Special Data Feature

Journal of Peace Research

2018, Vol. 55(4) 535–547
Organized violence, 1989–2017 ª The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343318784101
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Therése Pettersson & Kristine Eck
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Abstract
This article reports on trends in organized violence from data collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP). With almost 90,000 deaths recorded by UCDP last year, 2017 saw a decrease for the third consecutive year
to a level 32% lower than the latest peak in 2014. This trend in declining levels of organized violence is driven by
state-based armed conflict, and by the case of Syria in particular. Forty-nine state-based conflicts were active in 2017,
down by four compared to 2016, and ten of these reached the level of war, with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths.
The overall decrease in fatalities lends support to the claim that conflict deaths are in decline and that the world is
increasingly peaceful. This trend holds even more strongly when controlling for increases in world population. In
contrast, non-state conflict has increased: a new peak of 82 active non-state conflicts was recorded in 2017 and
fatalities have increased concurrently. Much of this is due to escalating violence in DR Congo and the Central African
Republic. However, fatalities from non-state conflict remain but 15% of the total number of fatalities from organized
violence. As for actors engaged in one-sided violence, their number also increased during 2017, although the number
of fatalities remained at the same level as in 2016.

Keywords
armed conflict, conflict data, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, war

Organized violence 1989–2017 nomadic pastoralist Fulani and the mainly agriculturalist
Mambila in Nigeria. Finally, one-sided violence covers
For the third year running, the annual update from
violence by the government of a state or by a formally
UCDP presents trends in not only state-based armed
organized group targeting unarmed civilians. Recent
conflict, but also non-state conflict and one-sided vio-
examples include the CPI-Maoist targeting civilians they
lence. The three categories are mutually exclusive and
consider enemies of their struggle, and the government
can be aggregated as ‘organized violence’. They also share
of Kenya killing protestors following elections.1
the same intensity cut-off for inclusion – 25 fatalities in a
Figure 1 shows that the number of fatalities in orga-
calendar year. State-based armed conflict includes vio-
nized violence decreased for the third consecutive year.
lence where at least one of the parties is the government
In 2017, UCDP recorded almost 90,000 deaths, a
of a state, that is, violence between two states and vio-
decrease of 32% compared to the latest peak in 2014.
lence between the government and a rebel group. An
State-based armed conflict drives this trend in declining
example of the former is the border conflict between
levels of organized violence.
Ethiopia and Eritrea, while the conflict between the
Taliban and the Afghan government is an example of
the latter. Non-state conflict, on the other hand, is the
1
use of armed force between two organized groups, such For full definitions of all key concepts, see the Online appendix. No
as rebel groups or ethnic groups, neither of which is the changes have been made in the definitions since last year.
government of a state. Examples include fighting
between the Islamic State (IS) and Tahrir al-Sham in Corresponding author:
Syria, as well as the interethnic fighting between the kristine.eck@pcr.uu.se
536
Figure 1. Fatalities in organized violence by type, 1989–2017
State-based conflict 1946–2017
Since the end of World War II, 614 dyads2 have been
active in 285 conflicts in 157 locations.3 Corresponding
numbers for the post-Cold War period, that is, 1989–
2017, are 371 dyads in 176 conflicts in 94 locations.
Forty-nine conflicts were active in 2017, down from
53 in the previous year,4 the peak year of the entire
1946–2017 period. The high level of state-based conflict
witnessed over the past few years has only been seen once
before, in the early 1990s, right after the end of the Cold
War. The growth of the Islamic State (IS) has driven the
recent trend, as the group has tried to expand its territory
resulting in a number of new conflicts (Melander, Petters-
son & Themnér, 2016). During 2017, both Iraq and
Syria reported the defeat of IS, and the group was indeed
weakened in many of its areas of control (BBC, 2018).
Nevertheless, IS was involved in 15 conflicts during 2017,
a full 31% of the total number of conflicts. This is both
the highest absolute number, and the highest percentage
recorded since the group announced its caliphate in 2014.
2
A conflict dyad is two conflicting primary parties of which at least
one is the government of a state. In interstate conflicts, both primary
parties are state governments. In intrastate conflict dyads the
nongovernmental primary party is an organized opposition
organization.
3
‘Location’ refers to the country/countries whose government(s)
have a primary claim to the issue in dispute.
4
Last year, we reported 49 active conflicts for 2016 (Allansson,
Melander & Themnér, 2017). Based on new information we have
added four conflicts for 2016, all of which involved the Islamic State
(IS): Tunisia, Philippines, Bangladesh, and Algeria. Table I, Figures
1–3, the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (www.ucdp.uu.se/database),
the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, and the UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset have been amended accordingly.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 55(4)
Figure 2. State-based armed conflict by type, 1946–2017
Three of the active IS conflicts in 2016 did not continue
in 2017 (Cameroon, Jordan, Tunisia) while four conflicts
were added to the list. Of these four, two had previously
been active in 2015 (Chad, Lebanon), while IS also chal-
lenged two new countries (Mali, Iran).
IS cells crossing the border from Iraq to Iran were
involved in small skirmishes against Iranian forces
already in 2016, but it was not until 2017, after a
large-scale attack against the Islamic Consultative Assem-
bly in Tehran, that the conflict in Iran reached 25 annual
battle-related deaths. In Mali, the establishment of an IS
territorial claim took a different form. In 2015, a faction
of the al-Qaida ally al-Murabitun pledged allegiance to
IS, calling itself ‘the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara’
(ISGS). However, the core IS leadership failed to
acknowledge the pledge for more than a year. It was not
until October 2016, when ISGS conducted a series of
cross-border attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger and the
core IS was under pressure in Iraq and Syria, that the
group officially recognized the pledge.
As Figure 2 shows, there have been few interstate
conflicts in the past decade. Of the 49 conflicts in
2017, only one was fought between states: an uptick in
violence along the Line of Control (LoC) between India
and Pakistan resulted in 118 deaths, the highest number
recorded since 2003. Tensions had increased already in
2016, due to widespread anti-India protests in Kashmir,
and remained high during 2017 amid mutual accusa-
tions of ceasefire violations.
Of the 48 intrastate conflicts, as many as 19, or 40%,
were internationalized, that is, troops from external states
supported one or both sides in the conflict. Both the
absolute number and the percentage are high for the
Pettersson & Eck 537

