ROGELIO
DANTIS, Petitioner, v. JULIO
MAGHINANG, JR., Respondent.
Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of
title and recovery of possession against
Julio Maghinang alleging that he was the
registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-125918, with an area of
5,657 square meters, located in Sta. Rita,
San Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired
ownership of the property through a deed
of extrajudicial partition of the estate of
his deceased father, Emilio Dantis
(Emilio), dated December 22, 1993; that
he had been paying the realty taxes on
the said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied
and built a house on a portion of his
property without any right at all; that
demands were made upon Julio, Jr. that
he vacate the premises but the same fell
on deaf ears; and that the acts of Julio, Jr.
had created a cloud of doubt over his title
and right of possession of his property.
Therefore, he prayed that judgment be
rendered declaring him to be the true and
real owner of the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. T-125918; ordering Julio, Jr.
to deliver the possession of that portion
of the land he was occupying; and
directing Julio, Jr. to pay rentals from
October 2000 and attorney’s fees of
P100,000.00.
He added that he was constrained to
institute an ejectment suit against Julio,
Jr. before the Municipal Trial Court of
San Miguel, Bulacan (MTC), but the
complaint was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
In his Answer,5 Julio, Jr. denied the
material allegations of the complaint. By
way of an affirmative defense, he
claimed that he was the actual owner of
the 352 square meters (subject lot) of the
land covered by TCT No. T-125918
where he was living; that he had been in
open and continuous possession of the
property for almost thirty (30) years; the
subject lot was once tenanted by his
ancestral relatives until it was sold by
Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to his father,
Julio Maghinang, Sr. (Julio, Sr.); that
later, he succeeded to the ownership of
the subject lot after his father died on
March 10, 1968; and that he was entitled
to a separate registration of the subject
lot on the basis of the documentary
evidence of sale and his open and
uninterrupted possession of the property.
As synthesized by the RTC from the
respective testimonies of the principal
witnesses, their diametrically opposed
positions are as follows:
Plaintiff Rogelio Dantis testified that he
inherited 5,657 square meters of land,
identified as Lot 6-D-1 of subdivision
plan Psd-031421-054315, located at Sta.
Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, through an
Extrajudicial Partition of Estate of
Emilio Dantis, executed in December
1993 which land was titled later on under
his name, Rogelio Dantis, married to
Victoria Payawal, as shown by copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
125918, issued by the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan on September 29, 1998,
declared for taxation purposes as Tax
Declaration with ARP No. C20-22-043-
07-046. According to him, defendant and
his predecessor-in-interest built the
house located on said lot. When he first
saw it, it was only a small hut but when
he was about 60 years old, he told
defendant not to build a bigger house
thereon because he would need the land
and defendant would have to vacate the
land. Plaintiff, however, has not been in
physical possession of the premises.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr.,
presented by plaintiff as adverse witness,
testified that he has no title over the
property he is occupying. He has not
paid realty taxes thereon. He has not paid
any rental to anybody. He is occupying
about 352 square meters of the lot. He
presented an affidavit executed on
September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis,
grandfather of Rogelio Dantis and the
father of Emilio Dantis. The latter was,
in turn, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The
affidavit, according to affiant Ignacio
Dantis, alleged that Emilio Dantis agreed
to sell 352 square meters of the lot to
Julio Maghinang on installment.
Defendant was then 11 years old in 1952.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. likewise
testified that for the defendant’s case as
follows: He owns that house located at
Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, on a 352
square meter lot. He could not say that he
is the owner because there is still
question about the lot. He claimed that
his father, Julio Maghinang (Sr.), bought
the said lot from the parents of Rogelio
Dantis. He admitted that the affidavit
was not signed by the alleged vendor,
Emilio Dantis, the father of Rogelio
Dantis. The receipt he presented was
admittedly a mere photocopy. He spent
P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Since 1953, he has not declared the
property as his nor paid the taxes thereon
because there is a problem.6
RTC: declaring Rogelio as the true
owner of the entire 5,657-square meter
lot located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel,
Bulacan, as evidenced by his TCT over
the same. The RTC did not lend any
probative value on the documentary
evidence of sale adduced by Julio, Jr.
consisting of: 1) an affidavit allegedly
executed by Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio),
Rogelio’s grandfather, whereby said
affiant attested, among others, to the sale
of the subject lot made by his son,
Emilio, to Julio, Sr. (Exhibit “3”)7; and
2) an undated handwritten receipt of
initial downpayment in the amount of
P100.00 supposedly issued by Emilio to
Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale of
the subject lot (Exhibit “4”).8  The RTC
ruled that even if these documents were
adjudged as competent evidence, still,
they would only serve as proofs that the
purchase price for the subject lot had not
yet been completely paid and, hence,
Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver
the property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found
Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by
tolerance.
On January 25, 2010, the CA rendered
the assailed decision in CA-G.R. CV
NO. 85258, finding the appeal to be
impressed with merit.  It held that
Exhibit “4” was an indubitable proof of
the sale of the 352-square meter lot
between Emilio and Julio, Sr. It also
ruled that the partial payment of the
purchase price, coupled with the delivery
of the res, gave efficacy to the oral sale
and brought it outside the operation of
the statute of frauds. Finally, the court a
quo declared that Julio, Jr. and his
predecessors-in-interest had an equitable
claim over the subject lot which imposed
on Rogelio and his predecessors-in-
interest a personal duty to convey what
had been sold after full payment of the
selling price.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS
A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF
SALE BETWEEN EMILIO AND
JULIO SR.
RULING:
NO.
After carefully sifting through the
evidence on record, the Court finds that
Rogelio was able to establish a prima
facie case in his favor tending to show
his exclusive ownership of the parcel of
land under TCT No. T-125918 with an
area of 5,657 square meters, which
included the 352-square meter subject
lot. From the records, it appears that TCT
No. T-125918 is a derivative of TCT No.
T-256228, which covered a bigger area
of land measuring 30,000 square meters
registered in the name of Emilio Dantis;
that Emilio died intestate on November
13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs,
including Rogelio, executed an extra-
judicial partition of estate on December
22, 1993 and divided among themselves
specific portions of the property covered
by TCT No. T-256228, which were
already set apart by metes and bounds;
that the land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the
subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315
with an area of 5,657 sq. m. went to
Rogelio, the property now covered by
TCT No. T-125918; and that the property
was declared for realty tax purpose in the
name of Rogelio for which a tax
declaration was issued in his name; and
that the same had not been transferred to
anyone else since its issuance.
In light of Rogelio’s outright denial of
the oral sale together with his insistence
of ownership over the subject lot, it
behooved upon Julio, Jr. to contravene
the former’s claim and convince the
court that he had a valid defense. The
burden of evidence shifted to Julio, Jr. to
prove that his father bought the subject
lot from Emilio Dantis. In Jison v. Court
of Appeals,18 the Court held:
Simply put, he who alleges the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil
case, the burden of proof never parts.
However, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case in his favor, the duty or the
burden of evidence shifts to defendant to
controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in
favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil
cases, the party having the burden of
proof must produce a preponderance of
evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s.
The concept of “preponderance of
evidence” refers to evidence which is of
greater weight, or more convincing, that
which is offered in opposition to it; at
bottom, it means probability of truth.19
Julio, Jr. failed to discharge this burden.
His pieces of evidence, Exhibit “3” and
Exhibit “4,” cannot prevail over the array
of documentary and testimonial evidence
that were adduced by Rogelio. The
totality of Julio, Jr.’s evidence leaves
much to be desired.
To begin with, Exhibit “3,” the affidavit
of  Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and,
thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary
weight. 
Evidence is hearsay when its probative
force depends on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to be
produced. The exclusion of hearsay
evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1)
absence of cross-examination; 2) absence
of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of
oath.20cralawvllred
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is
merely hearsay evidence where its
affiant/maker did not take the witness
stand.21 The sworn statement of Ignacio
is of this kind. The affidavit was not
identified and its averments were not
affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly,
Exhibit “3” must be excluded from the
judicial proceedings being an
inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot
be deemed a declaration against interest
for the matter to be considered as an
exception to the hearsay rule because the
declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but
his father (Ignacio).
Exhibit “4,” on the other hand, is
considered secondary evidence being a
mere photocopy which, in this case,
cannot be admitted to prove the contents
of the purported undated handwritten
receipt. The best evidence rule requires
that the highest available degree of proof
must be produced. For documentary
evidence, the contents of a document are
best proved by the production of the
document itself to the exclusion of
secondary or substitutionary evidence,
pursuant to Rule 130, Section 322.
A secondary evidence is admissible only
upon compliance with Rule 130, Section
5, which states that: when the original
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or
by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.
Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary
evidence is burdened to satisfactorily
prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1)
the execution or existence of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the
original or its non-production in court;
and (3) the unavailability of the original
is not due to bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror. Proof of the due
execution of the document and its
subsequent loss would constitute the
basis for the introduction of secondary
evidence.23 In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong
24
Corporation,  it was held that where the
missing document is the foundation of
the action, more strictness in proof is
required than where the document is only
collaterally involved.
In the case at bar, Julio, Jr. failed to
prove the due execution of the original of
Exhibit “4” as well as its subsequent
loss. A nexus of logically related
circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.’s
evidence highly suspect. Also, his
testimony was riddled with
improbabilities and contradictions which
tend to erode his credibility and raise
doubt on the veracity of his evidence.
First, the claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio
affixed his signature on the original of
Exhibit “4” in 1953 is highly improbable
because record shows that Emilio died
even before that year, specifically, on
November 13, 1952.
Second, Julio, Jr.’s testimony pertinent to
the alleged loss of the original of Exhibit
“4” is laden with inconsistencies that
detract from his credibility. His
testimony bears the earmarks of
falsehood and, hence, not reliable. Julio,
Jr. testified in this wise:
Atty. Roldan Villacorta
(On Direct examination)
Q:  Mr. Witness, I noticed that this
document marked as Exhibit “4” is only
a photocopy, where is the original of this
document?
A:  The original was with the
safekeeping of my parents because of
the lapse of time the original was
misplaced, Sir.26
The above testimony of Julio, Jr. tends to
give the impression that the original of
the document was lost while it was in the
possession of his parents. During cross-
examination, however, he testified that it
was lost while it was in his possession.
Atty. Vicente Millora
(On Cross-examination)
Q:  x x x Where did you keep that
document?
A:  I was the one keeping that
document because I live in different
places, [the said] it was lost or
misplaced, Sir.
Q:  In other words, it was lost while the
same was in your possession??
A:  Yes, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Still, later, Julio, Jr. claimed that his
sister was the one responsible for the loss
of the original of Exhibit “4” after
borrowing the same from him.
Third, it is quite strange that two receipts
were prepared for the initial payment of
P100.00 in connection with the sale of
the subject lot. The Court notes that the
contents of Exhibit “4” were similar to
those of Annex “A”31 of Julio, Jr.’s
Answer, dated June 9, 2002.  Annex “A,”
however, was typewritten and the name
of the recipient indicated therein was a
certain Cornelio A. Dantis, whose
identity and participation in the alleged
sale was never explained.
Fourth, apart from the lone testimony of
Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew or
read Exhibit “4,” much less saw it
executed, was presented.
In the absence of any shred of
corroborative evidence, the Court cannot
help but entertain doubts on the
truthfulness of Julio, Jr.’s naked
assertion.
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that
Exhibit “4” is admissible in evidence,
there will still be no valid and perfected
oral contract for failure of Julio, Jr. to
prove the concurrence of the essential
requisites of a contract of sale by
adequate and competent evidence.
