 ¥13,772 ($172.2) ¥15,898 ($198.7) ¥19,563($244.5) ¥23,283($291.0)
Source: Kanpō, various years.

Notes: 1994 Kōmeitō is the amount reported when the party dissolved. 1995 to 1997 reports
are for the smaller Kōmei, mostly Upper House and local politicians, when Kōmeitō was
absorbed into the New Frontier Party. Exchange rates of respective years.
168 Matthew Carlson
Figure 7.1 Percentage derived from major sources of revenue

Source: Kanpō, various years.
party-affiliated organizations that were generated after the subsidy was

introduced in 1995. Figure 7.1 captures the percentage share that each of
these four sources occupies in relation to total revenues. What is shown
is the strong position of publication income, which has occupied between
60 and 70 percent of total revenues. The advent of the party subsidy from
1995 is currently the second-largest source of revenue, followed by income
derived from membership fees and other party-affiliated organizations.
From 1998 to 2012, Kōmeitō averaged approximately 10 billion yen in
publication-related revenues. The majority of this income is generated
from its daily newspaper Kōmei Shimbun as well its Sunday edition. How-
ever, like Sōka Gakkai, Kōmeitō does not own a printing company and
thus there are considerable overhead costs that must be subtracted if a true
picture of net profits is to be derived. During this same period, Kōmeitō
reported an average of 7.6 billion yen in publication-related expenses. This
means a much smaller profit of 2.4 billion yen. Thus, Kōmeitō’s position
as the third-wealthiest party—as well as the JCP’s position as the wealthi-
est—might be reconsidered if the costs of their publishing activities are
factored in. As is the case with Sōka Gakkai, a benefit of the newspapers
and published materials is the information shared with like-minded sup-
porters and the type of community that this fosters.
5HYHQXHIURP3UHIHFWXUDO3DUW\+HDGTXDUWHUV
Beyond the level of national party headquarters, it is important to exam-
ine how Kōmeitō and others collect funds at the prefectural level. In each
of Japan’s forty-seven prefectures, Kōmeitō and other major parties have
Table 7.2 Sources of income collected by prefectural party organizations in 2005
Kōmeitō LDP DPJ JCP
Party
Headquarters ¥1,459.5 ($13.3) ¥1,990.7 ($18.1) ¥1,211.0 ($11.0) ¥9,311.9 ($84.7)
Branches ¥110.6 ($1.0) ¥274.4 ($2.5) ¥48.4 ($0.4) ¥2,620.6 ($23.8)
Contributions
Individual ¥2,287.2 ($20.8) ¥623.4 ($5.7) ¥649.3 ($5.9) ¥1,845.3 ($16.8)
Group ¥17.7 ($0.2) ¥103.8 ($0.9) ¥24.8 ($0.2) ¥ 0.0 ($0.0)
Political ¥19.9 ($0.2) ¥189.4 ($1.7) ¥34.6 ($0.3) ¥0.0 ($0.0)
Fund-raising ¥153.4 ($1.4) ¥1221.4 ($11.1) ¥490.9 ($4.5) ¥80.6 ($0.7)
Membership ¥0.0 ($0.0) ¥1,391.3 ($12.6) ¥81.6 ($0.7) ¥1,883.9 ($17.1)
Other ¥4.8 ($0.0) ¥273.6 ($2.5) ¥32.4 ($0.3) ¥150.3 ($1.4)
Total Income ¥4,053.0 ($36.8) ¥6,068.1 ($55.2) ¥2,573.0 ($23.4) ¥15,892.6 ($144.5)
Sources: Kanpō and Kōhō, various years.

Note: JPY and USD in millions.
prefectural party headquarters staffed with party professionals who over-

see party affairs for the entire prefecture. Their job includes everything
from helping with elections at all levels of office to organizing political
events for politicians and constituents, all of which requires often substan-
tial sums of money. To support these costs, prefectural organizations turn
to their party, contributions, fund-raising activities, membership revenue,
and other sources. By examining the disclosure reports for a one-year cy-
cle, it is possible to better understand the fund-raising efforts of Kōmeitō
at the local level and how they compares to those of other major political
parties. Of particular interest is the ability of Kōmeitō to generate sub-
stantially large sums of income from individual supporters, particularly
in prefectures where the party is the most active in fielding candidates to
the Lower and Upper Houses.
The financial reports for each of the main prefectural party organiza-
tions were collected and totaled for Kōmeitō, the LDP, the DPJ, and the
JCP for the 2006 filing year, which covers activities that took place in 2005
and the snap Lower House election that was called over the issue of postal
170 Matthew Carlson
privatization. Table 7.2, which captures the aggregate picture of this ef-
fort, reports the total amounts of income for all forty-seven prefectural
organizations in terms of five major sources of income: (1) party funds
from the national headquarters or from other local party branches (e.g.,
a party branch organized for a specific city); (2) contributions, which are
classified as being from an individual (kojin), group (dantai), or political
group (seiji dantai); (3) fund-raising activities; (4) membership revenues;
and (5) other sources of income that do not fall into any of the previous
categories.
Several observations about the four parties can be made by look-
ing at the aggregate picture. First, in terms of party sources, all of the
prefectural organizations rely on national party headquarters for one-
third to half or more of their funding. Except for the JCP, few funds are
derived from other local party branches located within the prefecture.
Kōmeitō organizations are thus no different from the LDP and DPJ in
terms of receiving a considerable share of funds from the national party
headquarters.
Second, the amounts raised through contributions vary considerably
by party and by contribution type. Kōmeitō, in particular, raises close to
60 percent of its total revenue from contributions, most of which are from
individual supporters. The DPJ, in contrast, raises only one-fourth of its
funds from this source, whereas the LDP and JCP collect one-fourth or
less. Kōmeitō can thus be distinguished considerably from the other par-
ties in its ability to collect the largest sum of individual contributions, at
least for the one year that was examined.
A third observation is that prefectural party organizations associated
with Kōmeitō and the JCP generally do not hold many fund-raising ac-
tivities as a means to generate income, particularly in contrast to the LDP
and DPJ. For one reason, both parties may have less necessity for this ap-
proach, particularly as they can rely on party sources for their funding. A
second reason is that fund-raising parties have generally been associated
with the LDP and the necessity of individual politicians to raise vast sums
of money to survive and prosper in the political system. In the present day,
fund-raising parties continue to be valuable for this purpose not only for
individual politicians, but also local party organizations. In 2005, LDP and
DPJ groups collected nearly 20 percent of their total revenues through this
source alone.
A fourth and final observation concerns the revenue derived from
membership fees. By registering and paying a nominal fee every year,
supporters become registered party members. The prefectural party or-
ganizations of Kōmeitō do not collect and report membership dues as
this task is conducted by the national party headquarters. There is thus
no income derived from this source for Kōmeitō at the prefectural level.4
For the remaining parties that report membership funds at the prefectural
level, the JCP collected the largest sum of funds: 1.9 billion yen from more
than 3 million supporters. The LDP raised a small sum of 1.3 billion from
1.2 million supporters whereas the DPJ gathered nearly 82 million yen
from less than 40,000 supporters.
What emerges from the overall aggregate picture is that Kōmeitō, in
contrast to the three other major parties, is particularly strong at collect-
ing individual contributions at the local level. The connection between
religion and politics is that many of the individual supporters of Kōmeitō
are members of Sōka Gakkai. Although Sōka Gakkai as an organization
does not directly fund Kōmeitō, its individual supporters do, which is
particularly evident if the finances of local party organizations are exam-
ined. For this reason, it is perhaps not surprising that Kōmeitō is quite
strong in terms of collecting funds from individual supporters at the local
level. These are many of the same supporters that help fund Sōka Gakkai
through the purchase of newspapers and through its membership system.
Kōmeitō and Money Politics

This third section examines Kōmeitō and other parties by looking at cam-
paign finance reports filed by individual politicians during five Lower
House election years.5 The analysis will cover politicians competing pri-
marily in single-seat districts. Politicians raise and spend funds through-
out the year and during the twelve-day official campaign period. Of
particular interest is how Kōmeitō members compare to members in the
LDP and the DPJ. Kōmeitō was part of the ruling LDP coalition govern-
ment from 1999 to 2009 and again from December 2012 on (see chapter
10). Compared to the average LDP member, Kōmeitō members generally
raised and utilized considerably less funds. Compared to the average DPJ
member, the average level of income and expenses for Kōmeitō has been
nearly double, with the amount somewhat narrowing in 2009 when the
DPJ took the reins of power.
Politicians’ Average Income and Expenses in the Lower House, 1996–2009
To examine how Kōmeitō fares against the LDP and DPJ in terms of poli-
ticians’ individual political finances, it is useful to detail the amounts of
4
In 2005 at the national level, Kōmeitō raised approximately 1.3 billion yen in member-
ship revenues from 400,000 supporters, which comes out to about 3,200 yen per supporter.
5
Reports used to estimate the most recent election in 2012 were not available at the time
of this writing.
172 Matthew Carlson
income and spending reported for five Lower House election years.6 Of
the multiple sources available for raising funds, two are highlighted in
particular: the percentage of income linked to party sources as well as the
percentage of income derived from political contributions. Party sources
are primarily party subsidies from the Law for Government Subsidies of
Political Parties (Seitō Joseihō) established in 1994 but include other funds
that party headquarters may give to its members. Proponents of the new
subsidy system argued it would promote a sound development of po-
litical activities of political parties, secure their legal and fair activities,
and encourage party-centered rather than candidate-centered campaigns.
Most politicians in Kōmeitō, LDP, and DPJ file disclosure reports for a sin-
gle fund agent (shikin kanri dantai) and their local party branch office (seitō
shibu), which is typically one of their main local offices.7 Average income
for politicians in each party is calculated by summing the total of fund
agent and party branch income and making any necessary adjustments to
prevent double counting when there are financial transfers between the
two organizations. The average amounts collected by politicians in the
three parties are reported in table 7.3.
For Kōmeitō members, average income ranged from 66.5 to 83.6 million
yen. The percentage of Kōmeitō member funds derived from the party
ranged from 35.2% to 54.9%, which is considerably higher than the LDP for
each election year but lower than the DPJ except for 2009. Most Kōmeitō
members also rely on individual contributions to generate enough funds
for their yearly activities. Contributions have generally made up nearly
half of politicians’ income, although contribution levels dropped consid-
erably in 2009.
For LDP members, average income ranged from 84.2 to 111.5 million
yen. The political party subsidy only accounts for 16.7% to 33.6% of their
income. The more significant source for the LDP is contributions from po-
litical groups and individuals. Although more than half came from this
source in 1996, the percentage amounts have gradually decreased each
election year to a low of nearly 39.4% in 2009. For DPJ politicians, average
income has ranged from a much smaller 34.6 to 50 million yen. The DPJ
raised considerably less than the LDP but was also surpassed by Kōmeitō
in each election year. The DPJ is closer to Kōmeitō in terms of its reliance
6
The JCP is excluded in this section, as most legislators from this party do not file re-
ports for local party branches. See Carlson (2007) for additional analysis and discussion of
campaign finance reports.
7
Many politicians, particularly in the LDP, file reports for multiple personal support or-
ganizations called kōenkai, which were not collected for all of the election years and thus not
reported. Kōenkai usually cost politicians money, although they can generate some income
particularly through membership fees and supporter contributions.
Table 7.3 Politicians’ average income and expenses
1996 2000 2003 2005 2009
Kōmeitō members
Annual Income ¥83.6 ($767,000) ¥78.5 ($727,000) ¥76.8 ($662,000) ¥66.5 ($604,000) ¥71.5 ($761,000)
% Party 36.4 36.6 35.2 36.1 54.9
% Contributions 45.0 56.7 49.9 53.3 36.3
Annual expenses ¥94.8 ($870,000) ¥83.5 ($773,000) ¥80.6 ($695,000) ¥66.9 ($608,000) ¥74.4 ($791,000)
Campaign Period ¥13.5 ($124,000) ¥14.1 ($131,000) ¥11.7 ($101,000) ¥13.0 ($118,000) ¥12.7 ($135,000)
LDP members
Annual Income ¥103.6 ($950,000) ¥111.5 ($1 million) ¥94.8 ($818,000) ¥89.7 ($816,000) ¥84.2 ($896,000)
% Party 16.7 18.0 21.2 27.1 33.6
% Contributions 59.0 52.3 47.0 45.3 39.4
Annual expenses ¥110.6 ($1 million) ¥121.8 ($1.1 million) ¥105.0 ($905,000) ¥95.1 ($864,000) ¥95.5 ($1 million)
Campaign Period ¥14.2 ($131,000) ¥13.9 ($129,000) ¥12.5 ($108,000) ¥12.6 ($115,000) ¥11.3 ($120,000)
DPJ members
Annual Income – ¥37.4 ($346,000) ¥34.6 ($299,000) ¥37.3 ($339,000) ¥50.0 ($532,000)
% Party – 44.4 40.4 47.0 45.9
% Contributions – 39.0 41.9 37.2 35.4
Annual expenses – ¥38.0 ($352,000) ¥36.5 ($314,000) ¥39.5 ($360,000) ¥50.7 ($540,000)
Campaign Period – ¥9.8 ($90,000) ¥9.6 ($83,000) ¥9.6 ($87,000) ¥7.7 ($82,000)
Sources: Kanpō and Kōhō, various years.
Notes: JPY and USD in millions. Included are estimates for Kōmeitō members prior to 1998 when the party merged with the New Frontier Party.
Income is calculated from the reports of main local party branches and politicians’ fund agents (excluding transfers of funds between the two
organizations) for all single member district-based members in the Lower House who reported any income for the election years in question.
174 Matthew Carlson
on the political party subsidy and other party funds, which partially re-
flects the party’s relatively new emergence in the late 1990s and its smaller
stock of incumbent legislators.
The revenues accrued by politicians in each party are spent on ev-
erything from personnel to maintaining support organizations (kōenkai).
Politicians are also able to transfer funds collected during the year to use
during the official campaign period that is scheduled just prior to the elec-
tion. During the official campaign period, campaign activities are heav-
ily regulated by the Public Offices Election Law, which is the main set of
regulations governing public elections. Among the regulations during this
time are spending limits for campaign-period expenditures.
For annual expenditures excluding the campaign period, table 7.3
shows that Kōmeitō politicians have averaged anywhere from 66.9 to 94.8
million yen. The highest average was when Kōmeitō was part of the NFP
and the LDP was its main competitor. From 2000 to 2005, the costs for
Kōmeitō dropped in each election partly because it joined the LDP in a
coalition government and many of its members could avoid direct compe-
tition with the LDP. In 2009, average costs for Kōmeitō increased possibly
in response to increasing party competition that would result in the elec-
toral defeat of the ruling coalition. Kōmeitō spending, like income, places
it squarely in the middle of the other two parties.
Overall, the averages for Kōmeitō show that the party is moderately
positioned between the LDP and DPJ in terms of income and spending.
Its members as a whole are more likely to rely on party funds instead
of political contributions, which can also be said of the DPJ. At the same
time, Kōmeitō politicians competing in the single-member districts may
not have needed as much funds since joining the coalition government
meant that the LDP and Kōmeitō cooperated to minimize any direct elec-
toral competition between each other. They might have also utilized fewer
funds because they could make use of a large army of Sōka Gakkai vol-
unteers (see chapter 5 and Ehrhardt 2009). Compared to the DPJ, Kōmeitō
members were also much better funded, which is reflected not only in the
party’s overall financial strength but also by the ability of the individual
members of the party to attract political contributions.
Campaign Finance Reform
One of the likely consequences of Kōmeitō’s relatively smaller reliance
on raising vast sums of money is that it is able to advocate for greater
transparency in the realm of Japan’s campaign finance laws. Kōmeitō’s
activities in this policy field are also motivated by its ideal of “humanist
politics” and the goal of fighting political decay (seiji fuhaibō) (see chapter
10). As part of the ruling government with the LDP (1999–2009), Kōmeitō
faced considerable obstacles for realizing these policy preferences since

the LDP’s way of financing itself was prone to corruption. During the co-
alition decade, there were two notable efforts to reform the campaign fi-
nance system and in both cases (2004 and 2007) the impetus to reform was
due to the exposure of scandal in the LDP.
In 2004, Kōmeitō and the LDP sponsored legislation that would ulti-
mately revise one part of the Political Funds Control Law. The main impe-
tus for reform was the revelation in the same year that the large Hashimoto
faction within the LDP had received an illegal hundred-million-yen dona-
tion from the Japan Dental Association, funds that were in all likelihood
intended to help sponsor the candidate it was backing in the 2001 Upper
House election. The fallout from the scandal weakened what had been one
of the LDP’s most powerful factions throughout Japan’s postwar period,
costing Hashimoto his career and helping further tarnish the image of the
LDP among Japanese voters. The campaign finance revision to emerge
from all of this commotion was a relatively minor rule change that placed
a restriction on the transfer of funds between political bodies (Asahi, 22
October 2004). Unfortunately, for both Kōmeitō and the LDP, this reform
did little to ward off another series of scandals three years later.
In 2007, the LDP and Kōmeitō proposed new legislation that would re-
quire one of the fund-collecting bodies created by politicians (shikin kanri
dantai) to attach receipts for expenditures of 50,000 yen or more, with the
exception of personnel fees (Asahi, 24 February 2007). The impetus for re-
form came from a series of scandals that began with the agriculture, for-
estry, and fisheries minister Matsuoka Toshikatsu. Among the accusations
leveled against Matsuoka was that he reported extremely high utilities
expenses when utilities for his Tokyo office are provided free of charge
from Japanese taxpayers. Mr. Matsuoka argued that his office had spent
the money on purified water, which subjected him to considerable ridicule
in the national press. His suicide shortly after stunned the nation. To make
matters worse for the LDP and its coalition partner, the successors to Mr.
Matsuoka’s position were cursed by additional scandals related to the fil-
ing of dubious expenses and other financial irregularities. The scandals
helped contribute to the LDP’s loss of majority control in the Upper House
in summer 2007. Kōmeitō lost three of the twelve seats that were up for
election. Two months after the election, the LDP’s then prime minister Abe
Shinzō checked himself into a hospital and announced that he was quit-
ting due to crippling diarrhea.
After the Upper House election and Abe’s abrupt resignation, the leg-
islation requiring receipts was strengthened and amended. The law that
went into effect in 2009 requires all political groups registered to Lower
and Upper House members to submit receipts for all ordinary and political
176 Matthew Carlson
expenses, excluding personnel fees, above 10,000 yen.8 The receipts must
be certified by a registered auditor who may be a lawyer, public accoun-
tant, or tax accountant. The receipts can be viewed in person or photocopy
requests can be made by interested parties.
Compared to the legislation passed in 2004, the 2007 revision is more
significant in scope as it subjects the murky area of expenditures to some
requirements for receipts and closer public scrutiny. Kōmeitō can surely be
credited with supporting the campaign finance legislation, but the major fac-
tors that gave rise to these reforms appear to have been public criticism and
the efforts of the DPJ and parts of the media to shine a light on the excesses
of LDP rule. After the 2009 election, Kōmeitō struggled to reposition itself
in the party system. In the realm of campaign finance, Kōmeitō attempted
to cooperate with the DPJ in increasing the penalties for false reporting on
campaign financial disclosure reports, but little progress was made.9
Sōka Gakkai’s Money-Collecting Methods

Thus far, this chapter has focused on Kōmeitō and has noted that its fi-
nances have been officially separate from Sōka Gakkai since its creation in
1964. The examination of official campaign finance reports demonstrated
that Kōmeitō was particularly strong in the realm of collecting funds from
individual donors, many of whom are likely members of Sōka Gakkai.
Likewise, Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai seem to have adopted similar practic-
es such as the use of publications to foster their community of supporters.
To highlight these points further and to compare Sōka Gakkai with
other religious organizations in Japan, this section delves into the
money-collecting strategies of Kōmeitō’s parent organization, Sōka Gak-
kai. It does so by examining previous studies on this topic. Although more
speculative than definitive, they nonetheless provide some of the only in-
formation available. To begin, it is necessary to offer a brief explanation
of the importance of Japan’s postwar constitution as well as the 1951 Re-
ligious Corporations Law to the emergence of New Religions in general.
Article 20 of Japan’s postwar constitution states: “Freedom of religion is
guaranteed to all. No religious organization should receive any privileges
8
Receipts for expenditures of 10,000 yen or less are supposed to be kept and disclosed
upon request. For details, see “Seiji Shikin Kiseihō, Kaiseian Kyō Teishutsu” [Political Funds
Control Law Reform Bill to be submitted today] (Asahi, 19 December 2007).
9
See, for instance, “Kōmeian, Ōsuji Ukeire e Minshu, Hoseiyosan Seiritsu Niramu-
Seijishikin Bassoku Kyōka” [Democratic Party accepts outline of Kōmeitō’s proposal with
an eye on passing the supplementary budget-strengthening penal regulations re. political
funds] in Asahi (28 October 2010), or “In Policy Shift, Komeito To Oppose Extra Budget” in
Japan Times (10 November 2010).
from the State, nor exercise any political authority.”10 There is nothing for-
mally that prohibits religious organizations from participating in Japanese
politics. Indeed, it has been argued that one of the reasons for their active
involvement in politics was that the new religious groups wanted to pro-
tect themselves from potential attacks from reactionary political forces,
including those who advocated for prewar State Shinto (Dorman 2006).
Consequently, after the war many of the New Religions such as Sōka Gak-
kai developed sophisticated organizations, which required considerable
expenses to maintain and operate. The Religious Corporations Law, which
was passed in 1951, granted religious groups considerable freedom from
taxation and government scrutiny of their finances. Because religious
groups were protected by the state (and from the state), they maintained
considerable freedom in how they operated and financed themselves.
The 1995 gassing of the Tokyo subway system by Aum Shinrikyō led
the LDP to pass a controversial bill revising part of the Religious Corpo-
rations Law (Métraux 1999; Klein 2012). Although the law now requires
Sōka Gakkai and other religious organizations to disclose their financial
assets to the Japanese government, there is nothing in its provisions that
mandates the disclosure of this information to the general public. Thus,
there has been no disclosure of Sōka Gakkai finances from 1951 to the
present day. The only exception, which will be discussed later in the chap-
ter, is the disclosure of taxable enterprises that was required for a brief
time. The lack of adequate reports and legal requirements for disclosure
has not only invited considerable negative criticism of Sōka Gakkai, but
has also resulted in the lack of basic information about its finances.
Fortunately, however, it is possible to glean partial insights into Sōka
Gakkai finances by making use of two sources: (1) existing scholarly and
journalistic accounts; and (2) the amounts on taxable enterprises linked to
Sōka Gakkai that the group disclosed to the Ministry of Finance between
2002 and 2004. Both these sources have considerable limitations in captur-
ing a complete and accurate picture of Sōka Gakkai’s financial bases. But
short of disclosure of the financial records of the group itself or a change
in the disclosure laws, these are two of the few sources that can be used
to glimpse into its current and former practices and to make comparisons
between Gakkai and other organizations.
Existing Studies on Sōka Gakkai’s Finances
There are countless publications about Sōka Gakkai, although only a few
of them give more than a passing mention of the organization’s finances.
10
The full text of the constitution is available at www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_
and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed Jan. 2014).
178 Matthew Carlson
This section will examine and compare two of the best accounts. The first
is The Sokagakkai and Mass Society (1970), by James White, one of the few
and most important political science studies to date on this organization.
Of particular relevance to this chapter is White’s discussion of Sōka Gak-
kai finances based on the fieldwork he conducted in the 1960s. The sec-
ond will be Shimada Hiromi’s (2008) Shin Shūkyō Bijinesu (New Religions’
business), which seeks to explain the various business models followed
by New Religions such as Sōka Gakkai. As will be discussed later, even
Shimada has to rely on considerable guesswork, which unfortunately
makes his study much more suggestive than definitive. Accepting Shi-
mada’s claims at face value, it seems that we know little more about Sōka
Gakkai finances despite the passage of four decades since White’s origi-
nal study.
White’s book examines Sōka Gakkai as a sociopolitical movement and
attempts to answer such questions as whether it can be categorized as
a mass movement and what it means for Japan’s democratic future. To
answer these questions, White considers some of its specific tactics and
strategies, including those related to finance. He compares Sōka Gakkai to
other New Religions in terms of shared finance. The new faiths place little
compulsory financial burden on members and instead derive their income
from other sources. He argues that having a strong financial base is critical
for Sōka Gakkai to maintain itself and support its many activities. Using a
variety of evidence gleaned from interviews and from sources both within
and outside the organization, White details what he deems to be the most
salient features of Sōka Gakkai’s funding base. These can be divided into
three main areas: donation drives, fees collected from the elite group in
the Financial Department, and funds from its publishing empire. Each of
these areas will be discussed and then compared and updated with Shi-
mada’s more recent study.
In White’s analysis, the most spectacular source of financial backing
for Sōka Gakkai is what he describes as the donation drives. These drives
emerged as a way for the organization to support itself, as members were
not assessed a regular levy even though they faced the expectation to buy
certain publications. They were created for the purpose of constructing
new buildings and facilities, but the target goal was always surpassed,
providing the organization with additional funds. White gives the spec-
tacular examples of the 1961 and 1965 drives to support the construction
of the Grand Reception Hall and the Main Hall of Worship at the Taiseki
temple in Shizuoka prefecture. On both occasions, the faithful donated
several times the amount of the stated goals of the drive: in 1961 they
brought in almost 3.2 billion yen and in 1965 around eight million people
contributed about 35.5 billion yen. White thus identifies these drives as
the most lucrative source of funding for Sōka Gakkai when he published
his book in 1970.
After donation drives, the second major source of funds for Sōka Gak-
kai according to White is members who are invited to join an elite group
in the organization called the Financial Department or zaimu buin system.
These are the members who are deemed to be financially and spiritually
fit. After being selected, they are given a gold badge to wear, which helps
identify their special status in the organization. The most important aspect
for finance is that these members are asked to donate a minimum amount
to the organization each year. At the time of White’s study, members paid
a sum of 8,000 yen ($22 at the time), which is believed to have helped the
Gakkai collect at least $40 million in annual income. Unlike the donation
drives, which were held sporadically, fees from the Financial Department
were a steady source of revenue from year to year.
The third and final major source of funds identified in White’s study is
the revenue culled from Sōka Gakkai’s considerable publishing empire.
He argues that the publishing activities are important not only because
of their revenue, but also because they help conserve manpower and are
valuable in transmitting information about the organization to its follow-
ers.11 The publications include everything from the Seikyō Shimbun (Holy
teachings news) to Nichiren’s works and children’s picture magazines.
How profitable is this publishing empire? White cites estimates that place
the annual income from these periodicals as being close to 19 billion yen.
However, there are considerable overhead costs that need to be subtracted
to derive a more accurate sense of net profit. All told, White surmises that
the publishing empire brings in slightly less revenue than that collected
from the Financial Department.
The three major sources of funds discussed by White have strong paral-
lels to some of the money-collecting practices utilized by Kōmeitō covered
in the previous section, such as individual contributions and publications
revenue. One of the reasons that the party’s finances are officially separate
is that it was able to borrow and adapt the money-gathering practices of
its parent organization to create an “independent” organization with its
own balance sheets. It is important to remember, however, that the divi-
sion is not absolute. The party’s finances are strong partly because it is
able to tap into the financial strength of Sōka Gakkai’s membership base.
11
The top Gakkai leaders typically do not receive salary for their roles in the organiza-
tion, but instead hold paid positions in the Seikyō Publishing Company and other commer-
cial subsidiaries.
180 Matthew Carlson
The unofficial financial ties should not be underestimated and await fu-
ture exploration and study.12
In contrast to White, Shimada’s study seeks to describe and explain
how Japan’s New Religions have each developed their own systems for
collecting funds. He emphasizes the importance of these systems because
they allow the organizations to maintain themselves. He argues that dif-
ferent organizations have developed their own type of system, which he
likens to a business model. He classifies Gakkai as having what he calls
a “book club” business model. His discussion of Sōka Gakkai finances
includes the three areas covered by White but these have been updated
to reflect current practices and contain his estimates of various sources
of income.
One distinguishing feature of Shimada’s study that is useful here is his
emphasis on the importance of the Religious Corporations Law to explain
the financial operations of Japan’s New Religions. Because Sōka Gakkai
is registered as an official religious corporation, it is not required to pay
property tax, inheritance tax, or income tax on activities that the law clas-
sifies under the religious sphere. However, for profit-making activities
such as publishing, the law allows a discounted income tax for affiliated
enterprises (Shimada 2008, 54). Shimada notes that religious organizations
cannot receive financial assistance from the government. Thus, if they do
not earn money, they will not be able to fund themselves and ultimately
will fail to maintain their organization.
Like White, Shimada discusses the importance of the donation drives
in the 1960s but does not emphasize their importance after this point. Shi-
mada explains that after the war, the leaders of the organization went to
great efforts to create a “religion that does not cost money.” Leaders were
particularly critical of other religions that stockpiled large sums of cash.
He notes that the second president of Sōka Gakkai, Toda Jōsei, stressed
that people could become rich just through their faith and targeted his
message to the lower economic classes of society. This message typically
appealed to those who migrated from the countryside to urban centers,
did not attain a high level of education, and were generally not employed
in the top companies or represented by labor unions (Shimada 2008, 61;
cf. chapter 3). Shimada thus is able to clarify why Toda resisted the imple-
mentation of a required membership fee system and why donation drives
were necessary for the organization after the war. Another contributing
12
One untapped area is to make use of the party’s original campaign finance reports that
list the names, addresses, and main affiliation of the individual donors. This level of detail
would be useful in identifying major donors and in helping to disaggregate different inter-
ests, as argued by Ehrhardt in chapter 8.
factor was simply the need to raise immediate funds when Sōka Gakkai
was affiliated with the Nichiren Shōshū sect of Buddhism to build enough
temples and buildings to accommodate the large influx of believers after
the war.13
Shimada further extends the historical importance of the donation
drives to the second area discussed by White: the Financial Department.
However, he identifies this system as being one of the original sources for
some of Sōka Gakkai’s current financial practices. When the system was
started in 1951, members were originally requested to donate 4,000 yen
each year. Shimada explains that this system started out as tapping into a
small elite group but gradually evolved as a responsibility that all mem-
bers face today. Currently, contributions are collected in December using
bank transfer. The target amount is 10,000 yen per household. Some mem-
bers cannot afford to pay this amount, while other members can donate
much more than the target.
How much money the organization currently derives from the zaimu
buin system is difficult to pinpoint, in part because of the difficulties Shi-
mada notes in estimating the number of members. Estimates from Sōka
Gakkai are based on household units—this is because it is the household
that is given the Gohonzon, the object of devotion in the form of the scroll,
from the organization itself. The current estimate of 8.27 million house-
holds, however, does not control for members that quit the organization
or those that do not actively participate. Despite the difficulties in estimat-
ing an accurate number, Shimada still attempts to calculate the financial
gains from this practice. He surmises that there are about 2.5 million ac-
tive members, or about 5 million if less active members are included (for
instance, those who help at election time). Thus, he calculates that with 2.5
million active members that give 10,000 yen each, the current zaimu buin
system probably nets the organization at least 25 billion yen yearly.
Following White, Shimada also discusses the importance of the pub-
lishing empire, which he views as being less lucrative in current times
compared to revenues from the Financial Department. The publishing
empire is one of the central components of what Shimada calls the Sōka
Gakkai book club model—followers purchase books, subscriptions, and
other literature as might be seen in a book club. He discusses the impor-
tance of the Seikyō Shimbun, which has around 5.5 million readers, making
it one of the largest newspapers in Japan. It is not a private newspaper,
as Shimada notes, but rather the Sōka publishing department that pays a
reduced tax for sales and publication. Instead of paying a membership fee
13
Nichiren Shōshū, or “Nichiren True Sect,” is a minority lineage that follows the Bud-
dhist teachings of Nichiren (see chapter 3).
182 Matthew Carlson
to join Sōka Gakkai, members are encouraged to subscribe to the newspa-

