U.S. Ex Rel Schneider V JPMorgan Chase Motion To Dismiss, 2nd Amended Complaint. 14-01047 D.D.C. D.E. 105

Case 1:14-cv-01047-RMC Document 105 Filed 11/12/15 Page 1 of 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., )
ex rel. LAURENCE SCHNEIDER, ) Case No. 1:14-cv-01047-RMC
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS RELATOR’S

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. and Chase Home Finance LLC (collectively “Chase”) hereby move to
dismiss Relator’s Second Amended Complaint. In support of this Motion, Chase relies upon the
accompanying Memorandum and the following declarations and exhibits:
1. Declaration of Jessica Dunn, and the attached Exhibit 1 (email from the National
Mortgage Settlement Monitor’s law firm to Joy Palazzo of Chase and Romeo Quinto of
Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP);
2. Declaration of Sandra Karwhite, and the attached Exhibit 1 (Making Home Affordable
“Subsequent Certification” template) and Exhibit 2 (letter from Chase and EMC
Mortgage Corporation to Paul Heran, Program Executive, Making Home Affordable-
Compliance); and
3. Declaration of Michael M. Maya, and the attached Exhibit 1 (comparison of Relator’s
First Amended Complaint against Relator’s Second Amended Complaint).
A proposed order is attached for the Court’s convenience.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: November 12, 2015 /s/ Robert D. Wick

Robert D. Wick (D.C. Bar No. 440817)
Christian J. Pistilli (D.C. Bar No. 496157)
Michael M. Maya (D.C. Bar No. 991742)
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP
One CityCenter
850 Tenth Street NW
Washington, DC 20001
Tel: (202) 662-6000
Fax: (202) 662-6291
Attorneys for Defendants
2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on November 12, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
motion, the supporting memorandum and declarations and the exhibits thereto, and an
accompanying proposed order were served electronically on all registered counsel of record via
ECF and are available for viewing and downloading from the ECF system.
/s/ Robert D. Wick

Robert D. Wick
One CityCenter
850 Tenth Street NW
Tel: (202) 662-6000
Fax: (202) 662-6291
Email: rwick@cov.com
Attorney for Defendants
3
Case 1:14-cv-01047-RMC Document 105-1 Filed 11/12/15 Page 1 of 42

)
)
Plaintiffs, ) Judge Rosemary M. Collyer
)
v. )
)
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR

MOTION TO DISMISS RELATOR’S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 4
A. The RCV1 Loans .................................................................................................... 4
B. Schneider’s National Mortgage Settlement Claims ................................................ 4
1. The consumer relief allegations .................................................................. 5
2. The servicing standard allegations .............................................................. 7
3. The False Claims Act allegations ............................................................... 9
C. Schneider’s HAMP Claims ................................................................................... 10
1. The regulatory framework ........................................................................ 10
2. Schneider’s HAMP allegations ................................................................. 11
D. Procedural history ................................................................................................. 12
LEGAL STANDARD................................................................................................................... 13
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 14
I. SCHNEIDER’S NMS CLAIMS FAIL ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS. ..................... 14
A. The NMS’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Provisions Bar This Action. ........... 14
B. Schneider’s NMS Claims Are An Improper Collateral Attack On The

Monitor’s Determinations That Chase Complied With The NMS. ...................... 16
II. SCHNEIDER’S NMS CLAIMS FAIL ON THE MERITS.............................................. 17
A. Schneider’s Consumer Relief Claims Should Be Dismissed. ............................... 18
1. The NMS does not require compliance with the servicing standards
as a condition for earning consumer relief credit...................................... 19
2. The NMS grants servicers discretion to select the borrowers who

will receive consumer relief. ..................................................................... 23
B. Schneider’s Servicing Standards Claims Should Be Dismissed. .......................... 25
ii
1. The NMS’s “cure” provisions preclude Schneider’s servicing

standard claims.......................................................................................... 26
2. The prospect of a civil penalties award is too contingent and

uncertain to constitute an “obligation” under the FCA. ............................ 26
C. Schneider’s Remaining NMS Allegations Fail To State An FCA Claim. ............ 30
D. Schneider’s State-Law Claims Fail To State An FCA Claim. .............................. 31
III. SCHNEIDER’S HAMP CLAIMS ARE DEFECTIVE. ................................................... 31
A. Schneider Fails To Allege That Chase Made A False Claim. .............................. 32
B. Schneider Fails To Allege The Necessary Element Of Scienter. ......................... 35
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 36
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
A-J Marine, Inc. v. Corfu Contractors, Inc.,

810 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D.D.C. 2011) .........................................................................................22
Amfac Resorts, L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

142 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2001) ...........................................................................................29
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) .................................................................................................................35
Beal Mortg., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,

132 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ...................................................................................................17
Cities of Bethany v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,

727 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ...............................................................................................23
Collier v. Dist. of Columbia,

46 F. Supp. 3d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) .........................................................................................13
Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada,

53 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2014)....................................................................................13
Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross,

439 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2006) ...............................................................................25, 26, 28
Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross,

518 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................29
In re Celotex Corp.,
487 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2007) .........................................................................................21, 24
Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc.,

190 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................29
McHugh v. DLT Solutions, Inc.,

618 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010)................................................................................................16
Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp.,

606 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................16
Neumann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,

367 F. Supp. 2d 969 (E.D. Va. 2005) ......................................................................................16
iv
Original Honey Baked Ham Co. of Ga., Inc. v. Glickman,

172 F.3d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ...........................................................................................21, 34
Si v. Laogai Research Found.,

71 F. Supp. 3d 73, 96-98 (D.D.C. 2014)............................................................................25, 26
U.S. ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,

305 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................35
U.S. ex rel. Bettis v. Odebrecht Contractors of Cal., Inc.,

297 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D.D.C. 2004) .........................................................................................35
United States ex. rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc.,

465 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2006) ...............................................................................................29
United States ex rel. Barrett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,

251 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2003) ...........................................................................................18
United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc.,

637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................18
United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos.,

520 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................29
United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sci. Applications Int’l Co.,

604 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D.D.C. 2009) .........................................................................................15
United States ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,

274 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2003) ...........................................................................................15
United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.,

286 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................14
United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd.,

389 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ...............................................................................................13
United States v. Bank of Am.,

78 F. Supp. 3d 520, 524 (D.D.C. 2015) .........................................................................7, 16, 26
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,

147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998) .................................................................................................21
United States v. Okoye,

731 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2013) ..........................................................................................21, 23, 24
United States v. Q Int’l Courier, Inc.,

131 F.3d 770 (8th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................29
v
United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp.,

626 F.3d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2010) .........................................................................................34, 35
Statutes
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)........................................................................................................... passim
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3) ............................................................................................................29, 30
Other Authorities
155 Cong. Rec. S4539 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) ...........................................................................30
155 Cong. Rec. S4543 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) ...........................................................................30
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)........................................................................................20
Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Participation

Agreement, available at
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/
servicerparticipationagreement.pdf ..........................................................................................10
Definition of Determine by Merriam-Webster, available at http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/determine ...........................................................................................16
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ........................................................................................................................32
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ............................................................................................................13, 14, 32
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..................................................................................................................13
vi
Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Chase Home
Finance LLC (collectively, “Chase”) respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of
Chase’s Motion to Dismiss Relator Laurence Schneider’s Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”).1
INTRODUCTION
Relator Laurence Schneider asserts two distinct sets of claims under the False Claims
Act: claims relating to the National Mortgage Settlement consent judgment (the “NMS”), and
claims relating to the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”). Both sets of claims
revolve around Chase’s treatment of certain non-performing mortgage loans that reside on its
Recovery One or “RCV1” system of record. According to the complaint, RCV1 loans are
“valueless” loans that have been written off of Chase’s books and that will not be foreclosed
upon. Although Schneider alleges that Chase violated both NMS and HAMP requirements in
connection with these loans, neither set of allegations gives rise to a cause of action.
1. The NMS Claims. Schneider’s NMS claims assert that Chase violated the False
Claims Act by making false certifications of compliance with certain NMS requirements in order
to avoid financial penalties for non-compliance. Under the NMS, Chase was required to
(1) provide a total of $4.4 billion in “consumer relief” to distressed mortgage borrowers, and
(2) service its mortgage loans in accordance with an enumerated set of “servicing standards.”
Schneider alleges that Chase violated both of those requirements in connection with its RCV1
loans, but nevertheless certified that it complied with them.
1
Chase Home Finance LLC merged into JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. in 2011 and no longer
exists as a separate entity.
As an initial matter, Schneider’s attempt to enforce the NMS’s requirements through the
vehicle of a False Claims Act action is barred by the procedural requirements of the NMS. To
prevent the NMS settlement agreement from generating the very types of disputes that it was
intended to resolve, the NMS requires that the parties engage in certain alternative dispute
resolution procedures before attempting to enforce the settlement. Schneider does not allege—
nor could he—that those procedures have been followed here. The NMS also attempts to
minimize disputes by providing for the appointment of a third-party Monitor empowered to
“determine” whether Chase complied with its settlement obligations. As Schneider reluctantly
acknowledges, the Monitor has “determined” that Chase complied with all of its obligations, and
none of those determinations has ever been challenged or set aside. Schneider’s allegations that
Chase breached its obligations under the NMS are thus an improper collateral attack on the
determinations of the Monitor.
The NMS claims also fail on substantive grounds. Schneider’s allegation that Chase
violated the servicing standards fails because Chase never received notice and an opportunity to
cure the alleged servicing violations—a pre-requisite to penalties liability under the NMS.
Furthermore, Schneider’s allegation that Chase violated the consumer relief requirements fails
because it depends on a mistaken interpretation of those requirements. In particular, Schneider
asserts that Chase was not entitled to consumer relief credit for forgiving RCV1 loans because
those loans allegedly were not serviced in compliance with the NMS’s servicing standards.
Contrary to Schneider’s assumption, however, the NMS does not limit eligibility for consumer
relief credit solely to loans that were serviced in conformity with NMS servicing standards. For
these reasons and the additional reasons set forth below, Schneider’s NMS claims should be
dismissed.
2
2. The HAMP Claims. Schneider’s HAMP claims allege that Chase made false
statements to the government in order to obtain HAMP incentive payments to which it was not
entitled. HAMP is a foreclosure relief program under which the government makes incentive
payments to mortgage servicers in exchange for modifying eligible mortgage loans. Subject to
certain exceptions, HAMP rules require participating servicers to solicit all eligible borrowers to
apply for HAMP loan modifications. According to Schneider, Chase violated this solicitation
requirement by failing to solicit RCV1 borrowers for loan modifications, but nevertheless
certified in its annual HAMP certifications that it had complied with HAMP’s requirements.
These allegations fail to state a claim under the False Claims Act for two independent reasons.
First, Schneider has not adequately alleged that Chase’s annual HAMP certifications
were false. Those certifications do not assert that Chase achieved perfect compliance with
HAMP’s requirements, but only that it achieved material compliance. Schneider’s allegations,
moreover, fall far short of alleging any material non-compliance. As noted above, Schneider
acknowledges that RCV1 loans are “valueless” and were not subject to foreclosures. It is
therefore unsurprising that the complaint fails to allege that material numbers of RCV1
borrowers (i) would have qualified for HAMP modifications, (ii) would have wanted such
modifications even if they qualified, or (iii) suffered any actual harm from Chase’s alleged
failure to solicit them to apply for loan modifications. Furthermore, the complaint essentially
admits that the government was aware of Chase’s non-solicitation of RCV1 borrowers at the
time it made incentive payments to Chase. That the government paid these incentives despite its
knowledge of Chase’s conduct confirms that there were no “material” violations of HAMP’s
requirements.
3
Second, Schneider has not adequately alleged that Chase knowingly made false
statements to the government, as the FCA requires. As numerous courts have observed, it makes
no sense to suggest that a party knowingly made false statements to the government if the party
also disclosed the truth of the matter to the government. Here, Schneider essentially concedes
that Chase disclosed its non-solicitation of RCV1 borrowers to the government, which negates
any inference that Chase acted with the scienter required for an FCA claim.
BACKGROUND
A. The RCV1 Loans
Schneider’s claims arise almost exclusively from a set of non-performing mortgage loans
that reside on Chase’s RCV1 system of record. According to the complaint, when Chase
determines that a mortgage loan is “valueless” under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,
it writes off (or in industry parlance “charges off”) the loan and then transfers the loan from its
general system of record to RCV1. See SAC ¶¶ 16, 172-76.
Schneider alleges that Chase is unable to service RCV1 loans according to its usual
servicing standards because the data in the RCV1 system “is fatally and irreparably flawed.” Id.
¶¶ 16, 18, 181, 186-87. Schneider does not allege, however, that charged-off RCV1 loans
require the same level of servicing as active mortgage loans. He does not allege, for example,
that any interest charges or penalties accrue on RCV1 loans, that any of the RCV1 borrowers are
making regular payments on their loans, or that Chases forecloses on those loans. To the
contrary, the complaint makes clear that Chase does not foreclose on RCV1 loans because it
would make no financial sense to foreclose on “valueless” loans. See id. ¶¶ 174-75, 286-292.
B. Schneider’s National Mortgage Settlement Claims
Count I of the complaint asserts that Chase committed False Claims Act violations by
falsely certifying its compliance with certain requirements of the NMS consent judgment. See
4
SAC ¶¶ 307-08. That consent judgment settled a civil action in which the federal government
and forty-nine states accused Chase of “misconduct related to [its] origination and servicing of
single family residential mortgages.” See Compl. [ECF 1] ¶ 1, United States v. Bank of Am.
Corp., No. 12-361 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2012). Four other mortgage servicers—Bank of America,
Citibank, Wells Fargo, and Ally Financial—entered into parallel NMS consent judgments.
Under the Chase consent judgment, Chase agreed to (1) provide $4.212 billion in
consumer relief to distressed mortgage borrowers and (2) abide by over 300 servicing standards
set forth in the NMS.2 Schneider alleges in Count I of the complaint that Chase violated each of
those requirements but nonetheless certified that it complied with them.
1. The consumer relief allegations
The NMS requires Chase to provide $4.212 billion in consumer relief in the form of loan
forgiveness, loan modifications, and other types of relief. See C.J. Ex. D. Although Schneider
(incorrectly) alleges that Chase fell slightly short of providing the full $4.212 billion in relief, he
wholly ignores the procedures set forth in the NMS for making that determination.
The parties to the NMS recognized that disputes might arise in the course of determining
whether Chase had fully satisfied its consumer relief obligations. In an effort to minimize those
disputes, the NMS provides for the appointment of a third-party Monitor empowered “to
determine . . . whether Servicer has satisfied the Consumer Relief Requirements.” C.J. Ex. E
§ C(5). The NMS also prescribes an elaborate, multi-step process to be used in making that
determination. Under the prescribed process:
2
See Consent Judgment [ECF 10] ¶¶ 2-5 & Exs. A-D, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No.
12-361 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012) (“Consent Judgment” or “C.J.”).
5
• The Monitor and the servicer must agree on a detailed Work Plan that specifies
“the testing methods and agreed procedures” that will be used to judge
compliance with the consumer relief requirements, C.J. Ex. E § C(13)-(15);
• An Internal Review Group (“IRG”) within Chase must apply the agreed-upon
procedures to audit and test Chase’s compliance with the consumer relief
requirements, id. Ex. E § C(7), (11);
• The Monitor and the professional firms appointed to support him must audit and
test the IRG’s findings, id. Ex. E § C(2), (16)-(21); and
• The Monitor must “determine . . . whether Servicer has satisfied the Consumer
Relief Requirements” and then “report his or her findings” to the Court and to a
Monitoring Committee composed of governmental parties to the NMS, id. Ex. E
§ C(5), D(3)-(5).
As shown by the numerous reports that the Monitor filed in this Court’s docket,
enormous effort was expended in carrying out this process.3 At the conclusion of the process,
moreover, the Monitor found that Chase had provided a total of $4.463 billion in consumer
relief—about $250 million more than the NMS required—and thus had “satisfied the minimum
requirements and obligations . . . imposed upon it under . . . the [NMS] to provide Consumer
Relief.” Monitor’s Final Report at 20-22, 25.
Schneider nevertheless asserts that Chase fell approximately $50 million short of
satisfying its consumer relief obligations. That is so, he alleges, because Chase improperly
received about $300 million in consumer relief credit for forgiving RCV1 loans. See SAC ¶¶ 24,
99, 199, 203, 215-16. According to Schneider, none of the RCV1 loans was eligible for
consumer relief credit because none was serviced in compliance with NMS servicing standards.
Id. ¶¶ 18, 24, 216. Nowhere in the complaint, however, does Schneider identify any language in
the NMS indicating that consumer relief credit is available only for loans that were serviced
3
See, e.g., Monitor’s Final Consumer Relief Report Regarding Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase
Bank, N.A. [ECF 143] at 11-19, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-361 (D.D.C. Mar.
18, 2014) (“Monitor’s Final Report”).
6
pursuant to the servicing standards. Nor does he allege that the Monitor was unaware of Chase’s
RCV1 servicing practices.
Schneider also makes a few conclusory assertions that Chase violated the consumer relief
requirements because it relied on its own discretion, rather than a non-discretionary application
process, in selecting the loans that it forgave in exchange for consumer relief credit. See id.
¶¶ 12, 17, 24, 97, 107-10, 204, 213. Schneider fails, however, to point to an NMS provision
requiring the use of a non-discretionary process in order to earn consumer relief credit. He also
implicitly acknowledges that the procedures used by Chase to distribute consumer relief were
vetted and approved by both the Monitor and the Monitoring Committee. See id. ¶¶ 83-86.
2. The servicing standard allegations
Schneider next alleges that Chase failed to satisfy the NMS’s servicing standards with
respect to its RCV1 loans, see SAC ¶¶ 181, 186-87, 216, 222, but he makes that allegation
without addressing the NMS’s framework for assessing compliance with the servicing standards.
The servicing standards comprise “304 defined business practice requirements” set forth
in Exhibit A to the NMS. United States v. Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d 520, 524 (D.D.C. 2015)
(Collyer, J.). These requirements touch on virtually all aspects of the servicing of residential
mortgage loans. See C.J. Ex. A. Most of the servicing standards are tested under a detailed set
of quantitative “metrics” set forth in the NMS. See Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d at 528. There
are many other servicing standards, however, that are not covered by metrics. See id. at 528-29.
As it does for the consumer relief requirements, the NMS provides that “[i]t shall be the
responsibility of the Monitor to determine whether Servicer is in compliance with the Servicing
Standards.” C.J. Ex. E § C(5). To make this determination, the Monitor must engage in a
complex testing process involving (i) “compliance reviews” and “test work” conducted by Chase
and its IRG, (ii) additional testing and compliance work conducted by the Monitor and his
7
professional firms, and (iii) the preparation of quarterly compliance reports by the Monitor and
his professionals. See, e.g., id. Ex. E §§ C(2), (7), (11), (16)-(21), D(3).
As this Court has observed, the NMS “does not require absolute perfection in loan
servicing.” Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d at 533. Thus, with respect to servicing standards that
are not covered by metrics, only “non-monetary equitable relief” is available in the event of a
violation. Id. at 530 (citing C.J. Ex. E § J(3)(a)). For servicing standards that are covered by
metrics, a servicer will be cited for a “Potential Violation” if the servicer exceeds a specified
“Threshold Error Rate” for a metric in a given quarter. C.J. Ex. E § E(1). If that happens, the
servicer is guaranteed “a right to cure” the Potential Violation pursuant to procedures set forth in
the NMS. Id. Ex. E § E(2)-(3). If the cure is unsuccessful, the servicer is potentially liable for
monetary penalties. See id. Ex. E § J(3)(b). If the cure is successful, however, “no Party shall
have any remedy” under the NMS. Id. Ex. E § E(6). Moreover, “the cure process for a Potential
Violation must run its course before suit on an uncured Potential Violation can be filed” because
a servicer “has a right to cure.” Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d at 531.
Without ever addressing this compliance framework, Schneider makes the sweeping
assertion that Chase has been in constant violation of “every” servicing metric from the very
inception of the NMS because it failed to include the RCV1 loans in its compliance testing. See
SAC ¶¶ 187, 266. That allegation, however, is flatly inconsistent with the Monitor’s reports on
Chase’s compliance. Far from finding that Chase violated “every” metric throughout the history
of the NMS, the Monitor cited Chase for only three Potential Violations, and in all three
instances, he found that Chase timely cured the problem.4
4
See Monitor’s Report Regarding Compliance by Defendants J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. for the Measurement Periods Ended March 31, 2013 and June 30,
2013 [ECF 119] at 24-25, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-361 (D.D.C. Dec. 4,
(continued…)
8
Significantly, Schneider never alleges that the Monitor was unaware of Chase’s servicing
or testing practices with respect to its RCV1 loans. Instead, he acknowledges in a footnote
Chase’s position that it informed the Monitor about those practices, SAC ¶ 16 n.2, and the
materials referenced in the footnote clearly corroborate Chase’s position, see, e.g., Dunn Decl.
Ex. 1.
3. The False Claims Act allegations
Count I of the complaint asserts that Chase’s alleged violations of the NMS also
constitute violations of the False Claims Act. See SAC ¶¶ 305-309. A key premise of this
allegation is that Chase falsely certified to the Monitor that it had complied with the NMS’s
servicing standards and consumer relief requirements when in fact it had not. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 24-
25, 198-99, 215-16, 297-303, 307. By making these false certifications, Schneider argues, Chase
avoided monetary penalties that it otherwise would have owed as a result of its alleged
violations. See id. ¶¶ 1, 31-33, 308. Schneider thus concludes that Chase violated the FCA’s
“reverse” false claims provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G), which, in pertinent part, imposes
liability on one who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.” Id.
Schneider also asserts that Chase violated similar provisions in the false claims statutes of
various states. See SAC ¶¶ 315-419.
All of these allegations depend entirely on Schneider’s initial premise that Chase actually
violated the NMS’s requirements. If there were no violations of those requirements, then there
2013); Monitor’s Report Regarding Compliance by Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
for the Measurement Periods Ended September 30, 2013 and December 31, 2013 [ECF 160] at
18-20, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-361 (D.D.C. May 14, 2014).
9
were no false certifications of compliance, and Schneider lacks an essential element of his
reverse false claims theory.
C. Schneider’s HAMP Claims
Count II of the complaint asserts that Chase violated the False Claims Act by making
false certifications of compliance with the requirements of the HAMP program. The relevant
background regarding these allegations is set forth below.
1. The regulatory framework
The Home Affordable Modification Program “provides eligible borrowers the
opportunity to modify their first-lien mortgage loans to make them more affordable.”5 Under
HAMP, mortgage servicers receive incentive payments from the Treasury Department in
exchange for agreeing to modify the terms of first-lien mortgages. See MHA Handbook at 61-
64, 135-36. In order to participate in HAMP, a servicer must enter into a Servicer Participation
Agreement (“SPA”) with Fannie Mae, which serves as Treasury’s financial agent for HAMP.6
Treasury Department guidance regarding HAMP has been collected in an “MHA
Handbook.” Subject to certain exceptions, the Handbook requires servicers to “proactively
solicit” eligible borrowers for HAMP loan modifications. See MHA Handbook at 70. One of
these exceptions provides that solicitation is not required if “the servicer has released the
5
MHA Program Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages (“MHA Handbook”), at 2
(version 4.5, June 1, 2015), available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/
programs/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_45.pdf; see also SAC ¶¶ 18, 39, 136, 138, 141,
144, 166, 190, 197, 216 (referring to this document).
6
See Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Participation Agreement,
available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/
servicerparticipationagreement.pdf; see also SAC ¶¶ 18-20, 36-39, 117, 119, 123-24, 133, 142,
144, 163, 199 (referring to this document).
10
borrower from liability for the debt and provided a copy of such release to the borrower.” Id. at
64. Servicers also are not required to solicit borrowers in active bankruptcy cases. Id. at 68.
HAMP participants must submit annual compliance certifications to a division of Freddie
Mac—Making Home Affordable-Compliance (“MHA-C”)—which serves as Treasury’s
compliance agent for HAMP. See id. at 1, 34. A servicer must “report instances of
noncompliance” with HAMP’s requirements in these certifications if the servicer believes that
the non-compliance had “a material effect on its ability to comply with . . . program
requirements.” Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
2. Schneider’s HAMP allegations
According to the complaint, Chase violated HAMP’s solicitation requirements because it
failed to solicit RCV1 borrowers to apply for HAMP modifications. See SAC ¶¶ 39, 190-91,
198-99. Nowhere in the complaint, however, does Schneider allege that Chase failed to solicit
HAMP applications from a material number of qualified and interested borrowers. For example,
although HAMP is limited to first-lien mortgage loans, Schneider acknowledges that the vast
majority of the loans in RCV1 are not first-lien loans. See id. ¶¶ 185, 205, 262. Similarly,
although HAMP solicitation is not required for loans in bankruptcy, Schneider admits that
substantial numbers of RCV1 loans were “subject to bankruptcies.” Id. ¶ 172. Finally,
Schneider concedes that Chase had no obligation to solicit borrowers whose loans had been
forgiven, id. ¶ 190, and the complaint expressly alleges that Chase forgave substantial numbers
of RCV1 loans, see id. ¶¶ 208, 242, 244; see also id. ¶ 249 (“Chase provided forgiveness letters
to mortgages with first liens that . . . were delinquent.”).
Schneider also acknowledges, at least tacitly, that the government was aware of Chase’s
solicitation practices with respect to RCV1 loans. In an earlier version of his complaint,
Schneider alleged that Chase concealed from Treasury’s compliance agent, MHA-C, both the
11
existence of RCV1 and “the way those [RCV1] loans were treated for purposes of HAMP
solicitation.” SAC ¶ 16 n.2. Tellingly, however, all such allegations have been excised from the
Second Amended Complaint.7 In addition, Schneider now explicitly references Chase’s position
that it “repeatedly disclosed the relevant facts” in its communications with MHA-C, see id., and
he makes no contrary allegations in the complaint.
Schneider nevertheless asserts that Chase “knowingly” presented “false or fraudulent
claims” for HAMP incentive payments. SAC ¶¶ 2, 40, 42, 312. Specifically, he asserts that
Chase “falsely certified that it was in compliance” with HAMP requirements when it submitted
annual certifications to MHA-C, thereby obtaining HAMP incentive payments to which it
allegedly was not entitled. Id. ¶¶ 2, 39-40.
Although the complaint implies that Chase certified that it was in perfect compliance
with HAMP’s requirements, the annual certifications themselves reveal that Chase merely
certified its belief that it had “materially complied with” those requirements. Karwhite Decl. Ex.
1 at 1-2 (emphasis added). As required by HAMP, moreover, Chase disclosed the list of
“subjective factors” that it considered in deciding whether instances of non-compliance were
“material.” Id. Ex. 2 at 2. These factors included such matters as whether instances of non-
compliance “substantially interfere[d] with the goals and objectives of the overall program.” Id.
D. Procedural history
Schneider filed this action in May 2013 in the District of South Carolina. He later moved
to transfer the action to this Court on the ground that, under the venue provision in the NMS,
7
Compare, e.g., First Am. Compl. [ECF 80] (“FAC”) ¶¶ 13, 16, 24, 35, 56, 163, 174, 176, 190,
202, 214, 257, 276, with, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 13, 16, 24, 39, 60, 172, 183-87, 211, 223, 266, 285.
Attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Michael M. Maya is a comparison showing all of the
changes between the FAC and the SAC.
12
“the parties to the [NMS] . . . must seek to enforce the [NMS] before” this Court. See Mem. in
Supp. of Mot. to Transfer Venue at 3 [ECF 57-1].
After his motion to transfer was granted, Schneider filed the operative Second Amended
Complaint on October 2, 2015. Both the federal government and the various states that
Schneider purports to represent in this action have declined to exercise their statutory right to
intervene. See ECF 24, 25-38, 41, 43, 70, 71, 74, 75, 83, 96, 99, 104.
LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to
state a claim for relief that is ‘plausible on its face.’” Collier v. Dist. of Columbia, 46 F. Supp.
3d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) (Collyer, J.) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). To meet this standard, “the facts alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[A] court need not accept as
true legal conclusions set forth in [the] complaint,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 14 (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
“In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider the facts alleged in the
complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and
matters about which the court may take judicial notice.” Id. at 13 (citing Abhe & Svoboda, Inc.
v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). The court may also consider documents that are
“referred to in [the] complaint and [are] central to [the] plaintiff’s claim.” Detroit Int’l Bridge
Co. v. Gov’t of Canada, 53 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13-14 (D.D.C. 2014) (Collyer, J.)
Because Schneider alleges that Chase engaged in fraudulent conduct, the SAC must
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-
Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In an FCA action, Rule 9(b)
13
requires a relator to allege “the time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact
misrepresented and what was retained or given up as a consequence of the fraud,” as well as “the
individuals allegedly involved in the fraud.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). To
meet this standard, the relator “must set forth an adequate factual basis for his allegations that the
[defendant] submitted false claims (or false statements in order to get false claims paid),
including a . . . detailed description of the specific falsehoods that are the basis for his suit.”
United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis,
internal quotations, and citations omitted).
ARGUMENT
I. SCHNEIDER’S NMS CLAIMS FAIL ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS.
Schneider’s NMS-based claims should be dismissed for the threshold reason that they
were filed in contravention of both the NMS’s dispute resolution procedures and the Monitor’s
controlling determinations that Chase complied with its settlement obligations.
A. The NMS’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Provisions Bar This Action.
The NMS settlement agreement was intended to resolve disputes among the parties, not
to generate them. It therefore provides for the appointment of a third-party Monitor empowered
to “determine” whether Chase complied with its settlement obligations. C.J. Ex. E § C(5). In a
further attempt to minimize disputes regarding the settlement, the NMS requires the parties to
engage in informal dispute resolution procedures before attempting to enforce the settlement
agreement. See id. Ex. E §§ G, J(2). Specifically, before an enforcement action may be filed,
Chase, the Monitor, and the Monitoring Committee must “engage in good faith efforts to reach
agreement on the proper resolution of any dispute.” Id. Ex E. § G. If those efforts are
unsuccessful, the aggrieved party must notify the Monitoring Committee of its intent to file an
14
enforcement action and may file such an action only after the Monitoring Committee and the
parties have had at least 42 days to consider the question. Id. Ex. E § J(2).
Schneider filed this action in clear violation of these procedures. Schneider does not
allege—and cannot allege—that any of his NMS allegations were the subject of “good faith
efforts” to resolve the dispute through the Monitor and the Monitoring Committee. Nor does he
allege that the requisite 42 days’ notice was provided to the Monitoring Committee. Failing to
abide by these procedures would bar the federal government from filing this action, and it
likewise bars Schneider from doing so because an FCA relator “stands in the shoes of the federal
government as a plaintiff.” United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sci. Applications Int’l Co., 604 F.
Supp. 2d 245, 249 (D.D.C. 2009); see also United States ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse
Elec. Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2003) (although relator “[has] a stake in the lawsuit,”
he “represents the interests of the United States,” and “the United States remains the real party in
interest” even when it declines to intervene).
It makes no difference that Schneider seeks to enforce the NMS’s requirements through
the vehicle of an FCA action. The NMS’s dispute resolution procedures broadly apply to “any
dispute concerning any issue arising under this Consent Judgment.” C.J. Ex. E § G (emphasis
added). Schneider’s allegations plainly meet that standard: he alleges that Chase breached its
obligations under the Consent Judgment and owes financial penalties as a result of the breaches.
Furthermore, Schneider has already admitted that this action is an attempt to enforce the NMS:
he moved to transfer this action to this Court on the ground that “the [NMS] was entered in the
District of Columbia and . . . the parties to the [NMS], including the United States, must seek to
enforce the [NMS] before Judge Collyer.” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Transfer Venue at 3 [ECF
57-1] (emphasis added). Having won his motion to transfer on the theory that this is an NMS
15
enforcement action, Schneider is judicially estopped from now arguing otherwise. See Moses v.
Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789, 792 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (judicial estoppel applies “where a
party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, succeeds in maintaining that position, and
then, simply because his interests have changed, assumes a contrary position” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
B. Schneider’s NMS Claims Are An Improper Collateral Attack On The

