G.R. No.
201011               January 27,
2014
THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION,
PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and
GLORIA, all surnamed DIMAGUILA,
Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO,
Respondents.
On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses,
Jose and Sonia Monteiro (Spouses
Monteiro), along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa,
and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint
for Partition and Damages before the RTC,
against the pet1t10ners, Theresita, Juan,
Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria
Dimaguila (The Dimaguilas), together with
Rosalina, Jonathan, Eve, Sol, Venus,
Enrique, Nina, Princess Arieta, and
Evangelina Borlaza. The complaint alleged
that all the pmiies were co-owners and
prayed for the pmiition of a residential
house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St.,
Liliw, Laguna, with an area of 489 square
meters, and covered by Tax Declaration No.
1453. Spouses Monteiro anchored their
claim on a deed of sale executed in their
favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila
(Pedro).
In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the
other defendants countered that there was no
co-ownership to speak of in the first place.
They alleged that the subject property, then
owned by Maria Ignacio Buenaseda, had
long been partitioned equally between her
two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila,
CA-G.R. No. SP 52833, which upheld the
through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,
with its southern-half portion assigned to
Perfecto and the northern-half portion to
Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the
heirs of Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro
had nothing to do with the property as they
were not heirs of either Perfecto or
Vitaliano.
During the course of the proceedings,
several incidents were initiated, namely: (a)
Motion to Dismiss for lack of legal capacity
to sue of Spouses Monteiro and for lack of
cause of action; (b) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of denial
thereof, which was denied; (c) Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents;
(d) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
granting the same, which was denied; (e)
Motion to Defer Pre-trial; (f) Notice of
Consignation by the petitioners in the
exercise of their alleged right of redemption
of the share being claimed by the Spouses
Monteiro in light of the deed of sale they
produced and claimed to have been executed
by the heirs of Pedro in their favor; (g)
Motion to Remove Sonia Monteiro (Sonia)
as plaintiff, which was denied; (h) Motion
for Reconsideration thereof, which was also
denied; (i) Motion for Clarification and/or
Extended Resolution; and (j) Motion to
Suspend Proceedings due to a pending
Petition for Certiorari before the CA
assailing several of the RTC orders. The
proceedings resumed after the promulgation
by the CA of its April 5, 2000 Resolution in
assailed RTC orders.
On January 2, 2001, upon resumption of the
proceedings, Spouses Monteiro filed their
Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit
Amended Complaint.4 The RTC granted
their motion. The amended complaint
abandoned the original claim for partition
and instead sought the recovery of
possession of a portion of the subject
property occupied by the Dimagui as and
other defendants, specifically, the potiion
sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro.
Furthermore, only Spouses Monteiro were
retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as
defendants.
In amending their complaint, Spouses
Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission
in their original answer that the subject
propetiy had already been partitioned
between Perfecto and Vitaliano, through a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated
October 5, 1945, and that during their
lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto
would become the owner of the southern-hal
f portion and Vitaliano of the northern-half
portion, which division was observed and
respected by them as well as their heirs and
successors-in-interest.
Spouses Monteiro further averred that
Perfecto was survived by Esperanza,
Leandro and Pedro, who had divided the
southern-half portion equally amongst
themselves, with their respective 1 /3 shares
measuring 81.13 square meters each; that
Pedro's share pertains to the 1 /3 of the
southern-half immediately adjacent to the
northern-half adjudicated to the
Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano; that on
September 29, 1992, Pedro's share was sold
by his heirs to them through a Bilihan ng
Lahat Naming Karapatan (Bilihan) with the
acquiescence of the heirs of Esperanza and
Leandro appearing in an Affidavit of
Conformity and Waiver; and that when they
attempted to take possession of the share of
Pedro, they discovered that the subject
portion was being occupied by the
Dimaguilas.
In their Answer5 to the amended complaint,
the Dimaguilas admitted that the subject
property was inherited by, and divided
equally between Perfecto and Vitaliano, but
denied the admission in their original answer
that it had been actually divided into
southern and nmihern portions. Instead, they
argued that the Extrajudicial Partition
mentioned only the division of the subject
property "into two and share and share
alike." In effect, they argued the existence of
a co-owenrship, contrary to their original
position. The Dimaguilas further argued that
the Bilihan did not specify the metes and
bounds of the property sold, in violation of
Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Even
assuming that such had been specified, they
averred that the sale of a definite portion of
a property owned in common was void since
a co-owner could only sell his undivided
share in the property.
During the trial, Spouses Monteiro presented
Pedrito Adrieta, brother of Sonia Monteiro
(Sonia), who testified that Perfecto was his
grandfather and that at the time of Perfecto's
death, he had two properties, one of which
was the subject property in Liliw, Laguna,
which went to his children, Esperanza,
Leonardo and Pedro. Pedro was survived by
his children Pedrito, Theresita, Francisco,
and Luis, who, in turn, sold their rights over
the subject property to Sonia.
Sonia testified that she was approached by
Pedro's son, Francisco, and was asked if she
was interested in purchasing Pedro's 1/3
share of the southern portion of the Bahay
na Sato, and that he showed her a deed of
extrajudicial partition executed by and
between Perfecto and Vitaliano, as well as
the tax declaration of the property to prove
that the property had already been
partitioned between the two brothers.
Engineer Baltazar F. Mesina testified that he
was the geodetic engineer hired by Spouses
Monteiro to survey the property in Liliw,
and recounted that he checked the boundary
of the subject property, subdivided the lot
into two and came up with a survey plan.
Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the
Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented
a certified true copy of the cadastral map of
Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.
Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), testified that as part of
her duties, she certifies and safekeeps the
records of surveyed land, including cadastral
maps from the region.
One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, was the
sole witness for the defendants. She testified
that their first counsel made a mistake when
he alleged in their original answer that the
property had already been partitioned into
n01ihern and southern portions between the
two brothers, as the original answer had
been rushed and they were never given a
copy of it. She claimed that the mistake was
only pointed out to her by their new counsel
after their former counsel withdrew due to
cancer. She further testified that there was
no intention to partition the "bahay na bato"
which stood on the subject property, in order
to preserve its historical and sentimental
value.
RTC: ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro
and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the
possession of the subject 1 /3 portion of the
southern-half of the property.
CA: affirmed the RTC.
The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had
established their case by a preponderance of
evidence thru their presentation of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition,8 the cadastral map
and the municipal assessor's records.9 It
noted, more importantly, that the
Dimaguilas themselves corroborated the
claim of partition in their original answer. It
likewise ruled that the petitioners were
estopped from denying their admission of
partition after the respondent spouses had
relied on their judicial admission.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE
PETITIONERS TIMELY OBJECTED
TO THE CADASTRAL MAP AND THE
LIST OF CLAIMANTS PRESENTED
BY THE RESP. SPOUSES ON THE
GROUND THAT THEY VIOLATED
THE RULE ON HEARSAY AND BEST
EVIDENCE RULE.
RULING:
NO.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d)
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document
itself, except when the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.22 Section 7 of
the same Rule provides that when the
original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public
office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof.23 Section 24 of Rule 132
provides that the record of public documents
may be evidenced by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody or the
record.24
Certified true copies of the cadastral map of
Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants
of the area covered by the map were
presented by two public officers. The first
was Crisostomo Arves, Clerk III of the
Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of
such documents. The second was Dominga
Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a
record officer, certifies and safekeeps
records of surveyed land involving cadastral
maps. The cadastral maps and the list of
claimants, as ce1iified true copies of original
public records, fall under the exception to
the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides
that entries in official records are an
exception to the rule.25 The rule provides
that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer
of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. The necessity of this rule
consists in the inconvenience and difficulty
of requiring the official's attendance as a
witness to testify to the innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. The
document's trustworthiness consists in the
presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty.26
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral
surveys. The DENR is the department
tasked to execute, supervise and manage the
conduct of cadastral surveys.27 It is,
therefore, clear that the cadastral map and
the corresponding list of claimants qualify as
entries in official records as they were
prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law.
As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are primafacie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
Even granting that the petitioners had not
admitted the partition, they presented no
evidence to contradict the evidence of the
respondent spouses. Thus, even without the
admission of the petitioners, the respondent
spouses proved by a preponderance of
evidence that there had indeed been a
partition of the subject property.
Sale of 1/3 Portion of the Southern-half
To prove that 1/3 of the southern-half
portion of the subject property was sold to
them, Spouses Monteiro presented a deed of
sale entitled Bilihan ng Lahat Naming
Karapatan,28 dated September 29, 1992,
wherein Pedro's share was sold by his heirs
to them, with the acquiescence of the heirs
of Esperanza and Leandro in an Affidavit of
Conformity and Waiver.29 The petitioners
argue that the Bilihan should not have been
admitted into evidence because it lacked the
documentary stamp tax required by Section
201 of the NIRC.
On August 29, 1994, the petitioners filed a
motion for the production and/or inspection
of documents,30 praying that Spouses
Monteiro be ordered to produce the deed of
sale, which they cited as the source of their
rights as co-owners. On November 20, 1995,
Spouses Monteiro submitted their
compliance,31 furnishing the RTC and the
petitioners with a copy32 of the Bilihan. On
January 3, 1996, the petitioners filed a
notice of consignation,33 manifesting that
they had attempted to exercise their right of
redemption as co-owners of the 1/3 portion
of the southern half of the property under
Article 162334 of the Civil Code by sending
and tendering payment of redemption to
Spouses Monteiro, which was, however,
returned.