Table I. The ten most conflict-affected countries in terms of fatalities, 1989–2017

Total no. of fatalities Fatalities in Fatalities in Fatalities in
Country 1989–2017 state-based conflict non-state conflict one-sided violence
Rwanda 520,586 6,551 0 514,035
Syria 313,418 281,588 23,366 8,464
Afghanistan 200,316 187,470 3,294 9,552
Ethiopia 177,050 167,402 6,544 3,104
Iraq 118,902 97,976 2,943 17,983
DR Congo (Zaire) 105,482 24,640 13,520 67,322
Sudan 91,920 51,497 20,844 19,579
Sri Lanka 65,162 61,234 567 3,361
India 52,568 36,918 4,899 10,751
Nigeria 50,282 15,950 19,016 15,316
Other countries 621,430 425,724 76,224 119,482
Total 2,317,116 1,356,950 171,217 788,949

post-1946 period – second only to 2015, with 20 con-

flicts. Research suggests that external troop involvement
is associated with higher lethality and longer durations
(Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce, 2008; Lacina, 2006).
With troops in seven internationalized intrastate con-
flicts, the USA was involved in more conflicts as a sec-
ondary warring party than any other country in 2017.
In 2017, ten state-based conflicts reached the inten-
sity level of war, with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths.
This is a decrease by two from 2016. The number of
wars is still at a high level compared to the most recent
decade, but not when seen in a longer perspective. As
Figure 3 shows, between 1981 and 1992 the number of
wars did not dip below ten.
Turning to the number of battle-related deaths in
state-based conflict, Figure 1 reveals that the decrease
Figure 3. State-based armed conflict by intensity level, 1946–
in fatalities continued for the third year in a row.5 With 2017
a fatality estimate of almost 69,000 battle-related deaths
in the state-based category, 2017 witnessed a 22% The past five years have witnessed high levels of fatal-
decrease compared to the 88,000 battle-related deaths ities compared to most years since the end of the Cold
in 2016; this is the lowest level of fatalities since 2012. War. Nevertheless, the wars of the 21st century have
The trend is mainly due to the reduction of violence in been nowhere near as lethal as the large-scale wars of the
Syria. Despite the overall decline, violence in Iraq and 20th century, such as the Chinese Civil War, Korea,
Afghanistan escalated in 2017, with Afghanistan experi- Vietnam, and the two World Wars (Lacina & Gleditsch,
encing its most violent year in the post-Cold War period 2005).7 Together with the substantial decrease in fatal-
and Iraq its second most violent year.6 ities witnessed over the past three years, this lends sup-
port to the claim that battle-deaths are in decline and
5
Battle-related deaths are those incurred in direct fighting between
7
the parties to the conflict, in guerilla tactics and bombings, and also UCDP battle-death estimates are only available from 1989
those civilians that were caught in cross-fire. For more on this, see the onwards, but for that period the trend in declining fatalities in
Online appendix. state-based conflict shown in Figure 1 holds even more strongly
6
Second after the interstate war between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. when controlling for increases in world population; the peak level
However, 2017 was the most violent year in the intrastate conflict of fatalities shifts from 2014 to 1990. Dupuy et al. (2017) find similar
over government. results using alternative battle-death data from 1946 onwards.
538
that the world today is increasingly peaceful (e.g. Gold-
stein, 2011; Pinker, 2011, 2018).
The state-based conflicts in Syria caused just over
20,000 deaths during the year, around 29% of the total
number of fatalities recorded in state-based conflict in
2017. Down by 20,000 from 2016, this was the lowest
number of fatalities in Syria since 2011. The decline was
partly due to the concentration of the fighting to fewer
areas and clearer delineation of the battle fronts. In part,
it can also be attributed to several ceasefire agreements
and de-escalation zones agreed upon during the year. In
contrast to earlier years, most of the fatalities occurred in
the conflict with IS over the territory called the Islamic
State, rather than over governmental power.
At its height, IS in Syria and Iraq controlled an area
the size of Portugal. By the end of 2017 the group had
lost control of almost all of its territory and was confined
to a few pockets of land along the Iraq–Syria border.
Since IS was also engaged in a non-state conflict with
the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF), which led to the fall of IS’s de facto capital Raqqa
in October (more on this below), Syrian government
forces were able to push the group out from areas on the
western side of the Euphrates river. At the same time,
SDF continued to take territory from IS on the eastern
side of the river. By the end of October, the new de facto
capital of the Islamic State – Mayadin, in Deir Ezzor
province – fell to the Syrian army, severely reducing IS’s
access to the Iraqi border (Toumaj, 2017).
Non-state conflict 1989–2017
UCDP has recorded a total of 670 non-state conflicts
since 1989, with a yearly average of 37 active conflicts.
While the increase in non-state conflict since 2010 was
reversed in 2016, it again rose substantially in 2017,
reaching a new peak of 82 active conflicts. As in previous
years, Syria and Mexico dominated this picture, together
responsible for 28% of the total number of non-state
conflicts. However, the number of active conflicts was
also on the rise in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). In
CAR, a new pattern of intra-Muslim violence emerged,
in addition to the widespread violence pitting Muslims
against Christians. After a failed attempt to unite the
mainly Muslim groups that used to be part of the ex-
Séléka alliance, these actors intensified attacks on
groups based among the mainly Muslim Fulani people,
claiming that they were foreigners. This led to new
alliances and enmities, resulting in an increasing num-
ber of non-state conflicts as well as higher levels of one-
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 55(4)
Figure 4. Fatalities in non-state conflict, by region, 1989–
2017
sided violence. In DRC, President Joseph Kabila has
stayed in power beyond the limit stated in the consti-
tution, sparking a political crisis. Widespread protests
met by violence have, in turn, encouraged the plethora
of armed groups in the country to mobilize and vio-
lently defend their interests.
Africa saw a large increase in the number of non-state
conflicts in 2017 compared to 2016, from 35 to 50. In
the Middle East, 19 non-state conflicts were recorded in
2017, up by two from 2016. As was the case in 2016, the
vast majority of the conflicts in the Middle East took place
in Syria. The Americas had 11 active non-state conflicts in
2017, an increase from 8 in 2016. For the past five years,
non-state conflicts in the Americas have been concen-
trated in Mexico. In 2017, however, three new conflicts
between criminal gangs were recorded in Brazil. At the
end of 2016, the longstanding alliance between two of the
country’s biggest criminal organizations, Comando Ver-
melho and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), broke
down. As a result, fighting between these two groups and
their allies escalated in 2017. Finally, just as in 2016, two
non-state conflicts were recorded in Asia in 2017, both of
them in Afghanistan.
The sharp increase in the number of non-state con-
flicts was accompanied by a rise in the number of fatal-
ities from this type of violence. Figure 4 shows a new
peak in fatalities in 2017, with more than 13,500 people
killed in non-state conflict. Much of this is due to the
conflict between IS and SDF in Syria, which was the
most lethal non-state conflict during the year, just as
in 2016. This conflict alone caused almost 5,000 deaths
as the Kurdish-dominated SDF launched the ‘Great Bat-
tle’ to expel IS from its de facto capital Raqqa in June
Pettersson & Eck 539

