Anderies SES Framework

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The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2013
Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems:

Implications for Public Policy
John M. Anderies and Marco A. Janssen
We conceptualize social-ecological systems (SESs) as complex adaptive systems where public policy
affects and is affected by the biophysical system in which it is embedded. The study of robustness of
SESs combines insights from various disciplines including economics, political science, ecology, and
engineering. In this paper we present an approach that can be used to explore the implications for public
policy when viewed as a component of a complex adaptive system. Our approach leverages the
Institutional Analysis and Development framework to provide a platform for interdisciplinary research
that focuses on system-wide outcomes of the policy process beyond just policy change. The main
message is that building robustness can create new vulnerabilities. Fail-free policies cannot be devel-
oped, and instead of a focus on the “right” policy, we need to think about policy processes that stimulate
experimentation, adaptation, and learning.
KEY WORDS: SES Framework, Robustness Framework, institutions, vulnerability, public infrastruc-
ture, common-pool resources, policy processes
Introduction
Public policy processes are complex, dynamic phenomena. Understanding such

dynamic phenomenon requires some sort of strategy for simplification—some way
to isolate key system components and relationships among them that can be gener-
alized to understand how the system structure defined by these components and
relationships relates to policy outcomes across various contexts. There has been
steady development of improved policy theory (Sabatier, 1999, 2007) focusing on
better understanding of how actors, problems, solutions, and decision opportunities
interact to generate policy change. Such theories often focus on explaining policy
change within a given organizational context that defines decision venues, restricts
how agents interact, determines costs and benefits of interactions and particular
outcomes. Given the notion of a policy cycle (the feedback from policy change back
into the policy process in Figure 1A) or some period for a policy change of interest
to play out, it is often reasonable to assume that key elements of the policy context
remain stable. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier, 1988) makes this
explicit by defining “relatively stable parameters” that frame the policy process: (i)
basic attributes of the problem area; (ii) basic distribution of natural resources; (iii)
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514 Policy Studies Journal, 41:3
Policy Subsystem Processes

Fixed Policy Policy
Policy Actors Decision
Challenges Problems Change
Context Opportunities
Solutions
Outcomes
Policy Subsystem Processes

Evolving Policy Policy
Policy Challenges Actors Decision
Problems Change
Context Opportunities
Solutions
Outcomes
Dynamic Biophysical System
Figure 1. (A): The Policy Process as a Flow-Through System in which Policy Challenges Generated in a
Fixed Policy Context Are Processed and Produce Policy Change. (B): The Policy Process as Part of a
Dynamic, Self-Organizing Feedback System.
fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure; and (iv) basic constitutional
structure (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) that are assumed to remain stable for
approximately 100 years or more.
There are situations, however, in which the assumption of a stable policy context
begins to break down. Recent work suggests that some policy contexts exhibit the
capacity to rapidly transform from one stable configuration to another (Brock, 2006;
Brock, Carpenter, & Scheffer, 2008; Scheffer & Carpenter, 2003; Scheffer, Carpenter,
Foley, Folke, & Walker, 2001). In these instances, the policy context remains stable for
long periods then, often due to policy choices themselves, rapidly shifts under the
feet of the policy process (Brock et al., 2008). In such cases, we need to link the notion
of the policy process to the policy context and provide a systematic approach to
understand the dynamic interaction between the two. Here we present a framework
intended to forge this link; the additional loop pictured in Figure 1B. The intent of
the framework is to embed the policy process in a dynamically evolving policy
context driven by the feedbacks between biophysical processes and policy processes.
Viewed in this way, the policy process can be understood as an emergent property of
a dynamic, underlying social-ecological system. The framework is based on ideas
from institutional rational choice and an extension of the Institutional Analysis and
Development (IAD) framework, familiar to many policy scholars. The key contribu-
tion of this article is to provide ideas, language, and tools to move from the concep-
tion of the policy process shown in Figure 1A to that in Figure 1B.
The framework presented here pushes beyond the extension of the IAD frame-
work to better accomodate biophysical context. Ostrom’s (2009) social-ecological
system (SES) framework already accomplishes this, and many policy scholars will
no doubt be familiar with it. The SES framework provides a mechanism to system-
atically parse a system composed of a set of actors (resource users), a governance
structure, and a resource system into its component parts for the purpose of study-
ing the sustainability of a particular SES. Here we focus on understanding funda-
Anderies/Janssen: Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems 515
mental principles of feedback systems like that in Figure 1B that transcend the
specific details of a particular SES. Specifically, we explore how the fit1 between
different elements of SESs affects their robustness characteristics. The robustness
characteristics of a SES are intimately related with its capacity to cope with uncer-
tainty and change. Although the SES framework acknowledges dynamics and feed-
backs, it provides no systematic methodology to study them. For this, we need
another set of ideas.
The Robustness Framework we discuss here, like the SES Framework, is an
extension of the IAD Framework. Unlike the SES Framework, the Robustness
Framework provides an additional layer of ideas to more explicitly address subtle-
ties that arise from nonlinear dynamics and feedback (Anderies, Rodriguez,
Janssen, & Cifdaloz, 2007) in SESs and how they may be accounted for in the
policy process. Our approach views SESs as complex adaptive systems whose
attributes are continuously evolving and adapting at different scales and levels of
organization.2 Humans experiment with new institutional arrangements and may
copy and adjust institutions that seem to work in other situations through an evo-
lutionary process of institutional change. The long-lasting SESs studied by Ostrom
and her colleagues are the results of this process playing out over several decades
or centuries. The aim of this paper is to present the framework that underpins our
transdisciplinary approach to a policy studies audience. Our conception of public
policy is very much informed by our work on small-scale communities who self-
organize their institutions within a nested system of institutional arrangements
and biophysical dynamics rather than formal policy processes at the national scale.
However, our approach that draws on both the SES Framework (see Figure 4) and
Robustness Framework (see Figure 3) is easily extensible to broader classes of
problems of interest to policy scholars. To allay the reader’s fear of “framework
overload,” we note that the Robustness and SES frameworks are, in fact, closely
related (Ostrom being involved in the development of both) and we use them
together in the approach presented here.
Changing Scales and New Public Policy Theory
Both conceptions of the policy process shown in Figure 1 are perfectly reason-
able. Which one to choose is a matter of the relative social, biophysical, and temporal
scales relevant to the problem of interest. These relative scales determine the degree
of connectedness between different components of policy subsystems and the policy
context. Note, in the ACF, the policy context is assumed to be constant over periods
on the order of a century (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). This implies that the feedback
through the biophysical system is very slow compared with the feedback from
policy change back into the policy process itself. Often, this is a reasonable assump-
tion, and Figure 1A is the appropriate view. It may be necessary to shift to the
representation in Figure 1B when the feedbacks through the biophysical system
begin to operate on timescales that approach that on which the policy process occurs.
This may occur when the policy process slows down (e.g., climate negotiations), the
dynamics induced by positive feedbacks speed up (e.g., melting of Greenland’s ice