By filing the notice of consignation and
tendering their payment for the redemption
of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the
property, the petitioners, in effect, admitted
the existence, due execution and validity of
the Bilihan. Consequently, they are now
estopped from questioning its admissiblity
in evidence for relying on such for their
right of redemption. Additionally, the Court
notes that the copy35 of the Bilihan which
was originally submitted by Spouses
Monteiro with its compliance filed on
November 20, 1995, does in fact bear a
documentary stamp tax. It could only mean
that the documentary stamp tax on the sale
was properly paid. The Bilihan was, 6% per annum shall also be imposed on the
therefore, properly admitted into evidence total amount of rent due from finality of this
and considered by the RTC. Decision until fully paid.37
In any case, as correctly held by the lower WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
cou1is, the petitioners, as heirs of Vitaliano, The August 15, 2011 Decision and the
who inherited the northern-half po1iion of March 15, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
the subject property, do not possess the Appeals, in CA-G .R. CV No. 92707 are
necessary personality to assail the sale of the AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that:
southern-half portion between Spouses
Monteiro and the heirs of Pedro.1âwphi1 a. The award of rent at the rate of
They are not real parties-in-interest who ₱500.00 per month shall be reckoned
stand to be benefited or injured by the sale from January 2, 2001 until the
of the 1/3 portion of the southern-half over property is vacated; and
which they have absolutely no right. As
correctly ruled by the courts below, only b. Interest at the rate of 6% per
fellow co-owners have the personality to annum shall be imposed on the total
assail the sale, namely, the heirs of Pedro's amount of rent due from finality of
siblings, Esperanza and Leandro. They have, this Decision until fully paid.
however, expressly aquiesced to the sale and
waived their right to the property in the SO ORDERED.
affidavit presented by Spouses Monteiro.36
As such, the petitioners have no right to
their counterclaims of demolition of
improvements and payment of damages.
With Spouses Monteiro having sufficiently
proved their claim over the subject I /3
portion of the southern-half of the prope1iy
through the Bilihan, the lower courts did not
err in awarding possession, rentals,
attorney's fees, and litigation expenses to
them.
The Court, however, finds that the award of
rentals should be reckoned from January 2,
2001, the date the Spouses Monteiro filed
their Amended Complaint seeking recovery
of the subject portion. Interest at the rate of
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v.
HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ,
REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P.
MACAPAZ, JR., Respondents.
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned
the property, the subject matter of this case,
with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz,
Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-
Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children
of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz,
Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete
Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, with a total area of
299 square meters, is located at No. 1273
Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe
Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered
in the names of the petitioner (married to
Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
183088.5 In said certificate of title,
appearing as Entry No. 02671 is an
annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela
asserting rights and interests over a portion
of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m. 6
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died
without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No.
183088 was cancelled and a new certificate
of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in the
name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of
Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby
Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion
to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included
among the documents submitted for the
purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was
an Affidavit9 dated July 12, 2005
purportedly executed by both the petitioner
and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the
affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela
was not signed by the Deputy Register of
Deeds of Makati City, making the same
legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005,
Fidela passed away.10
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed
a criminal complaint for two counts of
falsification of public documents under
Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code against the petitioner.11 However, said
criminal charges were eventually dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents,
asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra,
instituted the action for Annulment of Deed
of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466
with Damages against the petitioner and the
Register of Deeds of Makati City.12
In her Answer with Compulsory
13
Counterclaim, the petitioner averred that
the respondents have no legal capacity to
institute said civil action on the ground that
they are illegitimate children of Anastacio,
Sr. As such, they have no right over
Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of
the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate
children from inheriting intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of their
father and mother.
After trial, the RTC found for the
respondents
The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated
January 18, 2005 presented for the
cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was a
forgery considering that Silvestra, who
purportedly executed said deed of sale died
on November 11, 2002, about three years
before the execution of the said Deed of
Sale.16 Respecting the respondents' legal
capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in
this wise:
CA: affirming the RTC decision with
modification as to the amount of damages.
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the
cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of
the petitioner were obtained through forgery.
As to the question of whether the
respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and
thus have the legal capacity to institute the
action, the CA ruled in this wise:
ISSUE:
whether or not the respondents are legal
heirs of Silvestra.
RULING:
NO.
The petition is bereft of merit.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy
can only be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, as held
in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,30 this
Court however deems it necessary to pass
upon the respondents' relationship to
Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights
to the subject property. Besides, the question
of whether the respondents have the legal
capacity to sue as alleged heirs of Silvestra
was among the issues agreed upon by the
parties in the pre-trial.
At first blush, the documents presented as
proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the
marriage contract, and (2) the canonical
certificate of marriage, cannot be used as
legal basis to establish the fact of marriage
without running afoul with the Rules on
Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules on
Evidence provides that: "When the subject
of the inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than
the original document itself, x x x."
Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original
document can still be admitted as secondary
evidence subject to certain requirements
specified by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang,
Jr.,31 it was held that:
A secondary evidence is admissible only
upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5,
which states that: when the original has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses
in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror
of the secondary evidence is burdened to
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof,
namely: (1) the execution or existence of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or its non-production in court; and
(3) the unavailability of the original is not
due to bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror. Proof of the due
execution of the document and its
subsequent loss would constitute the basis
for the introduction of secondary evidence, x
x x.32 (Citation omitted)
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of
marriage is not a public document. As early
as in the case of United States v.
Evangelista,33 it has been settled that
church registries of births, marriages, and
deaths made subsequent to the promulgation
of General Orders No. 68 and the passage of
Act No. 190 are no longer public writings,
nor are they kept by duly authorized public
officials.34 They are private writings and
their authenticity must therefore be proved
as are all other private writings in
accordance with the rules of evidence. 35
Accordingly, since there is no showing that
the authenticity and due execution of the
canonical certificate of marriage of
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it
cannot be admitted in evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other
proofs can be offered to establish the fact of
a solemnized marriage.36 Jurisprudence
teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's
birth certificate may be recognized as
competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.37
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate
filiation, the respondents presented their
respective Certificates of Live Birth issued
by the National Statistics Office38 where
Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17
of both documents.
A perusal of said documents shows that the
respondents were apparently born to the
same parents — their father's name is
Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their
mother's maiden name is Fidela Overa
Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks:
"24. DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE
OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was
stated therein that respondents' parents were
married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang,
Leyte."39
The petitioner asserts that said documents do
not conclusively prove the respondents'
legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering
any evidence to the contrary. The
certificates of live birth contain no entry
stating whether the respondents are of
legitimate or illegitimate filiation, making
said documents unreliable and unworthy of
weight and value in the determination of the
issue at hand.
Moreover, the petitioner states that in the
respondents' certificates of live birth, only
the signature of Fidela appears, and that they
were not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She
argues that the birth certificate must be
signed by the father in order to be competent
evidence to establish filiation, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, invoking Roces v.
Local Civil Registrar of Manila40 where it
was held that a birth certificate not signed by
the alleged father is not competent evidence
of paternity.41
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public
document that consists of entries (regarding
the facts of birth) in public records (Civil
Registry) made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer (Civil Registrar)."42 Thus,
being public documents, the respondents'
certificates of live birth are presumed valid,
and are prima facie evidence of the truth of
the facts stated in them.43
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence
good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is
sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the
party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient."44
The petitioner's assertion that the birth
certificate must be signed by the father in
order to be a competent evidence of
legitimate filiation does not find support in
law and jurisprudence. In fact, the
petitioner's reliance on Roces45 is misplaced
considering that what was sought to be
proved is the fact of paternity of an
illegitimate child, and not legitimate
filiation.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, 46
the declaration of either parent of the new-
born legitimate child shall be sufficient for
the registration of his birth in the civil
register, and only in the registration of birth
of an illegitimate child does the law require
that the birth certificate be signed and sworn
to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only
by the mother if the father refuses to
acknowledge the child.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act
No. 3753 reads:
Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of
Birth. - The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in
default thereof, the declaration of cither
parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of a birth in
the civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from the documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician, or midwife in attendance at the
birth or by either parent of the newly born
child.
In such declaration, the persons above
mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship,
and religion of parents or, in case the father
is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant
was born; if) and such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.
x x x x
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth
certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only
the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state
or reveal in the document the name of the
father who refuses to acknowledge the child,
or to give therein any information by which
such father could be identified, x x x
(Emphasis Ours)
Forsooth, the Court finds that the
respondents' certificates of live birth were
duly executed consistent with the provision
of the law respecting the registration of birth
of legitimate children. The fact that only the
signatures of Fidela appear on said
documents is of no moment because Fidela
only signed as the declarant or informant of
the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate
children.
Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of
live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband
and wife for a number of years, as a result of
which they had two children — the second
child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than
three years after their first child, Alicia.
Verily, such fact is admissible proof to
establish the validity of marriage. Court
Resolution dated February 13, 2013 in GR.
No. 183262 entitled Social Security System
(SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso47 had the
occasion to state:
Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the
question of what other proofs can be offered
to establish the fact of a solemnized
marriage,
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
viz:
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this
Court ruled that as proof of marriage
may be presented: a) testimony of a
witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's
public and open cohabitation as husband
and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the
birth and baptismal certificate of children
born during such union; and d) the mention
of such nuptial in subsequent documents.48
(Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,49 it has been petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
held that, "[p]ersons dwelling together in dated October 20, 2009 and Resolution
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
absence of any counter presumption or in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are
evidence special to the case, to be in fact AFFIRMED.
married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties SO ORDERED.
were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage."50
Furthermore, as the established period of
cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela
transpired way before the effectivity of the
Family Code, the strong presumption
accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil
Code in favor of the validity of marriage
cannot be disregarded. Thus:
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions
favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or facts leans
toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the
legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of
parents over their children, and the validity
of defense for any member of the family in
case of unlawful aggression.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
 CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD.,
Petitioner,
vs.