By the contract of sale, one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of, and to deliver,
a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent.32 A contract of sale is a
consensual contract and, thus, is
perfected by mere consent which is
manifested by the meeting of the offer
and the acceptance upon the thing and
the cause which are to constitute the
contract.33 Until the contract of sale is
perfected, it cannot, as an independent
source of obligation, serve as a binding
juridical relation between the
34
parties.  The essential elements of a
contract of sale are: a) consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, consent to
transfer ownership in exchange for the
price; b) determinate subject matter; and
c) price certain in money or its
equivalent.35 
The absence of any of the essential
elements shall negate the existence of a
perfected contract of sale.36cralawvllred
Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the
sale by a receipt when it should be the
receipt that should further corroborate
the existence of the sale. At best, his
testimony only alleges but does not
prove the existence of the verbal
agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably failed to
establish by preponderance of evidence
that there was a meeting of the minds of
the parties as to the subject matter and
the purchase price.
The chief evidence of Julio, Jr. to
substantiate the existence of the oral
contract of sale is Exhibit “4.”  For a
better understanding and resolution of
the issue at hand, Exhibit “4” is being
reproduced here:
A perusal of the above document would
readily show that it does not specify a
determinate subject matter. Nowhere
does it provide a description of the
property subject of the sale, including its
metes and bounds, as well as its total
area. The Court notes that while Julio, Jr.
testified that the land subject of the sale
consisted of 352 square meters, Exhibit
“4,” however, states that it’s more than
400 square meters. Moreover, Exhibit
“4” does not categorically declare the
price certain in money. Neither does it
state the mode of payment of the
purchase price and the period for its
payment.
THEREFORE, THERE IS NO
PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE
BETWEEN EMILIO AND JULIO.
In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of
Appeals,37 the Court ruled that the
manner of payment of the purchase price
was an essential element before a valid
and binding contract of sale could exist.
Albeit the Civil Code does not explicitly
provide that the minds of the contracting
parties must also meet on the terms or
manner of payment of the price, the same
is needed, otherwise, there is no
sale.38 An agreement anent the manner of
payment goes into the price so much so
that a disagreement on the manner of
payment is tantamount to a failure to
agree on the price.39 Further, in Velasco
v. Court of Appeals,40 where the parties
already agreed on the object of sale and
on the purchase price, but not on how
and when the downpayment and the
installment payments were to be paid,
this Court
ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Such being the situation, it cannot,
therefore, be said that a definite and firm
sales agreement between the parties had
been perfected over the lot in question.
Indeed, this Court has already ruled
before that a definite agreement on the
manner of payment of the purchase price
is an essential element in the formation
of a binding and enforceable contract of
sale. The fact, therefore, that the
petitioners delivered to the respondent
the sum of P10,000.00 as part of the
down-payment that they had to pay
cannot be considered as sufficient proof
of the perfection of any purchase and
sale agreement between the parties
herein under Art. 1482 of the new Civil
Code, as the petitioners themselves admit
that some essential matter – the terms of
payment – still had to be mutually
covenanted.41
The CA held that partial performance of
the contract of sale – giving of a
downpayment coupled with the delivery
of the res - took the oral contract out of
the scope of the Statute of Frauds. This
conclusion arose from its erroneous
finding that there was a perfected
contract of sale. The above disquisition,
however, shows that there was none.
There is, therefore, no basis for the
application of the Statute of Frauds. The
application of the Statute of Frauds
presupposes the existence of a perfected
contract.42 As to the delivery of the res, it
does not appear to be a voluntary one
pursuant to the purported sale.  If Julio,
Jr. happened to be there, it was because
his ancestors tenanted the land.  It must
be noted that when Julio, Jr. built his
house, Rogelio protested.

FELINO EBREO, SPOUSES
ANTONIO and EVELYN P.
BERAÑA, IGNACIO EBREO and
ELEUTERIA CUETO, Petitioners,
vs.
GIL EBREO, represented by His
Attorney-in-Fact, FELIXBERTO
EBREO, FLAVIANO EBREO and
HOMOBONO CUETO, Respondents.
Does an annotation in a tax declaration
of an alleged Deed of Sale sufficiently
prove conveyance of title to a property?
This is the issue presented to Us in the
present petition.
A Complaint dated 04 January 1994,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4132 for
Partition, Reconveyance, Accounting and
Damages, was filed by Gil Ebreo,
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact
Felixberto Ebreo, Flaviano Ebreo and
Homobono Cueto against petitioners
Felino Ebreo, Spouses Antonio Ebreo
and Evelyn P. Beraña-Ebreo, Ignacio
Ebreo and Eleuteria Cueto before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas
City, Branch 7.
From plaintiffs’ account in their
complaint, Felipe Ebreo died intestate in
1926 leaving behind as heirs his five
children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio,
and Felipa.1 Subsequently, Felipa died
leaving behind her heirs, Genoveva,
Homobono and Eleuteria all surnamed
Cueto. Genoveva died in 1991 without
any issue. Defendants-spouses Antonio
Ebreo and Evelyn Beraña are the son and
daughter-in-law, respectively, of
defendant Felino, one of the five children
of Felipe Ebreo.
Felipe Ebreo left to his children an
untitled parcel of land situated in
Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, more
particularly described as follows:
Isang palagay na lupang palayanin o
linangin ipinamumuwis sa ilalim ng Tax
Declaration No. 39949 S-1953, na ang
mga karatig sa Ilaya ay Prudencia Coz,
sa Silangan ay Pablo Cantro at Santiago
Banaag, sa ibaba ay Ilat (Creek) at sa
Kanluran ay Marcos at Fortunato Banaag
may luwang na 31,781 metros
kuwadrados humigit kumulang at may
balor amiliorada na halagang ₱950.00,
lalong kilala sa Lote 9046 ng sukat
katastro dito sa Batangas.2
Pursuant to the subdivision made by their
father Felipe, Lot No. 9046 was
subdivided into six lots identified as Lots
A, B, C, D, E and F.3 lawph!l.net
On 11 September 1967, the five heirs of
Felipe Ebreo, through themselves and
their representatives, executed and
signed a document entitled, "Kasulatan
ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa"4 where they
extrajudicially partitioned the above-
described property except the portion
known as Lot No. 9046-F. As agreed
upon by these heirs, Lot No. 9046-F,
with an area of 13,799 square meters,
shall remain under the co-ownership of
Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the
heirs of Felipa Ebreo. However,
plaintiffs were surprised to discover that
Lot 9046-F was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of defendant
Antonio Ebreo. Based on plaintiffs’
recitals, they alleged that they never sold,
ceded, conveyed or transferred their
rights, share and co-ownership over Lot
9046- F.
Answering the complaint, the defendants
countered that after the execution of the
Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, by
and among the heirs of the late Felipe
Ebreo, Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs
to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of this sale,
the corresponding Real Property Tax
Declaration was transferred in the name
of Santiago Puyo as owner. However,
the deed of sale evidencing this
transaction was never presented.
As narrated by the defendants, Tax
Declaration No. 39241,5 beginning in the
year 1969 covering Lot 9046-F was
under the names of the heirs of Felipe
Ebreo. Thereafter, upon the sale of the
lot by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to
Santiago Puyo, Tax Declaration No.
39241 was cancelled and a new one, Tax
Declaration No. 482216 dated 15 January
1973, was issued in the name of Santiago
Puyo.
On this tax declaration, the alleged sale
of Lot 9046-F by the Heirs of Felipe
Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was annotated.
Soon, Tax Declaration No. 48221 was
cancelled by Tax Declaration No.
40427 for the year 1974, still in the name
of Santiago Puyo. Upon the sale by
Santiago Puyo of Lot 9046- F to Antonio
Ebreo on 23 July 1976, Tax Declaration
No. 4042 was cancelled and a new one,
Tax Declaration No. 50669,8 for the year
1977, was issued in the name of Antonio
Ebreo.
This Tax Declaration was later on
revised and cancelled by Tax Declaration
No. 075-534 upon the marriage of
defendant Antonio Ebreo to defendant
Evelyn Beraña.
From 1977 up to 1994, defendants-
spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn
Beraña religiously paid the taxes due on
the land.9
Defendants further alleged that the Deed
of Absolute Sale of Lot No. 9046-F by
the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago
Puyo was executed and ratified sometime
in 1968 before Attorney Doroteo M.
Chavez of Batangas City. From 1968 to
1976, Mr. Santiago Puyo possessed said
lot peacefully, continuously, publicly and
in the concept of owner. As stated
earlier, on 23 July 1976, Lot No. 9046-F
was sold by Santiago Puyo by way of
Absolute Sale, to defendant Antonio
Ebreo. The Deed of Absolute Sale or
"Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa"10 was duly
executed and ratified before one
Attorney Meynardo L. Atienza.
RTC: Ordering the parties-in-interest
(heirs of Felipe Ebreo and/or their
representatives) to partition Lot No.
9046-F among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance under Sec. 2,
Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and in default thereof, the
partition shall be conducted in
accordance with Sec. 3, et. seq., of the
same Rule.
CA: denied the appeal for lack of merit
and affirmed in toto the decision of the
trial court.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT A VALID
TRANSFER OF LOT NO. 9046-F
WAS EFFECTED WHICH
CONVEYED OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY TO SANTIAGO PUGO.
RULING:
NO.
TAX DECLARATION
The mere fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation
purposes in the name of the petitioners
does not necessarily prove ownership.
Neither does the payment of taxes
conclusively prove ownership of the land
paid for.22 It is merely an indicium of a
claim of ownership.
The typewritten entry on Tax Decl. No.
48221 (Exhs. “9” and “9-A”) detailing
the particulars of the alleged deed of sale
in favor of Santiago Puyo is patently
suspicious and a very very poor ersatz
for the primary document. While the sale
allegedly took place in 1967, said deed
was annotated on Exh. “9” which
however only “begins with the year
1973.” Moreover, while the alleged sale
took place in 1967, yet Tax. Decl. No.
32941 (Exh. “10”) that was issued on
Feb. 7, 1968 still carried the names of
Gil, Flaviano, Felino and Ignacio, all
EBREO and Genoveva, Eleuteria and
Homobono, all CUETO and not the
name of Santiago Puyo.\
It is self-evident that the seller cannot
transfer more than what he has or as
oftenly stated hyperbolically, the river
cannot rise above its source.
Tax declaration is not sufficient proof of
the transfer of property and inasmuch as
the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale,
it was incumbent on the petitioners to
adduce in evidence the original or a copy
of the deed consistent with Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the
absence of the said document, the
exhortations of petitioners regarding the Both the testimonies of Asuncion
existence of said deed of sale must fail. Aguado and Antonio Ebreo lacked the
legal underpinning needed to prove the
deed of sale. Their testimonies were not
To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan,
recollection of witnesses who saw the
Felino Ebreo and Asuncion Aguado are
execution and delivery of the document.
at most secondary evidence; hence, they
are inadmissible considering that the
petitioners, as offerors of the Deed of
Sale, thereof failed to prove any of the
exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court a
nd to establish conditions for their
According to Sec. 4, Rule 130, the
admissibility.30 Even if they are
contents of the lost writing may be
admitted, they have no probative value.
proved, inter alia, by the recollection of
witnesses.
Under this rule, it is axiomatic that
before a party is allowed to adduce
As matters stand, however, Aguado’s
secondary evidence to prove the contents
testimony relates not to the execution of
of the original of a deed or document, the
the document but to what her father
party has to prove with the requisite
(Santiago Puyo) did with the property
quantum of evidence, the loss or
after it was already acquired. (t.s.n. pp.
destruction or unavailability of all the
4-7, Direct, May 17, 1995)
copies of the original of the said deed or
document.
Similarly, Antonio Ebreo’s testimony
Indeed, before a party is allowed to
does not refer to the execution and
adduce secondary evidence to prove the
delivery of the deed of sale but of having
contents of the original of the deed, the
allegedly seen said document when he
offeror is mandated to prove the
purchased the lot from Santiago Puyo.
following: “(a) the execution and
He testified that “when I bought it from
existence of the original (b) the loss and
Santiago Puyo, he brought with him the
destruction of the original or its non-
Tax Declaration in the name of Santiago
production in court; and (c)
Puyo as well as the deed of sale between
unavailability of the original is not due to
my father and his brothers and Santiago
bad faith on the part of the offeror.”