per. They are also encouraged to purchase other publications, including
some of the hundred-plus books by its current honorary president, Ikeda
Daisaku. As nearly all of the publications feature Ikeda quite prominently,
Shimada even suggests that the book club model further resembles a “fan
club.” The main point of his discussion is that the book club model allows
the organization to generate valuable income to support its activities.
In Shimada’s coverage of the publishing empire, he does provide a use-
ful estimate of the revenue generated by the Seikyō Shimbun. His estimate
is derived by multiplying the monthly subscription price of 1,880 yen by
the number of readers. He then deducts the overhead costs, noting that the
newspaper does not own its own printing company but must pay other
companies for printing. The net profit is close to 16 billion yen, which
falls in second place compared to the 25 billion generated by the Financial
Department. Based on both estimates, Shimada thus ventures that Sōka
Gakkai is able to generate at least 40 billion yen annually.
Overall, the portrayal of Sōka Gakkai’s money-gathering methods is
fairly consistent between the studies despite the passage of nearly four
decades between them. One of the gradual changes to the organization is
the move away from the donation drives in the 1960s and the reliance on
a small elite in the Financial Department to the book club model where re-
sponsibilities and duties are spread across as many followers as possible.
The donation drives detailed by White in the 1960s had usefully served
their purpose of generating enough additional revenues beyond publish-
ing and the Financial Department to construct new buildings and temples
to deal with the massive increase in followers after the war. The high num-
ber of new followers was not something that the Nichiren Shōshū sect
could easily absorb without the financial assistance of Sōka Gakkai.14
Being the more recent, Shimada’s study also suggests that our knowl-
edge about Sōka Gakkai finances has not progressed very far in the four
decades since White’s book. Part of the reason mentioned earlier is that
neither the organization nor the Japanese government is required to dis-
close this information to the public. Another possible explanation is that
much of the writing and reporting on this topic seems to be more about
appealing to some of the public’s fascination with wealth, power, and re-
ligious groups. In the case of Shimada’s writings, one general criticism is
that he leaves too much to guesswork and not much effort is made to care-
fully document and verify all sources. For this reason, his claims about
14
The buildings and temples built with the donation drives are no longer under Sōka
Gakkai control since the organization repeatedly clashed with Nichiren Shōshū and both
split apart in the 1990s (Shimada 2007).
religious groups are suggestive, and a more definitive study of the Soka
Gakkai’s money-collecting methods remains to be conducted.
Income from Sōka Gakkai’s Profit-Making Enterprises
A second avenue to consider Sōka Gakkai’s money-collecting methods is
to examine some of the reports the organization was required to disclose
to the Japanese government regarding their profit-making enterprises. As
an officially registered religious corporation, Sōka Gakkai is not required
to pay taxes on activities that fall under the religious sphere, but it has
to pay taxes on profit-making activities such as publishing. This section
will present some of the information from these reports and try to situate
Sōka Gakkai’s profit-making income in relation to that of other religious
corporations in Japan.
From 2002 to 2004, the Ministry of Finance released information on
more than 700,000 profit-making enterprises in Japan, which included
some estimates for the profit-making companies affiliated with major reli-
gious corporations including Sōka Gakkai. These reports have been com-
piled and published for business users in Japan to capture a general sense
of which corporations in the country are making the most profit in a given
year and in a given sector. To compare Sōka Gakkai against other religious
corporations and to see the comparative rankings for each group among
the more than 700,000 profit-making enterprises, the earnings of the top
ten largest religious organizations for the year 2003 is reported in table 7.4.
Several observations can be made based on the figures presented in
table 7.4. First, it is clear that Sōka Gakkai is the top religious corporation
in Japan in terms of sheer earnings. In 2003 alone, it posted more than 18
billion yen in profits from its vast publishing empire alone. Second, while
Sōka Gakkai occupies the top spot for religious corporations, its earnings
place it in the 170th position among the more than 700,000 corporations.
The top position, incidentally, is held by the supermarket chain Itoyokado.
Thus, the Sōka Gakkai’s profit-based earnings are quite considerable if
compared with either other religious corporations or against other profit-
making corporations. The earnings were also surpassed by 169 corpora-
tions, which must be kept in perspective.
The success of Sōka Gakkai’s book club model has incidentally made
it a target for criticism along with the Religious Corporations Law that
allows it to receive reduced taxes. Some questioned why the Japanese
government would protect religious organizations with tax breaks when
many companies were going bankrupt during times of economic reces-
sion.15 Criticisms over the role of religious groups in politics also came to
15
For more discussion on this point, see Mullins (2001).
184 Matthew Carlson
Table 7.4 2003 earnings of religious corporations in Japan (yen in millions)
Rank Income Rank Corporate Body (Affiliation) Earnings
1 170 Sōka Gakkai (Buddhist) 18,115
2 2,020 Meiji Jingu (Shinto) 1,687
3 8,805 Gessōji (Buddhist) 409
4 9,296 Renjōji (Buddhist) 388
5 11,308 Sensōji (Buddhist) 321
6 11,402 Reiha no Hikari Kyōkai (Shinto) 319
7 11,426 Yasukuni Jinja (Shinto) 318
8 12,380 Kenshōkai (Buddhist) 293
9 13,416 Kōsenji (Buddhist) 269
10 13,416 Nihon Kirisuto Kyōdan Misakichō Kyōkai 258

(Christian)
Source: Hōjin shintoku rankingu (2004).
the forefront when Kōmeitō joined the coalition government led by the
LDP in 1999 (see chapter 9). Although I was not able to evaluate these criti-
cisms directly, the analysis and discussion here suggests that the money-
gathering methods of Sōka Gakkai have many things in common with the
methods of other religious groups, political parties, and corporations.
Conclusions
This chapter examined some of the money-collecting methods of Kōmeitō
and Sōka Gakkai with comparisons to other political parties and reli-
gious organizations. Compared to several of the other main political par-
ties, Kōmeitō’s money-gathering methods are not drastically different.
Kōmeitō is a wealthy political party, but not the wealthiest. Its publishing
empire, similar to that of Sōka Gakkai as well as the Communist Party,
generates considerable revenue. Like in the cases of the DPJ and LDP, con-
tributions from individual supporters form only a small portion of income
at the party headquarter or Lower House level. One exception here is at
the prefectural level, where Kōmeitō is particularly strong at collecting
individual contributions. What perhaps makes Kōmeitō unique as a reli-

gious political party seems to be its relationship with Sōka Gakkai, whose
members contribute money and support to the party through informal
channels that escape easy quantification. Additional research is needed
to better illuminate some of the informal ties but also efforts to compare
Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai to other religious groups that are active in Japa-
nese politics.
References
Carlson, Matthew. 2007. Money Politics in Japan: New Rules, Old Practices.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Dorman, Ben. 2006. “Religious Politics, Japanese Style.” Religion in the
News 9, no. 1:6–18.
Ehrhardt, George. 2009. “Rethinking the Kōmeitō Voter.” Japanese Journal
of Political Science 10, no. 1:1–20.
Hōjin shintoku rankingu: Nihon no kaisha besuto 7-man 1076-sha [Company
revenue ranking: Japan’s best 71,076]. 2004. Tokyo: Daiyamondosha.
Kanpō. Various years. Seiji dantai no shūshi hōkokusho no yōshi [Income
reports of political organizations]. Tokyo: Ministry of Finance Press.
Klein, Axel. 2012. “Twice Bitten, Once Shy: Religious Organizations and
Politics after the Aum Attack.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 39,
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Kōhō. Various years. Seiji dantai no shūshi hōkokusho no yōshi [Income
reports of political organizations]. Senkyo Kanri Iinkai [Election
Administration Commission] (located in each prefecture).
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of Aum Shinrikyo.” Asian Survey 35, no. 12:1140–1154.
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Affair.’” In Religion and Social Crisis in Japan, edited by Robert Kisala
and Mark Mullins, 71–86. New York: Palgrave.
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Available at www.komei.or.jp/en/about/view.html. Accessed 31
December 2013.
Shimada Hiromi. 2007. Kōmeitō vs Sōka Gakkai [Kōmeitō versus Sōka
Gakkai]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha.
———. 2008. Shin shūkyō ‘bijinesu’ [New Religions’ “business”] Tokyo:
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186 Matthew Carlson
Periodicals
million) was second only to that of the Yomiuri Shimbun (see http://
adv.yomiuri.co.jp/yomiuri/busu/busu01.html; accessed Jan. 2014).
Japan Times is the major English-language daily newspaper in Japan, with
a circulation of close to 50,000.
Eight
Housewife Voters and Kōmeitō Policies
George Ehrhardt
Introduction
Deciphering what Kōmeitō wants to accomplish is an enduring project
for outside observers. This is often driven by the way it commonly uses
left-of-center rhetoric on social issues while allying solely with the right-
of-center Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) instead of the more left-leaning
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Broadly speaking, there are two conven-
tional understandings of Kōmeitō political goals that explain this discrep-
ancy: religious motives and elite power seeking. While these theories have
different implications, they both rely on a top-down model of political
behavior, which assumes that voters echo politicians’ preferences, rather
than the other way around.
In this chapter, I take the perspective that in spite of its religious origins,
Kōmeitō is above all a political party, whose goal is to win elections. Like
other political parties, it pursues policies to win votes, and the key to un-
derstanding Kōmeitō’s policy goals is identifying whose votes the party
seeks to win (Aldrich 1995). To restate this differently, while important
decisions are typically made by elites in opaque processes, the contents of
those decisions are dominated by the long shadow of grassroots prefer-
ences. Correspondingly, understanding the party’s supporters allows us
to explain what the party is doing and is likely to do in the future. Saying
that Kōmeitō’s base is Sōka Gakkai—as most analyses do—isn’t wrong,
but it misses a fundamental point: unpacking the black box of Sōka Gak-
kai membership reveals a diversity of political preferences. Looking at
those gives us a more nuanced understanding, one that enables us to see
how the party relies on a particular portion of Sōka Gakkai for its votes,
and how that shapes its policy goals.
Here I propose and test an alternative hypothesis about Kōmeitō’s
agenda: like secular political parties, Kōmeitō’s policy agenda matches
that of its core supporters, which in this case is Sōka Gakkai’s Married
188 George Ehrhardt
Women’s Division (Fujinbu). I find that not only does a study of Kōmeitō
policies support this alternative hypothesis; the theory also helps us un-
derstand related political behavior. For example, it explains the uniquely
profemale gender gap in Kōmeitō party support and why Sōka Gakkai
membership produces different effects on the political behavior for wom-
en than it does for men.
This bottom-up hypothesis contrasts with the two top-down hypothe-
ses that have held sway since the 1960s. Until 1970 or so, observers agreed
that Sōka Gakkai’s explicit goal in political mobilization was religious
control. Levi McLaughlin’s chapter in this volume (chapter 3) builds on
earlier work by White (1970) and Nakano (2003) to explore these religious
intentions, arguing that Sōka Gakkai saw politics as a tool to converting
Japan to its brand of Nichiren Buddhism (White 1970; Métraux 1988, 1994;
Nakano 2003). Disregarding the postwar constitutional restrictions on
state-sponsored religion, Sōka Gakkai hoped its political wing Kōmeitō
would bring the ordination of Buddhist priests nationwide under their
control. By 1970, however, even the most ardent supporters understood
the strength of their opposition and dropped the explicitly theocratic por-
tion of the party’s agenda.
The currently dominant hypothesis among scholars looking at Sōka
Gakkai and Kōmeitō is that Kōmeitō’s primary goal is power itself (Miura
2003; Tamano 2008; Matsutani 2009; Suzuki 2010). In other words, the
party subordinates its policy agenda to whatever potential partner offers
it the greatest share of power and status. Kabashima, for example, insists
that “the reason Kōmeitō leaders don’t use their bargaining power over
the LDP is that they aren’t just interested in implementing policy, they
want power for the sake of being in power” (Kabashima and Yamamoto
2004). Tamano puts a more positive spin on this sentiment in his explana-
tion of Kōmeitō’s rationale for abandoning firm goals, saying that from
the party’s perspective, “to exercise influence and make policy, one has
to look carefully at the political scene and from time to time work with
different parties and make compromises.” Admittedly, this is true of all
political parties to some degree, especially junior parties in ruling coali-
tions, but these observers insist that since 1998, Kōmeitō in particular has
no enduring goals.1
These authors agree that the party’s turn away from ideology is a recent
event. In its early days, Kōmeitō claimed to be a voice for the marginal-
ized, those who belonged to neither unions supporting the Japan Socialist
1
Some authors qualify this assertion by noting Kōmeitō’s post-1995 interest in protect-
ing Sōka Gakkai from government oversight, and its leader Ikeda Daisaku from being com-
pelled to testify before the Diet.
Housewife Voters and Kōmeitō Policies 189
or Democratic Socialist Party nor industrial interests supporting the Lib-

eral Democrats. Former Kōmeitō chief representative Takeiri Yoshikatsu
and former Diet member Hirano Sado, who worked with Kōmeitō legisla-
tors in the 1993–1994 coalition government, both insist that Kōmeitō once
represented poor and marginalized migrants to Tokyo or Osaka working
at small businesses.2 Their criticism—and that of the scholars quoted ear-
lier—is for Kōmeitō in the twenty-first century. Matsutani (2009) supports
this with a Marxist false consciousness argument, insisting that the orga-
nization’s religious messages overwhelm lower-class Kōmeitō partisans’
economic interests. This turn, scholars agree, implies Kōmeitō is pursu-
ing power for the sake of power and status, not a policy agenda. Indeed,
Kōmeitō’s behavior during the DPJ administration may support this in-
terpretation; its refusal to join the DPJ in coalition calls its rhetoric into
question, since the DPJ agenda would appear to be more similar than the
LDP’s (see chapter 10).
Nevertheless, denials of Kōmeitō support for particular agendas are
ultimately unsatisfying. Saying that Kōmeitō’s policy agenda doesn’t cen-
ter on helping the poor, for example, does not mean that it has no policy
agenda. Similarly, Suzuki’s argument that Kōmeitō’s actions don’t fit so-
cial democratic ideology does not mean that the party has no ideology.
Political parties in all countries evolve over time, trading constituents and
policies, but that doesn’t mean that we can’t ascribe them a set of political
preferences. The best way to understand Kōmeitō’s goals is to investigate
who it does represent, not whom it doesn’t.
Investigating who the party does represent uncovers a trail that leads
straight to the housewives of the Sōka Gakkai Married Women’s Division.
Prior research has given us a robust picture of contemporary Japanese
housewives’ politics, and at first blush that picture looks very similar to
Kōmeitō’s policy choices. Consider the party’s self-proclaimed signature
achievements, the jidoteate (monthly payments to all families with small
children) and holding down health insurance costs for retirees. Both poli-
cies are aimed at a single audience—housewives who manage the finances
and care of both young children and elderly parents. I suggest the party’s
choice to trumpet these achievements, rather than policies to help the ur-
ban worker or small businessman, is a signal that the party itself sees Sōka
Gakkai housewives as its core constituency (see chapter 10).3
2
For evidence on the historical composition of Kōmeitō supporters, see White (1970)
and Azumi (1971).
3
For more detail on Kōmeitō’s promotional materials, electoral outreach, and campaign
rhetoric where these themes occur, see Ehrhardt (2009).
190 George Ehrhardt
Housewives
In Japan, the word shufu—usually translated as “housewife”—is a broadly
inclusive term, including both sengyō shufu (full-time housewives), who
do not work outside the home, and women who combine housework
with part-time jobs. Conceptually, though, it is closer to the English word
“homemaker,” because it carries connotations of holding primary respon-
sibility for the home and the people in it (Leblanc 1999). Over the past
decade, scholars have discovered a distinctive set of political attitudes
among Japanese housewives, one that cuts across economic status and
geography.
Japanese Housewives: Public, But Not Political
Scholars broadly agree on three common characteristics of Japanese
housewives. Their policy agenda focuses on issues that touch the house-
hold; foreign policy and business conditions are far less important. They
do act publicly, forming groups and associations to collectively solve
problems. Nevertheless, they remain deeply ambivalent about electoral
politics. While they vote in equal numbers to men, other forms of political
participation are far less common among women, especially those that
identify as housewives.
Susan Pharr (1998) coined the term “care issues” to describe housewife
policy preferences. In survey after survey, Japanese housewives prioritize
issues of social welfare, environmental protection, consumer protection,
tax reform, and education (Soma 1975; Watanuki 1991; Hastings 1996; Pat-
terson and Nishikawa 2002). Gill Steel (2004) supports these surveys with
focus groups, finding that her participants become particularly animated
when talking about environmental protection and neighborhood prob-
lems. Robin Leblanc (1999) confirms this with a long-term ethnographic
study of a group of housewives in Tokyo, finding that they are most inter-
ested in questions of how vulnerable members of society such as children,
the elderly, and the handicapped can be protected.
These women turn out to be highly active in community groups, par-
ticularly those that address their preferred issues. Some are directly re-
lated to their role as housewives, like the PTO or the consumer coopera-
tive Netto. Others are more community oriented, like the halfway house
for mentally handicapped that Leblanc volunteers at with the women she
studies. Either way, they blur the line between private and public life,
making Eto’s description of how housewife movements like Life Club or
Netto link women to public life worth quoting in full: “The organizations
provide women with a space for interplay between the public and private
spheres through three functions: the transformation of women’s private
concerns into public issues; problem-solving based on their everyday ex-

perience; and sharing knowledge and expertise which have been accumu-
lated in political activities” (2004, 42). Combined with our knowledge of
housewives’ policy preferences, this draws a picture of women interested
in a particular set of issues, those relating to their homemaker respon-
sibilities, and willing to leave the home to take public action to resolve
problems they see as important.
And yet, in spite of having clear political interests and a willingness to
act, Japanese housewives are relatively reluctant to translate those feel-
ings into campaign work. A survey of 1,618 voters after the 2000 election,
for example, found that 35% of men claimed to have helped in a political
campaign, in contrast to only 25% of women (Leblanc 1999; Steel 2004; Eto
2004; Nishizawa et al. 2001). Among women who identified themselves as
housewives, that number fell to 24%. Roughly the same percentage of men
(37%) claimed to have attended political rallies, a number that fell to 21%
among women and 20% among self-identified housewives. The survey
finds similar gender differences in other measures of political participa-
tion, including donating money, writing to politicians, and so on. When
asked if they had asked friends to vote for a political party (the most com-
mon form of Gakkai member political participation), 32% of men said yes
compared with only 21% of women. The only measure on which men and
women remained equal was voting; 91% of both sexes claimed to have
voted “a number of times” in past elections.
While contemporary Japanese women are as interested in politics as
men, equally well informed, and turn out to vote in roughly equal propor-
tion, women are nevertheless less likely to support a political party, less
likely to become politicians, less likely to feel they belong in the political
process, and more reluctant to engage in campaigning (Imamura 1987;
Watanuki 1991; Iwao 1993; Kutsuzawa 1998; Leblanc 1999; Patterson and
Nishikawa 2002). These gaps have decreased since the immediate postwar
period, but they remain significant. In short, Japanese women tend to re-
ject electoral politics.
The source of this rejection remains subject to debate, but scholars have
identified two explanations: one is cultural, inherent in housewives’ pri-
vate identity, and the other is rational, a decision that political parties do
not support their policy agenda. Eto and Leblanc argue the latter, citing
their participants’ insistence that the political realm cannot solve their
problems, pointing out how males’ separation from the domestic sphere
leads male politicians to neglect issues like elderly care or food safety.
At the same time, Patterson and Nishikawa analyze long-term sur-
vey data and find clear evidence that women do support some parties, as
192 George Ehrhardt
Figure 8.1 Size of gender gap in party support (in percent).

Source: Patterson and Nishikawa (2002) and data from various General Social Surveys from
2000 to 2008.
shown in figure 8.1. This figure shows the percentage of men that support
the party minus the percentage of women for each major party, so that
positive numbers represent majority male support, and negative numbers
represent majority female support. The vertical lines show the range of
observations over the five General Social Survey4 studies between 2000
and 2008, the circles represent the average gender balance for each party.
The LDP and DPJ have high numbers, indicating that their support among
men is higher than among women. The Communist Party and Socialist
Party, known for addressing issues that matter to housewives, have much
smaller gender gaps. And yet, even the Socialists still have more male par-
tisans than female partisans.
In fact, Kōmeitō is the only party that consistently has a profemale gen-
der gap. By Patterson and Nishikawa’s measures, Kōmeitō’s highest level
male support is below the lowest recorded by any other party, even parties
like the Socialists that are seen as more woman-friendly in the literature.
4
The General Social Survey is conducted every other year by the University of Chicago.
Kōmeitō’s position as the only party that draws higher support from
women than men—and one that does so consistently—raises a serious
question. Why are women willing to identify with Kōmeitō and not the
other parties? In this chapter I argue that Kōmeitō retains its female sup-
port by appealing to the housewives of Sōka Gakkai’s Married Women’s
Division—the Fujinbu.
Housewives: The “Pillar of the Sōka Gakkai”
Toward the end of my fieldwork with Sōka Gakkai in 2007, I was touring
a meeting hall in Osaka, and we came across a locked door in the base-
ment, with signs cautioning visitors to stay out. I asked what lay behind
the door, and my guide replied that was the “Fujinbu activity room.” I
pressed him, wondering what the women did behind closed doors, and
whether other divisions had their own room. He paused, clearly unsure
how to reply. In the end, he said that only the Fujinbu had a room, because
“women need space to do, you know, Fujinbu stuff.”5
In theory, the Fujinbu is for all adult females, but, in reality, the orga-
nization expects that its members are housewives; this expectation is al-
ready in place when members graduate from youth divisions to the gen-
dered adult divisions. Men’s identity is determined by their employment
status: entry into their adult group (Seinenbu) occurs when they enter the
workforce, and later join the Senior (Sōnen) Division. Women, on the con-
trary, gain their adult status from marriage, joining the Fujinbu when they
achieve that milestone; like marriage, Fujinbu status is for life—there is no
Retired Women’s Division as there is for men. Meeting schedules cement
these gendered identities. Men’s Division meetings start between nine
and ten at night, after members get home from work. Fujinbu meetings
start around 1 pm, arranged to fit a housewife’s schedule—sandwiched
between housework in the mornings and children’s arrival home from
school after 2:30 pm.6 Obviously, this works only for families held together
by a female homemaker—career women have no place, nor do men who
must stay home with their children at night.
This fixed gender role is common among Japanese New Religions, most
of which encourage believers to accept a worldview that a woman’s place
is in the home, subordinate to her husband. Hardacre’s work (1986) on
Risshō Kōseikai, a Buddhist New Religion, documents how its religious
doctrine bluntly asserts male superiority. Her work on Reiyūkai (1984)
shows how its emphasis on preserving extended families (ie) encourages
women to submit to their husbands and dedicate themselves to being a
5
All translations are mine.
6
Mixed-gender events usually happen on weekends.
194 George Ehrhardt
“dutiful wife.” Usui describes something similar in Shinyoen, where the

founding leader’s wife became an important figure in her own right, but
who remained situated in the kitchen, giving instruction while caring
for her family (2003, 217–241). She urged female believers to serve oth-
ers rather than themselves. Kaneko’s work on Tenrikyō finds elements of
this same maternalistic teaching, though she does qualify it as a modern
addition, rather than an original teaching (2003, 3–4 and 243–258). The net
result of these teachings is what Hardacre (1993) calls the “radical patri-
archism” of Japanese New Religions. By rhetorically valuing the maternal
role, they lead female believers to internalize a norm of staying at home.
This leaves the public sphere of collective activity and decision making
exclusively to men.
It is easy to see how this works in Sōka Gakkai. The subleaders around
honorary president Ikeda Daisaku are all male. Underneath them, at each
level—neighborhood, district, prefecture, and so on—there are separate
positions for the head of the Youth Division, Young Women’s Division,
Men’s Division, Women’s Division, and Senior Men’s Division, but only
the senior men’s leader is referred to as overall leader of that geographic
area. At mixed-gender meetings in my experience, men do more of the
speaking, and do so more authoritatively. For example, when two lead-
ers of different genders but equal rank were present, the male spoke last,
signifying his higher authority. In theory, then, it is difficult to imagine the
Fujinbu as an independent constituency with its own preferences.
And yet, a closer look at actual practice challenges this; there are too
many anecdotes like the following that it cannot explain. Sōka Gakkai’s
daily newspaper Seikyō Shimbun is a major part of communication within
the organization, and all members are expected to subscribe to it and sell
it to nonmembers. Women do the actual work of selling and distribut-
ing it, but, in theory, men are in charge. Theory, however, does not match
reality. At one year-end meeting I attended, for example, the male leader
responsible for newspaper sales got up to present the year’s results, but he
quickly went off the rails:
“Well guys, like usual, except for Mr. District-leader all the top sellers
were women. Here’s the list . . .” He stopped, confused, then looked at
his wife.
“Uh, honey? Do you have the list?” She shuffled through her papers,
found the list, and he read the names aloud. Then he said, “And our top
salesperson sold . . .” He stopped again.
“Uh, honey, how much did she sell?” he asked.
“Maybe I should do this?” she replied.
“Uh, maybe that’d be a good idea,” he said, sitting down.
I looked around the room. No one seemed disturbed, or even surprised,

that his wife was actually the one in control—most joined the presenter in
a good-natured chuckle. In theory, a gendered patriarchy is in charge. In
practice, it isn’t.
Another time, I attended a mixed-gender meeting where each division
performed a song. Singing is common at meetings, much like in Christian
services. This time, the women sang without incident, but when the Senior
Men Division’s turn came, their performance was a mess—out of tune,
unfamiliar lyrics. Watching the audience, I could see the older women
look at each other with expressions of “here we go again” and begin sing-
ing, carrying the men through the rest of their song. The striking thing
about this incident isn’t that the women helped sing, it was the expectation
of the men’s inability to fulfill their role without female help—the same
expectation I saw in the newspaper presentation.
On my way home from a later meeting, I discussed the issue with a
regional leader; an older man and successful business owner in a rural
farming community, a social role that tends to produce men who believe
that men should be in charge and women should do what they’re told. But
when I asked him about gender and power in Sōka Gakkai, he replied:
“Well, yes, men are in charge. But, you know, if we make decisions they
[the Fujinbu] don’t like, they argue. And they don’t stop arguing. They
don’t stop until we change. So we just don’t do anything they might argue
with.” I think he artfully sums up the role of gender in Sōka Gakkai that I
witnessed. Formally, men dominate, but they act in the long shadow of the
housewives of the Fujinbu.
I thought of these stories while listening to my two guides talk about
what might lie behind Fujinbu’s locked door on the tour I mentioned ear-
lier. After my guide admitted he didn’t know what happened inside the
room, he continued: “They don’t exactly tell us what they are doing.” The
observer from headquarters accompanying us nodded his head in agree-
ment, and the two commiserated about how “the Fujinbu does whatever
the Fujinbu decides to do.”7 At that point in my fieldwork, I was accus-
tomed to such comments, but I was still surprised to hear it from these two
men, since the man from headquarters was an important figure for the
whole Kansai area, and the tour guide was the regional director in charge
of the building itself.
7
Another version of this story: I asked someone from the organization about who picks
the songs for each meeting, wondering how it compared to Christian churches. He replied
that the organization issues guidance about which songs to sing each month, but the Fujinbu
sings songs they like and doesn’t sing songs they don’t.
196 George Ehrhardt
They acknowledged that women, ostensibly low in the gender hierar-

chy, carve out physical and metaphorical space for action independent of
the male control. The men responsible for their behavior in theory could
neither control nor even monitor their activity in practice. This indepen-
dence challenges our stereotype of gendered Japanese religion, forcing us
to acknowledge women’s potential for independent political action and
justifying an unprejudiced look at the Fujinbu’s role in electoral politics.
Sōka Gakkai Housewives: Public and Political
In contrast to secular housewives, Fujinbu members eagerly embrace elec-
toral politics. Journalistic exposés of Sōka Gakkai often include stories of
Fujinbu electioneering, told in breathless “can you believe it” tones. In one
interview, a former Fujinbu member divulges her electioneering secret—
wait until election season to hire home repairmen so she has a captive
audience (SGMK 2001).8 In my own fieldwork, one young man told me
a story about his mother’s enthusiasm: during election season, she regu-
larly harangues Communist Party candidates speaking at train stations,
shouting them down with cries of “Liar!” and worse—not at all what our
theories of housewife behavior predict. Sōka Gakkai itself leaves no doubt
that the Fujinbu is the most powerful vote-gathering organization in the
country (SGMK 2011).
Survey data support these claims, showing how strikingly different
Sōka Gakkai housewives are from the secular counterparts. Table 8.1
makes this clear, comparing the two groups. No matter what form of po-
litical participation one looks at, women in Sōka Gakkai are between two
and four times as likely to engage in it. This is especially true for asking
friends to vote and donating money—activities in which all Sōka Gakkai
members are expected to participate.
Admittedly, Sōka Gakkai men are still more likely than women to en-
gage in the traditional types of political participation measured in surveys.
What those surveys’ definitions of campaigning miss, however, are the
ways the Fujinbu drives others’ participation in ways that aren’t included
in those surveys. In chapter 5 of this volume I offer more details on Sōka
Gakkai electioneering, but here I want to point out how women have a
crucial internal role, organizing and mobilizing men’s campaign activities.
Sōka Gakkai campaign activities can be divided into two categories:
gathering external support (f-tori) and mobilizing members to go vote
8
Even Sōka Gakkai members recognize the potential for self-parody in this behavior.
The organization’s newspaper Seikyō Shimbun ran a cartoon in which two ladies sit in a
crowded public bath, carrying on a conversation about the virtues of the local Kōmeitō rep-
resentative, then smugly announce at their next Sōka Gakkai meeting that they did election
outreach to fifty people.
Table 8.1 Gender and political participation
Women in the Women in

Measures of political participation population at large Sōka Gakkai
Attend political rally 21% 46%
Ask friend to vote for a political party 21% 64%
Volunteer for a campaign 24% 39%
Donate money 10% 39%
Source: JEDS (2000).

