A Reluctant Military Leader

A Reluctant Military Leader?
Helmuth von Moltke and the

July Crisis of 1914
Annika Mombauer
f only things would finally boil over - we are ready; the sooner, the
better for us',1 the chief of the German general staff, Helmuth von
Moltke, exclaimed on 1 June 1914. This statement, referring to the
international situation and the prospect of war, was much in keeping
with other bellicose demands he had been voicing for some years. If
only the right occasion could be found to provoke a war - Moltke and
his military colleagues were ready and eager to seize the opportunity.
A few weeks later, the crisis in the Balkans following Archduke Franz
Ferdinand's assassination would provide just that opportunity.
In private, the chief of staff would sometimes admit that he had
doubts about Germany's actual chances of winning a future war, but
outwardly he maintained with demonstrative conviction that Germany
would be victorious. Moltke not only disguised his own doubts about
Germany's ultimate chances of victory, but despite them - or worse
even because of them - became a constant advocate for war the sooner
the better. As a result, based on the mistaken belief in German invinci-
bility, Germany's foreign policy makers never felt the need to rethink
or adapt their policy. Instead, they completely overestimated Ger-
many's military strength. In February 1915, Wilhelm von Stumm of the
German Foreign Office, the Auswartiges Amt, defended his role in July
1914, claiming that 'nobody could have foreseen that militarily every-
thing would not work out as one had believed'.2 Rather, the Auswar-
tiges Amt had operated with the presumed certainty of military superi-
ority. During the July crisis, Stumm had expressed this over-confidence
when he declared: 'I will force the Russians to their knees in three
days.'3 Under-State-Secretary Alfred Zimmermann had even told the
Austrian envoy Count Hoyos on 3 July that Germany's army, due to
Hermann Frhr. von Eckardstein, Lebenscrinnertngen und politsche Derkwurdigkeiten
(Leipzig, 1921) iii, p. 184.
2 T. Wolff, Tagebitcler 1914-1919%
ed. B. S6semann (2 vols, Boppard a.R., 1984), 17
Febr. 1915, 167.
GpC. cit., 11 May 1916, p. 379.
War in History 1999 6 (4) 417-46 0968-3445(99)WTH1860A © 1999 Amold

418 Annika Mombauer
the large increases of the army bill of 1913, was strong enough to fight
the war without Austrian help, if the latter should be tied up against
Serbia and unable to deploy significant numbers of troops to the East-
ern front. Zimmermann confidently asserted that this 'did not matter
because Germany was strong enough to conduct the war on both fronts
alone'.4 In May 1916, Kurt Riezler, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's
secretary, told the journalist Theodor Wolff that 'the General Staff had
declared that the war against France would take 40 days'.5 Moltke's
significant role in helping to make up the civilians' minds was also
recalled by Riezler in May 1915:
After all, Bethmann can blame the coming about of the war on the
problematic constellation that he took over and on the answer that
Moltke gave him at the beginning of July [!]. He did say yes! we
would succeed.6
In spite of such evidence, however, the image of Moltke today is
largely that of a pessimistic, hesitant and reluctant military leader7 who
shied away from war and lost his nerve at the critical moment. The
war that Germany launched under his leadership was not a victorious
one - unlike that led by his more illustrious uncle, and the younger
Moltke's name is indelibly linked to the defeat on the Marne in Sep-
tember 1914. His reputation has been further undermined by the myth
surrounding his predecessor, Count Alfred von Schlieffen, whom
admirers painted in glowing colours. Far from taking Moltke's belli-
cose outbursts seriously, some commentators have even regarded them
as further 'evidence' of his alleged weakness.8 By portraying Moltke as
a weak and insignificant figure his responsibility, and thus, by impli-
cation, also Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of war, are mini-
mized. If it can be shown that he did not really want war, and moreover
that he and his military colleagues were not even in Berlin in the cru-
cial days of July, German responsibility for the outbreak of war can
effectively be denied. And yet Moltke's importance cannot be rated
too highly. It lies in his increasingly desperate pressurising for war
before - as he saw it - time ran out for Germany and her only strategic
plan. That such time pressure and narrow options were to a large
extent his responsibility should not be overlooked - as chief of the
general staff it was Moltke's task to develop and update Germany's
Quoted in F. Fellner, Die Mission Hoyos', in W. Alf, ed., Deutschlands Sonderng von
Europa 1862-1945 (Frankfurt a.M., 1984), p. 312.
5 Wolff, Tagebiicheir 24 May 1916, p. 384.
6 K.D. Erdmann, ed., Kurt Riezler Tagebitclwr, Aufsdtze, Dokumte (G6ttingen, 1972), 25
May 1915, p. 275. Note that the date is earlyJuly, at a time when Moltke was away
from Berlin and allegedly not involved in decision-making. It is possible that he was
consulted on the telephone.
7 A view that stems largely from Wilhelm Groener's critical account, Der Eeld&err wider
Wilen. Ororatis Studien itber den Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1927).
L.C.F. Turner, The Origins of the Firt World War (London, 1970), p. 21; Turner, 'The
Significance of the Schlieffen Plan', Australian Journal of Politics and Historny XIII
(1967), p. 59.
War in History 1999 6 (4)

A Reluctant Military Leader? 419
strategic plans for a possible future war. Germany's options had already
been limited under his predecessor, but under Moltke's leadership
they were further reduced by scrapping the plan for an eastern deploy-
ment in April 1913, and by making German strategy dependent on a
coup de main on Liege before war had even been declared.9
With the help of newly discovered sources, including many eyewit-
ness accounts and documentary evidence, Moltke can be put centre
stage. His own evaluation of his role certainly exceeded that of his
critics. In June 1915, when he had long been replaced by Erich von
Falkenhayn, he complained bitterly to his friend Colmar von der Goltz:
'It is dreadful to be condemned to inactivity in this war which I pre-
pared and initiated."'1 In the light of the almost complete lack of per-
sonal papers, such accounts, many of which have only recently come
to light in the records of the Reichsarchiv, help to fill some of the gaps
in the primary material.11 Moltke's importance lies not so much in
his abilities as a military leader and strategist - here the critics of the
'Schlieffen school' are probably right to denigrate him - but in his
increasingly desperate pressuring for war before time ran out for Ger-
many and her only strategic plan. His bellicose prewar statements need
to be taken quite literally, especially in view of the fact that he had
been voicing them at different political junctures and with increasing
force and conviction. When the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-9
was resolved peacefully, Moltke complained to his Austrian counter-
part, Franz Conrad von Hdtzendorf, that 'an opportunity has passed
unused that should not present itself again soon under such favourable
conditions'.12 Famously during the Agadir crisis he exclaimed that he
would despair of the future of the German Reich 'if we once again
emerge from this affair with our tail between our legs, if we cannot
bring ourselves to make energetic demands which we would be ready
to force through with the help of the sword'.13 His demands were made
even more forcefully at the infamous war council meeting of 8
December 1912, when it was Moltke who advocated war 'the sooner
This constraint resulted from the decision to avoid violating Dutch neutrality, in
addition to that of Belgium and Luxemburg - one of the major differences between
the Schlieffen and Moltke plans.
0 MolItke to Colmar von der Goltz, 14 June 19 15, cited in J. R6hl, 'Germany', in K.
Wilson, ed., Decsions for War 1914 (London, 1995), p. 27.
The records of the Reichsarchiv, presumed lost in a bomb attack in 1945, were
returned to Germany by the Soviet Union in 1991 and are now available in
Germany's main military archive in Freiburg. For further details, see A. Mombauer,
'Helmuth von Moltke and the German General Staff: Military and Political Decision-
Making in Imperial Germany, 1906-19 16' (DPhil. thesis, University of Sussex, 1997),
Introduction.
12 F. Conrad von Hctzendorff, Am meiner Diemtzeit 1906-1918, 5 vols, Vienna 1921-25,
vol.1, p. 165.
Moltke to his wife, 19 August 1911, Helmuth von Moltke, Erinnengen, Briefe,
Dokumte 1877-1916. Ein Bld vom Kriegsaubbnch, erster Kriegsfithrng und Persdnlicewit
des eren militdfrischen Eilhrer des Krieges, ed. Eliza von Moltke, Stuttgart 1922, p. 362.

420 Annika Mombauer
the better' and 'now or never', a demand that he would repeat time
and again in the intervening months until war finally became reality.14
Due to his close relationship with the Kaiser, Moltke was able to
exercise political pressure and to influence the decisions of the civilian
government. His fear of what the future held for Germany was infec-
tious, and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, in particular, was a victim
of this dark vision of things to come. Moltke's responsibility lay in advo-
cating a war that he felt certain would come, but that he was not cer-
tain of winning, and in keeping these doubts a secret.
This article investigates why in late July 1914 Moltke felt he had no
option other than to speed up events that would lead to war, and how,
within the confines of the narrow parameters that existed for military
planning, Moltke felt unable to act differently from the way he did.
Sarajevo: A Golden Opportunity

For Germany's military decision-makers, the assassination of the Aust-
rian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife on 28 June 1914 pro-
vided - at last - a perfect pretext for provoking war. Research into the
July crisis has established that the decision to use the assassination of
the archduke, supposedly by Serbian-controlled terrorists, as an
opportunity for settling Austria's Balkan problems was arrived at in
Berlin as much as it was in Vienna, and that Germany put extensive
pressure on her ally to provoke a conflict with Serbia. The risk of such
a conflict escalating into a European war was willingly taken in Berlin
and Vienna.15
Most studies of German decision-making duringJuly 1914 emphasize
the activities of the chancellor and his diplomatic aides in the Auswar-
tiges Amt."6 The military leaders are often out of the picture, and
4 To engage fully with the debate on the war-council is outside the scope of this
article. See e.g. John Rhbl, 'An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg: Eine Dokumentation
flber den 'Kriegsrat' vom 8. Dezember 1912', MilitdrgescAicAtliche Mitteilungen (MGM)
vol.21, 1/1977; A. Mombauer, 'Helmuth von Moltke', chapter 3.3, 'The Balkan Wars
and the War Council of 1912'.
15 Further information on the diplomatic events of the July Crisis in I. Geiss (ed),
Julikrise und Kriegsausbrtwh, 2 vols, Hannover 1963/64, also the abridged English
edition July 1914. The Outbreak oftheEirst World War. Selected DocuTmets, London 1967;
Fritz Fischer, Krieg der Jlmionen, Dtsseldoff, 21970; Luigi Albertini, The Origim of the
War of 1914, 3 vols, Oxford 1952-1957½ Fritz Klein, Deutschland im Eren Weltkrieg,
vol.1, (East) Berlin, 1968, pp. 209ff; James Jollt The Origins of the First World War,
London 21992; K. Wilson (ed), Decisions for War 1914; John W. Langdon, July 1914.
The Long Debate 1918-1990, New York, Oxford 1991; David Stevenson, The Outbreak of
the First World War, London 1997.
16 There are some exceptions, e.g. Gerhard Ritter's account of the July Crisis,
Staatskumt und Kriegshandwek, 4 vols, Munich 1954-1968, II, pp. 282. His study is,
however, marred by his desire to exonerate Bethmann Hollweg in the light of the
first of Fritz Fischer's war-guilt allegations, by portraying the Chancellor as trying to
resist military pressure. Moreover, Ritter's study of 1960 is now very much out of
date. L.C.F. Turner, 'The Role of the General Staffs in July 19 14', Australian Joun al
of Politics and Histoyy, 11/3 (1965), pp. 305-23 underestimates the involvement of the
General Staff in the events of July 1914, and Moltke's role in particular. Ulrich
Trumpener's War Premeditated?' Central European History, 9, 1976 concentrates on