Puyo.” (t.s.n. pp. 13-14, Direct, Aug. 16,
1995). In fine, they were not witnesses to
the execution and delivery of the
document of sale to qualify their
testimonies under the phrase
“recollection of witnesses.”
Neither does the testimony of Felino
Ebreo evoke faith and confidence. His
salutary recollection of the missing
document failed to instill credulity. For
one, it was uncorroborated by any of the
parties to the alleged deed of sale.
In fact, such sale was directly
controverted by his supposed co-sellers
and co-owners Giland Flaviano.
Finally, Felino Ebreo’s claim that he
could not produce it because it was
borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto
and never returned to him was squarely
refuted by said Eleuteria Cueto when she
testified in rebuttal for the plaintiffs.
The defendant-appellants rely on the Deed of
Sale supposedly executed by the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo in favor of Santiago Puyo.
However, defendant-appellants failed to
produce the alleged Deed of Sale in violation
of the Best Evidence Rule.
As recounted by defendants, now
petitioners, Antonio and Evelyn Ebreo,
Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo initially to Santiago Puyo
sometime in 1967 or 1968 as evidenced
by a deed of sale executed and ratified
before Atty. Doroteo Chavez in Batangas
City. Santiago Puyo caused the transfer
of the tax declaration in his name and
caused the sale to be annotated therein.
Only this annotation in the tax
declaration was offered as proof of the
sale. Santiago Puyo took possession,
cultivated the land, exercised
uninterrupted ownership and paid real
estate taxes thereon for a period of eight
years.
Petitioners went on further to state that
the Deed of Sale from the heirs of Felipe
Ebreo to Santiago Puyo could not be
presented because the copy on file with
the Office of the City Assessor was lost
in the fire which occurred in 23 May
1979 that gutted the building housing
their office. From then on, petitioners
advance that they have paid the real
estate taxes on the land and were in open,
continous and uninterrupted possession
until the Complaint for Partition,
Reconveyance and Damages was filed by
the Respondents.
On the basis of the above narrations,
petitioners insist that there was a valid
transfer of the lot from the heirs of Felipe
Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, and thereafter
from Santiago Puyo to them. To buttress
this claim of sale by the heirs to Santiago
Puyo, petitioners presented the testimony
of Antonio Pajilan of the City Assessors
Office of Batangas City who testified on
the annotation in Tax Declaration No.
48221.
It is worth noting that Antonio Pajilan,
an employee of the City Assessor’s
Office of Batangas City20 who testified
regarding Tax Declaration No. 48221
dated 15 January 1973 on which was
annotated the alleged sale between the
heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo,
was employed in the said office only in
the year 1978. Thus, he did not make nor
did he witness the causing of the
annotation as he was not yet employed in
the said office at that time. Likewise, he
was neither present when the deed of sale
was executed nor did he personally see
the said deed of sale. For these reasons,
the testimony of Pajilan is inconclusive.
Petitioners next argue that Tax
Declaration No. 48221 in the name of
Santiago Puyo enjoys the presumption of
regularity in its issuance. It is a good
time as any to re-state that this rule is a
mere presumption, not absolute nor
inflexible and applies only in the absence
of proof to the contrary.21 Besides, the
mere fact that the disputed property may
have been declared for taxation purposes
in the name of the petitioners does not
necessarily prove ownership. In the same
manner, neither does the payment of
taxes conclusively prove ownership of
the land paid for.22 It is merely an
indicium of a claim of ownership.23
Petitioners also presented the testimony
of Felino Ebreo, father of petitioner
Antonio Ebreo, who testified that the
heirs of Felipe Ebreo sold Lot 9046 –F to
Santiago Puyo.24 When queried on the
whereabouts of the document of sale,
Felino alleged that it was borrowed by
his niece Eleuteria Cueto who is the
daughter of one of the heirs, Felipa
Ebreo.25 According to Felino, Eleuteria
refused to return the document and even
got angry when he tried to demand its
return.26 From Felino’s account,27 there
are three copies of the missing deed of
sale. Lamentably, petitioners failed to
present any one of them.
Finally, petitioners presented Asuncion
Aguado, step-daughter of Santiago Puyo,
who testified that her stepfather Santiago
Puyo bought the subject lot from the
Ebreo heirs.28 Similar to Pajilan’s
testimony, Aguado’s testimony cannot be
given much weight in view of the fact
that save for her bare allegations that Lot
9046-F was purchased by her stepfather
Santiago Puyo, she was not likewise
present when the deed was executed. In
her testimony she merely stated that her
stepfather paid taxes for his real estate
properties but could not state with
specificity if the payment was made for
Lot 9056-F.29
To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan,
Felino Ebreo and Asuncion Aguado are
at most secondary evidence; hence, they
are inadmissible considering that the
petitioners, as offerors of the Deed of
Sale, thereof failed to prove any of the
exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court and to
establish conditions for their
30
admissibility.  Even if they are admitted,
they have no probative value.31 This rule
provides:
SEC. 3. Original document must be
produced; exceptions. – When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original
document itself except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the
custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of
numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be
examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to
be established from them is only
the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public
record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public
office.
Under this rule, it is axiomatic that
before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents
of the original of a deed or document, the
party has to prove with the requisite
quantum of evidence, the loss or
destruction or unavailability of all the
copies of the original of the said deed or
document. As former Supreme Court
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran declared:
"Where there are two or more originals,
it must appear that all of them have been
lost, destroyed or cannot be produced
before secondary evidence can be given
of any one. For example, a lease was
executed in duplicate, one being retained
by the lessor and the other by the lessee.
Either copy was, therefore, an original,
and could have been introduced as
evidence of the contract without the
production of the other. One of these
originals could not be found. The non-
production of the other was not
accounted for it was held that "under
these circumstances, the rule is that no
secondary evidence of the contents of
either is admissible until it is shown that
originals must be accounted for before
secondary evidence can be given of any
one."
Indeed, before a party is allowed to
adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original of the deed, the
offeror is mandated to prove the
following:
"(a) the execution and existence of the
original (b) the loss and destruction of
the original or its non-production in
court; and (c) unavailability of the
original is not due to bad faith on the part
of the offeror."32
On this score, the factual findings of the
trial court are worth repeating. It held:
The pivotal document of sale allegedly
executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in
favor of Santiago Puyo and chiefly relied
upon by defendant Antonio Ebreo as the
derivative basis of his ownership is sadly
missing and remains a phantom in the
dark. The testimonies of Felino Ebreo,
Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo to
prove by way of recollection of
witnesses that Lot 9046-F was sold to
Santiago Puyo sometime in 1967 for
₱2,500.00 by virtue of a deed notarized
before deceased Atty. Doroteo Chavez
merits scant consideration. They were
the verbal say-so of interested parties and
attributed acts to a party whose lips had
been sealed by death. Quite evidently,
their testimony should be taken cum
grano salis – with a grain of salt.
Both the testimonies of Asuncion
Aguado and Antonio Ebreo lacked the
legal underpinning needed to prove the
deed of sale. Their testimonies were not
recollection of witnesses who saw the
execution and delivery of the document.
According to Sec. 4, Rule 130, the
contents of the lost writing may be
proved, inter alia, by the recollection of
witnesses. As matters stand, however,
Aguado’s testimony relates not to the
execution of the document but to what
her father (Santiago Puyo) did with the
property after it was already acquired.
(t.s.n. pp. 4-7, Direct, May 17, 1995)
Similarly, Antonio Ebreo’s testimony
does not refer to the execution and
delivery of the deed of sale but of having
allegedly seen said document when he
purchased the lot from Santiago Puyo.
He testified that "when I bought it from
Santiago Puyo, he brought with him the
Tax Declaration in the name of Santiago
Puyo as well as the deed of sale between
my father and his brothers and Santiago
Puyo." (t.s.n. pp. 13-14, Direct, Aug. 16,
1995). In fine, they were not witnesses to
the execution and delivery of the
document of sale to qualify their
testimonies under the phrase
"recollection of witnesses."
Neither does the testimony of Felino
Ebreo evoke faith and confidence. His
salutary recollection of the missing
document failed to instill credulity. For
one, it was uncorroborated by any of the
parties to the alleged deed of sale. In
fact, such sale was directly controverted
by his supposed co-sellers and co-owners
Gil and Flaviano. (t.s.n. pp. 7-8, Direct,
July 18, 1994; t.s.n. pp. 22-23, Cross,
Sept. 29, 1994) Then too, it appears
rather unusual for the heirs to retain Lot
9046-F in co-ownership in their partition
agreement of 1967 and sell the said Lot
that very same year (1967) if not on the
same occasion. Felino Ebreo did not give
the exact date of the supposed sale to
Santiago Puyo except to say that it was
sold in 1967. The Court got the
impression, though, that it was on the
same occasion as the partition
agreement. (t.s.n. pp. 6-7, 14-16, Direct,
Feb. 28, 1995) More important, his
humanistic bias to favor his son Antonio
Ebreo and his natural interest to defend
his actuations leading to the issuance of
the Tax Decl. 50669 (Exh. "2") which he
signed caution us to accept his testimony
with great care. He does not have the
cold neutrality of a disinterested party.
He was covetous of gain. The Tax Decl.
No. 50669 that transferred in 1976 the
property in the name of Antonio Ebreo
was signed by Felino Ebreo himself
(Exh. "2"). This illustrated a dialectical
connection between him and his favored
son Antonio Ebreo. Finally, Felino
Ebreo’s claim that he could not produce
it because it was borrowed by his niece
Eleuteria Cueto and never returned to
him was squarely refuted by said
Eleuteria Cueto when she testified in
rebuttal for the plaintiffs. (t.s.n. pp. 9, 12-
13, Direct, Feb. 28, 1995) (See testimony
of Eleuteria Cueto in rebuttal on July 17,
1997)
While many things have been said about
the crucial deed of sale, the decisive
documentary evidence remains an
elusive phantom and conspicuously
unproven. The ownership of Santiago
Puyo becomes moreover doubtful
because while the alleged sale was
executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in
1967 yet the earliest Tax Declaration in
the name of Santiago Puyo was issued
only in 1973 (Exh. "9") or 1974 (Exh.
"4") as far as the record of this case can
reveal. The issuance of a new tax
declaration in the name of the sunrise
owner (Puyo) which was late by six (6)
or seven (7) years naturally cast a slur on
the veracity of the sale.
The typewritten entry on Tax Decl. No.
48221 (Exhs. "9" and "9-A") detailing
the particulars of the alleged deed of sale
in favor of Santiago Puyo is patently
suspicious and a very very poor ersatz
for the primary document. While the sale
allegedly took place in 1967, said deed
was annotated on Exh. "9" which
however only "begins with the year
1973." Moreover, while the alleged sale
took place in 1967, yet Tax. Decl. No.
32941 (Exh. "10") that was issued on
Feb. 7, 1968 still carried the names of
Gil, Flaviano, Felino and Ignacio, all
EBREO and Genoveva, Eleuteria and
Homobono, all CUETO and not the
name of Santiago Puyo. There even
appears thereon the annotation that the
1968 tax was paid on Jan. 29, 1968 –
with no mention of Santiago Puyo
despite his having allegedly acquired the
property the year before (1967).
Riveting further its attention to the
typewritten entry on Exh. "9", the Court
finds it rather strange that such an entry
appears on the Tax Declaration. Firstly,
it is not a widely accepted practice to
make such annotation. Secondly, there is
more than meets the eye in the
conspicuous presence of this annotation
only on this particular Tax Declaration
(Exh. "9"). All other tax declarations in
this case do not have similar entry to
identify the documentary basis for the
issuance of the latest tax declaration.