TRAVELER KIDS, INC., Respondent.
Sometime in 2000, petitioner Capital Shoes
Factory Ltd., (CSFL),a foreign corporation
engaged in the manufacturing and trading of
children's shoes and similar products, and
respondent Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI),a
domestic corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing, importing and
distributing shoes, sandals and other
footware entered into an agreement, wherein
they agreed that TKI would import the shoes
and sandals made by CSFL from its China
factory.
After TKI placed numerous purchase orders,
CSFL began manufacturing the goods
pursuant to the special designs and
specifications of TKI. CSFL then shipped
the goods to TKI. It was their arrangement
that TKI would pay thirty (30%) percent of
the purchase price of the goods by way of
letters of credit, and the balance of seventy
(70%) percent by way of telegraphic
transfer, thirty (30) days from the date of
delivery of the goods.
For the first three years, TKI was able to pay
its purchase orders and the shipments made
by CSFL. In 2004, however, TKI started to
default in its payments. CSFL granted
numerous concessions and extensions to
TKI. Thereafter, TKI was able to make a
partial payment on its unpaid accounts.
As of July 10, 2005, the total unpaid
accounts of TKI amounted to U.S.
$325,451.39, exclusive of the interest
accruing thereto. In addition, CSFL also
manufactured $92,000.00 worth of
children's shoes and sandals pursuant to the
design and specifications of TKI in its
purchase orders.
Both verbal and written demand letters were
made by CSFL to TKI for the payment of its
unpaid accounts, but to no avail.
To protect its interest, CSFL filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money
and damages against TKI before the RTC.
During the trial, CSFL, through its witness,
identified several sales invoices and order
slips it issued as evidence of its transactions
withTKI. The latter objected to the
identification pointing out that the
documents being presented were mere
photocopies. TKI also objected to the
evidence presented by CSFL to prove the
amount of attorney’s fees on the ground that
it was not an issue raised during the pre-
trial. The RTC noted the objections.
After the presentation of its last witness,
CSFL filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits5
seeking the admission of, among others, the
sales invoices and order slips earlier
objected to by TKI. The latter objected to
the admission of the documents offered,
contending thatseveral of the sales invoices
and order slips should not be admitted
because they were merely photocopies. TKI
also objected to the admission ofdocuments
by which CSFL sought to prove its claim for
attorney’s fees.6
On May 13, 2011, the RTC issued the
Order7 admitting all the exhibits offered by
CFSL.
Not in conformity, TKI filed a motion for
reconsideration8 arguing that the exhibits
formally offered by CSFL were inadmissible
in evidence for being mere photocopies. TKI
also argued that the evidence relating to the
claimed "legal fees" were erroneously
admitted because the matter was not raised
as an issue during the pre-trial.
On June 23, 2011, the RTC issued the
order9 denying TKI’s motion for
reconsideration, ruling that the sales
invoices and order slips could be admitted
because the duplicate originals of the
invoices were already sufficiently
established by the testimony of CSFL’s
officer and principal witness, Ms. Susan
Chiu (Chiu). Regarding the documents
offered by CSFL to prove its claim for
attorney’s fees, the RTC stated that the
demand for attorney’s fees was impliedly
included in the issue of whether or not TKI
was liable to CSFL for the entire amount
claimed.
Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to
file a petition for certiorariwith prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
CAin which it reiterated its argument
regarding the inadmissibility of the
photocopied evidence and the erroneous
inclusion of those documents proving
entitlement to attorney’s fees which matter
was not raised during the pre-trial.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE
PHOTOCOPIED DOCUMENTS ARE
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE.
RULING:
YES.
Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
reads:
Sec. 4 . Original of document. —
xxxx
(b) When a document is in two or more
copies executed at or about the same time,
with identical contents, all such copies are
equally regarded as originals.
xxxx
In Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies v. The
Court of Appeals and Associated Bank,16 it
was stressed that duplicate originals were
admissible as evidence. Pertinent portions of
the said decision read:
Respondent court is of the viewthat the
above provision must be construed to mean
the original copy of the document
evidencing the credit and not its duplicate,
thus:
. . . [W]hen the law speaksof the delivery of
the private document evidencing a credit, it
must be construed as referring to the
original. In this case, appellees (Trans-
Pacific) presented, not the originals but the
duplicates of the three promissory notes."
(Rollo, p. 42)
The above pronouncement of respondent
court is manifestly groundless.It is
undisputed that the documents presented
were duplicate originals and are therefore
admissible as evidence. Further, it must be
noted that respondent bank itself did not
bother to challenge the authenticity of the
duplicate copies submitted by petitioner. In
People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]),we
said:
When carbon sheets are inserted between
two or more sheets of writing paper so that
the writing of a contract upon the outside
sheet, including the signature of the party to
be charged thereby, produces a facsimile
upon the sheets beneath, such signature
being thus reproduced by the same stroke of
pen which made the surface or exposed
impression, all of the sheets so written on
are regarded as duplicate originals and either
of them may be introduced in evidence as
such without accounting for the
nonproduction of the others.
[Emphases supplied]
Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL’s principal
witness, was able to satisfactorily explain
that Exhibits "D" to "GG-1" and "HH" to
"KK-1" were duplicate originals of
invoicesand order slips, and not mere
photocopies.
The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs)
clearly show that Chiu convincingly
explained that CSFL usually prepared two
(2) copies of invoices for a particular
transaction, giving one copy to a client and
retaining the other copy. The Court combed
through her testimony and found nothing
that would indicate that the
documentsoffered were mere photocopies.
She remained firm and consistent with her
statement that the subject invoices were
duplicate originals as they were prepared at
the same time. The Court sees no reason
why Section 4(b), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court should not apply. At any rate, those
exhibits can be admitted as part of the
testimony of Chiu.
The Court went over the RTC records and
the TSNs and found that, contrary to the
assertion of TKI, the duplicate originals
were produced in court and compared with
their photocopies during the hearing before
the trial court. The transcripts bare all of
these but were missed by the appellate court,
which believed the assertion of TKI that
what were produced in court and offered in
evidence were mere photocopies. The TSNs
further reveal that after the comparison, the
photocopies were the ones retained in the
records.18
The Court notes that this case involves a
foreign entity and has been pending since
October 6, 2005.19 It is about time that this
case be decided on the merits. At this
juncture, the Court reminds counsel for TKI
of his duty, as an officer of the court, to see
to it that the orderly administration of justice
be not unduly impeded.
After the admission of CSFL’s exhibits as
evidence, TKI should have let trial proceed
in due course instead of immediately
resorting to certiorari, by presenting its own
testimonial and documentary evidence and
in case of an unfavorable decision, appeal
the same in accordance with law. After all,
the RTC stated that, granting that the
questioned exhibits were not admissible,
"there still remained enough evidence to
substantiate plaintiff’s claim on which the
Court can validly render judgment upon
application of the pertinent law and/or
jurisprudence."20 In the case of Johnson Lee
v. People of the Philippines,21 it was
written:
In this case, there is no dispute that the RTC
had jurisdiction over the cases filed by the
public respondent against the petitioner for
estafa. The Order admitting in evidence the The pertinent records of the case are hereby
photocopies of the charge invoices and ordered remanded to the Regional Trial
checks was issued by the RTC in the Court, Branch 170, Malabon City, for
exercise of its "jurisdiction. Even if appropriate proceedings.
erroneous, the same is a mere error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction. The trial court is directed to give priority to
Additionally, the admission of secondary this case and act on it with dispatch.
evidence in lieu of the original copies
predicated on proof of the offeror of the SO ORDERED.
conditions sine qua non to the admission of
the said evidence is a factual issue addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial
court.1âwphi1 Unless grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown to have been
committed by the trial court, the resolution
of the trial court admitting secondary
evidence must be sustained. The remedy of
the petitioner, after the admission of the
photocopies of the charge invoices and the
checks, was to adduce his evidence, and if
after trial, he is convicted, to appeal the
decision to the appropriate appellate court.
Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, only questions of law
may be properly raised.
[Emphases supplied]
WHERE FORE, the October 5, 2011
Decision and the January 16, 20 i 2
Resoiution of the Court of Appeais in CA-
G.R. SP No. i 204 i 3, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the
exclusion of Exhibits ''D" to "GG-1" and
"HH'' to "KK-1 '' are concerned. The May
13, 2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 170, Malabon City, is
REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 205879               April 23, 2014
SKUNAC CORPORATION and
ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO S. SYLIANTENG and
CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This treats of the petition for review on
certiorari assailing the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated August 10, 2012 and February 18,
2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No.
92022.
The factual and procedural antecedents of
the case, as narrated by the CA, are as
follows:
The civil cases before the [Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City) involved two (2)
parcels of land identified as Lot 1, with an
area of 1,250 square meters (Civil Case No.
63987) and Lot 2, with an area of 990 square
meters (Civil Case No. 63988), both found
in Block 2 of the Pujalte Subdivision
situated along Wilson Street, Greenhills, San
Juan City which are portions of a parcel of
land previously registered in the name of
Luis A. Pujalte on October 29, 1945 and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
("TCT") No. (-78865) (-2668) -93165
("Mother Title") of the Register of Deeds for
the City of Manila.
Plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng
and Caesar S. Sylianteng ("appellants") base
their claim of ownership over the subject
lots a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in
their favor by their mother, Emerenciana
Sylianteng ("Emerenciana"), on June 27,
1983. Appellants further allege that
Emerenciana acquired the lots from the late
Luis Pujalte [Luis] through a Deed of Sale
dated June 20, 1958 as reflected in Entry
No. P.E. 4023, annotated on the covering
TCT, by virtue of which she was issued
TCT No. 42369. Then, when she sold the
lots to appellants, TCT No. 39488, covering
the same, was issued in their names.
[Herein petitioners] Skunac Corporation
("Skunac") and Alfonso F. Enriquez
("Enriquez"), on the other hand, claim that a
certain Romeo Pujalte who was declared by
the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151 in
Special Proceedings No. 3366 as the sole
heir of Luis Pujalte, caused the
reconstitution of the Mother Title resulting
to its cancellation and the issuance of TCT
No. 5760-R in his favor. Romeo Pujalte then
allegedly sold the lots to Skunac and
Enriquez in 1992. Thus, from TCT No.
5760-R, TCT No. 5888-R, for Lot 1 was
issued in the name of Skunac, while TCT
No. 5889-R for Lot 2 was issued in the name
of Enriquez.
[Respondents] contend that they have a
better right to the lots in question because
the transactions conveying the same to them
preceded those claimed by [petitioners] as
source of the latter's titles. [Respondents]
further assert that [petitioners] could not be
considered as innocent purchasers in good
faith and for value because they had prior
notice of the previous transactions as stated
in the memorandum of encumbrances
annotated on the titles covering the subject
lots. [Petitioners], for their part, maintain
that [respondents] acquired the lots under
questionable circumstances it appearing that
there was no copy of the Deed of Sale,
between Emerenciana and Luis Pujalte, on
file with the Office of the Register of
Deeds.3
On November 16, 2007, the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig (RTC) rendered judgment in
favor of herein petitioners. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiffs:
1. Declaring as null and void TCT
No. 42369 in the name of Emerciana
(sic) Sylianteng and TCT No. 39488
in the name of plaintiffs herein and
ordering the cancellation thereof;
2. Declaring the herein defendants as
buyers in good faith and for value;
and
3. Declaring TCT No. 5888-R in the
name of SKUNAC Corporation and
TCT No. 5889-R in the name of
Alfonso Enriquez as valid.
The complaint-in-intervention is ordered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
dismissed. 39488 in the names of Roberto S. APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
Sylianteng and Caesar S. Sylianteng; FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS
With costs against the plaintiffs. and FAILED TO PROVE THE
EXISTENCE OF SALE BETWEEN
SO ORDERED.4 3. Ordering defendants-appellees LUIS PUJALTE AND THEIR
Skunac Corporation and Alfonso F. PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST,
Herein respondents then filed an appeal with Enriquez, and intervenor-appellee EMERENCIANA SYLIANTENG.
the CA. Romeo N. Pujalte, jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiffs-appellants III. THE HONORABLE COURT
On August 10, 2012, the CA promulgated its Roberto S. Sylianteng and Caesar S. OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
assailed Decision, disposing as follows: Sylianteng: DECLARING NULL AND VOID
TCT NO. 42369 PURPORTED TO
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, a. Moral damages in the HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO
the appeal is GRANTED. The decision amount of ₱500,000.00, EMERENCIANA SYLIANTENG
dated November 16, 2007 of Branch 160, BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil b. Exemplary damages in the OF QUEZON CITY.
Case No. 63987 is hereby REVERSED and amount of ₱500,000.00,
SET ASIDE. IV. THE HONORABLE COURT
c. Attorney's fees in the OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of amount of ₱250,000.00, and FINDING THAT PETITIONERS
plaintiffs-appellants Roberto S. Sylianteng ARE THE LAWFUL OWNERS OF
and Caesar S. Sylianteng and against d. The costs of suit. THE SUBJECT LOTS SINCE
defendants-appellees Skunac Corporation THEY HAVE VALIDLY
and Alfonso F. Enriquez, and intervenor- SO ORDERED.5 ACQUIRED THE SAME FROM
appellee Romeo N. Pujalte: ROMEO PUJALTE, THE SOLE
Petitioners filed a Motion for HEIR OF LUIS PUJALTE.
1. Declaring as null and void Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its
Transfer Certificate of Title No. Resolution dated February 18, 2013. V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
5760-R in the name of Romeo N. APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING
Pujalte, Transfer Certificate of Title Hence, the instant petition with the MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
No. 5888-R in the name of Skunac following assignment of errors: DAMAGES AS WELL AS
Corporation, and Transfer Certificate ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COST
of Title No. 5889-R in the name of I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF OF SUIT TO RESPONDENTS
Alfonso F. Enriquez; APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING CONSIDERING THAT
IN THE CASE THE PROVISION PETITIONERS WERE NOT IN
2. Upholding the validity of Transfer OF THE CIVIL CODE ON BAD FAITH IN PURCHASING
Certificate of Title No. 42369 in the DOUBLE SALE OF A THE SUBJECT LOTS.6
name of Emerenciana Sylianteng, REGISTERED LAND.
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, the Court observes that the
main issues raised in the instant petition are
essentially questions of fact. It is settled that,
as a rule, in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be put in issue.7
Questions of fact cannot be entertained.
There are, however, recognized exceptions
to this rule, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of
discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are
conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the
CA went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant
and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are
contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are
conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are
based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.8
In the instant case, the findings of the CA
and the RTC are conflicting. It, thus,
behooves this Court to entertain the
questions of fact raised by petitioners and
review the records of this case to resolve
these conflicting findings. Thus, this Court
held in the case of Manongsong v. Estimo9
that:
We review the factual and legal issues of
this case in light of the general rules of
evidence and the burden of proof in civil
cases, as explained by this Court in Jison v.
Court of Appeals:
x x x Simply put, he who alleges the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case,
the burden of proof never parts. However, in
the course of trial in a civil case, once
plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's
prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must
be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover,
in civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must produce a preponderance of
evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.
The concept of "preponderance of evidence"
refers to evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing, that which is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it
means probability of truth.10
Coming to the merits of the case, the
abovementioned assignment of errors boils
down to two basic questions: (1) whether or
not respondents' predecessor-in-interest,
Emerenciana, validly acquired the subject
lots from Luis, and (2) whether or not
respondents, in turn, validly acquired the
same lots from Emerenciana.
The Court rules in the affirmative, but takes
exception to the CA's and RTC's application
of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
Reliance by the trial and appellate courts on
Article 1544 of the Civil Code is misplaced.
The requisites that must concur for Article
1544 to apply are:
(a) The two (or more sales)
transactions must constitute valid
sales;
 (b) The two (or more) sales
transactions must pertain to exactly
the same subject matter;
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds
over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each represent
conflicting interests; and
(d) The two (or more) buyers at odds
over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each have
bought from the very same seller.11
Obviously, said provision has no application
in cases where the sales involved were
initiated not by just one but two vendors.12
In the present case, the subject lots were
sold to petitioners and respondents by two
different vendors – Emerenciana and Romeo
Pujalte (Romeo). Hence, Article 1544 of the
Civil Code is not applicable.
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the
findings and conclusion of the CA that
Emerenciana's acquisition of the subject lots
from Luis and her subsequent sale of the
same to respondents are valid and lawful.
Petitioners dispute such finding. To prove
their contention, they assail the authenticity
and due execution of the deed of sale
between Luis and Emerenciana.
Petitioners contend that respondents'
presentation of the "duplicate/carbon"
original of the Deed of Sale13 dated June
20, 1958 is in violation of the best evidence
rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.14 The Court does not agree.
The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the
present case. The said rule applies only
when the content of such document is the
subject of the inquiry.15 Where the issue is
only as to whether such document was
actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.16 Any other substitutionary
evidence is likewise admissible without
need to account for the original.17 In the
instant case, what is being questioned is the
authenticity and due execution of the subject
deed of sale. There is no real issue as to its
contents.
In any case, going to the matter of
authenticity and due execution of the
assailed document, petitioners do not dispute
that the copy of the deed of sale that
respondents submitted as part of their
evidence is a duplicate of the original deed
of sale dated June 20, 1958. It is settled that
a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a
document executed at the same time as the
original is known as a duplicate original and
maybe introduced in evidence without
accounting for the non-production of the
original.18
Moreover, Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen a
document is in two or more copies executed
at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals."
In addition, evidence of the authenticity and
due execution of the subject deed is the fact
that it was notarized. The notarization of a
private document converts it into a public
document.19 Moreover, a notarized
instrument is admissible in evidence without
further proof of its due execution, is
conclusive as to the truthfulness of its
contents, and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity.20 This
presumption is affirmed if it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular.21
To assail the authenticity and due execution
of a notarized document, the evidence must
be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.22
In the present case, petitioners failed to
present convincing evidence to prove that
the notarization of the subject deed was
irregular as to strip it of its public character.