indeed this seems justified as most of them were quite literally absent
from Berlin. Many were on holiday and keeping a deliberately low pro-
file. Moltke, for example, arrived in Karlsbad on 28 June for a four-
week cure - his second stay at the spa that summer. What better proof
for those postwar apologists of German policy that the German
decision-makers could not possibly have conspired to provoke war as
a result of the assassination of the archduke?
Yet a detailed study of the available evidence demonstrates a much
higher degree of involvement of key military men than has previously
been suspected. They appreciated both the opportunity and the
seriousness of the diplomatic crisis, and they were kept informed of
events and decisions throughout July. Their return to the centre of
decision-making was carefully timed to coincide with the ultimatum,
ensuring that they could have their say when it really mattered - after
the diplomats had made their own crucial decisions. Of course,
emphasizing the military role in the July crisis is not to suggest that
the civilian decision-makers were victims of a military conspiracy. How-
ever, it is striking to what extent military concerns and reasoning had
become common currency, accepted without question by civilians and
determining their decision-making. At the end of July, the dogmatic
belief in the Schlieffen/Moltke plan not only narrowed down the mili-
tary and strategic options, but also significantly reduced the political
room for manoeuvre.
In the immediate aftermath of the assassination, Austria's willingness
to take action against Serbia and consciously to accept the risk of war,
and German willingness to support her ally in such a venture were of
major importance in determining the outcome of the ensuing crisis.
With the death of Franz Ferdinand, an influential voice against war
with Serbia was lost in Vienna. 17 In the early days of July, military com-
mentators in Berlin emphasized what a good opportunity the current
crisis presented, pointing in particular to Russia's relative unpre-
paredness. Yet, for several reasons, they did not really expect war to
result from the crisis. Thus, the Saxon envoy in Berlin, Freiherr von
Salza und Lichtenau, reported back to Dresden: 'There is renewed
pressure from the military for allowing things to drift towards war while
Russia is still unprepared, but I do not think that His Majesty the Kaiser
the military during the July crisis, and Holger Afflerbach's examination of the July
crisis highlights the actions of Falkenhayn and Moltke, and offers a re-evaluation of
the more common emphasis on the Wilhelmstrasse. Afflerbach's study is also
exceptional in demonstrating a much higher degree of involvement of the military
in the decision-making of July 1914 than previously suspected; Ealkenhayn. Politschs
Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich, Munich 1994, pp. 147ff. See also Jack Snyder, The
Ideology of the Offensive. Milita?y Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914, Ithaca, New
York, London 1984; Ritter, Der Anteil der Militars an der Kriegskatastrophe von
1914', fHistorische ZeitscArft, 193, 1961, pp. 72-91.
17 On Austria-Hungary's reaction to the assassination, see e.g. J. Maurer, The Outbeak of
the First World War. Strategic Plan ning Cris is Dec is on Making and Detrence Fa ilure,
Westport, Connecticut, London 1995, pp. 53f.

422 Annika Mombauer
will allow himself to be persuaded."'1 Similarly, Hauptmann Ernst von
Falkenhausen of the Prussian general staff recorded in his diary in
1914 that he did not believe a European war would result from the
assassination. 'If anyone had told me then that the world would be
ablaze a month later, I would only have looked at him with pity. For,
after the various events of the last years, the Morocco-Algeciras crisis,
the annexation crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one had slowly but surely
lost the belief in a war.'19
At the archduke's memorial service the Saxon military plenipoten-
tiary, Leuckart von Weissdorf, had spoken about the current situation
to Georg von Waldersee, Moltke's deputy during the chief of staffs
absence. His impression was that Waldersee was conveying Moltke's
views, too, and that both felt the current situation provided a good
opportunity for war. 'In competent circles here [in Berlin]', Leuckart
reported on 3 July, 'the political situation is regarded as very serious -
also for us.'
He [Waldersee] expressed his opinion that we might become
involved in a war from one day to another. Everything, he thinks,
depends on what attitude Russia takes in the Austro-Serbian busi-
ness. In any case the course of events is being closely watched by
the Great General Staff. I had the impression that they would regard
it with favour if war were to come about now. Conditions and pros-
pects would never become better for us.20
Moltke and Waldersee were well aware of the potential dangers that
the current crisis posed, although to them it seemed to present an
opportunity, rather than a threat. That time was running out, and that
the opportunity for war under favourable circumstances for Germany
was greater now than in an increasingly uncertain future was a much-
emphasized argument of the general staff during the July Crisis, as it
had been on previous occasions.
With their constant worries about Germany's future chances, the
military leaders exerted a direct influence on political decision-mak-
ing. The general staff's Cassandra cries had obviously not fallen on
deaf ears, for there were numerous subscribers among the political
decision-makers to its increasingly desperate views regarding Ger-
many's future. Particularly the chancellor was convinced by Moltke's
argument that Russia posed a potential future threat and that Germany
should therefore strike before it was too late. Prince Lichnowsky, Ger-
many's ambassador to London during the crucial prewar years, was in
no doubt about Moltke's detrimental effect on Bethmann's thinking,
telling the journalist Theodor Wolff in September 1915: 'Moltke had
wanted the war, perhaps also Falkenhayn. Moltke had been of the opi-
Saiza und Lichtenau to Vitzthum, 2 July 1914, Geiss, Ju4 1914, doc.12.
B9undesarchiv (BA)-Abteilung Potsdam, NL Falkenhausen, 90 Fa 1/10, diary
July/August 1914.
20 Geiss,Jlikrise, I, doc. 15.

nion better now than in two years' time, and had influenced
Bethmann.'21 Kurt Riezler recorded the chancellor's fear quite strik-
ingly. On 7 July, he noted that Bethmann was concerned about the
news of Anglo-Russian naval negotiations and Russia's increasing mili-
tary potential. 'The future belongs to Russia, which is growing and
growing and is becoming an increasingly burdensome nightmare for
us.'22 This was a nightmare that Moltke and the chancellor shared, and
a view that was echoed in the Auswartiges Amt. In February 1915,
Stumm remembered his own fears of the future in the days of July
1914, telling Wolff: 'If the war had not come now, then we would have
had to have it in two years' time under worse conditions.'23 In 1917,
shortly after his dismissal, Bethmann Hollweg made explicit the sig-
nificant influence that military concerns had had over his decisions in
1914, when he told his friend Conrad Haussmann:
Yes, God, in a way it was a preventive war. But if war was in any case
hovering over us, if it had come in two yearsX time, but even more
dangerously and even more unavoidably, and if the military leaders
declared that now it was still possible without being defeated, in two
years' time no longer! Yes, the military24
Later in the crisis, Bethmann returned to the Russian threat, as Riezler
recorded on 20 July: 'Again the topic is the entire situation. Russia's
increasing demands and amazing potential. In a few years no longer
possible to fend off, especially if current European constellation
remains.'25 In the light of these perceived future threats, it is important
to note that the military decision-makers considered the enemy armies
not yet ready inJuly 1914.26 In their eyes, this either might make Russia
and France more inclined to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis
or, if war resulted, would provide a good opportunity for Germany to
defeat her enemies before they became invincible.27
21
Wolff, Tagebiche 10 Sept. 1915, p. 284. See also 16 Mar. 1915, p. 181: 'L[ichnowsky]
says that Moltke was among those who were primarily in favour of the war.'
22 Riezler, Tagebncher 7 July 1914, pp. 181ff.
23 Wolff, Tagebachr 17 Febr. 1915, p. 167.
24 Quoted in Fischer, Illusione, p. 671. Haussmann was a member of the Reichstag for
the Progressive People's Party.
25 Riezler, Tagebiicher 20 July 1914, p. 187.
26 See e.g. Lerchenfeld to Hertling, 28 July 1914: 'Here, as well as in Vienna, the
military are of the opinion that the Russian army is not ready.' E. Deuerlein,
BriefwecAsel HetlingL-Lerchefeld 1912-1917 (Boppard a.R., 1973), doc. 108, p. 316.
27 See e.g. Graevenitz, Wflrttemberg's military plenipotentiary, 26 July 1914: 'The
general state of unreadiness in Russia and the damages revealed in France [as a
result of the revelations of Senator Humbert - see n. 49 below] would contribute
their part towards making the Russians and thus the French more inclined towards
solving the matter in a diplomatic way if possible.' Bundesarchiv-MilitUrarchiv (BA-
MA), W-10/50890. This view had almost become common currency. Thus,
Lerchenfeld informed Hertling on 3 Aug.: 'Germany hbas to pass a difficult test. It
is a consolation that we would never have been able to avoid that test and that it is
better that we fight now than in a few years' time, when our enemies would have
completed their armaments'. Deuerlein, Briefoechse doc. 116, p. 326.