sheets, rapid social movements), or both.
It is important to distinguish between variation in a fixed policy context and
dynamic change in coupled SES. A “fixed policy context” may involve considerable
variation as long as that variation exhibits a stable structure. Public policy has long
been addressing this type of variation, typically manifest in conceptions of “risk.”
The Code of Hammurabi, for example, deals with very specific types of risk: If a
landlord lets his land for fixed rental fee, if bad weather destroys the harvest, the
code specifies that the injury falls upon the tenant. In rental contracts based on
harvest shares, on the other hand, the landlord and tenant share the risk of crop loss
(and the potential benefit of a bumper crop). The numerous references in Hammu-
rabi’s code to risk and environmental variability are a testament to how long public
policy has had to address environmental variability. Further, the focus on assignment
of risk and emphasis on clear delineation of social roles (position rules sensu, Ostrom,
1990, 2005) suggests that part of the challenge for public policy in early societies may
have been the smooth functioning of society in the face of ever-present environmen-
tal variation. In some sense, this type of policy was focused at a small spatial
scale—on the tight connection between the individual and local biophysical context.
In this case, Figure 1A is a good representation of the system: The policy context is
fixed, delivering a reasonably stable distribution of exogenously driven weather
events (shocks). These shocks impacted individuals who likely had reasonable infor-
mation about expected payoffs and could choose appropriate contracts. Here, public
policy, or the code, is a constraint regarding what types of contracts are allowed for
spreading risk, reducing conflict, and promoting social stability.
It is interesting to note that the discourse on societal collapse tends to focus on
the interaction of the inner policy feedback and the outer biophysical context feed-
back. Tainter (1990) invokes the increasing complexity of infrastructure necessary to
solve increasingly difficult problems that occur on ever larger regional or continental
scales as societies grow. Eventually, this complexity collapses under its own weight,
perhaps triggered by a series of decisions occurring on the inner, faster feedback
loop. Butzer (2012) details how a series of slower (centennial scale) biophysical
process on the outer loop such as agricultural soil and pastoral degradation combine
with slower economic and social processes such as loss of economic networks,
productivity, and persistent poverty to set the preconditions for collapse. Collapse
may be precipitated by processes (e.g., intrainstitutional conflict, polarization of
elites) or averted by processes (rallying of elites, social transformation) on the inner
feedback loop on faster (decadal) time scales. In both these cases, slow feedbacks
through the biophysical system cause the policy context to change.
Much like in these historical examples of collapse, the types of environmental
challenges we face today cannot be treated as exogenous shocks, i.e., in terms of risk.
The scale of the human enterprise has reached a point where human actions affect
the biophysical environment at such a scale and speed that irreversible effects can be
observed in a human’s life span. We now, for example, measurably impact global
biogeochemical cycles (Schlesinger, Cole, Finzi, & Holland, 2011; Vitousek et al.,
1997). In such circumstances, individual human actions add up to generate impacts
that fundamentally change the nature of the policy context itself. There are two key
questions that arise in this regard: (i) Can the policy process, which often plays out
on the order of decades, possibly function when the policy context changes rapidly?;
and (ii) When the policy process and policy context involving a dynamic biophysical
system co-evolve as a coupled feedback system depicted in Figure 1B, under what
circumstances does infrastructure (socio-technical structures) emerge that makes the
system flexible and robust versus rigid and vulnerable in the face of novel change?
These questions are critical for public policy in the modern context in which global-
ization and global environmental change are generating a highly connected global-
scale system in which decisions at small scales are influenced by and will influence
processes at the global scale in unpredictable and novel ways (Adger, Eakin, &
Winkels, 2009). Will public policy (and societies themselves) be able to respond to the
sheer pace at which social and natural systems are currently changing? If faced with
one of either natural or social change, perhaps the answer is yes. However, in the face
of simultaneous impacts of global environmental change and globalization (O’Brien
& Leichenko, 2000), they may not be able to cope.
How do we conduct the public policy process in coupled SESs when the tem-
poral and spatial scales of both human activity and our impacts on biophysical
dynamics have fundamentally changed, and when the traditional approach of pro-
viding the best option to a concrete problem is insufficient? Here we describe a set
of ideas and tools designed to analyze dynamic feedback systems of which the
classes of SESs depicted in Figure 1B are examples. To do so, we will briefly define
SESs and present the Robustness and SES frameworks to analyze how systems deal
with disturbances and stress. We will illustrate the use of this collection of tools to
examine the fit between institutional arrangements and ecological dynamics. The
idea of “fit,” explored in detail next, is realized by characterizing trade-offs in the
capacity of the SES to cope with different types of shocks. These trade-offs arise as a
result of a fundamental property of feedback systems—conservation of fragility (or
vulnerability). Put simply, this implies that it is not possible to design public policy
for a given ecological (environmental) context—i.e., achieve a fit between policies
and the biophysical context so that the SES is robust to all possible shocks. Thus, one
aspect of the public policy process is effectively navigating trade-offs between per-
formance and robustness and choices between different vulnerabilities. We will
discuss possible approaches to this policy challenge with reference to ideas from
robust control that emphasizes system properties such as modularity, diversity, and
redundancy; and through reflections on the polycentric approach of Ostrom.
The Robustness and SES Frameworks
The idea of a “coupled social ecological system” emerged in response to what

was seen as failed resource management policy from the 1970s to the early 1990s.
Several scholars recognized that in most cases, management policies resulted in
unintended consequences because they neglected the coupling between social and
ecological systems. Early collaborations between mathematical biologists and
theoretical ecologists extending ideas from systems theory (feedback systems like
that in Figure 1B) focused on how “fast” and “slow” processes interact to generate
cycles of change in ecological systems. The big message was that ecological systems
do not tend toward a stable “climax” state (Clements, 1916) characterized by stable
distributions of species such as an old growth forest that management policy should
seek to maintain. Rather, management policy, and by extension, public policy, must
be designed to manage complex cyclical dynamics and acknowledge the potential
for abrupt regime shifts (Gunderson, Peterson, & Holling, 2008; Holling, 1973, 1978,
1979; Holling & Gunderson, 2002; Ludwig, Walker, & Holling, 1997; Ludwig, Jones,
& Holling, 1978). A regime shift occurs when the key drivers in a system fundamen-
tally change. A well-known example is when key drivers that affect the dynamics of
phosphorus concentration in the water column in a lake change and the water shifts
from clear blue (oligotrophic) to green and turbid (eutrophic). Examples of regime
shifts in the social domain are easy to imagine. One interesting example relates to
footbinding in Taiwan (Brown & Feldman, 2009). Footbinding was practiced by Han
Chinese who settled in Taiwan but not by Taiwanese aborigines. This difference in
custom strongly influenced marriage patterns between the groups. When footbind-
ing was banned by the government in 1915 (an exogenous shock to public infrastruc-
ture), marriage patterns and social roles changed drastically (a social regime shift).
This newly emerging view of how ecosystems function began to be connected
with social and economic systems through the resource management
literature—especially the work of C. S. Holling and his collaborators. Holling’s
observations of repeated resource management failures led him to define what he
called the “command and control pathology of natural resource management”
(Holling & Meffe, 1996) in which managers respond to erratic or surprising ecosys-
tem behavior with increased top-down control in an attempt to reduce this variation.
This reduction of natural variation leads to a loss of resilience of the ecological system
which, in turn, leads to crises when the system experiences an exogenous shock. At
the same time, Elinor Ostrom was also questioning the rationality of top-down,
command-and-control governance structures (Ostrom, 1990) from a very different
perspective. Ostrom’s argument was very powerful: Small groups of people can
effectively manage complex resource systems without top-down governance struc-
tures. In fact, she suggested that top-down interventions could have pathological
effects on social systems, reducing their capacity to solve problems and deal with
change, similar to the way in which Holling envisioned the impact of top-down
control on ecosystems. Fortunately, these research trajectories converged (Berkes,
Colding, & Folke, 2003) and the concept of SESs was formalized. Through her
collaborations with ecologists, economists, and dynamical systems theorists in the
resilience research community, Ostrom worked for over a decade to connect her
groundbreaking work on the IAD framework for institutional and public policy
analysis to features of the biophysical context in which they operate. The result was
the SES framework (Ostrom, 2007, 2009).
The development of the SES framework was motivated, in part, by the need to
understand governance in complex ecological contexts like those emphasized by
resilience theorists—the potential for dramatic regime shifts—i.e., lakes that flip
from oligotrophic to eutrophic conditions (Carpenter, Ludwig, & Brock, 1999) and
Figure 2. The IAD Framework (Adapted from Ostrom, 2011).