Thirdly, not even Tax Decl. Nos. 50669
and 075-534 (Exhs. "2" and "3") of
Antonio Ebreo carry such annotation to
indicate that he acquired the property by
virtue of Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15, Book
No. I, Series of 1976 of the Notarial
Register of Atty. Meynardo L. Atienza.
The pregnant suspicion lurks that the
alleged particulars of the document of
sale from Santiago Puyo to Antonio
Ebreo were belatedly annotated.
As icing on the cake, Gil Ebreo
categorically stated it was Felino Ebreo
who authored the transfer. He testified on
cross-examination that it was his eldest
brother Felino Ebreo who was the
caretaker of the lot and in-charge of the
payment of taxes. It was his brother
Felino who sold the subject lot known as
Lot No. 9046-F in favor of his son
Antonio Ebreo. (t.s.n. pp. 16-17, Cross,
July 18, 1994) The evidence tended to
show that indeed it was Felino Ebreo
who had the opportunity to cause the
transfer as it was he (Felino) who took
possession of the lot and acted as its
overseer. (t.s.n. pp. 3-4, Direct, Nov. 17,
1994)
The alleged document of sale executed
between Santiago Puyo and Antonio
Ebreo denominated as "Ganap na Bilihan
ng Lupa" (Exh. "1"), was ineffectual for
the purpose of transferring ownership of
disputed Lot No. 9046-F to said Antonio
Ebreo because the alleged vendor transfer of property and inasmuch as the
Santiago Puyo has not, as heretofore subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it
explained, acquired it from the heirs of was incumbent on the petitioners to
Felipe Ebreo as the transaction has no adduce in evidence the original or a copy
supporting document of sale. It is self- of the deed consistent with Section 3,
evident that the seller cannot transfer Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the
more than what he has or as oftenly absence of the said document, the
stated hyperbolically, the river cannot exhortations of petitioners regarding the
rise above its source. Moreover, Clerk of existence of said deed of sale must fail.
Court Jose C. Corales certified that the
Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa (Doc. No. 70,
Page No. 15, Book No. I, Series of 1976)
despite diligent efforts could not be
found in the old CFI vault located at the
Capitol Building, Batangas City. (Exh.
"E" – Rebuttal)

The fact that tax declarations for Lot

[No.] 9046-F were issued in the name of
defendant Antonio Ebreo (Exhs. "2" and
"3") and that he paid the taxes for the
land (Exh. "8") provides no evidentiary
value that he was the owner thereof. The
existence of the tax declarations and
payment of taxes did not transmogrify
his possession into ownership. Tax
declarations are not sufficient evidence
to prove possession in the concept of
owners. (Martinez, D., Summary of 1990
Supreme Court Rulings, Part. II, p. 734)
Tax receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership.33

In sum, considering that the annotation

of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax
declaration is not sufficient proof of the
 EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL
AND RESORT, INC., RUFO B.
COLAYCO, RUFINO L.
SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON
CHEN, and KUOK KHOON
TSEN, petitioners,
vs.
BF CORPORATION, respondent.
Before us are these two (2) consolidated
petitions for review under Rule 45 to
nullify certain issuances of the Court of
Appeals (CA).
Both petitions stemmed from a
construction contract denominated
as Agreement for the Execution of
Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-la
Hotel Project4 that ESHRI and BF
executed for the construction of the
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1,
1991. Among other things, the contract
stipulated for the payment of the contract
price on the basis of the work
accomplished as described in the
monthly progress billings. Under this
arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly
progress billing to ESHRI which would
then re-measure the work accomplished
and prepare a Progress Payment
Certificate for that month's progress
billing.5
In a memorandum-letter dated August
16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the
collection procedure BF was to follow, to
wit: (1) submission of the progress
billing to ESHRI's Engineering
Department; (2) following-up of the
preparation of the Progress Payment
Certificate with the Head of the Quantity
Surveying Department; and (3)
following-up of the release of the
payment with one Evelyn San Pascual.
BF adhered to the procedures agreed
upon in all its billings for the period from
May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992,
submitting for the purpose the required
Builders Work Summary, the monthly
progress billings, including an evaluation
of the work in accordance with the
Project Manager's Instructions (PMIs)
and the detailed valuations contained in
the Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for
final re-measurement under the PMIs.
BF said that the values of the Work
Variation Orders were contained in the
progress billings under the section
"Change Orders.6
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF
submitted a total of 19 progress billings
following the procedure agreed upon.
Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13,
ESHRI paid BF PhP 86,501,834.05.7
However, According to BF, ESHRI, for
Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not
re-measure the work done, did not
prepare the Progress Payment
Certificates, let alone remit payment for
the inclusive periods covered. In this
regard, BF claimed having been misled
into working continuously on the project
by ESHRI which gave the assurance
about the Progress Payment Certificates
already being processed.
After several futile attempts to collect the
unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26,
1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of
money and damages.
In its defense, ESHRI claimed having
overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1
to 13 and, by way of counterclaim with
damages, asked that BF be ordered to
refund the excess payments. ESHRI also
charged BF with incurring delay and
turning up with inferior work
accomplishment.
RTC: ruled in favor of BF
According to the RTC, ESHRI's refusal
to pay BF's valid claims constituted
evident bad faith entitling BF to moral
damages and attorney's fees.
CA: affirmed RTC in toto.
The CA predicated its ruling on the
interplay of two main reasons. First, the
issues the parties raised in their
respective briefs were, for the most part,
factual and evidentiary. Thus, there is no
reason to disturb the case disposition of
the RTC, inclusive of its award of
damages and attorney's fees and the
reasons underpinning the award. Second,
BF had sufficiently established its case
by preponderance of evidence. Part of
what it had sufficiently proven relates to
ESHRI being remiss in its obligation to
re-measure BF's later work
accomplishments and pay the same. On
the other hand, ESHRI had failed to
prove the basis of its disclaimer from
liability, such as its allegation on the
defective work accomplished by BF.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT BF
COMPLIED WITH THE LAYING-
THE- BASIS REQUIREMENT FOR
THE ADMISSION OF THE
PHOTOCOPIES AS SECONDARY
EVIDENCE.
RULING:
YES.
Admissibility of Photocopies of
Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19,
PMIs and WVOs
Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily
the trial court, on the matter of the
admission in evidence of the photocopies
of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the
complementing PMIs and the WVOs.
According to petitioners, BF, before
being allowed to adduce in evidence the
photocopies adverted to, ought to have
laid the basis for the presentation of the
photocopies as secondary evidence,
conformably to the best evidence rule.
The SC agrees with BF which averred
having complied with the laying-the-
basis requirement. Defending the action
of the courts below in admitting into
evidence the photocopies of the
documents aforementioned, BF
explained that it could not present the
original of the documents since they
were in the possession of ESHRI which
refused to hand them over to BF despite
requests.
We agree with BF. The only actual rule
that the term "best evidence" denotes is
the rule requiring that the original of a
writing must, as a general proposition, be
produced17 and secondary evidence of its
contents is not admissible except where
the original cannot be had under Rule
130, Section 3 particulary subsection b of
the Rules of Court enunciates the best
evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must
be produced; exceptions. - When
the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
 (a) When the original has
been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is
in the custody or under
the control of the party
against whom the
evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice;
(Emphasis added.)
Complementing the above provision is
Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document
is in adverse party's custody or
control. - If the document is in the
custody or under control of the
adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence,
he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be
presented as in the case of loss.
Secondary evidence of the contents of a
written instrument or document refers to
evidence other than the original
instrument or document itself.18 A party
may present secondary evidence of the
contents of a writing not only when the
original is lost or destroyed, but also
when it is in the custody or under the
control of the adverse party. In either
instance, however, certain explanations
must be given before a party can resort to
secondary evidence.
According to the SC, the trial court
correctly allowed the presentation of the
photocopied documents in question as
secondary evidence. According to the
exhanges between the counsel of BF and
ESHRI, the counsel for BF informed that
some of the originals are in ESHRI’s
possession.
Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the
required basis for presenting the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14
to 19 instead of their originals has to be
dismissed. The stenographic notes of the
following exchanges between Atty.
Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF
and ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF
had complied with the requirements:
ATTY. ANDRES:
During the previous hearing of this case,
your Honor, likewise, the witness
testified that certain exhibits namely, the
Progress Payment Certificates and the
Progress Billings the originals of these
documents were transmitted to ESHRI,
all the originals are in the possession of
ESHRI since these are internal
documents and I am referring
specifically to the Progress Payment
Certificates. We requested your Honor,
that in order that plaintiff [BF] be
allowed to present secondary original,
that opposing counsel first be given
opportunity to present the originals
which are in their possession. May we
know if they have brought the originals
and whether they will present the
originals in court, Your Honor.
(Emphasis added.)
ATTY. AUTEA:
We have already informed our client
about the situation, your Honor, that it
has been claimed by plaintiff that some
of the originals are in their possession
and our client assured that, they will try
to check. Unfortunately, we have not
heard from our client, Your Honor.
As such, from the exchanges between the
counsels, it can be concluded that there
was:
(1) the existence of the original
documents which ESHRI had possession
of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to
produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was
afforded sufficient time to produce them;
and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to
produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in
this case fall under the exception under
Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other words, the
conditions sine qua non for the
presentation and reception of the
photocopies of the original document as
secondary evidence have been met.
These are: (1) there is proof of the
original document's execution or
existence; (2) there is proof of the cause
of the original document's unavailability;
and (3) the offeror is in good
faith.19 While perhaps not on all fours
because it involved a check, what the
Court said in Magdayao v. People, is
very much apt, thus:
x x x To warrant the admissibility
of secondary evidence when the
original of a writing is in the
custody or control of the adverse
party, Section 6 of Rule 130
provides that the adverse party
must be given reasonable notice,
that he fails or refuses to produce
the same in court and that the
offeror offers satisfactory proof of
its existence.
xxxx
The mere fact that the original of
the writing is in the custody or
control of the party against whom
it is offered does not warrant the
admission of secondary evidence. that ESHRI should be restored to its own
The offeror must prove that he has funds without awaiting the final outcome
done all in his power to secure the of the main case. For ease of reference,
best evidence by giving notice to we reproduce what the appellate court
the said party to produce the pertinently wrote in its Resolution of
document. The notice may be in August 13, 1999:
the form of a motion for the
production of the original or made
in open court in the presence of
the adverse party
or via a subpoena duces tecum,
provided that the party in custody
of the original has sufficient time
to produce the same. When such
party has the original of the
writing and does not voluntarily
offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence
may be admitted.20 (Emphasis
supplied.)
On the Restitution of the Garnished
Funds
We now come to the propriety of the
restitution of the garnished funds. As
petitioners maintain, the CA effectively,
but erroneously, prevented restitution of
ESHRI's improperly garnished funds
when it nullified its own August 13,
1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
43187. In this regard, petitioners invite
attention to the fact that the restitution of
the funds was in accordance with this
Court's final and already executory
decision in G.R. No. 132655, implying
 REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, vs DEVELOPMENT
RESOURCES CORPORATION,
represented by Carlos Chua and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO
CITY..
Eighty-seven years ago on October 14,
1922 the Court of First Instance of
Davao, sitting as cadastral court,
adjudicated Lot 544 of Cad-102 in
Davao City, consisting of 260,818 square
meters, in favor of Antonio Matute.