424 Annika Mombauer
Both Moltke and Waldersee were away from Berlin,28 and could not
be consulted by the Kaiser after the fateful audience with the Austrian
ambassador Sz6gy6ny on 5 July.29 Wilhelm spoke to those key advisers
that were available: characteristically, he consulted his military advisers
first, namely the generals Plessen, Lyncker and Falkenhayn.30 Then he
met with Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann. The Kaiser informed
them of Austria's intentions to act against Serbia in retaliation for the
assassination and of her request for German support. He asked the
minister of war if the army was ready, as Falkenhayn told the Parlia-
mentary Commission31 after the war: 'Based on my convictions I briefly
confirmed this to be the case without any reservations and only asked
whether any preparations were to be made. H.M. declined this equally
briefly and dismissed me.' 32
Although Moltke was not present at any of these discussions, he was
subsequently informed in detail about them. Falkenhayn wrote to him
at Karlsbad telling him unofficially of his impression that Vienna might
not be quite as decided on war as the Kaiser had deduced from the
memorandum and letter that Sz6gy6ny had presented to him.
The chancellor ... appears to have as little faith as I do that the
Austrian government is really in earnest, even though its language
is undeniably more resolute than in the past. ... Certainly the com-
ing weeks will not bring a decision under any circumstances. ..
Nonetheless, although I have not been authorised to do so, I con-
sidered it advisable to inform you of the gravity of the situation so
that anything untoward which could, after all, occur at any time,
should not find you wholly unprepared.33
Thus, Falkenhayn was sceptical whether war would really result from
the current crisis,34 and as long as the Kaiser shared this notion (on
6 July he told Tirpitz's deputy, Capelle, as well as General von Bertrab
28 See Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes (PA-AA) R996, 'Mitteilungen des
Generalstabes der Armee und des Admiralstabes der Marine fber die militlrische
Leistungsfihigkeit anderer Staaten', Waldersee to Zimmermann, 4 July 1914.
Walden3ee had gone to Hanover on 4 July to visit his dying aunt.
29 On 5 July, the Austrian ambassador, Ladislans Count Sz6gyeny-Marich had delivered
the Austrian memorandum and Emperor Franz Joseph's letter to Wilhelm I, asking
the German ally for support for any action of revenge that Austria might decide on
in response to the assassination at Sarajevo. It was on this occasion that the famous
blank cheque' was issued to Austria.
0 Cf. Geiss, JuIikise I, p. 79; Klein, DeutscAland, p. 220; E. H61zle, Quellen zur EntsteAung
des Ersten Weltkreges (Darmstadt, 1978), doc. 131, pp. 308f. Falkenhayn recalled that
Plessen and Lyncker were also present at the meeting with the Kaiser, but
mentioned no other participants.
31 The Parlametarischer Untersuchungsausschums was the body that investigated the war
guilt question' after the war.
32 H61zle, QueZwn, pp. 308f.
G Geiss, Jukrise i, doc. 23a.
' Cf. Afflerbach, Eaenhayr, p. 150; A. von Wegerer, Der Aubrch des Weltkrieges 1914
(2vols, Hamburg, 1939) Is p. 132.

that he did not think war would occur35), the military's wishes could
not be fulfilled. The military were, however, unaware of Bethmann
Hollweg's resolve and underestimated his determination to encourage
the Austrian ally. That Falkenhayn, as well as the absent Moltke, did
not yet consider war unavoidable is further underlined by their
exchange of letters between 8 and 18 July on the matter of further
army increases.36
During these critical weeks in early July, the ball was in Vienna's
court. There was no need for immediate action, and therefore no need
to recall Moltke or cancel already arranged holidays. Falkenhayn, like
most military decision-makers, went on vacation as scheduled; he was
absent from Berlin from 8 July onwards. Wilhelm Groener, head of
the general staff's railway department, and Oberst Walter Nicolal, head
of section IIIb (secret intelligence), were also away and only returned
to Berlin on 25 July.37 Oberst Gerhard Tappen, the chief of the 2nd
(deployment) department of the general staff, left Berlin on 15 or 16
July for Goslar, returning to Berlin on 23 July.38
Before leaving for his annual North Sea cruise on 6 July, the Kaiser
instructed General Hermann von Bertrab, the most senior general staff
officer in Berlin during Moltke's and Waldersee's absence, to inform
the chief of staff of the events at Szdgy6ny's audience. It was from
Bertrab that Moltke learnt about the Austrian memorandum and the
Kaiser's decision to back Austria's demands and to support her should
Russia become involved in the conflict. Bertrab's impression was that
the Kaiser did not consider such a Russian involvement likely, and that
he viewed the matter as a purely Balkan affair, at least for the moment.
He informed Moltke that the Kaiser's departure for his cruise was to
be seen in that light.39 When Waldersee briefly returned to Berlin on
8 July, Bertrab advised him of his talk with the Kaiser and his letter to
Moltke. Waldersee felt no need to take further action at that point, as
he recalled after the war:
G Geiss, Juikrisei, docs 32a and 32b, p. 95. See also Hopman's letter to Tirpitz, in
which he passed on information from Capelle about this talk. According to this
document, the Kaiser claimed to have spoken about the current situation with the
chancellor, the chief of the General Staff, the minister of war and the deputy of the
chief of the Admiralty Staff on the previous day. Either Hopman was mistaken, or
the Kaiser must have spoken on the telephone with Moltke, for he was not in Berlin
at this time. Hopman to Tirpitz, 6 July 19 14, in Volker Berghahn and Wilhelm Deist,
'Kaiserliche Marine', MGM 1 (1970), doc. 1, p. 45.
36 This had been an area of ongoing dispute between the General Staff and the
ministry of war. Cf. Afflerbach, Ealenhayn, p. 151. On the debate on army increases,
see particularly S. F6rster, Der Dpelte Militarismus (Stuttgart, 1 985).
37 Tnimpener, War Premeditated?' p. 62.
g8 Tappen, 'Kriegserinnerungen', BA-MA, W-10/50661, p. 10.
3'
Geiss, Juikrise i, doc. 33, pp. 97f.; W. Gcrlitz, ed., Regere der Kaiser? Aufrichnungen
des Chefs des Marinekabinetts Admiral Georg Alexander von Mailer 1914-1918 2nd edn
(G6ttingen, 1959) (cited as Muller, Diary), p. 32. Muller commented on the fact that
Moltke, unusually, did not accompany the monarch on his cruise because he had
gone to Karlsbad.

426 Annika Mombauer
For my part, being the deputy of General von Moltke in all matters
relating to war, there was nothing to be arranged as a result of the
audience of General von Bertrab in Potsdam. The scheduled mobil-
ization work had been completed on 31 March 1914. The army was
ready, as always.40
The general staff could do nothing further while events in Vienna were
taking their course. The key decision-makers could wait in their various
holiday resorts, while their absence helped to create the impression of
calm that the civilian governments in Berlin and Vienna wanted to
convey to the outside world. Little did they know just how important
this alibi would become after the war. Moltke and Waldersee were
being kept informed of the events in Vienna by the German military
attache Karl von Kageneck, and about general developments by the
Auswartiges Amt. As Tappen recalled: 'During that time the Auswar-
tiges Amt kept in constant touch with the general staff.41 Tappen was
also able to brief Moltke in person when he visited him in Karlsbad
on 7 July.
From Kageneck, Moltke learned of the decisions taken by the Aus-
tro-Hungarian ministerial council of 7 July. Kageneck had found out
from an Austrian general staff officer that an unacceptable ultimatum
to Serbia was planned, and that it was considered probable that Russia
would become actively involved in the ensuing conflict. His informant
declared 'with a triumphant smile: "This time war is certain".'42 Ger-
man decision-makers, military and political, were not convinced, how-
ever, that Austria would not back down at the last moment. Thus Admi-
ral Albert Hopman wrote to Tirpitz on 9 July: 'Personally I am
convinced that the Austrians are already running out of steam and will
continue to do so, and that they were probably never as steamed up
as H.M. portrayed it.'43 A similar concern existed within the Auswar-
tiges Amt, as the Bavarian charge d'affaires, Hans von Schoen,
reported to Georg Count Hertling:
Here [in Berlin] one is quite in favour of Austria using this favour-
able hour, even given the danger of further complications. Whether,
however, one will ultimately show resolve in Vienna still seems
doubtful to Herr von Jagow and Herr von Zimmermann.44
40 Geiss, J/iikrisei, doc. 32 c, pp. 96f.

41 Cf. Tappen, 'Kriegserinnerungen', PA-MA, W-10/50661, p. 10.
42 Geiss, Juikrise i, doc. 44, p. 1 16. For this and other letters from and to Kageneck, see
now also Gfinther Kronenbitter's collection of new documents on the July Crisis;
'Die Macht der Illusionen. Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch 1914 aus der Sicht des
deutschen Militarattaches in Wien', MilitargescAicAtliche Mitteilungen 57 (1999), pp.
519-50.
4' Berghahn and Deist, 'Kaiserliche Marine', doc. 4, Hopman to Tirpitz, 9 July 1914.
44 Deuerlein, Biiefwechs4 Schoen to Hertling, 18 July 1914, doc. 104. For a similar
statement, see also Soden to Hertling, 9 July 1914, doc. 103.

Kageneck received a number of specific questions from the general
staff in Berlin. On 11 July, Waldersee requested information about
Conrad's military intentions: 'Is the entire army to be mobilised? Is it
planned to march into Galicia at the same time? Or are only a few
corps, partially strengthened, to march into Serbia?'45 It is clearly not
true to claim that Waldersee 'did nothing at all' during the crucial
days of July.46 In his reply of 15 July Kageneck explained that he had
been unable to consult Conrad, who was on holiday in Innichen in
the Tyrol, but had spoken to his deputy, General von Hdfer. He was
able to ascertain that Austria planned to mobilize against Serbia only
('Mobilmachung Balkan'), and not to deploy any troops in Galicia, not
least to ensure that Russia would have no pretext for becoming
involved.48 Hbfer was concerned, however, about the length of Austr-
ian mobilisation time, and about the possibility that Serbia's forces
would stay far in the south, in the area of Nis, so that an engagement
of Serbian troops could be delayed for about three weeks after the
outbreak of hostilities. Kageneck suspected that Russia would stay out
of the conflict, especially following the revelations by the French sena-
tor Humbert about the poor state of French armaments.49 He infor-
med Moltke that the date for the delivery of the ultimatum was set for
the 25th (it was later changed to the 23rd), and that Austria wanted
to wait until the end of the harvest before taking any action. Clearly,
then, for the German military there was no need to feel pressured by
time. Moltke commented in the margin of Kageneck's report: 'If the
demarche is only presented on 25 July a lot of water will flow down
Walden3ee to Kageneck, 11 July 1914, in Kronenbitter, 'Die Macht der Illusionen', p.

533.
46 Turner, The Role of the General Staffs', p. 312.
17 This was an unfortunate result of the
plan to demonstrate outward calm by sending
decisive men on holiday. Key decision-makers, such as Conrad and Moltke, could not
coordinate or confirm their strategies, and military discussions had to be conducted
by less senior figures. Kageneck to Waldersee in Geiss, Jlikri se I, p. 179, also in BA-
MA, W-10/50891.
48 See Maurer, Outbreak, pp. 79ff. on Conrad's strategy in 1914.
49 On 13 July 1914 the French senator Charles Humbert had publicly revealed serious
shortcomings within the French army. In the light of these revelations, Moltke
composed a secret memorandum on 31 July 1914. It concluded that France only had
a limited number of heavy artillery which did not meet modem requirements in
terms of effectiveness, range and mobility. Substantial changes to the current M81
model were, however, planned for the end of 1914. Ammunition supplies in France's
eastern fortifications had been increased over the last two years, but there was only
limited bomb-proof storage space. France did not yet have any new-style mortars
(Minenwfer), and would instead use antiquated mortars (glatte Mdner) with out-of-
date ammunition. The overall conclusion of the memorandum was that France's
heavy artillery, siege artillery and fortification artillery was of a much inferior
standard than previously presumed, and much inferior to Germany's. BA-MA,
PH3/629, pp. 12f. This knowledge made the current crisis appear even more of a
golden opportunity for Germany. On Humbert's revelations, see also G. Krumeich,
Armaments and Politics in France on the Eve of the Firt World War: The Introduction of the
Three-Year Conscription 1913-1914 (London, 1984), p. 214 and J. Keiger, France and the
Origins of the First World War (London, 1983), p. 149.