(Rudaw, 2017). After more than four months of intense

fighting between the two non-state groups, amid heavy
airstrikes carried out by the US-led coalition, SDF cap-
tured the city in October. Following the Raqqa offensive,
SDF continued to push back IS from its former strong-
holds in large parts of Deir Ezzor province. As a conse-
quence, the Middle East was the region where most
fatalities in non-state conflicts were incurred. However,
the overall increase in deaths was also caused by escalat-
ing violence in Africa. UCDP recorded an almost 50%
increase in the number of deaths in the region in 2017,
mainly due to the fighting in CAR discussed above.
While fatalities in non-state conflict peaked in 2017,
they remain but 15% of the total number of fatalities in
organized violence. As Figure 1 shows, the number of
people killed in state-based violence dwarfs that of non- Figure 5. Fatalities in one-sided violence, by type of actor,
state conflict, suggesting that it would be inadvisable to 1989–2017
infer a substitution effect between the two forms of vio-
level is higher than in any year during the 2005–12
lence. While some non-state conflicts can be seen as de
facto proxy wars between rival states, most non-state con- period, the figure is considerably lower than the high
flicts are connected to weak state apparatuses and the lack levels of one-sided violence in much of the 1990s; at its
of territorial control by the government (Fjelde & Nils- peak in 1994, hundreds of thousands of civilians were
son, 2012). The four countries in which the majority of killed in the Rwandan genocide.
non-state conflicts took place in 2017 – Syria, Mexico, One much-publicized case of one-sided violence dur-
Nigeria, and CAR – are examples of such weak states. ing 2017 took place in Myanmar (Burma) where the
government targeted and executed civilians mainly
belonging to the Muslim Rohingya ethnic minority.
One-sided violence 1989–2017 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, 2018) reports that
UCDP has recorded a total of 266 actors engaged in one-
more than 6,000 Rohingya were killed in violence in
sided violence since 1989, with a yearly average of 33
August and September 2017. However, UCDP records
active actors. In 2017, the number of actors carrying out
only around 750 civilian fatalities from one-sided vio-
one-sided violence increased substantially, from 278 to
lence in its best estimate. Information on the circum-
33. An escalation of violence by several groups in DRC
stances of killings, including actors involved and how
following President Kabila’s failure to hold elections
many people were actually killed, is extremely scarce due
partly caused this increase. This is the highest number
to restricted media access to the area. The number
of actors active since 2005, a return to the previous
reported by MSF is based on surveys carried out in refu-
higher levels seen in the 1995–2005 decade. The overall
gee camps and then extrapolated to estimate the total
downward trend witnessed during the last decade con-
number of victims. The UCDP, however, only includes
tinued, with an uneven yet clearly visible decrease since
2002–03 when 45 actors were recorded in both years. fatalities from events where the death itself and the con-
UCDP estimates show that a state or a formally orga- text in which it occurred, including actors involved, can
nized group targeted and killed almost 7,000 civilians be identified. Moreover, while MSF’s figure presumably
in 2017. Figure 5 reveals that while the number of one- includes considerable one-sided violence carried out by
sided actors increased compared to 2016, the number the government forces, it also contains other types of
of fatalities remained at the same level. Although that violent deaths, including one-sided violence carried out
by other organized groups as well as state violence target-
ing rebel groups, which in UCDP data is recorded to the
8
UCDP reported 21 active actors for 2016 in Allansson, Melander state-based armed conflict category.
& Themnér (2017). Based on new information UCDP has added six Although the killings of civilians by the Burmese gov-
actors for 2016, which were active in DRC, CAR, Rwanda,
Philippines, and Myanmar. Table I, Figures 1 and 5, the UCDP ernment constituted one of the most lethal cases of one-
Conflict Encyclopedia (www.ucdp.uu.se/database), and the UCDP sided violence in 2017, non-state actors caused the vast