Note that the IAD Framework is an example of a feedback control system. See text for further discussion.
policy choice in the face of potential catastrophic regime shifts (Brock et al., 2008).
Resilience theorists emphasized nonlinear feedbacks and the interaction of processes
occurring on different time scales. Although the IAD Framework (Figure 2) was
likely not originally designed to address such problems, it, in fact, does provide the
essential components. It explicitly contains the two feedback loops from Figure 1B,
and has always recognized the importance of feedback. Further, the IAD is an
example of a “feedback controller” of the type studied by controls specialists in
electrical engineering. The entities on the left, the biophysical conditions, commu-
nity, and rules, constitute a “plant” whose behavior reacts to feedback generated by
applying evaluative criteria to outcomes (this is what a “controller” does in engi-
neered systems). An essential question for policy analysis is when what the IAD
framework refers to “external variables” can actually be treated as such. We argue
that as the scale of the human enterprise grows, they almost never can. Most, if not
all, spatial and temporal scales must be endogenized in the policy process.
To address the policy challenges we face today, we cannot consider only the
feedback between policy outcomes and a fixed action situation through sequential
policy cycles (inner loop in Figure 1B and Figure 2). We must fully consider the
impacts of policies on more slowly changing (but potentially subject to rapid regime
shifts) variables that structure action situations. Policy scholars recognize this, of
course, and have written about various aspects of “long-run” feedbacks between
policy choice and the biophysical context (e.g., Jaffe & Stavins, 1995; Kline, 2001) and
between policy choice and the attributes of the community (e.g., Soroka & Wlezien,
2004; Soss & Schram, 2007). However, work in this area is underdeveloped, espe-
cially regarding issues of interest in this paper: the impact of uncertainty in feedback
systems like those represented by the IAD Framework and how to effectively
address it in our governance structures. Given the focus of the concepts of robustness
and robust feedback control on feedback systems with uncertainty, they were a
natural place to begin to extend the IAD Framework. This led Anderies, Janssen, and
Ostrom (2004) to work on developing a framework to study the robustness of SESs
from an institutional perspective (Figure 3).
The Robustness Framework emphasizes the dynamic interactions between the
“external variables” in the IAD framework that structure dynamically evolving action
situations. The framework distinguishes between actors (shown in ovals) and infra-
structure (shown as rectangles) and the relationship between those who use the
Exogenous drivers affecting social actors, e.g.inputs from related

social, economic, and political structures in the SES framework.
8
Resource 8
1 Users
2 Public
5 Infrastructure
Resource 6 Providers
4 3
Public
7 7 Infrastructure
Exogenous drivers affecting natural and human−made infrastructure,

e.g. inputs from related ecosystems in the SES framework.
Figure 3. The Robustness Framework (Adapted from Anderies et al., 2004).

Details of the external drivers and embedding were not specified in the original framework but are added
here to illustrate the correspondence between the Robustness Framework and the SES Framework
(Figure 4). The color coding illustrates the rough correspondence between entities in the frameworks.
resource, and those who may control it (public infrastructure providers), i.e., link 2
in Figure 3. Public policy enters the framework with public infrastructure. Public
policy—the output of the public policy process—is a type of public infrastructure
(e.g., legal systems) that in the case of resource management affects the relationship
between resource users and the resource itself (link 1) through link 5. A simple
example is a regulation such as an effort quota: Resource users can only harvest from
the resource so many days per year—a common public policy measure in fisheries in
the recent past. Also included with public infrastructure is hard infrastructure—
bridges, roads, irrigation canals—also the subject of public investment, and thus of
public policy. Link 6 highlights the importance of coproduction, the direct involve-
ment of resource users that is often essential in the provision of public infrastructure
(Ostrom, 1996; Parks et al., 1981).
As discussed earlier, the emphasis of this framework was not on the perfor-
mance of particular policies per se. Rather, the focus was on the basic structure of
relationships 1–6 and how they might enable SESs to cope with environmental
shocks (arrows 7) such as floods (impact on public infrastructure) or drought (impact
on resource) and social, political, economic shocks (arrows 8). We refer to the struc-
ture of these relationships as the “fit” between the biophysical conditions, actors,
and rules, as discussed below. The first-generation SES Framework pictured in
Figure 4 is similar to the Robustness Framework conceptually, but returned its focus
to understanding targeted public policy questions in the context of natural resource
management. The methodological basis for the framework, which Ostrom referred
to as “a multitier framework for analyzing a SES,” was based on a diagnostic
approach, motivated by the analogue of diagnosis in the medical field. The systems
that medical professionals work with are extraordinarily complex, and medical
professionals have steadily moved away from simple panaceas—the simple remedies
of the past. Ostrom argues that some policy practitioners have not come as far and
Social, Economic, and Political

Settings (S)
8
Resource Governance
System (RS) System (GS)
Interactions (I) Outcomes (O)
Resource Users
Units (RU) (U)
Direct Causal Link 7 Feedback
Related Ecosystems (ECO)
Figure 4. First-Generation SES Framework (Adapted from Ostrom, 2007).