Monitor’s Determinations That Chase Complied With The NMS.
Schneider’s NMS claims also are barred by the Monitor’s determinations that Chase
complied with its settlement obligations.
The NMS provides that “[i]t shall be the responsibility of the Monitor to determine
whether Servicer is in compliance with the Servicing Standards . . . and whether Servicer has
satisfied the Consumer Relief Requirements.” C.J. Ex. E § C(5) (emphasis added). “[T]he plain
meaning of the word ‘determine’ is ‘to settle or decide (a dispute, question, matter in debate) as a
judge or arbiter.’” Neumann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F. Supp. 2d 969, 975 (E.D. Va.
2005) (quoting 4 Oxford English Dictionary 550 (2d ed. 1989)).8 Thus, under the plain language
of the NMS, the Monitor’s determinations that Chase complied with its settlement obligations
are controlling unless and until those determinations are reversed or overturned. See United
States v. Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d 520, 526 (D.D.C. 2015) (Collyer, J.) (construing the NMS
according to its “plain language”).
8
See also Definition of Determine by Merriam-Webster, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/determine (last visited November 10, 2015) (defining “determine” as,
inter alia, “to officially decide (something) especially because of evidence or facts” or “to
establish (something) exactly or with authority”); McHugh v. DLT Solutions, Inc., 618 F.3d
1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (relying on Merriam-Webster online dictionary to define term in
contract construed under federal law).
16
To be sure, in appropriate circumstances, the NMS reserves the parties’ rights to
challenge the Monitor’s findings in this Court. See, e.g., C.J. Ex. E § D(5) (reserving right to
challenge Monitor’s “findings and/or statements”). No such challenge has been brought here,
however; nor does Schneider purport to bring one in this action. Schneider’s FCA action is
therefore an improper collateral attack on the Monitor’s determinations that Chase complied with
its settlement obligations.
Any other conclusion would allow Schneider simply to bypass the NMS’s carefully-
crafted framework for determining Chase’s compliance with the settlement. As the Court is
aware, thousands upon thousands of hours were spent by the Monitor, the Monitoring
Committee, the Monitor’s professional firms, Chase, and the Chase IRG in testing and evaluating
whether Chase satisfied its obligations. Schneider nevertheless seeks to throw out all of those
efforts, ignore the NMS’s fact-finding framework, and litigate from scratch the question of
whether Chase complied with the settlement. Adopting that approach would frustrate the clear
intent of the settlement and deny Chase the procedural protections for which it bargained. Cf.
Beal Mortg., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 132 F.3d 85, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (contract should
be read “to give meaning to all of its provisions and to render them consistent with each other”
(internal quotation omitted)).
II. SCHNEIDER’S NMS CLAIMS FAIL ON THE MERITS.
Separate and apart from the procedural barriers to Schneider’s NMS-based claims, those
claims also fail on the merits. The claims relating to the consumer relief requirements fail
because they rest on an erroneous interpretation of the NMS. The claims relating to the servicing
standards fail because the alleged violations of those standards, even if proven, would not give
rise to an “obligation” to pay money to the government, as required under the FCA.
17
A. Schneider’s Consumer Relief Claims Should Be Dismissed.
Schneider’s consumer relief allegations rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the
NMS. According to Schneider, Chase violated the NMS’s consumer relief requirements in two
different ways:
• it claimed consumer relief credit for forgiving loans that supposedly were ineligible
for credit because they were not serviced in conformity with the NMS’s servicing
standards; and
• it used its own discretion rather than a non-discretionary application process to select
the consumers to whom it granted consumer relief.
Supra at 5-7. Schneider further asserts that these alleged violations of the consumer relief
requirements are actionable under the FCA because Chase falsely certified that it complied with
those requirements, thereby avoiding monetary penalties that otherwise would have been due.
Supra at 9.
These claims fail as a matter of law because neither of the alleged violations of the
consumer relief requirements is, in reality, a violation. As a result, there was nothing “false”
about Chase’s certifications that it complied with those requirements, thus leaving Schneider
without the “false record or statement” that he needs to support his False Claims Act theory. See
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (requiring a “false record or statement” to support reverse false claims
cause of action based on false certification); United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4
Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2011) (relator fails to state reverse false claims cause of
action where he does not show “a false record or statement”); United States ex rel. Barrett v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 F. Supp. 2d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing reverse
false claims count where relator failed to allege that defendant “[made] a false record or
statement”).
18
1. The NMS does not require compliance with the servicing standards as
a condition for earning consumer relief credit.
According to the complaint, only those loans that were serviced in conformity with the
NMS’s servicing standards can be forgiven in exchange for consumer relief credit. Supra at 6-7.
On that basis, Schneider asserts that Chase improperly claimed credit for forgiving RCV1 loans
that had not been adequately serviced. Id. This assertion fails as a matter of law because the
NMS does not actually limit consumer relief credit to loans that were serviced in compliance
with the NMS’s servicing standards.
As an initial matter, the plain language of the NMS forecloses Schneider’s argument that
consumer relief credit depends on compliance with the servicing standards. The servicing
standards appear in Exhibit A to the NMS and carry their own distinct set of penalties if a
servicer fails to comply with them. See C.J. Ex. A; id. Ex. E § J(3)(b). The consumer relief
requirements, by contrast, appear in Exhibit D to the NMS and are backed by a separate set of
penalties. See id. Ex. D. Furthermore, although Exhibit D contains an extensive list of
requirements that loans must meet to qualify for consumer relief credit, nothing in Exhibit D
gives even the slightest indication that a loan must be serviced in accordance with Exhibit A’s
servicing standards to be eligible for credit. See id.
Far from suggesting that consumer relief credit has anything to do with the servicing
standards set forth in Exhibit A, Exhibit D makes clear that the criteria set forth therein are the
exclusive criteria for granting consumer relief credit. It does so by providing that Chase “shall,”
“will,” or “may” receive credit for forgiving or modifying loans provided only that the loans
meet the requirements of Exhibit D. For example, Exhibit D states:
19
• “Servicer will receive credit . . . for first-lien mortgage loan modifications made in
accordance with the guidelines set forth in this Section 1.” C.J. Ex. D § 1.9
• “A write-down of a second lien mortgage will be creditable” where the write-

down complies with the guidelines set forth in Exhibit D and the accompanying
Table 1. Id. Ex. D § 2(a)-(b).
• “Servicer may receive credit, as described in Table 1, for providing additional

transition funds . . . in connection with a short sale.” Id. Ex. D § 3.
• “Credit shall be provided in accordance with Table 1, Section 3.i” for incentive
payments made in connection with short sales. Id. Ex. D § 4(a).
• “Servicer may receive credit for waiving deficiency balances . . . subject to the
cap provided in Table 1, Section 5.i.” Id. Ex. D § 5(a).
• “Servicer may receive credit for forgiveness of payment of arrearages . . . in

accordance with Table 1, Section 6.i.” Id. Ex. D § 6(a).
• “Servicer may receive credit for certain anti-blight activities in accordance with
and subject to caps contained in Table 1, Section 7.” Id. Ex. D § 7(a).
• “Servicer shall receive credit under Table 1, Section 4, for mandatory waivers of
amounts under this Section 8.b.” Id. Ex. D § 8(b)(1).
• Refinancing relief “shall be credited under these Consumer Relief Requirements

as follows. . . .” Id. Ex. D § 9(e).
Under the plain language of these provisions, Chase is entitled to consumer relief credit for
providing relief that satisfies the requirements of Exhibit D regardless of whether the loans in
question were serviced in compliance with the servicing standards of Exhibit A. See Bank of
Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d at 526 (where NMS is unambiguous, “the plain language of the [consent
judgment] controls” (internal quotation omitted)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014) (“In dozens of cases, courts have held ‘may’ to be synonymous with shall or must, usu. in
an effort to effectuate what is said to be legislative intent.”).
9
All emphasis in the bullet-point quotations is added.
20
The expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of construction reinforces this conclusion.
That canon “instructs that when certain matters are mentioned in a contract, other similar matters
not mentioned were intended to be excluded.” United States v. Okoye, 731 F.3d 46, 49 (1st Cir.
2013). Here, Exhibit D identifies numerous requirements that loans must satisfy to qualify for
consumer relief credit. See C.J. Ex. D. Many of these requirements, moreover, refer explicitly
to the types of loans that are “eligible” for credit. See, e.g., id. Ex. D §§ 1(b), 1(c), 1(j), 2(d),
8(a)(ii). Under the expressio unius canon, the express recitation of these requirements for
consumer relief credit precludes any attempt to read into Exhibit D an additional, unwritten
requirement that only those loans that were serviced in accordance with Exhibit A may be
submitted for credit. See, e.g., Okoye, 731 F.3d at 49 (applying expressio unius canon in contract
case); In re Celotex Corp., 487 F.3d 1320, 1334 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); Original Honey Baked
Ham Co. of Ga., Inc. v. Glickman, 172 F.3d 885, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“A statute listing things it
does cover exempts, by omission, the things it does not list.”).
Schneider’s reading of the consumer relief provisions also would have the bizarre effect
of discouraging servicers from providing relief to the very consumers who are most deserving of
such relief—those whose loans were poorly serviced. Indeed, under Schneider’s reading of the
NMS, no rational servicer would ever grant relief to a consumer whose loan had not been
serviced in accordance with the servicing standards because the servicer would earn no credit for
providing such relief. Schneider thus asks this Court to turn a settlement that was intended to
help the victims of defective mortgage servicing into one that harms those victims by treating
them worse than consumers whose loans were serviced properly. The Court should reject any
reading of the NMS that leads to such troubling results. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in interpreting a consent decree, “[t]o find the
21
meaning of an ambiguous provision we look for the intent of the parties”); A-J Marine, Inc. v.
Corfu Contractors, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 168, 186 (D.D.C. 2011) (Collyer, J.) (relying on
“common sense” in interpreting contract).
Finally, to the extent Schneider suggests that a single violation of the servicing standards
disqualifies a servicer from receiving any consumer relief credit under the NMS, even in
connection with loans that were not affected by the violation, see, e.g., SAC ¶ 99, his argument
fails for yet another reason: it conflicts with a longstanding course of performance under the
NMS. For example, on at least four occasions, the Monitor has filed compliance reports
concluding that a servicer earned consumer relief credit during the very same period in which the
servicer was cited for Potential Violations of the servicing standards.10 If Schneider were correct
that violations of the servicing standards preclude servicers from earning any and all consumer
relief credit, then the Monitor should not have reached those conclusions, and the fact that he did
so should have generated objections from the governmental parties to the consent judgments.
That no such objections were ever made confirms that Schneider’s reading of the NMS is badly
10
Although the Monitor cited Chase for a Potential Violation of one of the servicing metrics in
the third quarter of 2012, and although he likewise cited Bank of America, Citibank, and Wells
Fargo for such violations in the first half of 2013, he nevertheless concluded—before the
Potential Violations were cured—that each of those servicers earned the consumer relief credit
that it claimed for the very same periods. See Monitor’s Report Regarding Compliance by
Defendants J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. for the Measurement
Periods Ended September 30, 2012 and December 31, 2012 [ECF 72] at 29, United States v.
Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-361 (D.D.C. June 18, 2013) (finding Potential Violation); Monitor’s
Interim Consumer Relief Report Regarding Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. [ECF 106]
at 34, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-361 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2013) (“Monitor’s
Interim Report”) (awarding consumer relief credit); Monitor’s metrics compliance reports for
Bank of America, N.A. [ECF 120]; Citibank, N.A. and CitiMortgage, Inc. [ECF 121]; and Wells
Fargo & Co. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. [ECF 123], United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No.
12-361 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2013) (finding Potential Violations); Monitor’s consumer relief reports
for Bank of America, N.A. [ECF 144]; CitiMortgage, Inc. [ECF 145]; and Wells Fargo & Co.
and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. [ECF 146], United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-361 (D.D.C.
Mar. 18, 2014) (awarding consumer relief credit).
22
mistaken. See Cities of Bethany v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d 1131, 1144 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (“The parties’ course of performance under a contract may give meaning to otherwise
unclear contract terms”).
For all these reasons, Schneider’s interpretation of the consumer relief requirements
should be rejected.
2. The NMS grants servicers discretion to select the borrowers who will
receive consumer relief.
Schneider also alleges that “[t]he Consumer Relief programs were required to be
implemented through an application process” under which relief would be available “to all
eligible borrowers.” SAC ¶¶ 107-08. According to Schneider, Chase violated this requirement
by using its own discretion, rather than a non-discretionary application process, to select the
loans that it forgave or modified in exchange for consumer relief credit. See id. ¶¶ 12, 17, 24, 97,
100, 107-10, 199, 213, 216. As a result, Schneider argues, “Chase did not and does not qualify
for any of the Consumer Relief Credit for which it applied.” Id. ¶ 24.
If this extraordinary interpretation of the consumer relief provisions were correct, then
none of the five servicers that entered into NMS consent judgments would have earned a single
penny of consumer relief credit, because none distributed relief through the type of process that
Schneider envisions. For several reasons, Schneider’s interpretation is plainly erroneous.
First, Schneider’s assertion that Chase should have used some sort of “application
process” to distribute consumer relief is made up out of thin air. Despite the detailed consumer
relief provisions set forth in the NMS, there are no indications in those provisions that relief
should be doled out through an application process; nor are there any indications of how such a
process would work. See C.J. Ex. D. This Court should therefore reject Schneider’s effort to
read into the NMS a sweeping new requirement that does not appear there. See Okoye, 731 F.3d
23
at 49 (expressio unius “instructs that when certain matters are mentioned in a contract, other
similar matters not mentioned were intended to be excluded” (internal quotation omitted));
Celotex, 487 F.3d at 1334 (same).
Second, the NMS is equally devoid of any prohibition on a servicer’s use of discretion in
the distribution of consumer relief. As discussed above, the NMS sets forth an extensive and
exclusive list of criteria for earning consumer relief credit. See C.J. Ex. D. Nowhere in those
criteria is there any suggestion that servicers are barred from using their discretion in selecting
the loans that will be forgiven in exchange for credit. See id. Moreover, in the absence of any
provision for an application process, there would be no way to distribute consumer relief without
the exercise of discretion.11
Third, and finally, Schneider’s lack-of-discretion theory is in stark conflict with the way
that the parties have understood and applied the NMS from its inception. The Monitor, the
Monitoring Committee, and the governmental parties to the NMS have known all along that
Chase was using its own discretionary criteria to “select the borrowers to whom it provided the
Consumer Relief.” See Monitor’s Interim Report at 31-33 (emphasis added); Monitor’s Final
Report at 24-25. They likewise understood that the other four servicers that entered into NMS
consent judgments were employing their own discretionary criteria to “select” the borrowers to
whom they provided relief.12 Schneider thus suggests that (i) all five NMS servicers have been
11
The non-discrimination language in the consumer relief provisions reinforces this reading of
the NMS. That language prohibits Chase from adopting consumer relief policies that are
“intended” to discriminate against a particular geography or protected class. See C.J. Ex. D at D-
1. The explicit inclusion of these two restrictions on Chase’s discretion precludes any attempt to
read other unwritten limitations on Chase’s discretion into the settlement. See Okoye, 731 F.3d
at 49; Celotex, 487 F.3d at 1334.
12
Monitor’s interim consumer relief reports for Bank of America, N.A. at 25-27 [ECF 107];
CitiMortgage, Inc. at 26-28 [ECF 108]; and Wells Fargo & Co. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. at
25-27 [ECF 109], United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-361 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2013);
(continued…)
24
operating in blatant violation of the consumer relief provisions from the outset, (ii) the Monitor
has known this and publicly reported on it for years, and (iii) the fifty governmental parties to the
consent judgments nonetheless have done nothing to correct these violations which, in
Schneider’s view, would entitle them to several billions dollars’ worth of monetary penalties.
There is nothing in the NMS to support this absurd conclusion.
B. Schneider’s Servicing Standards Claims Should Be Dismissed.
Schneider’s claims based on the servicing standards also should be dismissed. The
theory of these claims is that Chase avoided paying penalties to the government by falsely
certifying that it complied with the NMS’s servicing metrics. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 1, 24-25, 198-
99, 215-16, 297-303, 307. This theory fails because the complaint does not adequately allege
that Chase had an “obligation” to pay money to the government as a result of the alleged
servicing violations. In the absence of such an “obligation,” a claim under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(G) fails as a matter of law. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G); Si v. Laogai Research
Found., 71 F. Supp. 3d 73, 96-98 (D.D.C. 2014) (reverse false claims cause of action fails where
relator fails to allege existence of “obligation”); Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 439 F. Supp. 2d
38, 43-45 (D.D.C. 2006) (same), aff’d, 518 F.3d 61 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
The complaint fails to allege the existence of an “obligation” to pay money to the
government for two fundamental reasons. First, the NMS does not impose monetary penalties
on servicers merely for failing to comply with the servicing metrics. Rather, before a servicer
can be liable for penalties, (i) the Monitor must determine that the servicer has committed a
Potential Violation of a metric, and (ii) the servicer must be afforded an opportunity to cure the
Monitor’s final consumer relief report for Residential Capital, LLC, Ally Financial, Inc., &
GMAC Mortgage, LLC at 13-15 [ECF 136], United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-361
(D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2014).
25
Potential Violation. Schneider does not allege—nor could he—that either of those steps has
occurred here. Second, even when a servicer fails to cure a Potential Violation, penalties for
metrics violations are still too discretionary and contingent to give rise to an “obligation” within
the meaning of the FCA.
1. The NMS’s “cure” provisions preclude Schneider’s servicing