Note: N=1,618 total, 55 women in Sōka Gakkai.
(naibu kakunin). The former is essentially an individual act; each member is

responsible for producing his or her own list of associates to contact during
the election period. In contrast, internal mobilization is organized by the
Fujinbu. Prior to the election, Fujinbu members produce detailed spread-
sheets of the membership in their district, with names, addresses, and
phone numbers, as well as other relevant details about each person. Once
the list is complete, they divide it along the organization’s fine-grained
structure. For example, a Young Men’s block-leader would get the names
of young men in the five or so families in his “block.” The Senior Division
leaders would get their members’ names, and so on with the other divi-
sions. The person in each division at the next level up, the “chiku-leader,”
would get the lists of the three “blocks” under his supervision, and so
on up the ladder. Each leader is responsible for contacting their members
and verifying that they voted. Tellingly, though, while members are for-
mally responsible to their immediate supervisor for that information, in
fieldwork I often heard men complain that Fujinbu members continually
pester them on their progress. In the same way as the newspaper sales
anecdote illustrates how women manage that critical fund-raising activity,
women manage electoral mobilization for the whole organization.
The other women’s role is more difficult to assess. On the outside, Sōka
Gakkai appears wholly committed to Kōmeitō campaigning, but field-
work on the inside suggests there is a gender gap in enthusiasm. This
showed up in the way women describe campaigning as “fun” (runrun
suru, as one member put it at a Fujinbu meeting in 2007). They typical-
ly describe it in terms of meeting people and socializing, putting cam-
paigning in a broader context of social interaction. The most common
198 George Ehrhardt
response from men, meanwhile, is along the lines of “well, it’s better than
selling newspapers.”9 I have heard a variety of men—from rank-and-file
members in both the Young and Senior Men’s divisions to officials in the
Kōmeitō and even at Sōka Gakkai headquarters itself—express reserva-
tions about the pressure to contact everyone they know at election time.
Some explain that they just “aren’t enthusiastic,” others rationalize that
it may be counterproductive if it becomes harassment and alienates po-
tential voters. When I asked some of them why the practice persists, why
there isn’t a debate inside Sōka Gakkai about campaigning, they each sep-
arately pointed the finger at the Fujinbu, insisting that its commitment to
the current campaign strategy is too strong to resist.
As deep as the religious gap may be between secular housewives and
the Fujinbu, their political differences come down to one key point. Ob-
servers agree that secular housewives are publicly active in volunteer and
community organizations, but not in electoral politics. Members of the
Fujinbu share that public activism, but it takes the form of being politically
active in Kōmeitō electoral campaigns.
This activism is crucial to Kōmeitō’s electoral fortunes. While Sōka
Gakkai men are still more likely to engage in what we conventionally de-
fine as political participation, Kōmeitō political campaigns depend on a
backdrop of Fujinbu organization and commitment. It is impossible to put
a precise figure on how important the Fujinbu is to Sōka Gakkai election-
eering, but I heard from a variety of sources within the organization that
the Fujinbu is responsible for 70 to 80 percent of all Sōka Gakkai activity.10
When Ikeda Daisaku says, as he often does, that the Fujinbu is the “pillar”
of Sōka Gakkai, he means that without that 70 percent, the rest falls. So it
is with Kōmeitō election campaigns—without the Fujinbu, Kōmeitō falls.
Testing the Theory: Fujinbu Votes and Kōmeitō Policies

This means we must take a fresh look at the relationship between
Kōmeitō’s policies and its supporters’ political preferences. As I men-
tioned in the introduction to this chapter, there appears to be a gap be-
tween the l ower-class economic interests of many Sōka Gakkai voters and
the policies Kōmeitō has pursued in coalition with the LDP since 1999.
While there is some debate about what this implies, analysts agree that
the gap exists.11 They reach this conclusion through statistical looks at
9
The few men that were enthusiastic about campaigning tended to see it as an opportunity
for personal growth, rather than as an enjoyable activity.
10
Levi McLaughlin, the author of chapter 3 in this volume, confirms that he consistently
heard the same figure in his fieldwork as well.
11
Tamano (2010) argues that it presages dissension between Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō,
Sōka Gakkai, finding that its members are predominantly self-employed

or blue-collar, and have lower educational attainment than the national
average.12 This is true, if we see Sōka Gakkai only as a statistical aggregate
and ignore the evidence that Kōmeitō support is driven by a subset of
Sōka Gakkai members.
The presence of a large subgroup within Kōmeitō’s supporters who
have different preferences from the conventional class-based analysis im-
plies an alternative hypothesis about Kōmeitō motives. Within the limits
imposed on a junior coalition partner, Kōmeitō policy goals will be similar
to those of its largest coherent support group—housewives. Replacing the
assumption of a homogenous Sōka Gakkai with a more nuanced under-
standing of differences within the organization allows us to tie Kōmeitō
policies to portions of the religion.
The central puzzle in this chapter is why Kōmeitō pursues the policies
it does: as LDP-pleasing measures to ensure its acceptance in the ruling
coalition, or as voter-pleasing measures to ensure continued Fujinbu sup-
port. Fortunately, Kōmeitō’s time in the ruling coalition offers an oppor-
tunity to test these competing theories of Kōmeitō goals. If the party’s
policy agenda matches that of housewives, that will provide evidence that
it seeks those policies desired by its supporters—as do secular political
parties worldwide. Our earlier summary of the literature on housewives
policy preferences in Japan provides a baseline against which to compare
Kōmeitō policies: they should emphasize social welfare, education, politi-
cal corruption, environmental protection, and consumer protection, while
being willing to compromise on foreign policy, industrial policy, and ad-
ministrative reform. And if Kōmeitō policy goals do not match that list,
then we will have evidence that the conventional wisdom is correct about
Kōmeitō’s seeking power for the sake of power.
This section provides an overview of Kōmeitō policy as a ruling par-
ty from 1999 through 2009, which can be compared to what we know
of Fujinbu preferences (readers interested in a more complete picture
of Kōmeitō policy can find it in chapter 10 in this book). To understand
Kōmeitō policy, though, we need to look at two different aspects: the con-
tent of its policy stances and the kinds of issues on which it takes a stance.
but Matsutani (2009) thinks that is unlikely because religious rhetoric takes precedence over
economic interests among Sōka Gakkai voters.
12
In an interesting contrast between politicians and academics, Kōmeitō Diet member
Takagi Yōsuke interprets these results differently, pointing out that the average is an abstract
number, and that actual Sōka Gakkai members include “company presidents, housewives,
retirees, the disabled, straddling every social class” (AERA, 8 November 2004, 30).
200 George Ehrhardt
Kōmeitō Issues
Broad surveys that measure the content of parties’ stances on national is-
sues, like those analyzed by Kabashima and Matsutani, miss something
important about the kind of issues Kōmeitō cares about: the party pursues
a collection of small issues, not an overarching worldview.13 If you listen to
Kōmeitō party rhetoric from both national and local politicians, the phrase
“politics that listens to those on the front lines” (genba no koe ga todoku
seiji) crops up again and again, and it reflects the way Kōmeitō politicians
see their comparative advantage over other parties in solving problems in
daily life, not wrestling with macrolevel issues. While this sounds like the
constituent service that all politicians engage in, Kōmeitō candidates use
this phrase in the slightly different context of solving small-scale collective
problems rather than intervening for individuals.
This seems much like generic campaign rhetoric, which I did not ful-
ly appreciate until I heard a campaign speech by Hamada Masayoshi, a
Kōmeitō candidate in the 2010 Upper House election. The biggest issue
of the election was a proposed sales tax hike, and he did talk about that,
but he spent much more time on a peculiar issue—handwriting. Appar-
ently, the Ministry of External Trade and Industry has a subsidy program
for small businesses, but Hamada received a constituent complaint that
it was too difficult to apply for. Securing a copy of the application, he
decided that it was so long (three pages) that the small business owners
he knew would give up before they finished. Who can stand filling out a
three-page form? he asked rhetorically. So he scanned the form into his
computer and did some editing, shrinking the boxes so it all fit on a single
side of a page. When he took it back to METI, the bureaucrats refused to
use it, insisting that petitioners would write so small they would not be
able to read it. Hamada countered that the business owners could take
it to an unemployment office, where the clerks could fill it in neatly. The
bureaucrats agreed, he announced, and now life is (apparently) easier for
small business owners.
Nor was this the only example. He spent equally long talking about how
he had done fieldwork at electronics stores to see whether they numbered
their receipts so he could arrange for an “eco-star appliance” reimburse-
ment program to be backdated three months. Accustomed to ideological
politics and generic stump speeches, I was stunned. A national politician
making it a priority to boast about the time he spent photoshopping a
13
Tamano Kozushi, one of the few Japanese academics who study Kōmeitō, goes so far
as to predict (2010) that after Ikeda’s death, it will abandon national politics altogether and
be content as the country’s largest collection of local politicians.
government form? Or visiting appliance stores? Amid all the problems Ja-
pan faces he wants us to know about his intervention for three months of
appliance sales? This makes no sense in terms of a broad party agenda or
ideology, but it helps put the question of Kōmeitō’s alliance with the LDP
instead of the DPJ into the proper perspective.
A trivia-filled campaign speech makes perfect sense if we recognize
that Kōmeitō is beholden to a constituency that prioritizes neighborhood
problems over national macrolevel issues. Hamada’s speech owes little or
nothing to Buddhist theology or social justice, but it’s dead-on for talk-
ing to the women in Steel’s (2004) focus groups, who tuned out national
politics but perked up when the conversation turned to narrow daily life
issues. None of these evince a grand vision for Japanese society, nor do
they suggest any overarching ideology that voters might share. They do
not offer the analyst any leverage for placing the party on a standard po-
litical continuum. They do, on the contrary, seem designed to answer the
particularistic concerns of Japanese housewives.
This explains the contradiction between this chapter and arguments
by Kabashima, Matsutani, and others, that Kōmeitō’s party agenda does
not match that of its voters. That literature relies on survey research mea-
suring the distance between Sōka Gakkai voters and Kōmeitō policies,
particularly on two national surveys, the “Japan General Social Survey”
(JGSS) and the “Japan Election Survey” (JES), which are conducted ev-
ery few years. Both surveys ask respondents to position themselves on
two-dimensional conservative/progressive scales, or to rate their views
on national issues, like the U.S.–Japan alliance.14 Critically, their national
scope means that they cannot ask about specific local problems, except
in the most generic terms. Similarly, they cannot address issues that most
respondents have not heard of, like backdating eco-star reimbursement,
or the number of pages in small-business subsidy applications. That kind
of survey research is valid if voters base their party allegiance on national,
macrolevel ideological issues. However, if voters base their allegiance on
politicians’ demonstrated interest in solving specific issues in their daily
lives, national surveys like JGSS and JES will never find a connection, re-
gardless of whether actually one exists or not. As a result, their research
is suggestive, but not definitive. Actually understanding Kōmeitō’s goals
requires a deeper understanding of the party and its voters.
14
Future survey researchers should note that Sōka Gakkai organization—the PR office, at
least—insists that its members’ beliefs are not on that scale, that it needs another axis coming
up from the middle. Whether or not that is accurate, to the extent they share these views with
the membership, all such questions have a crippling validity problem.
202 George Ehrhardt
Kōmeitō Policy Content

Kōmeitō’s piecemeal approach to policy supports the contention that it
draws its goals from the Fujinbu in a “bottom-up” fashion, but broad-
er policy issues are also worth considering. During its first ten years as
a junior partner in the ruling coalition, Kōmeitō has supported policies
that run counter to both its stated principles and the interests of poor and
marginalized workers. Such is the fate of all junior coalition partners. The
question is how Kōmeitō does triage. Which issues does it push, which
issues does it sacrifice, and where does it draw the line on participation in
the coalition? More on Kōmeitō policy making in coalition can be found in
chapter 10, but this chapter focuses on so-called women’s issues.
Women’s issues are an interesting context for two reasons. First, they
often reveal the extent to which religious beliefs are affecting political
preferences. In Japan, religious groups have traditionally opposed prog-
ress on women’s issues: Klein and Reed in this volume describe religious
lobbying for conservative social policies; Hardacre (2005) recounts how
they have pushed to repeal the gender equality clause in Japan’s constitu-
tion; and Chan-Tiberghien (2004) describes how religious organizations
opposed adopting the Convention on Rights of the Child, for example (see
also Métraux 2007). Since Sōka Gakkai doctrine is similar to that of some
of the groups implicated here, we can test the influence of religious beliefs
on Kōmeitō policies by identifying where it stands. The second reason is
that, empirically, Kōmeitō has a mixed record on women’s issues. It seems
to support some, but not others, and Suzuki (2010) argues that this implies
the party has no guiding principles, asserting that it compromises on the
basis of LDP preferences, not its own. Understanding this give and take
on women’s issues is critical to seeing the relationship between the party
and the Fujinbu.
On the one hand, Kōmeitō has a history of taking the progressive side
on some women’s issues. In a discussion of the gender equality clause,
for example, Hardacre mentions how Kōmeitō prevented the LDP from
tampering with the clause. Furthermore, after joining the ruling coalition
in 1999, the party has supported a number of women-friendly laws, such
as the 2000 Antistalking Law. In a work on the policy implementation
of women’s rights, Chan-Tiberghien (2004) explicitly raises this conun-
drum—wondering why “major legal changes concerning child prostitu-
tion, stalking, and domestic violence continued,” even though the rul-
ing coalition became “much more conservative” after Kōmeitō replaced
the Social Democratic Party. The reality is that there is no puzzle here—
Kōmeitō’s policies on these issues have always diverged sharply from the
stereotypical conservatism of Japanese religion.
On the other hand, Kōmeitō does not uniformly support the progres-
sive woman’s agenda that traditionally left-leaning parties like the DPJ or
JSP do. When it was an opposition party, it regularly cosponsored broad
legislation on women’s issues with the Socialist Party, like a stronger ver-
sion of the 1985 Equal Opportunity in Employment Act (Horie 2005). Once
it tasted power, though, this cooperation faded. Miura’s work on Diet
deliberations, for example, argues that Kōmeitō Diet members have not
supported child care for working women; Suzuki’s research (2008) echoes
this, adding that Kōmeitō lacks interest in the broader issue of “work-life
balance” for women (see also Miura 2003). At first glance, then, Kōmeitō’s
behavior looks uncommitted—the party moves on some women’s issues,
but not others. If we assume that there is no connection between the par-
ty’s constituents and its specific policy agenda, as observers typically do,
then all these choices appear to be for expedience, with no underlying
rhyme or reason other than what the LDP will tolerate. If we look more
closely, however, there is a common thread tying these policies together—
housewife preferences.
Consider child care as a case where housewife preferences diverge
from traditional women’s issues. Suzuki explores how Kōmeitō has re-
fused to push the Ministry of Labor into combining kindergartens with
day-care centers. Doing so, he suggests, would offer working women
more child-care opportunities, but threaten the educational mission of
kindergartens—which matters more to housewives. Similarly, instead of
increasing the number of public child-care facilities, Kōmeitō’s agenda for
child care remains the jidoteate—monthly payments to families with small
children—which fits the needs of a housewife who can care for her own
children but lacks the income of a two-career family. In listing of accom-
plishments, the party continues to advertise its leading role in originally
passing the jidoteate in 1972 and subsequently increasing the program’s
coverage. Suzuki’s discussion (2008) of the policy process makes clear that
the push to expand the jidoteate program came solely from Kōmeitō, in the
face of LDP resistance.
Chan-Tiberghien’s work (2004) on women’s gains under the LDP and
Kōmeitō is also suggestive. The causes that she finds have advanced—
antistalking legislation, domestic violence protection, and prostitution—
are relevant to housewives, who are threatened by all of these. At the same
time, career women’s issues like sexual harassment and lifting the glass
ceiling—which are not as relevant to housewives—do not appear on her
list of gains.
Even when addressing issues that are not women’s issues per se,
Kōmeitō finds a way to make them relevant to the Fujinbu. Its 2008 cam-
paign video for Sōka Gakkai viewing pushed health care, like the Dr. Heli
204 George Ehrhardt
program for increasing the number of helicopter ambulances or funding

centralized prefectural EMT (emergency medical technician) dispatch
stations. It did so, though, after reminding viewers of the way pregnant
women had died while driving around in an ambulance trying to find a
hospital that would admit them for delivery.
The same appeal to housewife interests appeared during the 1986 leg-
islative debate on imposing a sales tax; when the issue of granting ex-
clusions for one-income households came up, and some complained that
it might discriminate against working women or women with part-time
jobs, Kōmeitō legislators supported the exclusion, saying that “there may
be 4 million working women, but there are 14 million full-time house-
wives” (Horie 2005, 384). The quote makes clear where Kōmeitō believes
its interests lie.
Kōmeitō confuses observers because it resembles a social democratic
party in some respects, like claiming to represent the poor and promoting
welfare, but diverges in other respects, like its lack of support for work-
ing women. This leads some to claim that Kōmeitō’s rhetoric is a front for
pursuing policies of expediency and power-seeking, but the coherence of
Kōmeitō legislative action suggests otherwise. Kōmeitō is a political party,
and just like every other political party, it responds to its constituents by
pushing policies they support. Since taking power, the party has consis-
tently pursued policies that meet the needs of its largest support group—
the housewives of Sōka Gakkai’s Fujinbu. Given the messy nature of poli-
tics, this focus cannot be absolute, and coalition politics forces the party
to support policies that many of its constituents may not agree with, but
overall there is clear evidence that Kōmeitō has swung from supporting
theocratic or urban worker interests in the 1960s and 1970s to supporting
housewife interests in the 1990s and 2000s.
Religion, Gender, and the Public Sphere

From a comparative politics perspective, this is a very simple story. A so-
cial movement spawns a political party that represents the movement’s
members; over fifty years’ time the members’ needs change, and the party
shifts goals to accommodate its current supporters rather than the ones
who founded it. From a gender studies perspective, though, it is not that
simple. Earlier in the chapter I described the extensive literature showing
that housewives avoid the electoral arena and Japanese New Religions
(like Sōka Gakkai) suppress female participation in the public sphere even
further. According to that research, then, Fujinbu members should never
have become such inveterate campaigners. So what happened?
One possible explanation is that Sōka Gakkai membership increases

political activity for members in general, whether male or female.15 This
does explain part of the story, but only part, because the effect of member-
ship turns out to be much larger for women than for men. This is visible in
table 8.2, which expands the data presented earlier in table 8.1 to add com-
parisons between men as well. The darker-printed rows labeled “gender
gap” show the difference between men and women among Sōka Gakkai
members and in the population at large, as a percentage of male participa-
tion. The gap shrinks by more than a third in three of the four measures. In
addition, comparing the statistical tests for each category show how our
confidence in the existence of gender gaps shrinks. In 2007, I personally
conducted a similar survey of Sōka Gakkai cadre and found even higher
levels of political activity among both male and female leaders in the or-
ganization. In fact, among those individuals, the gender gap largely dis-
appeared: 62 percent of self-identified housewives feel that campaigning
is very important to them, the same percentage as males.16 In short, Sōka
Gakkai membership provokes a much larger change among women than
it does among men.
Legitimizing Housewife Politics
Sōka Gakkai does this, it would seem, by legitimizing the transforma-
tion of housewives’ willingness to participate in collective action into a
willingness to participate in electoral action. We know that housewives
actively participate in collective action—nonpolitical volunteer organiza-
tions—but avoid politics for two reasons: a cultural sense of distance from
the political arena and a rational calculation that political parties do not
serve their interests. Sōka Gakkai overcomes both of these barriers by con-
necting politics to believers’ individual lives and by arguing that Kōmeitō
serves their interests.
Culturally, the shared language of public caring justifies breaking down
the barriers keeping them out of public life, and their commitment to reli-
gious practice gives them leverage over male believers who might not oth-
erwise support housewife political preferences. Their faith, one can often
hear Sōka Gakkai women say at meetings, teaches them to care for others
beyond the limit of their family. This may seem like a strange thing for a
housewife to say, since their days are filled with caring for others, but it
can also be understood as imbuing their activity with a higher purpose.
15
Chapters 3 and 5 in this volume explain how and why this happens.
16
I describe this survey in more detail in Ehrhardt (2009). Predictably, Student Division
members were the lowest, at 14 percent.
Table 8.2 Gender and political participation
Measures of political participation Population at large Sōka Gakkai members
Attend political rally
Males 37% 60%
Females 21% 46%
Gender Gap 44% 23%
Test of Difference t=-5.08, p<.001 t=-1.35, p=0.19
Ask friend to vote for a political party
Males 33% 85%
Females 21% 64%
Gender Gap 36% 25%
Test of Difference t=-3.29, p=.001 t=-2.16, p=.035
Volunteer for a campaign
Males 35% 67%
Females 24% 39%
Gender Gap 31% 43%
Test of Difference t=-3.54, p<.001 t=-2.46, p=.017
Donate money
Males 16% 44%
Females 10% 39%
Gender Gap 38% 11%
Test of Difference t=-1.53, p=.126 t=0.03, p=.973
Number of Respondents 1618 55
Source: JEDS 2000.