428 Annika Mombauer
the Danube before it may come to more.'50 Kageneck expressed con-
cern that Serbia might back down once the 'Mobilization Balkan' was
under way.
Then what? Should this great start again come to nothing?
Berchtold fears such a turn of events. In my opinion it should then
be down to the military leaders to ensure that there can be no turn-
ing back.51
This is exactly where the intervention of Moltke and his colleagues
proved to be decisive - by ensuring that there would be no turning
back.
Waldersee received Kageneck's reply on 17 July. He immediately
informed the chief of the general staff about its content 'in the most
careful manner',52 and passed on the information in a private letter
to Jagow. He informed the state secretary that Austria intended to
deploy six army corps against Serbia, and none against Galicia, but
that Austria would turn away from Serbia and towards Russia, 'the main
opponent', if the latter became involved in the conflict. Waldersee
warned, however, that the Austrian military measures might be slow,
for a partial mobilisation was never without shortcomings; the change
from the Serbian to the Russian front would take time, and one did
not yet know where (i.e. how far in the south) the Serbs would con-
front the Austrian army. What Jagow could not know was just how
much Germany's strategy depended on Austria not being slow in its
deployment against Russia in the first weeks, a fact that Waldersee
omitted to point out. Lacking detailed knowledge about the war plan,
Jagow did not know that Austria's rapid mobilization in the East was
essential while German troops were primarily deployed against France.
Waldersee did assure Jagow, however, that there was as yet no need
for action from Germany's military authorities. 'General Moltke plans
to return to Berlin on the 25th of this month. I remain here ready to
pounce; we in the general staff are ready, in the meantime there is
nothing for us to arrange.'53 At this time, Waldersee was not yet con-
vinced that 'the current crisis would lead to actions of a larger sort',
as he put it in a letter to Kageneck.54 On 22 July, Moltke wrote to his
wife from Karlsbad: 'I am sorry not to be able to stay here another
50 Quoted in T. von Schifer, 'Generaloberst von Moltke in den Tagen vor der
Mobilmachung und seine Einwirkung auf Osterreich-Ungamn', Die Kriegsschuldftage.
Beri;ner Monatshefte r internationale AufAlarng (Aug. 1926), p. 515.
51 Geiss, Jukrise i, doc. 102, p. 179.
52 Walden3ee to Kageneck, 17 July 1914, in Kronenbitter, 'Die Macht der Illusionen', p.
534.
G Geiss, Juikrise i, doc. 124, pp. 198f.
54 Walden3ee to Kageneck, 17 July 1914, in Kronenbitter, 'Die Macht der Illusionen', p.
534.

week, but I have to return to Berlin. Tomorrow, the 23rd, is the critical
day! I am eager to find out what will happen.'55
Waldersee informed the parliamentary commission in 1919, 'I only
returned to Berlin once the greatest political tensions occurred, on
the 23rd of July.' It would be more accurate to say that he returned
when he knew to expect the greatest political tensions, i.e. on the 23rd,
the day the ultimatum to Serbia was finally delivered. The military were
informed of the date for the delivery of the ultimatum, and of its unac-
ceptable character, and Waldersee, as well as other key military leaders,
timed their return to coincide with it.56 Waldersee was, however, lying
in 1919 about the period of time he supposedly spent away from
Berlin. While he did go to Hanover on 4 July, he did not stay for his
aunt's funeral, and was in fact not absent from the centre of decision-
making for as long as he later suggested. In September 1914 he wrote:
I could not attend the funeral because I was recalled due to the
political tensions. After that, following discussion with Jagow and
Zimmermann, I went to Ivenack for a bit in order to avoid attention,
from where I was recalled three times, however; finally on the
23rd.57
While Germany's military leaders did indeed keep a low profile in July
1914, it can no longer be maintained that they were not involved in
the decision-making of those critical weeks, and particularly the final
days. The key military decision-makers all returned to Berlin within
hours of each other. Tappen, as we have seen, was back in Berlin on
23 July. Minister of War Falkenhayn arrived from the island of Juist on
24 July, and was back at work at the war ministry the next day.58
Moltke's return was also timed to coincide with the expected rising of
tensions following the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He arrived back
in Berlin on the evening of the 25th, and met up with Waldersee the
5 Cited in J. von Crone, 'Zum Kriegsausbruch 1914', Die Dre4 Zeitschnftfitr

AntAroposopAie und Dwigliederng, Herausgegeben von der Anthroposophischen
Gesellschaft (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 8. This letter is not included in the edited
Erinnerungun.
56 See Geiss, Jiikrise i, p. 96, n. 3, who points out that only Berlin and Vienna knew
about the soon-to-be delivered ultimatum and that 'the most severe political
tensions' could not yet have occurred.
17 Walderee's secret memorandum, Sept. 1914: 'Meine Erlebnisse nu Beginn des
Krieges 1914', BA-MA, W-10/51032, p. 9. See also Klein, DeutscAland, p. 222, who
cites postwar letters from Walderee to Jagow, in which Waldersee wrote that he
returned repeatedly from Ivenack in nearby Mecklenburg to Berlin or had his
adjutant visit him. As Klein points out, this is important evidence to suggest that
military preparations were undertaken in Berlin following the meetings of 5/6 July.
Trumpener maintains that Waldersee left Berlin on 8 July and did not return until
the 23rd, and is unconvinced by Klein's allegations or the evidence he cites.
Trumpener, War Premeditated?' p. 63. However, Waldersee's memorandum, as well
as the letter Klein cites, both prove without doubt that Waldersee did indeed return
from the Mecklenburg countryside to oversee and coordinate military decision-
making.
8 Afflerbach, Eakenhoyn, P. 153.

430 Annika Mombauer
next morning for a discussion of the situation, later meeting Jagow in
the Auswartiges Amt.59
It was also on the 26th that Moltke passed on his draft for a notifi-
cation to Belgium to the Auswartiges Amt, which would be used by the
diplomats, with only minor alterations, to initiate the violation of
Belgian neutrality. Military concerns gave rise to this notification,
which constituted a clear encroachment on the civilian decision-mak-
ers' prerogative. On the same day Moltke also spoke with the chancel-
lor, who had spent most of July away from Berlin in his country estate
at Hohenfinow.60 Bethmann, too, had secretly travelled to Berlin on
several occasions during the crisis. In the tense days before and after
the ultimatum was delivered, he spent most of his time on the tele-
phone, as Riezler noted in his diary: 'Apparently preparations for all
eventualities, discussions with the military leaders about which nothing
is said.'61 Like Moltke, Bethmann and Riezler returned to Berlin on
Saturday, 25 July.62 Two days later, the Kaiser arrived at Wildpark
Station in Potsdam.63 He had been kept away from Berlin because it
was feared that he would lose his nerve and counsel peace at the last
minute, and indeed, impressed with Serbia's conciliatory answer to
Austria's ultimatum, he - briefly - no longer favoured war on his
return. Count Dohna recalled that the scene at the station seemed to
him 'a moment during which peace seemed once again in the offing;
the war party seemed disappointed'.64
Wilhelm invited his closest advisers, the chancellor, Jagow, Moltke,
Pohl and the cabinet chiefs to his Potsdam residence, the Neues Palais,
for a meeting. Minister of War Falkenhayn only received information
about the meeting 'through unofficial channels',65 not having been
9 This is e.g. confirmed by Dommes, who wrote after the war: 'During July 1 914
Generaloberst von Moltke was at the spa in Karlsbad. He returned to Berlin on 25
July, the day that the first Hungarian ultimatum [sic] to Serbia expired. During the
decisive days following the 25th I was in almost daily contact with Generaloberst von
Moltke, until - commanded to him at the beginning of our mobilization - I moved
to the general staff building for good on 2 August.' Stellungnahme Dommes ffir
Friedensverhandlungen, Febr. 1919, NL Moltke, N78/34. Geiss gives the date for
Moltke's retun as the 25thb, Geiss, Judkrise ii, pp. 11-12, as does Wegerer, AusbruIs,
p. 355. Ritter mistakenly claims that Moltke returned on 26 July (Staatskunst ii, p.
312) and even that he was away until the 27th (p. 282). Similarly, Fischer mistakenly
claims that Moltke, as well as Waldersee, only returned to Berlin on 26 July.
Illmionen, p. 702. Turner also gives the wrong (later) date, and attaches significance
to this apparent late return, claiming that Moltke arrived in Berlin after Austria's
partial mobilization. 'The Role of the General Staffs', p. 312.
60 Cf. Geiss, Julikise ii, p. 12, n. 3. Schifer, 'Generaloberst von Moltke in den Tagen
der Mobilmachung', Die Kriegsschuldfrage (1926), p. 516; Wegerer, Ausbruh I, p. 355.
61 Riezler, Tagebiichet 25 July 1914, pp. 190f.
62 Gp. ct., 27 July 1914, p. 191.
63 Mfiller, Diary, p. 35.
64 Alfred Craf von Dohna, Der Feldzug in Ostpreul3en 1914', 24 Apr. 1920, in BA-MA,
W-10/51032, pp. 136f.
65 Falkenhayn diary, 27 July 1914, in BA-MA, W-10/50635. Falkenhayn's diary was
copi ed by Gen eralm aj or von Tieschowitz for the Reichsarchiv in 1 927; the ori ginal
diary is lost. The copies were among the recently returned documents from Moscow,
and they are an invaluable source for shedding light on the decision-making process