One-Sided Violence Dataset have been amended accordingly. majority of the global fatalities from one-sided violence.
540
This has been the case for most years since 1989; in only
seven out of 29 years were governments responsible for
more deaths than non-state groups. Non-state groups are
generally weaker than their state opponents and terrorist
attacks against civilians can be used as a tactic to over-
come this asymmetry (e.g. Hultman, 2007; Kalyvas,
2006; Pape, 2005). Governments, on the other hand,
face more pressure from the international community,
which may influence their decision to refrain from tar-
geting civilians. They may also choose to outsource this
type of repression to pro-government militias (Carey,
Colaresi & Mitchell, 2015).
IS continued to be the actor responsible for most one-
sided violence – around 35% of the total number of
deaths – although the killings carried out by the group
decreased substantially from 2016. As the group has
been militarily weakened and pushed back in many of
its formal strongholds, some experts have warned that
attacks against civilians may increase (e.g. IHS Markit,
2017; Winter, 2017). So far, however, the data do not
seem to support this forecast although the group has
continued to carry out suicide attacks in numerous coun-
tries around the world, with the majority taking place in
Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan.
Conclusion
The number of fatalities in organized violence decreased
for the third consecutive year. In 2017, almost 90,000
deaths were recorded by UCDP which is a decrease of
32% compared to the latest peak in 2014. The reduction
of violence in Syria drives this trend. Although the past
five years have witnessed high levels of fatalities com-
pared to most years since the end of the Cold War, the
wars of the 21st century have been nowhere near as lethal
as the large-scale wars of the 20th century. This trend
holds even more strongly when controlling for increases
in world population. Together with the substantial
decrease in fatalities witnessed over the past three years,
this lends support to the claim that battle-deaths are in
decline and that the world is becoming more peaceful.
Although the general trend was that of a decline in fatal-
ities from organized violence, deaths in conflicts between
non-state actors increased. A new high was recorded in
2017, both in terms of the number of non-state conflicts,
and in the number of fatalities these conflicts resulted in.
However, fatalities in non-state conflict remain but 15%
of the total number of fatalities in organized violence.
The number of actors engaged in one-sided violence also
increased during 2017, although the number of victims
remained on the same level as in 2016.
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 55(4)
Replication data
The complete datasets (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset, UCDP Dyadic Dataset, UCDP Battle-Related
Dataset, UCDP Non-State Dataset, and UCDP One-
Sided Dataset) updated to 2017 are found at http://
ucdp.uu.se/downloads/. Older versions of these datasets
can also be found at this address (all datasets) and www.
prio.no/cscw/armedconflict (the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset). The tables and figures in this article
were created directly from the Excel sheets at the UCDP
web page. Detailed descriptions of the individual cases are
found in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia at www.ucdp.
uu.se/. Replication data for this article, as well as the
Online appendix, can be found both at http://ucdp.
uu.se/downloads/ and https://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets/.
Acknowledgements
Numerous colleagues in Uppsala have contributed to the
data collection, notably, Marie Allansson, Mihai Croicu,
Paulina Cruz Velásquez, Garoun Engström, Daniel Finnbo-
gason, Helena Grusell, Stina Högbladh, Gabrielle Lövquist,
Emil Petersson, Marcellina Priadi, Margareta Sollenberg,
Samuel Taub, Lotta Themnér, and Kajsa Tidblad-
Lundholm. Summer interns Aaron Woonik and Remco
Jansen were also of great help. We are grateful to Martin
Tegnander for assistance with designing Figures 1 and 5.
ORCID iD
Kristine Eck http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4998-7964
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Appendix 1. State-based armed conflicts active in 2017