The original framework did not include the numbers 7 or 8 on the links between exogenous drivers and
the system in question. These have been added to show the correspondence between the SES Framework
and the Robustness Framework in Figure 3. The color coding illustrates the rough correspondence
between entities in the frameworks.
still rely too much on panaceas (privatization, cap and trade). Each particular
resource system has special characteristics that require careful policy design.
Resource systems (or any system composed of human-made natural infrastructure)
require a tailored policy cure, analogous to personalized medicine. Ostrom’s initial
multitier framework (which later became the SES Framework) provided a tool to
diagnose the problem and find a cure.
It is clear by comparing Figures 3 and 4 that the SES Framework is a special case
of the Robustness Framework. The exogenous drivers of resource dynamics (arrow
7) were assumed to be quite general in the Robustness Framework. In the SES
framework, these were replaced by related ecosystems. Likewise, the exogenous
drivers impacting the resource users (RUs), public infrastructure providers (PIPs)
(arrows 8), and the public infrastructure (PI) itself (arrow 7) have been instantiated as
social, economic, and political settings in the SES Framework. In the Robustness
Framework, the “Governance System” was conceptualized as the dynamic interac-
tion among RUs, PIPs, PI via links 2, 3, and 6. In this view, PI includes both “soft”
and “hard” infrastructure necessary to govern a system. In the SES Framework in
Figure 4, PI and PIPs are replaced with “Governance System” (GS). Finally, the
resource system (RS) in Figure 4 was conceptualized as one aspect of exogenous
drivers (arrow 7) or impact of infrastructure (arrow 4) on Resources in Figure 3. The
resources in Figure 3 are the equivalent of resource units (RUs) in Figure 4.
The policy process as conceptualized by policy studies scholars is captured
explicitly in the Robustness Framework by link 3. This link refers to the dynamic
interaction between PIPs (policy actors) and PI (the organizations and rules govern-
ing collective action in which the policy process plays out). Obviously, resource users
who are affected by policy change through links 5 and 6 will enter into the policy
process in a number of ways, e.g., as advocacy coalitions attempting to influence
decisions of PIPs, if they are allowed to do so either through link 2 or 6. The
Robustness Framework does not specify the dynamics of the policy process. More
precisely, further delineation of the nature of links 2, 3, and 6 can generate a garbage
can model (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972), its more refined cousin—the multiple
streams framework of Kingdon (1984), or the ACF (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
What distinguishes the SES Framework from the Robustness Framework is
that it provides a more systematic articulation of framework elements the relation-
ships 1–8. Specifically, Ostrom identified second-tier variables associated with the
top-tier variables depicted in Figure 4. Table 1 provides some examples of such
variables. The text in bold indicates to what elements and relations in the Robust-
ness Framework the variables relate. Analogous to linkages in the Robustness
Framework, the second-tier variables are an entry point for a more specific articu-
lation for how the policy process plays out. In fact, we are now at a point to begin
to understand how policy studies intersect with the Robustness and SES frame-
works. Specifically, we can explore how particular models of the policy process
perform when coupled with particular classes of biophysical dynamics and uncer-
tainties and in Figure 1B. Here, the aim is not to explain the policy process but,
rather, to explore how different possible policy processes might function in a
dynamic policy context. For instance, a garbage can policy process may be well
suited to explore complex environments but may be very slow in developing
appropriate policy for pressing problems, thus trading off short-term adaptive
capacity for long-term learning. Likewise, an ACF policy process may perform
well in quickly identifying alternative approaches to problems, but may crowd out
exploration as actors join coalitions and build cases for particular points of view—a
rather narrow type of learning. In the remainder of the paper we will attempt to
illustrate how both the Robustness and SES frameworks can contribute to a col-
lection of essential tools for public policy and governance for complexity (SES) and
change (Robustness). Together, these frameworks provide a platform for interdis-
ciplinary research that focuses on system-wide outcomes of the policy process
beyond just policy change. They provide a more focused lens and systematic struc-
ture for studying the articulation between policy and the biophysical system ele-
ments in which it is embedded.
Governance for Complexity and Change
Using the basic elements presented in Figures 3 and/or 4 along with Table 1, it
seems reasonable to assume that policy designers have enough machinery at hand to
generate reasonably good policies for reasonably well-bounded policy problems.
Once reasonable policy options have been identified, our understanding of how
policy processes unfold would then enable the implementation of those policies.
However, what if the policy problem space is not reasonably well bounded? What if
there is massive uncertainty about the links between actions and outcomes? What if
Table 1. Examples of Second-Level Variables under First-Level Core Subsystems

(S, RS, GS, RU, U, I, O, and ECO) in Ostrom’s Framework for Analyzing Social-Ecological Systems
Presented in Ostrom (2009)
Social, economic, and political settings (S)

S1 Economic development. S2 Demographic trends. S3 Political stability
S4 Government resource policies. S5 Market incentives. S6 Media organization
(Note: In the Robustness Framework of Anderies et al. (2004), these are examples of exogenous
drivers 8.)
Resource systems (RS) Governance systems (GS)
RS1 Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish) (R+1+6) GS1 Government organizations (PI+PIP)
RS2 Clarity of system boundaries (R+PI+1+5) GS2 Nongovernment organizations (PI+PIP)
RS3 Size of resource system* (R) GS3 Network structure (RU+PIP+2)
RS4 Human-constructed facilities (PI) GS4 Property-rights systems (PI)
RS5 Productivity of system* (R+7) GS5 Operational rules (PI)
RS6 Equilibrium properties (R) GS6 Collective-choice rules* (PI)
RS7 Predictability of system dynamics* (R+PI+4+7) GS7 Constitutional rules (PI)
RS8 Storage characteristics (R+PI+4) GS8 Monitoring and sanctioning processes
RS9 Location (R) (PIP+3)
Resource units (RU) Users (U)

RU1 Resource unit mobility* (R) U1 Number of users* (RU+1)
RU2 Growth or replacement rate (R) U2 Socioeconomic attributes of users (RU)
RU3 Interaction among resource units (R+7+PI) U3 History of use (RU+1)
RU4 Economic value (R+7) U4 Location (RU)
RU5 Number of units (R) U5 Leadership/entrepreneurship* (RU+1+2+6)
RU6 Distinctive markings (R) U6 Norms/social capital* (RU+6)
RU7 Spatial and temporal distribution (R) U7 Knowledge of SES/mental models* (RU)
U8 Importance of resource* (RU+1)
U9 Technology used
Interactions (I) → Outcomes (O)

I1 Harvesting levels of diverse users (RU) O1 Social performance measures
I2 Information sharing among users (PI+6) (PI+PIP+RU+2+6)
I3 Deliberation processes (PI+PIP+RU+2+3) (e.g., efficiency, equity, accountability,
I4 Conflicts among users (RU) sustainability)
I5 Investment activities (PI+PIP+RU+3+6) O2 Ecological performance measures
I6 Lobbying activities (PI+PIP+3+8) (PI+PIP+RU+2+6)
I7 Self-organizing activities (PI+RU+6) (e.g., overharvested, resilience, biodiversity,
I8 Networking activities (6+2) sustainability)
O3 Externalities to other SESs (7)
Related ecosystems (ECO)