Note: The JEDS survey does not ask respondents’ religion, but it is possible to identify
respondents who belong to a religious group whose members support Kōmeitō—i.e., Sōka
Gakkai.
Consider the testimony of this young mother about the relationship be-
tween faith and caring. Speaking between pauses to collar a rambunctious
toddler, she explained: “I was brought up in a Gakkai household, and I
did gongyo [chanting] when I was very little. It was part of our house, so I
didn’t think too much about it. As I got older, I stopped coming to meet-
ings entirely. Several years ago I married an active member, though, and
started practicing again. Now I realize how little I know about the faith,
and how much I need to study the gosho [Nichiren’s collected writings].
I hope it can teach me, help me to think about and take care of others.”
The timing of her recommitment is telling. As a single woman, she did not
feel a strong connection to Sōka Gakkai’s message, but that changed once
she got married and started raising children. Forced to restructure her life
around caring for others, she turned to a set of beliefs that gave meaning
to her work. Crucially, Sōka Gakkai teachings include the idea that politi-
cal work on behalf of the “common people” is a form of caring activity.
Scholars have argued that women are stigmatized by secular society when
they participate in politics, often by criticism phrased in terms of neglect-
ing their family (Iwao 1993; Kutsuzawa 1998; Tsunematsu 2004, 97–114).
Sōka Gakkai women, in contrast, hear from peers and organizational lead-
ers that their electoral work is an extension of their care and family love,
making the two activities complementary, not contradictory.17 In this way,
Sōka Gakkai theology overcomes the cultural obstacle to housewives in
politics by closing the perceived gap between housewife identity and elec-
toral politics.
Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai leaders also appeal to Fujinbu voters’ ratio-
nal side. Supporting Kōmeitō need not be entirely altruistic; housewives
can do well while doing good. The party’s outreach highlights a legisla-
tive agenda that speaks directly to housewife interests, such as the child
allowance, capping health costs for the elderly, reducing domestic vio-
lence, and antistalking legislation. In contrast, as Miura and Suzuki have
noted, a career woman’s agenda is noticeably absent. The party’s webpage
on women’s issues is instructive—the only concession to career women is
the promotion of maternity leave among small businesses. Obviously, the
party may be going overboard claiming credit for many of these policies,
but by trumpeting its involvement in these particular bills, as opposed to
those associated with issues like administrative reform or national secu-
rity—which Japanese women tend not to emphasize—the party sends a
signal to housewives that it shares their priorities.
17
On the religious merit of electoral campaigning, see chapter 3.
208 George Ehrhardt
Conclusion
This chapter offers a new and more powerful explanation of Kōmeitō’s
policy agenda than previous work. For the past decade, conventional wis-
dom has followed the tabloid press’s lead, asserting the existence of a hid-
den agenda among Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai leaders, a theory that—like
all conspiracy theories—is impossible to disprove. That view of Kōmeitō
does, though, require the reader to close his or her eyes to the possibility
of diverse interests among the millions of voters that support Kōmeitō,
and assume that they are unable to think reflexively about their own po-
litical activity. It also demands that we close our eyes to the way Fujinbu
activism seems to violate what we know about Japanese housewives and
electoral politics. And in its support, it offers nothing more than inconsis-
tencies in the party’s policy agenda—something that one could say about
every party flexible enough to belong to a ruling coalition.
Taking off those blinders reveals a straightforward connection between
Kōmeitō and the voters that support it. By all accounts, the Fujinbu is the
most active faction in Sōka Gakkai, Kōmeitō’s largest support group, and,
as a result, the party makes policy choices to accommodate that faction.
While its allegiance is necessarily imperfect, this accommodation can be
seen in its choice of daily life-oriented issues to address the way it treats
women’s issues as “housewife issues” rather than “career women’s is-
sues,” the way it frames its medical policies in terms of ob/gyn needs,
and its rhetorical insistence that it is not corrupt and self-interested “like
regular political parties.”
Accepting the independence and importance of the Fujinbu with-
in Sōka Gakkai action makes it possible to integrate our puzzles about
Kōmeitō motives and female activism to see how they explain each other.
Sōka Gakkai teaching motivates its female members to engage in political
activity, but they still carry their housewife identity, which predisposes
them to certain views about politics and policy preferences. The interplay
between religion and politics allows Kōmeitō to harness the latent activ-
ism of housewives. Where their secular counterparts might join Netto or
other volunteer organizations, Fujinbu members turn to politics. The flip
side of this, though, is that they participate on their own terms—support-
ing Kōmeitō for policies that resonate with housewife preferences—ensur-
ing the party toes their line.
This vision of Kōmeitō as a party with a social democratic legacy, but
which now answers to middle-class housewives, offers a much richer pic-
ture of both the party and its supporters. Not only does it explain the con-
temporary issues that Kōmeitō prioritizes and subtle variation in the way
it addresses those issues, it also explains how and why Kōmeitō arrived at
that point. Furthermore, this also explains the seeming contradiction be-
tween secular housewives and the Fujinbu over electoral politics by show-
ing how Sōka Gakkai practice simply redirects activism into the electoral
arena, rather than creating it out of whole cloth. Much remains to be ex-
plained about Kōmeitō policy-making, but this chapter helps us see the
party as it is, a necessary first step.
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Part V: The Way to Power
Nine
Anti-Kōmeitō Countermobilizations
Introduction
Sōka Gakkai’s entrance into the political arena changed the relation-
ship between religion and politics in Japan. It did so by creating a new
cleavage that divided religious groups and politicians into two camps:
those who opposed the creation of a religious political party and those
who accepted the idea of, what we called in chapter 2, the “mixing of
religion and politics.” In politics, mobilization tends to trigger counter-
mobilization, though seldom of equal and opposite force, and Kōmeitō
has triggered political countermobilizations on four different occasions.
First, the founding of Kōmeitō in 1964 produced a countermobilization
led primarily by rival religious groups. An umbrella organization for the
New Religions, Shinshūren (Shin Shūkyō Renmei), led by Sōka Gakkai’s
largest rival among the New Religions, the Risshō Kōseikai (RKK), united
by a single candidate in the 1965 Upper House election to counter the
perceived threat (Asahi, 5 July 1967). These groups had already been sup-
porting candidates in various elections, most running on the LDP ticket,
but in the 1965 Upper House elections they took the unprecedented step
of nominating the leader of the Shinshūren to represent them collectively.
The second countermobilization began in late 1993 and was led by the
April Society (Shigatsukai). This movement included many leaders of the
first countermobilization but was more of a political and less of a religious
movement. At the time, Kōmeitō was part of a coalition government that
excluded the LDP, the first time a religious party had ever participated in
government in Japan. One strategy the LDP used to regain power was to
gather support from those religious groups critical of Kōmeitō. The LDP
directed intense public criticism focusing on the danger of a government
controlled by Ikeda Daisaku, Sōka Gakkai’s honorary president and lead-
er, arguing that it was a breach of Article 20 of the constitution. When
in June 1994 the coalition government of which Kōmeitō was a part was
replaced by the LDP, the campaign against Kōmeitō faded.
A third countermobilization began soon thereafter, in December 1994,
when Kōmeitō merged (albeit incompletely) with the New Frontier Party
(NFP; Shinshintō). Because the NFP was the primary alternative to the
LDP in the 1996 general election, Kōmeitō had a real chance of finding
its way back into government under the NFP umbrella. The LDP and a
revived April Society launched a fierce campaign against their new rival,
charging the NFP with being “nothing more than the Sōka Gakkai in dis-
guise.” The Aum terrorist incident in 1995 added fuel to this campaign
(Klein 2012). The NFP experiment failed, in part because Kōmeitō refused
to participate fully, and the party disintegrated at the end of 1997. Kōmeitō
emerged from the wreckage of the NFP virtually intact but once again
found itself in opposition and on its own.
The LDP gained a majority in the Lower House in 1997 by convincing
several Diet members, many from the defunct NFP, to (re)join its ranks
(Reed 2003, 42). In order to also obtain a majority in the Upper House,
however, the LDP needed a coalition partner; the only party with the
number of seats needed to produce that majority was Kōmeitō. Despite
the fact that the LDP had driven the third anti-Kōmeitō countermobili-
zation and that Kōmeitō policy preferences were closer to those of the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ; Minshutō), in 1999 Kōmeitō agreed to
join the coalition government of LDP and the Liberal Party (LP; Jiyūtō),
thus sparking the fourth countermobilization. Most of the members of the
April Society were members or supporters of the LDP. Although including
incompatible groups within the party had long been a standard LDP strat-
egy for maintaining power (Reed 2011), the party proved unable to keep
both Kōmeitō and its religious rivals within the fold. Sōka Gakkai’s rivals
stopped or reduced their support for the LDP as soon as the coalition was
formed and, over the next several elections, some shifted their support to
the DPJ. Within the LDP, many opponents of Sōka Gakkai fought against
the coalition, and it took the party leaders almost two years to squelch the
resistance.
Kōmeitō was in the middle of every political turning point of the 1990s.
The party played a key role in defeating the LDP in the 1993 general elec-
tion and a key role in sustaining the LDP between the 2000 and 2009 gen-
eral elections and again in 2012. It was a key to the short-lived success of
the NFP but also a key to its ultimate failure. Kōmeitō offered a unique set
of costs and benefits to any potential alliance partner. The benefits of coop-
erating with Kōmeitō were, first and foremost, the best-organized voting
bloc in Japan (see chapter 2). The costs, in contrast, include the fact that
Sōka Gakkai provokes political animosity to a degree that exceeds even
Anti-Kōmeitō Countermobilizations 217
that toward the Japanese Communist Party (JCP; Kyōsantō). Allying with
Kōmeitō brings a large and disciplined voting bloc to the table but also
provokes countermobilizations. In this chapter, we will describe each of
these countermobilizations.
Mobilizing against the Formation of a Religious Party

Religious groups that provoke animosity from other religious groups and
society are often characterized by aggressive proselytism and intoler-
ance of other religious practices. In these respects, Sōka Gakkai resembles
another well-studied case, that of early Christianity under the Roman
Empire (Osiander 2008, 770). Like early Christianity, Sōka Gakkai criti-
cized all other religious groups in its environment. Its publications and
statements labeled other religious groups “enemies” (teki) and “heresies”
(jakyō). In the early postwar period, Sōka Gakkai proselytizing (and cam-
paigning) were extremely aggressive. New converts were forced to burn
all objects of worship in their possession and allowed to own only those of
Nichiren Shōshū Buddhism. Just as early Christians refused to participate
in the “benign” social practice of animal sacrifice (Caseau 1999, 27), Sōka
Gakkai long refused to participate in the festivals that are standard com-
munity activities in Japan. In the 1990s, Sōka Gakkai changed its stance on
festivals, reinterpreting them as “cultural activities” (bunka katsudō) and
allowing its members to participate, as long as they do not pray sincerely
to Shinto shrines.1 Until that time, however, refusal to participate in festi-
vals was a major source of friction between Sōka Gakkai members and the
communities in which they lived.
Like Sōka Gakkai, RKK also supports candidates in elections but takes
the position that Japan’s constitution mandates seikyō bunri, which it inter-
prets as the separation of church (kyōkai; i.e., religious organizations) and
state (seifu), but not the separation of religion (shūkyō) from politics (seiji)
(Shinshūkyō Shimbun, 25 March 2007). The English version of Article 20 of
Japan’s constitution states in its first sentence, “No religious organization
shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political au-
thority,” but many actors in the Japanese political and religious worlds in-
terpret Article 20 to mean “keeping religion out of politics.” Though most
legal scholars agree with the RKK interpretation, the theme of keeping
religion out of politics has widespread appeal as a political slogan, thus
mobilizing the religion and politics cleavage.
For RKK the clearest violation of seikyō bunri is a religious organization
supporting a specific political party and directly exercising political power
by participating in government. This norm is, in fact, widespread among
1
Levi McLaughlin, personal communication.
Japanese religious groups and, indeed, was originally shared by Sōka

Gakkai. Until the early 1960s, Sōka Gakkai’s then president Ikeda Dai-
saku maintained that his organization would only support its members
in their attempts to win seats in local assemblies and the Upper House,
claiming that these had “no political color” (Murata 1969, 164). McLaugh-
lin suggests in chapter 3 that the “founding of the separate political party
Kōmeitō perhaps functioned in part as a means of working around ear-
lier promises that Sōka Gakkai itself would not become involved in the
Lower House.”
At the time of Kōmeitō’s founding, Sōka Gakkai was growing at a
breathtaking pace. RKK shared a widespread fear that Sōka Gakkai would
use its political power to dominate religious competition to the point of
establishing itself as the national and sole religion of Japan (Shinshūkyō
Shimbun, 20 December 1964). At stake was nothing less than the freedom
of religious belief (shinkyō no jiyū). In retrospect, the danger was clearly
exaggerated but at that time even foreign observers were concerned about
the “phenomenal growth of Nichiren Shōshū Sōka Gakkai” and described
the organization and its political party as the “controversial center of at-
tention inside and outside the Japanese political scene” (Ingram 1969, 155;
see also White 1970). RKK also believes that religious groups are some-
times capable of accomplishing goals that may currently seem impossible
but yield to constant effort in the long run.2 Thus, though there was nev-
er any real danger of Sōka Gakkai establishing itself as the sole religion of
Japan, the threat appeared real to RKK and other members of Shinshūren,
and they mobilized against Kōmeitō in the 1965 Upper House election.
In that race, ten candidates backed by religious groups other than Sōka
Gakkai were running in the national district, all nominated by the LDP.
Most represented specific religious groups, though one was simply a well-
known Buddhist activist. The key figure in the countermobilization was
Kusunoki Masatoshi, the forty-three-year-old managing director (jōmu riji)
of Shinshūren. His nomination was designed to unite Shinshūren mem-
ber groups for the common cause of fighting Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō.
Shinshūren’s newspaper told its readers that Kusunoki offered voters the
exact opposite of the “exclusive and self-righteous assertions” (haita do-
kuzen no shuchō) of Sōka Gakkai. It warned that the ultimate goal of Sōka
Gakkai was the erection of a national ordination platform (kokuritsu kai-
dan; see chapter 3) and its teaching could eventually become state religion
and effectively wipe all other religions from Japan (Shinshūkyō Shimbun, 5
May 1965).
2
Interview with Hirohashi Takashi, chief editor of the Shinshūkyō Shimbun, Tokyo, 17
November 2008.
When Kusunoki won a seat, Shinshūren waxed poetic about the “beau-
tiful cooperation among religious groups,” making it clear that such co-
operation was rare and difficult to achieve (Shinshūkyō Shimbun, 5 July
1965). The Shinshūkyō Shimbun, in its next issue, proclaimed that, although
Kōmeitō had won two more seats, it had won twenty thousand votes less
than in the previous election. It went on to explain that Kōmeitō won nine
seats while Shinshūren candidates won three and candidates from estab-
lished Buddhist sects won four. Adding other candidates with some reli-
gious affiliation brought the total to twenty. Shinshūren’s newspaper also
calculated Kōmeitō votes per member claimed by the Sōka Gakkai and
found that the ratio had declined. Shinshūren thus congratulated itself on
having halted the dangerous growth of its rival.
After this initial success, Kusunoki continued to run with Shinshūren
backing on the LDP ticket, winning in 1971 and 1977. In 1983, however,
he lost. The problem was not a loss of support but rather a change in the
electoral system that hurt all candidates backed by religious groups except
Kōmeitō. The new system forced voters to vote for a party instead of a
candidate. Sōka Gakkai members had no trouble writing Kōmeitō on their
ballots but other religious groups found it hard to convince their members
to write “LDP” (or any other party label) on their ballots. These groups
and their members continued to believe that religious groups should sup-
port candidates, not parties.
The founding of Kōmeitō, a religious political party, provoked a reli-
gious countermovement that mobilized a significant number of voters. In
the aftermath of the Fujiwara incident (see chapter 3), the religious coun-
termobilization was an important factor that halted Kōmeitō’s growth.
The party’s vote did in fact level off (figure 9.1; see also chapter 4). The
newly found balance of power between Sōka Gakkai and its rivals lasted
until the early 1990s, and the durability of that balance suggests that the
first countermobilization had ended in something approaching a draw.
Indeed, as soon as the growth in Sōka Gakkai membership and Kōmeitō
votes had leveled off, it became more difficult to mobilize Sōka Gakkai’s
religious rivals. As we shall show later, RKK proved ready to back another
countermobilization, but many other groups had lost interest to varying
degrees.
Mobilizing against Kōmeitō Participation in Government

The balance between Sōka Gakkai and its rivals was upset in August 1993
when Kōmeitō became part of the Hosokawa coalition government. That
coalition unseated the LDP for the first time in its history and included all
parties except the Liberal Democrats and the JCP. At the end of 1993, LDP
Figure 9.1 Absolute number of votes won by Kōmeitō in the nationwide district
of the Upper House, 1956–1980
Source: Calculated by authors from Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications data,
various years.
Diet member Kamei Shizuka initiated the formation of the Association

to Discuss Article 20 of the Constitution (Kenpō 20-jō o Kangaerukai), a
group that opposed Kōmeitō’s participation in government. The inaugu-
ral declaration framed the issue as essential for Japan’s democracy and
the country’s future in general. The association’s purpose was to protect
the “freedom of the heart” (kokoro no jiyū), which it defined as “respect
for the free will of every citizen.” That freedom was in danger, they ar-
gued, because “one extremely exclusive religious organization included
the political party that it controlled into the governing parties” and was
now plotting “to monopolize politics and to rule the country.” The as-
sociation depicted the danger as particularly threatening because of the
introduction of the new electoral system for the Lower House. Together
with academics and other religious groups, the assembly was determined
to protect the country from this threat (Shirakawa 2000, 203–208).
The April Society, which was to form the core of this countermobiliza-
tion, was founded a few months later, on 12 May 1994. It included many
of the same actors that were involved in the first countermobilization but
was broader. Officially, there were no politicians among the members but
many lawmakers openly expressed their sympathy for the group. The
April Society called itself a “friendly gathering of all circles to affirm the
freedom and dignity of belief and spirituality.” Newspaper and magazine
reports at the time reported little about the group and referred to the April
Society as a group of “intellectuals [bunkajin] and people from religious

groups” (Asahi Shimbun), “religious groups, scholars and intellectuals”
(AERA), or “religious groups and scholars” (Yomiuri Shimbun) critical of
Kōmeitō.3
Ironically, the official inaugural meeting on 23 June 1994 took place
about a week before Kōmeitō was forced to return to the opposition
benches. The Hosokawa coalition lasted for less than nine months, and
its successor under Hata Tsutomu only two months. The founders of
the April Society continued to function though the “threat” had abated.
Kōmeitō was still a welcome enemy in the sense that the LDP could mo-
bilize many religious organizations by appealing to their common dislike
of Sōka Gakkai.
On 29 June 1994, Socialist Murayama Tomiichi became prime minister,
heading a coalition government consisting of his own party, the LDP, and
the small New Harbinger Party (Shintō Sakigake). As a consequence, all
of the approximately sixty national lawmakers at the inaugural ceremony
of the April Society belonged to one of the ruling parties (AERA, 4 July
1994, 68). Liberal Democrats present included well-known names such as
Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Hatoyama Kunio, Obuchi Keizō, Hirasawa Katsuei,
Ishihara Shintarō, and Katō Kōichi. Among the religious organizations
participating were RKK, Bussho Gōnenkai Kyōdan, Shingonshū, Shintō
Seiji Renmei, Reiyūkai, Zennihon Bukkyōkai, and Shinshūren. Among the
religious organizations that did not participate were Tenrikyō and Chris-
tian groups.
Prime Minister Murayama, LDP president Kōno Yōhei, and the leader
of the New Harbinger Party, Takemura Masayoshi, all complied with the
organizers’ request to deliver speeches.4 These speeches provide a clear
picture of the atmosphere. Takemura Masayoshi argued, “We cannot al-
low a religious group to be closely connected to political power” (Yomiuri,
24 June 1994). Similarly, LDP president Kōno Yōhei said, “There is a reli-
gious organization deeply involved in a party that is close to the center of
political power.” In response, Kōmeitō argued that the major goal of the
April Society was to “use political force to oppress a religious organiza-
tion.” The party repeatedly stressed that it had never put religion on the
political agenda: “In the thirty years since its foundation, Kōmeitō has
3
A search in Kikuzō, a data archive including the Asahi Shimbun and its weekly magazines
AERA and Shūkan Asahi, resulted in two hits for “shigatsukai” in June 1994, neither of which
was a report on the event itself. Yomiuri’s online archive “Yomidasu” also produced two
hits, both from 24 June 1994. On that day, page 3 featured a short, 363-character-long article
on the inaugural ceremony; the second article, on page 4, only mentioned the April Society
in one sentence.
4
Interview with Takemura Masayoshi, Tokyo, May 2010.
not once brought religion into the political arena” (Kōmeitō 2001, 200).
The party also argued that it was, in fact, the governing parties who were
mixing religion and politics (seikyō itchi) by using state power to combat
an allegedly religious organization like them. Sōka Gakkai’s Seikyō Shim-
bun called the Murayama coalition the “April Society Cabinet” (AERA, 14
November 1994, 15).
The April Society’s modes of participation in electoral politics mirrored
those of religious groups other than Sōka Gakkai. The society focused on
supporting individual candidates not political parties, although LDP can-
didates clearly enjoyed most of their help. Candidates and parties that
received April Society support maintained their independence from the
group just as Kōmeitō stressed its independence from Sōka Gakkai. In
both cases the strategy was chosen partly to avoid legal problems.5
The second religious countermobilization cannot take much, if any,
credit for the failure of the Hosokawa coalition government, but at the end
of the process Kōmeitō again found itself in opposition while Shinshūren
and the April Society backed the parties in government.
Mobilizing against Kōmeitō as Part of the New Frontier Party

Kōmeitō soon found another opportunity to change its fate. On 28 April
1994, the day Hata replaced Hosokawa as prime minister, Ozawa Ichirō
organized several parties and groups in the coalition into a parliamentary
group called “Kaishin” (Reform). This movement provoked the Socialists
and New Harbinger Party into leaving the coalition, but Kaishin grew
into the New Frontier Party in December 1994. The new party included
members of the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP; Minshu Shakaitō), the
Japan New Party (JNP; Nihon Shintō), the Renewal Party (Shinseitō), and
a group of fifteen from the LDP. Kōmeitō members of the Lower House
joined the party but neither the party’s vast local party organization nor
the members of the Upper House participated in this political venture.
At the time, joining the NFP looked like an excellent way for Kōmeitō
to solve its political problems. The party’s growth had leveled off and
prospects for future gains looked dim. Kōmeitō was never going to win
power on its own and the party’s coalition potential was limited by the
widespread antipathy toward the mixing of religion and politics. Becom-
ing part of a large party seemed to be a way Kōmeitō could participate
in government without generating another countermobilization because,
technically at least, there would be no Kōmeitō against which to mobilize.
On 27 October 1994, Sōka Gakkai declared that from now on its local
branches were free to support candidates running for parties other than
5
Interview with Shirakawa Katsuhiko, Tokyo, 28 September 2010.
Kōmeitō depending on the situation in each electoral district. Officially,

four criteria were required from such candidates: (1) protection of human
rights and freedom of religion; (2) protection of the spirit of the Japanese
constitution and contribution to international (relief) efforts; (3) protec-
tion of diverse cultures and support for welfare measures that deal with
the ageing of society; (4) realization of clean politics “along the expecta-
tions of the common people” (Mainichi, 28 October 1994). The Sōka Gakkai
decision opened the way for supporting NFP candidates, though it took
another two months for the party to be formally established.
NFP candidates came from various backgrounds and had various rela-
tionships with Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō. Those with established relation-
ships had little trouble, but those without had to negotiate with Kōmeitō
for its support and reports from local newspapers make clear that the par-
ty often drove hard bargains. Kōmeitō had long experience giving sup-
port while getting little or nothing in return (Christensen 2000). In order
to prevent this from happening again, the party demanded a list of the
members of the NFP candidate’s personal support organization (kōenkai).
If the candidate agreed, the members would soon receive phone calls from
Kōmeitō. Being able to use the name of the NFP candidate in introducing
themselves, the party gained access to voters who would normally refuse
to listen to a phone call from Kōmeitō (see chapter 5).
The parties forming the NFP were well aware that a stable organized
vote would be necessary in order to mount a serious challenge to the LDP.
Kōmeitō seemed to provide a solution to that problem but the solution
came with some costs. Several candidates, often those supported by RKK,
decided not to participate in the NFP because of their opposition to Sōka
Gakkai. Former DSP chairman Ōuchi Keigo was one prominent example.
He not only declined to join the NFP, but ran (unsuccessfully) for the LDP
in 1996. At the same time, many other DSP candidates had cooperated
with Kōmeitō since the mid-1970s and had no trouble.
The NFP debuted with 13.1% support in the polls, nine percentage
points behind the LDP (Yomiuri, 22 December 1994). The party also did
quite well in its early electoral tests, winning its first governorship in Ao-
mori prefecture in February and winning two of the three gubernatorial
races in which they faced the LDP directly in April. In 1995, the NFP did
well in the Upper House elections. In response to these electoral setbacks,
the LDP established the “Special Research Committee on Religious Or-
ganizations and Social Order” (Shūkyō Hōjin To Shakai Chitsujo Ni Kan
Suru Tokubetsu Iinkai). While Aum Shinrikyō—which had just released
sarin gas into the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 people and injuring
more than 6,300 (Asahi, 7 March 2010)—was the official reason for the par-
ty’s initiative, LDP leaders also targeted Sōka Gakkai (Asahi, 19 October
1995; see Klein 2012). Asahi (18 October 1995) quoted Liberal Democrat
Shirakawa Katsuhiko: “Like Aum, Sōka Gakkai is a religious organization
that does not separate politics and religion” (seikyō bunri shiteinai). The
bill to revise the law on religious organizations was meant to force the
organization to be more transparent in its activities and financial trans-
actions (Kisala and Mullins 2001). In addition, the LDP demanded that
Ikeda Daisaku appear as a sworn witness in parliament to be questioned
by lawmakers (Klein 2012).
The LDP’s strategy of tightening the legal framework for religious or-
ganizations drove other religious organizations to unite with Sōka Gak-
kai to fight the proposed revision (Mainichi, 30 October 1995). Kōmeitō
representatives even took the unusual step of visiting Shinshūren, suc-
cessfully asking for cooperation in the fight against the revision.6 Liberal
Democrat Matsunaga Hikaru most likely overstated the case when he said
that, if “Sōka Gakkai and RKK unite, not a single LDP candidate will win
a seat at the next Lower House election” (Asahi, 17 October 1995), but the
prospect of facing a united front of religious groups surely was unpleasant
for the LDP.
The LDP was further embarrassed when Justice Minister Tazawa To-
moharu expressed reservations about the proposed revision. Tazawa
owed his election in the proportional representation (PR) tier of the Upper
House to the support of RKK and his reservations reflected the interests
of his constituency. In addition, it was found that Tazawa had received a
loan of 200 million yen from RKK and failed to report it in the financial
statements required of cabinet members. In October 1995, he was forced to
resign as minister (Asahi, 17 October 1995).
The incident revealed the LDP’s dependence upon support from re-
ligious groups, but in the particular circumstances created by the Aum
attack, the party was able to temporarily do without allies. The public out-
cry after the terror attack was multiplied by the media and clearly pushed
the LDP to take a tough stance on religious organizations. In spite of all
the criticism and pressure produced by these groups, the LDP govern-
ment did not change its plans to reform the “law on religious juridical
persons” (Shūkyō hōjinhō). It traded organized votes against broad public
support and the opportunity to exploit the Aum attack for the campaign
against the NFP (Klein 2012).
The Upper House by-election in Saga prefecture held in November
1995 after the nationwide election signaled a shift in the political winds.
The LDP Upper House member who had passed away had been a strong
6
Interview with Hirohashi Takashi, chief editor of Shinshūkyō Shimbun, Tokyo, 25 June
2008.
farmers’ advocate, loudly opposing his own government’s moves toward

liberalizing the importation of agricultural products. Agricultural inter-
ests dominate Saga, and in previous elections the endorsement of the
prefectural agricultural organization (Nōkyō) had often proved a more
valuable electoral asset than the LDP nomination. The LDP nominated a
prefectural assemblyman who did not please Nōkyō (Yomiuri, 6 October
1995). However, the NFP was led by the people who had liberalized rice
imports under the Hosokawa administration. Nōkyō thus declared a free
vote, supporting neither candidate. With the central concern of Saga vot-
ers deleted from the agenda, Katō Kōichi, who as secretary-general bore
the primary responsibility for the conduct of elections, decided to focus
on the issue of the separation of politics and religion. The Aum attack
and the proposed revision of the law on religious juridical persons pro-
vided a perfect background for this strategy. At the time over 80 percent
of the population favored stricter regulation for religious organizations
with less than 10 percent opposed (Yomiuri, 23 November 1995). The “re-
ligious card” seemed to work and the LDP won. LDP secretary-general
Katō Kōichi attributed the victory to the voters’ dislike of mixing religion
with politics, and claimed that the LDP won several subsequent elections
using the same strategy.7
In January 1996, the LDP newsletter, the Jiyū Shimpō, started a weekly
series titled “NFP = Sōka Gakkai.” The LDP charged Sōka Gakkai with
unfair political competition. The newsletter reported, for example, that
Sōka Gakkai claimed to vote for the candidate not the party but, in fact,
it only supported candidates from the NFP (Jiyū Shimpō, 26 November
1996). The newsletter further reported that it had obtained an actual video
of a religious gathering at which political appeals were made (Jiyū Shimpō,
27 February 1996). Though the same charge could be leveled at religious
groups that support the LDP, the “religious” atmosphere described in the
Jiyū Shimpō article would probably have made many Japanese uncomfort-
able. Another charge was that Sōka Gakkai not only improperly pressures
members to vote, as directed by Ikeda Daisaku, but also asks that mem-
bers pressure their friends. Critics of Sōka Gakkai often mention “friend
votes” (F-hyō) as a particularly scandalous practice (see chapter 8). Many
people who have experienced high-pressure phone calls from, for ex-
ample, former schoolmates, find it an unpleasant experience, but many
democratic theorists consider asking a friend to vote for a candidate to be
praiseworthy political participation.
In the 1996 election, the LDP failed to achieve a majority, but its 239
seats clearly outpaced the NFP with only 156. Exit polls revealed that the
7
Interview with Katō Kōichi, Tokyo, 31 January 2011.
most loyal NFP votes came from former Kōmeitō supporters, with over 91
percent voting for NFP (Yomiuri, 5 November 1996). Kōmeitō had played
its role as the solid base for the NFP and had reaffirmed its status as the
most reliable organized voting bloc in Japan. At the same time, the anti-
Kōmeitō rhetoric played some role in limiting the NFP vote. The anti–Sōka
Gakkai mobilization was not the NFP’s only problem, but it was one of its
more serious. The NFP was also hurt by the fact that it was not the only
new party challenger to the LDP. The anti-LDP vote was split between the
NFP and the newly formed DPJ, which won fifty-two seats.
Having failed to win power, there was little to hold the diverse party
together. Most damaging to the party’s prospects was the refusal of the
local Kōmeitō organizations to join the NFP. Kōmeitō was supposed to be
the solid base of support that would sustain the party during hard times
but the limits of what the NFP could expect became apparent in the 1997
Tokyo Prefectural Assembly election. Running as an independent party,
Kōmei received 700,000 votes, while the NFP, running without its reli-
gious component, could manage only 70,000 votes and won no seats at all
(Sentaku, August 1997, 48–49). The NFP fell apart in December 1997. The
mantle of “the primary alternative to the LDP” was passed on to the DPJ.
Kōmeitō reemerged as a separate party without allies. The third counter-
mobilization had thus proved an unqualified success.
Mobilizing against the LDP–Kōmeitō Coalition