This list includes all conflicts that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in 2017 and fulfilled
the other criteria for inclusion.1 The column Year shows the latest range of years in which the conflict has been active
without interruption. The start year is found in parentheses in the Incompatibility column, which indicates when the
armed conflict reached 25 battle-related deaths for the first time. If a conflict has been inactive for more than ten years
or if there has been a complete change in the opposition side, the start year refers to the onset of the latest phase of the
conflict. For more complete information on the conflict history and dyad history, see (a) the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict Dataset and the UCDP Dyadic Dataset at http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ and (b) the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program’s online conflict encyclopedia at http://www.ucdp.uu.se. The column ‘Intensity in 2017’ displays the
aggregated conflict intensity in terms of the number of battle-related deaths. Thus, if more than one dyad is active
in the conflict, the intensity column records their aggregated intensity. Three fatality estimates are given in the table:
low, best and high.

Intensity in 2017

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2017 Year Low Best High

Europe
Azerbaijan Territory (Artsakh/Nagorno- Republic of Artsakh2 2014–17 36 36 37
Karabakh) (1991)
Russia Territory (Islamic State) IS 2015–17 53 53 76
(2015)
Ukraine Territory (Novorossiya) DPR, LPR3 2014–17 396 409 459
(2014)
(continued)
542 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 55(4)

Appendix 1 (continued)

Intensity in 2017

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2017 Year Low Best High

Middle East
Egypt Territory (Islamic State) IS 2015–17 279 394 514
(2015)
Egypt Government (2017) Harakit Sawa’id Misr, Jama’at Ansar al- 2017 103 103 160
Islam
Iran Territory (Islamic State) IS 2017 27 27 27
(2017)
Iraq Government4 (2004) IS 2004–17 13,138 13,817 17,129
Lebanon Territory (Islamic State) IS 2017 69 70 96
(2014)
Syria Government5(2011) Syrian insurgents 2011–17 9,426 9,433 9,777
Syria Territory (Islamic State)6 IS 2013–17 10,919 10,996 11,461
(2013)
Turkey Territory (Islamic State) IS 2015–17 591 594 618
(2015)
Turkey Territory (Kurdistan) (1983) PKK 2015–17 703 703 718
Yemen Government (2009) Forces of Hadi7 2009–17 2,317 2,317 2,564
Asia
Afghanistan Government8 (1978) Taleban 1978–2017 15,368 16,129 17,632
Afghanistan Territory (Islamic State)9 IS 2015–17 2,721 2,775 3,003
(2015)
Bangladesh Territory (Islamic State) IS 2016-17 46 47 47
(2016)
India Government (1991) CPI-Maoist 1996–2017 240 241 242
India Territory (Kashmir) (1990) Kashmir insurgents10 1990–2017 321 321 321
India Territory (Western South UNLFW 2015–17 39 39 41
East Asia) (2015)
India, Territory (Kashmir) (2014) 2014–17 118 118 120
Pakistan
Myanmar Territory (Arakan) (2016) ARSA 2016-17 393 393 401
Myanmar Territory (Kachin) (2011) KIO 2011–17 28 28 28
Myanmar Territory (Kokang) (2009) MNDAA 2017 35 35 49
Myanmar Territory (Palaung) (2013) PSLF 2017 44 44 44
Pakistan Government11 (2007) TTP 2007–17 508 508 509
Pakistan Territory (Islamic State) IS 2016-17 80 80 81
(2016)
Philippines Government (1969) CPP 1999–2017 174 174 214
Philippines Territory (Mindanao)12 ASG 1993–2017 84 84 90
(1972)
Philippines Territory (Islamic State) IS 2016-17 1,336 1,363 1,435
(2016)
Thailand Territory (Patani) (2003) Patani insurgents13 2003–17 43 43 43
Africa
Algeria Government (1991) AQIM 1991–2017 60 60 73
Angola Territory (Cabinda) (1991) FLEC-FAC 2017 18 25 109
Cameroon Government Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal- 2015–17 63 63 63
Jihad14 (2015)
Chad Territory (Islamic State) IS 2017 57 57 219
(2015)
DR Congo Government (2011) CMC, CNPSC (Yakutumba), Kamuina 2016-17 1,607 1,608 2,727
Nsapu, M23, MNR
(continued)
Pettersson & Eck 543