ECO1 Climate patterns. ECO2 Pollution patterns. ECO3 Flows into and out of focal SES.
(Note: In the Robustness Framework of Anderies et al. (2004), these are examples of exogenous
drivers 7.)
In bold are cross-references to elements and linkages to the robustness framework developed by Anderies
et al. (2004) shown in Figure 3 (A). Note that this table is adapted from the version from Ostrom (2009)
which was an extension of the initial version presented in Ostrom (2007). The asterisks refer to subset of
variables found to be associated with self-organization.
the problem space encompasses a very large number of interacting elements? Such
are the problem spaces we face in the environmental policy domain: biodiversity and
resource management, climate change, and a globally interlinked economic system
of spiraling complexity.
Here we reflect on key challenges and opportunities for governing such systems.
We note that Ostrom began applying concepts from work on institutions to this
problem almost 20 years ago with her work on “designing complexity to govern
complexity” (Ostrom, 1995, 1998). This work stressed the importance of “complex,
nested systems of governance” (Ostrom, 1995, p. 34), comprised of “quasi-
autonomous units operating at quite small up to extremely large scales” (Ostrom,
1998, p. 149). Ostrom suggests that the institutional design principles, derived from
her work on self-governing SESs, provide some guidance as to how to design
complexity to govern complexity. Although the design principles were derived from
a research program whose emphasis was not on dynamics and change, they do
establish collective choice processes that address dynamics on the time scale of the
policy process. For example, they emphasize the creation and changing of rules,
conflict resolution mechanisms, and monitoring and enforcement processes
required to reach a policy equilibrium and maintain a governance regime. The
challenge is to connect the dynamics occurring at the policy process level (relatively
fast—e.g., days, months) to those occurring at the SES level (relatively slow—e.g.,
years to centuries). Ostrom’s recognition of the need for additional tools to make this
connection inspired her to develop the frameworks presented here. In the next
section, we discuss two elements of SESs that are critical to governing changing,
deeply uncertain systems: (i) the notion of “fit”; and (ii) fundamental properties of
feedback systems. Following that we reflect on the associated set of design principles
for such systems.
Key Challenges
The Fit between Institutional Arrangements and Ecological Dynamics. The development
of frameworks to study the interactions between social and ecological systems aims
to provide a systematic way to analyze diverse and complex case studies. Although
we know resource users are able to overcome collective action problems to share
common-pool resources (CPRs) and provide public goods, there is increasing inter-
est in addressing the “problem of fit”: the interplay between institutional arrange-
ments and ecological dynamics (Folke, Pritchard, Berkes, Colding, & Svedin, 2007;
Young, 2002). The importance of fit is greatest regarding operationalizing governance
structures which requires translating de jure rules into rules-in-use. The core ele-
ments enabling this translation are monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution
(Ostrom, 2005). Thus, a “good fit” is one that leverages biophysical and social
structures to reduce the costs of monitoring, sanctioning, and managing conflict (or
its complement of maintaining fairness). Studies of long-lasting SESs such as fisher-
ies, pastoralist and transhumance systems, irrigation systems, and forests, show that
institutions developed by those systems are mainly based on where, when, and how
to harvest, not how much to harvest (Ostrom, 2005; Schlager, 1994; Wilson, Acheson,
Metcalfe, & Kleban, 1994). This suggests that an understanding of the fit between
institutions and ecology needs to incorporate how human activities can match the
temporal and spatial dynamics of the specific resource. In the end, this match may
have the effect of regulating the amount of resources withdrawn, but the fit, i.e., the
linkages between the governance system and the resource being governed, will not
be predicated on measuring harvest amounts—typically because this is too costly to
monitor.
For example, local resource users can be very effective in monitoring the use of
a common-pool resource, especially due to their local knowledge and stake in the
sustainability of the ecosystem. Paid guards from outside the local community can be
effective as they may have access to better technology, especially if they are paid well
(but this is costly). However, they may not have a stake in the SES, and thus may be
prone to rent-seeking behavior and may see bribes as a source of income. The spatial
and temporal dynamics of ecological systems affect the ability of monitors to observe
resource use. When fishers harvest fish from a large territory, farmers withdraw
water from a long irrigation canal, or villagers harvest from a large forest, it is almost
impossible for them to see what everyone else is currently doing. Rules on who,
where, when, and how to harvest are easier to monitor and enforce than a quota, and
if there is more confidence that people are following the rules, others will follow
them too. Could such a general principle to frame policy in terms of who, what, and
when questions rather than how much questions improve public policy process
outcomes? For example, policy based on science and its associated measurement
protocols (very costly) may make policy change impossible as attention is focused on
debatable human constructs and protocols (generates rather than resolves conflict),
and are thus prone to being “poor fits,” regardless of the biophysical context. Policies
with “good fits,” rather, tend to rely on more practical principles where measure-
ment equates to common-sense, easily observable attributes of the biophysical
context that are simple enough to not be debatable. Finding such practical principles
many not be possible for all policy problems, but a focus on practical principles and
common-sense measurement may still be a useful design principle for many situa-
tions. A governance regime that begins to rely on complex models and precise data
that is costly to obtain is likely a “poor fit” in almost any context.
Many farmer-managed irrigation systems allocate a particular time to a specific
farmer depending on location along the canal and size of farm (and resulting contri-
butions to maintenance of the system) (Burns, 1993; Maass & Anderson, 1978;
Shivakoti & Ostrom, 2002). The frequent routine is to allocate a certain time block to a
farmer in a specific order either from the head-end to the tail or from the tail-end to the
head of the system (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Tang, 1992). In either case, that means that
when the water transfers from Farmer A to Farmer B, both will be at their distribution
point so that Farmer A gets as much water as possible but Farmer B is able to start
watering crops on time. This system illustrates important linkages among public
infrastructure, public infrastructure providers, and resource users (links 2 and 3 in
Figure 3). Specifically, the nature of public infrastructure, both physical (an irrigation
system) and institutional (appropriation rules based on the Spanish tanda
system—i.e., timed withdrawals), coupled with the fact that the resource users are, in
fact, the public infrastructure providers for monitoring and enforcement of rules,
generates an endogenous feedback system. This arrangement brings the two most
important actors for ensuring that the rule is enforced to the correct monitoring point
on the canal at the correct (same) time. This is an effective way to enable two key
participants to monitor what is happening locally and to enforce any observed rule
infractions. Further, this example of an excellent fit between soft infrastructure (rules)
and hard infrastructure (the canals) solves the second-order collective action of who
is monitoring the monitors. The “goodness of fit” is expressed in the fact that the
incentives of the resource users and public infrastructure providers are very neatly
aligned (attribute of link 2) and eliminate the second-order collective action dilemma.
In some systems, such as fisheries, the state of the system (e.g., location and
number of fish) is much more costly (perhaps impossible) to measure. This affects
the ability of agents in the system to collect information to feed back into the
governance system. Not only is the state of the ecology difficult to determine, it
might be that the behavior of resource users is difficult to monitor in some systems.
If a fisher fishes on the open sea on his own and returns to port with his catch, there
is only limited information that can be observed relating to the actual harvesting
practices employed by that fisher. An important example is bycatch which is often
not reported (Baker et al., 2006; Read, Drinker, & Northridge, 2006). As a conse-
quence of the difficulties with monitoring fishers, some fisheries include an official
monitor on each vessel (e.g., Alaska Fisheries Science Center, 2011). Other fisheries
have strict gear restrictions that are easy to check in the harbors. This is yet another
example of an institutional arrangement that fit the biophysical conditions: It is very
easy to assess fishing gear and almost impossible to measure fish stocks. Given these
and many other examples of how different types of infrastructure and actors are
tightly linked and interact in subtle ways to produce successful governance out-
comes, we are tempted to ask if there are general lessons that can be ported from
successful SES governance structures to the context of the policy process.
In their attempts to understand the complexity associated with the sheer number
of variables, relationships, and feedbacks represented in Figures 3, 4, and Table 1,
CPR scholars have naturally gravitated toward studying simpler, local CPRs. This
begs the question of whether the SES and Robustness frameworks can be used to
analyze modern, more complex policy situations. It is unlikely that any analytical
framework will ever be able to cope with actual levels of complexity in real systems.
We must, therefore, rely on design principles derived from the study of simple
systems that remain reasonably effective as system complexity (i.e., number and
diversity of agents, relationships, etc.) increases. That is, we need to learn to govern
systems we can never fully understand. In fact, this is the very essence of robust
control—a field that focuses on the construction of regulatory feedback networks to
do just this. The strategy is based on the fact that networks of simple feedbacks can
evolve to produce, for example, extraordinarily complex life-forms. Feedback is an
extremely powerful tool to cope with complexity and uncertainty. Policymaking
processes based on robust feedback control might embrace complexity and provide
mechanisms to respond to failure like robust systems that are either designed, or
have evolved, to do. For example, rather than finding the “correct” operational rules
for a given SES, policy might focus on constructing effective collective choice
rules that leverage feedback on both time scales in Figure 2 to change operational
rules that do not work. The challenge is using feedback wisely; it is very powerful
indeed, but generates its own set of problems.
Using Feedback to Cope with Complexity, Disturbances, and Stress. The discussion of
“fit” in the previous section focused on reducing the cost of governance activities. In
this section, we consider another aspect of fit: How do policies affect the ecological
system to which they are applied? Do they amplify or dampen natural variation? Do
they restructure certain ecological relationships? Consider a situation in which there
is a clearly defined problem to be solved and in which the linkages between actions
and outcomes is perfectly understood. In such a situation, it is possible in theory to
generate a control system to achieve any particular policy outcome within the space
of possible outcomes conditioned by the biophysical and social constraints. In such
“perfect information” cases, policies can be made to literally run like clockwork, i.e.,
we can achieve a perfect fit between the control system and the system to be
controlled. Very few real systems behave like this—even precisely designed ones.
There are at least three reasons for this: We never have perfect information about the
state of the system (e.g., we can never know the actual stock level in a fishery), we
never fully understand the causal relationships that generate dynamics in SESs, and
there are always exogenous disturbances and stresses impinging upon the system of
interest. How can we design policy processes for such situations?
It turns out that all complex biological systems (of which SESs are examples)
must cope with uncertainty, stress, and disturbance. As such, complex biological
systems with the capacity to adapt to these difficult circumstances have a common
feature: They are composed of complex regulatory feedback networks. These distrib-
uted, multiscale networks make the maintenance precise biological processes pos-
sible. They also enable the control of uncertain systems, and are used extensively in
engineered systems that must function in spite of disturbance and stress (e.g.,
modern passenger aircraft in the face of air turbulence—see below). A moment’s
reflection reveals that SESs are feedback systems. Specifically, policies, in the broad-
est sense, are rules (institutions sensu, Ostrom, 1990, 2005) that translate information
about a system (e.g., state of the environment, demographics, etc.) into action that
feeds back into the system. Thus, enacting a policy that affects the way humans
interact with an ecological system can be (and often is) equivalent to adding a
feedback loop to a SES.
Feedback is an extremely powerful tool to create and maintain complexity. Given
a particular set of disturbances, agents in SESs can construct policies (feedback
controls) to increase performance (output) and robustness (minimize the sensitivity
of the system to disturbance and stress). Over time, SESs can become extremely well
adapted to a particular biophysical context, including the disturbance and stress
associated with it, as well as critical policy processes required to implement policies
under stress. Consider the case of the tramos in Diaz Ordaz, Mexico studied by
Downing (1974) where conflict resolution mechanisms and water rights change from
riparian to prior appropriations with the level of environmental stress. More gener-
ally, the process through which policy change can occur should likely be adaptive to
exogenous stress and disturbances.
There is one drawback to such fine-tuning: Feedback systems are known to
exhibit inherent robustness-fragility trade-offs (Csete & Doyle, 2002). Irrigation
systems provide an important example: Human societies can build large-scale physi-
cal infrastructure (canals, reservoirs) and social infrastructure (rules for water allo-
cation, canal maintenance) to eliminate sensitivity of food supply to interannual
variation in local water supplies. However, in so doing, societies become much more
vulnerable to low frequency variation in rainfall (the 100-year flood that destroys the
irrigation system) and social upheaval. That is, building robustness to certain classes
of disturbances and increasing narrowly focused efficiency (e.g., agricultural yield)
introduce fragilities in the system. Worse yet, such fragilities typically are hidden
from the user by virtue of good design (Csete & Doyle, 2002), and are only exposed
through failure. An irrigation system may work extremely well for a century, and no
one is thinking about the 100-year flood and subsequent famine until it happens.
There is an increasing body of work suggesting that the capacity of systems to cope
with stress and disturbance using feedback regulatory networks (policy networks)
faces a hard limit (Chandra, Buzi, & Doyle, 2011; Rodriguez, Cifdaloz, Anderies,
Janssen, & Dickeson, 2011). Thus, navigating such performance-robustness,
robustness-fragility trade-offs through policy design and policy processes involving
learning and exploration are an essential element of public policy.
Public Policy Design Principles
Given the challenges outlined above, what are the practical tools we can use to
cope with change and disturbances? How do we extend the basic ideas that we have
learned about the importance of “fit” between rules, actors, and biophysical context
that increase the effectiveness of governance regimes? What principles should we
employ to exploit the power of feedback to govern systems we do not (and can never
fully) understand? How do we scale up lessons learned in applying the Robustness
Framework from a small-scale irrigation system in Nepal with 120 households (e.g.,
Cifdaloz, Regmi, Anderies, & Rodriguez, 2010) to a large-scale, modern context like
the Colorado River Basin with millions of households? Doing so requires that we
address two questions:
1. What general features of SESs transcend scales (system size)? For example, water
for agriculture and development in the Phoenix Basin can be seen as a two-stage
collective action problem with three common-pool resources, the Colorado River
watershed; the combined Salt, Verde, and Gila River watersheds; and the ground-
water system. First, the stakeholders provide the immense public (hard) infra-
structure consisting of multiple dams, canals, pumps across an enormous spatial
scale. Second, they provide the soft infrastructure to attempt to solve the coor-
dination problem of the common-pool resource that this public infrastructure
provides, e.g., the Colorado River Compact and the Arizona Groundwater Man-
agement Act of 1980. The fundamental features of this system are the same as the
small-scale counterpart in India or Nepal: provisioning and coordination.
2. How does complexity matter? Is the Colorado River system really more complex
than its small counterpart in India or Nepal? Does the mere fact that there are
four orders of magnitude more resource users add meaningful complexity?
Probably not. The Robustness Framework suggests that meaningful complexity
differences likely reside in relationships 1, 2, 5 and exogenous drivers 7 and 8.