invited to attend the audience. Although Falkenhayn was under the
impression that the decision was made 'to fight the matter through to
the end, whatever the cost', when he approached the chancellor the
next day to demand 'return of all troops currently located outside of
garrisons back to garrison', Bethmann refused.66 Bethmann's problem
was the Kaiser, who had decided that all reason for war had been
removed in the light of Serbia's answer to the ultimatum.67 He no
longer wanted Austria to provoke a conflict, and was even prepared to
drop the ally to avoid it. Falkenhayn's diary recorded coldly: 'I remind
him that he is no longer in control of these matters.'68 By delaying
and altering the Kaiser's mediation proposal to Vienna (the idea of a
'Halt-in-Belgrade'), it was the chancellor who in the end ensured that
the monarch was indeed no longer in a position to prevent an escal-
ation.69
On 28 July, the day of Austria's declaration of war on Serbia, the
Kaiser's mood had changed again, as Falkenhayn recorded. 'Claims,
as he says, that once the ball is rolling it can no longer be stopped.'
At this point, Falkenhayn was already advocating that the state of
'impending danger of war' ('drohende Kriegsgefahr') be declared, but
Bethmann still favoured a delay of that measure.70 The chancellor was
intent on letting Germany/s future opponents, and Russia in particular,
put themselves in the wrong. It was paramount that Germany 'appear
as the attacked', if public support for war were to be forthcoming.
Bethmann was also still motivated by the vain hope that Britain might
stay out of a conflict, if Germany appeared peaceful.71 To Falkenhayn's
during the July Crisis. See also Afflerbach, Ealkenhoyn, pp. 148ff.
66 This is confirmed by Wenninger's note of 29 July in Geiss, Juikiise ii, doc. 704.
Similarly, Leuckart wrote on 29 July about his briefing at the Ministry of War: 'It was
added - as extremely secret - that the minister of war only managed to force the
chancellor with the greatest of effort to order the recalling of the troops from the
training grounds.' BA-MA, W-10/50890.
67 Geiss, Julikrise ii, doc. 575, Wilhelm II to Jagow, 28 July 1914.
68 Falkenhayn diary, 28 July 1914, BA-MA, W-10/50635.
69 See Geiss, JIiikrise ii, p. 164
70 The military leadership had three different stages of mobilizing measures at its
disposal: reinforcements, state of impending war and mobilisation (Verstdrkung,
drohede Kriegsgefahr und MobilmacAung). First troop movements were expected within
36 hours after initial declaration of the state of impending war (see e.g. BA-MA,
PH3/720, General von Below to Falkenhayn, 6 June 1914). Arden Bucholz
distinguishes seven different stages of mobilization, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War
Planning New York (Oxford, 1991), pp. 300-2.
71 Bethmann explained at the meeting with Falkenhayn, MolItke and Jagow that
Germany had to wait for Russia's mobilization, 'because otherwise we will not have
the public opinion on our side either here or in England. The latter was desirable
because, in the Reich-Chancellor's view, England would not be able to be on Russia's
side if she unleasbhed a general war by attacking Austria, thus taking all the blame
for the whole conflagration [filr den groJen Kadderadatsch]' This was not a hope that
Falkenhayn, convinced of Britain's opportunism, shared. Falkenhayn diary, 29 July
1914, BA-MA, W-10/50635; also Afflerbach, Ea:enhayn, p. 157; Fischer, Jlmionen, p.
711.

432 Annika Mombauer
surprise, Moltke also advocated a delay.72 Falkenhayn thought that

Moltke still hoped for peace, for he noted:
I do, by the way, understand this decision; for, whoever still believes
in the possibility of keeping the peace or at least wishes for it can,
of course, not subscribe to the declaration of danger of impending
war. Naturally, this decision leads to a military disadvantage for us,
but if Moltke is willing to justify this then I cannot oppose it.73
But was Falkenhayn right to suspect that Moltke wanted to preserve
peace at that time? More likely, he agreed with Bethmann's view that
one should wait as long as possible in order to let the Russians take
the blame for being the first great power to declare a general mobiliz-
ation. Like the Chancellor, he never underestimated the importance
of public opinion. Moreover, he had received intelligence suggesting
that Russia's mobilization preparations were not as extensive and sys-
tematic as he had previously been led to believe.74
On the same day, other military observers had a very different
impression of Moltke's resolve, and thought him far from peaceable.
Theirs were, however, second-hand opinions, and as such possibly less
reliable than Falkenhayn's first-hand account.75 Generalleutnant Karl
Ritter von Wenninger, the Bavarian military attache in Berlin, infor-
med the Bavarian minister of war, Kress von Kressenstein, that he was
under the impression that there was a battle between the ministry of
war and the general staff on the one hand, and the chancellor and
Auswartiges Amt on the other. The minister of war, with support from
the chief of staff, was pushing for immediate military measures, in
keeping with the current political tensions. In fact, Wenninger
observed that Moltke wanted to go even further, noting that
he uses his whole influence towards ensuring that this unusually
favourable military situation be used in order to strike; he points
out that France is almost in a military embarrassment,76 that mili-
tarily Russia feels anything but secure; in addition the favourable
time of year, the harvest largely brought in, the annual training pro-
gramme completed.77
72 Falkenhayn diary, 29 July 1914, BA-MA, W-1O/50635. See also Afflerbach, Ealnhoy n,
p. 155.
7'
Falkenhayn diary, 29 July 1914, BA-MA, W-10/50635.
7' See Trumpener, 'War Premeditated?', p. 77; Geiss, Julikrise ii, p. 237.
7 The discrepancy between Wenninger's and Falkenhayn's accounts is also commented
on by the Reichsarchiv. Haeften concluded that Wenninger can only have had third-
hand information, as he would not have had the opportunity for a discussion with
Moltke. BA-MA, W-10/52106, 'Bericht fber Besprechung mit Prof. Bernadotte
Schmitt im Reichsarchiv', 31 July 1928.
76 This view was clearly based on Humbert's revelations about the poor state of the
French army. Cf. n. 49.
77 Geiss, Ju/krise ii, doc. 704, 29 July 1914.

Similarly, the Saxon military attache General von Leuckart reported

to Adolf von Carlowitz, the Saxon minister of war:
There is no doubt that the chief of the general staff is for the war,
while the chancellor is holding back. Generaloberst v. Moltke is
reported to have said that we would never again find a situation as
favourable as now, when neither France nor Russia have completed
the extension of their army organisations.78
Whatever Moltke's doubts may have been, he was outwardly confident
and determined to seize the current opportunity to provoke a'preven-
tive' war.
The Last Days of July: The Military Take-Over

On 28 July Moltke drafted a memorandum for the Kaiser and
Bethmann, 'Assessment of the Political Situation'. In it, he argued that
a Russian partial mobilization should be followed by a German general
mobilization. In Albertini's words, the memorandum 'marks an
invasion by the military authorities of the political field which lies out-
side their province', and indeed Moltke felt quite entitled to comment
on the political situation, as the title of the memorandum suggests.79
He began to put pressure on the politicians and attempted to influ-
ence foreign policy decisions by making these dependent on military
necessities, rather than the other way around.
In his memorandum, Moltke outlined how a number of partial and
general mobilizations would follow one another in a domino effect.
Austria had so far only mobilized against Serbia, but, when faced with
Russian mobilization in the districts of Kiev, Odessa and Moscow, she
would have to mobilize her remaining forces against Russia. Once Aus-
tria mobilized her entire army, however, a clash between Austria and
Russia would become unavoidable. This, in turn, would imply the casus
foederis for Germany, who would have to mobilize herself, or break her
alliance agreement and allow Austria to be destroyed by superior Rus-
sian forces. A German mobilization would lead to a general mobilis-
ation in Russia, who would secure French support by maintaining that
she was being attacked by Germany. Moltke urged that Germany begin
her mobilization in the light of Russian and French mobilizing meas-
ures, and that it was imperative that it be established as soon as possible
whether Russia and France were willing to go to war.
78 Gp. cit., doc. 705. Frhr. von Varnbfler, the Wfrttemberg ambassador, learnt from the
military plenipotentiary Graevenitz that there had been a pronounced difference
between civilian and military decision-makers. While Bethmann still wanted to gain
time, the chief of staff and minister of war advocated immmediate mobilization
measures. A. von Wegerer, Der Abrtwh des Weltkrieges 1914 (2 vols, Hamburg, 1939)
Ii, p. 112.
71 'Zur Beurteilung der politischen Lage'. Cf. Albertini, Origins ii, pp. pp. 488f.; Geiss,
Judikrise ii, pp. 235f., doc. 659; Ritter, Staatskumt ii, p. 315.

434 Annika Mombauer
The more our neighbours' preparations continue, the quicker they
will be able to complete their mobilizations. As a result, the military
situation is worsening for us day by day and can lead to fateful conse-
quences for us if our likely opponents can continue to prepare calm-
ly.80
Whereas the German politicians had previously not intended to mobil-
ize in response to a Russian partial mobilization, Moltke's insistence
led to a change of heart. In Geiss's words, Moltke's memorandum
amounted to a serious intervention in the decision-making process,
and he rightly concludes: 'on 29 July [Moltke] decisively contributed
to bringing about this horrible war [Moltke's words!] with his robust
intervention into German politics.'81 Yet, the memorandum also high-
lights Moltke's ambiguity regarding the coming war. While he clearly
felt the need to advocate military measures, and did not want Germany
to back down or adopt a conciliatory policy, he had no illusions about
the result of these seemingly inevitable developments. Instead he
anticipated the carnage of the coming war, and predicted the begin-
ning of 'the mutual tearing apart of the European culture states'.82
Only a miracle, he wrote, could prevent war at the final hour, a war
'that would destroy the culture of almost the whole of Europe for dec-
ades to come'. Moltke was torn between feeling bellicose and fright-
ened, and was perhaps more concerned about the nature of the
impending tragedy than some of his military contemporaries.83 Yet, he
never counselled peace.
By 29 July Moltke was adamant that Germany needed to announce
general mobilization, although Russia had not yet declared hers, and
although Russia and Austria were not yet engaged in hostilities, when
on only the previous day he had made a German mobilization depen-
dent on those points. He was concerned about the speed that was
needed to implement the first part of the Schlieffen/Moltke plan -
initial success in Belgium depended on a surprise attack on Li-ege, and
the plan's overall success depended on the capture of Belgian railway
lines and on slow Russian mobilization. As Germany could not afford
to wait for the mobilization of her enemies, military concerns were
now beginning to dictate political measures.
Perhaps it was the fact that Austria had declared war on Serbia that
motivated Moltke to change his previously reluctant attitude. It is also
possible that Moltke reacted to news of Russian partial mobilization
reaching a 'far advanced' stage, suggesting that Russian mobilization
would be quicker than had previously been thought. Even more worry-
80 Ritter, Staatskunst ii, p. 315.
s1 Geiss, Juikrise ii, p. 236. See also Albertini, Origins ii, 489f.; Ritter, Staatskumt II, p.
315.
82 Geiss, Jdkrise ii, doc. 659.
Certainly Falkenhayn did not have the same qualms. Famously, he declared on 4
Aug.: 'Even if we should perish over this, at least it was fun.' Quoted in Afflerbach,
Ealenhayn, p. 147. See also Albertini, Origim ii, p. 490.
ing must have been the news that the Belgians were withdrawing troop
units from training-grounds and were calling up reservists. Worse still,
they were preparing for action in and around Liege. The garrison was
confined to its quarters, bridges were being prepared for demolition,
and the forts around Liege were being supplied with ammunition.84
This is exactly the kind of bad news that would have stirred Moltke
into action - from a military point of view, Germany could now no
longer afford any delays.
Yet, according to Falkenhayn's diary, Moltke's confidence was
shaken, and he did not feel he could support a decision that would
amount to war, now that the war that he had so often demanded was
imminent. He had doubts about Germany's chances of victory and he
knew, more so than Falkenhayn, who did not know of the planned
coup de main on Lifge, that hostilities would have to follow almost
immediately once the 'impending danger of war' had been declared.
The planned coup de mazn was thus an extra burden of responsibility
for Moltke - what had looked good as a plan on paper must have
appeared like a frightening gamble once it threatened to become
reality. Moreover, Erich Ludendorff, the co-author of this risky plan,
could no longer provide moral support or act as a fellow-conspirator,
having been removed from the general staff in November 1913. Moltke
told the Austrian liaison officer, Hauptmann Fleischmann75 on 30 July
that, contrary to a Russian partial mobilization, German mobilization
would automatically mean war. He explained that a Russian partial
mobilization
gave no occasion for a similar measure on the part of Germany,
since German mobilization would only follow upon the beginning
of a state of war between the Monarchy [i.e. Austria] and Russia. In
contrast to the already customary Russian mobilizations and demob-
ilizations, a German mobilization would inevitably lead to war.86
There was only one explanation why war would become unavoidable
once German mobilization was declared: because German troops
would have to march into Belgium and take Li-ege immediately. The
Schlieffen/Moltke plan, once in action, significantly constrained Ger-
many's political options and did not allow for last-minute changes of
heart. Of all the influential decision-makers in those crucial last days
of the crisis, only Moltke realized just how much each hour counted
because only he really knew about the planned coup and about the
84 Trumpener, War Premeditated?' pp. 79-80; see also Geiss, Jzdikrise ii, pp. 335f.
85 eischmann had arrived in Berlin on 30 July as part of an effort to coordinate
military matters between the German and Austrian General Staffs. Upon his arrival, a
direct telephone line between the two staffs was established. Cf. BA-MA, W-10/50890,
Reichsarchiv questionnaire, 9 June 1928.
86 Quoted in Albertini, Originm ii, p. 672. See also Afflerbach, Ealenhayn p. 156.