Appendix 1 (continued)

Intensity in 2017

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2017 Year Low Best High

DR Congo Territory (Kongo Kingdom) BDK 2017 90 90 90
(2007)
Kenya Territory (Northeastern Al-Shabaab 2015–17 83 85 110
Province and Coast)
(2015)
Libya Territory (Islamic State)15 IS 2015–17 95 96 121
(2015)
Libya Government (2014) Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil, Forces of the 2017 308 308 337
House of Representatives, PFLL
Mali Government16 (2009) AQIM, JNIM 2012–17 299 302 384
Mali Territory (Islamic State) 17 IS 2017 43 43 43
(2017)
Niger Territory (Islamic State)18 IS 2015–17 203 203 203
(2015)
Nigeria Government19 (2009) Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal- 2011–17 1,061 1,062 1,114
Jihad
Nigeria Territory (Islamic State)20 IS 2015–17 817 817 1267
(2015)
Somalia Government21 (2006) Al-Shabaab 2006-17 1,700 1,837 2,525
South Government (2011) SPLM/A In Opposition 2011–17 461 465 659
Sudan
Sudan Government (1983) SRF, SARC 1983–2017 116 128 325
Uganda Government22 (1980) ADF 2013–17 235 235 243
Americas
USA Government23 (2001) Al-Qaida 2001–17 110 111 194
Total number of battle-related deaths in 2017 67,061 68,969 78,742
1
See Online appendix for definitions.
2
The Republic of Artsakh was supported by troops from Armenia. The group was previously known as Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh.
3
DPR and LPR were supported by troops from Russia.
4
The Iraqi government was supported by troops from Australia, Belgium, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom and United States of
America.
5
The Syrian government was supported by troops from Iran and Russia.
6
The Syrian government was supported by troops from Iran and Russia.
7
Forces of Hadi was supported by troops from Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and United Arab Emirates.
8
The Afghan government was supported by troops from Pakistan and United States of America.
9
The Afghan government was supported by troops from United States of America.
10
A large number of groups have been active. Some of the groups active in 2017 were Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizbul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammed.
11
The Pakistani government was supported by troops from Afghanistan.
12
The Philippine government was supported by troops from Malaysia.
13
E.g. BRN-C, GMIP and RKK.
14
Commonly called Boko Haram.
15
The Libyan government was supported by troops from United States of America.
16
The Malian government was supported by MINUSMA, involving troops from Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Congo, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, El
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast,
Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Mauritania, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States of America and Yemen. France also contributed troops via the
French-led counter-terrorism Operation Barkhane, which succeeded Operation Serval (2013–14).
17
Ibid.
18
The Nigerien government was supported by troops from Chad and United States of America.
19
The Nigerian government was supported by troops from Cameroon.
20
The Nigerian government was supported by troops from Chad.
21
The Somali government was supported by AMISOM, involving troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone and Uganda. Also United States of America contributed troops on the side of the government.
22
The Ugandan government was supported by troops from DR Congo.
23
The US government was supported by troops from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
544 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 55(4)

Unclear cases of state-based armed conflict in 2017

Cases that have been completely rejected because they definitely do not meet the criteria of armed conflict are not
included in the list below. For the conflicts listed here, the available information suggests the possibility of the cases
meeting the criteria of armed conflicts, but there is insufficient information concerning at least one of the three
components of the definition: (a) the number of deaths, (b) the identity or level of organization of a party or (c) the
type of incompatibility. The unclear aspect may concern an entire conflict or a dyad in a conflict that is included above.

Location/government Opposition organization(s) Unclear aspect

Burkina Faso Ansaroul Islam Incompatibility
Cameroon United Front Identity of organization
Congo Ntsiloulous Number of deaths
Ethiopia BPLM Number of deaths
Yemen Forces of Saleh Incompatibility

Appendix 2. Non-state conflicts active in 2017

This list includes all non-state conflicts that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 deaths in 2017 and fulfilled the other
criteria for inclusion.1 The column ‘Start year’ shows the first year when the non-state conflict caused at least 25 fatalities
(since 1989). The column ‘Fatalities in 2017’ displays the number of people killed, in the low, best and high estimate.