Specifically, resource users are almost completely disconnected from public
infrastructure provision. This weakens link 2. Link 5 suppresses natural variation
in water supply and creates an illusion of abundance, weakening link 1. Diver-
gent social and economic drivers (8) create a very heterogeneous group of
resource users who place very different values on the resource (e.g., developers,
farmers, energy producers, commercial interests, residents). Finally, the Colo-
rado System likely experiences shocks to the resource and infrastructure (7) over
a much wider range of frequencies than a small-scale system.
Once we systematically address these questions, we can tackle challenges that
both small and large systems face using the ideas of fit and feedback that we have
been discussing. We must choose the correct puzzle pieces (system modules) and cut
the edges (design feedbacks) so they fit together well. In the language of institutional
analysis and our frameworks, the system modules are polycentric governance
units, ecosystems, and infrastructure systems. The feedbacks are the soft
infrastructure—the rules, norms, and shared strategies that form the protocols by
which the system modules interact. The study of simpler irrigation systems (which
are to SESs as the fruit fly is to evolutionary biology) helps understand the micro-
level details of fit. The study of large systems helps us identify which aspects of fit are
robust to system size and those that are not. Through the iterative study of a range
of systems of different sizes and types, we can begin to develop methods to address
what we see as the essential public policy design question: how to choose polycentric
governance units and the appropriate feedbacks to link these units to biophysical
system modules in order to achieve a good fit for robust performance of the SES in
question. We are not aware of a systematic design methodology to do this—it is more
likely an art.
Having said this, there are a number of practical insights from a comparative
analysis of various types of social and biological systems (Janssen & Osnas, 2005) that
can help guide the policy design process. Diversity (a multiplicity of different types
of regulatory feedback mechanisms), redundancy (many regulatory mechanisms
perform similar functions), and modularity (some regulatory feedback mechanisms
are allowed only limited connectivity with others) have been shown to be system
characteristics that enhance robustness and adaptive capacity. Redundancy of com-
ponents, information, tasks, and connections enables a system to maintain its func-
tion when a component is lost and the redundant component takes over the function.
Redundancy is common in engineered infrastructure systems (both hard and
soft) and biological systems. The engineered system of a Boeing 777, which has
150,000 different subsystem modules, can continue to fly when many modules have
been knocked out (Csete & Doyle, 2002). This high-level redundancy is necessary to
achieve extreme robustness (at great financial expense): The ability of the Boeing 777
to continue to function when modules fail is crucial because the cost of overall
system failure is so high. This is not the case for, say, a coffee machine whose failure
has far less impact on our lives. Coffee machines can be developed at a much lower
cost, but with much less robustness. An example of redundancy in institutions is the
concurrent use of informal and formal rules for resource management (Low, Ostrom,
Simon, & Wilson, 2003). If informal rules (subsystem modules) fail, progressive
layers of formal institutional arrangements (higher-level, more costly subsystem
modules that perform a similar function) are activated. Perhaps the most important
example of redundancy in biological systems is related to genes. Experiments show
that deleting a gene in an organism often has little phenotypic effect due to the
existence of duplicate genes (subsystem module) or compensation by alternative
metabolic pathways (higher-level subsystem module performing a similar function)
(Gu et al., 2003).
Modularity provides a system with different functional parts or modules that
can evolve somewhat independently. The modules might be loosely linked with each
other, but a failure in one module does not severely affect the others, as would
happen if they were tightly linked. Sufficient links between modules are required as
modules might learn from the activities occurring within other modules. Within the
social sciences this has been referred to as polycentricity. Ostrom, Tiebout, and
Warren (1961) identified a polycentric metropolitan area as having many centers of
decision making that were formally independent of each other, but one could learn
from experimentation in the other various centers (McGinnis, 1999).
A third general factor is diversity in agents or connections. In organizations, a
diverse set of connections is important for the creation of a diverse portfolio of
knowledge or shared organizational mental models (Staber & Sydow, 2002). In
systems with low diversity, there are fewer chances of creating new ideas, compo-
nents, or connections. A population of organisms with the same ability to initiate an
immune response will be hit hard when a harmful new disease enters the popula-
tion. Genetic diversity provides the capacity to create novel antibodies, so at least a
few individuals in the population might be able to resist the new disease. Tinkering,
mutations, and making errors are essential to generate new components and links in
a system (Kirschner & Gerhart, 1998). Importantly, in a modular system, such novelty
can be tested without severely disturbing other modules—i.e., experimentation can
occur locally without impacting overall system function. If the innovation is benefi-
cial, it might be replicated. In the case of a novel disturbance such as a disease, it is
essential that a system is able to generate new responses.
Although there are several examples of designed and evolved systems in which
these key properties confer robustness, it is challenging to operationalize them in a
policy context. It is clear that the notion of polycentricity is important for the creation
and maintenance of redundancy, modularity, and diversity in policy contexts. The
challenge lies in defining what a “module” is and exactly where redundancy and
diversity lie. In a genetic system, the module is a collection of phenotypic traits that
vary together and do not vary with other phenotypic traits (Wagner & Altenberg,
1996). Redundancy lies in genetic codes that perform the same function (code for the
same proteins), and diversity lies in the variation of genes in a population. In the
policy context, the module may be one of many centers of authority and control in a
polycentric system. Although reasonable in theory, in practice it is difficult to define
boundaries of polycentric units. For example, when policy problems involve mul-
tiple ecological services with different spatial and temporal dynamics, incentives
and regulatory constraints may conflict across ecosystem services and stakeholder
groups generating a situation in which there is no way to naturally define a polycen-
tric unit and its boundary. Diversity, on the other hand, may be easy to define by
simply noting the variation across polycentric units. But in what dimensions do these
centers of control vary? Do they vary across the policy processes they employ, the
range of policies they implement, or the knowledge they possess? Which combina-
tion of these might enable polycentric units to achieve a better fit with the ecological
and social dynamics they control? Likewise, redundancy may be manifest in mul-
tiple centers of authority that perform similar functions using slightly different
policy processes. Such redundancy in a governance system would be very expen-
sive, limiting the number of polycentric units. Given this limited number, is it
possible to achieve redundancy and diversity goals? These are all difficult and
important questions for policy scholars to address as we seek to “design complexity
to govern complexity” (Ostrom, 1995).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have argued that the increasing scale and interconnectedness of
human activities have important implications for the policy process. Specifically, we
can no longer treat the policy context as fixed on the time scale on which the policy
process plays out. Rather, the dynamic feedback between policy and the biophysical
context depicted in Figure 1B will become increasingly important as the process of
globalization proceeds. This calls for new tools and theories to better understand and
inform the public policy process. Here we have presented two related theoretical
frameworks with the potential to contribute to this understanding.
Most of Ostrom’s work on theoretical frameworks focuses on policies as rules and
their functioning in different social and ecological contexts. The policy process of
interest to most readers of this journal is not addressed explicitly in either framework
discussed here (Figures 3 and 4). However, the policy process is implicit in the
institutional rational choice framework in general, and thus in the robustness and SES
frameworks in particular: It is an emergent property of a system of actors and rules.
Complex notions of advocacy coalitions, learning, beliefs, etc., are difficult to address
explicitly in the SES and Robustness frameworks, but they certainly would be observ-
able patterns given a collection of agents, rules, and resources. Thus, the policy process
itself is an example of an SES, where the “ecosystem” is mostly human made as in the
well-developed concept of “industrial ecosystems.” The question is how useful it is to
think of the policy process as an SES embedded in broader social, economic, and
political settings and related ecosystems as depicted in Figures 3 and 4.
For many policy questions, these frameworks may not add value. However, we
suggest that there is at least one specific instance where they can: when public policy
must cope with deep uncertainty and change in the policy context that occurs on the
same time scale as the policy process itself—i.e., sufficiently fast. The main lesson
from applying the Robustness Framework in particular is the notion that one can
cope with uncertainty and change, but this will have a price. Developing policies to
increase robustness of SESs requires an explicit decision about robustness of what
system properties and aspects of performance to what types of exogenous shocks.