On the contrary, a certified copy of page 26
of the notarial register of the notary public
who notarized the subject deed of sale,
which was issued by the Records
Management and Archives Office of Manila,
shows that the sale of the subject lots by
Luis to Emerenciana was indeed regularly
notarized.23
Petitioners further argue that the deed of sale
between Emerenciana and Luis was not
registered with the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. The Court, however, agrees
with the CA that the said deed was, in fact,
registered as evidenced by official
receipts24 issued to this effect. Petitioners,
again, did not present any evidence to assail
the authenticity of these documents.
Petitioners also question the authenticity of
the subject deed of sale (Exhibit "B-1-C")
by arguing that only one copy of such deed
was prepared as only one document number
was assigned by the notary to the said deed.
Petitioners claim that this is contrary to the
claim of respondents that the said deed of
sale was prepared, executed and notarized in
several copies. The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that Section 246, Article V, Title
IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative
Code provides that "[t]he notary shall give
to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and
shall also state on the instrument the page or
pages of his register on which the same is
recorded." In this regard, the Court agrees
with respondents' contention that the
"instrument" being referred to in the
abovequoted provision is the deed or
contract which is notarized. It does not
pertain to the number of copies of such deed
or contract. Hence, one number is assigned
to a deed or contract regardless of the
number of copies prepared and notarized.
Each and every copy of such contract is
given the same document number. It is, thus,
wrong for petitioners to argue that only one
copy of the June 20, 1958 deed of sale was
prepared and notarized, because only one
document number appears on the notarial
book of the notary public who notarized the
said deed. On the contrary, evidence shows
that at least two copies of the subject deed of
sale was prepared and notarized – one was
submitted for registration with the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City and the other was
retained by Emerenciana, which is the copy
presented in evidence by respondents.
As to petitioners' contention that the copy of
the deed of sale presented by respondents in
evidence is of dubious origin because it does
not bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, suffice it
to state that the Court finds no cogent reason
to disagree with respondents' contention that
the duplicate original of the subject deed of
sale which they presented as evidence in
court could not have been received by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City because
only the original copy, and not the duplicate
original, was submitted to the Register of
Deeds for registration.
Petitioners also question the authenticity of
and the entries appearing on the copy of the
title covering the subject properties in the
name of Luis. However, the Court finds no
cogent reason to doubt the authenticity of
the document as well as the entries
appearing therein, considering that the
parties (herein petitioners and respondents)
stipulated25 that the machine copy of TCT
No. 78865 in the name of Luis, marked as
Exhibit "DDD" for respondents, is a faithful
reproduction of the original copy of the said
title, including the memorandum of
encumbrances annotated therein. Included in
the memorandum of encumbrances is Entry
No. P.E. 4023, which states, thus:
This certificate of title is hereby cancelled
(sic) partially with respect to Lots 1 and 2,
Blk. 2 by virtue of a Deed of Sale ratified on
June 20, 1958 before Armenio P. Engracia
of Notary for the City of Manila and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42369 is
issued in the name of Vendee, Emerenciana
A.S. de Sylianteng, filing the aforesaid Deed
under T-No. 42369.26
The same entry appears in Exhibit "11" for
petitioners.27
P.E. No. 4023 has been entered on TCT No.
78865 by the then Acting Register of Deeds
of San Juan.1âwphi1 Petitioners assail the
regularity of such entry. However, one of
the disputable presumptions provided under
Section 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court is that official duty has been regularly
performed. Under the said Rule, this
presumption shall be considered satisfactory
unless contradicted and overcome by other
evidence. In the present case, petitioners
failed to present sufficient evidence to
contradict the presumption of regularity in
the performance of the duties of then Acting
Register of Deeds of San Juan.
Petitioners, nonetheless, insist that they have
valid title over the subject properties. They
trace their respective titles from that of
Romeo. Romeo, in turn, derives his
supposed ownership of and title over the
subject lots from his claim that he is the sole
heir of the estate of his alleged predecessor-
in-interest, Luis. Evidence, however, shows
that Romeo never became the owner of the
subject properties for two reasons.
First, as shown above, the disputed lots were
already sold by Luis during his lifetime.
Thus, these parcels of land no longer formed
part of his estate when he died. As a
consequence, Romeo's sale of the disputed
lots to petitioners was not affirmed by the
estate court, because the subject parcels of
land were not among those included in the
said estate at the time that Romeo was
appointed as the administrator thereof. As
shown in its October 11, 1993 Order,28 the
RTC of Pasig, acting as an estate court,
denied Romeo's motion for approval of the
sale of the subject lots, because these
properties were already sold to respondents
per report submitted by the Register of
Deeds of San Juan.
In fact, as early as July 14, 1960, prior to
Romeo's appointment as administrator of the
estate of Luis, Paz L. Vda. de Pujalte (Paz),
the mother of Luis, who was then appointed
administratrix of the estate of the latter, in
her Inventory and Appraisal29 which was
submitted to the estate court, already
excluded the subject properties among those
which comprise the estate of Luis.
Subsequently, in the Project of Partition30
of the residual estate of Luis, dated March
22, 1963, Paz again did not include the
disputed lots as part of such residual estate.
Hence, Romeo's sale of the subject lots to
petitioners is invalid as it is settled that any
unauthorized disposition of property under
administration is null and void and title does
not pass to the purchasers.31
Second, even granting that the subject lots
formed part of the estate of Luis, it was
subsequently proven in a separate case that
Romeo is not his heir. In a criminal case for
use of falsified documents filed against
Romeo, it was proven that his claim of
heirship is spurious. In the said criminal
case, his birth certificate and the marriage
certificate of his supposed parents, which he
presented before the estate court, to prove
his claim that he is the sole heir of Luis,
were found by the criminal court to be
falsified.32 In this regard, it bears to note the
disquisition of the CA as to the legitimacy of
Romeo's claim, and its subsequent effect on
petitioners' rights to the disputed properties,
to wit:
Appellees' [herein petitioners'] predicament
is further compounded by Romeo Pujalte's
conviction on November 18, 2005 of the
offense of Use of Falsified Documents, for
falsifying the documents that enabled him to
deceive the estate court and have himself
named as Luis Pujalte's sole heir. He did not
appeal his conviction and, instead, applied
for probation. It goes without saying that the
documents purportedly conveying the lots in
question to appellees and which are founded
on Romeo Pujalte's alleged rights over the
estate of the late Luis Pujalte do not deserve
any consideration at all. x x x33
Indeed, not being an heir of Luis, Romeo
never acquired any right whatsoever over
the subject lots, even if he was able to
subsequently obtain a title in his name. It is
a well-settled principle that no one can give
what one does not have, nemo dat quod non
habet.34 One can sell only what one owns or
is authorized to sell, and the buyer can
acquire no more right than what the seller
can transfer legally.35 Since Romeo has no
right to the subject lots, petitioners, who
simply stepped into the shoes of Romeo, in
turn, acquired no rights to the same.
In addition, and as correctly pointed out by
the CA, petitioners' position is neither
helped by the fact that, in the present case,
Romeo filed a Verified Complaint-in-
Intervention36 with the RTC, denying that
he sold the subject lots to petitioners and
claiming that the same properties still form
part of the estate of Luis.
Stretching petitioners' contention a bit
further, granting that both petitioners and
respondents bought the disputed lots in good
faith by simply relying on the certificates of
the sellers, and subsequently, acquiring titles
in their own names, respondents' title shall
still prevail. It is a settled rule that when two
certificates of title are issued to different
persons covering the same land in whole or
in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and,
in case of successive registrations where
more than one certificate is issued over the
land, the person holding a prior certificate is
entitled to the land as against a person who
relies on a subsequent certificate.37 The
titles of respondents, having emanated from
an older title, should thus be upheld.
Anent petitioners' bad faith, this Court finds
no persuasive reason to depart from the
findings of the CA that petitioners had prior
knowledge of the estate proceedings
involving the subject lots and that they have
notice of the defect in the title of Romeo.
It is true that a person dealing with
registered land need not go beyond the title.
However, it is equally true that such person
is charged with notice of the burdens and
claims which are annotated on the title.38 In
the instant case, The Torrens Certificate of
Title (TCT No. 5760-R) in the name of
Romeo, which was the title relied upon by
petitioners, also contained Entry No. P.E.
4023, quoted above, which essentially
informs petitioners that the lots which they
were about to buy and which they in fact
bought, were already sold to
Emerenciana.39 This entry should have
alerted petitioners and should have prodded
them to conduct further investigation.
Simple prudence would have impelled them
as honest persons to make deeper inquiries
to clear the suspiciousness haunting
Romeo's title. On the contrary, rather than
taking caution in dealing with Romeo,
petitioners, instead, subsequently executed
deeds of sale40 over the same properties but
all of which were, nonetheless, disallowed
by the estate court in its Order41 dated
October 11, 1993 on the ground that the said
lots were already sold, this time, by
Emerenciana to respondents. In this regard,
petitioners acted in bad faith.
Thus, as correctly held by the CA,
respondents are entitled to moral damages.
Moral damages are treated as compensation
to alleviate physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury
resulting from a wrong.42 In the instant
case, respondents satisfactorily established
their claim for moral damages. They
endured suffering brought about by Romeo's
bad faith in using falsified documents to case where the court deems it just and
enable himself to acquire title to and sell the equitable that attorney's fees and expenses
subject lots to petitioners to the prejudice of of litigation should be recovered.
respondents. Respondents also suffered by
reason of petitioners' stubborn insistence in WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
buying the said properties despite their The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
knowledge of the defect in the title of Appeals, dated August 10, 2012 and
Romeo.43 Though moral damages are not February 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R.
capable of pecuniary estimation, the amount CV No. 92022, are AFFIRMED.
should be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted.44 SO ORDERED.