436 Annika Mombauer
audacity of the undertaking.87 Little wonder that he kept changing his
mind during these last crucial days of July.
At a meeting at the Retchskanzlerpalais on 29 July, Falkenhayn again
pushed for a decisive German response to Russia's partial mobilisation.
Bethmann refused to answer Russia's partial mobilization with a Ger-
man onee, against quzet, very quzet resistance from Moltke'.8 Moltke had
still not found the resolve to demand what he knew to be a military
necessity. Bethmann continued to oppose a declaration of mobilization
on 30 July.89 Falkenhayn and Tirpitz tried to change his mind, both
at a meeting at the Prussian Staatsminzsterium and afterwards, when
Moltke was also present.90 That evening, Moltke finally abandoned his
cautious approach. Falkenhayn recorded in his diary:
Late in the evening at the chancellor's an argument between him
[the chancellor] and Moltke about who would carry the responsi-
bility for a possible war. ... Moltke declares himself decidedly in
favour of war sarsphrase& His changes of mood are hardly explicable,
or not at all.91
At this late point in the crisis, Bethmann Hollweg finally tried to
restrain Vienna, although his attempts were not only too late but also
not forceful enough, considering his constant encouragement in the
previous weeks. At the same time, Moltke secretly liaised with the Aus-
trian general staff behind the chancellor's back, demanding immediate
general mobilization from the ally, famously leading Berchtold to ask
Conrad: 'Who rules in Berlin - Moltke or Bethmann?'92
At the meeting in the evening of 30 July Moltke, Bethmann and
87 The secrecy around the coup de main was extended to exclude the military cabinet,
with further negative consequences. Because the general staff refused, for reasons of
secrecy, to explain why they wanted particular generals deployed on the western
front (namely officer that knew of the plan and were familiar with the terrain
around Liege), the cabinet refused to comply, and sent e.g. Waldersee to the Eastern
front. See Eugen Fischer-Baling's account of a postwar conversation with Waldersee,
in NVerdl.. Kabinettswirtschaft' [sic], Vossische Zeitung, 18 Sept. 1932.
88 Falkenhayn diary, 29 July 1 914, BA-MA, W-10/50635; cf. Afflerbach, Ealkenhayn, p.
157. Emphasis original.
89 See op. cit., p. 158, which quotes from the minutes of a meeting of the
Staatsministerium on 30 July 1914.
90 According to Wenninger's report of 30 July 1914, the chancellor had asked
Falkenhayn and Tirpitz to a meeting at 1 p.m., but not Moltke. He appeared
uninvited after having been informed about the meeting by Falkenhayn. Wenninger
suspected that Moltke and Falkenhayn had made arrangements to keep each other
informed. B.-F. Schulte, 'Neue Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch und Kriegsverlauf
1914', MGM 25 (1979), p. 139; BHStA-KA, MKr 1765, no. 2650. It is unclear why
Moltke was not invited, but it is likely that Bethmann was trying to break up the
military 'lobby' and attempting not to have Falkenhayn and Moltke both present at
the same time.
91 Falkenhayn diary, 30 July 1914, BA-MA, W-10/50635; Afflerbach, Falkenhoyn, pp. 158-
9.
92 See D. Stevenson, The Firt World War and Intemational Politics (Oxford, 1988), p. 28;
H. Herwig, The First World War: Crmany and Amtria-Hungayy 1914-1918 (London,
1997) p. 28; F. Conrad von H6tzendorf, Am meiner Diemtzeit, 1906-1918 (5 vols,
Vienna, 1921-5) rv, p. 152.

Falkenhayn agreed a deadline, following 'endless negotiations'. Falken-
hayn recorded cynically in his diary:
The Chancellor and his people (Jagow - Zimmermann) apparently
still hope for a miracle. ... Moltke and I finally manage to assert
that the decision over the declaration of 'impending danger of war'
must be made by tomorrow midday at the latest.93
It was decided that Germany was to declare the 'state of impending
war' by 12 o'clock on 31 July, whether Russia had mobilised or not.94
Major Hans von Haeften, Moltke's personal adjutant in 1914, was
called to Moltke shortly after midnight in the night of 30-31 July.
Moltke instructed him to draft the Kaiser's soon-to-be-delivered declar-
ation to the people, the army and the navy. Moltke was clearly con-
cerned about the time pressure that Germany was under, for he told
Haeften:
However, if we mobilize this means war. If Germany still continues
to hesitate to implement this measure, for example in order to gain
extra time for negotiations, then this means, in case that such
negotiations fail - which is to be predicted - that Germany would
enter the war under the worst conceivable circumstances. We would
thus allow our opponents to carry the war into German territory. If
we hesitate with mobilization, our situation will be worsening day
by day and can lead to the most fateful results for us if our likely
opponents can continue to prepare themselves without disruption.95
Haeften's impression was that Moltke 'was suffering serious psychologi-
cal turmoil'96 under the pressure of having to advocate German mobil-
ization against Russia. He made his fears plain to Haeften: 'This war
will turn into a world war in which England will also intervene. Only
few can have an idea of the extent, the duration and the outcome of
this war. Nobody today can have a notion of how it is all going to
end.'97 Not even Haeften realised the extra pressure of time that the
coup de main on Liege posed, and he recalls considering Moltke's atti-
tude at the time as 'too pessimistic'. In the light of what Moltke knew,
this was hardly the case.
Moltke co-operated for a time with Bethmann Hollweg's desire to
let the Russians put themselves in the wrong, by waiting for Russian
mobilization to be declared. Yet he was torn between such political
considerations and the need for speed which was essential for Ger-
many's strategic plan. Knowledge of the time pressure must have made
it extremely frustrating for him to see time being 'wasted' in catering
Falkenhayn diary, 30July 1914, BA-MA, W-10/50635.

94 Geiss, Juikrise ii, doc. 801.
PBA-MA, N35/1, p. 26, 'Generaloberst v. Moltke in der Nacht vom 30. zum 31. Juli
1914', Aufzeichnung v. Haeften.
96 BA-MA, W-10/50897, Haeften to Reichsarchiv 30 Jan. 1926.
97 BA-MA, N35/1, Aufzeichnungen v. Haeften, p. 27.

438 Annika Mombauer
for such political considerations. However, with the timing of the coup
de main on Liege still a closely guarded general staff secret, Moltke
could not explain why speed was so important. After all, it was possible
that Bethmann Hollweg and the Kaiser, so concerned to let Russia take
the blame for starting the hostilities, would not consent to such a blat-
ant act of aggression, for while the coup made military sense, it was a
disastrous political faux pas. Certainly, German mobilization became
a matter of urgency once Austria had declared war on Serbia on 28
July, and this event led Moltke to join Falkenhayn in his vociferous
demands for mobilization.
As the 12 o'clock deadline was approaching on 31 July, there was
uncertainty over whether Russia had already declared mobilization,
and while Moltke, Falkenhayn and the Kaiser waited for news, Moltke
appeared to Falkenhayn 'unfortunately very nervous'. Finally, just
before the self-imposed deadline, news arrived confirming Russia's
general mobilization.
Bethmann, who arrived later at the scene in the Stemensaal, was furi-
ous that the military had now usurped centre stage of decision-making,
even interfering in such 'civilian' matters as drafting the Kaiser's dec-
laration to the German people. This is the scene as described by Falk-
enhayn in his diary:
The order about impending danger of war is being signed in my hand,
standing up. Then Moltke reads out the draft, written by Major v.
Haeften, for a declaration to the people, delivered in such a way, some-
times with a voice that is almost suffocated by tears but yet energetic at
the same time, that it makes a superb impression. .-. The declaration
to the people is taken on by the chancellor, who appeared in the mean-
time, and who expresses his displeasure in no uncertain terms that
Moltke had infringed here upon his prerogative, which leads to a clash
between the chancellor and H[is] M[ajesty].98
In the light of the newly established certainty that Russia would
become involved on Serbia's side, and that Britain would not remain
a neutral onlooker, Bethmann, like the Kaiser earlier, began to urge
restraint on Austria in the last days of July. Now the military came into
their own, pushing for the war that they had so long wanted.99 Once
it became clear that the assassination in Sarajevo could be the desired
'trigger', the military decision-makers, and with them Moltke, were
determined to put into action what they had so far painstakingly
planned on paper. The circumstances for a war at that time were con-
sidered favourable, as for example Lerchenfeld noted on 31 July:
In military circles here one is feeling most confident [ist man des
besten Mutes]. Months ago [szc] the chief of the general staff, Herr
Falkenhayn diary, 31 July 1914, BA-MA, W-10/50635. See Afflerbach, Ealenhoyn, p.