Three years later, or on December 15,
1925 the Register of Deeds issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 493
to him by virtue of Decree 195328. Since
then, several transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) derived from OCT 493 were
issued, including TCT 44671,
covering Lot 1 of Pcs-16678, with an
area of 36,485 sq m and TCT 44675,
covering Lot 5 also of Pcs-16678 with an
area of 33,415 sq m, both in the name of
respondent Development Resources
Corporation (DRC).1
On April 5, 1993 petitioner Republic,
acting through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao
City2 for cancellation of TCT 44671 and
TCT 44675 and for the reversion of Lots
1 and 5 of Pcs-16678 to the public
domain. The Republic claimed that no
valid title vested in 1922 on Antonio
Matute, respondent DRC's predecessor,
because all of Lot 544 from which the
two lots came was still a public forest
and inalienable on October 14,
1922.3 The Republic asserted that only
on August 6, 1923 was Lot 544 declared
alienable based on LC Map 47.4 The
Republic presented a certification to this
effect from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).5 
DRC, on the other hand, contended that
its two lots could no longer be reverted
to the public domain because they are
now private properties held by
purchasers in good faith.6
RTC: dismissed the complaint, holding
that the Republic failed to prove that the
subject lots were still part of the public
domain when the same were adjudicated
to Antonio Matute.7 
The RTC ruled that LC Map 47 has no
probative value because: (1) the copy
presented in court was a reproduction
and not the original or certified copy; and
(2) it does not show that the land was
declared alienable and disposable only as
of August 6, 1923; rather that it was
certified on that date.8
CA: affirmed in toto.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LC MAP
47 HAS A PROBATIVE VALUE.
RULING:
NO.
Since a complaint for reversion can upset
the stability of registered titles through
the cancellation of the original title and
the others that emanate from it, the State
bears a heavy burden of proving the
ground for its action.11 
In the case at bar, the Republic fails to
discharge such burden.
For one, it failed to present the original
or a certified true copy of LC Map 47 but
only its electronic reproduction,12 which
has no probative value.13
The Court held in SAAD Agro-
Industries, Inc. v. Republic of the
Philippines14 that a mere photocopy of an
LC Map is not a competent evidence of
the existence of such map. While
evidence is admissible when the original
of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public
office, as in this case, there is a need to
present a certified copy of it issued by
the public officer having custody of the
document to prove its
contents.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
The Republic of course claims that its
version of LC Map 47 should be
regarded as the original itself because it
was the official copy of the region
furnished by the National Mapping and
Resources Inventory Authority where the
original is kept.15 But, as admitted by
Crisanto Galo, the Land Evaluation
Coordinator for DENR Region XI, the
copy they presented was neither marked
nor certified as a reproduction of the
original.16 Hence, it cannot be considered
as an official copy, more so an original
copy.
Furthermore, the RTC below correctly As such, the RTC and CA correctly
held that LC Map 47 does not state on its dismissed the subject reversion suit for
face that Lot 544 became alienable and failure of the Republic to discharge its
disposable only on the date appearing on evidential burden.
that Map, namely, on August 6, 1923,
about 10 months after Lots 1 and 5 of WHEREFORE, the petition
Pcs-16678 of the Davao Cadastre were is DENIED for lack of merit.
adjudicated to Antonio Matute. The
DENR certification17 has no additional
value since it was just based on the same
map.
In Sta. Monica Industrial and
Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,18 the Republic offered in
evidence LC Map 2427 to prove that at
the time the land was decreed to the
original owner, it had not yet been
released and still fell within the forest
zone. The Court did not, however, give
credence to the LC map because it did
not conclusively state the actual
classification of the land at the time it
was adjudicated to the original owner. It
does not help the Republic's case that the
subject lots were part of a cadastral
survey initiated by the Government to
encourage titling of the lands in Davao
by those in legitimate possession.
 Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN,
namely: LOLITA GABATAN,
POMPEYO GABATAN,
PEREGRINO GABATAN,
REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA
GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS,
RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and
FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and
LOURDES EVERO
PACANA, Respondents.
Subject of the present controversy is a
1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified
as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at
Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro
City. This lot was declared for taxation
in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the
complaint before the RTC, respondent
Pacana alleged that she is the sole owner
of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the
same from her deceased mother,
Hermogena Gabatan Evero
(Hermogena).
Respondent further claimed that her
mother, Hermogena, is the only child of
Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana
Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was
entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan
(Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita
Gabatan, for administration.
It was also claimed that prior to her
death Hermogena demanded for the
return of the land but to no avail. After
Hermogena’s death, respondent also did
the same but petitioners refused to heed
the numerous demands to surrender the
subject property. According to
respondent, when Teofilo and his wife
died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and
Catalino Acantilado took possession of
the disputed land despite respondent’s
demands for them to vacate the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that
respondent’s mother Hermogena was the
daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana
Clarito and that Hermogena or
respondent is the rightful heir of Juan
Gabatan.
Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan
died single in 1934 and without any issue
and that Juan was survived by one
brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo
(petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest),
Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or
their heirs, inherited the subject land
from Juan Gabatan and have been in
actual, physical, open, public, adverse,
continuous and uninterrupted possession
thereof in the concept of owners for more
than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the
fruits of the improvements thereon, to the
exclusion of the whole world including
respondent.
Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis
and Catalino Acantilado have no interest
in the subject land; the former is merely
the husband of Teofilo’s daughter while
the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners
added that a similar case was previously
filed by respondent against Teofilo’s
wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February
21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No.
5840 but the case was dismissed on May
3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally,
petitioners contended that the complaint
lacks or states no cause of action or, if
there was any, the same has long
prescribed and/or has been barred by
laches.
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was
amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo
were individually named, to wit: Lolita
Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino
Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila
Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita
Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an
amended answer, additionally alleging
that the disputed land was already
covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name
of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented
by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilo’s
daughter).
RTC: in favor of Pacana
CA: affirmed in toto
Discounting petitioners’ argument that
respondent is not related to Juan
Gabatan, the CA declared that
respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan
Gabatan was sufficiently established
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long
line of jurisprudence that findings of fact
of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and are not disturbed except for
cogent reasons, such as when the
findings of fact are not supported by
evidence.
The CA likewise gave weight to the
Deed of Absolute Sale5 executed by
Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo,
Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan,
wherein Hermogena was identified as an
heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of
legal age, married, Filipino citizen and
presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao
del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the
deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on
July 30, 1966 containing such
declaration which was signed by Teofilo
and the latter’s nearest relatives by
consanguinity, is a tangible proof that
they acknowledged Hermogena’s status
as the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
Applying Section 38, Rule 1306 of the
Rules of Court on the declaration against
interest, the CA ruled that petitioners
could not deny that even their very own
father, Teofilo formally recognized
Hermogena’s right to heirship from Juan
Gabatan which ultimately passed on to
respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA
ruled that petitioners’ possession of the
disputed property could not ripen into
acquisitive prescription because their
predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never
held the property in the concept of an
owner.lawphil.net
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PACANA WAS
THE SOLE HEIR OF GABATAN.
RULING:
NO.
After a meticulous review of the records
of this case, we find insufficient and
questionable the basis of the RTC in
conferring upon respondent the status of
sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to
possession and ownership of the
property, pinned her claim entirely on
her alleged status as sole heir of Juan
Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to
present preponderant evidence in support
of her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of
legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate
children is proved by the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or by an
authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles
indicated in the preceding article, the
filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a
legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of
birth, authentic document, final judgment
or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Here, two conflicting birth
certificates19 of respondent were
presented at the RTC. Respondent,
during her direct testimony, presented
and identified a purported certified true
copy of her typewritten birth certificate
which indicated that her mother’s maiden
name was "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan."
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented
a certified true copy of respondent’s
handwritten birth certificate which
differed from the copy presented by
respondent. Among the differences was
respondent’s mother’s full maiden name
which was indicated as "Hermogena
Calarito" in the handwritten birth
certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the
regional trial court ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic)
each other by presenting two conflicting
Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff
herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are
Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff and Exhibit
"1" for the defendants. Which of this
(sic) is genuine, and which is falsified.
These (sic) issue is crucial and requires
serious scrutiny.
The Court is of the observation that
Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff which is a
certified true copy is in due form and
bears the "as is and where is" rule. It has
the impression of the original certificate.
The forms (sic) is an old one used in the
1950’s. Her mother’s maiden name
appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic)
Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit "1", the
entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten
which is very unusual and of dubious
source. The form used is of latest
vintage. The entry on the space for
mother’s maiden name is Hermogena
Calarito. There seems to be an apparent
attempt to thwart plaintiff’s mother
filiation with the omission of the
surname Gabatan. Considering these
circumstances alone the Court is inclined
to believe that Exhibit "A" for the
plaintiff is far more genuine and
authentic certificate of live birth.20
Having carefully examined the
questioned birth certificates, SC simply
cannot agree with the above-quoted
findings of the trial court.
To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial
court noted, was an original typewritten
document, not a mere photocopy or
facsimile. It uses a form of 1950’s
vintage21 but this Court is unable to
concur in the trial court’s finding that
Exhibit 122 was of a later vintage than
Exhibit A which was one of the trial
court’s bases for doubting the
authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the
contrary, the printed notation on the
upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states
"Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised,
January 1945)" which makes it an older
form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial
court’s finding regarding which form
was of more recent vintage was
manifestly contradicted by the evidence
on record.
No actual signature appears on Exhibit
A except that of a certain Maximo P.
Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar,
Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly
certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A
was a true copy of respondent’s birth
certificate. The names of the attendant at
birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil
registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were
typewritten with the notation "(Sgd.)"
also merely typewritten beside their
names. The words "A certified true copy:
July 6, 1977" above the signature of
Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear
to be inscribed by the same typewriter as
the very entries in Exhibit A. It would
seem that Exhibit A and the information
stated therein were prepared and entered
only in 1977.
Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was
never presented as a witness to identify
Exhibit A. Said document and the
signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein
were identified by respondent herself
whose self-serving testimony cannot be
deemed sufficient authentication of her
birth certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s
view that since the entries in Exhibit 1
were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one
of dubious credibility. Verily, the
certified true copies of the handwritten
birth certificate of respondent
(petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly
authenticated by two competent
witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms.
Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of
the Office of the City Civil Registrar,
Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E.
Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the
National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta.
Mesa, Manila.
Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part
of their official duties they have custody
of birth records in their respective
offices,23 and (b) the certified true copy
of respondent’s handwritten birth
certificate is a faithful reproduction of
the original birth certificate registered in
their respective offices.24 
Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even
brought the original of the handwritten
birth certificate before the trial court and
respondent’s counsel confirmed that the
certified true copy (which was eventually
marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful
reproduction of the original.25 Ms. Vidal
likewise categorically testified that no
other copy of respondent’s birth
certificate exists in their records except
the handwritten birth certificate.26 Ms.
Cacho, in turn, testified that the original
of respondent’s handwritten birth
certificate found in the records of the
NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was
photocopied) was the one officially
transmitted to their office by the Local
Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de
Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho
testified and brought their respective
offices’ copies of respondent’s birth
certificate in compliance with subpoenas
issued by the trial court and there is no
showing that they were motivated by ill
will or bias in giving their testimonies.
Thus, between respondent’s Exhibit A
and petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8, the
latter documents deserve to be given
greater probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of
argument that the birth certificate
presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a
reliable document, the same on its face is
insufficient to prove respondent’s
filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan
Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had
been credible and authentic, would have
proven was that respondent’s mother was
a certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan."
It does not prove that same "Hermogena
Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan
Gabatan. Even the CA held that the
conflicting certificates of live birth of
respondent submitted by the parties only
proved the filiation of respondent to
Hermogena.28
It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s
cause of action that she convincingly
proves the filiation of her mother to Juan
Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the
relationship of respondent’s mother to
Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the
best evidence of such familial tie was the
record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or an authentic document or a
final judgment. In the absence of these,
respondent should have presented proof
that her mother enjoyed the continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate
child. Only in the absence of these two
classes of evidence is the respondent
allowed to present other proof admissible
under the Rules of Court of her mother’s
relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondent’s mother’s
(Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which
would have been the best evidence of
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan
Gabatan, was never offered as evidence
at the RTC. Neither did respondent
present any authentic document or final
judgment categorically evidencing
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan
Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of
her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima
Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac
Villareal who testified that they
personally knew Hermogena
(respondent’s mother) and/or Juan
Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan
was married to Laureana Clarito and that
Hermogena was the child of Juan and
Laureana. However, none of these
witnesses had personal knowledge of the
fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or
the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan
and Laureana. They were not yet born or
were very young when Juan supposedly
married Laureana or when Hermogena
was born and they all admitted that none
of them were present at Juan and
Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s
birth. These witnesses based their
testimony on what they had been told by,
or heard from, others as young children.