The LDP emerged from the 1996 election as the largest party but without
a majority in either house of the Diet. Both former coalition partners, the
Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshutō, born out of the former JSP)
and the New Harbinger Party (Shintō Sakigake), suffered significant elec-
toral defeats and, although they agreed to continue their support for the
LDP government, they refused to enter into a formal coalition or to accept
any cabinet posts. The LDP followed two strategies to achieve a majority
government. First, the party convinced a sufficient number of lawmakers,
mostly from the defunct NFP, to (re-)join its ranks to regain its majority
in the Lower House (Reed 2003, 42). Second, the LDP sought coalition
partners to regain its majority in the Upper House. The only party capable
of delivering the numbers needed was Kōmeitō. The strategic situation
clearly pointed toward an alliance between the LDP and Kōmeitō, but the
path to coalition proved to be long and hard.
Moving toward Rapprochement and Coalition
One apparent obstacle to coalition was disagreement over policy. Kōmeitō
was, and remains, closer to the DPJ on most policies than to the LDP
(Kabashima 1999), but policy differences have never been an insurmount-

able obstacle for either party. While participating in the Hosokawa coali-
tion government, for example, Kōmeitō kept a low profile on policies.8 For
its part, after the fall of the Hosokawa government when a coalition with
the JSP was the quickest path back into government, the LDP had little
trouble forming a coalition with the party that had been its main rival for
over forty years. Thus, when Kōmeitō and the LDP began to discuss an
alliance, it was not policy but elections that motivated both sides. To the
public, their coalition was explained as being based on common conserva-
tive ideals.9
The most prominent problem that a coalition needed to solve was gain-
ing a majority in both the Upper and Lower Houses, but the new elec-
toral system, particularly the single-member districts (SMD), posed a
more pressing problem for both parties. Kōmeitō was acutely aware that
it could not win a single SMD without help. The party had consistently
opposed the introduction of SMDs and had been willing early on to take
to the streets to prevent them (White 1970, 160). In May 1999, Kōmeitō
offered electoral cooperation to the LDP, demanding a return to a “new
system of multi-member districts” (Yomiuri, 8 May 1999). The “newness”
of a return to the “old” system was a matter of having three-member dis-
tricts instead of the previous three-, four-, and five-member districts and
a willingness to implement those three-member districts only in urban
areas, leaving rural areas as SMDs. As the third-largest party, with most
of its strength in urban areas, Kōmeitō could reasonably expect to win the
third seat in most of these three-member districts (Yomiuri, 13 May 1999).
At many opportunities thereafter, Kōmeitō has renewed its demand for
a return to multi-member districts (see, e.g., Yomiuri, 22 December 2000,
24 May 2001, 25 April 2001, 25 August 2001, 8 September 2001, 9 January
2002, 2 April 2002). In 2008, Ikeda Daisaku also stressed the need to abol-
ish single-member districts at a meeting of the Sōka Gakkai’s board of
directors.10
The LDP was not necessarily interested in electoral reform, but it was
intensely interested in the upcoming general election. Kōmeitō was able
to provide an organized vote that could swing many SMDs in urban ar-
eas to the LDP. Kōmeitō was strong precisely where the LDP was weak.
For its part, Kōmeitō could expect to win some SMDs if the LDP did not
nominate a candidate and could convince some of their supporters to vote
8
Interview with Takemura Masayoshi, Tokyo, 18 May 2010; see also Ichikawa 2014.
9
Interview with Sakaguchi Chikara, Tokyo, 31 January 2011; see also chapter 4.
10
Interview with Kajimoto Akira, Tokyo, 13 May 2008.
for the Kōmeitō candidate. For both parties, therefore, the electoral math
clearly pointed toward cooperation.
A more significant obstacle to rapprochement was the LDP’s Jiyū Shimpō
“NFP=Sōka Gakkai” series mentioned earlier. Not only had Kōmeitō and
Sōka Gakkai been heavily criticized but honorary president Ikeda Dai-
saku had been accused of a “woman problem” (josei mondai). The articles
alleged that Ikeda and other leaders of Sōka Gakkai would maintain sexu-
al relationships with women to test their loyalty (Jiyū Shimpō, 2 July 1996).
Between January 1996 and October 1997, the series detailed a lawsuit in
which a former female member of Hokkaido’s Sōka Gakkai branch had
accused Ikeda of having raped her three times between 1973 and 1991.
In order to remove this obstacle to coalition, leaders in both parties,
negotiating behind the scenes, agreed on a plan. Kōmeitō would lodge a
protest against Jiyū Shimpō, and the LDP would officially apologize. Next,
politicians from both parties would make conciliatory remarks in public
and work to convince their supporters of the advantages of an alliance.11
As the court case moved toward Ikeda’s acquittal in April 1998, Sōka Gak-
kai asked two of its lawyers to address a formal letter of protest to the LDP.
A few days after the letter officially reached LDP general-secretary Katō
Kōichi, the Jiyū Shimpō printed not only the full text of the protest note but
also an official apology. Yosano Kaoru, then head of the LDP’s press de-
partment, apologized for having gone too far in criticizing Ikeda and de-
clared that the research for the articles had been “improper” (futekisetsu).
Yosano also expressed his hope that his apology could be a first step to
improve the relationship between Sōka Gakkai and the LDP (Jiyū Shimpō,
21 April 1998). The next day, the Kōmei Shimbun (22 April 1998) reported
this development on its front page. Sōka Gakkai critics within the LDP
complained that the apology came too soon, as the plaintiff was consider-
ing an appeal. Those in charge of the apology responded that they were
merely following the advice of lawyers (Yomiuri, 29 March 1998; Mainichi,
14 May 1998).
Over the next year, Kōmeitō made public overtures to the LDP and ex-
plained the advantages of the coalition to its support base. Local party
branches, for example, complained that they had just finished campaign-
ing against the LDP and had trouble accepting yesterday’s foe as today’s
friend (Yomiuri, 12 May 1999). Sōka Gakkai president Akiya Einosuke
(in office 1981–2005) presented his personal view stating that a coalition
with the LDP was one option to “pass legislation for the common people”
(minshū no soba ni tatta seisaku jitsugen no tame) (Seikyō Shimbun, 8 June
11
Interview with Hirasawa Katsuei, Tokyo, 11 November 2010.
1999). Finally, at the Kōmeitō annual party convention in July 1999, the
delegates voted for a coalition with the former enemy.
The LDP had analogous problems persuading candidates to step down
in favor of a Kōmeitō candidate and were much less successful in doing
so. Many LDP candidates turned down offers of guaranteed PR list po-
sitions in exchange for withdrawing from their SMD. Though the LDP
was unable to provide as much cooperation as promised, the seven seats
Kōmeitō won in 2000 were seven more than they could have won with-
out LDP cooperation (Reed and Shimizu 2009). In a move that made little
sense at the time, the LDP invited the Liberal Party led by Ozawa Ichirō to
form a coalition in January 1999. According to Hirasawa Katsuei, the move
was designed to “cushion” public reaction when Kōmeitō later joined the
coalition.12 LDP leaders also made conciliatory public statements. For ex-
ample, Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu stated that “Kōmeitō has been
continuously developing into a party that separates religion and politics
(Kōmeitō ha seikyō bunri shita seitō toshite dappi shitsutsuaru)” (Asahi, 12 July
1999). Two months later, negotiations were completed and the party of-
ficially joined the LDP–LP coalition on 5 October 1999.
A year and a half lay between the LDP’s official apology and forma-
tion of the coalition. Opposition within Kōmeitō did not openly disrupt
the new partnership but the LDP leadership had to continue fighting the
resistance within its own ranks. Nineteen LDP members of the Lower
House had signed a declaration titled “Opinion Paper on the Coalition
with Kōmeitō” that rejected the alliance and insisted instead on coop-
eration with Kōmeitō on single policy issues. Shirakawa Katsuhiko, one
of the signees, claimed that by August 1999 about one hundred Liberal
Democrats had in private expressed their support for the initiative, but
would not do so publicly for fear of either offending their faction leader
or antagonizing Sōka Gakkai in their electoral districts (Shirakawa 2000,
185). This resistance was to form the fourth countermobilization.
The Political Consequences of Coalition
The LDP–LP–Kōmeitō alliance was not popular with the public. As soon
as Kōmeitō had entered the coalition in October 1999, support for the cabi-
net of Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō stopped rising and began to fall. Be-
tween September and December 1999, the support rate fell from 56.1% to
44.6% (Yomiuri, 31 December 1999). Attempts to justify the alliance politi-
cally could not but be awkward. The rhetoric of the years before had to be
trivialized or revoked and policy differences needed to be glossed over.
12
The religious rivals of Sōka Gakkai also started turning away from the
LDP. The Busshō Gonenkai Kyōdan, for example, suspended payment on
the dues of their 200,000 LDP members (Yomiuri, 13 June 1999). Groups
that normally sent representatives to the LDP national convention refused
to do so, among them RKK, Reiyūkai, and Shinsei Bukkyō Kyōdan (Yo-
miuri, 20 January 2000). The number of LDP candidates receiving recom-
mendations from establishment religious groups fell sharply (Yomiuri, 15
June 2000).
The DPJ did not just watch these developments from the sidelines but
spotted an opportunity to attract LDP supporters to the DPJ. Just as the
LDP had used anti-Kōmeitō rhetoric to attack the NFP, the DPJ began
courting the April Society by attacking the fusion of religion and politics
(Yomiuri, 30 August 1999). In January 2000, Hatoyama Yukio, leader of the
DPJ at the time, declared that gaining the support of the April Society
and possibly that of Liberal Democrats who opposed the coalition with
Kōmeitō was “a golden opportunity” to take over government (Yomiuri,
20 January 2000). Yet the DPJ was also divided on the issue of Kōmeitō, just
as the LDP had been in 1996. Many DPJ candidates had received Kōmeitō
support as members of the NFP in 1996 or earlier and continued to main-
tain good relations with Sōka Gakkai. At the same time, the Group To
Consider Religion and Politics (Shūkyō to Seiji o Kangaerukai) attracted
seventy-three members and began hearing lectures on the dangers of hav-
ing Sōka Gakkai involved in politics from people who had been associated
with the April Society.
The DPJ’s efforts paid off in the 2007 Upper House election, when
Shinshūren shifted its support to the party. Three candidates running in
the PR tier were found to deserve support, but by this time two were from
the DPJ and only one from the LDP. The LDP candidate was considered
a “friend of religion” and was also endorsed by Sōka Gakkai.13 Table 9.1
shows the steady movement of RKK away from the LDP to the DPJ. By
2005 over 80 percent of the candidates endorsed by RKK were nominated
by DPJ. Yet, RKK continued to endorse a few LDP candidates, some of
whom also received Kōmeitō support.
The strategy was less successful with Jōdo Shinshū, as shown in table
9.2. Support for DPJ candidates rose steadily but support for LDP can-
didates did not fall. In 2009, candidates from the two major parties were
supported at about the same level. The primary trend was toward concen-
trating support on candidates from one of the two major parties.
13
Interview with Hirohashi Takashi, chief editor of Shinshūkyō Shimbun, Tokyo, 17 No-
vember 2008.
Table 9.1 Candidates supported Table 9.2 Candidates supported by

by RKK Jōdo Shinshū
LDP DPJ Total LDP DPJ Total
2000 42.7% 42.7% 82 1996 50.0% 13.0% 46
2003 36.8% 56.6% 152 2000 41.5% 32.1% 53
2005 8.6% 89.3% 187 2003 54.2% 33.3% 48
2009 11.7% 85.5% 214 2005 53.2% 38.7% 62
Source: Kōsei Shinbun, various years. 2009 47.4% 48.7% 76
Source: Honganji Shinpō, various years.
Yet the coalition proved an electoral success for the LDP. Kabashima
(2000) estimates that in the 2000 HR election thirty-five Liberal Democrats
would not have won without Kōmeitō support and Kōmeitō support
thereafter proved crucial to the LDP’s continued hold on power. Kōmeitō
and Sōka Gakkai provided more than enough votes to make up for losses
in public popularity and the drop in support from Sōka Gakkai’s reli-
gious rivals.
Kōmeitō, however, had less reason to be pleased with the results. On
the one hand, the new electoral system hurt them badly. In 2000, Kōmeitō
fielded eighteen candidates in single-member districts only to see elev-
en fail. The party’s 13 percent of the proportional vote translated into
twenty-four additional seats, producing a total of thirty-one. In 1993, the
last election in which Kōmeitō had run under its own label and under the
old multi-member system, it had gained fifty-two seats with 8.2% of the
vote (Klein 2005, 389–390).
As had been the case in previous cooperative arrangements since the
1970s, Kōmeitō proved better able to direct its candidates, local organiza-
tions, and voters to support the LDP than the LDP proved in directing its
candidates, local organizations, and voters to support Kōmeitō (see fig-
ure 9.2). According to exit polls, only 38% of LDP supporters voted for
Kōmeitō candidates in 2000, but that percentage rose to 56% in 2003 and
to 68% in 2005, dropping back to 54% in 2009. Kōmeitō support for LDP
candidates started at 61% in 2000, rising to 72% in 2003 and 78% in 2005
(Yomiuri, 12 September 2005), though the percentage fell to 73% in 2009
(Yomiuri, 14 September 2009). In each election Kōmeitō supporters were
the most loyal LDP voters, more loyal than LDP supporters, just as had
been the case with the NFP in 1996.
Figure 9.2 Mutual voter support between LDP and Kōmeitō (Lower House
elections, 2000–2012)
Light grey: percentage of Kōmeitō voters (PR) who chose an LDP candidate in SMDs
Dark grey: percentage of LDP voters (PR) who chose a Kōmeitō candidate in SMDs
Sources: Data were taken from various postelection newspaper editions.
Note: For 2012, none of the major newspapers published the percentage of voters who cast
their ballot for the LDP in PR and for a Kōmeitō candidate in an SMD.
Even so, local Sōka Gakkai support did not necessarily follow national
coalition patterns. In the electoral district Kanagawa 5, for example, Tanaka
Keishū received Kōmei support not only in 1996, when he ran for the NFP,
but also in 2000 and 2003 running for the DPJ. Only in 2005 did Kōmeitō
support move to the LDP. The reason given was simple: Sōka Gakkai had
established a “long relationship” (tsukiai ga nagai) with Tanaka. This pat-
tern is common. Local Kōmeitō decisions often fail to follow national pat-
terns because of relationships established under different political circum-
stances (see, e.g., Cox 2003). Within three or four elections, however, local
organizations were brought into line with the national political strategy.
7KH&RXQWHUPRELOL]DWLRQ)DGHV
In December 1999, the April Society announced its full support for the
twelve Liberal Democrats who had formed the Association To Oppose
Cabinet Appointments for Kōmeitō (Kōmeitō to no Kakunai Kyōryoku
ni Hantai suru Kai) (Nikkei, 19 February 2000). In February 2000, the So-
ciety for Protecting the Separation of Religion and Politics (Seikyō Bunri
o Tsuranuku Kai, SBTK) evolved out of this group. The society’s pro-
spectus (shuisho) expressed strong doubts regarding the constitutional-
ity of Kōmeitō’s participation in government and pointed out the strong
resistance among the public, party members, and other religious organi-
zations. The SBTK’s raison d’être was to protect the liberal tradition and
save both the LDP and the spirit of Article 20 (Shirakawa 2000, 199).
The SBTK provoked harsh criticism from Kōmeitō. Kanzaki Takenori,
party leader at the time, felt his party had been “stabbed in the back”
and suggested that those Liberal Democrats “in doubt about the coali-
tion should leave their party.” Kōmeitō’s secretary-general, Fuyushiba
Tetsuzō, declared that all members of the SBTK would now be considered
“complete enemies” (kan’zen ni tekitai suru) (Yomiuri, 19 February 2000).
Sōka Gakkai criticized these Liberal Democrats, arguing, “The truth is that
they are trying to attract the votes of anti–Sōka Gakkai religious groups
(Honne ha ichibu no han-Sōka Gakkai-kei kyōdan no hyō meate da)” (Seikyō
Shimbun, 24 February 2000).
Shirakawa claimed that “within the [LDP] party there is absolutely no
problem with our activities” (Shirakawa 2000, 200), but LDP general secre-
tary Nonaka Hiromu declared that those participating in the SBTK would
not receive the LDP nomination for the next election (Yomiuri, 20 February
2000) and ordered all party factions to report which of their members be-
longed to the anti-Kōmeitō group (Yomiuri, 23 February 2000). This kind of
threat had been made many times in the past by LDP secretaries-general
against various violations of party discipline but had never been enforced.
This time the task was particularly tricky since the SBTK was assumed to
have between thirty and fifty members (Yomiuri, 11 May 2000), though
only ten of them were willing to make their names public.
Based on newspaper reports, we were able to identify twenty-three
candidates who had run on anti-Kōmeitō platforms in 1996 and 2000.
Six of them were so strong in their own districts that they were able to
simply ignore the national coalition pattern and continue to run without
Kōmeitō support for several elections. The remaining eighteen candidates
faced trade-offs between maintaining their anti-Kōmeitō principles and
their need for reelection. Six of these fourteen lost in 2000. In several cases
it seems clear that they suffered because they refused to compromise. In
the SMD Chiba 2, Eguchi Kazuo refused to move to the PR tier in order
to allow a Kōmeitō candidate to represent the coalition in that district.
In Hyogo 8, Murai Kunihiko lost as an independent running against the
Kōmeitō candidate in 2000 and then ran for the DPJ in 2003. Several oth-
ers, most notably Kamei Shizuka, opposed Koizumi’s postal reforms in
2005 and formed the New People’s Party (Kokumin Shintō). In Niigata 6,
Shirakawa Katsuhiko lost his election in 2000 but continued his battle with
Kōmeitō. We will continue his story in more detail later in the chapter.
At least five others compromised their principles when faced with elec-
toral defeat. In Hyogo 2, Okutani Tōru moved to PR in order to facilitate
LDP-Kōmeitō cooperation. His decision was probably influenced by the

fact that he had lost the 1996 election and was thus in a weak bargain-
ing position. In Gifu 3, Mutō Kabun won in 2000 without Kōmeitō coop-
eration but sought it in 2003 when his electoral prospects had weakened.
Yamazaki Taku won in 2000 but lost in 2003 due to a “woman scandal.”
He sought Kōmeitō support in order to win the by-election that followed
in 2004 and reelection in 2005. By 2009, he was instructing his supporters
to vote for Kōmeitō in the PR tier in order to maximize Kōmeitō support
in his SMD. Mihara Masahiko is the classic example, losing in 2000 then
enthusiastically cooperating with Kōmeitō thereafter. Hiranuma Takeo in
Okayama 3 was strong enough to win without Kōmeitō support, and in-
deed since 2005 without any party support, but he compromised in order
to elect the LDP candidate for the Upper House in 2004 (Yomiuri, 16 July
2004). One more, Ochi Michio, stuck to his principles, but his son succeed-
ed him and accepted Kōmeitō support. Finally, Jimi Shōsaburō supported
Koizumi Jun’ichirō in his campaign for the LDP presidency in 2001. Af-
ter Koizumi’s victory, Jimi was rewarded with a party post and gave up
his resistance to the coalition, erasing all trace of his earlier anti-Kōmeitō
stance in his personal profile.14
The Lower House election in 2000 thus dealt an important blow to the
anti–Sōka Gakkai movement within the LDP as practical politics trumped
principle in so many cases. Shirakawa Katsuhiko, however, did not give
up the fight even after losing his seat. In February 2001, he left the LDP
and founded the New Party Freedom and Hope (Shintō Jiyū to Kibō). He
hoped that other members of Katō Kōichi’s faction would follow him but
none did. He got RKK support for his anti-Kōmeitō party, but that support
was divided with another candidate running for the DPJ in the PR tier.
RKK stuck to its principle of supporting candidates but not parties. The
number of people who voted for Shirakawa ranked him sixteenth, ahead
of thirty-four candidates who won seats and well ahead of the DPJ candi-
date supported by RKK who won his seat. Under the new electoral system
used for the first time in 2001, however, seats are allocated to parties based
on the total of the votes obtained by the party and each of their nomi-
nated candidates. That total for Shirakawa and his party was not enough
14
Until March 2013, Jimi’s website featured his CV, but then he deactivated his website
and twitter account. After the 2012 general election, Jimi had been the only National Diet
member left of the New People’s Party. His request to accept his party into the LDP was
rejected by the Liberal Democrats in March 2013. Jimi then held a one-Diet-member party
convention at which it was decided to dissolve the New People’s Party. He also decided not
to run in the 2013 Upper House election. At the time of this writing (February 2014) his blog
(http://profile.ameba.jp/jimmyoffice/) had not been updated for half a year.
to win a seat for even its top vote-getter. The party folded and Shirakawa
returned to his legal practice.15
Inside the LDP the countermobilization finally collapsed in 2001 with
the failure of Shirakawa’s party and the dissolution of the April Society.
Although a few anti-Kōmeitō Liberal Democrats continued to refuse sup-
port from their coalition partner, none were actively trying to end the al-
liance. By 2009, only one candidate in our original list was still running
without official Kōmeitō support, Hirasawa Katsuei in Tokyo 17. In 2000,
he had survived intensive pressure from then general-secretary Nonaka
Hiromu and campaign manager (senkyo taisaku honbuchō) Suzuki Muneo.
Both had tried to prevent Hirasawa’s official nomination as an LDP candi-
date. In the end, Hirasawa was the last of 271 Liberal Democrats to receive
the official party nomination, but he won with the support of several anti-
Kōmeitō religious groups.16
Two others who were not on our original list are Asō Tarō and Koga
Makoto, both from Fukuoka prefecture. Neither had taken a clear stand
against the coalition in either 1996 or 2000 and have never accepted
Kōmeitō support. In 2000, only 58% of LDP candidates received Kōmeitō
support; the figure subsequently rose to 70% in 2003, 82% in 2005, and
94% in 2009. In 2009, only seventeen LDP candidates failed to receive the
official support of Kōmeitō. Of these, seven ran in districts with two LDP
candidates, one nominated and the other running as an independent.
Kōmeitō either refused to choose between the two or supported the inde-
pendent unofficially. Three of the remaining seven cases, Hirasawa, Asō,
and Koga, appear to have been candidates refusing Kōmeitō support, but
the other four could just as well be cases of Kōmeitō’s refusing to support
the candidate as the candidate’s refusing Kōmeitō support.
The final mobilization against Kōmeitō’s coalition within the LDP must
be considered a total failure. It saw electoral strategy win over policy dif-
ferences and animosity, and party strategy win over the interests of in-
dividual politicians. For both party leaderships, the risk they took when
they set out to form a coalition paid off.
From Pariah to Coalition Partner

The events described in this chapter portray the evolution of a pariah party
into a coalition partner. Though it is a Japanese story, it shares much with
the evolution of pariah parties around the world. The transition from a
pariah to a coalition partner involves, first and foremost, winning enough
seats to become relevant to the coalition-building process. Kōmeitō had
15
Interview with Shirakawa Katsuhiko, Tokyo, 28 September 2010.
16
managed to do this by the 1970s, but it was also a flagging LDP that
opened the door for Kōmeitō’s participation in government.
Numbers, however, are a necessary but insufficient condition for be-
coming a potential coalition partner. The party itself has to change, be-
come more “realistic” by eliminating some of the ideals that motivated
party formation in the first place, a lesson learned by the most success-
ful transition from pariah to coalition partner, the German Greens (Po-
guntke 1994).
Kōmeitō, since its founding, has dropped many of its most controver-
sial policy planks. The most important step was taken in 1970 with the of-
ficial separation of Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō. Though the separation was
far from complete, it was sufficient for the purposes of turning the party
into a potential coalition partner. McLaughlin (chapter 3) lists the steps
taken: the plan to construct a “national ordination platform” was aban-
doned, Buddhist doctrinal terminology was eliminated from Kōmeitō’s
internal regulations, and Kōmeitō members resigned from all positions
within Sōka Gakkai.
In addition, Kōmeitō’s tenures in coalition government have largely
disproven the rhetoric portraying the party as a danger to democracy. The
party has increasingly staked out policy positions that put some distance
between itself and its larger coalition partner (Klein 2012; chapter 10).
These positions appeal to its Sōka Gakkai base but also often to the gen-
eral public. Indeed, under the Abe administration Kōmeitō often appears
in the role of defender of democracy and a brake on the LDP’s rightist
tendencies.17
Finally, Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō are taking steps to improve their re-
spective and joint images with the general public. Along with many other
religious groups, Sōka Gakkai has turned its organizational resources to
the task of disaster relief. Sōka Gakkai, RKK, and other groups were active
in disaster relief after the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of 1995 but those ef-
forts were “all but completely ignored” by the media (McLaughlin 2013,
301). When the 3.11 earthquake hit the northeast in 2011, religious groups
sprang into action once again, this time receiving somewhat better press.
Sōka Gakkai was among the most rapid and almost certainly the largest
single relief effort (McLaughlin 2013, 302). Sōka Gakkai was also careful
to keep these efforts free of “religious” content, “aiding victims regardless
of religious affiliation and regarding rescue and reconstruction as means
of building stronger community ties outside the boundaries of the group”
(McLaughlin 2013, 303).
17
Cf. interview with Ōta Akihiro in Asahi (1 October 2006); also see chapter 10.
As Kōmeitō’s public image improves, the costs of coalition with the

party fall, while the benefits remain high. We therefore doubt Kōmeitō
will face any further countermobilizations.
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2014.
Ten
Kōmeitō in Coalition
Linda Hasunuma and Axel Klein
Introduction
As explained in the previous chapter, Kōmeitō and the Liberal Democratic
Party went from fierce political competitors to coalition partners over a
transitional period of just a few years. Their alliance proved stable enough
to rule Japan from 1999 to 2009. It then weathered a brief period in opposi-
tion, allowing the two parties to fight the 2012 election campaign together
and to form a new coalition government thereafter. Most of the scholar-
ship that deals with these years of Japanese politics, however, pays little
attention to Kōmeitō’s involvement (see Govella and Vogel 2007; Mura-
matsu et al. 2001).1 The studies that do tend to focus on the controver-
sial Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) Law (November 2001), which was
drafted in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and was
meant to make Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) part of the “war against
terror” (Shinoda 2006; Benedict 2011; Fisker-Nielsen 2012).2 While the
LDP pushed strongly for passage of the bill, Sōka Gakkai’s ideal of paci-
fist noninterventionism placed Kōmeitō politicians between a rock and a
hard place. As part of the Japanese government and in order to maintain
the alliance with the Liberal Democrats, Kōmeitō had no real alternative to
agreeing to the SDF’s dispatch. At the same time, Kōmeitō politicians were
beholden to vote-gathering Sōka Gakkai constituents who considered the
dispatch to be a violation of Japan’s constitution and who upheld pacifist
ideals promoted for decades by their religious leaders, most notably Hon-
orary President Ikeda Daisaku. The party delayed parliamentary delibera-
1
The Liberal Party, which had been part of the coalition from 1999 to 2000, received
considerably more attention from political scientists and journalists, while the smaller New
Conservative Party (2000 until it merged completely with the LDP in 2003) was ignored like
Kōmeitō, though it was clearly less relevant.
2
Exceptions are Suzuki’s case study of Kōmeitō’s fertility policies (2008) and Métraux’s
(1999) description of the beginning of the coalition.
Kōmeitō in Coalition 241
tions and specified certain conditions for deployment, but ultimately gave
the LDP the votes necessary to pass the bill.
Kōmeitō’s inability to fulfill both the expectations of its coalition part-
ner and those of its core constituency, however, is representative of the
workings of any coalition. In a coalition, no party wins them all, and a ju-
nior partner typically scores fewer wins than its senior counterpart. Com-
promise is inevitable, political ideals are often rationalized, and the party
base is sometimes disappointed. As this chapter demonstrates, the story
of Kōmeitō in coalition displays these and other typical traits of coalition
governments, but in no way does this depict the party as a mere stooge of
the LDP.
Our analysis here focuses on the first coalition period, beginning in 1999
and ending with a devastating electoral defeat in 2009. It is guided gen-
erally by those political scientists who value the importance of country-
specific factors (e.g., Strøm et al. 1994; Debus 2006) for explaining the
formation and policy processes of a coalition. One concrete example for
country-specific factors is the electoral system for the Lower House (see
Cox 1997). Established in 1994, it was the major factor that convinced the
leaders of both parties to pursue a rapprochement in spite of the years of
political opposition (see chapter 9). For the LDP, Sōka Gakkai support was
vital, especially in urban electoral districts. For Kōmeitō, there were three
important factors related to the electoral system: first, Kōmeitō needed
to keep the LDP–Liberal Party (LP) coalition from reducing the share of
proportional seats, thus further reducing Kōmeitō’s electoral chances (see
Métraux 1999).3 Second, as much as the LDP needed electoral coopera-
tion from Kōmeitō and its core constituency, Kōmeitō was in need of LDP
support in some urban single-member districts as well. Third, the party
hoped to gain a chance to change the electoral system altogether once in
power so that it would have better electoral prospects over the long run.
More than fifty years ago, when political scientists began to construct
theories explaining coalition governments, their first major assumption
was that parties join coalitions primarily to gain government offices (Riker
1962; Leierson 1966, 1968). We test this assumption by drawing on data
that reveal the number and nature of cabinet allocations that Kōmeitō re-
ceived. These data show us whether the share of government offices cor-
responded with the party’s parliamentary strength. By combining these
data with an analysis of Kōmeitō manifestos produced for the four general
elections held during the first coalition period (2000, 2003, 2005, and 2009),
3
The LP was successful in its attempt to reduce the number of proportional seats from
200 to 180, thus reducing chances for smaller parties like Kōmeitō.
242 Linda Hasunuma and Axel Klein
we are also able to assess whether Kōmeitō’s portfolios reflected the major
policy goals of the party.
We then examine the major claim of the second wave of coalition theo-
ries, namely, that parties are mostly motivated to join a coalition by their
will to push certain policies (Leierson 1966; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Scho-
field et al. 1988; Schofield 1993, 1996). Though we would prefer to do a
close analysis of the policy-making processes and negotiations for a com-
prehensive selection of areas engaged by Kōmeitō during its ten years in
government, this goes beyond the scope of this chapter. We will therefore
focus on three cases: Kōmeitō’s efforts to change the electoral system of
the Lower House, to raise child allowances, and to pass a fixed payment
as income support and economic stimulus to all citizens of Japan. We se-
lected these three cases for several reasons. First, they were initiated by
Kōmeitō and not by the LDP. Second, they exemplify political goals crucial
to the party. And finally, they can be interpreted as one political success,
one failure, and one compromise for Kōmeitō. In sum, all three cases help
us better understand the dynamics of the coalition as well as Kōmeitō’s
policy leverage vis-à-vis the LDP.
Cabinet Office Allocation