Once the choice about which vulnerabilities are to be addressed, building robustness
requires navigating trade-offs between short-term efficiency and long-term robust-
ness. Finally, and most importantly, even if these complex trade-offs can be success-
fully navigated in a policy process, there remains a final trade-off about which agents
have little choice: Increasing robustness to one type of known disturbance necessarily
increases vulnerability to other types of disturbances (Chandra et al., 2011; Csete &
Doyle, 2002). Worse yet, these emergent vulnerabilities are largely hidden, revealed
only by a system-level failure.
A key message for policy scientists is simply the importance of the acknowledg-
ment that such fundamental robustness-vulnerability trade-offs exist. The acceptance
that policies may, and eventually must, fail immediately follows. Given that fail-free
policies cannot be developed, we need to shift thinking away from coalitions advo-
cating for the “right” policy to policy processes that stimulate experimentation,
adaptation, and learning. In a world of continuous change, policies that are appro-
priate for some contexts may reveal new vulnerabilities in another context. Such
robustness-vulnerability conflicts are one reason why it can be so much more diffi-
cult to deal with both social and environmental change simultaneously than with
either one in isolation (Rodriguez et al., 2011). Policies should therefore be seen as
experiments that require systematic, ongoing monitoring and evaluation as elements
of regulatory feedback networks. Decentralized experimentation would allow for
innovation and increase the probability of achieving a fit between policies and
local conditions (modularity and diversity). Governance at higher levels may
stimulate a process of information exchange to facilitate learning from local-level
experimentation.
A robust SES may exist in the form of a polycentric system where higher levels
provide coordination, monitoring, and synthesis, but hold local level units account-
able to reach certain policy outcomes. At the local level there is a certain degree of
freedom to craft policies that may lead to desired outcomes, and those policies might
be tailored to local conditions. When local governance fails, as it must, higher levels
provide support based on knowledge gained from other local conditions (redun-
dancy and diversity). The challenge in terms of policy processes is twofold. First, do
local-level governance regimes necessarily exhibit more efficient policy processes?
Second, what policy processes are used to determine policy outcomes at the next
level? How is it decided what policy outcomes are demanded of the local level?
Which actors from across different levels of governance participate in this process?
Whether or not such an idealized polycentric system can be implemented, the main
lesson from studies of robustness is that successes from the past do not guarantee
success in the future. Policy processes must have the capacity to adapt rapidly.
Studies of SES, and feedback systems more generally, suggest that multilevel, poly-
centric governance regimes are essential to match institutions to challenges at the
right temporal and organizational scale. What is needed is a “meta” policy process
that connects governance regimes across levels to cope with cross-scale interactions
that are sure to become more prevalent as the process of globalization plays out over
the coming decades.
Dr. J. Marty Anderies is an Associate Professor with a joint appointment in the