Their testimonies were, in a word,
hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from
giving full faith to respondent’s
witnesses’ testimonies. The records
would show that they cannot be said to
be credible and impartial witnesses.
Frisco Lawan testified that he was the
son of Laureana by a man other than
Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at
all related to Juan Gabatan.29 His
testimony regarding the relationships
within the Gabatan family is hardly
reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana
and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are
children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,30 this
Court is wary of according probative
weight to their testimonies since
respondent admitted during her cross-
examination that her (respondent’s)
husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac
Pacana.31 In other words, although these
witnesses are indeed blood relatives of
petitioners, they are also the mother and
the aunt of respondent’s husband. They
cannot be said to be entirely disinterested
in the outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of
respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC
and the CA relied heavily on a
photocopy of a Deed of Absolute
Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by
respondent and which appeared to be
signed by the siblings and the heirs of the
siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this
document involving the sale of a lot
different from Lot 3095 C-5,
"Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the
deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as
one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the
statement therein as an affirmation or
recognition by Teofilo Gabatan,
petitioners’ predecessor in interest, that
Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan
Gabatan.33 The CA considered the same
statement as a declaration against interest
on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.34
However, the admission of this Deed of
Absolute Sale, including its contents and
the signatures therein, as competent
evidence was vigorously and repeatedly
objected to by petitioners’ counsel for
being a mere photocopy and not being
properly authenticated.35 After a close
scrutiny of the said photocopy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot
uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original
document itself.36  the deed that it is a certified true xerox
Although the best evidence rule admits
of exceptions and there are instances
where the presentation of secondary
evidence would be allowed, such as
when the original is lost or the original is
a public record, the basis for the
presentation of secondary evidence must
still be established. Thus, in Department
of Education Culture and Sports v. Del
Rosario,37 we held that a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best
or primary evidence before he can resort
to secondary evidence.
A party must first present to the court
proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for non-production of the
original instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the
transcript of the testimony of Felicisima
Nagac Pacana (who identified the
photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale)
plainly shows that she gave no testimony
regarding the whereabouts of the
original, whether it was lost or whether it
was recorded in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off
Exhibit H as an admissible public
document. For this, respondent relied on
the stamped notation on the photocopy of
copy and said notation was signed by a
certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr.,
Assessment Officer, who seems to be an
officer in the local assessor’s office.
Regarding the authentication of public
documents, the Rules of Court38 provide
that the record of public documents,
when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy.39 
The attestation of the certifying officer
must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a
specific part thereof, as the case may
be.40
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was
presented by respondent that an original
of Exhibit H was registered or exists in
the records of the local assessor’s office.
Furthermore, the stamped certification of
Honesto P. Velez is insufficient
authentication of Exhibit H since Velez’s
certification did not state that Exhibit H
was a true copy from the original. Even
worse, Velez was not presented as a
witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true
copy from the original. Indeed, it is
highly doubtful that Velez could have
made such an attestation since the
assessor’s office is not the official
repository of original notarized deeds of
sale and could not have been the legal
custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated
by law to keep an original of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in his notarial register and
to forward the same to the proper court.
It is the notary public or the proper court
that has custody of his notarial register
that could have produced the original or
a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the
Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by
Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite
appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not
a disinterested witness and as can be
gleaned from her testimony, she had no
personal knowledge of the preparation of
the alleged certified true copy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale.
She did not even know who secured a
copy of Exhibit H from the assessor’s
office.41 To be sure, the roundabout and
defective manner of authentication of
Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the
purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that
Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or
admitted the status of Hermogena
Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of
proper authentication of Exhibit H and
consider the same admissible, it still
nonetheless would have only provided
proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan
was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H
does not show the filiation of respondent
to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan
Gabatan. As discussed above, the only
document that respondent produced to
demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena
Gabatan" (respondent’s Exhibit A) was
successfully put in doubt by contrary
evidence presented by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are
inclined to likewise rule against
respondent. According to respondent’s
own testimony,42 Juan Gabatan died
sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of
action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to
recover the decedent’s property from
third parties or to quiet title to their
inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet,
respondent and/or her mother
Hermogena, if they were truly the legal
heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their
rights as such. It is only in 1978 that
respondent filed her first complaint to
recover the subject property, docketed as
Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita
Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo
Gabatan.43 However, that case was
dismissed without prejudice for failure to
prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited
until 1989 to refile her cause of action,
i.e. the present case.45 She claimed that
she waited until the death of Rita
Gabatan to refile her case out of respect
because Rita was then already old.46
We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy
reason. It is precisely because Rita
Gabatan and her contemporaries (who
might have personal knowledge of the
matters litigated in this case) were
advancing in age and might soon expire
that respondent should have exerted
every effort to preserve valuable
evidence and speedily litigate her claim.
As we held in Republic of the
Philippines v. Agunoy: "Vigilantibus,
sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt,
the law aids the vigilant, not those who
sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not
sleep on a right while expecting to
preserve it in its pristine purity."47
All in all, this Court finds that
respondent dismally failed to
substantiate, with convincing, credible
and independently verifiable proof, her
assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property
under litigation. Aggravating the
weakness of her evidence were the
circumstances that (a) she did not come
to court with clean hands for she
presented a tampered/altered, if not
outright spurious, copy of her certificate
of live birth and (b) she unreasonably
delayed the prosecution of her own cause
of action. If the Court cannot now affirm
her claim, respondent has her own self to
blame.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273,
affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint and amended complaint in
Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES ARMANDO AND LORNA
TRINIDAD, Petitioners, v. DONA* MA
RIE GLENN IMSON, Respondent.
On August 17, 2007, herein petitioners
Spouses Trinidad filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Pasig City a Complaint4 for ejectment
against Imson herein respondent. In their
Position Paper,5 petitioners alleging that:
they are the owners of a condominium
unit, denominated as Unit 2203, which is
located at AIC Gold Tower, Emerald
Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City; they
purchased the condominum unit from
three (3) Indian nationals who originally
contracted to buy the said property from
the developer, AIC Realty Corporation
(AIC), but had not fully paid for it yet;
petitioners' purchase was evidenced by a
Deed of Assignment and Transfer of
Rights6 dated June 13, 2002 and, later on,
a Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated July 13,
2007 in the name of petitioner Armando;
at the time of petitioners' purchase of the
subject condominium unit, the same was
being leased by Imson respondent from
the original owners; the period of lease
was from April 1, 2002 to March 1,
2003;
Thus, the spouses respected the contract
of lease between Imson respondent and
the original owners; however, since June
2002 up to the time of the filing of the
complaint for ejectment, respondent
neither remitted nor consigned the
monthly rentals due to petitioners for her
continued use of the condominium unit;
the rental arrears amounted to a total of
P2,130,000.00; petitioners sent a letter of
demand to respondent requiring that she,
together with any and all persons using
the said unit with her approval, vacate
the premises and pay her arrears;
respondent ignored petitioners' demand
letter; petitioners tried to settle the case
amicably but no agreement was reached.
In her Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaims,8 Imson countered that:
she, indeed, entered into a contract of
lease with the original owners of the
disputed condominium unit which was to
commence on April 1, 2002 and would
end on March 1, 2003; sometime in June
2002, she decided to purchase the unit;
however, since she was then undergoing
proceedings to annul her previous
marriage and thinking that her purchase
of the subject property would disrupt the
property arrangements already agreed
upon,
she thought it best not to have the
condominium unit registered yet in her
name; instead, she requested Armando
Trinidad, who was her confidante, to
purchase the unit and register it under his
name with the understanding that the
said property would actually be owned
by respondent;
Armando agreed without objection,
which led to the execution of the Deed of
Assignment and Transfer of Rights in his
name; payments for the purchase price
were made by respondent through cash
and checks paid to the original owners
who acknowledged said payments; aside
from paying the purchase price,
respondent also paid the real property
taxes due on the condominium unit as
well as the association dues, water bills,
common area real estate tax, building
insurance and other charges billed by the
developer; having full trust in Armando,
coupled with her hectic schedule,
respondent did not bother to transfer
ownership of the subject unit in her
name;
since April 2002 up to the time of filing
her Answer, respondent has been in open
and public possession of the subject
property;
in 2007, while respondent was out of the
country, Armando, without respondent's
knowledge, annotated his claim on the
condominium certificate of title; he also
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in his
favor on July 13, 2007; as a result,
respondent was surprised to receive a
copy of petitioners' demand letter and
complaint.
The MeTC found that respondent is the
true owner of the subject property and
that the true intention of the parties is for
Armando to hold the condominium unit
in behalf of respondent until the property
could be placed in the latter's name.
RTC: reversed.
The RTC held that, by preponderance of
evidence, the question of ownership is
resolved in favor of petitioners. The RTC
held that the subject Deed of Assignment
and Transfer of Rights and the Deed of
Absolute Sale in the name of Armando is
superior to the evidence presented by
respondent, which merely consisted of
bills of payments of association dues,
utility bills, real estate tax on the
common areas and building insurance.
On December 22, 2010, the CA
promulgated its assailed Decision setting
aside the RTC judgment and ordering
petitioners to return possession of the
subject condominium unit to respondent.
The CA ratiocinated that, based on the
evidence adduced by the parties,
respondent's claim of ownership deserves
more credence. The CA ruled that
records of payment of the purchase price
of the subject property, through
respondent's personal checks,
acknowledgment of these payments by
the former owners by way of receipt and
affidavit, and respondent's exercise of
acts of ownership prove that she is the
owner of the disputed condominium unit
and, thus, is entitled to the possession
thereof.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PIECES
OF EVIDENCE SHOWN BY IMSON
IS SUFFICIENT TO
PROVISIONALLY DECLARE HER
AS OWNER OF THE SUBJECT
CONDOMINIUM UNIT.
RULING:
YES.
The SC is not persuaded with the
Spouses trinidad’s contention that they
heavily reliedon the Deed of Assignment
and Transfer of Rights as well as the
Deed of Absolute Sale, which were
executed in Armando's favor, to prove
their ownership of the subject property.
Having been notarized, they contend that
these documents outweigh all the pieces
of evidence presented by respondent.
While it is true that the subject Deed of
Assignment and Transfer of Rights and
Deed of Absolute Sale are notarized. It is
well settled that a document
acknowledged before a notary public is a
public document that enjoys the
presumption of regularity.19 It is a prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated therein and a conclusive
presumption of its existence and due
execution.20However, the CA correctly
held that the existence and due execution
of these documents are not in issue.
Moreover, the presumption of truth of
the facts stated in notarized documents is
merely prima facie, which means that
this presumption can be overcome by
clear and convincing evidence.21 Hence,
the truth of the facts stated in the
disputed Deed of Assignment and
Transfer of Rights as well as the Deed of
Absolute Sale may be rebutted by
evidence.
In the case at bar, what is being asserted
by respondent is that the above
documents do not embody the true intent
and agreement of the parties. To this end,
respondent submitted sufficient proof to
refute the contents of the aforementioned
documents and to establish the real intent
of the parties, to wit: (1) nine [9] checks
drawn from the personal account of
respondent, variously dated from
October 11, 2002 to June 11, 2003, each
of which amounts to P416,666.67 and
paid to the order of Amarnath
Hinduja;22 (2) Acknowledgment Receipt
recognizing the various payments made
by respondent to the former owners of
the subject property;23(3) Real Property
Tax Receipts evidencing respondent's
payment of the real estate taxes due on
the property;24  property.