standard claims.
All claims based on the servicing standards should be dismissed because the complaint
fails to allege that the Monitor found any Potential Violations of the servicing metrics that went
uncured by Chase. As this Court recognized in United States v. Bank of America, there can be
no monetary penalty for violating the servicing standards unless (1) the Monitor finds a Potential
Violation of a Servicing Metric, and (2) the servicer fails to effect a cure of the Potential
Violation. See 78 F. Supp. 3d at 530-31. “[T]he cure process for a Potential Violation must run
its course before suit on an uncured Potential Violation can be filed” because a servicer “has a
right to cure.” Id. at 531; see also C.J. Ex. E § E(2) (“Servicer shall have a right to cure any
Potential Violation.”).
Schneider does not allege—and cannot allege—that Chase’s alleged violations of the
servicing standards were cited as Potential Violations by the Monitor or that Chase failed to cure
any such Potential Violations. See supra at 7-9. As a result, Chase had no “obligation” to pay a
financial penalty related to the servicing standards that could sustain an FCA claim. See Si, 71 F.
Supp. 3d at 96-98; Hoyte, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 43-45.
2. The prospect of a civil penalties award is too contingent and uncertain

to constitute an “obligation” under the FCA.
Schneider’s servicing claims also fail because any servicing-related penalties that Chase
theoretically might owe to the government are too uncertain and contingent to constitute an
“obligation” to pay money to the government within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
26
The NMS does not invariably impose a monetary penalty if a servicer fails to cure a
Potential Violation of a servicing metric. Rather, before any penalty could be due, a party to the
NMS would have to exercise its discretion to bring an enforcement action seeking a penalty, and
the Court would have to exercise its discretion to grant the requested penalty. See C.J. Ex. E
§ J(2) (party or Monitoring Committee “may” bring enforcement action seeking monetary
penalties); id. Ex. E § J(3)(b) (Court “may” award penalties for uncured Potential Violations).
Neither of these discretionary acts is automatic or self-executing, and unless and until such
discretionary acts take place, a servicer has no obligation to pay a penalty. See C.J. Ex. E § J;
Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d at 530. Furthermore, before a penalty payment may be sought, (i)
the Monitor must determine that a Potential Violation has occurred, (ii) the servicer must be
given an opportunity to cure, (iii) the attempted cure must be unsuccessful, and (iv) informal
dispute resolution must fail. C.J. Ex. E §§ E, G, J; Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d at 530-31.
Accordingly, before Chase could be required to pay a penalty, all of the following contingencies
would have to occur:
• the Monitor would have to find that Chase committed a Potential Violation of a
servicing metric;
• Chase would have to fail to cure the Potential Violation;
• the dispute resolution procedures set forth in the NMS would have to be followed
without success;
• a party to the NMS or the Monitoring Committee would have to exercise its
discretion to bring an Enforcement Action; and
• the Court would have to exercise its discretion to award a penalty.
Supra at 7-9; C.J. Ex. E §§ E, G, J; Bank of Am., 78 F. Supp. 3d at 530-31. There are no
allegations that any of these steps have occurred here. Any potential liability to the government
is therefore far too contingent and uncertain to give rise to an “obligation” that could sustain an
27
FCA claim. See, e.g., Hoyte, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 44-45 (discretionary and contingent civil penalty
does not constitute “obligation” under FCA).
Hoyte addressed an FCA relator’s claim that she was terminated in retaliation for alleging
that her employer had violated a consent decree entered into with the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) and had submitted false records to avoid paying penalties under the
consent decree. See id. at 42, 44. The question for the Court was whether the relator’s
allegations “could lead to a viable . . . case” for false claims liability. Id. at 42 (internal
quotations omitted). Judge Friedman held that they could not. He began by recognizing that, to
state a claim under the FCA, the relator would have to allege an “obligation” to the government
that was “a present, existing debt or liability, owed at the time the alleged false statement is
made, and not some future or contingent liability.” Id. at 43 (emphasis added). Judge Friedman
found that the relator could not make such an allegation because, under the consent decree, “[t]he
decision whether to impose sanctions rests exclusively with the FDA, and no obligation will
arise until the FDA decides to exercise its authority under the [consent decree].” Id. at 44. In
light of the FDA’s “discretion” to seek penalties or to “refrain from doing so,” no “obligation” to
pay money or property existed within the meaning of the FCA. Id.
Here, the penalty payments that Chase allegedly might owe for violating the servicing
metrics are even more remote and contingent than in Hoyte. Similar to the circumstances in
Hoyte, no penalty could be due here unless and until a party exercised its discretion to bring an
action seeking a penalty and this Court exercised its discretion to award a penalty. Even before
these exercises of discretion could occur, however, the Monitor would have to find a Potential
Violation of a metric and Chase would have to fail to cure the Potential Violation. Because
28
Schneider does not allege—nor could he—that these steps have taken place, he has not alleged
that Chase had an “obligation” to pay money to the government for purposes of the FCA.
The 2009 amendments to the FCA, which added a definition of the term “obligation,” do
not alter this result. Prior to 2009, when the term “obligation” was undefined, courts consistently
held that potential penalties that had not yet been assessed or enforced did not give rise to an
“obligation” within the meaning of the FCA. See Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 518 F.3d 61, 67
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[A]n unassessed potential penalty for regulatory noncompliance does not
constitute an obligation that gives rise to a viable FCA claim.”); United States ex rel. Marcy v.
Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (“potential and contingent” liability is outside
scope of FCA); United States v. Q Int’l Courier, Inc., 131 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1997) (“The
obligation cannot be merely a potential liability.”).
The definition added by Congress in 2009 did not change this understanding. Congress
defined an “obligation” as “an established duty, whether or not fixed,” arising from, inter alia, a
contractual relationship, statute, or regulation. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3) (emphasis added). This
definition resolved a disagreement among the courts about whether a debt to the government had
to be “fixed” in amount for an “obligation” to arise.13 The definition also makes clear, however,
that a potential penalty that has not yet been assessed remains outside the scope of the statute, as
no such penalty could be an “established” duty to pay money or property. See id. Nor does any
other language in the statute suggest an intent on the part of Congress to alter the pre-2009
understanding that contingent penalties do not give rise to FCA liability. See Amfac Resorts,
13
Compare, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs.’ Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 190 F.3d 729, 734-36 (6th
Cir. 1999) (requiring “a fixed sum that is immediately due”), and Q Int’l, 131 F.3d at 774
(same), with United States ex. rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc., 465 F.3d 1189, 1201 (10th Cir.
2006) (obligation may arise even if “the sum has not been precisely determined”).
29
L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 142 F. Supp. 2d 54, 81 (D.D.C. 2001) (where statute is subject to
“prevailing understanding,” courts “presume that Congress was aware of and therefore adopted
this view” by enacting legislation “without changing it”).
The legislative history of the 2009 amendments confirms that contingent debts do not
satisfy the statutory definition of the term “obligation.” Draft language that embraced
“contingent” obligations appeared in an early version of what became Section 3729(b)(3), but it
was struck in the final form of the legislation. See 155 Cong. Rec. S4539 (daily ed. Apr. 22,
2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl). The bill’s sponsor explained that the reason for this change was
to foreclose precisely the theory of contingent liability that Schneider has asserted here. See 155
Cong. Rec. S4543 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (legislative amendment
introducing language now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3) “modifies the bill’s definition of
the term ‘obligation’ as used in the reverse False Claims Act to exclude contingent obligations,
thus precluding the possibility that conduct that makes a defendant liable for a penalty or a fine
could become actionable under this law before that fine is actually established or assessed”).
Because Schneider has not adequately alleged that any potential liability to pay penalties
for the violation of a servicing standard would constitute an “obligation” to pay money to the
government, Schneider’s servicing standards claims should be dismissed.
C. Schneider’s Remaining NMS Allegations Fail To State An FCA Claim.
Schneider makes two other vague allegations related to Chase’s performance under the
NMS that likewise fail to state a claim for relief. Specifically, he alleges that Chase
(1) purported to forgive certain loans and release certain liens that did not qualify for consumer
relief credit and/or that previously had been sold to companies controlled by Schneider, see SAC
¶¶ 245-52, 253-64, 267-78, and (2) violated the NMS’s anti-blight requirements by releasing
liens without providing sufficient notice to “interested parties,” see id. ¶¶ 286-95. These
30
allegations do not support a cause of action under the FCA because Schneider does not
adequately allege that this purported conduct resulted in (i) the submission of a false or
fraudulent claim for payment, (ii) the creation of a false record or statement material to a false
claim, or (iii) the avoidance of an obligation to pay money to the government. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (G). Among other things, Schneider does not allege that Chase actually
claimed or received any consumer relief credit for forgiving loans that did not qualify for credit;
nor does he allege that the asserted anti-blight violations gave rise to an “obligation” to pay
money to the government. These allegations therefore add nothing to Schneider’s claims.
D. Schneider’s State-Law Claims Fail To State An FCA Claim.
In addition to asserting NMS-based claims under the False Claims Act, Schneider asserts
virtually identical claims under 21 analogous state statutes. See SAC ¶¶ 315-419. Schneider
makes no factual allegations specific to any of these causes of action, and he does not assert that
any of the state statutes differ materially from the FCA. Accordingly, Schneider’s state-law
claims should be dismissed for the same reasons as the parallel claims asserted under the FCA.
III. SCHNEIDER’S HAMP CLAIMS ARE DEFECTIVE.
Schneider separately alleges that Chase violated the FCA by “knowingly” submitting
“false or fraudulent” annual certifications that it complied with the rules of the HAMP program.
SAC ¶¶ 2, 40, 312; see 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B). According to Schneider, these annual
certifications were false because they failed to disclose that Chase did not solicit RCV1
borrowers to apply for HAMP loan modifications. SAC ¶ 39.
This claim fails as a matter of law because Schneider does not adequately allege that
Chase’s non-solicitation of RCV1 borrowers constituted a “material” violation of HAMP’s
requirements. The Treasury Department requires servicers to certify material compliance—not
perfect compliance—with the rules of HAMP. Schneider nevertheless fails to allege any facts
31
that demonstrate material non-compliance. He does not allege, for example, that substantial
numbers of RCV1 borrowers would have wanted or qualified for HAMP modifications, that
Chase’s failure to solicit those borrowers resulted in increased foreclosures, or that the Treasury
Department was unaware of Chase’s practices at the time it approved Chase’s HAMP payments.
Schneider’s allegations that Chase’s annual certifications were “knowingly false” therefore fail
to satisfy the basic pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), let alone the heightened requirements
applicable under Rule 9(b).
A. Schneider Fails To Allege That Chase Made A False Claim.
Schneider’s HAMP claims should be dismissed because he does not adequately allege
that Chase’s annual HAMP certifications were “false.”
Under Treasury Department rules, HAMP certifications must disclose “instances of
noncompliance that [the servicer] believes have a material effect on its ability to comply with
MHA program requirements.” MHA Handbook at 38 (emphasis added). Consistent with that
requirement, Chase was required to certify only that it was in “material compliance” with
HAMP. See Karwhite Decl. Ex. 1 at 1-2 (emphasis added). Chase also was required to disclose
the criteria that it used to determine whether any instances of non-compliance were material. See
MHA Handbook at 38. Accordingly, Chase disclosed a list of “subjective factors” that it
considered in making its annual certifications, a list that included whether any non-compliance
“resulted in substantial injury to a significant number of borrowers” or “substantially interfere[d]
with the goals and objectives of the overall program.” See Karwhite Decl. Ex. 2 at 2.
Schneider must allege that Chase’s purported violation of HAMP’s solicitation
requirements was “material” within the meaning of these “subjective factors” in order to allege
32
that Chase’s certifications were “false” for purposes of his FCA claim. For several reasons, he
has not met that burden.
First, Schneider does not assert that the alleged failure to solicit RCV1 borrowers to
apply for HAMP modifications impacted a substantial number of borrowers. Although the
complaint asserts in conclusory terms that RCV1 borrowers might have qualified for HAMP
modifications, the complaint’s specific factual allegations do not support that conclusion. For
instance, only first-lien mortgages are eligible for HAMP, yet, as Schneider tacitly
acknowledges, the vast majority of the loans in RCV1 are not first-lien loans. See SAC ¶¶ 177,
184-85. Schneider also acknowledges that Chase released and forgave large numbers of RCV1
loans, see id. ¶¶ 14, 208-09, 242, 244, 286-88, and it is undisputed that borrowers whose loans
have been forgiven need not be solicited for HAMP. Id. ¶ 190; MHA Handbook at 64.
Accordingly, the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations thoroughly undermine the
conclusion that Chase failed to solicit a material number of borrowers who could have qualified
for HAMP.
Second, Schneider does not allege that Chase’s non-solicitation of RCV1 borrowers
resulted in injury to those borrowers or substantially interfered with the goals of the HAMP
program. The fundamental purpose of HAMP is to avoid unnecessary foreclosures. See MHA
Handbook at 1; SAC ¶ 9. Schneider, however, concedes that Chase did not foreclose on RCV1
loans because it made no financial sense to foreclose on those “valueless” loans. See supra at 4.
Nor does Schneider allege that substantial numbers of RCV1 borrowers—who faced no threat of
foreclosure even though they were not paying their loans—would have wanted HAMP
modifications even if they could have qualified for such modifications. For these reasons as
well, the complaint does not allege a “material” violation of HAMP’s requirements.
33
Third, and finally, Schneider fails to allege that Treasury’s compliance agent, MHA-C,
was unaware of Chase’s solicitation practices with respect to RCV1 loans. Schneider’s original
complaint asserted that Chase “concealed from . . . MHA-C both the existence of the RCV1
charged-off [loans] and the way those loans were treated for purposes of HAMP solicitations.”
SAC ¶ 16 n.2; see also FAC ¶ 163 (RCV1 “was not disclosed or reported to Freddie Mac”). All
such allegations, however, were (rightly) purged from Schneider’s amended complaint.14
Schneider thus concedes, as he must, that Treasury was well aware of Chase’s treatment of the
RCV1 loans at the time it approved Chase’s HAMP incentive payments.
The alleged HAMP violations are therefore immaterial as a matter of law. As the D.C.
Circuit has explained, an allegedly false certification is “material” only if it impacts “the
government’s decision to pay.” United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257,
1271 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In other words, a “false certification . . . is actionable . . . only if it leads
the government to make a payment which, absent the falsity, it may not have made.” Id. at 1270
(quoting United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th
Cir. 2010)). Here, there is no question that any alleged falsity in Chase’s HAMP certifications
was immaterial to the government’s decision to pay: Treasury knew about Chase’s solicitation
practices and approved its HAMP payments anyway.
In sum, Schneider pleads no facts supporting the conclusion that Chase’s non-solicitation
of RCV1 borrowers was “material,” and as a result he has not adequately alleged that Chase’s
HAMP certifications were “false.”
14
Compare, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 13, 16, 24, 35, 56, 163, 174, 176, 190, 202, 214, 257, 276, with, e.g.,
SAC ¶¶ 13, 16, 24, 39, 60, 172, 183-87, 211, 223, 266, 285; see also Maya Decl. Ex. 1.
34
B. Schneider Fails To Allege The Necessary Element Of Scienter.
Schneider’s HAMP claims also fail because he has not adequately alleged that Chase
knowingly made a false statement, as the FCA requires. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)-(B).
Under the MHA Handbook, Chase was required to disclose instances of non-compliance
with HAMP requirements only if it “believed” that the non-compliance was “material.” See
MHA Handbook at 38. Accordingly, in order to plead the scienter required for his FCA claim,
Schneider must allege facts supporting the conclusion that Chase subjectively believed that it was
in material non-compliance with HAMP’s requirements at the time it made its annual
certifications to the government. See SAIC, 626 F.3d at 1271. The complaint contains no facts
that remotely support this conclusion.15
Any assertion that Chase knowingly made false certifications, moreover, is belied by
Schneider’s implicit concession that Chase disclosed its non-solicitation of RCV1 borrowers to
the government. See supra at 11-12. It is well-established that “prior government knowledge of
an allegedly false claim can negate the scienter required for an FCA violation.” U.S. ex rel.
Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2002) (collecting
cases); see also U.S. ex rel. Bettis v. Odebrecht Contractors of Cal., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 272,
286 n.22 (D.D.C. 2004) (explaining that the government’s knowledge “is a circumstance that is
relevant to determining whether defendant lacked the requisite scienter”), aff’d sub nom. U.S. ex
rel. Bettis v. Odebrecht Contractors of Cal., Inc., 393 F.3d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The
government’s knowledge of Chase’s solicitation practices thus rebuts the conclusion that Chase
15
While Schneider conclusorily alleges that Chase “knowingly” made false statements, see, e.g.,
SAC ¶ 312, such legal conclusions are not entitled to deference on a motion to dismiss. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
35
knowingly made false certifications to the government. Indeed, it defies common sense to
suggest that Chase was attempting to deceive the government in its annual HAMP certifications
while simultaneously disclosing to the government the relevant facts.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Chase’s motion to dismiss should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
November 12, 2015 /s/ Robert D. Wick

Robert D. Wick (D.C. Bar No. 440817)
Christian J. Pistilli (D.C. Bar No. 496157)
Michael M. Maya (D.C. Bar No. 991742)
One CityCenter
850 Tenth Street NW
Tel: (202) 662-6000
Fax: (202) 662-6291
Attorneys for Defendants
36
Exhibit 1
Submitted for Filing Under Seal
Exhibit 1
FORM OF SUBSEQUENT CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION
This certification (“Certification”) is delivered as provided in Section 1.C. of the [Amended and
Restated] Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Participation Agreement
(the “Commitment”), effective as of [DATE], by and between Federal National Mortgage
Association, a federally chartered corporation, acting as financial agent of the United States
(“Fannie Mae”), and the undersigned party (“Servicer”). All terms used, but not defined herein,
shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Commitment.
Servicer hereby certifies, based on its knowledge, (1) as of [INSERT DATE ON WHICH
SUBSEQUENT CERTIFICATION IS EFFECTIVE (SEE SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE FOR
APPLICABLE INITIAL CERTIFICATION EFFECTIVE DATE)] (the “Subsequent
Certification Effective Date”) and (2) during the period from the effective date of the most recent
prior Certification relating to the Programs through and including the Subsequent Certification
Effective Date, that:
1. Servicer is established under the laws of the United States or any state, territory,
or possession of the United States or the District of Columbia, and has significant
operations in the United States. Servicer had full corporate power and authority to enter
into, execute, and deliver the Agreement and to perform its obligations hereunder and has
all licenses necessary to carry on its business as now being conducted and as
contemplated by the Agreement.
2. In connection with the Programs, Servicer is in material compliance with, and

certifies that all Services have been materially performed in compliance with, all
applicable Federal, state and local laws, regulations, regulatory guidance, statutes,
ordinances, codes and requirements, including, but not limited to, the Truth in Lending
Act, 15 USC 1601 § et seq., the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 15 USC §
1639, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 USC § 41 et seq., the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 USC § 701 et seq., the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 USC § 1681 et
seq., the Fair Housing Act and other Federal and state laws designed to prevent unfair,
discriminatory or predatory lending practices and all applicable laws governing tenant
rights, bankruptcy, mediation and foreclosure. Subject to the following sentence,
Servicer has obtained all governmental approvals or made all registrations required under
applicable law to authorize the performance of its obligations under the Programs in
which Servicer is participating and the Agreement. The performance of Services under
the Agreement has not conflicted with, or been prohibited in any way by, any other
agreement or statutory restrictions by which Servicer is bound, except to the extent of any
restrictions arising out of contractual limitations under applicable pooling and servicing
agreements and other servicing or related contracts to which Servicer is subject. Servicer
is not aware of any other legal or financial impediments to performing its obligations
under the Programs or the Agreement and has promptly notified Fannie Mae of any
financial and/or operational impediments which may have impaired its ability to perform
its obligations under the Programs or the Agreement. Servicer is not delinquent on any
Federal tax obligation or any other debt owed to the United States or collected by the
United States for the benefit of others, excluding any debts or obligations that are being
contested in good faith.
3. Servicer has materially complied with the following: (i) performed its
obligations in accordance with the Agreement and in accordance with accepted servicing
practices, and has promptly provided such performance reporting on the Programs as
Fannie Mae and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, a federally chartered
corporation, acting as compliance agent of the United States (“Freddie Mac”) have
reasonably required; (ii) all Services relating to benefits under the Programs available to
eligible borrowers have been offered by Servicer to such borrowers, fully documented
and administered by Servicer in accordance with the applicable Program Documentation
then in effect; and (iii) all data, collection information and other information reported by
Servicer to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under the Agreement, including, but not limited
to, information that was relied upon by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in calculating the
Purchase Price and in performing any compliance review, was true, complete and
accurate in all material respects, and consistent with all relevant business records of the
Servicer, as and when provided or, if such information was provided from third parties,
including borrowers or prior servicers, Servicer has no knowledge that such information
is incorrect or incomplete at the time it was provided to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
Notwithstanding the above, Servicer may have inadvertently violated any of the above,
but has taken or will take all necessary actions to rectify any such violation or lack of
compliance.
4. Servicer has materially complied with the following: (i) performed the Services
required under the Program Documentation and the Agreement in accordance with the
practices, professional standards of care, and degree of attention used in a well-managed
operation, and no less than that which the Servicer exercises for itself under similar
circumstances; and (ii) used qualified individuals with suitable training, education,
experience and skills to perform the Services. Servicer acknowledges that participation in
the Programs required changes to, or the augmentation of, its systems, staffing and
procedures. Servicer took all reasonable actions necessary to ensure that it had the
capacity to implement the Programs in which it is participating in accordance with the
Agreement.
5. Servicer acknowledges that the provision of false or misleading information to

Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in connection with the Programs or pursuant to the
Agreement may constitute a violation of: (a) Federal criminal law involving fraud,
conflict of interest, bribery, or gratuity violations found in Title 18 of the United States
Code; or (b) the civil False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733). Servicer has disclosed
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac any credible evidence known to Servicer, in connection
with the Services, that a management official, employee, or contractor of Servicer has
committed, or may have committed, a violation of the referenced statutes.
6. Servicer acknowledges that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be required to
assist the Treasury with responses under the Privacy Act of 1974 (the “Privacy Act”), 5
USC § 552a; inquiries from borrowers and Freedom of Information Act, 5 USC § 552;
inquiries from other parties; as well as formal inquiries from Congressional committees
and members, the Government Accounting Office, Inspectors General and other
government entities, as well as media and consumer advocacy group inquiries about the
Programs and their effectiveness. Servicer has responded promptly and accurately to all
reasonable requests for assistance made by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, complied with
Page 2
any related procedures which Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have established relating to
such requests, and provided related training, or instituted policies and procedures to its
employees and contractors to ensure prompt cooperation with such requests. In
connection with Privacy Act inquiries, Servicer has provided updated and corrected
information as appropriate about borrowers’ records to Fannie Mae on behalf of the
Treasury.
7. Servicer acknowledges that Fannie Mae is required to develop and implement

customer service call centers to respond to borrowers’ and other parties’ inquiries
regarding the Programs in which Servicer participates, which may require additional
support from Servicer. Servicer has provided such additional customer service call
support in a timely manner as Fannie Mae has reasonably requested to support such
Programs.
8. Servicer acknowledges that Fannie Mae and/or Freddie Mac are required to
develop and implement practices to monitor and detect loan modification fraud and to
monitor compliance with applicable consumer protection and fair lending laws. Servicer
has fully and promptly cooperated with Fannie Mae’s inquiries about loan modification
fraud and legal compliance and has complied with any anti-fraud and legal compliance
procedures which Fannie Mae and/or Freddie Mac have required.
9. Solely if Servicer has elected to participate in the Second Lien Modification

Program by executing and delivering to Fannie Mae a Service Schedule relating thereto,
Servicer acknowledges that each mortgage loan it modified under the Second Lien
Modification Program was, at the time of modification, second in priority relative to the
first lien that was modified under the Programs.
10. During the period from [INSERT SUBSEQUENT CERTIFICATION

EFFECTIVE DATE] to the date hereof, nothing came to our attention that caused us to
believe that Servicer cannot comply with any of the certifications made herein, or that
any of the certifications made herein cease to be true and correct.
Servicer hereby certifies that (1) as of the Subsequent Certification Effective Date and (2) during
the period from the effective date of the most recent prior Certification relating to the Programs
through and including the Subsequent Certification Effective Date:
1. Servicer has disclosed to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (a) any Event of Default
or any Act of Bad Faith of which it has become aware and (b) any other facts or
information known to Servicer that Treasury, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac should
reasonably expect to know about Servicer and its contractors in managing and monitoring
the Programs.
2. Servicer has developed and implemented an internal control program reasonably

designed to monitor and detect loan modification fraud and to monitor compliance with
applicable consumer protection and fair lending laws, among other things, as provided in
Section 4 of the Financial Instrument.
3. Servicer has conducted sufficient tests of specific controls to obtain evidence and
provide reasonable assurance that controls were operating effectively (i.e., were meeting
the related control objectives for each of the Program activities) during the period
covered by this Certification.
Page 3
4. Servicer has disclosed any instances of noncompliance that have a material effect
on its ability to comply with Program requirements in accordance with Supplemental
Directive 10-06.
Servicer acknowledges that this Certification, taken as a whole, does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
with respect to the period of time covered by this Certification.
In the event that any of the certifications made herein are later discovered not to be true and
correct in all material respects, Servicer agrees to notify Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac promptly.
[INSERT FULL LEGAL NAME OF SERVICER]:
____________________________________ ________________________
[Name of Authorized Official] Date
[Title of Authorized Official]
Page 4
Exhibit 2
Submitted for Filing Under Seal

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

ex rel. LAURENCE SCHNEIDER, Case No. l:14-cv-01047-RMC
Plaintiffs, Declaration of Michael M. Maya
V.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

et al.,
Defendants.
Michael M. Maya declares as ollows:
1. I am an attorney at the aw firm of Covington & Burling LLP, counsel to
Defendants JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., JPMorgan Chase & Co., and Chase Home Finance,
LLC (collectively "Defendants"). I am a member ingood standing ofthe bar ofthe District of
Columbia and this Court.
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Declaration, which
I make in order to place before the Court certain material relevant to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Relator's Second Amended Complaint.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a comparison of
Relator's First Amended Complaint in this case against Relator's Second Amended Complaint in
this case.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746,1 declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing
is true and correct.