Most coalition theories include the assumption that parties enter coali-
tions because they seek government positions. How did Kōmeitō fare in
this respect? We begin answering this question by analyzing office alloca-
tion over all fifteen cabinet lineups of the coalition period from 1999 to
2009 to examine the share Kōmeitō secured.4 As it is common practice
among ruling parties in many countries to reflect parliamentary strength
in the number of governmental positions distributed to each partner (a
principle known as “Gamson’s Law”; see Caroll and Cox 2007), results
of this analysis will determine whether or not the LDP–Kōmeitō alliance
worked in a similar fashion.
In our analysis, we need to consider a number of country-specific fac-
tors. For one, changes in cabinet lineups are quite common in Japan. Dur-
ing the coalition decade only one cabinet lasted longer than one year (Koi-
zumi’s first, which lasted seventeen months), while the average duration
was 7.2 months. Except for Asō Tarō, every prime minister from 1999 to
2009 changed the lineup of his cabinet at least once. Some changes are
only partial (naikaku kaizō, or “reorganized cabinets”), while others in-
clude all or almost all government positions. When looking at the time
4
The analysis is complicated by a reform of ministries and government positions in the
year 2001, and the fact that next to the LDP and Kōmeitō the coalition also consisted of the
Liberal Party (1999–2000) and the New Conservative Party (2000–2003; see note 8).
span government positions were held, we need to keep in mind that some
cabinets ended much faster than originally intended. Koizumi’s second,
Abe’s reorganized first, and Fukuda’s reorganized first cabinets were all
dissolved within a month or two due to political circumstances; Asō’s cab-
inet, by contrast, started with the expectation of a near general election but
turned out to last twelve months.
Kōmeitō’s Share of Office Allocation
When Kōmeitō entered the coalition with the LDP and the Liberal Party in
October 1999, it was given the chief position in the Management and Coor-
dination Agency (Sōmuchō) until the administrative reform changed the
institutional structures of Japan’s government in 2001. Like the National
Defense Agency (Bōeichō), the Agency for Environment (Kankyōchō), and
the Economic Planning Agency (Keizai Kikakuchō), the Management and
Coordination Agency did not have the same formal standing as a ministry,
but its chief was nevertheless a member of the cabinet. For the purpose of
this study, we therefore take this position as equal to that of minister.5
A look at the cabinet lineups shows that Kōmeitō filled exactly one min-
ister position in each of the fifteen cabinets, equal to a share of 5.9%, with
the exception of the second Mori reorganized cabinet, when Kōmeitō’s
share reached 6.25%. How does that compare to parliamentary strength?6
During the first seven coalition cabinets, Kōmeitō held more than 13% of
all coalition seats. During Koizumi’s second reorganized cabinet, it held
14.1% and then fell to 11.6% and 11.7% respectively (average 12.7%). As
figure 10.1 illustrates, over the ten-year period the party received one min-
ister position less than parliamentary strength would have suggested.
Was Kōmeitō shortchanged, or was it perhaps compensated with a larg-
er share of senior vice ministerial and vice ministerial positions? On aver-
age, it held 3.1 senior vice minister (seimujikan, fukudaijin) positions, which
equals an average share of 13.9%, 1.2% higher than the party’s seat share.
5
As the discussion regarding the upgrade of the National Defense Agency to the Min-
istry of Defense in 2007 showed, there are in fact differences between agencies and minis-
tries, but they are negligible for the purpose of this study. In addition, whereas the cabinet
consisted of twelve ministers and five heads of agencies before the administrative reform of
2001, there were sixteen ministers and just one agency chief after the reform. The number of
seventeen remained the same.
6
Although the Upper House is politically less influential than the Lower House, we have
not weighed seats differently because of mitigating factors that are difficult to measure. For
example, Kōmeitō’s Upper House seats were more important to the LDP than Kōmeitō’s
Lower House seats since the Liberal Democrats had no majority in the Upper House.
Whereas all prime ministers have changed their cabinet after Lower House elections, this
did not happen after Upper House elections. We therefore calculated with the number of
Upper House seats at the day of cabinet formation.
Figure 10.1 Kōmeitō’s share of seats within the coalition and government
positions
Source: www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidai/kakuryo/heisei.html (accessed January 2013);
calculation by authors.
This overallocation, however, was compensated by the share of vice min-

ister (seimujikan) positions, which ran at 2.9 in total numbers and equaled
a share of 10.2%.7 While we can thus find a proportional office allocation
if we combine only the senior vice minister and vice minister positions,
there still is a constant deficiency of one position in all coalition cabinets if
we also include the ranks of ministers. Additionally, since Kōmeitō never
held any position within the cabinet office (Naikakufu), it is obvious that
the party got less out of office allocation than parliamentary strength and
Gamson’s Law would suggest.
Our attempts to find explanations for this imbalance produced a few
clues but no definite answers. Referring to the early period of the coali-
tion, then prime minister Mori stated he did not offer Kōmeitō more than
one minister post in order to prevent the Liberal Party from also asking
for two positions (Asahi, 29 June 2000; Yomiuri, 4 August 2008). After the
7
The position of vice minister was introduced in 2001 during the second Mori cabinet and
expanded the number of politicians in government positions. The Japanese term for senior
vice minister was changed from seimujikan to fukudaijin.
LP had left the coalition in 2000, this reasoning may have also been ap-
plied to the New Conservative Party (NCP; Hoshu [Shin]tō8), which was
created by members of the LP who refused to leave the coalition. The NCP
remained as a third ruling party until it fused with the LDP in 2003, reduc-
ing the number of coalition partners to two. Still, even then Kōmeitō never
filled more than one cabinet position.
It is remarkable that while newspaper reports often discussed the ques-
tion of which LDP faction was awarded how many and which government
positions, the issue of whether or not Kōmeitō was shortchanged was not
raised once in the major newspapers during the coalition years (see Asahi,
6 December 2000, 26 April 2001, 25 September 2002, 27 September 2006, 1
August 2008). Apparently, Kōmeitō did not set the issue on the govern-
ment’s agenda. Nagaoka Tōru, director general of Kōmeitō’s party policy
research council, explained in an interview that there had never existed
any formal agreement between the two parties regarding the number of
cabinet positions.9 He added, however, that the balance of power within
the LDP–Kōmeitō coalition on some questions did not reflect the share of
seats but instead “transcended mere numbers.” The intense competition
between LDP factions made government positions a precious currency
for all LDP prime ministers to reward inner party supporters. Limiting
Kōmeitō to one cabinet post increased the loot that could be split between
rival Liberal Democrats.
Only in 2008 did the LDP move on this issue. Former Lower House
member Ueda Isamu stated in an interview that when Prime Minister Fu-
kuda was planning to reshuffle his cabinet, he offered a second position to
Kōmeitō.10 According to the Asahi (2 August 2008), Upper House member
Hamayotsu Toshiko was suggested as a new cabinet member, but Kōmeitō
rejected the offer. With the Fukuda cabinet suffering from low support
rates and the looming prospect of a general election, the party apparently
feared that taking on a second minister position would expose it to col-
lateral damage. The Asahi (2 August 2008) quotes a member of the party
leadership (kanbu) anonymously as saying: “Except for minister of the en-
vironment there is no other position beneficial to us at the moment.” The
Yomiuri (4 August 2008) published this comment of an unnamed member
of Kōmeitō’s leadership: “A minister is only a hostage to keep the coalition
8
In 2000, former members of the LP formed the Hoshutō (literally, Conservative Party)
and decided to name it “New Conservative Party” in English. In 2002, some politicians left
the party and joined the LDP. The remaining members kept the English title but changed the
Japanese party name to “Hoshu SHINtō (literally, “Conservative New Party”).
9
Interview conducted by Yuki Abe and Axel Klein, Tokyo, 17 October 2012.
10
Interview conducted by Axel Klein, Tokyo, 15 October 2012.
together. Two are really not necessary.” After nine years of never receiving
more than one position, the party apparently was not willing to send an
additional representative to board a sinking ship.
Which Portfolios?
If Kōmeitō was disadvantaged in terms of the number of government of-
fices, what about the kinds of portfolios the party got to fill? In order to
answer this question, we will first survey ministries to which Kōmeitō
politicians were appointed and then assess how long the party kept offices
within them. We start the analysis with a summary of the four minister
positions Kōmeitō politicians filled between 1999 and 2009 (in chronologi-
cal order):
1. The Management and Coordination Agency, which existed only
until January 2001 and was in charge of youth policy, the Northern
Territories, and coordination of administrative state organs. Tsuzu-
ki Kunihiro filled the position of minister for fourteen months dur-
ing the second Obuchi reorganized cabinet and the first and second
Mori cabinets (Oct. 1999–Dec. 2000).
2. The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (Kōsei Rōdoshō), which
was led by Sakaguchi Chikara for 35.5 months from the end of the
Mori government to the second Koizumi cabinet (Dec. 2000–Nov.
2003).
3. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism
(Kokudo Kōtsūshō), which Kitagawa Kazuo and Fuyushiba
Tetsuzō led for a total of 44 months from Koizumi’s second reorga-
nized cabinet to Fukuda’s first (Nov. 2003–Aug. 2008).
4. The Ministry of the Environment (Kankyōshō), which was led by
Saito Tetsuo for the final 2 months of the Fukuda government and
all 12 months of the coalition under Prime Minister Asō Tarō (Aug.
2008–Sep. 2009).
Figure 10.2 summarizes the duration each of these four positions were
held and illustrates the prominence of the Ministry of Land, Infrastruc-
ture, Transport, and Tourism as well as that of the Ministry of Health,
Labor, and Welfare. If we look at the positions of senior vice ministers (fig.
10.3), we again see Health, Labor, and Welfare; Internal Affairs and Com-
munication (the successor of the Management and Coordination Agency);
and Environment among the top four portfolios. Only Finance is new
Figure 10.2 Tenure of Kōmeitō politicians as ministers
Figure 10.3 Tenure of Kōmeitō politicians as senior vice ministers

Figure 10.4 Tenure of Kōmeitō politicians as vice ministers
Figure 10.5 Tenure of Kōmeitō politicians in all minister positions

at number two, replacing Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism

(Kōmeitō did not hold a senior vice minister position there).11
Finally, we turn to vice minister positions (fig. 10.4). Internal Affairs
and Communication is again among the top three together with Educa-
tion, Culture, and Science, as well as Economy, Trade, and Industry. If we
add up the months of all three levels of position, we see that Health, La-
bor, and Welfare as well as Internal Affairs and Communication are the
portfolios that Kōmeitō politicians held the longest (fig. 10.5). For almost
the entire coalition period, the party had its representatives deployed in
these two ministries—sometimes with two lawmakers at the same time.
We also see that Kōmeitō had little business in the portfolio of Justice and
none in Defense. In addition, the party never filled the position of cabinet
secretary—a post that receives intense media exposure—or held one of the
positions of minister of state for special missions (naikakufu tokumei tantō
daijin) who are usually put in charge of a variety of (mostly unrelated) is-
sues considered important by the prime minister.12
In summary, Kōmeitō did not make full use of the potential inherent in
its cabinet participation. This is true in quantitative terms, but also with
regard to the amount of attention that cabinet members can attract among
the mass media and the general public. One possible explanation is that
the party’s focus was directed almost exclusively to portfolios and policies
related to its core constituencies. A second explanation is that Kōmeitō’s
coalition strategy allowed for a low cabinet profile, enabling the party to
trade government positions with the LDP for concessions in other politi-
cal arenas.
Kōmeitō Manifestos
We base the second part of our analysis on the assumption that Kōmeitō
favored some portfolios over others and actively tried to gain positions in
the ministries associated with these posts. A comparison of the concrete
government offices Kōmeitō politicians filled with the party’s manifestos
can tell us the extent to which the party was able to occupy ministry posi-
tions closely related to its core interests and proposals.
We examined the four manifestos published ahead of the general elec-
tions in 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2009. In the manifesto prefaces, Kōmeitō
11
In 2001 the Management and Coordination Agency, the Ministry of Postal Services
(Yūseishō), and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Jichishō) were combined to form the new
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (Sōmushō).
12
Kōmeitō’s Nagaoka Tōru stated in his interview with Abe and Klein that the cabinet
secretary has to work very closely with the prime minister so that it is preferable to fill the
position with a politician from the prime minister’s party (always the LDP).
declares itself to be the party of peace, human rights, social welfare, en-
vironment, and (from 2009) education. If we look at figure 10.5 (tenure of
Kōmeitō politicians in all minister positions), we can see a clear overlap
with welfare, environment, and education.
A complete analysis of the four election platforms, however, shows
that the main policy areas consist not only of welfare, environment, and
education, but also include additional proposals that cater to the needs
of Kōmeitō’s core constituencies or, as the party calls them, the “common
people” (shomin). As other chapters in this volume have explained, shomin
overlap widely with the prime constituencies of Sōka Gakkai and now
consist primarily of housewives and the families they manage, small shop
owners, and employees and employers of small- and medium-sized en-
terprises (SME). Conspicuously absent are most influential and wealthy
groups of Japanese society: big business, the financial sector, and powerful
lobby organizations like the Japan Medical Association, the construction
industry, or the Society of Bereaved Families (Nihon Izokukai).
Even though Kōmeitō’s voter cleavages are also target groups of the
Communist Party and would be considered clientele of leftist parties in
most democracies, Kōmeitō’s manifestos clearly differ in rhetoric and con-
tent from those of social democratic, socialist, or class-focused programs.
The term “social justice” (shakai seigi) was not used once. In 2009, the term
“social stratification” (kakusa shakai) appeared, but in preceding years it
had turned into an omnipresent phrase to be found in political statements
of all parties. In its 2005 manifesto, the party explained that its policies
were neither conservative nor progressive, but the result of Kōmeitō’s
“politics for the livelihood of the people” (seikatsusha no seiji).
These “politics for the livelihood of the people” provide a multitude of
tax-funded social services. Living environments are to be developed and
public security improved, public transport expanded, and medical care
enhanced. The manifestos call for additional child-care institutions and
high-quality schools. Government-funded financial support for SMEs and
small shop owners also forms an integral part of Kōmeitō’s policy prom-
ises to improve life for the “common people,” although the party does not
address the question of who will pay the bill.
Another prominent topic in Kōmeitō’s election platforms concerns the
areas of local government autonomy, local taxes, local government fi-
nances, and the merger of municipalities, towns, and villages. Kōmeitō
repeatedly calls for increased decision-making powers for prefectures and
other subnational governments, including greater fiscal authority over
spending and an increase in tax revenues for local governments. During
the major reform initiative under Prime Minister Koizumi in 2005 that led
to the merger of many municipalities, Kōmeitō claimed to be the “engine

of reform” (kaikaku no enjin).
Finally, ideals stemming from Sōka Gakkai’s teaching are included in
the party’s manifestos where they form the ethical foundation of Kōmeitō’s
policies. The party calls for a “twenty-first century rich in humanism”;
undefined pacifist goals are another example of Gakkai legacies. As the
party explains, in its 2003 manifesto: “The basis for Japan’s foreign policy
should be built on a ‘guarantee for human security’ that liberates all hu-
man beings around the world from terrorism, poverty, war, infectious dis-
eases, and other threats.” The ideal of “humanist politics” is reflected in
the party’s demands for measures to “prevent all forms of political decay”
(seiji fuhaibō).
The problem Kōmeitō faced here, however, was that the major source
of corruption scandals in Japan’s political world had always been the LDP.
While in opposition, Kōmeitō had attacked the Liberal Democratic Par-
ty again and again for its “money politics” (kinken seiji) and proposed a
considerable number of bills to fight corruption.13 Indeed, its very name,
“Clean Government Party,” reflects the organization’s founding as an op-
positional response to a corrupt governmental order dominated by the
Liberal Democratic Party. In 1993, Kōmeitō even agreed to a new electoral
system for the Lower House to live up to its high-minded values on cor-
ruption even though this new system substantially undermined the par-
ty’s chances at the ballot box (see our first case study later in this chapter).
When the coalition with the LDP began in 1999, the issue of “clean poli-
tics” forced Kōmeitō into a major dilemma. In its manifestos, the party
dealt with this problem primarily by ignoring it. Kōmeitō did not men-
tion the issue in 2000. In 2003, in response to “repeated cases of politics
and money,” Kōmeitō promised to be at the forefront of the movement
to clean up the political world, but even after a major corruption scandal
involving former prime minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō had been revealed,
the party was unable to achieve more than a minor rule change in financial
accounting in 2004 (cf. chapter 7). In 2005, the issue had again disappeared
from the party’s manifesto. In 2009, it featured prominently, but this time
because Hatoyama Yukio and Ozawa Ichirō, two leading politicians of the
rival Democratic Party, were suspected of being involved in illegal finan-
cial transactions.14
13
It was a major embarrassment to Kōmeitō when it was revealed that its Diet member
Ikeda Katsuya was involved in Japan’s largest corruption scandal, the “Recruit Case” (see
Tahara 2007; for the final verdict in Ikeda’s law suit, see Asahi, 22 December 1994).
14
In 2007, another financial scandal involving LDP politicians was revealed. Facing severe
public criticism, the coalition agreed to reform the legal framework of political financing
How Do Manifestos and Office Allocation Compare?

If we compare the major policy fields in Kōmeitō’s manifestos to the re-
sults of our office allocation analysis, we see a broad congruency between
the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare on the one hand, and the many
policy proposals in the field of social welfare on the other. The same holds
true for the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science, and the Ministry
of the Environment, since both institutions are in charge of policy fields
that belong to the core areas of Kōmeitō. The prominence of positions
in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Management matches Kōmeitō’s
policy proposals in the area of local government autonomy. What is re-
markable here is that while policies in the fields of welfare, education, and
environment are directly connected to the party’s main constituencies, in-
ternal affairs are not.
Still, the party has a very clear interest in this policy field. Being much
stronger and better organized in local parliaments and politics, thereby
strengthening the powers of those governments, is an obvious strategy
to widen the party’s influence. The same is true for a second field under
the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: elections and electoral
systems. As our first policy case study will demonstrate, the 1994 electoral
reform made it much more difficult for Kōmeitō to win seats. Reforming
the election system again has been a central goal of the party ever since. Of
course, appealing to voters by proposing policies that primarily benefit the
party itself is not an effective campaign strategy. Consequently, Kōmeitō
has stressed the claim that the electoral system of the Lower House would
not reflect the diversity of public opinion. It proposed a new system for
the Lower House, and large districts and a reduction of seats for the Up-
per House. It may be added here that Kōmeitō also campaigned for vot-
ing rights for permanent foreign residents in local elections, a clientele
Kōmeitō considered to be sympathetic to the party.15
Clearly, Kōmeitō managed to concentrate its cabinet participation on
positions that dealt with the party’s core policy fields. Given the size of its
parliamentary faction (kaiha), this was a rational strategy. The party pro-
moted few other proposals: except for its general embrace of pacifism and
diplomacy regarding China, Kōmeitō presented few initiatives in foreign
relations or national defense. The party also elaborated little on macrolev-
el issues of financial and economic policy, and its proposals for financial
recovery remained briefly outlined and vague.16 Kōmeitō left these and
again, this time requiring fund agent organizations of politicians to attach receipts for expen-
ditures of 50,000 yen or more (cf. chapter 7).
15
On some occasions, this initiative also made Kōmeitō the target of right-wing attacks.
16
Still, in 2009, the party was confident enough to promise to solve the economic crisis
completely within three years.
other policy fields mostly to the LDP, which as a “catch-all party” covered
a wider policy spectrum and possessed the human resources to fill the
respective positions.
As a side effect, the limitation in policy fields and the role as junior part-
ner sometimes allowed Kōmeitō to withdraw from the political front line
when the going got tough. As its rejection of a second minister position
in 2008 confirmed, Kōmeitō often put itself in the passenger seat of the
coalition. For example, it was the LDP and Prime Minister Abe who had
to endure most of the massive criticism in 2007 for the so-called pension
scandal, not Kōmeitō.17
Struggle over Policies: Three Cases

In order to better understand the inner workings of the coalition, here we
will take a brief look at three of Kōmeitō’s core initiatives: electoral reform,
increases to the child allowance, and a special fixed payment meant as a
means to stimulate consumption. Examination of these three issues indi-
cates that Kōmeitō’s position and leverage was well within the range we
find with junior coalition partners in other countries and in other histori-
cal periods, insofar as the party would win concessions in some areas and
lose ground in others. It never was an obedient junior to the LDP, but also
had to fight hard in order to not be disadvantaged by its more powerful
coalition partner.
Electoral Reform
One of the first policies pushed by Kōmeitō after joining the coalition was
the reform of the Lower House electoral system and the introduction of
150 three-member districts. Métraux (1999, 934–935) quotes Kōmeitō Diet
member Endō Otohiko, who said that three-member districts are “far
more conducive to Japan’s traditional consensus society.” The party also
declared the existing electoral system to be undemocratic because votes
given to those candidates who did not win the race in the three hundred
single-member districts had no impact on the composition of parlia-
ment. In Japanese, these votes were therefore referred to as “dead votes”
(shihyō). In addition, the party claimed that the electoral system had failed
to achieve the goals its proponents had put forward when it was intro-
duced in 1994.18
17
The Social Insurance Agency had mishandled pension payments for years, resulting in
up to fifty million payments that could not be traced to their payees.
18
Kōmeitō had supported electoral reform and the introduction of single member dis-
tricts in 1993 as part of the Hosokawa coalition. Now the party had to explain why it was
trying to get rid of an electoral system it had helped to introduce only a few years before.
The problem with Kōmeitō’s line of argument was that Japan’s mass
media almost completely ignored it. Instead, newspaper commentators
and political analysts regularly drew on the party’s electoral reform pro-
posals to tell Japan’s public that Kōmeitō was attempting to improve its
own chances at the ballot box, a claim that fit well with what political sci-
entists know about the effects of electoral systems. Critics also argued that
other political issues should take priority on the government’s agenda.
When Kōmeitō threatened to boycott all parliamentary work if its elec-
toral reform plan was not agreed upon, the mass media did not give any
neutral, let alone favorable, treatment of the issue and even the LDP dis-
sociated itself from the idea.19
Kōmeitō, however, had made electoral reform a core issue in its nego-
tiations with the LDP before joining the coalition (see Métraux 1999). This
explains the persistence with which Kōmeitō pursued its goal. The Lib-
eral Party, the third coalition partner, rejected Kōmeitō’s idea and instead
pushed for a reduction in the number of proportional seats in the Lower
House. Unable to stand in the way, Kōmeitō went along with this plan,
apparently expecting to be rewarded later.
Whereas the LDP leadership under Prime Minister Mori had appeared
obliged by its promise to support Kōmeitō in its electoral reform endeav-
or, Mori’s successor, Koizumi, who took office in April 2001, displayed no
enthusiasm at all for this platform. Representatives of both parties met
twice to work out a compromise. Each time Kōmeitō settled for less, yet
in every case Kōmeitō’s proposed compromise was eventually rejected by
the LDP committee in charge. Eventually Kōmeitō had to walk away from
the discussion with nothing but the promise to pick up the discussion in a
year. Even that promise was not kept by the LDP.
Child Support Payment
Public allowances to primarily lower income families with children were
introduced to Japan first at the local level when Kōmeitō lawmakers suc-
cessfully pushed a law through the municipal assembly of Ichikawa city
in Chiba prefecture in 1967. During the years that followed, the ruling
LDP responded to increasing electoral success of opposition parties by
co-opting some of the opposition’s social policy proposals and eventually
implemented child allowance at the national level in 1972.20
19
For example, the Yomiuri (2 November 2001) called Kōmeitō’s electoral reform proposal
“pure party interest” (tōri tōryaku mukidashi) and criticized the party’s behavior as “extremely
disgraceful” (kiwamete fukenshiki). The Asahi (31 October 2001) commented that “Kōmeitō
now is judging everything only according to whether it is a loss or a benefit for itself,” and
added, “We are shocked by this absurd logic (Suji chigai no ronpō ni wa akireru).”
20
Calder (1991) discusses how the LDP co-opted popular social welfare policies initiated
The LDP eventually took child allowance off its list of policy priorities,
yet this platform remained crucial to Kōmeitō and its political identity. A
look at LDP manifestos and policy positions before 1999 shows that an
expansion of the child income support payments was low on the LDP’s
policy agenda. However, when Kōmeitō joined the coalition in 1999, the
issue was brought back to the table. Between 1999 and 2007, Kōmeitō tried
to expand the child allowance act four times.
Kōmeitō’s goal was to double the amounts provided and increase the
number of eligible recipients when it negotiated its partnership with the
LDP. The head of the Kōmeitō from 1998 to 2006, Kanzaki Takenori, met
with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo to discuss the importance of the child
allowance as a condition for joining the coalition. The secretary-general of
Kōmeitō at the time, Fuyushiba Tetsuzo, asked the LDP to make a commit-
ment to implement a new child allowance policy (Yomiuri, 20 December
1999). Kōmeitō’s policy demand for an expansion of child support was
also included in the original coalition agreement. In March 2000, Kōmeitō
submitted its Child Benefit Law Reform Bill, which requested that the
original amount be doubled (Imai and Matsui 2010).
At this point, the issue of child subsidies was considered an important
element of the government-mandated “measures against low fertility”
(shōshika taisaku), and it was discussed within the greater debate of how
to respond to Japan’s ageing society (Coulmas et al. 2008). However, even
in this context the LDP and the Liberal Party were reluctant to increase
the share of the national budget dedicated to family policy. Kōmeitō also
faced opposition from the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Health and Wel-
fare and the Ministry of Finance. One reason given by those who opposed
the expansion of the program was that, in times of very limited finan-
cial resources, payments should go directly to child-care centers to help
families in which both parents are gainfully employed. There was also
significant disagreement on where the money for the expansion of such a
program would come from—either from general tax revenues or cuts in
other benefits (Schoppa 2006).
Kōmeitō managed to push its proposal, yet the actual outcome clearly
included more concessions than Kōmeitō had desired. The LDP, Liberal
Party, and Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare had negotiated an in-
crease in the age of eligibility so that support would be provided for chil-
dren up to the age of six. The bill also included an income ceiling stipu-
lating that the 15 percent of Japanese families with the highest income
would not receive the allowance. The law, however, did not translate
by opposition parties at the local level during this period because of the electoral challenges
these opposition parties posed to the LDP.
into more money for all families with children. To finance the expansion
of the child allowance program, a tax credit for dependents was elimi-
nated. As a result, families with older children saw their financial burden
increase.
While the new family policy did provide parts of Kōmeitō’s core con-
stituency with more money and enabled the party to claim that it was pro-
tecting the livelihood of the common people, the outcome of this policy
initiative also showed that the LDP had not given in to their junior part-
ner’s demand to increase the budget for social policy, but only shifted the
financial resources from one purpose to another. Nevertheless, had it not
been in coalition, policies like this would not have seen the light of day at
a time of growing public expenditures and declining revenue.
Stimulating the Economy with “Money for Everyone”
In late September 2008, Asō Tarō took over from Fukuda Yasuo and, as
is typical of new Japanese prime ministers, enjoyed a relatively high ap-
proval rate of 45 percent, up 20 percent from his predecessor (Yomiuri, 26
September 2008). Many in and out of government expected the new prime
minister to use his popularity to dissolve the Lower House and call gen-
eral elections in November (Asahi, 5 November 2008), but Asō did not do
so. He claimed it was important to fight the economic crisis and that it was
not the time for election campaigns (Yomiuri, 30 September 2008).
Kōmeitō disagreed with the prime minister. For one, the party had
hoped to profit from the popularity of the new head of government. Sec-
ond, consideration had to be given to its main support organizations and
the limits of electoral mobilization. With the election of the Tokyo prefec-
tural assembly scheduled for late June, campaigning became a complex
endeavor for Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai. The LDP was a Kōmeitō partner
in the national election but a competitor in Tokyo. If both elections were
held in short succession, instructing Sōka Gakkai’s campaign volunteers
and potential voters threatened to become highly complicated. What
made things more difficult was that the seats in Tokyo’s prefectural as-
sembly are considered by Sōka Gakkai to be of utmost importance. Many
Gakkai members routinely travel from across Japan to the national capital
to support campaigns for seats in the Tokyo prefectural assembly.
In this situation, Kōmeitō reportedly demanded that its LDP coalition
partner agree to key policies, which would compensate Kōmeitō for the
political difficulties occasioned by Asō’s refusal to hold elections. News-
paper reports and statements from politicians indicate that this was the
background for Asō’s consent to a fixed payment to every Japanese citi-
zen, a payment that came to be known as teigaku kyūfukin (hereafter just
“payment”) (Asahi, 8 January 2009; Yomiuri, 5 March 2009).
The payment idea was not new. Right before becoming a ruling party,
Kōmeitō had managed to push the LP–LDP coalition to pass a bill that
provided every Japanese citizen with twenty single 1,000-yen vouchers
(so-called local promotion vouchers, or chiiki shinkō ken) to be used for
shopping, dining, and other forms of consumption intended to stimulate
the economy. Under the government of Fukuda Yasuo (September 2007–
September 2008) Kōmeitō had pushed a tax reduction, and for those earn-
ing too little to pay taxes the party suggested a similar payment to its
stimulus proposal.
When Asō mentioned the payment for the first time at a press confer-
ence on 30 October 2008, every citizen was scheduled to receive 12,000 yen,
but Kōmeitō asked for an extra allowance of 10,000 yen for schoolchildren
and senior citizens. After negotiations with the LDP, whose representa-
tives considered Kōmeitō’s plans to be too costly, the coalition settled for
a bill that would give Japanese eighteen years of age and younger as well
as those sixty-five and older an extra 8,000 yen (Asahi, 8 November 2008).
Still in the dark as to when general elections would be called, Kōmeitō
urged the LDP to pass the bill quickly in order to be able to campaign
with it, but this hurry had some undesirable side effects for Kōmeitō. For
one, there was no appropriate legal instrument to limit the recipients to
middle- and low-income households. Instead of passing a law to survey
household income first, Kōmeitō was willing to include wealthy house-
holds in the payment scheme (Yamaguchi Natsuo in Asahi, 5 November
2008). The media also quickly alluded to the fact that politicians, includ-
ing cabinet ministers and even Prime Minister Asō, would also be among
those receiving the payment, a situation that was bound to outrage many
Japanese voters.
There was more bad news for Kōmeitō: the necessary cost of this mea-
sure was estimated to reach 2 trillion yen (Asahi, 5 November 2008).21 The
cabinet office predicted that instead of spending the money, households
would save three-quarters of it and the rest would result in economic
growth of only 0.1% (Asahi, 11 November 2008). The public was not con-
vinced of the effectiveness of the idea, either. According to a poll con-
ducted by Asahi (11 November 2008), about 60 percent of interviewees did
not consider the payment to be a necessary policy. Another poll in Janu-
ary 2009 showed that 63 percent said it would be better to scrap the pay-
ment, and 71 percent said they anticipated no effect on the economy at all
(Asahi, 13 January 2009). Kōmeitō, however, defended the payment. Party
leader Ota Akihiro publicly refuted the survey results and stressed that
people told him “on the street” (genba de) that the payment was welcome
21
In November 2008 this amounted to US$21 billion.
and would be spent by “those many senior citizens living alone, by those
who have a hard time paying for their kids’ education” (Asahi, 16 Novem-
ber 2008).
In spite of this rhetoric, Diet deliberation on the bill slowed down. Al-
though Asō had originally agreed to pass the bill within the calendar year
2008, he soon extended that period until the end of the fiscal year, that is,
March 2009. This prospect also threatened the next election date Kōmeitō
had wished for, April 2009 (Asahi, 27 January 2009), putting further strain
on Sōka Gakkai’s vote mobilization machinery. In addition, Asō had an-
nounced his plan to raise the consumption tax in three years, a move that
was generally unpopular among Japanese voters and particularly with
Sōka Gakkai’s Married Women’s Division (Asahi, 19 December 2008).
When the payment bill finally passed parliament in March 2009, the
government as a whole had suffered considerable damage from the ini-
tiative. The question as to whether Asō himself would accept the money
produced additional negative press—he accepted it and promised to im-
mediately spend the amount in order to stimulate the economy (Yomiuri, 3
March 2009). The Liberal Democrats had accepted the measure, but many
of them blamed Kōmeitō for initiating this policy (Yomiuri, 26 February
2009) and claimed that the payment was a fee to preserve the coalition
(Asahi, 21 November 2008).
In contrast to Kōmeitō’s campaign to reform the electoral system, this
time the party had successfully enacted one of its policy proposals. In both
cases, however, many Liberal Democrats were openly critical of their co-
alition partner. Kōmeitō also experienced a tremendous amount of criti-
cism in the public arena and the mass media. As both policy proposals
were crucial to the party and its constituencies, however, Kōmeitō leaders
held on to their initiatives.
Conclusion: High Costs, Higher Benefits