Respondents sought the award of
₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages from each
of the petitioners, but the Court agrees with
the CA that the total amount of ₱500,000.00
is sufficient for both respondents.
As to exemplary damages, these are
imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.45 They are imposed not to enrich
one party or impoverish another, but to serve
as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions.46 While respondents were again
seeking the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages from each of the
petitioners, the CA correctly reduced it to a
total of ₱500,000.00.
Respondents are also entitled to attorney's
fees, as awarded by the CA, on the strength
of the provisions of Article 2208 of the Civil
Code which provides, among others, that
such fees may be recovered when exemplary
damages are awarded, when the defendant's
act or omission has compelled the plaintiff
to litigate with third persons, or in any other
G.R. No. 203302               April 11, 2013
MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI,
Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
HOMER T. SAQUILAVAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court hereby resolves the Extremely
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration tiled by
petitioner Emmanuel L. Maliksi against the
Court's decision promulgated on March 12,
2013, dismissing his petition for certiorari
assailing the resolution dated September 14,
2012 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Bane that sustained the
declaration of respondent Homer T.
Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor of
Imus, Cavite.
For clarity, we briefly restate the factual
antecedents.
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan
the winner for the position of Mayor of
Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of
votes, brought an election protest in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
alleging that there were irregularities in the
counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the
votes, and, based on the results of the
revision, declared Maliksi as the duly
elected Mayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from
performing the functions of said office.
Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In
the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s
motion for execution pending appeal, and
Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First
Division, without giving notice to the
parties, decided to recount the ballots
through the use of the printouts of the ballot
images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an
order dated March 28, 2012 requiring
Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary
to defray the expenses for the decryption
and printing of the ballot images. Later, it
issued another order dated April 17, 2012
for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
On August 15, 2012, the First Division
issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s
decision and declaring Saquilayan as the
duly elected Mayor.1
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration,
alleging that he had been denied his right to
due process because he had not been
notified of the decryption proceedings. He
argued that the resort to the printouts of the
ballot images, which were secondary
evidence, had been unwarranted because
there was no proof that the integrity of the
paper ballots had not been preserved.
On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En
Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for
reconsideration.2
Maliksi then came to the Court via petition
for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the
decryption, printing, and examination of the
ballot images without prior notice to him,
and to the use of the printouts of the ballot
images in the recount proceedings
conducted by the First Division.1âwphi1
In the decision promulgated on March 12,
2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed
Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court
concluded that Maliksi had not been denied
due process because: (a) he had received
notices of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the First
Division — referring to the orders of the
First Division directing Saquilayan to post
and augment the cash deposits for the
decryption and printing of the ballot images;
and (b) he had been able to raise his
objections to the decryption in his motion
for reconsideration. The Court then
pronounced that the First Division did not
abuse its discretion in deciding to use the
ballot images instead of the paper ballots,
explaining that the printouts of the ballot
images were not secondary images, but
considered original documents with the
same evidentiary value as the official ballots
under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and
that the First Division’s finding that the
ballots and the ballot boxes had been
tampered had been fully established by the
large number of cases of double-shading WITH THE PHYSICAL BALLOTS AND
discovered during the revision. RESORT TO THEIR DIGITAL IMAGES
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
In his Extremely Urgent Motion for THE BALLOTS ARE THE BEST AND
Reconsideration, Maliksi raises the MOST CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF
following arguments, to wit: THE VOTERS’ WILL, AND THAT
BALLOT IMAGES CAN BE RESORTED
I. TO ONLY IF THE OFFICIAL BALLOTS
ARE LOST OR THEIR INTEGRITY WAS
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS COMPROMISED AS DETERMINED BY
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN THE RECOUNT/REVISION
BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN COMMITTEE, CIRCUMSTANCES
DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHICH ARE WANTING IN THIS CASE,
DESPITE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF AND IN FACT THE INTEGRITY OF THE
PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL BALLOT BOXES AND ITS CONTENTS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS PRESERVED AND THE ISSUE OF
CONSIDERING THAT DECRYPTION, TAMPERING WAS ONLY BELATEDLY
PRINTING AND EXAMINATION OF RAISED BY THE PRIVATE
THE DIGITAL IMAGES OF THE RESPONDENT AFTER THE REVISION
BALLOTS, WHICH IS THE BASIS FOR RESULTS SHOWED THAT HE LOST.
THE ASSAILED 14 SEPTEMBER 2012
RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC III.
RESPONDENT, WHICH IN TURN
AFFIRMED THE 15 AUGUST 2012 WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, IT IS THE
RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC HUMBLE SUBMISSION OF THE
FIRST DIVISION, WERE DONE PETITIONER-MOVANT THAT THE 12
INCONSPICUOUSLY UPON A MOTU MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION ISSUED BY
PROPRIO DIRECTIVE OF THE THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
COMELEC FIRST DIVISION SANS ANY EN BANC IS NULL AND VOID AB
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER, AND INITIO AND THEREFORE OF NO
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. FORCE AND EFFECT, FOR HAVING
BEEN PROMULGATED DESPITE THE
II. ABSENCE OF HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE JOSE PORTUGAL
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS PEREZ AT THE TIME OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT EN DELIBERATION AND VOTING ON THE
BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN 12 MARCH 2013 RESOLUTION IN THE
UPHOLDING THE COMELEC FIRST INSTANT CASE.3
DIVISION’S RULING TO DISPENSE
Maliksi insists: (a) that he had the right to be
notified of every incident of the proceedings
and to be present at every stage thereof; (b)
that he was deprived of such rights when he
was not informed of the decryption, printing,
and examination of the ballot images by the
First Division; (c) that the March 28, 2012
and April 17, 2012 orders of the First
Division did not sufficiently give him notice
inasmuch as the orders did not state the date,
time, and venue of the decryption and
printing of the ballot images; and (d) that he
was thus completely deprived of the
opportunity to participate in the decryption
proceedings.
Maliksi contends that the First Division’s
motu proprio directive for the decryption,
printing, and examination of the ballot
images was highly irregular. In this regard,
he asserts: (a) that the decryption, printing,
and examination should have taken place
during the revision before the trial court and
after the revision committee had determined
that the integrity of the official ballots had
not been preserved; (b) that the trial court
did not make such determination; (c) that, in
fact, Saquilayan did not allege or present
any proof in the RTC to show that the
ballots or the ballot boxes had been
tampered, and had, in fact, actively
participated in the revision proceedings; (d)
that the First Division should not have
entertained the allegation of ballot
tampering belatedly raised on appeal; (e)
that the First Division should have limited
itself to reviewing the evidence on record;
and (f) that the First Division did not even
explain how it had arrived at the conclusion
that the integrity of the ballots had not been
preserved.
Maliksi submits that the decision
promulgated on March 12, 2013 is null and
void for having been promulgated despite
the absence from the deliberations and lack
of signature of Justice Jose Portugal Perez.
Ruling
The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and
reverses the decision promulgated on March
12, 2013 on the ground that the First
Division of the COMELEC denied to him
the right to due process by failing to give
due notice on the decryption and printing of
the ballot images. Consequently, the Court
annuls the recount proceedings conducted
by the First Division with the use of the
printouts of the ballot images.
It bears stressing at the outset that the First
Division should not have conducted the
assailed recount proceedings because it was
then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to
which no existing rule of procedure allowed
it to conduct a recount in the first instance.
The recount proceedings authorized under
Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be
conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only
in the exercise of their exclusive original
jurisdiction over all election protests
involving elective regional (the autonomous
regions), provincial and city officials.4
As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily
arrogated unto itself the conduct of the
recount proceedings, contrary to the regular
procedure of remanding the protest to the
RTC and directing the reconstitution of the
Revision Committee for the decryption and
printing of the picture images and the
revision of the ballots on the basis thereof.
Quite unexpectedly, the COMELEC En
Banc upheld the First Division’s
unwarranted deviation from the standard
procedures by invoking the COMELEC’s
power to "take such measures as the
Presiding Commissioner may deem proper,"
and even citing the Court’s minute
resolution in Alliance of Barangay Concerns
(ABC) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections5 to the effect that the "COMELEC
has the power to adopt procedures that will
ensure the speedy resolution of its cases.
The Court will not interfere with its exercise
of this prerogative so long as the parties are
amply heard on their opposing claims."
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of
Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission
on Elections, the power of the COMELEC
to adopt procedures that will ensure the
speedy resolution of its cases should still be
exercised only after giving to all the parties
the opportunity to be heard on their
opposing claims. The parties’ right to be
heard upon adversarial issues and matters is
never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be
treated so lightly because of the possibility
of the substantial prejudice to be thereby
caused to the parties, or to any of them.
Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not
have upheld the First Division’s deviation
from the regular procedure in the guise of
speedily resolving the election protest, in
view of its failure to provide the parties with
notice of its proceedings and an opportunity
to be heard, the most basic requirements of
due process.
I.
Due process requirements
The picture images of the ballots are
electronic documents that are regarded as
the equivalents of the original official ballots
themselves.6 In Vinzons-Chato v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,7 the
Court held that "the picture images of the
ballots, as scanned and recorded by the
PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that
faithfully capture in electronic form the
votes cast by the voter, as defined by
Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the
printouts thereof are the functional
equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by
the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral
protest."
That the two documents—the official ballot
and its picture image—are considered
"original documents" simply means that
both of them are given equal probative
weight. In short, when either is presented as
evidence, one is not considered as weightier
than the other.