Executed on November 12, 2015 in Washington, DC
Michael Mf^vlaya^


)
Case. No. 1:14-cv-01047-RMC Judge
)
Plaintiffs,
)
Rosemary M. Collyer
)
Ex rel. [UNDER SEAL],
)
) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff-Relator,
)
)
v.
)
)
[UDER SEAL],
)
Defendants. )
)
FILED IN CAMERA AND UNDER SEAL
EXHIBIT A

)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
)
STATES OF CALIFORNIA, Case. No. 1:14-cv-01047-RMC
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DELAWARE, FLORIDA, GEORGIA,
)
HAWAII, ILLINOIS, INDIANA, IOWA, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer
)
MASSACHUSETTS, MINNESOTA,
)
MONTANA, NEVADA, NEW
)
HAMPSHIRE, NEW JERSEY, NEW
)
MEXICO, NEW YORK, NORTH FIRST
)
CAROLINA, RHODE ISLAND,
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TENNESSEE, VIRGINIA, AND THE
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA., SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
)
)
Plaintiffs, )
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Ex rel. LAURENCE SCHNEIDER, )
)
Plaintiff-Relator, )
)
v. )
)
J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, )
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, J.P. )
MORGAN CHASE & COMPANY; AND )
CHASE HOME FINANCE LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
FILED IN CAMERA AND UNDER SEAL

Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)
EXHIBIT A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................2
A. Defendants’ Fraud ...............................................................................................2
B. Damages to the Government Related to the NMSA ...........................................8
C. Damages to the Government Related to the HAMP Program...........................10
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ........................................................................................1112
III. PARTIES ...........................................................................................................................1213
A. Relator ...............................................................................................................1213
B. Defendants.........................................................................................................1314
IV. BACKGROUND ...............................................................................................................1415
A. Massive Mortgage Wrongdoing By Chase And Other Banks ......................... 1415
B. Bank’s History of Regulatory Settlements and Enforcement Actions ............. 1516
C. National Mortgage Settlement Agreement ....................................................... 1617
1. Servicing Standards .................................................................................... 1819
2. Implementation of Servicing Standards ..................................................... 2122
3. Consumer Relief ..........................................................................................25
4. Implementation of Consumer Relief .......................................................... 2728
D. The HAMP Program ........................................................................................ 2829
1. Servicing Guidelines ...................................................................................3031
2. Implementation of Servicing Guidelines.....................................................3132
3. Compliance With Servicing Guidelines ......................................................33
4. Relationship Manager A/K/A SPOC...........................................................3738
5. Incentive Payments......................................................................................4041
EXHIBIT A
E. The U.S. Bankruptcy Trustee Program and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency Identified Servicing Practices by Chase Which Violated the NMSA
and the HAMP Loan Servicing and Modification Requirements .................... 41
V. CHASE FALSELY CLAIMED COMPLIANCE WITH SERVICING STANDARDS

AND CONSUMER RELIEF REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONSENT JUDGMENT
AND THE SERVICING REQUIREMENTS OF THE HAMP ......................................4144
A. The Secondary System of Loans: Recovery One ............................................4144
B. The “2nd Lien Extinguishment Program” .......................................................4649
1. The RCV1-SOR Collection Agencies .....................................................5054
2. “DOJ: Default: Recovery 2nd Lien Credit Initiative,

Financial Impact Overview, November 14, 2012” ................................5255

3rd Mailing Portfolio Selection, January 23, 2013” ................................5457
C. Chase Mails Thousands of Letters from their RCV1-SOR .............................5457
D. Chase Admits to Misconduct Utilizing 2nd Lien Forgiveness Letters .............5761
E. Chase’s “Alternative Foreclosure Program” Violates

the Requirements of the Servicing Standards..................................................6064
VI. DOCUMENTATION CONTAINING FALSE CLAIMS ...............................................6366
VII. CAUSES OF ACTION ....................................................................................................6568
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ..............................................................................................................8891
ii
EXHIBIT A
1. This is an action to recover damages and civil penalties on behalf of the United
States and on behalf of Plaintiff/Relator Laurence Schneider (“Relator”), based on violations of
the National Mortgage Settlement Agreement (“NMSA”) entered into between the United States
and Defendants, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, J.P. Morgan Chase & Company
and Chase Home Finance LLC (collectively “Chase” or “Defendant” or “Company”). Under the
NMSA, Chase was required to meet certain loan servicing standards and consumer relief
provisions. When Chase failed to meet those conditions, it was required to make certain
payments to the United States and also was subject to penalties. In order to avoid these payments
and penalties, Chase filed false reports and certifications with the Court appointed Monitor of the
NMSA. These false certifications are actionable “reverse” false claims under 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(G), which prohibits the submission of “a [knowingly] false record or statement
material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or [that]
knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the Government.”
2. This action also seeks to recover damages and civil penalties on behalf of the
United States and on behalf of the Relator based on violations of the “Amended and Restated
Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Participation Agreement”
(“Commitment” or “SPA”) entered into between the United States and Chase. Under the
Commitment, Chase was required to meet servicing standards specified in the Home
Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) and provide loan modifications to its borrowers.
Chase was paid various amounts for each loan modification by the Government. Chase also
received additional incentive payments based on its performance. Payments were
conditioned upon Chase certifying that it was in compliance with the HAMP servicing
standards. Chase falsely certified that it was in compliance with those standards and created
EXHIBIT A
false records to support each certification. These false certifications and records are
actionable under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) & (B), which prohibit knowingly submitting “a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” or the use of “a false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent claim.”
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Defendant’s Fraud
3. Defendant Chase’s fraud arises out of its response to efforts by the United States
Government (“Government” or “Federal Government”) and the States (the “States”) 1 to remedy
the misconduct of Chase and other financial institutions whose actions significantly contributed
to the consumer housing crisis.
4. Defendant’s misconduct resulted in the issuance of improper mortgages,
premature and unauthorized foreclosures, violation of service members’ and other homeowners’
rights and protections, the use of false and deceptive affidavits and other documents, and the
waste and abuse of taxpayer funds. Each of the allegations regarding Defendant contained
herein applies to instances in which one or more, and in some cases all, of the defendants
engaged in the conduct alleged.
5. In March 2012, after a lengthy investigation (in part due to other qui tam
plaintiffs) under the Federal False Claims Act, the Government, along with the States, filed a
1
States of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming; the Commonwealths of Kentucky, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and
Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
EXHIBIT A
complaint against Chase and the other banks responsible for the fraudulent and unfair mortgage
practices that cost consumers, the Federal Government, and the States tens of billions of dollars.
Specifically, the Government alleged that Chase, as well as other financial institutions, engaged
in improper practices related to mortgage origination, mortgage servicing, and foreclosures,
including, but not limited to, irresponsible and inadequate oversight of the banks’ quality control
standards.
6. These improper practices had previously been the focus of several administrative
enforcement actions by various government agencies, including but not limited to, the Office of
the Controller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Bank and others. Those enforcement actions
resulted in various other Consent Orders that are still in full force and effect.
7. In April 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
approved a settlement between the Federal Government, the States, the Defendant and four other
banks, which resulted in the NMSA. The operative document of this agreement was the Consent
Judgment (“Consent Judgment” or “Agreement”). The Consent Judgment contains, among other
things, Consumer Relief provisions. The Consumer Relief provisions required Chase to provide
over $4 billion in consumer relief to their borrowers. This relief was to be in the form of, among
other things, loan forgiveness and refinancing. Under the Consent Judgment, Chase received
“credits” towards its Consumer Relief obligations by forgiving or modifying loans it maintained
as a result of complying with the procedures and requirements contained in Exhibits D and D-1
of the Consent Judgment.
8. The Consent Judgment also contains Servicing Standards in Exhibit A that were
intended to be used as a basis for granting Consumer Relief. The Servicing Standards were
tested through various established “Metrics” and were designed to improve upon the lack of
quality control and communication with borrowers. Compliance was overseen by an

7
EXHIBIT A
independent Monitor.
9. The operational framework for the Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief
requirements of the NMSA was based on a series of Treasury Directives that were themselves
designed as part of the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program. The MHA program was a
critical part of the Government's broad strategy to help homeowners avoid foreclosure, stabilize
the country's housing market, and improve the nation's economy by setting uniform and industry
wide default servicing protocols, policies and procedures for the distribution of federal and
proprietary loan modification programs.
10. Before the Consent Judgment was entered into, Chase sold a significant amount of
its mortgage obligations to individual investors. Between 2006 and 2010, the Relator bought the
rights to thousands of mortgages owned and serviced by Chase. Unbeknownst to the Relator,
these mortgages were saturated with violations of past and present regulations, statutes and other
governmental requirements for first and second federally related home mortgage loans.
11. After both the Consent Judgment was signed and the MHA program was in effect,
numerous borrowers, whose 2nd lien mortgages had been sold by Chase to the Relator, received
debt-forgiveness letters from Chase that were purportedly sent pursuant to the Consent
Judgment.
12. Relator, through his contacts at Chase, was made aware that 33,456 letters were
sent by Chase on September 13, 2012 to second-lien borrowers. On December 13, 2012 another
approximately 10,000 letters were sent, and on January 31, 2013 another approximately 8,000
letters were sent, for a total of over 50,000 debt-forgiveness letters. These letters represented to
the recipient borrowers that, pursuant to the terms of the NMSA, the borrowers were discharged
from their obligations to make further payments on their mortgages, which Chase stated, it had
forgiven as a “result of a recent mortgage servicing settlement reached with the states and federal
8
EXHIBIT A
government.” None of these borrowers made an application for a loan modification as required
by the Consent Judgment. These letters were not individually reviewed by Chase to ensure that
Chase actually owned the mortgages or to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the borrower’s
information but instead were “robo-signed”; each of the letters sent out was signed by “Patrick
Boyle” who identified himself as a Vice President at Chase.
13. Relator’s experience with Chase’s baseless debt-forgiveness letters was not
unique. Several other investors were also affected by Chase choosing to mass mail the “robo-
signed” debt-forgiveness letters to thousands of consumers from its hidden system of records in
order to earn credits under the terms of the Consent Judgment and to avoid detection of its
illegal and discriminatory loan servicing policies and procedures.
14. In addition to the debt forgiveness letters sent, and after both the Consent
Judgment was signed and the MHA program was in effect, numerous borrowers, whose 1st
mortgages had been sold by Chase to the Relator, had their 1st mortgages liens quietly released.
15. Relator, through his third party servicer, which was handling normal and
customary default mortgage servicing activities, was made aware that several lien releases were
filed in the public records on mortgage loans that were owned by Relator in the fall of 2013.
Through Relator’s subsequent investigation of the property records for 1st mortgage loans that
Chase had previously sold to Relator, scores of additional lien releases were also discovered.
16. During the course of Relator’s investigation of Chase’s servicing practices, he
discovered that Chase maintains a large set of loans outside of its primary System of Records
(“SOR”). The hidden system of records”), which is known as the Recovery One population
(“RCV1” or “RCV1 SOR”). RCV1 The , essentially a “back room” operation, was disclosed
neitherdescribed to the Monitor of the NMSA nor to Freddie Macby Chase as compliance
agentan “application” for the Federal Government under the MHA, and it isloans that had been
EXHIBIT A
charged off but still only known to those select few that are directly involved with it within
Chase. part of its main SOR. However, once loans had been charged off by Chase, the
accuracy and integrity of the information pertaining to the borrowers’ accounts whose loans are
inbecame part of the RCV1 population was and is fatally and irreparably flawed. Furthermore,
the loans in the RCV1 were not serviced according to the requirements of Federal law, the
Consent Judgment, the MHA programs or any of the other consent orders or settlements
reached by Chase with any government agency prior to the NMSA. 2
17. Chase’s practice of sending unsolicited debt-forgiveness letters to intentionally
pre-selected borrowers of valueless loans did not meet the Servicing Standards set out in the
Consent Judgment to establish eligibility for credits toward its Consumer Relief obligations.
This practice enabled Chase to reduce its cost of complying with the Consent Judgment and
MHA program, while at the same time enhancing its own profits through unearned
Consumer Relief credits and MHA incentives. Chase sought to take credit for valueless
charged-off and third-party owned loans instead of applying the Consumer Relief under the
NMSA and MHA
2
By letter dated September 16, 2015 to Schneider’s counsel, in reference to Relator’s claim
that “Chase concealed from the Monitor and MHA-C both the existence of the RCV1
charged-off and the way those loans were treated for purposes of HAMP solicitations and NMS
metrics testing”, Chase’s counsel stated that “Those allegations are wholly incorrect. Chase
repeatedly disclosed the relevant facts to both the Monitor and MHA-C.”
Schneider’s counsel requested that Chase provide all documents demonstrating the “relevant
facts” to support Chase’s statement. Chase has refused to provide said documents, citing
Chase‘s concerns with providing documents that it had previously provided to the U.S.
Government. While Chase has offered to allow Chase’s counsel to read such documents
“verbatim” to Schneider’s counsel, Schneider knows of no supportable reason why documents
previously disclosed to the U.S. Government should not be shared with Schneider in his
capacity as a Relator under the FCA. No privilege exists for such a claim and therefore
Schneider has rejected this limitation. Such documents, if they in fact exist, should be produced
before such a defense can be raised, particularly because Chase’s counsel has raised the issue of
Rule 11 responsibilities.
loan modification programs to properly vetted borrowers who could have applied for and
10
EXHIBIT A
benefitted from the relief and modification programs, those borrowers that were originally
intended by the Government to receive the benefit of the Government’s bargainsbargain
with Chase.
18. The Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent
Judgment are set forth in Exhibits A and D of that document. The Consent Judgment is
governed by the underlying Servicer Participation Agreements of the MHA program, which
required mandatory compliance with the Treasury Directives under the MHA Handbook
(“Handbook”). Chase is required to demonstrate compliance with the Handbook’s guidelines in
the form of periodic certifications to the government. Chase ignored the requirements of
Exhibits A and D of the Consent Judgment, especially with respect to the RCV1 population of
loans. Therefore, Chase has been unable to service with any accuracy the charged-off loans it
owns and to segregate those loans that it no longer owns. As such, any certifications of
compliance with the Consent Judgment or the Services Participation Agreement (“SPA”) are
false claims.
19. Relator conducted his own investigations and found that the DefendantDefendants
sent loan forgiveness letters to consumers for mortgages that Chase no longer owns or that were
not eligible for forgiveness credit. Further, Chase continues to fail to meet its obligations to
service loans and to prevent blight as required by both the Consent Judgment and SPA. Chase’s
intentional failure to monitor, report and/or service these backroom loans, and its issuance of
invalid loan forgiveness letters and lien releases, evidence an attempt to thwart the goal of the
Consent Judgment and the MHA program. The purpose of this scheme was to quickly satisfy the
Defendant’s Consumer Relief obligations as cheaply as possible, without actually providing the
relief that Chase promised in exchange for the settlement that Chase reached with the Federal
Government and the States. In addition, Chase applied for and received MHA incentive
11
EXHIBIT A
payments without complying with the MHA mandatory requirements. In short, Chase decreased
its liabilities, increased its revenues, avoided its obligations, and provided little to no relief to
consumers.
20. The mere existence of RCV1 makes all claims by Chase that it complied with the
Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment false.
Likewise, the existence of RCV1 makes all claims by Chase that it complied with the SPA of the
MHA program false.
B. Damages to the Government Related to the NMSA
21. Exhibit E of the Consent Judgment provides for penalties of up to $5 million for
failure to meet a prescribed Metric of the Servicing Standards. Exhibit E, ¶ J.3(b) at E15.
22. Exhibit D of the Consent Judgment provides:
If Servicer fails to meet the commitment set forth in these Consumer Relief
Requirements within three years of the Servicer’s Start Date, Servicer shall pay an
amount equal to 125% of the unmet commitment amount, except that if Servicer
fails to meet the two year commitment noted above, and then fails to meet the
three year commitment, the Servicer shall pay an amount equal to 140% of the
unmet three-year Commitment amount.
Exhibit D, ¶10.d. at D-11.
23. The required payment set out in Exhibit D, ¶10.d is made either to the United
States or the States that are parties to the Consent Judgment. Fifty percent of any payment is
distributed to the United States. Consent Judgment, Exhibit E, ¶ J.c.(3)c. at E-16.
24. As explained in more detail below, Chase was required to certify that it was in
compliance with the Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements. Many, if not
all, of the loans that Chase identified for credits against the $4 billion Consumer Relief
provisions were not eligible for the credit, because Chase did not comply with the Servicing
Standards or the Consumer Relief Requirements. Specifically, all loan modification programs
12
EXHIBIT A
must be made available to all borrowers, who may then apply to determine eligibility. Hundreds
of thousands of borrowers’ accounts, hidden in the RCV1 system of records, were not
considered for all eligible loss mitigation options (even though they could likely have qualified).
Due to this omission none of the loan modification programs qualified for Consumer Relief
Credit. Thus, Chase did not and does not qualify for any of the Consumer Relief Credit for
which it applied.
25. For these reasons, each of Chase’s certifications to the Federal Government of
compliance represents a “reverse” false claim to avoid paying money to the Government.
26. Under the FCA a person is liable for penalties and damages who:
[k]nowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or

statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
2727. Under the FCA, “the term ‘obligation’ means an established duty, whether or not
fixed, arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the
retention of any overpayment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(3).
28. Thus, under the FCA, Chase is liable for its false claims whether or not the
government fixed the amount of the obligation owed by Chase.
29. Under the FCA, “the term ‘material’ means having a natural tendency to
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.” U.S.C. §
3729(b)(3).
30. Under the "natural tendency” test Chase is liable for its false statements so long as
they reasonably could have influenced the government’s payment or collection of money. A
13
EXHIBIT A
statement is false if it is capable of influencing the government's funding decision, not whether
it actually influenced the government.
31. Each of Chase’s false certifications is actionable under 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(G), because they represent a false record or statement that concealed, avoided or
decreased an obligation to transmit money to the Government.
2832. The Federal Government and the States agreed to the NMSA with Chase, with
the understanding that Chase would meet its obligations under the Consent Judgment.
2933. As set out in the Consumer Relief Requirements, the measure of the Federal
and State Governments’ damages is up to 140 percent of the credits that Chase falsely claimed
met the requirements of the Consent Judgment and up to $5 million for each Metric the Chase
failed to meet.
3034. These damages are recoverable under the Federal Civil False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (the “FCA”), and similar provisions of the State False Claims Acts of the
States of California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia, and the District
of Columbia.
3135. The Federal Government and the States are now harmed because they are not
receiving the benefit of the bargain for which they negotiated with Chase due to the false
claims for credit that have been made by the Defendant.
C. Damages to the Government Related to the HAMP
3236. The Amended and Restated Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and
Servicer Participation Agreement between the United States Government and Chase provided
for the implementation of loan modification and foreclosure prevention services (“HAMP
14
EXHIBIT A
Services”).
3337. The value of Chase’s SPA was limited to $4,532,750,000 (“Program Participation
Cap”).
3438. The value of EMC Mortgage Corporation’s (“EMC”) SPA (Chase is successor in
interest) was limited to $1,237,510,000.
3539. As explained in more detail below, Chase must certify that it is in compliance
with the SPA and the MHA program and must strictly adhere to the guidelines and procedures
issued by the Treasury with respect to the programs outlined in the Service Schedules (“Program
Guidelines”). The Program Guidelines pursuant to the Treasury Directives are cataloged in the
MHA Handbook (“Handbook”). None of the loans that Chase and EMC identified and
submitted for payment against their respective Participation Caps were eligible for the incentive
payment, because neither Chase nor EMC complied with the SPA and Handbook guidelines.
Specifically, all loan modification programs must be made available to all borrowers, who must
then apply to determine eligibility. Hundreds of thousands of borrowers’ mortgage loan
accounts hidden in the RCV1 system of records were not offered and thereby unable to be
considered for all eligible loss mitigation options (even though they likely could have qualified).
Due to the omission of the RCV1 population for any loss mitigation options, none of the
modifications that Chase provided qualified for HAMP incentives. Thus, Chase does not qualify
for any of the HAMP incentives for which it applied and received funds.
3640. Therefore, Chase’s certifications of compliance and its creation of records to
support those certifications represent both the knowing presentation of false or fraudulent claims
for a payment and the knowing use of false records material to false or fraudulent claims.
3741. Under the FCA, a person is liable for penalties and damages who:
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for

payment or approval;
15
EXHIBIT A
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)
and
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or

statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
3842. Each of Chase’s false certifications is actionable under either 31 U.S.C. §
3729(a)(1)(A) and (B), because they represent a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval
of a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.
3943. Under HAMP, the Federal Government entered into the Commitment with Chase,
with the understanding that Chase would meet its obligations under the SPA and related Treasury
directives. The Federal Government is now harmed because it is not receiving the benefit of the
bargain for which it negotiated with Chase due to the false claims for payment that have been
made by the Defendant.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4044. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) and supplemental jurisdiction over the counts related to
the State False Claims Acts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
4145. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) because
Defendant transacts the business that is the subject matter of this lawsuit in the District of
Columbia and numerous acts proscribed by 31 U.S.C. § 3729 occurred in the District of
Columbia.
16
EXHIBIT A
III. PARTIES
A. Relator
4246. Relator, Laurence Schneider, submits this complaint on behalf of the Federal
Government, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, and on behalf of the States of California,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Virginia, and the District of Columbia, pursuant to their
respective State False Claims Acts. Relator is an experienced real estate and mortgage investor
who works and resides in Boca Raton, Florida. Because of his ownership of thousands of
mortgage loans and hundreds of rental housing units, Relator has acquired extensive knowledge
of banking practices, laws and regulations. Relator has direct and personal knowledge of the
fraudulent scheme described herein. Relator, as President of S&A Capital Partners, Inc., 1st
Fidelity Loan Servicing, LLC, and Mortgage Resolution Servicing, LLC, has purchased
mortgage notes from Chase since 2005. Relator has over 20 years of experience in mortgage
loan origination and servicing. In that time, he has built relationships and purchased mortgage
loans from over 40 different loss mitigation representatives in three different loan servicing
centers operated by Chase in Wisconsin, Arizona and Texas. In the process, he has learned
intimate details of Chase’s loss mitigation activities and gained an understanding of Chase’s
overall loan servicing policies and procedures.
4347. S&A Capital Partners, Inc. (“S&A”) is a Florida corporation located at 6810 N.
State Road 7, Coconut Creek, Florida. Relator is the President and shareholder of S&A. From
2005 to 2010, S&A purchased First Lien and Second Lien mortgages owned by Defendant
Chase.
4448. 1st Fidelity Loan Servicing, LLC (“1st Fidelity”) is a Florida Limited Liability
17
EXHIBIT A
Company located at 6810 N. State Road 7, Coconut Creek, Florida. Relator is the President and
managing member of 1st Fidelity. From 2007 to 2010, 1st Fidelity purchased First Lien and
Second Lien mortgages owned by Defendant Chase.
4549. Mortgage Resolution Servicing, LLC (“Mortgage Resolution”) is a Florida
Limited Liability Company located 6810 N. State Rd. 7, Coconut Creek, Florida. Relator is the
President and managing member of Mortgage Resolution. Mortgage Resolution purchased a
pool of what were purported and represented to be 3,529 First Lien mortgages from Defendant
Chase on February 25, 2009.
4650. By letter dated March 28, 2013, the Relator voluntarily provided information on
which this action is based prior to the filing of his original Complaint on May 6, 2013. The
Relator served his statement of material information regarding this action on the Government
together with the Complaint in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
B. Defendants
4751. Defendants JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association and Chase Home
Finance LLC are subsidiaries of Defendant JP Morgan Chase & Co.. Chase’s headquarters is
located at 270 Park Avenue, New York, New York. Defendant JP Morgan Chase & Co. is a
Delaware corporation. On September 25, 2008, Washington Mutual Bank., F.S.B., a federal
savings bank headquartered in Henderson, Nevada, failed, and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
purchased substantially all of the assets and assumed all deposit and substantially all other
liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank., F.S.B., pursuant to a Purchase and Assumption
Agreement with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the FDIC as Receiver
for Washington Mutual Bank, F.S.B. On March 16, 2008, Chase acquired EMC Mortgage
Corporation as part of its acquisition of Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. The business of Defendant
J.P. Morgan and its subsidiaries and affiliates includes the origination and servicing of mortgage
18
EXHIBIT A
loans.
IV. BACKGROUND
A. Massive Mortgage Wrongdoing By Chase And Other Banks
4852. In 2008, Congress enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) in
response to the Great Recession. The EESA included the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
which charged the Secretary of the Treasury with developing a program to provide relief to
struggling homeowners while offering incentives to the loan servicers of homeowner mortgages.
4953. In February 2009, the Government introduced the MHA, a plan to stabilize the
housing market and help struggling homeowners get relief and avoid foreclosure.
5054. The U.S. Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") established the HAMP
pursuant to section 101 and 109 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, as
section 109 of the Act has been amended by section 7002 of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009.
5155. In March 2009, Treasury issued uniform guidance for loan modifications across
the mortgage industry and subsequently updated and expanded that guidance in a series of policy
announcements and Treasury Directives. On June 26, 2014, the Government extended the
application deadline for MHA programs to December 31, 2016.
5256. On March 12, 2012, the Federal Government, 49 individual States, and the
District of Columbia jointly filed a complaint against numerous banks and loan servicing
companies, including Chase, for misconduct related to their origination and servicing of single
family residential mortgages (the “National Mortgage Complaint”).
5357. The National Mortgage Complaint was the capstone on a series of enforcement
actions brought against Chase and other servicers for certain deficiencies and unsafe or unsound
practices in residential mortgage servicing. These actions were brought by a wide variety of
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EXHIBIT A
regulatory agencies including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve
Bank, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and others.
These prior actions resulted in various settlements and consent agreements, many of which
remain in full force and effect.
5458. The National Mortgage Complaint, among other things, alleged that the
misconduct of the defendants “resulted in the issuance of improper mortgages, premature and
unauthorized foreclosures, violation of service members’ and other homeowners’ rights and
protections, the use of false and deceptive affidavits and other documents, and the waste and
abuse of taxpayer funds.” The National Mortgage Complaint also contained several allegations
concerning unfair and deceptive trade practices engaged in by Chase and other financial
institutions.
B. Bank’s History of Regulatory Settlements and Enforcement Actions
5559. These unfair and deceptive trade practices engaged in by Chase and other
financial institutions led to several enforcement actions both prior to and during the pendency of
the National Mortgage Complaint action.
5660. These enforcement actions address the same core issues and unsafe or unsound
servicing and mortgage practices. In each instance, the government enforcement agency
bringing the action required Chase to remediate its policies and procedures and to come into
compliance “with each and every applicable provision of” the particular enforcement action. In
each instance, Chase failed to address the problems on an institutional level because in each
instance the RCV1 system of records was hidden and deliberately kept from regulatory
oversight. not serviced in accordance with the requirements governing federally related loans.
5761. Relator experienced many aspects of Chase’s repeated and deliberate unfair and
deceptive loan servicing practices prior to, during and after Chase entered into the SPA’s with
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EXHIBIT A
the federal government and the Consent Judgment.
C. National Mortgage Settlement Agreement
5862. On February 9, 2012, the Attorney General of the United States announced that
the Federal Government and 49 states had reached a settlement agreement with the nation’s five
largest mortgage services to address mortgage servicing, foreclosure, and bankruptcy abuses. On
April 4, 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia entered a Consent
Judgment approving the NMSA, officially making it the single largest consumer financial
protection settlement in United States history, totaling approximately $25 billion dollars in
monetary sanctions and relief.
5963. The resulting settlement attempted to address the primary goals of the attorneys
general: to provide immediate relief to enable struggling homeowners to avoid foreclosure; to
bring badly needed reform to the mortgage servicing industry; to ensure that foreclosures are
lawfully conducted; and to penalize the banks for robo-signing misconduct. The settlement
imposed monetary sanctions on the banks while seeking to provide immediate and continuing
relief to homeowners.
6064. The settlement requires comprehensive reforms of mortgage loan servicing. The
mandated standards cover all aspects of mortgage servicing, from consumer response to
foreclosure documentation. To ensure that the banks meet the new standards, the settlement was
recorded and is enforceable as a court judgment. Compliance was overseen by an independent
monitor who reported to the attorneys general and the Court.
6165. The Consent Judgment is “expressly subject to, and shall be interpreted in
accordance with, (a) applicable federal, state and local laws, rule and regulations, including, but
not limited to any requirements of the federal banking regulations, (b) the terms of the applicable
mortgage loan documents, (c) Section 201 of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of
21
EXHIBIT A
2009, and (d) the terms and provisions of the Servicer Participation Agreement [SPA] with the
Department of Treasury. . . .” Consent Judgment, at A, IX A. 1.
6266. The principal statute governing mortgage servicing is the Real Estate Settlement
and Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq.
6367. Nothing in the Consent Judgment relieved the Servicers of their obligation to
comply with applicable state and Federal law and any pre-existing consent judgments and
enforcement actions or agreements or programs, such as the SPA and HAMP.
6468. Additionally, the NMSA was intended to be interpreted consistent with the
provisions of RESPA and related regulations.
6569. First among the requirements of the Consent Judgment was a payment of
$1,121,188,661 directly to the Government. See Consent Judgment at p. 3, ¶ 3. This
portion of the NMSA is termed the “Direct Payment Settlement Amount.” Id. Money
paid in this method was transferred to an administrator to provide cash payments to
borrowers whose homes were sold or taken by foreclosure between January 1, 2008 and
December 31, 2011. This timeline is consistent with prior enforcement actions and
marks the height of the improprieties by the Banks.
6670. After the Direct Payment, the Consent Judgment has two main intertwined
components, new comprehensive Servicing Standards and wide spread Consumer Relief. The
first sentence of Exhibit A of the Consent Judgment, entitled the Settlement Term Sheet, states
the major focus of the NMSA in a succinct manner that brings both components together. Both
the Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Credits “are intended to apply to loans secured
by owner-occupied properties that serve as the primary residence of the borrower. . . .”
1. Servicing Standards
6771. The first of these components requires Servicers to comply with new
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EXHIBIT A
comprehensive Servicing Standards designed to improve upon the lack of quality control and
continuity of communications with borrowers, issues that caused chaos in the housing market to
date. These Service Standards, as detailed under Exhibit A of the Consent Judgment, were first
implemented under the HAMP.
6872. The NMSA Servicing Standards require, among other things, a single point of
contact, adequate staffing levels and training, better communication with borrowers, and
appropriate standards for executing documents in foreclosure cases, ending improper fees, and
ending dual-track foreclosures for many loans.
6973. The Consent Judgment requires that “Defendant . . . comply with the Servicing
Standards, attached hereto as Exhibit A, in accordance with their terms and Section A of Exhibit
E, attached hereto.” Consent Judgment at p. 3 ¶ 2. These Servicing Standards under the Consent
Judgment were intended to redress the practices in mortgage servicing that led to the clams that
resulted in the NMSA.
70. 74. The Servicing Standards are governed by the HAMP and apply to all
federally related mortgage loans serviced by the Servicer. Among others, they contained the
following provisions:
a. Integrity of Documents – Servicers were required to affirm that documents
(affidavits, sworn statements, and declarations) filed in bankruptcy and
foreclosure proceedings:
• Are based on the affiant’s personal knowledge;
• Fully comply with all applicable state law requirements;
• Are signed by hand of affiant (except for permitted electronic filings) and
dated; and
• Shall not contain false or unsubstantiated information.
b. Single Point of Contact (“SPOC”). – Servicers were required to maintain an easily

23
EXHIBIT A
accessible and reliable Single Point of Contact (“SPOC”) for each potentially eligible
borrower (those at least 30 days delinquent or at imminent risk of default due to
financial situation). Specifically the SPOC:
• Contacts all eligible borrowers, explains programs and their requirements, and
facilitates the loan modification application process;
• Obtains information throughout the loss mitigation, loan modification, and

foreclosure processes;
• Coordinates receipt of documents associated with loan modification or

loss mitigation;
• Notifies borrower of missing documents and provides an address or

electronic means for document submission;
• Is knowledgeable and provides information about the borrower’s status;
• Helps the borrower to clear any internal processing requirements; and
• Communicates in writing Servicer’s decision regarding loan modification

application and other loss mitigation activity;
• Ensures that a borrower who is not eligible for MHA programs is

considered for proprietary or other investor loss mitigation options.
c. Customer Service – Servicers were required to have other standards in place:
• Adequate staffing and systems to track borrower documentation and

information and are making periodic assessments to ensure adequacy;
• Establish reasonable minimum experience, educational and training

requirements for loss mitigation staff;
• Ensure that employees who are regularly engaged in servicing mortgage
loans as to which the borrower is in bankruptcy receive training specifically
addressing bankruptcy issues;
• Participate in the development and implementation of a nationwide loan

portal to enhance communications with housing counselors; and
d. Loss Mitigation – Servicers were required to comply with all Loss Mitigation
initiatives:
• Have designed proprietary first lien loan modification programs to provide
24
EXHIBIT A
affordable payments for borrowers needing longer term or permanent

assistance;
• Are not levying application or processing fees for first and second lien
modification applications; and
• Are performing an independent evaluation of initial denial of an eligible

borrower’s complete application for a first lien loan modification.
e. Service Member Protection – Servicers were required to:
• Comply with the Service Members Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) and any
applicable state law offering protections for service members; and
• Engage independent consultants to review all foreclosures in which an SCRA-

eligible service member is known to have been a mortgagor and to sample to
determine whether foreclosures were in compliance with SCRA.
f. Other – The Consent Judgment implemented various policies and procedures
including, but not limited to:
• Requirements concerning the accuracy and verification of a

borrowers’ account information;
• Notification requirements by servicers to provide to borrowers;
• Information concerning chain of assignment procedures;
• Quality Assurance requirements of documents filed on behalf of

servicers;
• Oversight over third-party providers including due diligence;

• General loss mitigation requirements including adequate staffing,
caseload limits and documentation requirements, and
g. Anti-Blight – Servicers were required to report that they have developed
and implemented policies to ensure that REOs (real estate owned by the
Servicer) do not become blighted.
2. Implementation of Servicing Standards
7175. The Servicing Standards were to be implemented and tested through a process
involving various levels of checks and balances designed to ensure compliance with the
25
EXHIBIT A
requirements of the Consent Judgment.
7276. The first part of this process was the establishment of an internal quality control
group called the Internal Review Group (“IRG”). This group was required to be, and remain,
“independent from the line of business whose performance [was] being measured [] to perform
compliance reviews each calendar quarter [] in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
work plan and satisfaction of the Consumer Relief Requirements. . . .” Exhibit E, ¶ 7 at E-3.
The independence of the IRG ensures that the Servicer complies with the Consent Judgment and
that its actions remain transparent and are regularly reviewed by Servicer's senior management
and Company's Board of Directors.
7377. The IRG’s independence is critical to the success of the entire implementation of
the Consent Judgment.
7478. Internal Chase documents demonstrate that its IRG was not in fact independent of
Chase’s mortgage operations. These internal communications demonstrate that there was direct
communication between the servicing department and the IRG concerning which loans were
appropriate for review by the Monitor and could be advanced for credits.
7579. The next part of the process, as defined under the Consent Judgment, was the
appointment of a “Monitor”, here Joseph A. Smith, who, as part of his tasks, was responsible for
overseeing Servicer's implementation of and compliance with the Servicing Standards. The
Monitor was subject to oversight by a Monitoring Committee, which was comprised of
representatives of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the U.S. Department
of Justice and representatives of 15 states.
7680. The Consent Judgment then required the Monitor to engage professionals who
possessed expertise in the areas of mortgage servicing, loss mitigation, business operations,
compliance, internal controls, accounting and foreclosure and bankruptcy law. These
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EXHIBIT A
professionals were known as the Primary Professional Firm (“PPF”) and the Secondary
Professional Firm (“SPF”).
7781. The PPF operated in a supervisory capacity to review the SPF's work in assessing
compliance among the Servicers to ensure consistency of work product across all Servicers.
7882. Separate SPFs were assigned to each of the Servicers to assist in the review of
each of the Servicers’ performance.
7983. Together, the Monitor, PPF, SPF and IRG designed a clearly defined plan of
action (“Work Plan”) to implement the Servicing Standards and to facilitate and implement an
array of proprietary and government Consumer Relief programs, as discussed below.
8084. The Servicer implemented the Work Plan. The Work Plan described in detail the
performances that are to be measured and the procedures by which such measurements will be
undertaken.
8185. The Work Plans for all of NMSA Servicers were similar and applied the
Servicing Standards in a uniform manner across all Servicers. The NMSA established a general
framework for the formulation of each of the Servicers’ work plans, to include:
• The testing methods and agreed procedures to be used in performing test work and
computing Servicing Metrics for each quarter;
• The methodology and procedures utilized in reviewing and testing the work
performed by the IRGs for both the Servicing Standards and Consumer Relief
Requirements; and
• The description of the review process to be used by the IRGs and by the
Professional Firms and the mechanisms for ensuring compliance.
8286. The Work Plan for Chase was reviewed and not objected to by the Monitoring
Committee.
8387. The NMSA required that implementation of the Servicing Standards by the
Servicer would be phased in over time and would be in full effect by October 2, 2012.
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EXHIBIT A
8488. To test the implementation of the Work Plan, the Monitor established 29 Metrics
to test the application and performance of the required Servicing Standards as they applied to the
entire population of the SOR. The Work Plan mapped to these Metrics to determine whether the
Servicing Standards were being followed.
8589. Servicer's system of record, or SOR, consists of the Servicer’s business records
related to and storage systems pertaining to Servicer's entire mortgage servicing operation and
related business operations. The SOR is the electronic data entered and maintained on the
Servicer’s servicing platforms and includes all of Servicer' s mortgage servicing platforms, home
equity line servicing platforms, and default processing platforms for mortgage loans, including
home equity lines. The SOR also includes records maintained by either Servicer or third parties
for Servicer.
8690. The Servicer provided the Professional Firms with information and explanations
on those parts of the SOR that were sufficient for Metrics testing.
8791. The completeness and the integrity of the Servicer’s entire SOR was integral to
the proper implementation, compliance and testing of the Servicing Standards.
8892. The IRG was required to use the Servicer’s SOR to compile the full population of
loans related to each metric and then to test a statistically valid sample of each applicable
population to determine whether the Servicer had passed the metric and was fully implementing
and complying with the particular Servicing Standard tested.
8993. The Professional Firms relied on the IRG to select mortgage loan testing
populations from the appropriate sources within the SOR.
9094. As a check and balance to the process, the SPF was then to review the results
provided by the IRG and then retest a sub-sample of the IRG’s test sample in a process overseen
28
EXHIBIT A
by the PPF and the Monitor.
9195. The results were set forth in Quarterly Reports and included reviews of
Work Plans and confirmation of the IRG's selection of testing populations and the IRG's
testing of Metrics.
9296. In short, the Monitor, through the chain of the process, relied on the IRG’s testing
of the metrics pursuant to the terms of the Consent Judgment to determine the Defendant’s
compliance with the Consent Judgment.
3. Consumer Relief
9397. The second objective of the Consent Judgment, Consumer Relief, required Chase
to provide over $4 billion in consumer relief in the form of loan forgiveness and refinancing.
Under the Consumer Relief provisions of the Consent Agreement, Chase received “credits”
towards its Consumer Relief obligations by forgiving or modifying loans it owns or services
under a detailed and defined protocol, including a loan modification application. The process is
set forth in Exhibits A, D and D-1 of the Consent Judgment.
9498. The Servicing Standards control the processes that lead to implementation of the
Consumer Relief.
9599. A failure to meet the Servicing Standards would prevent proper determination and
issuance of Consumer Relief pursuant to the Work Plans as required by the Consent Judgment,
therefore would render any Consumer Relief Credits claimed by Chase invalid.
96100. As set forth in Exhibit A, eligible borrowers considered for Consumer Relief were
tracked through a process, controlled by the Servicing Standards, which includes publicly
available information, a single point of contact, a defined application procedure, and a strict
timeline for evaluation, approval and implementation. All conditions must be met for the relief
for which they purported to qualify to merit credits under the NMSA.
29
EXHIBIT A
97101. Under the terms of the Judgment, Servicer is obligated to provide $4,212,400,000
in Consumer Relief. Servicer’s Consumer Relief Requirements were allocated as
follows:
• $3,675,400,000 of relief to consumers who meet the eligibility requirements in
paragraphs 1-8 of Exhibit D; and
• $537,000,000 of refinancing relief to consumers who meet the requirements of
paragraph 9 of Exhibit D.
See Consent Judgment ¶ 5 at 4.
98102. As reflected in Exhibit D of the Consent Judgment, each of the forms of
Consumer Relief had unique eligibility criteria and modification requirements. In order for the
Servicer to receive credit with respect to Consumer Relief activities performed, these eligibility
criteria and modification requirements had to be satisfied and validated by the Monitor in
accordance with Exhibits D, D-1 and E. Credits earned could vary based on timing, the form of
Consumer Relief, and the transaction type within each form.
99103. Servicer receives additional credit in the amount of 25% above the actual credits
earned on the foregoing activities completed and implemented on or before February 28, 2013.
100104. In contrast, the Servicer incurred a debt payment of 125% of its unmet
Consumer Relief Requirements if it did not meet all of its Consumer Relief Requirements within
three years of March 1, 2012. That payment increased to 140% of its unmet Consumer Relief
Requirements in cases in which Servicer also has failed to complete 75% of its total Consumer
Relief Requirements within two years of March 1, 2012.
101105. Under the Consent Judgment, a Servicer received credit when it:
• Allowed borrowers to make First Lien and Second Lien Modifications;
• Allowed borrowers to make Second Lien Portfolio Modification;
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EXHIBIT A
• Provided borrowers Enhanced Transitional Funds;
• Facilitated Short Sales for borrowers;
• Provided borrowers Deficiency Waivers;
• Provided Forbearance for Unemployed Borrowers; and
• Assisted in Anti-Blight efforts.
See Exhibit D at D1 to D7.

4. Implementation of Consumer Relief
102106. As described above, the Servicer, SPF, PPF and Monitor agreed upon a
Work Plan that sets out the testing methods, procedures and methodologies for validation of
Servicer’s claimed Consumer Relief under Exhibits D and D-1.
103107. The Consumer Relief programs were required to be implemented through
an application process that is facilitated and dependent on coordination with the SPOC as
defined under the Servicing Standards as per Exhibit A of the Consent Judgment.
104108. The Consumer Relief programs were required to be made available to all
eligible borrowers and thus vetted against the entire population of the SOR.
105109. Eligible borrowers applied by submitting a completed loan application
and all other required information through the SPOC.
106110. Based on the Servicer’s evaluation of a completed loan modification
application, the Servicer determined which loan modification programs borrowers were eligible.
107111. Servicers then used the forgiveness or remediation to apply for Consumer
Relief based on the structure and status of each mortgage. The Servicer was entrusted to
determine the amount of credit given to itself. See Exhibit D at D1 to D7 and Exhibit D-1 at D1-
1 to D1-5.
108112. The IRG performed a Satisfaction Review after Servicer asserted that it
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EXHIBIT A
had satisfied its Consumer Relief Requirements. The IRG was required to report the results of
that work to Monitor through an IRG Assertion.
109113. The IRG’s testing of Servicer’s Consumer Relief Report required the
IRG randomly selecting valid samples from the testing populations based on data provided by
Defendant utilizing a simple Excel spreadsheet. The data reporting did not require providing
original documentation.
110114. The Professional Firms reviewed the work by the IRG and tested the same
sample set per the Work Plan.
111115. The Consent Judgment required that Monitor determine whether
Defendant had satisfied the Consumer Relief Requirements and report Monitor’s findings to
the Court in accordance with the provisions of Sections D.3 through D.5 of Exhibit E.
D. The HAMP Program
112116. As stated above, the government relied on the certifications of compliance
with HAMP when entering into the Consent Judgment.
113117. To implement and help facilitate the uniform servicing guidelines and
provide various government sponsored loan modification programs, Treasury incentivized
participating servicers under a Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer
Participation Agreement, by and between Federal National Mortgage Association, a federally
chartered corporation, as financial agent of the United States (“Fannie Mae").
114118. The Treasury established a variety loan of modification programs under the
Act to further stabilize the housing market by facilitating first and second lien mortgage loan
modifications and extinguishments, providing home price decline protection incentives,
encouraging foreclosure alternatives, such as short sales and deeds in lieu of foreclosure, and
making other foreclosure prevention services available to the marketplace (collectively, together
32
EXHIBIT A
with the HAMP Services, the "Services"). These programs included;
• The Home Price Decline Protection Incentives (HPDP) initiative.
• The Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA).
• The Home Affordable Unemployment Program (UP).
• The Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program (HAFA).