Fatalities in 2017

Location Side A Side B Start year Low Best High

Middle East
Lebanon Hezbollah Tahrir al-Sham 2017 190 190 190
Lebanon IS Saraya Ahl al-Sham, Tahrir 2017 33 33 33
al-Sham
Syria Ahrar al-Sham Tahrir al-Sham 2017 183 183 214
Syria Ahrar al-Sham, FSA, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, IS 2016 32 32 32
Jaysh al-Islam
Syria Ahrar al-Sham, FSA, Jaysh al-Islam, Tahrir IS 2017 54 56 56
al-Sham
Syria Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, IS 2016 33 33 33
Southern Front
Syria Ahrar al-Sham, Southern Front, Tahrir IS 2017 251 252 252
al-Sham
Syria Hawar Kilis Operations Room IS 2016 246 246 291
Syria Hawar Kilis Operations Room SDF 2016 317 318 334
Syria IS SDF 2015 4,852 4,958 5,874
Syria IS Jaysh al-Islam 2017 26 26 26
Syria IS Jaysh al-Asha’er 2017 29 29 32
Syria IS Tahrir al-Sham 2017 595 595 596
Syria IS Southern Front, Tahrir 2017 161 161 164
al-Sham
Syria Jaysh al-Islam Rahman Corps, Tahrir 2017 210 210 211
al-Sham
Syria Liwa al-Aqsa Tahrir al-Sham 2017 339 346 360
Syria Nour al-Din al-Zenki Tahrir al-Sham 2017 46 46 47
Yemen AQAP Forces of Hadi 2015 129 129 140
Yemen IS Forces of Hadi 2015 44 44 47
(continued)
Pettersson & Eck 545

Appendix 2 (continued)

Fatalities in 2017

Location Side A Side B Start year Low Best High

Asia
Afghanistan IS Taleban 2015 318 343 396
Afghanistan Taleban High Council of Afghanistan 2015 67 72 110
Islamic Emirate
Africa
Cameroon Comités locaux de vigilance Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna 2017 62 62 63
Lidda’awati wal-Jihad2
CAR 3R anti-Balaka 2017 51 54 98
CAR anti-Balaka FPRC 2013 54 54 56
CAR anti-Balaka UPC/Ali Darass Fulani 2014 342 392 468
supporters
CAR FPRC UPC/Ali Darass Fulani 2017 33 33 33
supporters
CAR anti-Balaka MPC (Al Khatim rebels) 2017 77 79 80
CAR anti-Balaka, FPRC-AK FPRC 2017 360 367 403
CAR anti-Balaka - Mokom, FPRC, MPC (Al UPC/Ali Darass Fulani 2016 30 30 30
Khatim rebels), RPRC supporters
CAR anti-Balaka Peuhl militia (Zemio) 2017 62 62 70
Chad Toubou Zaghawa 2017 22 25 25
DR Congo Baluba Batwa 2016 340 340 344
DR Congo Lulua-Luba Chowe-Pende 2017 58 58 58
DR Congo NDC-R Mayi Mayi Mazembe 2017 135 135 138
DR Congo CMC CNRD 2017 91 91 91
DR Congo Bambuti, Batwa Batabwa 2017 27 27 27
Ethiopia Oromo Somali (Ethiopia) 2000 258 276 300
Libya Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council Forces of the House of 2014 377 378 480
Representatives
Libya Derna Mujahideen Shura Council Forces of the House of 2016 31 31 31
Representatives
Libya BDB Forces of the House of 2017 63 63 63
Representatives
Libya Forces of the House of Representatives IS 2015 59 59 83
Libya Operations Room Combating Daesh, Anas al-Dabbashi Brigade, 2017 43 43 43
Shuhada al-Wadi militia Brigade 48
Mali CMA GATIA 2016 36 47 93
Mali Dogon Fulani 2012 31 31 90
Mali IS MSA 2017 25 25 25
Mali GATIA, MSA IS 2017 36 36 66
Nigeria Fulani Mambila 2002 40 40 351
Nigeria Hausa Yoruba 1998 46 46 46
Nigeria Fulani Tiv 2011 61 68 90
Nigeria Black Axe Eyie 2011 18 25 25
Nigeria Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad Yan Gora 2013 94 94 97
Nigeria Deebam NDV 2016 44 44 47
Nigeria Ikot-Offiong community Oku Iboku community 2017 25 37 99
Nigeria Wanhihem community Wanikade community 2017 150 150 150
Nigeria Fulani Kadara 2017 37 37 37
Nigeria Fulani Irigwe 2017 66 66 66
(continued)
546 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 55(4)

Appendix 2 (continued)