But this juridical reality does not
authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and
the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the
picture images of the ballots in the
proceedings had before them without
notice to the parties. Despite the equal
probative weight accorded to the official
ballots and the printouts of their picture
images, the rules for the revision of
ballots adopted for their respective
proceedings still consider the official
ballots to be the primary or best evidence
of the voters’ will. In that regard, the
picture images of the ballots are to be
used only when it is first shown that the
official ballots are lost or their integrity
has been compromised.
For instance, the aforesaid Section 6, Rule
15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 (In
Re: Comelec Rules of Procedure on
Disputes In An Automated Election System
in Connection with the May 10, 2010
Elections), as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9164, itself requires that "the
Recount Committee determines that the
integrity of the ballots has been violated or
has not been preserved, or are wet and
otherwise in such a condition that (the
ballots) cannot be recounted" before the
printing of the image of the ballots should be
made, to wit:
xxxx
(g) Only when the Recount Committee,
through its chairman, determines that the
integrity of the ballots has been preserved or
that no signs of tampering of the ballots are
present, will the recount proceed. In case
there are signs that the ballots contained
therein are tampered, compromised, wet or
are otherwise in such a condition that it
could not be recounted, the Recount
Committee shall follow paragraph (l) of this
rule.
xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee
determines that the integrity of the ballots
has been violated or has not been preserved,
or are wet and otherwise in such a condition
that it cannot be recounted, the Chairman of
the Committee shall request from the
Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD), the printing of the image of the
ballots of the subject precinct stored in the
CF card used in the May 10, 2010 elections
in the presence of the parties. Printing of the
ballot images shall proceed only upon prior
authentication and certification by a duly
authorized personnel of the Election
Records and Statistics Department (ERSD)
that the data or the images to be printed are
genuine and not substitutes. (Emphases
supplied.)
xxxx
Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of
the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal
Election Contests, which governs the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Courts
exercising original jurisdiction over election
protests, provides:
xxxx
(m) In the event that the revision committee
determines that the integrity of the ballots
and the ballot box have not been preserved,
as when proof of tampering or substitution
exists, it shall proceed to instruct the
printing of the picture image of the ballots
stored in the data storage device for the
precinct. The court shall provide a non-
partisan technical person who shall conduct
the necessary authentication process to
ensure that the data or image stored is
genuine and not a substitute. Only after this
determination can the printed picture image
be used for the recount. (Emphases
supplied.)
xxxx
A similar procedure is found in the 2010
Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
to wit:
Rule 43. Conduct of the revision. – The
revision of votes shall be done through the
use of appropriate PCOS machines or
manually and visually, as the Tribunal may
determine, and according to the following
procedures:
xxxx
(q) In the event that the RC determines that
the integrity of the ballots and the ballot box
was not preserved, as when there is proof of
tampering or substitution, it shall proceed to
instruct the printing of the picture image of
the ballots of the subject precinct stored in
the data storage device for the same
precinct. The Tribunal may avail itself of the
assistance of the COMELEC for the service
of a non-partisan technical person who shall
conduct the necessary authentication process
to ensure that the data or images stored are
genuine and not merely substitutes. It is only
upon such determination that the printed
picture image can be used for the revision of
votes. (Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
Also, the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal’s Guidelines on the Revision of
Ballots requires a preliminary hearing to be
held for the purpose of determining whether
the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes
used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not
preserved, as when there is proof of
tampering or substitutions, to wit:
Section 10. Revision of Ballots
xxxx
(d) When it has been shown, in a
preliminary hearing set by the parties or by
the Tribunal, that the integrity of the ballots
and ballot boxes used in the May 10, 2010
elections was not preserved, as when there is
proof of tampering or substitutions, the
Tribunal shall direct the printing of the
picture images of the ballots of the subject
precinct stored in the data storage device for
the same precinct. The Tribunal shall
provide a non-partisan technical person who
shall conduct the necessary authentication
process to ensure that the data or image
stored is genuine and not a substitute. It is
only upon such determination that the
printed picture image can be used for the
revision. (As amended per Resolution of
February 10, 2011; Emphases supplied.)
xxxx
All the foregoing rules on revision of ballots
stipulate that the printing of the picture
images of the ballots may be resorted to only
after the proper Revision/Recount
Committee has first determined that the
integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes
was not preserved.
The foregoing rules further require that the
decryption of the images stored in the CF
cards and the printing of the decrypted
images take place during the revision or
recount proceedings. There is a good reason
for thus fixing where and by whom the
decryption and the printing should be
conducted. It is during the revision or
recount conducted by the Revision/Recount
Committee when the parties are allowed to
be represented, with their representatives
witnessing the proceedings and timely
raising their objections in the course of the
proceedings. Moreover, whenever the
Revision/Recount Committee makes any
determination that the ballots have been
tampered and have become unreliable, the
parties are immediately made aware of such
determination.
When, as in the present case, it was not the
Revision/Recount Committee or the RTC
exercising original jurisdiction over the
protest that made the finding that the ballots
had been tampered, but the First Division in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the
parties should have been given a formal
notice thereof.
Maliksi was not immediately made aware of
that crucial finding because the First
Division did not even issue any written
resolution stating its reasons for ordering the
printing of the picture images. The parties
were formally notified that the First Division
had found that the ballots had been tampered
only when they received the resolution of
August 15, 2012, whereby the First Division
nullified the decision of the RTC and
declared Saquilayan as the duly elected
Mayor. Even so, the resolution of the First
Division to that effect was unusually mute
about the factual bases for the finding of
ballot box tampering, and did not also
particularize how and why the First Division
was concluding that the integrity of the
ballots had been compromised. All that the
First Division declared as justification was a
simple generalization of the same being
apparent from the allegations of ballot and
ballot box tampering and upon inspection of
the ballot boxes, viz:
xxxx
The Commission (First Division) took into
consideration the allegations of ballot and
ballot box tampering and upon inspecting
the ballot boxes, it is apparent that the
integrity of the ballots had been
compromised so, to be able to best
determine the true will of the electorate, we
decided to go over the digital image of the
appealed ballots.8 (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
It was the COMELEC En Banc’s assailed
resolution of September 14, 2012 that later
on provided the explanation to justify the
First Division’s resort to the picture images
of the ballots, by observing that the
"unprecedented number of double-votes"
exclusively affecting the position of Mayor
and the votes for Saquilayan had led to the
belief that the ballots had been tampered.
However, that explanation by the
COMELEC En Banc did not cure the First
Division’s lapse and did not erase the
irregularity that had already invalidated the
First Division’s proceedings.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonio T.
Carpio advances the view that the
COMELEC’s finding of ballot tampering
was a mere surplusage because there was
actually no need for such finding before the
ballots’ digital counterparts could be used.
He cites Section 3, Rule 16 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, as amended by
Resolution No. 9164, which states:
Section 3. Printing of Ballot Images. - In
case the parties deem it necessary, they may
file a motion to be approved by the Division
of the Commission requesting for the
printing of ballot images in addition to those
mentioned in the second paragraph of item
(e). Parties concerned shall provide the
necessary materials in the printing of images
such as but not limited to copying papers,
toners and printers. Parties may also secure,
upon prior approval by the Division of the
Commission, a soft copy of the ballot
images contained in a secured/hashed disc
on the condition that the ballot images be
first printed, at the expense of the requesting
party, and that the printed copies be signed
by the parties’ respective revisors or
representatives and by an ERSD IT-capable
representative and deposited with the
Commission.
The Over-all chairman shall coordinate with
the Director IV, Election Records and
Statistics Department (ERSD), for the
printing of images. Said director shall in turn
designate a personnel who will be
responsible in the printing of ballot images.
Justice Carpio posits that when a party files
a motion for the printing of the ballots that
he or she deems necessary, there is actually
no need for a finding of tampering of the
ballots or the ballot boxes before the
COMELEC Division may grant the motion.
He states that a determination by the parties
that the printing is necessary under Section 3
is a ground separate from Section 6(e),
which in turn pertinently states that:
Section 6. Conduct of the Recount –
xxxx
(e) Before the opening of the ballot box, the
Recount Committee shall note its condition
as well as that of the locks or locking
mechanism and record the condition in the
recount report. From its observation, the
Recount Committee must also make a
determination as to whether the integrity of
the ballot box has been preserved.
In the event that there are signs of tampering
or if the ballot box appears to have been
compromised, the Recount Committee shall
still proceed to open the ballot box and make
a physical inventory of the contents thereof.
The committee shall, however, record its
general observation of the ballots and other
documents found in the ballot box.
The application of Section 3 to this case is
inappropriate, considering that the First
Division did not in any way suggest in its
decision dated August 15, 2010 that it was
resolving Saquilayan’s motion to print the
ballot images. Instead, the First Division
made therein a finding of tampering, thus:
The COMELEC (First Division) took into
consideration the allegations of ballot and
ballot box tampering and upon inspecting
the ballot boxes, it is apparent that the
integrity of the ballots had been
compromised so, to be able to best
determine the true will of the electorate, we
decided to go over the digital images of the
appealed ballots.
Even the COMELEC En Banc did not
indicate in its decision dated September 14,
2012 that the First Division merely resolved
Saquilayan’s motion for the printing of the
ballot images; instead, it reinforced the First
Division’s finding that there was tampering
of the ballots. The non-mention of
Saquilayan’s motion was a clear indication
of the COMELEC’s intention to act motu
proprio; and also revealed its interpretation
of its very own rules, that there must be
justifiable reason, i.e. tampering, before the
ballot images could be resorted to.