(4) Certification issued by AIC Golden
Tower Condominium acknowledging
respondent's regular payment of
association dues, water bills, common
area real estate tax, building insurance
and other charges billed by AIC;25 (5)
Affidavit executed by the former owners
acknowledging the supposed agreement
of the parties that the condominium unit
shall be purchased in the name of
Armando with the understanding that he
will hold it in behalf of respondent until
the same could be placed in her name.26
The MeTC and the CA were one in
holding that the foregoing pieces of
evidence submitted by respondent,
coupled with the surrounding
circumstances in this case, are sufficient
to overcome the prima facie presumption
of the truth of the facts stated in the
questioned Deed of Assignment and
Transfer of Rights and Deed of Absolute
Sale. The Court agrees.
Indeed, petitioners failed to offer any
credible explanation why payments of
the purchase price were made by
respondent by using her personal checks
if she is not, in fact, the buyer of the
Neither was there any justification why
respondent paid the real property taxes
due on the property, as well as the utility
bills, association dues, common area real
estate tax and building insurance. More
importantly, petitioners also fell short in
advancing a plausible refutation why the
former owners would execute an
affidavit indicating therein that the
agreement among the parties is that the
subject property shall be purchased in the
name of Armando with the
understanding between the latter and
respondent that Armando would hold the
property in respondent's behalf until it
will be placed in her name, thus exposing
themselves to possible perjury charges, if
such agreement is not really true.
In addition, if petitioners are the real
owners of the subject condominium unit,
why did they wait until February 19,
2007,27 or almost four (4) years after the
supposed expiration of respondent's lease
contract, to demand that she vacate the
disputed premises and pay rentals.
Moreover, as the MeTC has noted, it was
only in 2007 that Armando annotated his
claim on the condominium certificate of
title, executed the subject Deed of
Absolute Sale and requested certification
of his ownership from the developer.
Furthermore, the SC did not agree with
the Spouses’ argument that under the
Parole Evidence Rule, when the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be,
as between the parties, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.28  his pleading:
Based on this rule, petitioners contend
that since the former owners, as well as
respondent, are all parties to the Deed of
Assignment and Transfer of Rights, they
are bound by the said Deed and they
cannot allege terms which are not found
within the said agreement.
However, according to the SC, the fact
that the Deed of Assignment and
Transfer of Rights was put in writing and
notarized does not accord it the quality of
incontrovertibility otherwise provided by
the Parole Evidence Rule.29  following are instances of conclusive
The rule on parole evidence is not, as it
were, ironclad.
Thus, the second paragraph of Section 9,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
the exceptions, to wit:
Section 9. Evidence of written
agreements. - x x x
However, a party may present evidence
to modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the  written
agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement;
or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed
to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written
agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.30
As observed by the CA, respondent
squarely put in issue in her Answer31 that
the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of
Rights did not express the true intent of
the parties. Hence, the exception applies.
The Court is neither convinced by
petitioners' argument that when ley
bought the subject property from its
former owners, they stepped into the
shoes of the latter who were the lessors
of respondent and that, as lessee,
respondent is barred from contesting the
title of her lessor or her lessor's
sjuccessor-in-interest, who are herein
petitioners.
Article 1436 of the Civil Code provides
that "[a] lessee or bailee is estopped from
asserting title to the thing leased or
received, as against the lpssor or bailor."
In addition, the conclusive presumption
found in Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court known as estoppel against
tenants provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The
presumptions:
x x x x
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny
the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them.
It is clear from the above-quoted
provision that what a tenant is stopped
from denying is the title of his landlord
at the time of the commencement of the
landlord-tenant relation.32 If the title
asserted is one that is alleged to have
been acquired subsequent to the
commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply.33 Hence, the
tenant may show that the landlord's title
has expired or been conveyed to another
or himself; and he is not estopped to
deny a claim for rent, if he has been
ousted or evicted by title paramount.34 In
the present case, what respondent is
claiming is her title to the subject
property which she acquired subsequent
to the commencement of the landlord-
tenant relation between her and the
former owners of the questioned
condominium unit. Thus, the
presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court does not apply
and respondent is not estopped from
asserting title over the disputed property.
As to whether or not an implied trust was
created in respondent's favor, the first
sentence of Article 1448 of the Civil
Code provides that "[t]here is an implied
trust when property is sold and the legal
estate is granted to one party but the
price is paid by another for the purpose
of having the beneficial interest of the
property." This is sometimes referred to
as a purchase money resulting trust, the
elements of which are: (a) an actual
payment of money, property or services,
or an equivalent, constituting valuable
consideration; and (b) such consideration
must be furnished by the alleged
beneficiary of a resulting trust.35 The
principle of a resulting trust is based on
the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration, and not legal title,
determines the equitable title or interest
and are presumed always to have been
contemplated by the parties.36 They arise
from the nature or circumstances of the
consideration involved in a transaction
whereby one person thereby becomes
invested with legal title but is obligated
in equity to hold his legal title for the
benefit of another.37
Intention - although only presumed,
implied or supposed by law from the
nature of the transaction or from the facts
and circumstances accompanying the
transaction, particularly the source of the
consideration - is always an element of a
resulting trust and may be inferred from
the acts or conduct of the parties rather
than from direct expression of
conduct.38 Certainly, intent as an
indispensable element, is a matter that
necessarily lies in the evidence, that is,
by evidence, even circumstantial, of
statements made by the parties at or
before the time title passes.39 Because an
implied trust is neither dependent upon
an express agreement nor required to be
evidenced by writing, Article 1457 of our
Civil Code authorizes the admission of
parole evidence to prove their
existence.40 Parole evidence that is
required to establish the existence of an
implied trust necessarily has to be
trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose,
equivocal or Indefinite declarations.41 In
the instant petition, the Court finds no
cogent reason to depart from the findings
of the MeTC and the CA that, under the
circumstances of the case, the parole
evidence presented by respondent
sufficiently proves that an implied trust
was created in her favor.
Finally, a trust, which derives its strength
from the confidence one reposes on
another, does not lose that character
simply because of what appears in a legal
document.42 Applying this principle to
the present case, petitioner Armando, as
trustee, cannot repudiate the trust by
simply relying on the questioned Deed of
Assignment and Transfer of Rights and
the Deed of Absolute Sale.
 SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and
NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA
ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO,
OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL
ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO,
OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO
ESPEJO and NEMI
FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
When the parties admit the contents of
written documents but put in issue
whether these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the
parties, the deciding body is authorized
to look beyond these instruments and
into the contemporaneous and
subsequent actions of the parties in order
to determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of
doubt, it is the intention of the
contracting parties that prevails, for the
intention is the soul of a contract, not its
wording which is prone to mistakes,
inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold
otherwise would give life, validity, and
precedence to mere typographical errors
and defeat the very purpose of
agreements.
Respondents Espejos were the original
registered owners of two parcels of
agricultural land, with an area of two
hectares each. One is located
at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the
other is located in Barangay Murong,
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong
property). There is no dispute among the
parties that the Lantap property is
tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez
(Nemi)6 (who is the husband7 of
respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita),
while the Murong property is tenanted by
petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez)
and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).8
Nemi mortgaged both parcels of land to
Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI)
to secure certain loans. Upon their failure
to pay the loans, the mortgaged
properties were foreclosed and sold to
RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated
title to the properties and transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in
the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-
62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued
for the Murong property.
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares.
Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on
the southeast, and southwest by public
land; and on the northwest by Public
Land, properties claimed by Hilario
Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearings
true. Declination 0131 ‘E. Points referred
to are marked on plan H-176292.
Surveyed under authority of sections 12-
22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with
existing regulations of the Bureau of
Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land
Surveyor, [in] December 1912-March
1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons.
15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot
No. 159 of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.9
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated
June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap
property and contained the following
description:
Both TCTs describe their respective
subjects as located in "Bagabag
Townsite, K-27," without any reference
to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay
Murong.
On February 26, 1985, respondents
Espejos bought back one of their lots
from RBBI. The Deed of
Sale11 described the property sold as
follows:
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong
(NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee
simple in accordance with the Land
Registration Act, its title thereto
being evidenced by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-62096 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.
As may be seen from the foregoing, the
Deed of Sale did not mention
the barangay where the property was
located but mentioned the title of the
property (TCT No. T-62096), which title
corresponds to the Murong property.
However, there is no evidence that
respondents took possession of the
Murong property, or demanded lease
rentals from the petitioners (who
continued to be the tenants of the
Murong property), or otherwise
exercised acts of ownership over the
Murong property. On the other hand,
respondent Nemi (husband of respondent
Elenita and brother-in-law of the other
respondents), continued working on the
other property -- the Lantap property --
without any evidence that he ever paid
rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The
Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No.
T-62096 almost a decade later, on July 1,
1994.12
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI,
pursuant to Sections 2013 and 2114 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,15 executed
separate Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners
Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of
the Murong property. Both VLTs
described the subject thereof as an
agricultural land located in Barangay
Murong and covered by TCT No. T-
62836 (which, however, is the title
corresponding to the Lantap property).16
After the petitioners completed the
payment of the purchase price of
₱90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the
corresponding Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to
17 18
petitioners Marquez  and Dela Cruz  on
September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated
that their subjects were parcels of
agricultural land situated in Barangay
Murong.19 The CLOAs were registered in
the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya
on September 5, 1991.
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10
years after the Deed of Sale in favor of
the respondents and almost seven years
after the execution of VLTs in favor of
the petitioners),
respondents filed a Complaint20 before
the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of
petitioners’ CLOAs, the deposit of
leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor
of respondents, and the execution of a
deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI
in favor of respondent Nemi. The
complaint was based on respondents’
theory that the Murong property,
occupied by the petitioners, was owned
by the respondents by virtue of the 1985
buy-back, as documented in the Deed of
Sale. They based their claim on the fact
that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No.
62096, which pertains to the Murong
property.
Petitioners filed their Answer21 and
insisted that they bought the Murong
property as farmer-beneficiaries thereof.
They maintained that they have always
displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to
RBBI when it became the owner of the
Murong property, bought the same from
RBBI upon the honest belief that they
were buying the Murong property, and
occupied and exercised acts of ownership
over the Murong property. Petitioners
also argued that what respondents
Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985
was actually the Lantap property, as
evidenced by their continued occupation
and possession of the Lantap property
through respondent Nemi.
RBBI answered22 that it was the Lantap
property which was the subject of the
buy-back transaction with respondents
Espejos. It denied committing a grave
mistake in the transaction and maintained
its good faith in the disposition of its
acquired assets in conformity with the
rural banking rules and regulations.
OIC-RARAD Decision23
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to
the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed
of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T-
62096 appeared on respondents’ Deed of
Sale and the said title refers to the
Murong property, the OIC-RARAD
concluded that the subject of sale was
indeed the Murong property. On the
other hand, since the petitioners’ VLTs
referred to TCT No. T-62836, which
corresponds to the Lantap property, the
OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners’
CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap
property. As for the particular
description contained in the VLTs that
the subject thereof is the Murong
property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it
was a mere typographical error.
Further, since the VLTs covered the
Lantap property and petitioners are not
the actual tillers thereof, the OIC-
RARAD declared that they were
disqualified to become tenants of the
Lantap property and ordered the
cancellation of their CLOAs. It then
ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold
contract with the real tenant of the
Lantap property, Nemi.
The OIC-RARAD recognized that
petitioners’ only right as the actual tillers
of the Murong property is to remain as
the tenants thereof after the execution of
leasehold contracts with and payment of
rentals in arrears to respondents.
DARAB Decision24
Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the
DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD
Decision. It ruled that in assailing the
validity of the CLOAs issued to
petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers,
the burden of proof rests on the
respondents. There being no evidence
that the DAR field personnel were remiss
in the performance of their official duties
when they issued the corresponding
CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the
presumption of regular performance of
duty prevails. This conclusion is made
more imperative by the respondents’
admission that petitioners are the actual
tillers of the Murong property, hence
qualified beneficiaries thereof.