Fatalities in 2017

Location Side A Side B Start year Low Best High

Nigeria Bwatiye Fulani 2016 92 109 122
Somalia Al-Shabaab Aaro Aaro 2017 39 39 39
South Bor Dinka Murle 2007 95 96 101
Sudan
South Lou Nuer Murle 2006 32 32 42
Sudan
South Bor Dinka Mundari 2009 36 40 44
Sudan
South Aliap Dinka Atuot Dinka 2017 30 30 30
Sudan
South Pakam Dinka Rup Dinka 2017 172 172 172
Sudan
South Ayiel Dinka Waat Dinka 2017 44 44 44
Sudan
South Jalwau Thiyic Dinka 2017 43 43 43
Sudan
Sudan SPLM/A-North SPLM/A-North – MA faction 2017 62 72 72
Sudan Habaniya Salamat Baggara 2017 41 41 41
Sudan Hamar Kababish 2017 53 53 54
Sudan Ma’aliyah Rizeigat Baggara 2002 68 68 70
Sudan Misseriya Salamat Baggara 2013 32 32 32
Sudan Rizeigat Abbala Zaghawa 1996 31 31 31
Americas
Brazil FDN PCC 2017 99 99 103
Brazil PCC Sindicato RN 2017 30 30 30
Brazil Comando Vermelho GDE 2017 116 116 120
Mexico Cartel Independiente de Acapulco La Barredora 2011 28 28 28
Mexico Gulf Cartel Los Zetas 2010 52 52 167
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Generation La Nueva Familia 2017 43 43 43
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Generation Los Zetas 2011 147 147 928
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Generation Sinaloa Cartel 2015 333 333 904
Mexico Juarez Cartel Sinaloa Cartel 2004 65 65 109
Mexico Los Ardillos Los Rojos 2015 82 82 82
Mexico Forces of Damaso Sinaloa Cartel 2015 58 58 65
Total number of fatalities in non-state conflicts in 2017 13,362 13,662 17,220
1
See Online appendix for definitions.
2
Commonly called Boko Haram.
Pettersson & Eck 547

Appendix 3. One-sided violence in 2017

This list includes all cases of one-sided violence that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 fatalities in 2017 and
fulfilled the other criteria for inclusion.1 The column ‘Start year’ shows the first year when one-sided violence caused
at least 25 fatalities (since 1989). The column ‘Fatalities in 2017’ displays the number of civilians killed, in the low,
best and high estimate.

Fatalities in 2017

Location Actor Start year Low Best High

Middle East
Iraq Government of Iraq 1990 102 102 102
Iraq, Syria, Nigeria2 IS 2004 2,514 2,524 2,684
Syria Government of Syria 2011 65 65 67
Asia
Afghanistan Taleban 1996 88 89 129
India CPI-Maoist 2005 130 130 139
India Kashmir insurgents 1990 25 25 25
Myanmar (Burma) Government of Myanmar (Burma) 1991 565 755 1,295
Myanmar (Burma) ARSA 2017 78 78 80
Pakistan TTP 2007 42 42 58
Pakistan LeJ 1998 102 102 102
Africa
Burkina Faso, Mali Ansaroul Islam 2017 4 30 30
Burundi, Tanzania Government of Burundi 1995 42 42 43
Cameroon Government of Cameroon 1994 42 42 102
Central African Republic MPC (Al Khatim rebels) 2017 55 55 55
Central African Republic anti-Balaka - Mokom, FPRC, MPC (Al Khatim rebels), 2017 69 69 78
RPRC
Central African Republic UPC/Ali Darass Fulani supporters 2014 254 278 366
Central African Republic anti-Balaka 2013 141 177 191
Central African Republic 3R 2016 88 88 88
Central African Republic, DR LRA 1989 26 26 28
Congo
DR Congo Government of Congo (Zaire) 1989 257 294 792
DR Congo ADF 1997 34 34 34
DR Congo Bana Mura 2017 174 174 174
DR Congo CMC 2017 33 33 35
DR Congo Kamuina Nsapu 2017 199 201 205
DR Congo Mayi Mayi Mazembe 2016 55 59 62
DR Congo Mayi Mayi Mazembe, NDC-R 2017 27 27 27
Ethiopia Government of Ethiopia 1989 173 173 188
Kenya Government of Kenya 2007 43 43 44
Mali Dozos (Mali) 2017 25 25 35
Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad3 2010 909 909 979
Somalia, Kenya Al-Shabaab 2008 113 122 134
South Sudan Government of South Sudan 2012 214 218 224
Sudan Government of Sudan 1989 51 51 63
Total number of fatalities from one-sided violence in 2017 6,739 7,082 8,658
1
See Online appendix for further information regarding definitions.
2
The vast majority of the violence took place in these three countries. However, killings were also registered in Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Burkina Faso, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey and United States of America.
3
Commonly called Boko Haram.