The application of Section 3 would only
highlight the First Division’s denial of
Maliksi’s right to due process. For, if the
First Division was really only acting on a
motion to allow the printing of the ballot
images, there was a greater reason for the
First Division to have given the parties
notice of its ruling thereon. But, as herein
noted, the First Division did not issue such
ruling.
To interpret Section 3 as granting to any one
of the parties the right to move for the
printing of the ballot images should such
party deem it necessary, and the COMELEC
may grant such motion, is contrary to its
clear wording. Section 3 explicitly states: "in
case the parties deem it necessary, they may
file a motion." The provision really
envisions a situation in which both parties
have agreed that the ballot images should be
printed. Should only one of the parties move
for the printing of the ballot images, it is not
Section 3 that applies but Section 6(e),
which then requires a finding that the
integrity of the ballots has been
compromised.
The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be
informed of the decision to print the picture
images of the ballots and to conduct the
recount proceedings during the appellate
stage cannot be brushed aside by the
invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able
to file, after all, a motion for
reconsideration. To be exact, the motion for
reconsideration was actually directed against
the entire resolution of the First Division,
while Maliksi’s claim of due process
violation is directed only against the First
Division’s recount proceedings that resulted
in the prejudicial result rendered against
him. Notably, the First Division did not
issue any order directing the recount.
Without the written order, Maliksi was
deprived of the chance to seek any
reconsideration or even to assail the
irregularly-held recount through a Division had no intention of giving the
seasonable petition for certiorari in this
Court. In that context, he had no real
opportunity to assail the conduct of the
recount proceedings.
The service of the First Division orders
requiring Saquilayan to post and augment
the cash deposits for the printing of the
picture images did not sufficiently give
Maliksi notice of the First Division’s
decision to print the picture images. The said
orders did not meet the requirements of due
process because they did not specifically
inform Maliksi that the ballots had been
found to be tampered. Nor did the orders
offer the factual bases for the finding of
tampering. Hence, to leave for Maliksi to
surmise on the factual bases for finding the
need to print the picture images still violated
the principles of fair play, because the
responsibility and the obligation to lay down
the factual bases and to inform Maliksi as
the party to be potentially prejudiced thereby
firmly rested on the shoulders of the First
Division.
Moreover, due process of law does not only
require notice of the decryption, printing,
and recount proceedings to the parties, but
also demands an opportunity to be present at
such proceedings or to be represented
therein. Maliksi correctly contends that the
orders of the First Division simply required
Saquilayan to post and augment his cash
deposit. The orders did not state the time,
date, and venue of the decryption and
recount proceedings. Clearly, the First
parties the opportunity to witness its
proceedings.
Mendoza v. Commission on Elections9
instructs that notice to the parties and their
participation are required during the
adversarial aspects of the proceedings. In
that case, after the revision of the ballots and
after the election protest case was submitted
for decision, the ballots and ballot boxes
were transferred to the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) in connection with a protest
case pending in the SET. Mendoza later
learned that the COMELEC, with the
permission of the SET, had meanwhile
conducted proceedings within the SET’s
premises. Mendoza then claimed that his
right to due process was violated because he
had not been given notice by the
COMELEC that it would be conducting
further proceedings within the SET
premises. The Court did not sustain his
claim, however, and pointed out:
After consideration of the respondents’
Comments and the petitioner’s petition and
Reply, we hold that the contested
proceedings at the SET ("contested
proceedings") are no longer part of the
adversarial aspects of the election contest
that would require notice of hearing and the
participation of the parties. As the
COMELEC stated in its Comment and
without any contrary or disputing claim in
the petitioner’s Reply:
"However, contrary to the claim of
petitioner, public respondent in the
appreciation of the contested ballots in EPC
No. 2007-44 simultaneously with the SET in
SET Case No. 001-07 is not conducting
"further proceedings" requiring notice to the
parties. There is no revision or correction of
the ballots because EPC No. 2007-04 was
already submitted for resolution. Public
respondent, in coordinating with the SET, is
simply resolving the submitted protest case
before it. The parties necessarily take no part
in said deliberation, which require utmost
secrecy. Needless to state, the actual
decision-making process is supposed to be
conducted only by the designated members
of the Second Division of the public
respondent in strict confidentiality."
In other words, what took place at the SET
were the internal deliberations of the
COMELEC, as a quasi-judicial body, in the
course of appreciating the evidence
presented and deciding the provincial
election contest on the merits. These
deliberations are no different from judicial
deliberations which are considered
confidential and privileged. We find it
significant that the private respondent’s
Comment fully supported the COMELEC’s
position and disavowed any participation in
the contested proceeding the petitioner
complained about. The petitioner, on the
other hand, has not shown that the private
respondent was ever present in any
proceeding at the SET relating to the
provincial election contest.1âwphi1
To conclude, the rights to notice and to be
heard are not material considerations in the
COMELEC’s handling of the Bulacan
provincial election contest after the transfer
of the ballot boxes to the SET; no
proceedings at the instance of one party or
of COMELEC has been conducted at the
SET that would require notice and hearing
because of the possibility of prejudice to the
other party. The COMELEC is under no
legal obligation to notify either party of the
steps it is taking in the course of deliberating
on the merits of the provincial election
contest. In the context of our standard of
review for the petition, we see no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by the
COMELEC in its deliberation on the
Bulacan election contest and the
appreciation of ballots this deliberation
entailed.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the First Division denominated the
proceedings it had conducted as an
"appreciation of ballots" like in Mendoza.
But unlike in Mendoza, the proceedings
conducted by the First Division were
adversarial, in that the proceedings included
the decryption and printing of the picture
images of the ballots and the recount of the
votes were to be based on the printouts of
the picture images. The First Division did
not simply review the findings of the RTC
and the Revision Committee, but actually
conducted its own recount proceedings
using the printouts of the picture image of
the ballots. As such, the First Division was
bound to notify the parties to enable them to
participate in the proceedings.
Significantly, Section 6(l), Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No, 8804, as
amended by COMELEC Resolution No.
9164, requires the parties’ presence during
the printing of the images of the ballots,
thus:
xxxx
(l) In the event the Recount Committee
determines that the integrity of the ballots
has been violated or has not been preserved,
or are wet and otherwise in such a condition
that it cannot be recounted, the Chairman of
the Committee shall request from the
Election Records and Statistics Department
(ERSD), the printing of the image of the
ballots of the subject precinct stored in the
CF card used in the May 10, 2010 elections
in the presence of the parties. Printing of the
ballot images shall proceed only upon prior
authentication and certification by a duly
authorized personnel of the Election
Records and Statistics Department (ERSD)
that the data or the images to be printed are
genuine and not substitutes.
xxxx
We should not ignore that the parties’
participation during the revision and recount
proceedings would not benefit only the
parties, but was as vital and significant for
the COMELEC as well, for only by their
participation would the COMELEC’s
proceedings attain credibility as to the result.
The parties’ presence would have ensured
that the requisite procedures have been
followed, including the required
authentication and certification that the
images to be printed are genuine. In this
regard, the COMELEC was less than candid,
and was even cavalier in its conduct of the
decryption and printing of the picture
images of the ballots and the recount
proceedings. The COMELEC was merely
content with listing the guidelines that the
First Division had followed in the
appreciation of the ballots and the results of
the recount. In short, there was vagueness as
to what rule had been followed in the
decryption and printing proceeding.
II.
printing of the digital images of the ballots
and to hold recount proceedings, with due
notice to all the parties and opportunity for
them to be present and to participate during
such proceedings. Nothing less serves the
ideal objective safeguarded by the
Constitution.
In the absence of particular rules to govern
its proceedings in accordance with this
disposition, the COMELEC is urged to
follow and observe Rule 15 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, as amended by
COMELEC Resolution No. 9164.
The Court, by this resolution, does not
intend to validate the victory of any of the
parties in the 2010 Elections. That is not the
concern of the Court as yet. The Court
simply does not want to countenance a
denial of the fundamental right to due
process, a cornerstone of our legal system.11
After all, it is the Court’s primary duty to
protect the basic rights of the people vis-à-
vis government actions, thus:
will continue to uphold the Constitution and
its enshrined principles.12
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY
GRANTS the Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner Emmanuel
Maliksi; REVERSES the Court's decision
promulgated on March 12, 2013; and
DIRECTS the Commission on Elections En
Bane to conduct proceedings for the
decryption of the picture images of the
ballots involved in the protest after due
authentication, and for the recount of ballots
by using the printouts of the ballot images,
with notice to and in the presence of the
parties or their representatives in accordance
with the procedure laid down by Rule 15 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as
amended by Resolution No. 9164.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Remand to the COMELEC It cannot be denied that most government

We are mindful of the urgent need to
speedily resolve the election protest because
the term of the position involved is about to
end. Thus, we overlook pro hac vice the lack
of factual basis for the COMELEC’s
decision to use the digital images of the
ballots and sustain its decision thereon.
Although a remand of the election protest to
the RTC would have been the appropriate
procedure, we direct the COMELEC En
Banc instead to conduct the decryption and
actions are inspired with noble intentions, all
geared towards the betterment of the nation
and its people. But then again, it is important
to remember this ethical principle: "The end
does not justify the means." No matter how
noble and worthy of admiration the purpose
of an act, but if the means to be employed in
accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable
with constitutional parameters, then it
cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot
just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It