The main goal of this chapter was to shed light on Kōmeitō’s role as junior
coalition partner of the LDP by looking at office allocations, policies, and
the internal dynamics of the alliance in government from 1999 to 2009. We
presented our findings with the caveat that it is a very complex endeavor
to evaluate the nature and outcome of such a partnership, but we can sug-
gest a number of conclusions from our analysis.
First, Kōmeitō got a raw deal in terms of office allocation, yet did not
make this a contentious issue in its cooperation with the LDP. Second,
the party mostly got to fill those government positions that correspond-
ed to its core policy interests. Third, although Kōmeitō had to constantly
stand its ground against its larger coalition partner, it acted autonomously.
Finally, the alliance with the LDP was, and still is, a natural choice for both
parties.
We began this chapter by showing that Kōmeitō consistently filled one
minister position less than its parliamentary strength would have sug-
gested. Surprisingly, we could not find any discussion of this in the media,
and even Kōmeitō representatives were not displaying any signs of dissat-
isfaction. Toward the end of the coalition, the party even rejected an offer
to contribute one more member to the ailing cabinet of unpopular Prime
Minister Fukuda. Kōmeitō possibly did not consider a stronger involve-
ment in the cabinet and higher public exposure as part of the government
to be crucial to its political success, and in rough times may have even
profited from remaining in the background.
Clearly, such a strategy is possible only for junior coalition partners.
In contrast to the LDP, Kōmeitō has no need to cover all issues govern-
ments have to deal with, but can instead concentrate on those that cohere
with its policy priorities and core constituencies. At the same time, the
constraints of a coalition government force the party to reduce its policy
ideals. As is the case in all coalitions, the partnership makes compromise
inevitable. Financial constraints, influential lobby groups, and a critical
mass media add to the need to make concessions. Whenever this results in
diluting its stated ideals, Kōmeitō faces pressure from the party base and
core supporters.
What sets Kōmeitō apart in this respect, however, is the fact that it is
supported by a religious organization. This not only adds a religious ben-
efit to electoral campaigning (see chapter 3) but also provides ethical and
religious underpinnings for Kōmeitō’s politicians and their policies. A
clash between Sōka Gakkai’s utopian ideals and the compromise-laden
reality of a party in government is inevitable. This clash has been soft-
ened, however, by the willingness of many members of Sōka Gakkai to
accept the constraints and forces of politics, at least to a certain degree.
Being in government and getting at least some Kōmeitō policies through
the Diet are apparently evaluated more highly by Kōmeitō’s supporters
than being an idealistic opposition with hardly any impact on government
policy at all.
George Ehrhardt makes this point (see chapters 5 and 8), and Fisker-
Nielsen (2012) in her study on how Sōka Gakkai members reacted to the
passage of the PKO bill in 2001 also underlines this conclusion. While
many of Fisker-Nielsen’s interviewees opposed the U.S.–led “coalition
of the willing” and its war against Saddam Hussein in Iraq, they were
also convinced that Kōmeitō politicians had done their best to prevent the
LDP from supporting the efforts of the Bush administration. A similar case
can be made for Kōmeitō’s support of attempts by the LDP to reform the
constitution (Hardacre 2005) and Prime Minister Abe’s 2007–2008 initia-

tive to include patriotic elements in school education. As can be seen in
these examples, Kōmeitō’s achievements were also judged in light of what
the party was able to prevent the LDP from doing. As former Kōmeitō
leader Ōta put it, one task of his party was to resist right-wing tendencies
in the coalition (Asahi, 1 October 2006).
The case studies provided in this chapter illustrate how Kōmeitō ma-
neuvered between the LDP and its religious parent organization while
maintaining its identity as a political party. With regard to Sōka Gak-
kai, tensions between the two sides varied in intensity over the coalition
years from 1999 through 2009. Beginning with the onset of the coalition,
Kōmeitō set itself progressively farther and farther apart from its parent
religious sect. However, as can be seen in the priorities announced in the
party manifestos and in the constituencies to which the party continues to
appeal, Kōmeitō remains beholden to a Gakkai base. There is also reason
to believe that, in spite of all official institutional differentiation between
the party and its former religious parent, Kōmeitō has continuously func-
tioned as an invisible insurance policy for Sōka Gakkai against state inter-
ference (cf. chapter 9).
With regard to Kōmeitō’s relationship with the LDP, our study shows
that Kōmeitō’s case was widely consistent with what we know of junior
coalition parties in other democracies like Germany, Great Britain, or Aus-
tralia. As the smaller partner, Kōmeitō was able to push a number of pol-
icy proposals but clearly was not on equal footing with the stronger LDP.
On a few crucial policy issues such as the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq
or electoral reform, Kōmeitō could not influence the LDP in a noteworthy
way, even if Kōmeitō displayed strong persistency and determination. In
addition, whenever the LDP was busy with internal issues, such as the
election of a new party president, power struggles between factions, or
corruption cases, the voice of the junior partner was often ignored. Most of
Kōmeitō’s demands to adjust the timing of elections to its organizational
needs, for example, fell on deaf ears during these periods.22 As our third
case study showed, however, Kōmeitō’s leverage grew when the LDP and
its prime minister suffered from very low support rates and elections were
looming.
The mere fact that the party did not abandon the alliance, however, is
evidence that Kōmeitō leaders viewed the coalition as beneficial and that
it was a politically rational choice. Core constituencies of both parties are
highly complementary. By this we do not mean that voters of one party
22
See, for example, the period after the end of the Fukuda government in September
2008.
were sympathetic to the other; this was surely not the case, particularly at
the beginning of the alliance, when many non-Gakkai religious organiza-
tions ended their support for the Liberal Democrats (see chapter 9). What
we suggest is that there was little intersection between the core constitu-
encies of LDP and Kōmeitō. Therefore, an alliance between the two par-
ties allowed them to expand their voting base and minimize the danger
of poaching votes from one another during elections. Theory tells us that
coalition partners do not stop competing for each other’s voters. In the
case of Kōmeitō and the LDP, however, this competition was compara-
tively weak. There was little voter migration between the parties, and the
coalition provided them with an opportunity for one coalition partner to
direct its voters to support the other party. In terms of theory, the LDP–
Kōmeitō case suggests that the more voter cleavages of coalition parties
complement one another, the smaller the probability of the alliance break-
ing apart.
In addition, policies of the two parties were similarly complementary.
Many of Kōmeitō’s proposals were characterized by a limited range of ef-
fect and the direct link the party created to the livelihood of its supporters.
While the LDP would often touch upon the level of macroeconomics or
the metalevel of social policies, Kōmeitō’s manifestos would rather lay out
in detail the problems of daily life that its proposals would solve. For ex-
ample, the 2000 manifesto stated: “We will support the ‘80 20’ campaign,
a health campaign that by means of dental check-ups and self-control
will enable seniors to keep 20 or more teeth even when they turn 80.”23
In 2005, Kōmeitō proposed: “There are six hundred railway crossings in
Japan which during peak times are closed forty minutes or more every
hour. We will reduce these ‘non-opening crossings’ by 70 percent in five
years, and by 100 percent in ten years.” Proposals of this nature were on
such a small scale that they were unlikely to face resistance from Liberal
Democrats, who remained primarily concerned with larger-scale concerns
of their party’s constituency.24
Via Kōmeitō’s exclusive and direct channels of communication, includ-
ing the party newspaper Kōmei Shimbun, Sōka Gakkai’s paper Seikyō Shim-
bun, meetings of Sōka Gakkai, and the groups’ websites, Kōmeitō man-
aged to continuously paint a picture of itself as a party with jitsugenryoku,
or “power to actualize”: the power to push policies and have them passed
by parliament. In the 2009 manifesto, Kōmeitō claimed a jitsugenryoku
of 96.5%, meaning that almost all of the 258 proposals made in the 2007
23
According to Ueda Isamu, this campaign was created by the Japan Dental Association
and adopted by Kōmeitō (interview conducted by Axel Klein, 25 October 2012).
24
For more examples and further analysis, see chapter 8.
manifesto were either in a state of being deliberated, had already taken the
form of a bill, or had been passed (Kōmeitō 2009, 42–43).25
Evidence for the strength of the ties between LDP and Kōmeitō be-
came especially obvious in 2009, the last year of the coalition. By then,
the oppositional Democratic Party was much closer to Kōmeitō on most
social policy issues. In this sense it would have offered an emergency exit
for Kōmeitō to get away from an unattractive coalition partner and stay
in power after the next general election. The unpopular Prime Minister
Asō and his party were clearly threatening to, and eventually did, take
Kōmeitō down with them at the ballot box. Polls showed that a majority
of Japanese voters wanted a “change in government” (seiken kōtai), but
most of them were tired of the LDP, not of Kōmeitō (see Asahi, 10 February
2009). Kōmeitō, however, stayed put, and in its 2009 electoral defeat lost
all of its single-member districts and approximately one-third of its Lower
House seats, dropping from thirty-one in 2005 to twenty-one in 2009.
Neither office seeking nor policy-focused theories can explain Kōmeitō’s
behavior. Electoral cooperation with the LDP, however, does. Candidacies
of both parties are organized in such a way that no Kōmeitō politician
runs against a Liberal Democrat in any of the country’s three hundred
single-member districts. Switching to the DPJ would have entailed a costly
and strife-ridden relocation of candidates from both parties (see chapter
9). Quickly convincing voters that yesterday’s foe is today’s best friend
raised the hurdle even higher. It is no surprise, therefore, that Kōmeitō
stuck with the LDP. After returning to the opposition benches in late 2009,
the party tried to establish itself as an independent third political force,
but more than a year before the 2012 election Kōmeitō accepted that it
could not hope to be reelected without its old ally (Klein 2013).
After regaining power, the coalition has continued working just as it
did from 1999 to 2009. Since 2012, Kōmeitō has filled only one cabinet po-
sition, stressed its “power to actualize” (especially in social policy fields),
and has slowed down many of the LDP’s nationalist endeavors such as
constitutional revision and history textbook reform. It has not pushed
policies favoring Sōka Gakkai, but we suggest that the party is again on
standby in terms of guarding the legal privileges of its erstwhile religious
mother organization.
Finally, we would like to suggest that Kōmeitō’s performance as a rul-
ing party improved its public image in an important way. As part of the
government in power, Kōmeitō could expand its reach and develop im-
portant relationships with voters, organizations, and groups outside a
25
The emphasis on jitsugenryoku was not exclusive to Kōmeitō but could also be found in
statements by other parties.
religious context. Furthermore, during its first ten years in government,

Kōmeitō raised only one issue with a religious color to it: the party pro-
tested Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a
contentious matter of concern to a wide range of constituencies, religious
and not, in Japan and overseas, and not an issue that is specific to Sōka
Gakkai and its adherents.
For a party that is conventionally defined as “religious” and frequently
maligned as a covert plot to install the teaching of Sōka Gakkai as Japan’s
national faith, it is striking to note the absence of any evidence in poli-
cy, lawmaking, or other actions on the part of Kōmeitō to favor its erst-
while religious parent organization during its decade in government. In
the 1990s, Kōmeitō’s critics had argued that should Kōmeitō win election
the party would try to establish a state religion, enabling Sōka Gakkai’s
honorary president Ikeda Daisaku to control the country and suppress
all other religious organizations. None of these scenarios materialized. It
may be argued that Kōmeitō never had sufficient parliamentary strength
to pursue these goals, but achieving such a level of influence and con-
trol needed to realize these objectives would require a society in which
Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō are already dominant forces. The truth is quite
different. From what we know about Japanese voters, electoral support
for Kōmeitō leveled off long ago (see chapter 9), as has membership in
Sōka Gakkai. It is perhaps most important to note that, instead of pursu-
ing religiously motivated goals, Kōmeitō persists in operating as a junior
coalition party in ways that are directly comparable to nonreligious junior
coalition members in other contexts.
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Part VI: Conclusion
Eleven
Kōmeitō
Politics and Religion in Japan

and Steven R. Reed
What Have We Learned?

The clearest conclusion to be drawn from this volume is that Kōmeitō is
a “normal” political party. By this we mean nothing more than the theo-
ries that political scientists use to study political parties work as well for
Kōmeitō as they do for any other party. The most extraordinary aspect of
Kōmeitō’s operation as a political party is its capacity to mobilize voters,
a capacity that far exceeds that of any other Japanese political party and
probably finds few equals around the world. The party not only gets its
voters to the polls but it directs those votes toward whatever candidate
or party Kōmeitō is supporting in any particular electoral district. How-
ever, this extraordinary mobilization is accomplished using standard tech-
niques that are employed by other parties and campaign organizations
as well. Our field research provided us with evidence that Sōka Gakkai
meetings are used to introduce Kōmeitō candidates and to advertise the
party, particularly during the period leading up the election; we saw noth-
ing that resembled what critics have termed “brainwashing.” Rather, the
obvious partisanship of Sōka Gakkai resembles the outspoken advocacy
for specific parties displayed by Catholic priests in many parts of Europe
or evangelical activists in the United States, and does not differ greatly
from techniques used to mobilize doctors, dentists, farmers, or any of the
other special interest groups that endorse candidates in Japan.
More generally, Kōmeitō can be understood as a “mass party” by em-
ploying the same theories used to analyze labor and Catholic parties in
Western Europe. A mass party is a party founded and supported by an
organization in civil society. Japan has two mass parties, Kōmeitō and
the Japan Communist Party. Both of these parties display strong party
discipline politically both with respect to where and when candidates

will run for office and with respect to policy within the Diet. This makes
Kōmeitō different from most other parties in Japan but similar to many
parties around the world.
Religious organizations are among the most common bases on which
to form a mass party. Catholic parties are arguably the most successful
parties in Western Europe, more successful but less studied than social-
ist political organizations (Kalyvas 1996). The only Western European
Protestant-based party to experience similar levels of electoral success is
the Anti-Revolutionary Party in the Netherlands. The successful Chris-
tian Democratic Union of Germany includes both Catholic and Protestant
churches (Freston 2004). The BJP in India offers a non-Western example
of a successful religious party (Dalal 2002; Hansen 1999). Islamic political
parties are also common but few have the opportunity to participate in
established democratic politics. Islamic parties have won control of the
government in Turkey but have faced constitutional challenges after every
election (Yavuz 2003), and the Egyptian government of Mohamed Morsi,
leader of the country’s Muslim Brotherhood, was removed from office af-
ter only a year by the country’s military.
If there is anything special about Kōmeitō as a mass party, it is simply
the size of the party. The best-studied mass parties are those based on or-
ganizations, such as the labor union movement or the church in Catholic
countries, that claim a large proportion of the population. Mass parties
are often major parties that regularly participate in government, either in
coalition or as the sole ruling party. Kōmeitō, however, is based on a reli-
gious organization that is not only much smaller than the Catholic Church,
for example, but is a minority group that is unpopular with a majority of
voters. Kōmeitō is thus firmly situated as a “third party.” It is valued as a
(junior) coalition partner but is unlikely to ever provide a prime minister
at the head of a coalition government. We are aware of only one other
“small” mass party: the Ulster Union in Northern Ireland, which is based
upon the Orange Order (Evans and Tonge 2005).
Though Kōmeitō takes a special interest in peace, human rights, social
welfare, environment, and education, it has no clear “litmus test” issues
on which only one particular position is to be recognized. Indeed, if you
want to predict what position Kōmeitō will take on any particular issue,
you are better off thinking about what would please the average Japanese
housewife in low- and middle-income households than analyzing the
religious beliefs of its parent organization. As we have discussed in this
volume, quite a number of policies proposed by the party originate from
direct dialogue with housewives organized by Sōka Gakkai.
Like many mass parties overseas, but unlike most other Japanese
parties, Kōmeitō exercises strict discipline over its members. Kōmeitō
Kōmeitō 271
politicians operate as a unit within the Diet, and the Kōmeitō vote in a
given district varies little over time, no matter which candidate is run-
ning. The nomination process is centralized and candidates can claim very
few personal votes. The only other party in Japan that displays the same
level of party discipline is the Japan Communist Party. All other parties
including the LDP suffer from lack of voting discipline and seldom muster
unanimous votes on controversial issues.
Like other mass parties, Kōmeitō must continually balance the de-
mands of its organizational base with the requirements of electoral and
legislative politics. The balance between the two shifts over time, yet
Kōmeitō has always proven capable of compromising on policy in order
to promote electoral goals. Especially since entering into coalition with
the LDP, Kōmeitō has repeatedly given priority to maintaining that coali-
tion rather than representing the express desires of Sōka Gakkai members.
Again, Kōmeitō proved to be a normal party in that the political ideals it
held high while in opposition were subjected to compromise when par-
ticipating in a coalition government.
Kōmeitō thus supported sending Japanese troops to Iraq despite its
clear founding stance as a pacifist organization opposed to military in-
terventionism. As a consequence, the party had to allay protest from its
base, particularly the Sōka Gakkai Young Men’s Division. Kōmeitō poli-
ticians went to great lengths to convince their voters that dispatching
Self-Defense Forces was the best way to support the people of Iraq and
promote world peace, going so far as to send their party leader to Iraq
to assure their supporters that the troops were safe (Yomiuri, 3 December
2003; Asahi, 22 December 2003).
Kōmeitō has also cooperated with the LDP in other ways that conflict
with Sōka Gakkai interests: in 2011 and 2012, for example, the party joined
the LDP in opposing some of the DPJ government’s efforts to aid the tsuna-
mi and nuclear disaster victims following the Great East Japan Earthquake
of 11 March 2011. The primary purpose of this opposition has been to try
to force the DPJ to call an election. Sōka Gakkai members complained that
they are working hard to help disaster victims and have pointed out that
their party should be doing the same (Yomiuri, 7 August 2011). The party
responded to this complaint by sponsoring member bills that expressed the
wishes of Sōka Gakkai (Kōmei Shimbun, 6 August 2011) but did not endanger
the coalition, because member bills have no chance of being passed into law.
Kōmeitō follows typical mass party behavior in coalition: a growing inde-
pendence of the party from its organizational sponsor is a common pattern.
Like other parties originating from a religious organization, Kōmeitō
grew increasingly independent and turned into a self-contained, self-
interested party with a distinct agenda that is not always compatible with
that of Sōka Gakkai. While many aspects of the relationship between the
organizations are still unclear, the image of Kōmeitō as a mere political

branch of Sōka Gakkai is clearly mistaken. Concerns regarding Kōmeitō’s
link to religion remain, yet our findings indicate clearly that the separation
between party and religious group announced by Ikeda Daisaku in 1970
made a real difference. Kōmeitō has matured into an organization that,
in terms of policy and institutional behavior, has shifted both its strate-
gies and policies in a politically rational manner. In the 1970s, Kōmeitō
cooperated with opposition parties. When these attempts failed, the party
responded positively to LDP approaches, leading eventually to the coali-
tion government in 1999.
Finally, as we detailed in chapter 10, none of the dire predictions about
what would happen if Kōmeitō ever gained power have come to pass.
First, Kōmeitō in power has not proven a threat to democracy. Indeed,
during the second coalition period starting in December 2012, Kōmeitō
has taken positions in opposition to the LDP that should be described as
defending democracy. Second, Kōmeitō in power has not threatened other
religious groups or tried to get special privileges for Sōka Gakkai relative
to other religious groups. Indeed, Kōmeitō has acted to protect the inter-
ests of religious groups in general.
More generally, we can confirm the common finding that religious
groups often prove to be effective campaign organizations. In Japan, Sōka
Gakkai is the most prominent example, yet other religious groups have
also been important in elections since the end of the war. We can now add
the finding that electoral campaigning can be good for religious groups as
well. McLaughlin makes this point most clearly: electioneering as religious
practice has the positive effect of expanding both the religious group and
the political parties it supports through focusing adherents on the tangible
goal of electoral success.
A major motivation for producing this volume was our conviction that
Kōmeitō is one of the most understudied aspects of Japanese politics. We
hope this volume has redressed that imbalance to some degree, yet we are
acutely aware that much remains to be done, both on Kōmeitō and, more
generally, on the relationship between religion and politics in Japan. We
therefore conclude with suggestions for future research.
Directions for Future Research

First and foremost, we need more research on Kōmeitō as a political party.
This volume has merely scratched the surface of the topic. Smith analyzes
Kōmeitō nomination behavior and Klein and Reed provide several clues
about which candidate Kōmeitō chooses to support in a particular district,
but we also need to know how, and how effectively, the party mobilizes
support for LDP candidates. Similarly, Klein and Hasunuma have begun
Kōmeitō 273
the task of analyzing Kōmeitō’s influence on the policy outputs of and its
role within the coalition, yet much more work needs to be done to fully
understand the merits and demerits for Kōmeitō of participating in a co-
alition government (cf. Klein 2013).
Perhaps the most important task, however, is to understand the evolv-
ing relationship between Kōmeitō and Sōka Gakkai. As Ehrhardt’s chap-
ters in this volume and the recent anthropological study by Fisker-Nielsen
(2012) show, this is a sensitive issue for both organizations because both
have suffered from popular suspicion regarding their perceived mixing
of religion and politics, and the degree to which Sōka Gakkai exerts in-
fluence on Kōmeitō. A future study that starts from the idea of Kōmeitō
as a mass party and applies theories that have been developed studying
the mass parties of Western Europe would advance our understanding of
Sōka Gakkai–Kōmeitō connections.
We have focused on Kōmeitō as a national political party but it is, in
fact, a much stronger political force in local politics. Kōmeitō and the Ja-
pan Communist Party are by far the best-organized parties in prefectural
and municipal assemblies and exert an influence well beyond their num-
bers at the polls. Unlike other small parties in Japan, Kōmeitō and the JCP
survive at the national level under an electoral system that favors two
large parties due to their solid local bases. A seat in a municipal or pre-
fectural assembly forms part of the Kōmeitō career ladder, and local elec-
tions serve to keep the party active in districts that do not have a Kōmeitō
candidate. It is at this level that mutual support deals are struck between
Kōmeitō candidates and candidates from other parties, deals that form the
basis of trust necessary for agreements reached at higher levels. Further
investigation of how Kōmeitō operates at the municipal and prefectural
levels is required to fully understand how the party negotiates a place for
itself in national politics.
We have focused on Sōka Gakkai and Kōmeitō because they are by far
the most important political players among religious groups. However,
other religious groups also play roles that are well worth studying. Risshō
Kōseikai deserves attention as one of Sōka Gakkai’s main rivals, both in
politics and religion. We also remain largely ignorant about the important
political roles played by Shinto- and traditional temple-based Buddhist or-
ganizations. John Breen (2010a, 2010b) and Mark Mullins (2012a, 2012b) are
doing important work on Shinto groups and politics from a religious stud-
ies point of view, and Roy Starrs (2011) has published an edited volume on
important historical aspects of religion and politics in Japan that deals in
part with postwar Shinto political engagements. Though this work from
religious studies should be of great interest to political scientists, a political
science perspective on contemporary Shinto would also be welcome.
Jōdo Shinshū (True Pure Land Sect), Japan’s largest temple Buddhist de-
nomination, is another group that has played a much larger role than has
been recognized in political science literature to this point. Beside exten-
sive engagements in electoral politics, Jōdo Shinshū has been consistently
active in politically engaged social movements, including the a ntiwar
movement of the immediate postwar decades and protests against nuclear
power that emerged from the Fukushima crisis in 2011.
Should research along these lines follow this volume, we will be on the
way toward building a reliable body of literature that makes sense of re-
ligious engagement in Japanese electoral politics. By taking seriously the
persistent and frequently influential ways religious organizations partici-
pate in Japanese politics at all levels, we can move away from the current
tendency in Japanese political science to ignore religion or treat it as a
marginal phenomenon to instead pursue a deeper understanding of ways
religious individuals and institutions shape Japan’s political processes.
References
Breen, John. 2010a. “‘Conventional Wisdom’ and the Politics of Shinto in
Postwar Japan.” The Politics and Religion Journal 4:68–82.
———. 2010b. “Resurrecting the Sacred Land of Japan: The State of
Shinto in the 21st Century.” Japanese Journal of Religious Studies
37:295–315.
Dalal, Bhoopender S. 2002. BJP and Kōmeitō: Religion and Politics in India
and Japan. New Delhi: Confluence International.
Evans, Jocelyn A., and Jonathan Tonge. 2005. “Problems of Modernizing
an Ethno-Religious Party: The Case of the Ulster Unionist Party in
Northern Ireland.” Party Politics 11:319–339.
Japan. New York: Routledge.
Freston, Paul. 2004. Protestant Political Parties. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Hansen, Thomas Blom. 1999. The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu
Nationalism in Modern India. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1996. The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe. Ithaca,
Klein, Axel. 2013. “Kōmeitō—The First “Third” Force.” In Japan Decides
Mullins, Mark R. 2012a. “Secularization, Deprivatization, and the
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———. 2012b. “The Neo-Nationalist Response to the Aum Crisis.”

Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 39:99–125.
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Periodicals
million) was second only to that of Yomiuri Shimbun. Available at
2014.
circulation of 800,000. Personal communication with newspaper
2014.
Contributors
Yuki Abe was Senior Research Fellow at the German Institute of Japanese
Studies in Tokyo before becoming Associate Professor in the Faculty of
Law, Kumamoto University, Japan. His research focuses on religion and
politics, international relations, and comparative politics between Japan
and European states.
Matthew Carlson is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Uni-

versity of Vermont. He specializes in East Asian politics, public opinion,
electoral systems, and human rights. He is currently writing a book with
Steven R. Reed on political corruption in Japan.
George Ehrhardt is Associate Professor of Government at Appalachian

State University. His primary interests lie in elections and voting behavior,
especially at the intersection of faith and electoral action.
Masahisa Endo is Research Associate, School of Political Science and Eco-

nomics, Waseda University, Japan. His research interests are voting behav-
iour, public opinion, and Japanese politics.
Linda Hasunuma is Assistant Professor of Government at Franklin and

Marshall College. She has published work on Koizumi’s reforms, central-
local relations, and the LDP-Kōmeitō coalition. Her current projects are on
Japan’s gender-equality institutions and policies that affect women and
families.
Axel Klein is Professor of Modern East Asian Studies at the University

of Duisburg-Essen (Germany). His focus is on election campaigning, reli-
gion, and politics as well as demographic change.
Levi McLaughlin is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy

and Religious Studies at North Carolina State University. He is currently
278Contributors
completing a book manuscript titled Sōka Gakkai: Buddhism and Romantic

Heroism in Modern Japan.
Steven R. Reed is Professor at Chuo University in Japan. His major areas

of research are elections and electoral systems. He recently coedited Japan
Decides: The Japanese General Election of 2012 with Robert Pekkanen and
Ethan Scheiner. His current research interests include religious groups in
politics.
Daniel M. Smith is Assistant Professor in the Department of Government

and a faculty associate at the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at
Harvard University. His Ph.D. in political science is from the University of
California, San Diego.
Index
“80 20” campaign, 261 campaigning); mobilization; money

politics (kinken seiji); naibu kakunin
Abe Shinzō, 175, 236, 243, 253, 260 (internal mobilization, internal
Aisutaa, 27 confirmation); priming; Public Offices
Akahata (Shimbun), 75, 166 Election Law
Akiya Einosuke, 89, 228 candidate recruitment, 15, 140, 142, 158
antistalking law, 202, 203, 207 catch-all party, 141n3, 253
Article 20. See Constitution (1947) Catholic Church, 25, 44, 269–270
Article 89. See Constitution (1947) Central Executive Committee, 142–143
Asahara Shōkō, 29 child allowance (jidoteate), 158, 207, 242,
Asō Tarō, 235, 242, 243, 246, 256–258, 262 253, 254–256
Association To Discuss Article 20 of the China, 76n50, 86–88, 252
Constitution (Kenpō 20-jō o Kangae- Christian Political Union (Kirisutosha
rukai), 220 Seiji Renmei), 28
Association To Oppose Cabinet Christianity, 4, 5, 12, 25, 44, 54, 61, 114,
Appointments for Kōmeitō (Kōmeito 184, 195, 217, 221, 270
to no Kakunai Kyōryoku ni Hantai Chun Doo-Hwan, 89
suru Kai), 232 common people (shomin), 67, 84, 122, 207,
Aum Shinrikyō, 5, 9, 29, 44, 177, 216, 223, 228, 250, 256
223–224, 225 Constitution (1947), ix, 3, 5, 27, 33, 39, 61,
64, 77, 101, 176, 177n10, 188, 202, 215,
Buddhist democracy (buppō min 217, 220, 223, 240, 260; Article 9, 101;
shushugi), 3, 67, 72, 73 Article 20, 61, 176, 215, 217, 220, 233;
Bukkyō Minwatō (Buddhist Party), 28, 33 Article 89, 61
Bussho Gōnenkai Kyōdan, 221, 230 corruption, 36, 120, 163, 175, 199, 251, 260
cultural activities (bunka katsudō), 62, 217
Cabinet Office (Naikakufu), 242–244, 257 Culture Bureau (Sōka Gakkai), 67, 68
Cabinet Secretary, 249 Culture Division (Sōka Gakkai), 62–63,
campaigning. See cultural activities 68
(bunka katsudō); f-hyō (friend votes); culture festivals (bunkasai), 56
f-tori (winning voters from friends);
kobetsu hōmon (house-to-house Daibyaku renge, 59, 120, 134
280Index
daigohonzon. See gohonzon Endō Otohiko, 253

dead votes (shihyō), 253 Environment Agency of Japan
Democratic Party of Japan (Minshutō; (Kankyōchō), 243
DPJ), 31, 37, 40, 41, 42–43, 116, 117, 127, Equal Opportunity in Employment Act,
135, 140, 141n3, 143, 147, 152, 156, 157, 203
187, 192, 201, 262; finances, 31, 166–167,
169–174, 176, 184; as opposition, 30, f-hyō (friend votes), 225
33, 34, 37, 38, 44, 120, 216, 226, 230–231, Financial Department (zaimu buin), 178,
232, 233, 234; as ruling party, 37, 166, 179, 181, 182
171, 189, 271; social policy, 44, 187, 203 f-tori (winning voters from friends), 131,
Democratic Socialist Party (Minshū 196–197
Shakaitō; Minshatō; DSP), 26, 36, Fujii Hirohisa, 33
84–87, 88, 90–91, 92–93, 99, 103–104, Fujinbu. See Married Women’s Division
105, 189; and Japan Communist Party, Fujinomiya, 96
75n89; and Japan Socialist Party, 84, Fujiwara Hirotatsu (author of I Denounce
85–86, 88, 90–91, 99, 105; and Liberal Sōka Gakkai), 8, 75–76, 219
Democratic Party, 85–86, 87, 90, 92, Fukuda Takeo, 89, 91n10
101, 105; and New Frontier Party, 36, Fukuda Yasuo, 243, 245, 246, 256, 257, 259,
106, 222–223; security and defense, 260n22
93, 101 Fukumoto Jun’ichi, 11
door-to-door canvassing. See kobetsu fund-raising parties, 170
hōmon Fuyushiba Tetsuzō, 233, 246, 255
Dr. Heli, 203–204
Gamson’s Law, 242, 244
earthquake, Great East Japan, 236, 271 Gekkan Pen, 6n3, 96
earthquake, Hanshin-Awaji, 236 gender, 56, 69, 70, 72, 97, 130, 140, 188,
Economic Planning Agency (Keizai 191–197, 202, 204–206
Kikakuchō), 243 gohonzon (object of worship), 57–58, 59,
Eda Saburō, 90–91 60, 181, 217
education, 27, 53, 55, 56, 61, 62, 69–72, 97, Gokatsukai (May Society), 9
98, 147–149, 180, 190, 199, 203, 249, 250, gongyō (chanting), 51, 53, 58, 207
252, 258, 260, 270 gosho (Nichiren’s collected writings),
Eguchi Kazuo, 233 57n9, 59n14, 207
election law. See Public Offices Election Gotōda Masaharu, 96
Law Green Breeze Society (Ryokufūkai),
Election Strategy Committee, 142, 143 32–33
elections. See Upper House; Lower Group To Consider Religion and Politics
House (Shūkyō to Seiji o Kangaerukai), 230
electoral reform, 142, 143, 147, 152, 153,
227, 252, 253–254, 260 Hamada Masayoshi, 126–127, 200–201
electoral system, 16, 32, 33, 34–35, 36, 106, Hamayotsu Toshiko, 245
141, 142, 147, 151, 157–158, 219, 220, 227, Happiness Realization Party (Kōfuku
231, 234, 241–242, 251, 252, 253–254, Jitsugentō; HRP), 29, 30, 39n10, 52n1
273 Happy Science. See Kōfuku no Kagaku
emperor, ix, 27, 33, 38, 55, 60 Harashima Kōji, 66
Index 281
Harashima Takashi, 6, 7 Japan Christian Party (Nihon

Hashimoto Ryūtarō, 175, 221, 251 Kirisutokyōtō), 28
Hata Tsutomu, 221, 222 Japan Communist Party (Nihon
Hatoyama Kunio, 221 Kyōsantō; JCP), 11, 17, 25, 114n1, 141,
Hatoyama Yukio, 230, 251 143, 151, 157, 217, 219, 269, 271, 273;
Hirano Sadao, 11, 189 accord with Sōka Gakkai, 88–89, 104,
Hiranuma Takeo, 234 106; finances, 154, 166–171, 172n6;
Hirasawa Katsuei, 36, 221, 229, 235 and Japan Socialist Party, 91, 93; and
history textbook, 262 Kōmeitō voters, 100n18, 103–105;
honmon no kaidan (true ordination publications, 10, 75n49, 166; wiretap
platform), 58, 59, 60, 73 of chairman’s house, 89, 96. See also
Hosokawa Morihiro, 43, 219, 221, 222, Akahata (Shimbun)
225, 227, 253n18 Japan Dental Association, 175, 261n23
house-to-house campaigning. See kobetsu Japan Election Survey (JES), 97n17,
hōmon 100n18, 201
Japan General Social Survey (JGSS), 201
Ichi-ichi line, 10 Japan New Party, 36, 106, 222
Ichikawa Yūichi, 10 Japan Socialist Party (Nihon Shakaitō;
Iha Yoishi, 30 JSP), 37, 84–86, 88, 90–91, 92–93, 99–
Ikeda Daisaku (b. 1928), 6, 9, 12n12, 100, 101, 103–104, 105, 106, 141n3, 143,
58–59, 65, 66–68, 72–76, 87, 88, 96, 151, 203, 226, 227
121, 134, 182, 188n1, 194, 200n13, 218, Jimi Shōsaburō, 234
228, 240, 272; and Buddhism, 15, Jinja Hochō (umbrella organization for
72–73, 85; critiques of, 6, 75–76, 228, Shintō groups), 39
263; founding of Kōmeitō, 3, 67, 218; jitsugenryoku (power to actualize), 261,
Fujinbu, 198; and Japan Communist 262
Party, 88; and Japan-China relations, Jiyū Shimpō, 225, 228
87; and Kōseiren, 66–67; and kōsen Jōdo Shinshū (True Pure Land Sect), 28,
rufu, 73; and Liberal Democratic 33, 40–43, 53, 61, 230–231, 274
Party, 215, 224, 225, 228, 240; Osaka
Incident, 64–66, 133; and shakubuku, Kamei Shizuka, 220, 233
72; and Single-Member Districts, 227; Kan Naoto, 120, 128
and Seiji to shūkyō, 73–74; Sōka Gakkai Kanzaki Takenori, 233, 255
as purely religious, 66–68 Katō Kōichi, 221, 225, 228, 234
Ikeda Hiromasa, 134 Kitagawa Kazuo, 246
Ikenobō Yasuko, 145 kobetsu hōmon (house-to-house campaign-
internal confirmation (naibu kakunin), ing), 27, 45, 63, 64, 65, 123, 124, 133
130, 197 kōenkai (personal support networks), 116,
Iraq, 259, 260, 271 172n7, 174, 223
iron triangle, 163 Kōfuku no Kagaku (Science of Happi-
Ishihara Shintarō, 36, 221 ness or Happy Science), 29, 30, 44,
Ishii Yoshinobu, 117–118 52n1
Islam, 4, 5, 114, 270 Koga Makoto, 235
Itō Yoshitaka, 28, 33 Koizumi Jun’ichirō, 233, 234, 242–243,
Ittōen, 26, 28 246, 250, 254, 263
282Index
kokuritsu kaidan (national ordination 241, 242, 251–254; Liberal Democratic

platform), 57, 59–63, 72, 77–78, 218, 236 Party, 166, 216, 224, 226, 227, 229, 232,
Kōmei (party), 106n23, 166, 167, 226, 232 234, 241; proportional representation,
Kōmei (publication), 66 141, 154, 157; various members of, 36,
Kōmei Seiji Renmei (Kōseiren; Clean 245
Government Political Assembly), 64,
66, 67, 68, 70 Makiguchi Tsunesaburō (1871–1944), 53,
Kōmei shimbun, 66n34, 107n25, 145, 147, 55, 56, 60, 62, 66
149, 168, 228, 261 Management and Coordination Agency
Kōmeikai (Clean Government Associa- (Sōmuchō), 243, 246, 249n11
tion), 66 manifesto, 241, 249–252, 260, 261–262; by
Kōno Yōhei, 221 Liberal Democratic Party, 255
Korea, 89–90 Married Women’s Division (Fujinbu;
kōsen rufu, 57–63, 66, 73 of Sōka Gakkai), 9, 69–70, 129, 130,
Koshi’ishi Azuma, 37 187–209, 258
Kusakawa Shōzō, 145, 155 mass party, 89, 141–142, 144, 147, 156, 158,
Kusunoki Masatoshi, 218–219 269–271, 273
Matsunaga Hikaru, 62, 224
labor union, 31, 32, 45, 46, 84, 86, 116n2, Matsuoka Toshikatsu, 175
156, 180, 188, 270 measures against low fertility (shōshika
Labour Party (UK), 31 taisaku), 255
Law for Government Subsidies of Politi- Men’s Division (of Sōka Gakkai), 193,
cal Parties (Seitō Joseihō), 172 194, 198
Liberal Alliance (Jiyū Rengō), 27–28 Mihara Masahiko, 234
Liberal Party (Jiyūtō; LP), 62, 106, 216, minister of state for special missions
229, 240n1, 241, 242n4, 243, 244, 245, (naikakufu tokumei tantō daijin), 249
254, 255, 257 Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Indus-
local government, 68, 250, 252 try (Keizai Sangyōshō; METI), 200
Lotus Sūtra, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 61, 67n35 Ministry of Education, Culture,
Lower House (House of Representa- Sports, Science, and Technology
tives), 10, 27, 31, 41, 59, 68, 78, 90, 94, (Monbukagakushō; MEXT), 252
106n24, 140, 145–148, 150–153, 163, 164, Ministry of Finance (Zaimushō), 33, 177,
166, 169, 171–173, 175, 184, 218, 220, 183, 255
243n6, 256, 227, 243, 245, 256, 257; 1964 Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare
elections, 68; 1967 elections, 25, 68; (Kōsei Rōdoshō), 246, 252, 255
1969 elections, 74; 1972 elections, 87; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
1976 elections, 94; 1979 elections, 36; Transport, and Tourism (Kokudo
1980 elections, 91; 1984 elections, 116; Kōtsūshō), 246
1990 elections, 29; 1993 elections, 4, Ministry of the Environment
166, 216; 1996 elections, 152, 216; 2000 (Kankyōshō), 246, 252
elections, 29, 152, 234, 241, 249; 2003 Minshatō. See Democratic Socialist
elections, 241, 249; 2005 elections, 241, Party
249; 2009 elections, 30, 37, 120, 241, Minshutō. See Democratic Party of Japan
249, 262; 2012 elections, 30, 234n14; Mixed Member Majoritarian system
electoral reform, 141, 142, 143, 220, (MMM), 141n2, 157
Index 283
Miyamoto Kenji, 75n49, 89 Nichiren Buddhism, 7, 15, 28, 53–55, 57,

mobilization, 5, 13, 26, 32, 69, 84, 87, 94, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 72, 141, 188
113–116, 122, 123–134, 135, 142–143, Nichiren Shōshū (Nichiren True Sect),
145n11, 156, 188, 197, 215, 256, 258, 269 12n13, 15, 52, 53, 55, 57, 60, 65n31, 73,
Money for Everyone (teigaku kyūfukin), 88, 96, 181, 182, 217, 218
242, 253, 256–258 Nihon Izokukai (Society of Bereaved
money politics (kinken seiji), 171–176, 251 Families), 250
Mori Yoshiro, 243, 244, 246, 254 Nikaidō Susumu, 95–96
Multi-Member District (MMD), 141n2, Nikkyōso (Japan Teachers’ Union), 37
146, 148, 150, 151, 157, 227, 231 Nishida Makoto, 114, 117–119, 126, 127,
Murai Kunihiko, 233 128n13, 131
Murayama Tomiichi, 221–222 Nishida Tenkō, 28
Muslim. See Islam Nishimura Eiichi, 85–86
Mutō Kabun, 234 Nishiyama Eiichi, 27
Mutō Tomio, 28 Nōkyō (Japan Agriculture Cooperatives),
119, 225
naibu kakunin (internal mobilization; Nonaka Hiromu, 229, 233, 235
internal confirmation), 130, 197 nonelectoral political parties, 27
naikaku kaizō (reorganized cabinet), 242,
243, 246 Obuchi Keizō, 221, 229, 246, 255
Nakaima Hirokazu, 30 ōbutsu myōgō (harmonious fusion of
Nakasone Yasuhiro, 95–96 government and politics), 8n5, 59, 60,
National Defense Agency (Bōeichō), 243 67, 72, 73, 77
national railway workers union Ochi Michio, 234
(Kokurō), 116n2 Ōe Yasuhiro, 30, 39n10
Netto, 190, 208 office allocation, 16, 242–249, 252–253,
New Conservative Party (Hoshu [shin] 258
tō; NCP), 240n1, 242n4, 245 Ōhira Masayoshi, 89, 91–92
New Frontier Party (Shinshintō; NFP), 4, Ōkawa Ryūhō, 29, 30, 52
10, 36, 106, 146, 149, 150, 152–153, 167, Okutani Tōru, 233
173, 174, 222–226, 228, 230, 231, 232; open recruitment (kōbo), 143
formation and dissolution of, 10, 36, ordination platform. See honmon no
106, 152, 166, 216, 222, 223, 226 kaidan; kokuritsu kaidan
New Harbinger Party (Shintō Sakigake), organized vote (soshikihyō), 26, 31–32, 37,
221, 222, 226 43, 45, 135, 223, 224, 227
New Party Freedom and Hope (Shintō Osaka Incident, 62, 64–66
Jiyū to Kobō), 28–29, 234 Ōta Akihiro, 257, 260
New People’s Party (Kokumin Shintō), Ōuchi Keigo, 36, 223
233, 234n14 Ozawa Ichirō, 10, 36, 106n23, 120, 222,
New Religions, 5, 9, 11, 32, 46, 52n1, 55, 229, 251
70n41, 163, 176–177, 178, 180, 193, 194,
204, 215 pariah party, 16, 235
Nichiren (1222–1282), 20, 51, 53–54, 55, Peace Keeping Operation (PKO), 101, 158,
56n8, 57, 58, 59n14, 60, 61, 64, 66, 67, 240, 259
179, 181n13, 207 PL Kyōdan, 36, 39
284Index
political associations (seiji dantai), 116, Seichō no Ie, 33, 39, 44

117, 170, 172, 175 Seikyō bunri (separation of state [seifu]
Political Funds Control Law (Seiji Shikin and church [kyōkai, i.e., religious
Kiseihō), 165, 175, 176n8 organizations]), 12n14, 76, 217, 224,
politics for the livelihood of the people 229, 232
(seikatsusha no seiji), 250 Seikyō Shimbun, 56, 59, 62, 64n29, 65n30,
priming, 116, 119–121, 129 120, 179, 222, 228, 233, 261; and
Proportional Representation (PR), 33, 34, Sōka Gakkai membership, 134; and
37, 38, 94–95, 106, 122n9, 123, 126, 134, political candidates, 145, 147, 149; and
141, 143, 145–146, 148–153, 154–157, revenue, 181, 182; and women, 194,
201n14, 224, 229, 230, 232–234 196n8
Protestant, 25, 270 Self-Defense Forces (Jieitai; SDF), 11, 84,
Public Offices Election Law, 33, 63, 65, 86, 89, 91, 92, 100–101, 240, 260, 271
123, 133, 139, 174 senior vice minister (seimujikan, fukudai-
jin), 243–244, 246, 247, 249
Reform Club (Kaikaku Kurabu), 30 Shigatsukai (April Society), 9n6, 215, 216,
Reiyūkai, 55, 193, 221, 230 220–222, 230, 232, 235
religious corporation (shūkyō hōjin), 26, Shimada Hiromi, 7n4, 9–10, 164, 178,
180, 183–184, 223 180–182
Religious Corporations Law (Shūkyō Shin Shūkyō Renmei, 215. See also
Hōjinhō), 26, 176–177, 180, 183–184, 224 Shinshūren
Renewal Party (Shinseitō), 36, 106, 222 Shingonshū, 221
Risshō Kōseikai (RKK), 39–41, 43–44, 55, Shinnyo-en, 194
193, 215, 217–219, 221, 230, 236, 273; Shinritō (Truth Party), 29
endorsing candidates from other Shinsei Bukkyō Kyōdan, 230
parties, 29, 36, 43, 223, 224, 230–231, Shinseiren. See Shintō Seiji Renmei
234; sponsoring candidates from Shinshūren, 32, 34, 215, 218–219, 221, 222,
other parties, 34 224, 230
Shintō Seiji Renmei, 39, 44, 113, 221
Saitō Tetsuo, 246 Shirakawa Katsuhiko, 28–29, 224, 229,
Sakaguchi Chikara, 246 233, 234–235
Sasaki Ryōsaku, 90 Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV),
scandal, x, 5, 84, 85, 86n3, 87, 105, 165; 141n2, 151, 157
bribery, 91, 145n12; house-to-house Single-Member Districts (SMD), 31, 36,
campaigning, 63; Ikeda Katsuya, 106, 123, 141, 143, 146, 148–154, 157, 174,
251n13; Liberal Democratic Party, 227, 229, 231–234, 241, 253, 262
163, 175, 251, 253; Matsuoka, 175; Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises
published critiques of Sōka Gakkai (SME), 250
or Ikeda Daisaku, 3, 6, 8, 72, 75–77; small business, 118, 133, 189, 200, 201, 207
Hashimoto Ryūtarō, 251; Yamazaki small shop owners, 250
Taku, 234; Tanaka Kakuei, 36, 76n50 Social Democratic Party (Shakai
Science of Happiness. See Kōfuku no Minshutō; Shamintō), 202, 226
Kagaku social justice (shakai seigi), 201, 250
Security Treaty (U.S.–Japan), 74, 86, 89, social stratification (kakusa shakai), 250
91, 92, 100 Society for Protecting the Separation of
Index 285
Religion and Politics (Seikyō Bunri o Ueda Isamu, 245, 261n23

Tsuranaku Kai; SBTK), 232 Ueda Tetsu, 36
Society To Develop True Constitutional- Ulster Union, 270
ism (Rikken Yōseikai), 28 Unification Church, 44
Soka Gakkai International (SGI), 52, United Nations, 101
65n31 unity of religion and politics (seikyō
Sōka Gakkai o kiru (I Denounce Sōka Gak- itchi), 222
kai). See Fujiwara Hirotatsu Upper House (House of Councilors),
Sōka University, 12, 69, 145–147 10, 32, 35, 78, 94–95, 106n23n24, 140,
Soviet Union, 88 141n2, 143, 147, 151, 153, 154, 166–167,
State Shinto, ix, 38, 55, 177 169, 175–176, 218, 220, 222, 227, 243n6,
Suzuki Hiroshi, 8, 68–70, 189, 202, 203, 252; 1947 elections, 28; 1956 elections,
207, 240n2 61, 63, 72; 1959 elections, 72; 1962
Suzuki Muneo, 235 elections, 66, 70n41, 72; 1964 elec-
Suzuki Zenkō, 95–96 tions, 68; 1965 elections, 72, 215, 218;
1968 elections, 72; 1971 elections, 86;
Taisekiji (temple), 60, 178 1972, 1974, and 1975 elections, 152;
Taiwan, ix, 87 1977 elections, 35; 1980 elections, 91;
Takagi Yōsuke, 199n12 1983 elections, 34n7; 1995 elections,
Takeiri Yoshikatsu, 6, 7, 76, 85, 86–87, 223, 224; 2001 elections, 29, 175; 2007
89–92, 95–96, 107, 189, elections, 120, 230; 2010 elections, 15,
Takemura Masayoshi, 221 30, 37, 114, 134, 200; 2013 elections, 30;
Takenaka Heizō, 122 Democratic Party of Japan, 37, 120,
Takeya Toshiko, 114, 116–119, 125–128 230; endorsing candidates from other
Tamaki Kazuo, 39 parties, 35, 37; Liberal Democratic
Tanaka Chigaku, 28, 59–60 Party, 31, 33, 34, 35, 37, 101, 120, 175,
Tanaka Kakuei, 36, 76, 86, 96 216, 224, 226, 234; and media, 32, 120,
Tanaka Keishū, 232 134; national tier, 28, 141n2, 145, 152,
tax, 119, 128n13, 177, 180, 181, 183, 190, 154–157; sponsoring candidates from
200, 204, 250, 255, 256, 257, 258 other parties, 32–35; upper tier of, 26,
Tazawa Tomoharu, 224 27, 28, 32, 34, 35; various members of,
teigaku kyūfukin. See Money for Everyone 11, 28, 39, 64, 86, 91, 134, 145, 175, 224,
Tenrikyō, 32, 113, 194, 221 234n14, 245
Territorial Defense Guards (Kokudo
Keibitai), 86 Vice Minister (seimujikan), 243–244, 248,
terrorism, 4, 5, 29, 44, 216, 224, 240, 251 249
third (political) force, 262
Toda Jōsei (1900–1958), 6n3, 15, 53, 55, 56, Wahōtai no kai, 27
57, 58–62, 65, 66, 68, 72, 73, 180 wiretap. See scandal
Tokyo prefectural assembly, 30, 117, 226, Women’s Division (of Sōka Gakkai). See
256 Married Women’s Division; Young
Tokyo Trials (1946–1948), 38 Women’s Division
Tōyama Kiyohiko, 154 Women’s Party (Joseitō), 27, 45
tsuika kōnin (ex-post nomination), 152 World Spirit Cleansing Society (Seika
Tsuzuki Kunihiro, 145n10, 246 Jōreikai), 28, 45
286Index
Yamaguchi Natsuo, 257 Young Women’s Division (of Sōka Gak-

Yamazaki Masatomo, 6–7, 97 kai), 56, 69, 70, 75, 129, 194
Yamazaki Taku, 234 Youth Division (of Sōka Gakkai), 64, 73,
Yano Jun’ya, 6, 7, 85, 87, 88–89, 90, 95–96, 97, 193, 300, 194
107
Yasukuni (Shrine), ix, 4–5, 38–39, 40, zadankai (discussion sessions), 56, 78, 119
41–43, 95, 184 Zennihon Bukkyōkai (Japan Buddhist
Yosano Kaoru, 228 Federation), 221
Young Men’s Division (Seinen Danshibu; Zhou Enlai, 87
of Sōka Gakkai), 56, 64, 69, 75, 129, 132,
197, 271
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY KOREA RESEARCH MONOGRAPHS (KRM)
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Japanese Research Monograph 18

ISBN-13: 978-1-55729-162-2 (electronic)

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Komeito : politics and religion in Japan / George Ehrhardt, Axel Klein,

Copyright © 2014 by the Regents of the University of California.

Cover design: Axel Klein and Mindy Chen.

List of Abbreviations vii

1. Kōmeitō: The Most Understudied Party of Japanese Politics 3

Part II: The Context

2. Religious Groups in Japanese Electoral Politics 25

Part III: The History

3. Electioneering as Religious Practice:

Part IV: The Structure

5. How Kōmeitō Politicians Get Elected 113

Part V: The Way to Power

9. Anti-Kōmeitō Countermobilizations 215

Part VI: Conclusion

11. Kōmeitō: Politics and Religion in Japan 269

List of Contributors 277

DPJ Democratic Party of Japan

Anyone who studies politics in contemporary Japan will eventually come

DIJ) in Tokyo in 2008, where we discovered that we were all indepen-

composing their individual chapters. This cooperation may be one rea-

George Ehrhardt, Axel Klein, Levi McLaughlin,

Why This Book?

organizational base, which allowed it to retain an influential presence in

What Has Been Written Thus Far about Kōmeitō?

on new religious movements (for example, title stories were published

Gakkai members, published by Takarajima, includes a few short sections

However, Shimada’s tendency to omit documentation undermines the

on Japanese politics by Muramatsu, Itō, and Tsujinaka fails to refer to the

of a specific Sōka Gakkai demographic, it does not cover those aspects of

Organization of This Book

Chapters 3 and 4 turn to the history of Kōmeitō, from its founding up to

through personal interviews with Kōmeitō politicians, Smith evaluates

———. 2000. Ending the LDP-Hegemony: Party Cooperation in Japan.

Ichikawa Yūichi. 2014. “Kīman ga mita ‘renritsu no kyokui’” [The

———. 2001. “The Changing Role of the Kōmeitō in Japanese Politics.”

———. 2001b. Sōka Gakkai/Kōmeitō no hanzai hakusho [White paper on

Religious Groups in Japanese

Axel Klein and Steven R. Reed

or the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP; Minshū Shakaitō). At least since

Religious Political Parties

largest number of ephemeral parties. In this tier, the electoral threshold

losing his seat in Niigata in the 2000 general election. As an anti-Kōmeitō

Supporting Candidates Running for Other Political Parties

Sponsoring Candidates from Other Parties

Society (Ryokufūkai). About half of their candidates were elected, but

Figure 2.1 Candidates elected to the Upper House by religious group

sponsored by other religious groups hovered around 75%. Kōmeitō elects

these, fourteen were supported by religious groups, eleven of whom won

Which Candidates and Parties Do Religious Groups Support?

opposed to the formation of a religious party. The “religion and politics”

Table 2.1 Do religious groups support the same candidates?

Jōdo Shinshū 0.23 0.56

RKK −0.24 −0.65

items connected in some fashion with Ikeda Daisaku’s person—appear