School of Human Evolution and Social Change and School of Sustainability at
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ. His current research interests focus on robust
management and robust institutional design for coupled social-ecological systems.
He studies a range of archaeological, historical, and present-day examples of social-
ecological systems using multiple methods including human subject experiments,
qualitative case-study analysis, and formal mathematical modeling and analysis to
develop an understanding of ecological, behavioral, social, and institutional factors
that generate vulnerability and/or enhance resilience and robustness in social-
ecological systems.
Dr. Marco A. Janssen is an Associate Professor in the School of Human Evolution
and Social Change and Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity,
both at Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA. His research interests focus on the
governance of social-ecological systems using a multi-method approach, and the
modeling of human-environmental interactions in past, present and future. His use
of behavioral experiments in the lab and the field aims to understand how behavioral
traits and social context interact with the ecological context in governing social-
ecological systems. The insights of experimental work are used to develop empiri-
cally grounded models of social-ecological systems. His main application areas
aresmall-scale irrigation systems, ground water use, and energy use.
Notes
We acknowledge financial support for this work from the National Science Foundation, grant numbers
SES-0645789, SES-0748632, and BCS-1115054.
1. Note that we use the term “fit” in the sense that elements of a system fit well together much like puzzle
pieces fit well together. We do not use the term in the sense of evolutionary “fitness.”
2. Some readers may be familiar with the resilience literature and some distinctions between the terms
resilience and robustness. We use the term robustness in a very specific sense relating to regulatory
feedback systems which we make clear as we develop the framework. For a detailed discussion of the
relationship between resilience and robustness, see Anderies, Folke, Walker, and Ostrom (2013).
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The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2013

Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems:

Public policy processes are complex, dynamic phenomena. Understanding such

Policy Subsystem Processes

Policy Subsystem Processes

Dynamic Biophysical System

Changing Scales and New Public Policy Theory

dynamics induced by positive feedbacks speed up (e.g., melting of Greenland’s ice

The Robustness and SES Frameworks

The idea of a “coupled social ecological system” emerged in response to what

Figure 2. The IAD Framework (Adapted from Ostrom, 2011).

Exogenous drivers affecting social actors, e.g.inputs from related

Exogenous drivers affecting natural and human−made infrastructure,

Figure 3. The Robustness Framework (Adapted from Anderies et al., 2004).

Social, Economic, and Political

Interactions (I) Outcomes (O)

Related Ecosystems (ECO)

Figure 4. First-Generation SES Framework (Adapted from Ostrom, 2007).

Governance for Complexity and Change

Table 1. Examples of Second-Level Variables under First-Level Core Subsystems

Social, economic, and political settings (S)

Resource units (RU) Users (U)

Interactions (I) → Outcomes (O)

Related ecosystems (ECO)

Public Policy Design Principles

differences likely reside in relationships 1, 2, 5 and exogenous drivers 7 and 8.

system properties and aspects of performance to what types of exogenous shocks.

Dr. J. Marty Anderies is an Associate Professor with a joint appointment in the

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