As for respondents’ allegation that they
bought back the Murong property from
RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they failed
to support their allegation with
substantial evidence. It gave more
credence to RBBI’s claim that
respondents repurchased the Lantap
property, not the Murong property.
Respondents, as owners of the Lantap
property, were ordered to enter into an
agricultural leasehold contract with their
brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual
tenant of the Lantap property.
The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001
Decision in this wise:
We find no basis or justification to
question the authenticity and validity of
the CLOAs issued to appellants as they
are by operation of law qualified
beneficiaries over the landholdings; there
is nothing to quiet as these titles were
awarded in conformity with the CARP
program implementation; and finally, the
Board declares that all controverted
claims to or against the subject
landholding must be completely and
finally laid to rest.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In appealing to the CA, the respondents
insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling
that they repurchased the Lantap
property, while the petitioners were
awarded the Murong property. They
were adamant that the title numbers
indicated in their respective deeds of
conveyance should control in
determining the subjects thereof.
Since respondents’ Deed of Sale
expressed that its subject is the property
with TCT No. T-62096, then what was
sold to them was the Murong property.
On the other hand, petitioners’ VLTs and
CLOAs say that they cover the property
with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be
understood that they were awarded the
Lantap property. Respondents added that
since petitioners are not the actual tillers
of the Lantap property, their CLOAs
should be cancelled due to their lack of
qualification.
The CA agreed with the respondents.
Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied
in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that
the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as
to its contents, particularly the
description of the land which was the
object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale
expressed that its subject is the land
covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the
Murong property – then that is the
property that the respondents
repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for
petitioners’ VLTs, the same refer to the
property with TCT No. T-62836; thus,
the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap
property. The additional description in
the VLTs that the subject thereof is
located in Barangay Murong was
considered to be a mere typographical
error. The CA ruled that the technical
description contained in the TCT is more
accurate in identifying the subject
property since the same particularly
describes the properties’ metes and
bounds.
Both the RBBI26 and petitioners27 filed
their respective motions for
reconsideration, which were separately
denied.28
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate
Petition for Review on Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this
Court.29 RBBI raised the issue that the
CA failed to appreciate that respondents
did not come to court with clean hands
because they misled RBBI to believe at
the time of the sale that the two lots were
not tenanted. RBBI also asked that they
be declared free from any liability to the
parties as it did not enrich itself at
anyone’s expense. RBBI’s petition was
dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of
merit. The said Resolution reads:
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and
arguments adduced in the petition for
review on certiorari, the Court Resolves
to DENY the petition for lack of
sufficient showing that the Court of
Appeals had committed any reversible
error in the questioned judgment to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this
case.30
Their Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied with finality.31 Entry of
judgment was made in that case on
December 15, 2004.32
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE SHOULD BE
APPLIED TO DETERMINE THE
SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACT.
RULING:
NO.
The SC held that the CA erred in citing
the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130,
Section 3.
It did not agree with what the CA held
that the Deed of Sale between
respondents and RBBI is the best
evidence as to the property that was sold
by RBBI to the respondents. Since the
Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the
land covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the
title for the Murong property – then the
property repurchased by the respondents
was the Murong property. Likewise, the
CA held that since the VLTs between
petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No.
T-62836 – the title for the Lantap
property – then the property transferred
to petitioners was the Lantap property.
Petitioners argue that the appellate court
erred in using the best evidence rule to
determine the subject of the Deed of Sale
and the Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer. They maintain that the issue in
the case is not the contents of the
contracts but the intention of the parties
that was not adequately expressed in
their contracts. Petitioners then argue
that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that
should be applied in order to adequately
resolve the dispute.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its
application of the Best Evidence Rule.
The Best Evidence Rule states that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, the best evidence is the
original document itself and no other
evidence (such as a reproduction,
photocopy or oral evidence) is
admissible as a general rule. The original
is preferred because it reduces the chance
of undetected tampering with the
document.42
In the instant case, there is no room for
the application of the Best Evidence Rule
because there is no dispute regarding the
contents of the documents. It is admitted
by the parties that the respondents’
Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-
62096 as its subject; while the
petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as
its subject, which is further described as
located in Barangay Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted
contents of these documents adequately
and correctly express the true intention
of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale,
petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that
while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the
parties actually intended the sale of the
Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-
62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that
the reference to TCT No. T-62836
(corresponding to the Lantap property)
reflects the true intention of RBBI and
the petitioners, and the reference to
"Barangay Murong" was a typographical
error. On the other hand, petitioners
claim that the reference to "Barangay
Murong" reflects their true intention,
while the reference to TCT No. T-62836
was a mere error.
This dispute reflects an intrinsic
ambiguity in the contracts, arising from
an apparent failure of the instruments to
adequately express the true intention of
the parties. To resolve the ambiguity,
resort must be had to evidence outside of
the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look
beyond the literal wording of the
documents and rejected any other
evidence that could shed light on the
actual intention of the contracting
parties. Though the CA cited the Best
Evidence Rule, it appears that what it
actually applied was the Parol Evidence
Rule instead, which provides:
When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered
as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence
of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.43
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol
or extrinsic evidence by which a party
seeks to contradict, vary, add to or
subtract from the terms of a valid
agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears
that what the CA actually applied in its
assailed Decision when it refused to look
beyond the words of the contracts was
the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best
Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave
primacy to the literal terms of the two
contracts and refused to admit any other
evidence that would contradict such
terms.
However, even the application of the
Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the
case at bar.
In the first place, respondents are not
parties to the VLTs executed between
RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers
to the written contracts.
Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides
that parol evidence rule is exclusive only
as "between the parties and their
successors-in-interest." The parol
evidence rule may not be invoked where
at least one of the parties to the suit is not
a party or a privy of a party to the written
document in question, and does not base
his claim on the instrument or assert a
right originating in the instrument.44
Moreover, the instant case falls under the
exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as
provided in the second paragraph of Rule
130, Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence
to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement if he puts in issue
in his pleading:
(1) An intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the
written agreement;
(2) The failure of the written
agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the petitioners’ VLTs suffer from
intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described
the subject property as covered by TCT
No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they
also describe the subject property as
being located in "Barangay Murong."
Even the respondents’ Deed of Sale falls
under the exception to the Parol
Evidence Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-
62096" (Murong property), but RBBI
contended that the true intent was to sell
the Lantap property. In short, it was
squarely put in issue that the written
agreement failed to express the true
intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of
the instant case necessitates an
examination of the parties’ respective
parol evidence, in order to determine the
true intent of the parties.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of
doubt, it is the intention of the
contracting parties that prevails, for the
intention is the soul of a contract,45 not
its wording which is prone to mistakes,
inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold
otherwise would give life, validity, and
precedence to mere typographical errors
and defeat the very purpose of
agreements.
In this regard, guidance is provided by
the following articles of the Civil Code
involving the interpretation of contracts:
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract
are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the
evident intention of the parties, the latter
shall prevail over the former.
Article 1371. In order to judge the
intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts
shall be principally considered.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for
the rules on the interpretation of
documents is likewise enlightening:
Section 13. Interpretation according to
circumstances. – For the proper
construction of an instrument, the
circumstances under which it was made,
including the situation of the subject
thereof and of the parties to it, may be
shown, so that the judge may be placed
in the position of those whose language
he is to interpret.
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it
is clear that the Deed of Sale was
intended to transfer the Lantap property
to the respondents, while the VLTs were
intended to convey the Murong property
to the petitioners. This may be seen from
the contemporaneous and subsequent
acts of the parties.
Third issue
Determining the intention of the parties
regarding the subjects of their contracts
We are convinced that the subject of the
Deed of Sale between RBBI and the
respondents was the Lantap property,
and not the Murong property.
After the execution in 1985 of the Deed
of Sale, the respondents did not exercise
acts of ownership that could show that
they indeed knew and believed that they
repurchased the Murong property. They
did not take possession of the Murong
property. As admitted by the parties, the
Murong property was in the possession
of the petitioners, who occupied and
tilled the same without any objection
from the respondents. Moreover,
petitioners paid leasehold rentals for
using the Murong property to RBBI, not
to the respondents.
Aside from respondents’ neglect of their
alleged ownership rights over the
Murong property, there is one other
circumstance that convinces us that what
respondents really repurchased was the
Lantap property. Respondent Nemi
(husband of respondent Elenita) is the
farmer actually tilling the Lantap
property, without turning over the
supposed landowner’s share to RBBI.
This strongly indicates that the
respondents considered themselves
(and not RBBI) as the owners of the
Lantap property. For if respondents
(particularly spouses Elenita and Nemi)
truly believed that RBBI retained
ownership of the Lantap property, how
come they never complied with their
obligations as supposed tenants of
RBBI’s land? The factual circumstances
of the case simply do not support the
theory propounded by the respondents.
We are likewise convinced that the
subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners
was the Murong property, and not the
Lantap property. When the VLTs were
executed in 1990, petitioners were
already the tenant-farmers of the Murong
property, and had been paying rentals to
RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural
that the Murong property and no other
was the one that they had intended to
acquire from RBBI with the execution of
the VLTs. Moreover, after the execution
of the VLTs, petitioners remained in
possession of the Murong property,
enjoying and tilling it without any
opposition from anybody. Subsequently,
after the petitioners completed their
payment of the total purchase price of
₱90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials
conducted their investigation of the
Murong property which, with the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, did not
reveal any anomaly. Petitioners were
found to be in actual possession of the
Murong property and were the qualified
beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR
officials issued CLOAs in petitioners’
favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer
to the land in Barangay Murong. All this
time, petitioners were in possession of
the Murong property, undisturbed by
anyone for several long years, until
respondents started the controversy in
1997.
All of these contemporaneous and
subsequent actions of RBBI and
petitioners support their position that the
subject of their contract (VLTs) is the
Murong property, not the Lantap
property. Conversely, there has been no
contrary evidence of the parties’
actuations to indicate that they intended
the sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it
appears that the reference in their VLT to
TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was
due to their honest but mistaken belief
that the said title covers the Murong
property. Such a mistake is not
farfetched considering that TCT No. T-
62836 only refers to the Municipality of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does
not indicate the particular barangay
where the property is located. Moreover,
both properties are bounded by a road
and public land. Hence, were it not for
the detailed technical description, the
titles for the two properties are very
similar.
The respondents attempt to discredit
petitioners’ argument that their VLTs
were intrinsically ambiguous and failed
to express their true intention by asking
why petitioners never filed an action for
the reformation of their contract.46 A
cause of action for the reformation of a
contract only arises when one of the
contracting parties manifests an
intention, by overt acts, not to abide by
the true agreement of the parties.47 It
seems fairly obvious that petitioners had
no cause to reform their VLTs because
the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners)
never had any dispute as to the
interpretation and application thereof.
They both understood the VLTs to cover
the Murong property (and not the Lantap
property). It was only much later, when
strangers to the contracts argued for a
different interpretation, that the issue
became relevant for the first time.
All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale
dated February 26, 1985 between
respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap
property under TCT No. T-62836, while
the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-
396 of the petitioners cover the Murong
property under TCT No. T-62096. In
consequence, the CA’s ruling against
RBBI should not be executed as such
execution would be inconsistent with our
ruling herein. Although the CA’s
decision had already become final and
executory as against RBBI with the
dismissal of RBBI’s petition in G.R. No.
163320, our ruling herein in favor of
petitioners is a supervening cause which
renders the execution of the CA decision
against RBBI unjust and inequitable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
assailed October 7, 2003 Decision, as
well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
69981
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
January 17, 2001 Decision of the
DARAB Central Office
is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale
dated February 26, 1985 between
respondents and Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap
property under TCT No. T-62836, while
the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-
396 of the petitioners cover the Murong
property under TCT No. T-62096. The
Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is
directed to make the necessary
corrections to the titles of the said
properties in accordance with this
Decision. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.