161.
qp. ct., p. 153.

von Moltke, had already expressed the opinion that the point in
time was militarily as favourable as it would not be again in the
foreseeable future.100
That Britain would not remain neutral was a mere hiccup for the
general staff. In a conversation with Freiherr von Eckardstein on 1
June 1914, Moltke had dismissed the attach&'s pessimistic assessment
of Germany's diplomatic situation and claimed: 'You are also mistaken
as regards England; in any case, what she will do in case of war we can
await calmly.'101 Unlike the chancellor, Moltke was under no illusion
regarding Britain's attitude in case of a violation of Belgian neutrality,
and unlike the Wilhelmstrasse, the general staff was not overly con-
cerned to keep Britain neutral.102 Moltke did not regard Britain's
decision to become involved as a reason to back down, to avoid the
escalation from localized to European and ultimately world war. His
only concession was his concern to keep the British out of the Nether-
lands. As he recalled in 1915: 'Because we spared Holland it also
became impossible for England to violate the neutrality of that coun-
try. After all, she had declared war on the basis of being the protector
of the small neutrals.'103 The general staff completely underestimated
the damage that the British Expeditionary Force could wreak, in the
same way as they underestimated all their other future opponents.104
There was also little concern over the likely consequences a British
involvement would have for Germany's alliance partners. A hostile Bri-
tain would most probably lead Italy to opt for a position of neutrality,
if not in due course to join the alliance's enemies.105 Astonishingly,
the military actually looked forward to facing the British, as Oberst von
Klewitz recalled in 1925: 'Every one of us was dying not only to defeat
the English, but also to take every last one prisoner. How often was
there talk about this in peace-time.'106
Moltke's reaction to the outbreak of war was twofold. As we have
seen, he was convinced of its inevitability, and was far from advocating
100 Lerchenfeld to Hertling, 31 July 1914, in Deuerlein, Bfiefitchslj doc. 113, p. 322.
Moltke gave several reasons why Germany was still superior to Russian and French
troops, such as the superiority of German artillery and of the German infantry gun,
as well as the inadequate training of French soldiers due to the recent changeover
from two to three year service.
101 Eckardstein, Lebenserinncrtngen Iii, p. 186.
102 Jagow suggested a curious plan to threaten Britain with a German occupation of
Holland, if she were to intervene in the war, a suggestion that was rejected by
Admiral von Capelle. Cf. Berghahn and Deist, 'Kaiserliche Marine', docs 10 and 1;
V. Berghahn, C.rmany and the Appoach of War in 1914 (London, 1973), p. 211.
10' MolItke to Freytag-Loringh oven, 26 July 1 91 5, BA-MA, W-10/5 1 063.
104 See e.g. Wenninger's diary entry of 31 July, when rumours of an ultimatum to
France led to speculation in the ministry of war whether this was necessary, as
France seemed to be shying away from an armed conflict. Wenninger recorded:
'General von Wild says: "Well, we'd like to have brothers take part, too." 'Schulte,
'Neue Dokumente', p. 140.
105 See also Beck, 'West- oder Ostoffensive 1914?', in Studien, ed. H. Speidel (Stuttgart,
1955), p. 150.
106 Klewitz to Haeften, 16 Jan. 1925, BA-MA, W-10/50897, p. 125.

440 Annika Mombauer
peace. Once he was certain that war would come, he was determined
to see it through, and within the general staff there was confidence
that the German army was well prepared. The mobilization that went
'like clockwork', and the performance of the German troops in the
first weeks of the war, seemed to confirm the generals' pride in
their preparations.
However, Moltke was also painfully aware that the war that was about
to start would be worse than one could imagine, and he worried about
its consequences. Despite his bellicose words, he was not certain of
German victory, although he wanted it desperately. Yet, as we have
already seen, the image that he and his fellow officers gave to the out-
side was that victory was certain.107 The only doubts he voiced were as
to the likely length of the coming war, as Lerchenfeld recorded on
5 August:
England's joining with our opponents no doubt worsened our situ-
ation, because it might become difficult to ensure supplies for the
civilian population should the war take longer. This point was of
some concern to him.108
Recently, the notion that a short war was generally expected in 1914
has been challenged by Stig Fdrster, who demonstrates that the 'short
war illusion' was not universally shared.109 Moltke was among those
who harboured serious, if mostly secret, doubts whether the coming
war would be short. Yet his strategy was utterly dependent on swift
victories and largely geared towards a short war. Germany would not
be able to survive a protracted struggle. As with his concerns about
Germany's ultimate chances of victory, however, he did not make
known his fears about the prospects of a long war of attrition, and
failed to instigate any precautionary measures.11 Therefore, Lerchen-
feld could report optimistically on 2 August:
One can say today that Germany and Austria will be opposed by the
whole world in the impending war. Nonetheless, the mood in the
military circle here is one of complete confidence.11
The Events of 1 August 1914

In the last days of the crisis, military demands made it impossible for
the politicians to act upon Russia's assurances that her mobilisation
107 See e.g. Lerchenfeld to Hertling, 3 Aug. 1914: 'It seems to stay that way that
everyone is going against us, but I share the optimism of the military that we will
succeed.' Deuerlein, BriefwecAse doc. 116, p. 325.
108 Lerchenfeld to Hertling, 5 Aug. 1914, in Deuerlein, BriefwcAselj doc. 119, p. 330.
09 S. F6rster, Der deutsche Generaistab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871-
1914. Metakritik eines Mythos', MGM 54 (1995). See also Herwig, The First World
War, pp. 36, 49.
1l1 See L. Beck, 'Besass Deutschland 1914 einen Kriegsplan?', in Studier, p. 98.
l Lerchenfeld to Hertling, 2 Aug. 1914, in Deuerlein, BriefwcAsel, doc. 115, p. 324.

did not have to result in war, and that Russian troops would not begin
hostilities while Austria and Serbia were still negotiating. Nor could
they support Britain's suggestion that Austria should make a negoti-
ation proposal that Russia could not refuse. Britain even suggested that
in such a scenario she would not support Russia, if a conflict proved
unavoidable despite a genuine Austrian offer. The restrictions of the
Schlieffen/Moltke plan meant that Germany could no longer accept
such proposals.112
Although Russia had not yet replied to Germany's ultimatum by the
afternoon of 1 August, Moltke and Falkenhayn insisted that German
mobilization had to begin. With reliable news from Russia still out-
standing, Admiral Tirpitz suggested delaying action in the west, but
Moltke 'urged we should proceed immediately'. Although the arrival
of an important telegram from Lichnowsky, Germany's ambassador in
London, had been announced, Moltke did not even want to wait for
it. Tirpitz expressed the opinion 'that an hour more or less did not
matter for our intended action. H.M. agreed with me, despite Moltke's
protest.'13 Of all the men present at the Schloss, only Moltke knew
how much each hour counted. The Kaiser finally signed the mobiliz-
ation order at 5 p.m.114 The first mobilization day was to be 2 August.
His task at the Schloss completed, Moltke had already left when the
fateful telegram arrived that threatened to overthrow all the careful
military arrangements for the first days of the war. Lichnowsky
reported from London not only that Britain would remain neutral, but
that it would guarantee French neutrality in a forthcoming war, too,
if Germany refrained from hostilities against France.115 This was a real
opportunity for avoiding the dreaded two-front war. In Lyncker's
words, the news came 'like a bomb':
Immediately the opinion was prevalent that this request could under
no account be turned down, even if the offer was only a bluff, which
was possible after all. For firstly this might be the opportunity per-
haps to have to face only 1 rather than 3 opponents, that is Russia,
against whom war has already been declared today, and secondly
the Kaiser must grasp the hand that is offered and must not reject
it out of loyalty for the [German] people.116
The Kaiser and the chancellor were concerned to preserve British neu-
trality; in fact, a dettnte with Britain had been the basic premise of
112 See Ritter, Staatskumt ii, pp. 329ff.

11 Tirpitz quoted in Geiss, Juikrise ii, doc. lOOOe.
114
Gp. cit., doc. 1000; Falkenhayn diary, 1 Aug. 1914; Wegerer, Ausbrtwh ii, p. 187. See
also Lerchenfeld to Hertling, 1 Aug. 1914, in Deuerlein, BriefwecAse doc. 114, p. 323.
l Geiss, Judkrise ii, do c. 983.
16 Lyncker's diary, Geiss, Juikrise ii, doc. 00GOb. There are several testaments to the
events in the Kaiser's Schloss that day, collected in op. cit., doc. 1000 a-e; see also
Wegerer, Ausbrtwh ii, pp. 188ff. Haeften's accounts are particularly important. Cf.
BA-MA, N35/1, also his article in Deutsche Aligemeine Zeitung, 1 Oct. 1921.

442 Annika Mombauer
Bethmann's policy all along. Now the Kaiser insisted on a change of
deployment. Instead of heading west, he wanted 'his' troops to go east.
Moltke was immediately summoned back to the Schloss. As he
recalled, 'there was a joyful mood. Now we only had to conduct the
war against Russia. The Kaiser said to me: "So we simply deploy the
whole army in the East!"' Moltke replied that this was impossible.
Lyncker noted: 'There was general astonishment when Moltke
declared that the deployment in the West could no longer be stopped
and that war would have to be forced onto France despite everything.'
Admiral von MOller, who was also present at the meeting, recorded
similarly:
The Kaiser says: 'Of course we must go along with this and therefore
stop the deployment in the West for the time being.' General v.
Moltke: 'We cannot do that, if that were to happen, we would dis-
rupt the whole army and would give up any chance of success.
Besides, our patrols have already entered Luxemburg and the
Division from Trier is to follow immediately.'117
To the shocked Moltke, the Kaiser's interference demonstrated that
the monarch still wanted to preserve peace. Could it be that, at the last
minute, the war that already seemed unavoidable would be averted?
Outraged, he complained: 'The final straw would be if Russia now also
fell away.'18 He declared that he could not accept any responsibility
for the war if the 16th division was prevented from leaving Trier for
Luxemburg. Bethmann's response was that for his part he would not
accept responsibility if the British offer were declined.119 Falkenhayn,
who had been called to the scene, was no less belligerent than Moltke,
but he calmed the frantic chief of staff. Moltke was later to complain
bitterly that the minister of war had not supported him by speaking
out against the Kaiser.120 Falkenhayn apparently did not believe that
Lichnowsky's telegram would alter what had been initiated with the
signing of the mobilization order at 5 p.m. In the event, he was
proved right.
It was during these tense hours on 1 August that Moltke 'lost his
nerve', as commentators put it, because he had no alternative to the
deployment of troops in the west, and to the surprise attack on Li-ege
before war was even declared. Railway timetables and mobilization
plans had been worked out meticulously by the general staff - what
117 Miller, Diary, pp. 38ff.; also in Geiss, Julikrise ii, doc. lOOOd.
18 Muller, Diary, p. 39; Geiss, Juikrise ii, doc. lOOOd. Thomas Meyer, one of Moltke's
apologists, credits the chief of staff with rather a lot of foresight when he claims:
'The first telegram had appeared unrealistic to Moltke's political astuteness, and thus
he had to refuse to alter the entire deployment of the army.' In fact, Meyer tries to
blame Britain for the outbreak of war. Helmuth von Moltke, 1848-1916: Dokumente zu
seinem Leben und WiAen (2 vols, Basel, 1993) Is pp. 16f.
19 MUller, Diary, p. 39.
120 Haeften, 'Meine Erlebnisse aus den Mobilmachungstagen 1914', BA-MA, N35/1, p.
35.