• The Second Lien Modification Program (2MP).
• The FHA-HAMP Program.
• The Treasury/FHA Second-Lien Program (FHA2LP).
• Housing Finance Agency Hardest Hit Fund (HHF).
115119. The SPA provides various types of Servicer Incentive Payments
depending on the various governments loan modification programs: These incentives include;
• Completed one-time Modification Incentives
• Pay-for-Success Incentives
• Full Extinguishment Incentives
• Borrower Incentive Compensation
116120. To participate in HAMP a Servicer was required to register using the HAMP
registration form and HAMP Reporting Tool.
117121. Fannie Mae was designated by the Treasury as the financial agent of the
United States in connection with the implementation of the Programs. Its responsibilities were
general administration and record keeper for the Programs, standardization certain mortgage
modification and foreclosure prevention practices and procedures as they relate to the Programs,
consistent with the Act and in accordance with the directives of, and guidance provided by, the
Treasury.
118122. In addition to the Commitment, Chase simultaneously executed and
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EXHIBIT A
delivered to Fannie Mae numerous schedules describing the various loan modification initiatives
(“Services”) to be performed by Servicer pursuant to the Agreement ("Service Schedule") which
are numbered sequentially as Exhibit A of the Commitment.
119123. On March 24, 2010, Henry John Beans, SVP of Default Servicing for
Chase registered and executed a Servicer Participation Agreement and Service Schedules
(SPA) with the Program Administrator. The SPA governs servicer participation in MHA.
1. Servicing Guidelines
120124. Servicers participation in the MHA program included strictly adhering to
the guidelines and procedures issued by the Treasury with respect to the Programs outlined in
the Service Schedules ( "Program Guidelines"); and any supplemental documentation,
instructions, directives, or other communications, including, but not limited to, business
continuity requirements, compliance requirements, performance requirements and related
remedies and duties of the Participating Servicers in connection with the Programs outlined in
the Service Schedules (“Supplemental Directives" and, together with the Program Guidelines,
the "Program Documentation"). The SPA’s Servicing Standards in the MHA handbook were
intended to be used as the specific basis for granting Consumer Relief in the National Mortgage
Settlement Agreement.
121125. Chase was required to perform the Services described in the Financial
Instrument ("Financial Instrument"); referenced as Exhibit B of Commitment. Servicer’s
represented, warranted, and acknowledged its agreement to fulfill its duties and obligations, with
respect to its participation in the Programs and under the Agreement were set forth in the
Financial
Instrument.
122126. The Commitment between the Government and Chase was

34
EXHIBIT A
$4,532,750,000, which is referred to as the Program Participation Cap.
123127. The Commitment between the Government EMC, with Chase as
successor in interest to EMC, was $1,237,510,000.
124128. Fannie Mae, in its capacity as the financial agent of the United States,
remitted payments described in the Program Documentation to Chase for its successful
compliance with the Treasury Directives and subsequent successful modifications of distressed
mortgages.
125129. In April 2012, the Department of the Treasury issued guidelines regarding
which Consumer Redress Activities may be considered “qualified loss mitigation plan[s]” for
purposes of Section 201 of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (“HFSTHA”).
As part of HSFTHA, Congress amended the Truth in Lending Act such that each residential loan
modification, deed-in-lieu of foreclosure transaction, short sale, refinancing, or principal
reduction transaction identified in the Settlements, including those specific to individual servicer
settlements, is a “qualified loss mitigation plan.”
126130. In addition to entering into the qualified loss mitigation plans, mortgage
servicers were required to satisfy other requirements of HFSTHA, including the following:
• The mortgage must have been originated before May 20, 2009;
• Default on the payment of such mortgage has occurred, is imminent, or is

reasonably foreseeable;
• The mortgagor occupies the property securing the mortgage as his or her principal
residence;
• The servicer reasonably determines, consistent with these guidelines, that the
application of the qualified loss mitigation plan will likely provide an anticipated
recovery on the outstanding principal mortgage debt that will exceed the
anticipated recovery through foreclosure.
2. Implementation of Servicing Guidelines
35
EXHIBIT A
127131. Servicers were required to maintain complete and accurate records of, and
supporting documentation for, all Services provided in connection with the Programs including,
but not limited to, data relating to borrower payments (e.g. principal, interest, taxes,
homeowner's insurance), loan modification and extinguishment agreements. The documentation
was relied upon by Fannie Mae when calculating the Purchase Price to be paid by the Treasury
for each certified modification.
128132. Servicers certification as to its continuing compliance with, and the truth
and accuracy of, the representations and warranties set forth in the Financial Instrument were
provided annually in the form of a certification (the "Certifications"), beginning on June 1, 2010
and again on June 1of each year thereafter during the term of the SPA.
129133. The requirements of the SPA applied to all mortgage loans Chase serviced,
whether it serviced such mortgage loans for its own account or for the account of another party,
including any holders of mortgage-backed securities.
130134. Servicers were required to report periodic loan-level data for all
transactions related to HAMP using the HAMP Reporting Tool. Servicers upload data tapes
of borrowers loan level data including the type of modification performed.
131135. The HAMP Compensation Matrix provides details on the incentive
amount, frequency, timing and conditions required for incentive payments in the form of the
official monthly report (“OMR”).
132136. The HAMP requirements are now set out in “The Making Home
Affordable Program Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages” (“Handbook”). The
Handbook was intended to provide a consolidated resource for guidance related to the HAMP
Program for mortgage loans that are not owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
(Non-GSE Mortgages).
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EXHIBIT A
3. Compliance With Servicing Guidelines
133137. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") was
designated by the Treasury as a financial agent of the United States in its capacity as compliance
agent of the Programs and oversight of Servicers performance of the Services and
implementation of the Programs.
134138. As Compliance Agent for the elements of HAMP that are addressed in the
Handbook, Freddie Mac created an independent division, Making Home Affordable-Compliance
(MHA-C) for this purpose. MHA-C conducts independent compliance assessments and servicer
reviews to evaluate servicer compliance with the requirements of MHA. During the course of
conducting compliance assessments, it requests such documentation, policies, procedures, loan
files, and other materials necessary to conduct the review.
135139. These are similar responsibilities as those of the Monitor pursuant to the
NMSA.
136140. Servicers were required to maintain appropriate documentary evidence of
their HAMP-related activities, and to provide that documentary evidence upon request to MHA-
C. Servicers must maintain required documentation in well-documented servicer system notes or
in loan files for all HAMP activities, for a period of seven years from the date of the document
collection. Required general documentation applicable to all MHA Programs.
137141. The Handbook set forth the requirements for documentation required. It
stated that:
• Servicers are required to maintain appropriate documentary evidence of

their MHA-related activities, and to provide that documentary evidence
upon request to MHA-C. Servicers must maintain required documentation
in well-documented servicer system notes or in loan files for all MHA
activities, for a period of seven years from the date of the document
collection. Required general documentation applicable to all MHA
Programs includes but is not limited to:
37
EXHIBIT A
* * *
• The servicer’s process for pre-screening non-performing loans against the

basic program requirements prior to referring any loan to foreclosure or
conducting scheduled foreclosure sales.
• For charged off mortgage loans not considered for HAMP, evidence that
the servicer has released the borrower from liability for the debt and
provided a copy of the release to the borrower.
• For loans not considered for HAMP or UP due to property condition,

evidence that the property securing the mortgage loan is in such poor
physical condition that it is uninhabitable or condemned.
* * *
• Information relating to the borrower’s payment history.
* * *
• All policies and procedures related to clearing Dodd-Frank Certification,

Borrower Identity and Owner-Occupancy Alerts and for addressing any
potential irregularities that may be identified independently by the
servicer, including the process the servicer will take to notify the
borrower, methods for borrower communication, and the process to verify
the accuracy of information disputed by a borrower.
138142. In short, servicers were required to establish and maintain internal
controls that provide reasonable assurance that they are in compliance with MHA Program
requirements. Further, servicers are required to certify that they have developed and
implemented an internal controls program to monitor compliance with applicable consumer
protection and fair lending laws, among other things, as described in the SPA.
139143. Servicers review the effectiveness of the internal controls program on a
quarterly basis throughout the period covered by the related Certification. Servicers are also
required to develop and execute a quality assurance program to assess documented evidence of
loan evaluation, loan modification and accounting processes and to confirm adherence to MHA
Program requirements. The quality assurance program includes of internal control processes, and
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EXHIBIT A
should be assessed to ensure that it: (i) includes loans from all potentially relevant categories (ii)
is independent from the business lines; (iii) applies appropriate sampling methodology; (iv)
reaches appropriate conclusions; (v) distributes reports to appropriate members of management.
140144. Each servicer must develop, document and execute an effective quality
assurance (“QA”) program that includes independent reviews of each MHA program in which
the servicer is participating pursuant to an executed SPA to ensure that the servicer’s
implementation and execution of such program(s) conforms to the requirements of the SPA and
this Handbook.
141145. The QA function must establish an internal QA function that:
• Is independent of the servicer’s mortgage related divisions (a/k/a an “Internal

Review Group”);
• Is comprised of personnel skilled at evaluating and validating the processes,

decisions and documentation utilized throughout the implementation of each
program;
• Has the appropriate authority, privileges, and knowledge to effectively

conduct internal QA reviews;
• Coordinates activities and validates results with other risk and control units
within the servicer’s organization including, but not limited to, internal
audit, compliance, and operational risk;
• Evaluates whether management, at varying levels, is receiving appropriate

information on a timely basis which would allow for the identification of process
failures, backlogs, or unexpected results or impacts; and
• Evaluates the completeness, accuracy and timeliness of the servicer’s response

to MHA-C servicer-level review reports.
142146. The established QA function evaluated all components of the
servicer’s participation in applicable MHA programs, including, but not limited to:
• Availability and responsiveness of servicing personnel to borrower inquiries,

questions, and complaints , including Escalated Cases;
• Solicitation and outreach to potentially eligible borrowers;
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EXHIBIT A
• Determination of borrower eligibility for any MHA program;
• Pre-screening practices exclusion from solicitation due to known eligibility

failures or automated programs used to target and identify potentially eligible or
qualified individuals for MHA programs;
• Tracking and retention of documentation submitted by borrowers;
• Compliance with the requirements concerning Borrower Notices;
• Reporting of Government Monitoring Data;
• Adherence to prohibitions on referral of loans to foreclosure and conducting of

scheduled foreclosure;
• Underwriting, including assessment of imminent default and hardship

circumstances, calculation of borrower income, debts and escrow analysis;
valuation of property; application of each applicable standard modification
waterfall and, if required, the applicable alternative modification
waterfall(s);
• Documentation of a request for and approval of a modification (or other loss

mitigation option) by the mortgage insurer, investor and/or other interested
party in a loss position;
• Timely consideration of alternative loss mitigation options, as well as other

foreclosure alternatives when a permanent modification is not appropriate;
• Reconciliation and distribution of incentives payments;
• Maintenance of documentation appropriate to support MHA requirements and

decisions; and
• Reporting of MHA data timely and accurately for recording in the HAMP
Reporting Tool, including data related to incentive payments, and the process
used to map program data from the servicer’s loss mitigation system to the
HAMP Reporting Tool.
143147. QA reviews must occur at least quarterly and the report must be distributed
to the appropriate executives or board-level committees, including senior management
independent of the area under review. (a/k/a Monitor Reports).
144148. Results of QA activities required support by adequate work papers and
other documentation that is well organized and sufficiently detailed to allow a knowledgeable
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EXHIBIT A
third party who did not participate in the review to assess the documentation and understand
how the conclusions reached in the associated report are substantiated (a/k/a Professional
Firms).
4. Relationship Manager A/K/A SPOC
145149. Servicers that have a Program Participation Cap of $75,000,000 or more as
of May 18, 2011, were required to establish and implement a process through which borrowers
who potentially are eligible for HAMP are assigned a relationship manager to serve as the
borrower’s single point of contact. The relationship manager’s functions were similar to the
SPOC under
the NMSA.
146150. Each servicer was required to have clear and comprehensive internal
written policies for identification and solicitation of borrowers who are potentially eligible
based on information in the servicer’s possession.
147151. The same relationship manager was responsible for managing the
borrower relationship throughout the entire delinquency or imminent default resolution process,
including any home retention and non-foreclosure liquidation options, and, if the loan was
subsequently referred to foreclosure, had to be available to respond to borrower inquiries
regarding the status of the foreclosure.
148152. Each such servicer must assign a relationship manager to a delinquent
borrower or a borrower who requests consideration under a designation of imminent default
immediately upon the successful establishment of Right Party Contact with the borrower and (i)
the determination by the servicer of a borrower’s potential eligibility for HAMP based on
information disclosed during the initial telephone interview or other oral communication, or (ii)
upon receipt from the borrower of any completed or partially completed Initial Package (as
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EXHIBIT A
defined in Section 4 of Chapter II of the Handbook) signed by the borrower.
149153. The relationship manager’s responsibilities included, without limitation:
• Communicating the options available to the borrower for resolving the

delinquency or imminent default, the actions the borrower must take to be
considered for those options, the timing requirements for completion of actions
by the borrower and the servicer, and the status of the servicer’s evaluation of
the borrower for those options;
• Coordinating maintenance and tracking of documents provided by the borrower
and that the borrower is notified promptly of the need for additional
information;
• Being knowledgeable about the borrower’s situation and current status in the
entire delinquency or imminent default resolution process, including any home
retention or non-foreclosure liquidation options; and
• Coordinating with other personnel responsible for ensuring that a borrower who
was not eligible for MHA programs be considered for other available
proprietary loss mitigation options.
150154. The relationship manager had primary responsibility for coordinating the
servicer’s actions to resolve the borrower’s delinquency or imminent default until all available
home retention and non- foreclosure liquidation options had been exhausted and for
communicating those actions to the borrower.
151155. A servicer evaluated a borrowers loan modification options after its
relationship manager receives the borrowers Initial Package.
The Initial Package included:
• Request for Modification Assistance (“RMA”) Form;
• Either (i) IRS Form 4506-T or 4506T-EZ or (ii) a signed copy of the
borrower’s tax return for the most recent tax year;
• Evidence of income; and
• Dodd-Frank Certification
152156. Servicers could require use of the RMA by all borrowers requesting
consideration for HAMP or may use other proprietary financial information forms that are
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EXHIBIT A
substantially similar in content to the RMA.
153157. Included in the RMA was a Hardship Affidavit. Every borrower seeking a
modification, regardless of delinquency status was required to sign a Hardship Affidavit that
attests that the borrower is unable to continue making full mortgage payments and describes the
type of hardship.
154158. Servicers were required to use HAMP as the first loss mitigation option for
each borrower.
155159. Each servicer was required to have written standards for determining
imminent default that are consistent with applicable contractual agreements and accounting
standards and must apply the standards equally to all borrowers. The mortgage file and/or
servicing system had to contain evidence of this determination.
156160. A servicer had to document in its servicing system and/or mortgage file the
basis for its determination that a payment default is imminent and retain all documentation used
to reach this conclusion.
157. 161. Servicers were required to include in their internal quality assurance
plan appropriate assessments of relationship manager activities. These assessments included,
but were not limited to, coverage of the following areas:
1. Timing of communications to borrowers about relationship manager

assignment and changes;
2. Relationship manager access to information, including the borrower’s

current status in the delinquency or imminent default resolution process, and
appropriate training to understand the information;
3. Relationship manager coordination of document and information flow to

and from borrowers;
4. Relationship manager’s access to individuals with the ability to stop

foreclosure proceedings;
5. Organizational structure and staffing levels such that relationship managers can
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EXHIBIT A
properly carry out responsibilities; and

6. Relationship manager input on the certification prior to foreclosure sale.
158162. Servicers were required to maintain evidence of the control testing
activities conducted in order to assess compliance and submit the annual certification.
159163. The SPA required a servicer to submit an annual certification (Annual
Certification) as to its continued compliance with, and the truth and accuracy of, the
representations and warranties set forth in the SPA on June 1, 2010. On June 1 of each year
thereafter during the term of the SPA, servicers are required to submit Subsequent Certification.
The Form of Certification is attached to the original SPA as an exhibit.
160164. If a servicer became aware of any information that would cause them to be
unable to certify to the truth and accuracy of the representations and warranties included in the
applicable, the servicer was required to notify MHA-C promptly and amend its Certification to
include that information.
161165. These included any representations and warranties, or covenants that
ceased to be true and correct or any deficiencies in the design or operating effectiveness of the
internal controls, including the servicer’s quality assurance program.
5. Incentive Payments
162166. Under the HAMP Chase received incentive compensation for each
eligible loan modification. This compensation varied based on the delinquency period of the
loan and the continued success of the loan modification effort. The specific conditions for
these incentive payments are set out in Chapter 1, Section 13 of the HAMP Handbook.
E. The U.S. Bankruptcy Trustee Program and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency Identified Servicing Practices by Chase Which Violated the
NMSA and the HAMP Loan Servicing and Modification Requirements
167. On March 3, 2015 the Department of Justice announced that the U.S. Trustee
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EXHIBIT A
Program (“USTP”) had entered into a $50 million settlement agreement with JP Morgan Chase.
As part of the settlement, Chase acknowledged that it filed over 50,000 false payment change
notices (“PCN”) in bankruptcy courts around the country. The admissions contained in this
settlement agreement demonstrate that Chase violated many of the requirements of NMSA and
the HAMP and that any certifications that Chase was in compliance with those requirements
were false.
168. On August 31, 2015, the Monitor of the NMSA published a report titled “Office
of Mortgage Settlement Oversight Bankruptcy Filings Review for JP Morgan Chase.”
https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/09/NMS-
Bankruptcy-Reporting-USTP-JPMC-8-31-15.pdf. The Monitor stated that he conducted a
separate investigation and confirmed the USTP’s findings that Chase had violated the NMSA’s
bankruptcy related servicing requirements. The Monitor explained that: “[t]he USTP’s review
identified issues that were covered by the NMS standards but not covered by the quarterly NMS
metrics testing detailed in Exhibit E of the Settling Servicers’ individual Consent Judgments.” Id.
at 1. Thus, the Monitor confirmed that his methodology used to test Chase’s compliance with
the NMSA servicing requirements was inadequate to detect serious violations by Chase.
169. On June 16, 2015, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) filed a
document in bankruptcy court titled “CONSENT ORDER AMENDING THE 2011 CONSENT
ORDER and 2013 AMENDMENT TO THE 2011 CONSENT ORDER” regarding Chase.
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2015-064.pdf. The original consent order was
issued after the OCC “identified certain deficiencies and unsafe or unsound practices in residential
mortgage servicing and in the Bank’s initiation and handling of foreclosure proceedings.”
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2011/nr-occ-2011-47e.pdf. As part of the
original OCC consent order, Chase agreed to take specific actions to correct its servicing
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EXHIBIT A
deficiencies. The OCC’s amended consent order details the many ways in which Chase violated
these commitments.
170. Specifically, the 2015 amended consent order stated that Chase violated the following
commitments:
(a) the Bank shall implement its Revised Action Plan and ensure
effective coordination of communications with borrowers, both oral and
written, related to Loss Mitigation or loan modification and foreclosure
activities, including, at a minimum:
(i) appropriate deadlines for responses to borrower communications

and requests for consideration of Loss Mitigation, including deadlines for
decision-making on Loss Mitigation Activities, with the metrics
established not being less responsive than the timelines in the Home
Affordable Modification Program (commonly referred to as “HAMP”);
(ii) a requirement that written communications with the borrower

identify a single point of contact along with one or more direct means of
communication with the contact; and
(iii) procedures and controls to ensure that a final decision regarding a

borrower’s loan modification request (whether on a trial or permanent
basis) is made and communicated to the borrower in writing, including
the reason(s) why the borrower did not qualify for the trial or permanent
modification (including the net present value calculations utilized by the
Bank, if applicable) by the single point of contact within a reasonable
period of time before any foreclosure sale occurs.
OCC Amended Consent Order at 8-9.
171. These requirements are similar, if not identical, to requirements in the HAMP and
the Consent Judgment of the NMSA described above in ¶¶ 67 - 70 and ¶¶ 133 - 161. Thus, the
OCC consent order represents a finding that Chase violated those requirements and that any
certifications by Chase that it was in compliance with those requirements were false.
V. CHASE FALSELY CLAIMED COMPLIANCE WITH SERVICING

STANDARDS AND CONSUMER RELIEF REQUIREMENTS OF THE
CONSENT JUDGMENT AND THE SERVICING REQUIREMENTS OF HAMP
A. The Secondary System of Loans: Recovery One
163172. As statedindicated, Chase maintains a hidden secondary set of loans stored

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EXHIBIT A
outside of its primary SOR. The secondary set of loans is known as the Recovery One
(“RCV1”) or RCV1-SOR. The RCV1 – essentially a “back room” operation – was not
disclosed or reported to Freddie Mac or the Monitor, and is still only known to those select few
working in it within Chase. This RCV1- SOR is essentially a collection of various federally
regulatedrelated mortgage loans that have been charged off by Chase and whose documentation
has been corrupted, ignored or allowed to fall into disarray. It includes various levels of
defaulted and charged off loans in both first and second lien positions. It also includes
mortgages that are subject to bankruptcies and post- foreclosure deficiencies.
164173. In short, the RCV1-SOR is a loose collection of once compliant loans that
Chase has relegated to the No Man’s Land of the bank where these mortgage loans and the
associated borrowers are ignored to the point where compliance with any regulatory body is
impossible.
165174. The RCV1 population of loans is comprised of loans that Chase has
removed from its primary SOR upon a determination that the loans were valueless based on
General Acceptable Accounting Principles (GAAP) and other internal methods of
bookkeeping.
166175. Upon the determination that a loan is valueless, Chase removes the loan
from its balance sheet and adjusts its accounting entry, thus charging off the loan as a bad debt
expense.
167176. This “charge off,” as it is commonly known, is generally defined as a
creditor having little expectation of collection of the debt. However, the loan’s “charge off”
status does not relieve a mortgage servicer of its federally required servicing responsibilities.
168177. Chase’s policies and procedures regarding loan charge-offs included both
first and second lien mortgages.

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EXHIBIT A
169178. These charge-offs included proprietary bank owned mortgage loans and
loans which are serviced on behalf of others, including Residential Mortgage Backed Securities
(RMBS) and loans serviced on behalf of Government Sponsored Entities (GSE) such as FNMA,
Freddie Mac and the Federal Housing Authority (FHA).
170179. The motivating factors for moving charged off mortgages from the primary
SOR to the RCV1-SOR includes the high cost – in terms of both financial and human resources –
of properly servicing these federally regulatedrelated mortgages that require a single point of
contact, timely and accurate information, adequate and knowledgeable staffing, communications
with law firms, code enforcement, compliance with all Federal and State laws and other
associated activities.
171180. Other motivating factors included servicing contracts between the Servicer
and third party investors that did not provide for reimbursement of third party expenses such as
those for property preservation, insurance, payment of taxes, costs of foreclosure and disposition
fees.
172181. Loans in RCV1 are not serviced as definedrequired by RESPA, Treasury
Directives, the Consent Judgment or HAMP.
173182. These loans remain subject to collection actions by collection agencies
and the liabilities were not released.
174. 183. The failure to service the loans in the RCV1 population and the failure to
disclose the existence of the RCV1 population is a violation of the applicable Servicing
Guidelines of the MHA and Servicing Standards of the NMSA that apply to all loans serviced by
Chase.
175. 184. While Chase disclosed the existence of RCV1 to the Monitor, it did not
report the complete population of loans in RCV1. The Monitor published data regarding the
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EXHIBIT A
total number of loans reported by each servicer and by various categories, including lien position
and delinquency status. This document, “Final –Report-Template-Servicing-Performance-Data-
1(2).xlsx,” can be found at https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/reports/final-progress-
report/. It indicates that Chase informed the Monitor that there were only 3,517 2nd liens that
were delinquent for over 180 days. See cell R18.
185. Chase’s internal documents show a much larger number of such loans in RCV1.
In the July 2012 - 2nd Lien Extinguishment Initiative, described more fully below, Chase
identified 38,407 charged off loans from its RCV1 SOR. Most of these loans had been charged
off (designated “C/O”) for over 180 days. Therefore, most, if not all would have been delinquent
for 180 days. Additionally, in the November 2012 - 2nd Lien Extinguishment Initiative Chase
identified another 56,070 loans for consideration for the second mailer. Finally, in the January
2013 – 2nd Lien Extinguishment Initiative, Chase identified another pool of 21,985 loans as
potentially eligible for its third mailer. The total number of loans identified for potential 2nd lien
extinguishment in these three mailers was 116,462. Subtracting the number of bankruptcy loans
leaves a total of 88,788 loans. Virtually all, if not all, of these loans were delinquent for over
180 days. This represents 25 times the number of 2nd liens delinquent for over 180 that Chase
reported to the Monitor.
186. ,The existence of RCV1 and the fact that its universe of loans was not included
in the compliance statistics reported to Freddie Mac or the Monitor,serviced in accordance with
existing law and regulations made it impossible for Chase to be in compliance with the
Treasury Directives of the HAMP or the Servicing Standards of the Consent Judgment. Thus,
any assertion by Chase that Chase met those directives and standards represented a false claim.
176187. Throughout the time Chase was creating the Work Plan, Chase knew the
existence of the RCV1 as a hidden system of records and that the integrity and accuracy of the
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EXHIBIT A
data in the RCV1 population was irreparably corrupted and, thus, would fail every Metric for
Servicing Standards if provided for Metric testing.
177188. The practice of porting loans out of the primary SOR and into the
RCV1-SOR began as early as 2000 when JP Morgan & Company merged with Chase
Manhattan Corporation.
178189. Chase’s policy of porting charged off home loans into the RCV1-SOR
damaged its ability to properly document the loans due to the complete lack of any servicing,
and thus a complete corruption of the accuracy and integrity of the records for these mortgage
loans.
179190. While the Handbook allowed a Servicer to not consider certain “charged
off loans” for HAMP, this carve out itself had specific requirements that Chase did not meet.
The borrowers of the charged off loans that were not considered must have been released from
all “liability for the debt” and provided with a copy of the release. The Servicer was then
required to keep copies of those releases in the file and/or system of record.
180191. As the internal documentation entitled “Chase Home Loan Servicing and
Default: Daily Agency Recovery Summary” (and as described below) demonstrated, these
borrowers, whose loans were in the RCV1 population, were not released of the “liability for the
debt” but instead were still the subject of collections efforts by various collection agencies who
did not service these federally regulatedrelated mortgages. These mortgage loans were therefore
subject to all HAMP servicing requirements.
181. 192. The Servicing Standards of the Consent Judgment
state that:
Servicer shall maintain procedures to ensure accuracy and timely updating of

borrower’s account information, including posting of payments and imposition of
50
EXHIBIT A
fees. Servicer shall also maintain adequate documentation of borrower account

information, which may be in either electronic or paper format.
* * * *
Servicer shall take appropriate action to promptly remediate any inaccuracies in

borrowers’ account information, including:
a. Correcting the account information;
b. Providing cash refunds or account credits; and
c. Correcting inaccurate reports to consumer credit reporting agencies.
Exhibit A at A-4, A-6
182193. The HAMP servicing guidelines and the NMSA Servicing Standards
required that Servicer’s systems to record account information be periodically independently
verified for accuracy and completeness by an independent reviewer.
183194. Internal documents of Chase demonstrate that the RCV1 contains mortgage
loans whose borrowers have had no contact with Chase since as far back as 2000, more than a
decade before such loans were then vetted for potential inclusion within the Consumer Relief
portions of the Consent Judgment.
184195. The entire population of loans sold to the Relator’s entity Mortgage
Resolution came directly from the RCV1-SOR, a small portion of the hundreds of thousands
of loans contained within it.
185196. After the transfer to Mortgage Resolution of 3,529 loans from the
RCV1-SOR, Chase sent nofailed to send transfer letters to the borrowers as required by
RESPA. Chase did not provide any complete or accurate servicing information. The
reason for this failure is simply explained;
Chase did not possess the records necessary to determine whose loanloans had been
transferred. Chase did not provide any complete or accurate servicing information for these
loans. Loans included in the HAMP population sold to Relator included loans which were
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EXHIBIT A
foreclosed during 2009 and were eligible for NMSA payments.
186. As recently as March 2014, over 5 years after the completion of the sale, Chase
admitted in writing that it was unable to determine which loans it had included in the sale to
Mortgage Resolution.
187197. Since the loans contained in the RCV1 population are not maintained or
serviced according to any Servicing Standards, they fail to meet any of the requirements set
forth in the MHA Commitment and its accompanying HAMP Handbook and the NMSA
Consent Agreement, the past standards under prior laws and regulations or the standards set
forth in the Dodd-Frank legislation.
188198. Due to Chase’s total disregard of the HAMP Handbook, the Consent
Judgment Servicing Standards and servicing requirements under RESPA, none of the borrowers
in the RCV1-SOR were considered for eligibility for any proprietary or government loan
modification programs offered to borrowers in the primary system of records. In contrast, none
of the borrowers in the primary SOR’s were considered for eligibility for Chase’s 2nd Lien
Extinguishment Program.
189199. Pursuant to the SPA and Consent Judgment, all loan modification programs
must be made available to all eligible borrowers. Since Chase did not make its proprietary or
government loan modification programs available to all eligible borrowers, none of the incentive
payments paid in accordance with HAMP or Consumer Relief credits claimed in accordance
with the NMSA are attributable to such programs cannot be paid or credited.
190. The Commitment for MHA Incentive Payments and the Consent Judgment
Consumer Relief credit are both conditioned on Chase complying with the Treasury Directives
pursuant to SPA. Chase did not report the existence of RCV1 to the United States
Government or the Monitor; therefore, all of its claims for MHA Incentive payments and
52
EXHIBIT A
NMSA Consumer Relief credits are false.
B. The “2nd Lien Extinguishment Program”
191200. Pursuant to the terms of the Consumer Relief requirements of the Consent
Judgment:
A write-down of a second lien mortgage will be creditable where such write-down

facilitates either (a) a first lien modification that involves an occupied Property for
which the borrower is 30 days delinquent or otherwise at imminent risk of default
due to the borrower’s financial situation; or (b) a second lien modification that
involves an occupied Property with a second lien which is at least 30 days
delinquent or otherwise at imminent risk of default due to the borrower’s financial
situation.
Exhibit D, ¶ 2(b) at D-4.
192201. Instead of following the requirements of the Consent Judgment, Chase
set out – in an internal document (“DOJ July 2012”) – its own standards used to grant relief for
second liens:
• Loans were primary selected based on aging collectability performance.

“Arguably, those with the smallest likelihood to pay also represent the
populations that need relief the most.”
• Loans were rank ordered using a variety of factors that included aging,
balance size and probability of payment.
• Loans were then segmented and binned into 5 distinct groups, each
offering its own benefits and opportunity cost collections.
• Each bin contains an estimated lifetime recoveries sum that was used to
determine the impacts to the line of business and 2012 recovery budget.
193202. Using these criteria, Chase tasked its Mortgage Banking Recovery
with identifying second mortgage home loans for DOJ credit in the amount of Three
Hundred, Ninety-Seven Million Dollars ($397,000,000.00). The credit amounts
assumed:
• Ten (10%) percent credit for every dollar forgiven;
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EXHIBIT A
• Twenty-Five (25%) percent additional credit (12.5% total credit) for all dollars
forgiven by the end of year 2012; and
• Three Billion Dollars ($3,000,000,000.00) in second lien balances needed to be

identified for forgiveness to accomplish the task.
194203. Proper application of the criteria for credits under the Consent Judgment
would have excluded from eligibility for credit any of these loans selected by Chase. Instead,
Chase simply “forgave” loans that did not qualify for credit under the Consent Judgment and
then sought credit under the Consent Judgment for those loans’ forgiveness.
195204. Instead of applying the specific criteria set forth in the MHA
Handbook and Consent Judgment, Chase substituted its own self-serving algorithm,
referencing criteria such as the number of months since charge-off, last payment date and
age of loan to determine the least valuable loans in its portfolio.
196205. After running its queries through the RCV1 population, Chase identified
38,407 potential loans for the program. Among those loans were:
• There were 93 second mortgage loans totaling $5,653,705.00 in principal balance

that were more than 2 years since claims were filed under various legal issues (i.e.
probate, SCRA and FEMA);
• There were 780 second mortgage loans totaling $38,370,019.00 in principal

balance that were behind first loans that themselves were already identified for the
“Alternative Foreclosure Program.” (As described below);

balance that were one year charged off and had balances of greater than
$50,000.00;
• There were 8685 second mortgage loans totaling $1,291,337,758.00 in principal

balance that were charged off more than 3 years prior and had balances of greater
than $75,000;

balance that were discharged chapter 7 bankruptcies with charge off dates older
than December 2008;

54
EXHIBIT A
balance that were discharged chapter 7 bankruptcies with charge off dates
between January and December 2009 and with balances greater than $100,000;

balance that were active probate cases with charge off dates older than 2 years;
and
• The last group was 11,329 second mortgage loans totaling $644,541,049.00 in
principal balance that were termed “inactive”.
197206. In several Chase internal documents, Chase specifically references
excluding from the loans considered for Consumer Relief those loans that could provide a
larger monetary benefit to Chase than the value of the Consumer Relief credit would have.
Examples of loans not included are:
• Those loans whose properties were MLS listed;
• Those loans that had been charged off in the last six months; and
• Those loans whose borrowers were making payments in the last year.
198207. In short, Chase specifically excluded those homeowners for whom the
Consumer Relief would have meant the most.
199208. To implement this scheme, on or about September 13, 2012, Chase mailed
33,456 letters to borrowers with charged off second mortgage loans whose loans were stored
within the RCV1-SOR.
200209. Each letter contained the same basic language and stated in part:
We are writing to let you know that we are cancelling the amount you owe Chase
on the loan referenced below, totaling [X] amount, as a result of the recent
mortgage servicing settlement reached with the states and federal government.
This means you will owe nothing more on the loan and your debt will be
cancelled. You don’t need to sign or return anything for this to happen.
(Emphasis added.)
201210. Each letter included the: 1) name of the borrower; 2) amount left on the
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EXHIBIT A
loan; and 3) account number assigned to the mortgage. Each letter was “robo-signed” by Patrick
Boyle, Vice President.
202211. The loans chosen for this mailing were selected based solely on internal
queries of the RCV1-SOR. In other words, they were loans from the backroom with the least
possibility of collection, no servicing history and not in compliance with the objectives of the
Consent Judgment.
203212. Among these loans were loans sold to the Relator’s entities.
204213. The letters were the result of efforts by Chase to minimize the cost of the
NMSA credits and to maximize its own profitability from the implementation of the Consumer
Relief by circumventing the application process and ignoring the MHA Servicing Guidelines and
the NMSA Servicing Standards.
205214. Using historical data from past performance, Chase calculated that by
applying the Consumer Relief in the manner described above, it converted this pool of
approximately $3 billion in loans, whose lifetime collectability was only $4.2 million – a
collection ratio calculated by Chase to be 0.14 percent – into credits equal to $397 million
dollars. In a single move – based on this calculation – Chase increased its rate of return on these
defaulted loans by nearly 100 times.
206215. Ultimately, Chase claimed credits of $308,672,792 for second lien
modifications.
207216. Because all of the loans used to claim credits for second lien consumer
relief came from RCV1 which were not serviced according to the MHA Handbook or NMSA
Servicing Standards and because they were not included in the primary SOR and were selected
according to the criteria set out in the Consumer relief requirements, all claims for credits for
second lien consumer relief were false.
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EXHIBIT A
208217. As the internal Chase documents reveal, the bulk of these borrowers
were no longer living in the homes originally securing their loans.
209218. Additionally, liens on a large percentage of these loans were no longer valid
due to foreclosure on the homes by first lien mortgage holders. In many cases, Chase itself owned
or was servicing the first lien that was foreclosed, wiping out the second lien that Chase was
attempting to use as a credit.
210219. Chase’s attempt to take credit for the forgiveness of these loans undermined
major objectives of the Consent Judgment. As plainly stated on the first page of Exhibit A, the
major objective was retained homeownership and prevention of community blight.
1. The RCV1-SOR Collection Agencies
211220. Chase established policies and procedures for those mortgage loans in the
RCV1- SOR that included the rapid transfer of these borrowers’ accounts through several levels
of third party collections activity, from primary agencies through quinary agencies, based on
their collection success.
212221. Through the use of these serial collection agencies, Chase increased the
profitability of these defaulted home loans and lowered costs on the funds collected because
these agencies were compensated based on a percentage collected.
213222. Because the collection agencies did not service the federally
regulatedrelated mortgage loans, the RCV1 loan portfolio was not capable of being serviced
as required by the MHA Program and NMSA Consent Judgment.
214223. The use of collection agencies was reserved for the worst portion of the
RCV1- SOR. It was in essence a “back closet” located in the “back room”.
215224. These collection agencies are unlicensed, unregulated and do not
possess the servicing platforms to provide any mortgage servicing functions. This
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EXHIBIT A
institutional unwillingness to service loans properly placed Chase in violation of its legal
obligations regarding the servicing of hundreds of thousands of mortgage loans.
216225. Six months after the deadline for full implementation of the Servicing
Standards of the Consent Judgment, and years after Chase certified continued compliance with
the Commitment, an internal Chase document from April 2013 entitled “Chase Home Loan
Servicing and Default: Daily Agency Recovery Summary” stated Chase had 160,309 loans with
a total aggregate outstanding balance of $12,296,131,671.00 assigned to collection agencies for
servicing.
217226. These loans included 130,204 bank-owned loans.
218227. These loans also included 30,105 service-only loans that were under
contractual servicing agreements, such as mortgage backed security loans.
219228. This pool of 160,309 loans is but a portion of the total population included
in the RCV1. Based on information and belief the total number of such loans exceeds 500,000.
220229. This serial use of collection agencies added to the data corruption already
inherent in the design of the RCV1. The data was incomplete, inconsistent and, in many places,
irreparably corrupted by the collection agencies’ involvement in the management of the data.

Financial Impact Overview, November 14, 2012”
221230. In an internal document entitled “DOJ: Default: Recovery 2nd Lien
Credit Initiative, Financial Impact Overview, November 14, 2012” (“DOJ November 2012”),
Chase began by admitting to itself that the data from the RCV1 pool was “challenged.”
222231. The DOJ November 2012 document is broken down between identifying
issues from the first Chase mailer and identifying loans to be included in the second mailer.
223232. Chase went on to state that the mailing that it had sent out on September 13,
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EXHIBIT A
2012 had encountered issues, including “confusion over letters sent (bankruptcy and unsecured
customers)” and that “[r]emediation efforts are still in progress.” Those remediation efforts
primarily addressed the issues caused by mailing borrowers of non-Chase owned loans.
224233. Among the non-Chase owned loans were several loans owned by the
Relator’s entities.
225234. The DOJ November 2012 document also set forth the series of admissions
as to the failings:
Data issues resulted in four high level gaps:
• Lien status issues exist within the population;
• Inactive loans included in the pool did not include updated bankruptcy
information;
• Loans previously sold to investors lacked proper coding in Recovery One

system, causing these loans to be included in the pool in error; and
• Loans previously settled as part of the “repurchase/make whole” process

were not identified in Recovery One system, causing these loans to be
included in the pool in error.
226235. The document acknowledged that 108 loans were owned by 21 different
investors, with 83 out of 108 loans (78 percent) purchased by 8 investors. Relator owns 3 of the
eight identified companies.
227236. Within the pool of loans to which Chase sent the first mailing were
several hundred active bankruptcies of various types and more than 12,000 discharged
bankruptcies, in which the borrower no longer owed the debt.
228237. The DOJ November 2012 document also stated that the “[m]ethodology
would be to tier older, never paid loans as first into the 2nd mailer pools.”
229238. This rationale sought to remove the necessity of borrowers applying for the
credits that would fulfill the objective of keeping people in their homes. Instead, Chase weighed
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EXHIBIT A
the financial benefits to its own program higher than meeting the objectives of the Consent
Agreement.
230239. In evaluating the loans, Chase designed the searches to focus on various
criteria that would rid Chase of loans that had no possibility of future payments and that had
low life time collectability, thus increasing Chase’s profitability and focusing on borrowers
who were more likely not to need the benefit because their debt was uncollectable.
231240. Chase had had no contact with these borrowers in over ten years and had
no knowledge of the status of the loans. Due to the corruption of the data in the RCV1
population, Chase had no information about these loans and could not have applied the
required criteria under the Consent Judgment.
232241. Chase, in complete disregard for the requirements of the MHA Commitment
and the NMSA Consent Judgment, made no effort to apply the criteria to any of the
borrowers to whom they sent debt forgiveness letters.
233242. Chase followed up this first mailing with a second mailing of
approximately 10,000 loans, which were selected from a pool of 57,860 loans.

3rd Mailing Portfolio Selection, January 23, 2013”
234243. In an internal document entitled “DOJ: Default: Recovery 2nd Lien
Credit Initiative, 3rd Mailing Portfolio Selection, January 23, 2013” (“DOJ January 2013”),
reviewed “21,985 bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy loans are the base population for the next
mailing.”
235244. Based on this review, Chase identified approximately 8,000 loans for the
third mailing from the pool of 21,985 loans.
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EXHIBIT A
C. Chase Mails Thousands of Letters from their RCV1-

SOR
236245. As noted, the Consumer Relief requirements of the Consent Judgment
provided: A write-down of a second lien mortgage will be creditable where such write-down
facilitates either (a) a first lien modification that involves an occupied Property for which
the borrower is 30 days delinquent or otherwise at imminent risk of default due to the
borrower’s financial situation; or (b) a second lien modification that involves an occupied
Property with a second lien which is at least 30 days delinquent or otherwise at imminent
risk of default due to the borrower’s financial situation.
Exhibit D, ¶ 2(b) at D-4.
237246. Aside from the obvious requirements set forth in ¶ 2(b) of Exhibit D, that
the property be occupied, which could only be determined through communications with the
borrower, the loan forgiveness letters sent by Chase failed to meet the requirements for receiving
Consumer Relief credits under the Consent Judgment for several other reasons.
238247. Chase provided forgiveness letters to individuals on a second lien mortgage,
where the first lien with Chase was current at the time the letters were sent. No modification had
occurred and therefore the second liens were not eligible to be forgiven for credit under the terms
of the Consent Judgment.
239248. Chase also provided forgiveness letters to individuals on their second lien
despite the fact that the borrower’s first lien was current, which was serviced by lenders other
than Chase and thus forgiveness of the mortgage was not eligible to qualify for credit under the
terms of the Consent Judgment.
240249. Similarly, Chase provided forgiveness letters to mortgages with first liens
that had not been modified but rather were delinquent, thus making them ineligible for credit if
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EXHIBIT A
forgiven under the terms of the Consent Judgment.
241250. Also, numerous mortgages for which Chase provided debt forgiveness
letters had been recently foreclosed upon by Fannie Mae. This indicates that the underlying first
lien mortgages were not recently modified and thus could not qualify for credit under the
Consumer Relief Matrix.
242251. Chase also provided debt forgiveness letters to individuals who had
already paid off the mortgage loan.
243252. Chase also sent debt forgiveness letters to borrowers who had sold their
interest in the property.
244253. In addition to the issues with their own borrowers, Chase also caused issues
with other lenders’ borrowers when recipients of the September 13, 2012 mailing included
borrowers for whom Chase neither owned nor serviced their mortgages.
245254. These Recipients included borrowers whose loans were owned and serviced
by Relator’s entities, S&A and 1st Fidelity.
246255. Between 2005 and 2010, S&A entered into several agreements to
purchase non- performing first and second mortgage loans from Chase.
247256. Between 2009 and 2010 1st Fidelity entered into several agreements to
purchase non-performing closed end first and second mortgage loans from Chase.
248257. As a result, starting in September 2012, after receiving Chase’s baseless
forgiveness letters, borrowers informed the Relator that they would no longer be making
payments on their mortgages. For example, one borrower informed the Relator that he would no
longer be making the $520 monthly payments he had been making since October 2009.
249258. Another borrower engaged legal counsel and stated they would call the
attorney general if the loan was not released pursuant to the terms of the fraudulent Chase letter
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EXHIBIT A
he received.
250259. Each of the letters sent by Chase states that forgiveness of the loan at issue
is “as a result of the recent mortgage servicing settlement reached with the states and federal
government.”
251260. The Relator’s entities’ loans were not the only ineligible loans whose
borrowers received these letters.
252261. Chase sent debt forgiveness letters to the borrowers of at least 21 note-sale
buyers, like Realtor, who had purchased these mortgage loans from Chase in the past. Some of
these purchases had occurred as long ago as 2003.
253262. In total Chase reviewed over 100,000 charged-off, second loans for
inclusion in the three mailings done for the Consumer Relief initiative. During this same
period, Chase reported to the Monitor that it had only 3,736 second mortgage loans that were
180+ days delinquent for its servicing metric. Chase later reported on or about December 31,
2012 that it had 3,406 second mortgage loans that were 180+ days delinquent.
254263. Chase sent Relator several data tapes containing over 25,000 loans for his
review and opinion based on his experience as a note-buyer. It later became apparent that Chase
personnel were seeking help to determine whether such loans could be included in the second
lien extinguishment program.
255264. Said data tapes included many of Relator’s own loans. Relator warned
Chase personnel in writing that these loans were owned by the Relator and should be removed
from their lists.
256265. During the period where the IRG group for Chase reported servicing
compliance to the Monitor, the amounts reported were a bare fraction of the total loans reviewed
for inclusion in their population for Consumer Relief credit under their proprietary second lien
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EXHIBIT A
extinguishment program.
257266. Chase purposely did not report the extent of its RCV1 SOR to the
Monitor and Professional Firms when asserting compliance with Servicing Standards Metrics,
while at the same time it asserted that loans in the RCV1 SOR qualified for consumer credit.
Essentially, Chase used its primary SOR to test compliance for its Servicing Standards while
using a small portion of its secondary hidden RCV1 SOR for its consumer credits related to
loan forgiveness.
D. Chase Admits to Misconduct Utilizing 2nd Lien Forgiveness Letters
258267. In response to Defendant’s baseless forgiveness letters, Relator emailed
Omar Kassem, Vice President and Portfolio Manager for Mortgage Banking at Chase.
Relator explained that borrowers, whose mortgage notes he held, received loan forgiveness
letters, all signed by Patrick Boyle as Vice President of Chase.
259268. Significantly, Chase does not dispute that it had forgiven loans it did
not own. Rather than correcting the misrepresentations to borrowers, Chase offered to buy
back the mortgages it sold to S&A and 1st Fidelity.
260. 269. On December 5, 2012 Chase sent the Relator two letters offering to buy
back over 20 mortgages which were improperly forgiven.
261. 270. These letters stated in relevant part:
As part of the recent mortgage servicing settlement reached with the states
and federal government, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) elected to
participate in a second lien extinguishing program. Because of this, we sent
letters to certain customers notifying them that we were extinguishing their
debt with Chase and releasing the associated lien. However, we subsequently
found that several of your customers received this letter in error because of
an incorrect coding entry. These customers and their respective loans were
identified and are appended to this letter and referenced as “Exhibit A.” We
apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused you.
(Emphasis added.)
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EXHIBIT A
262271. The letter regarding the loans sold to S&A acknowledged that Chase
had inaccurately and without authorization sent the S&A borrowers the debt forgiveness
letter.
263272. The letter regarding the loans sold to 1st Fidelity acknowledged that Chase
had inaccurately and without authorization sent the 1st Fidelity borrowers the debt forgiveness
letter.
264. 273. Chase claimed that the erroneous letters were caused by a “coding
error”.
265274. The forgiveness letters were sent by Chase in an effort to circumvent the
Consent Judgment. Relator’s borrowers were pulled into this scheme due to the complete
corruption of the data within the RCV1 population from which Chase obtained the names and
loans for their mailings.
266275. Chase’s pattern of forgiving loans it no longer owns or services was not
only limited to those loans it sold to the Relator. Through Relator’s extensive experience and
relationship with Chase, he was provided a list of mortgages for which Chase provided loan
forgiveness letters. Through Relator’s investigation it became apparent that many of the
mortgages were forgiven despite the fact that Chase had sold, or otherwise no longer maintained
ownership or servicing rights to the loans.
267276. After months of negotiation between Chase and the Relator, the Relator
sold back some of the loans that were erroneously sent loan forgiveness letters. However the
Relator declined to sell back several of the loans.
268277. In an attempt to conceal Chase’s fraudulent scheme, and only after
Relator refused to sell back, and only after borrowers had filed complaints with various
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EXHIBIT A
enforcement agencies, Chase agreed to repurchase certain affected loans at the full balance
owed on each mortgage.
269278. Chase stated that other loans were not a “big enough problem” to
resolve and ignored Relator’s request for resolution on the matters.
270279. Chase is under an affirmative obligation to report any failure to meet its
metrics to the Monitor and to the MHA-C. Chase did not report that it sent loan forgiveness
letters to borrowers whose loans Chase did not own.
271280. In an internal email sent by Jason Oquendo, Project Manager (Second
Lien Extinguishment Program), on December 2, 2013, he describes the process by which Chase
notates accounts that have been chosen for the 2nd Lien Extinguishment Program. The email
describes a “DCL” note code indicating an intact lien exists where RECOVERY can take DOJ
credit. He refers to an internal communication: “ARD text confirmed DOJ eligible from 2nd
mailer – process account for DOJ NonBK Process”. .” He then describes the final coding
process. “Then append a DOJ note code to all accounts to move them through the RCV1/POTS
interface to process the lien releases.”
272281. This email clearly acknowledges the existence of the RCV1 System of
Records, which he refers to as “interface”. He then describes the process for sending 1099-Cs,
which he wants backdated to prior year. “Finally move the accounts to the “R1099C” queue and
back date the “date assigned” to 12/31/2012.
273282. Relator obtained a partial list of borrowers that received IRS Form
1099C in connection with debt forgiveness. These were specifically coded as “R1099C”.
274283. The documentation of the 1099C forms demonstrates Chase’s intention
to use these forgiven mortgages to earn credits under the Consent Judgment.
275284. Numerous other mortgages listed on R1099C debt forgiveness list had
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EXHIBIT A
already been foreclosed by Chase or another company and therefore precluded Chase from
applying for any consumer credit.
276285. Almost the entire population of loans, for which Chase asserted Consumer
Relief Credit under the 2nd Lien Extinguishment program, is identified in the “CLTR” data field
on the RCV1 “back-room” SOR.
E. Chase’s “Alternative Foreclosure Program” Violates

the Requirements of the Servicing Standards
277286. Chase maintains a policy of not foreclosing on first lien loans that are
secured by properties located in blighted neighborhoods and where the underlying property has
little or no value. These loans are least likely to be repaid, represent the highest reputational
risk and the highest servicing costs to Chase. Instead, Chase seeks another path aimed at
circumventing the issues related to these properties. This internal Chase policy is known as the
“Alternative Foreclosure Program” (“AFP”).
278287. The AFP process is an ongoing effort to conceal legal violations, relieve
Chase of liabilities, mitigate losses and circumvent the objectives and requirements of the
Consent Judgment to prevent community blight.
279288. Under Chase’s AFP, thousands of mortgage loans have been, and continue
to be, quietly released, with no notice to any interested parties, no documentation or
correspondence with homeowners or others, and no outside indication of any type to alert
interested parties of this action.
280289. Chase simply files releases of liens to appear as if the borrower had paid
off the underlying loan.
281290. These lien releases are not individually reviewed by Chase to ensure that
Chase actually owned or serviced the mortgages or to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the
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EXHIBIT A
borrower’s information but instead were “robo-signed”; many of which signed by Amy Knight,
who identified herself as a Vice President at J.P. Morgan Chase Bank and others signed by Ingrid
Whitty and Arocla Whitty who identified themselves as Vice President and Asst. Secretary
respectively of JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A, Successor In Interest By Purchase From The FDIC
As Receiver of Washington Mutual Bank, FA F/K/A Washington Mutual Home Loans, Inc,
Successor By Merger to Homeside Lending, Inc. All of the lien releases indicated that “the
instrument was signed on behalf of its corporation, by authority from its board of directors.”
282291. Prior to the implementation of the AFP, the underlying loans
remained in collection as unsecured debts despite their status as federally related loans
with all related attributes.
283292. Chase applied the AFP to valueless RCV1 first mortgage loans, which it
had not serviced in accordance with law, thus creating and enhancing community blight.
284293. The use of the RCV1-SOR population in the application of the AFP
meant that, once again, Chase’s malfeasance affected loans that it neither owned nor serviced.
285294. Relator’s investigation has revealed that Chase’s practices under AFP
violated the terms of the anti-blight requirements of the Consent Judgment. As a result, Chase
has rapidly enhanced blight, rather than limited it, in many of the country’s hardest hit areas,
including areas within Detroit, Michigan, St. Louis, and St. Louis County, Missouri. This
directly violated government policies and publications, such as Fannie Mae’s Property
Preservation Matrix and Reference Guide, thatwhich mandated that throughout the default
process, servicers are responsible for performing all property maintenance functions to ensure
that the condition and appearance of properties are maintained.
286295. Pursuant to the terms of the Consent Judgment, servicers such as
Chase were required to take certain measures to deter community blight. Specifically
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EXHIBIT A
Exhibit states:
1. Servicer shall develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure

that Real Estate Owned by the Servicer (“REO”) properties do not become
blighted;
2. Servicer shall develop and implement policies and procedures to enhance

participation and coordination with state and local land bank programs,
neighborhood stabilization programs, nonprofit redevelopment programs,
and other anti-blight programs, including those that facilitate discount sale
or donation of low-value REO properties so that they can be demolished
or salvaged for productive use;
3. As indicated in I.A.18, Servicer shall (a) inform borrower that if the

borrower continues to occupy the property, he or she has responsibility to
maintain the property, and an obligation to continue to pay taxes owed,
until a sale or other title transfer action occurs; and (b) request that if the
borrower wishes to abandon the property, he or she contact Servicer to
discuss alternatives to foreclosure under which borrower can surrender the
property to Servicer in exchange for compensation; and
4. When the Servicer makes a determination not to pursue foreclosure action

on a property with respect to a first lien mortgage loan, Servicer shall:
a. Notify the borrower of Servicer’s decision to release the lien and not
pursue foreclosure, and inform borrower about his or her right to
occupy the property until a sale or other title transfer action occurs; and
b. Notify local authorities, such as tax authorities, courts, or code

enforcement departments, when Servicer decides to release the lien and
not pursue foreclosure.
Exhibit A at A-40.
287296. Because of Chase’s policies and procedure in implementing the AFP,
Chase merely released liens in many of the hardest hit areas rather than foreclosing. Despite
electing not to pursue foreclosure, Chase has failed to abide by the Consent Judgment’s mandate
requiring a Servicer who decides not to pursue foreclosure to notify both the borrower and local
authorities so that the property can be adequately maintained and not contribute to community
blight. Additionally, Chase continues to pursue the underlying debt for those loans in the AFP
which require them to be accounted for through HAMP in the primary SOR.
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EXHIBIT A
VI. DOCUMENTATION CONTAINING FALSE CLAIMS
288297. Pursuant to the Consent Judgment, the IRG for each of the Servicers are
required to submit quarterly reports to Monitor concerning their adherence to the Servicing
Standards and progress towards their Consumer Relief Requirements. The Monitor is then
required to submit reports regarding the Servicers compliance to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia. The reports submitted to the Monitor and subsequently submitted from the
Monitor to the Court contained False Claims.
289298. On June 18, 2013, Monitor submitted to the Court as Document 72,
“Monitor’s Report Regarding Compliance By Defendants J.P. Morgan Chase & Company and
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. for The Measurement Periods Ending September 30, 2012 and
December 31, 2012.” This Report identified a Quarterly Report submitted by the IRG to the
Monitor on November 14, 2012. This Quarterly Report contained False Claims.
290299. On October 16, 2013, Monitor submitted to the Court as Document 106,
“Monitors Interim Consumer Relief Report Regarding Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A.” On February 14, 2013, after completing a Satisfaction Review, the IRG submitted to the
Monitor an IRG Assertion setting out the amount of Consumer Relief earned from March 1,
2012 through December 31, 2012 dated September 11, 2013, signed by Nicole L. Hoboppl, IRG
Manager. This IRG Assertion was filed with the Monitor’s Report as Document 106-B. The
IRG Assertion contained false claims.
291300. On December 4, 2013, Monitor submitted to the Court as Document 119,
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. For The Measurement Periods Ending March 31, 2013 and June
30, 2013.” This Report identified Quarterly Reports submitted by the IRG to the Monitor on
May 15, 2013 and August 14, 2013. Each of these Quarterly Reports contained False Claims.
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EXHIBIT A
292. 301. On March 18, 2014, Monitor submitted to the Court as Document 143,
“Monitors Final Consumer Relief Report Regarding Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.”
Filed with the Monitor’s Report as Document 143-2 was an IRG Assertion setting out the
amount of Consumer Relief earned from January 1, 2013 through April 15, 2013. The IRG
Assertion was dated January 6, 2014 and signed by Nicole L. Hoboppl, IRG Manager. The IRG
Assertion contained false claims.
293. 302. On May 14, 2014, Monitor submitted to the Court as Document 160,
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. For The Measurement Periods Ending September 30, 2013 and
December 31, 2014.” This Report identified compliance reports submitted by the IRG to the
Monitor on November 14, 2013 and February 14, 2014. Each of these compliance reports
contained False Claims.
294303. On September 10, 2010, Chase filed a Certification of compliance with
its “Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Participation Agreement.”
This Certification contained False Claims.
295304. On September 10, 2010, Chase’s subsidiary, EMC, filed a Certification of
compliance with its “Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Participation
Agreement.” This Certification contained False Claims.
VII. CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I
Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G)
Against All Defendants
296305. Relator realleges and incorporates herein by reference all the allegations set
forth in paragraphs 1 through 295304 of this Complaint.
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EXHIBIT A
297306. The Relator seeks relief against Chase under Section 3729(a)(1)(G) of the
FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
298307. As set forth above, Chase knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance
and/or reckless disregard of the truth, made, used, or caused to be made or used, false records
and/or statements material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the United
States, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of
the truth, made, used or caused to be made or used false records and/or statements to conceal,
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the United States.
These false statements and false records include various reports to the Monitor and the IRG
Assertions containing certifications that Chase had complied with the Servicing Standards and
Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment.
299308. Chase’s false reports and certifications enabled it to avoid penalties and
claim credits to which it was not entitled. By falsely claiming such credits, Chase avoided
paying money to the government required by the Consent Judgment.
300309. By reason of the forgoing, the United States has been damaged in a
substantial amount to be determined at trial, and is entitled to treble damages and a civil penalty
as required by law for each violation.
COUNT II
Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) & (B)
301310. Relator realleges and incorporates herein by reference all the
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 295304 of this Complaint.
302311. The Relator seeks relief against Chase under Section 3729(a)(1)(A) & (B) of
the FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) & (B).
303312. As set forth above, Chase knowingly presented, or causes to be presented, a

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EXHIBIT A
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval and knowingly made, used, or caused to be
made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim. These false
claims and false records were made in the form of certifications of compliance with its
“Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Participation Agreement” and
records and documents used to support those certifications.
304313. Chase’s use of false reports and certifications enabled it to obtain payments
from the Government for which it was not entitled.
305314. By reason of the forgoing, the United States has been damaged in a
substantial amount to be determined at trial, and is entitled to treble damages and a civil penalty
as required by law for each violation.
COUNT III
California False Claims Act
Cal. Govt. Code § 12651 (a)(7)
307316. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the California
False Claims Act, Cal. Govt. Code § 12650 et seq.
and/or statements material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of
California, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of California.
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EXHIBIT A
the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment.
paying money to the State of California required by the Consent Judgment.
310319. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of California
has been damaged, and possibly continues to be damaged, in an amount yet to be
determined.
COUNT IV
Delaware False Claims Act
Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, § 1201(a)(7)
311320. Relator realleges and incorporates herein by reference all the allegations
set forth in paragraphs 1 through 295304 of this Complaint.
312321. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Delaware
False Claims Act, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, § 1201 et seq.
Delaware, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of North
Carolina. These false statements and false records include various reports to the Monitor and the
IRG Assertions containing certifications that Chase had complied with the Servicing Standards
and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment.
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EXHIBIT A
paying money to the State of Delaware required by the Consent Judgment.
315324. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Delaware has
been damaged, and possibly continues to be damaged, in an amount yet to be determined.
COUNT V
District of Columbia False Claims Act
D.C. Code Ann. § 2-308.14 (a)(7)
317326. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the District of
Columbia False Claims Act, D.C. Code Ann. § 2-308.14 et seq.
and/or statements material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the District
of Columbia, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard
of the truth, made, used or caused to be made or used false records and/or statements to conceal,
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the District of
Columbia. These false statements and false records include various reports to the Monitor and
the IRG Assertions containing certifications that Chase had complied with the Servicing
Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment.
paying money to the District of Columbia required by the Consent Judgment.
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EXHIBIT A
320329. By reason of the payments and approvals, the District of Columbia has
COUNT VI
Florida False Claims Act
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 68.081 (2)(g)
322331. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Florida False
Claims Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 68.081 et seq.
Florida, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of the
truth, made, used or caused to be made or used false records and/or statements to conceal, avoid,
or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Florida. These
false statements and false records include various reports to the Monitor and the IRG Assertions
containing certifications that Chase had complied with the Servicing Standards and the
paying money to the State of Florida required by the Consent Judgment.
325334. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Florida has been
damaged, and possibly continues to be damaged, in an amount yet to be determined.
76
EXHIBIT A
COUNT VII
Georgia False Claims Act
Georgia (O.C.G.A. § 23-3-121(7)
327336. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Georgia
False Claims Act, O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-120 to 127.
Georgia, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Georgia.
paying money to the State of Georgia required by the Consent Judgment.
330339. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Georgia has been
COUNT VIII
Hawaii False Claims Act
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 661-21 (a)(6)
77
EXHIBIT A
332341. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Hawaii False
Claims Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 661-21 et seq.
Hawaii, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of the
or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Hawaii. These
paying money to the State of Hawaii required by the Consent Judgment.
335344. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Hawaii has been
COUNT IX
Illinois Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act
740 III. Comp. Stat. § 175/3(a)(1)(G)
337346. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Illinois
Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act, 740 III. Comp. Stat. § 175/1 et seq.
78
EXHIBIT A
Illinois, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of the
or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Illinois. These
containing certifications that Chase had complied with the Servicing Standards and the Consumer
Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment.
paying money to the State of Illinois required by the Consent Judgment.
340349. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Illinois has been
COUNT X
Indiana False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act
Ind. Code § 5-11-5.5-2(b)(6)
342351. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Indiana
False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act, Indiana Code § 5-11-5.5.
79
EXHIBIT A
Indiana, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of the
or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Indiana. These
paying money to the State of Indiana required by the Consent Judgment.
345354. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Indiana has been
COUNT XI
Iowa False Claims Act
Iowa Code § 685.2.2.g
347356. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Iowa False
Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act, Iowa Code § 685.
Iowa, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of the
truth, made, used or caused to be made or used false records and/or statements to conceal,
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Iowa.
80
EXHIBIT A
paying money to the State of Iowa required by the Consent Judgment.
350359. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Iowa has been
COUNT XII
Massachusetts False Claims Act
Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 12, § (9)
352361. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the
Massachusetts False Claims Act, Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 12, §§ 5(B)(1)-(B)(4), 5(B)(8).
and/or statements material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or
with reckless disregard of the truth, made, used or caused to be made or used false records and/or
statements to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. These false statements and false records include various
reports to the Monitor and the IRG Assertions containing certifications that Chase had complied
with the Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment.
81
EXHIBIT A
paying money to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts required by the Consent Judgment.
355364. By reason of the payments and approvals, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts has been damaged, and possibly continues to be damaged, in an amount yet to
be determined.
COUNT XIII
Minnesota False Claims Act
Minn. Stat. § 15C.02(a)(7)
357366. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Minnesota
False Claims Act, Minn. Stat. § 15C.01 et seq.
Minnesota, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Minnesota.
82
EXHIBIT A
paying money to the State of Minnesota required by the Consent Judgment.
360369. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Minnesota has
COUNT XIV
Montana False Claims Act
Mont. Code Ann. § 17-8-403(1)(g)
362371. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Montana
False Claims Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 17-8-401 et seq.
Montana, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Montana.
paying money to the State of Montana required by the Consent Judgment.
365374. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Montana has
been damaged, and possibly continues to be damaged, in an amount yet to be
83
EXHIBIT A
determined.
COUNT XV
Nevada False Claims Act
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 357.040 (1)(g)
367376. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Nevada
False Claims Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 357.010 et seq.
Nevada, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of the
or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Nevada. These
paying money to the State of Nevada required by the Consent Judgment.
370379. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Nevada has been
84
EXHIBIT A
COUNT XVI
New Hampshire False Claims Act
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 167:61-b I. (e)
372381. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the New
Hampshire False Claims Act, N.H. Rev. Stat. § 167:61-b I. (e) et seq.
New Hampshire, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless
disregard of the truth, made, used or caused to be made or used false records and/or statements to
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of
New Hampshire. These false statements and false records include various reports to the Monitor
and the IRG Assertions containing certifications that Chase had complied with the Servicing
paying money to the State of New Hampshire required by the Consent Judgment.
375384. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of New Hampshire
has been damaged, and possibly continues to be damaged, in an amount yet to be determined.
COUNT XVII
New Jersey False Claims Act
N.J. Stat. § 2A:32 C-3 (g)
85
EXHIBIT A
377386. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the New Jersey
False Claims Act, N.J. Stat. § 2A:32 C-1 et seq.
New Jersey, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of New Jersey.
paying money to the State of New Jersey required by the Consent Judgment.
380389. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of New Jersey
determined.
COUNT XVIII
New Mexico False Claims Act
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-5(G)
382391. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the New Mexico
86
EXHIBIT A
False Claims Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-1 et seq.
New Mexico, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of New
Mexico.
paying money to the State of New Mexico required by the Consent Judgment.
385394. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of New Mexico
determined.
COUNT XIX
New York False Claims Act
N.Y. State Fin. L. § 189.1.(g)
387396. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the New York
False Claims Act, N.Y. St. Fin. L. § 187 et seq.
87
EXHIBIT A
New York, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of New York.
paying money to the State of New York required by the Consent Judgment.
390399. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of New York has
COUNT XX
North Carolina False Claims Act
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-607(a)(7)
392401. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the North
Carolina False Claims Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-605 et seq.
88
EXHIBIT A
North Carolina, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless
disregard of the truth, made, used or caused to be made or used false records and/or statements to
conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of
North Carolina. These false statements and false records include various reports to the Monitor
and the IRG Assertions containing certifications that Chase had complied with the Servicing
paying money to the State of North Carolina required by the Consent Judgment.
395404. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of North Carolina
has been damaged, and possibly continues to be damaged, in an amount yet to be determined.
COUNT XXI
Rhode Island False Claims Act
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1.1-3(a)(7)
397406. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Rhode Island
False Claims Act, R.I. Gen. Laws §9-1.1-1 et seq.
Rhode Island, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Rhode
89
EXHIBIT A
Island. These false statements and false records include various reports to the Monitor and the
IRG Assertions containing certifications that Chase had complied with the Servicing Standards
and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment.
paying money to the State of Rhode Island required by the Consent Judgment.
400409. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Rhode Island
determined.
COUNT XXII
Tennessee Fraud Against Taxpayers Act
Tenn. Code Ann. §4-18-1-3(a)(7) Against
All Defendants
402411. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Tennessee
Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-18-101, et seq.
Tennessee, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with reckless disregard of
avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the State of Tennessee.
90
EXHIBIT A
paying money to the State of Tennessee required by the Consent Judgment.
405414. By reason of the payments and approvals, the State of Tennessee has
COUNT XXIII
Virginia Fraud Against Taxpayers Act
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-216.3 (A)(7)
407416. This is a claim for treble damages and civil penalties under the Virginia
Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-216 et seq.
and/or statements material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Commonwealth of Virginia, and/or knowingly, or acting in deliberate ignorance and/or with
reckless disregard of the truth, made, used or caused to be made or used false records and/or
statements to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to
the Commonwealth of Virginia. These false statements and false records include various reports
to the Monitor and the IRG Assertions containing certifications that Chase had complied with the
Servicing Standards and the Consumer Relief Requirements of the Consent Judgment.
91
EXHIBIT A
paying money to the Commonwealth of Virginia required by the Consent Judgment.
410419. By reason of the payments and approvals, the Commonwealth of
Virginia has been damaged, and possibly continues to be damaged, in an amount yet to be
determined.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Relator Laurence Schneider requests that judgment be entered against
Defendants, ordering that:
1. Defendants pay an amount equal to three times the amount of damages the United
States, the States of California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and the District of Columbia have
sustained because of Defendants’ actions, plus a civil penalty against Defendants of not less than
$5,000, and not more than $10,000 for each violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729 and similar provisions
of the State False Claims Acts;
2. Relator be awarded the maximum amount allowed pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §
3730(d) and similar provisions of the State False Claims Acts;
3. Relator be awarded all costs of this action, including attorneys’ fees, expenses,
and costs pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) and similar provisions of the State False Claims Acts;
4. The United States, the States of California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and the
District of Columbia and Relator be granted all such other relief afforded by law as the Court
deems appropriate;
92
EXHIBIT A
REQUEST FOR A TRIAL BY JURY
Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff/Relator hereby
demands a trial by jury.
Dated: October 2, 2015 /s/ Joseph A. Black
93
EXHIBIT A
Joseph A. Black (D.C. Bar No. 414869)

Daniel E. Cohen (D.C. Bar No. 414985)
THE CULLENLAW FIRM, PLLC
1101 30th Street, NW
Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20007
Tel. (202) 944-8600
Fax. (202) 944-8611
Roberto L. Di Marco
Jennifer M. Foster
WALKER & DI MARCO, P.C.
350 Main Street
First Floor
Malden, MA 02148
Tel. (781) 322-3700
Fax. (781) 322-3757
Admitted Pro Hac Vice
94
EXHIBIT A
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 2, 2015, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Second
Amended Complaint was served electronically on all registered counsel via ECF.
I also certify that on October 2, 2015, a true and correct copy of the Second Amended
Complaint was sent via First Class Mail, postage prepaid, to the following recipients:
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Kenneth J. Sugarman, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General Jane Drummey, Esq. Office
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 of Attorney General Public
San Francisco, CA 94102-7004 Advocacy Section
441 Fourth Street, NW
STATE OF DELAWARE STATE OF FLORIDA

Gillian L. Andrews, DAG Russell S. Kent, Esq.
Delaware Department of Justice Special Counsel for Litigation
Consumer Protection Unit Office of the Attorney General
820 N. French Street, 5th Floor The Capitol, PL-01
Wilmington, DE 19801 Tallahassee, FL 32399
STATE OF GEORGIA STATE OF HAWAII

Samuel S. Olens David M. Louie, Esq.
Department of Law - State Of Georgia Hawaii Attorney General
40 Capitol Square, SW 425 Queen St.
Atlanta, GA 30334-1300 Honolulu, HI 96813
STATE OF ILLINOIS STATE OF INDIANA

Lisa Madigan, Esq. Greg, Zoeller, Esq.
Attorney General Attorney General
Special Litigation Bureau Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Illinois Attorney General Office of the Indiana Attorney General
100 W. Randolph Street, 11th Floor 302 W. Washington Street, 5th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601 Indianapolis, IN 46204
95
EXHIBIT A
STATE OF IOWA STATE OF MASSACHUSSETS

Tom Miller, Esq. Martha Coakley, Esq.
Consumer Protection Division Massachusetts Attorney General
Iowa Attorney General 1 Ashburton Place
1305 E. Walnut St. Boston, MA 02108
Des Moines, IA 50319
STATE OF MINNESOTA STATE OF MONTANA

Lori Swanson, Esq. Chuck Robert Munson, Esq.
Minnesota Attorney General Montana Department of Justice
445 Minnesota Street 555 Fuller Avenue
St. Paul, MN 55155 Helena, MT 59601
STATE OF NEVADA STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Catherine Cortez Masto, Esq. Joseph Foster, Esq.
Nevada Attorney General Consumer Protection and Antitrust Bureau
Old Supreme Ct. Bldg. Office of the Attorney General
100 N. Carson St. 33 Capitol Street
Carson City, NV 89701 Concord, NH 03301
STATE OF NEW JERSEY STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Kathryn J.H. Boardman, Esq. Gary King, Esq.
New Jersey Deputy Attorney General New Mexico Attorney General
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 408 Galisteo Street
25 Market Street Villagra Building
P.O. Box 080 Santa Fe, NM 87501
Trenton, NJ 08625
STATE OF NEW YORK STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

Sujata Tanikella Jennifer Harrod, Esq.
Investment Protection Bureau Assistant Attorney General
120 Broadway Consumer Protection Division
New York, NY 10271 N.C. Department of Justice
114 W. Edenton Street
Raleigh, NC 27603
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND STATE OF TENNESSEE

Peter Kilmartin, Esq. Robert E. Cooper, Jr.
Rhode Island Attorney General Tennessee Attorney General
150 S. Main St. Cordell Hall Building, Ground Fl
Providence, RI 02903 425 5th Ave, North
Nashville, TN 37243
96
EXHIBIT A
STATE OF VIRGINIA
David B. Irvin, Esq.
Office of Virginia Attorney General
Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Dated: October 2, 2015 /s/ Joseph A. Black

Joseph A. Black (D.C. Bar 414869)
The Cullen Law Firm, PLLC
1101 30th Street NW, Suite 300
(202) 944-8600
Counsel for Plaintiff/Relator
97
EXHIBIT A

)
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
[PROPOSED] ORDER
UPON CONSIDERATION of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Relator’s Second
Amended Complaint and the accompanying Memorandum, declarations, and exhibits, it is
hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED and the Relator’s Second Amended
Complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
SO ORDERED:
_________________________________
The Honorable Rosemary M. Collyer
United States District Court Judge
Date:

U.S. Ex Rel Schneider V JPMorgan Chase Motion To Dismiss, 2nd Amended Complaint. 14-01047 D.D.C. D.E. 105

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U.S. Ex Rel Schneider V JPMorgan Chase Motion To Dismiss, 2nd Amended Complaint. 14-01047 D.D.C. D.E. 105

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Case 1:14-cv-01047-RMC Document 105 Filed 11/12/15 Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS RELATOR’S

accompanying Memorandum and the following declarations and exhibits:

Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP);

Mortgage Corporation to Paul Heran, Program Executive, Making Home Affordable-

3. Declaration of Michael M. Maya, and the attached Exhibit 1 (comparison of Relator’s

First Amended Complaint against Relator’s Second Amended Complaint).

A proposed order is attached for the Court’s convenience.

Dated: November 12, 2015 /s/ Robert D. Wick

Attorneys for Defendants

/s/ Robert D. Wick

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv

A. The RCV1 Loans .................................................................................................... 4

B. Schneider’s National Mortgage Settlement Claims ................................................ 4

1. The consumer relief allegations .................................................................. 5

2. The servicing standard allegations .............................................................. 7

3. The False Claims Act allegations ............................................................... 9

C. Schneider’s HAMP Claims ................................................................................... 10

1. The regulatory framework ........................................................................ 10

2. Schneider’s HAMP allegations ................................................................. 11

D. Procedural history ................................................................................................. 12

I. SCHNEIDER’S NMS CLAIMS FAIL ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS. ..................... 14

B. Schneider’s NMS Claims Are An Improper Collateral Attack On The

II. SCHNEIDER’S NMS CLAIMS FAIL ON THE MERITS.............................................. 17

A. Schneider’s Consumer Relief Claims Should Be Dismissed. ............................... 18

2. The NMS grants servicers discretion to select the borrowers who

B. Schneider’s Servicing Standards Claims Should Be Dismissed. .......................... 25

1. The NMS’s “cure” provisions preclude Schneider’s servicing

2. The prospect of a civil penalties award is too contingent and

C. Schneider’s Remaining NMS Allegations Fail To State An FCA Claim. ............ 30

D. Schneider’s State-Law Claims Fail To State An FCA Claim. .............................. 31

III. SCHNEIDER’S HAMP CLAIMS ARE DEFECTIVE. ................................................... 31

A. Schneider Fails To Allege That Chase Made A False Claim. .............................. 32

B. Schneider Fails To Allege The Necessary Element Of Scienter. ......................... 35

A-J Marine, Inc. v. Corfu Contractors, Inc.,

Amfac Resorts, L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

Beal Mortg., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,

Cities of Bethany v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,

Collier v. Dist. of Columbia,

Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of Canada,

Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross,

Hoyte v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross,

Inst., Inc. v. The Limited, Inc.,

McHugh v. DLT Solutions, Inc.,

Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp.,

Neumann v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,

Original Honey Baked Ham Co. of Ga., Inc. v. Glickman,

Si v. Laogai Research Found.,

U.S. ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,

U.S. ex rel. Bettis v. Odebrecht Contractors of Cal., Inc.,

United States ex. rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc.,

United States ex rel. Barrett v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,

United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc.,

United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos.,

United States ex rel. Morgan v. Sci. Applications Int’l Co.,

United States ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,

United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.,

United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., Ltd.,

United States v. Bank of Am.,

United States v. Microsoft Corp.,