had taken months to perfect could not simply be changed at the last
minute. No such painstaking attention had been devoted to an alterna-
tive plan, perhaps even a defensive one. Moltke recalled explaining to
the Kaiser: 'If His Majesty insists on leading the entire army to the east
then you would not have an army that was ready to strike but a messy
heap of disorderly, armed people without supplies.'121 After all, on
what basis would such a change be made? On a vague promise from
Britain that could be revoked at any moment? That German strategy
could not be based on such an assurance Moltke had already emphas-
ized in a memorandum of January 1913:
I would consider it to be extraordinarily dangerous if we decided
to do without the one and only chance that a speedy war against
France would give us, based only on vague assurances from England.
We would burden ourselves with the difficulty of a frontal attack on
the French eastern front and have no guarantee that England would
not intervene at a given moment anyway.122
In this memorandum, Moltke had speculated on the possibility of Bri-
tish neutrality - the very scenario that he was faced with on 1 August
1914. He posed the question as to whether the march through Belgium
should be abandoned if Britain guaranteed her neutrality. He was
quite adamant that this would not be possible.
This would be very dangerous, because it is quite uncertain whether
England would keep her promise; at the same time we would aban-
don our only chance of the quick and resounding success we need
so badly. The renunciation of the march through Belgium would
only be possible if England went along with us. But this is out of
the question, because England considers Germany stronger than
France, is afraid of German hegemony and wants to preserve the
balance in Europe.123
In August 1914, he re-emphasized this point, explaining that it was
impossible for Germany to respect Belgium's neutrality. Even the pros-
pect of British neutrality would not make this worthwhile, because an
offensive war against France was only possible via Belgium.124
Moltke's refusal to comply with the Kaiser's order on 1 August led
to the monarch snapping: 'Your uncle would have given me a different
121 Moltke, Einnerungen, p. 20; also in Geiss, Julikrise ii, doc. lOOc.
122 BA-MA, W-10/50276: 'Die MilitUrpolitische
Lage Deutschlands', pp. 667. This
important document of Jan. 1913 has probably not survived the Second World War.
It is also referred to by Gerhard Ritter, who saw it in 1943 and presumed that it was
intended for the chief of the military cabinet. The original document was entitled
'Germany's conduct in a Triple Alliance War' (VerAaltn DeutscAhands in einem
Dw ibundkrieg). Ritter's notes can now be supplemented with this ReicAsarcAiv study.
See Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (London, 1958), pp. 68-9,
n. 50.
123 Ritter, ScAlieffen Plan, p. 69, n. 50.
124 Lerchenfeld to Hertling, 4 Aug. 1914, in Geiss, Julikrise ii, doc. 1148.

444 Annika Mombauer
answer, and 'It must be possible, if I order it.' The 'Supreme War
Lord' prominently displayed his lack of military expertise and under-
standing in this situation.125 He ordered a stop to the advance of the
16th division. Although Moltke tried to explain the strategic impor-
tance of the Luxemburg railways, which the 16th division was to occupy
on the first mobilization day, he was simply told that he would have
to use different railway tracks. 126 Eventually, Moltke was able to achieve
a compromise: deployment was allowed to continue as planned, but
had to stop just before the French border. Depending on the nature
of French assurances, an orderly move to the east could then be under-
taken, rather than halting the deployment immediately and creating
chaos. However, Moltke could not change the monarch's decision that
the declaration of war against France and any hostilities were to be
postponed.127
When Moltke returned to the general staff building from the Schloss
that evening, he was distraught. As Oberstleutnant von Dommes
recalled, the excitement of the day had proved too much, and eyewit-
nesses recorded that the chief of staff might have suffered a slight
stroke as a result.128 In the eyes of his critics, Moltke's failing health
would become a frequently cited reason for his downfall. According
to this view of the 'Schlieffen school', it was not the general staff or
its 'sacred' Schlieffen plan that had failed Germany, but the ill, and
ill-fated, Moltke.
It was only later that night that Moltke was finally given the go-ahead
for the occupation of Luxemburg."29 The Kaiser told Moltke: 'As has
now transpired, Lichnowsky's telegram was based on a misunderstand-
ing.' Turning over in his bed, he continued: 'Now do as you please;
I don't care either way'."' To Moltke, the Kaiser's interference was
disastrous, although perhaps not altogether unexpected. The monarch
had always been a risk factor in military planning; his interferences,
though less frequent by the time Moltke was chief of the general staff,
were still unpredictable and potentially dangerous. Moltke had always
been aware that, just as Wilhelm II had been prone to interfere in
army manoeuvres, he was likely to get involved in 'the real thing'. This
125 See Ritter, Staatskumt ii, p. 336.
126 Moltke, Erinncrtngen, pp. 20-1; also in Geiss, Juikrise ii, doc. lOOOc; Wegerer,
Ausbtwh ii, p. 190.
127 C+. C t, p. 189.
128 BA-MA, W-10/51061, Dommes to Reichsarchiv 14 Jan. 1926. Haeften's memories of
the event also record that Eliza Moltke thought her husband had suffered a slight
stroke. Haeften, 'Meine Erlebnisse aus den Mobilmachungstagen 1914', BA-MA.
N35/1, p. 35. See also Crone, 'Zum Kriegsausbruch 1914', Die Drei, p. 8.
129 Lichnowsky's telegram has usually been regarded as based on a misundertanding
(see e.g. Geiss, Juikise ii, p. 530), but see Afflerbach, EaenhAyn, p. 166, n. 82, who
argues it was in fact motivated by Grey's difficulty in getting an approval from the
cabinet for intervention on the continent. On Britain's decision-making during the
July Crisis, see Z. Steiner, Britain and the OCrigim of the Firt World War (London,
1977).
Haeften, 'Meine Erlebnisse aus den Mobilmachungstagen 1914', BA-MA, N35/1, pp.
35f.

was a contingency that even the most careful planning could not
pre-empt.
On 1 August 1914 the horrified Moltke, faced with the Kaiser
ordering a German deployment in the east, complained bitterly to
Haeften: 'I want to wage a war against the French and the Russians,
but not against such a Kaiser'.131 He feared that the monarch would
not even have signed the mobilization order if Lichnowsky's telegram
had arrived half an hour earlier.132 One could at least speculate that
in such a case war might still have been averted.
On 1 August 1914, Moltke had been adamant that the German army
could not be directed eastwards. After the war, however, some com-
mentators, such as Groener and Kuhl, felt that a deployment in the
east would actually have been feasible - perhaps from the vantage-
point of wisdom after the events.133 It has also been suggested that
such a change was not only a possibility, but also, crucially, that it could
have had a positive effect on the outcome of the war. Both Ludwig
Beck and Gerhard Ritter have argued that the elder Moltke's strategy
would have offered more hope of military success than the Schlieffen
plan. Gordon Craig rightly points out that, decades after the event, it
is impossible to maintain this with any certainty, but he is also correct
in suggesting that the fraught relationship between the German and
Austrian allies might have been ameliorated by a joint success on the
Eastern front against a common enemy. 134 However, Germany's armies
could not have been deployed as speedily and decisively in the east as
it was possible to do in the west. From a strictly military point of view,
a deployment in the west was the only option to try to achieve the
'guaranteed speedy victory' that the general staff had so confidently
advocated. One might ask, however - given that he did not hesitate to
involve himself in the making of foreign policy - whether Moltke's
duty should not have been to combine military-strategic concerns with
political, economic and even moral ones?
Moltke's defenders have perhaps been too keen to blame the Kaiser
for the disastrous events of 1 August 1914 - he was no military expert,
and as such unaware of the implications of his order, but his layman's
instinct rightly suggested to him that there should have been an alterna-
tive to the almost suicidal mobilization plan in the west. If Moltke had
tried to develop an alternative plan, rather than deciding to scrap the
Ostaufmarschplan in 1913, the option to deploy troops in the east would
have existed in 1914. Moreover, such a plan would have allowed for
131c9t,
. p. 34.
132 See Heisterkamp, Lebensskizze', in Meyer, Moltke i, p. 35.
133 See H. Herzfeld, Der ente Weltkrieg (Munich, 1968), pp. 50-1; H. von Kuhi, Der
Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (2 vols, Berlin, 1929) I" pp. 15f. Kuhl argues such a change of
plan would tecAnically have been possible, but was not for military-political reasons,
although he does not specify these. See also W. Groener, Lebenserinwrurgen:Jugend,
Generalstab, Weltkrieg (G6ttingen, 1957), p. 145; Beck, 'West-oder Ostaufmarsch'.
134 C. Craig, 'The World War I Alliance of the Central Power in Retrospect: The
Military Cohesion of an Alliance', Jounial of Modern History (Sept. 1 965), p. 344.

446 Annika Mombauer
more honesty with Austria, for Russia was the only major enemy they
shared. Instead, whatever the casus belli, German troops had to begin
a war by violating her neutral neighbours' territory.
In the final analysis, Helmuth von Moltke can be held responsible for
the narrowing of military options in Germany's strategic planning dur-
ing his time as chief of the general staff, and for disguising his own
doubts about Germany's military capabilities. His main share of
responsibility lies elsewhere, however. It was in encouraging, almost to
the point of deception, an aggressive foreign policy when he knew
full well that Germany's military potential could not guarantee success.
Increasingly, the option for Germany under Moltke's military leader-
ship had become 'war now or never'. That the civilian leaders would
decide that war was no longer an option was something the military
wanted to avoid at all costs. Little wonder, then, that Moltke felt
responsible for the suffering the war had already caused in his lifetime.
He, at least, was fully aware of this responsibility and, when it began
to dawn on him that his planning had been too optimistic in anticipat-
ing a speedy victory in the west, he confessed his feelings of guilt to
his wife:
What rivers of blood have already flowed, what nameless sorrow has
come over the countless innocents whose houses have been burnt
and pillaged - I am often overcome by dread when I think of this
and I feel I should have to take responsibility for this horror; and
yet, I could not have acted differently from the way I did.135
His death in June 1916 spared him the realization of the full extent
of the horrors of the war that he willed. If he is remembered today, it
should certainly not be as a reluctant military leader, but rather for
his decisive role in the events that led to war in 1914. As we have seen,
in private correspondence with his wife and some of his fellow gen-
erals, at least, he did not deny that responsibility.
Acknowledgements
This article is based on my DPhil. thesis, 'Helmuth von Moltke and
the German General Staff: Military and Political Decision-Making in
Imperial Germany, 1906-1916', University of Sussex, 1997. I would like
to thank John Rdhl, Robert T. Foley, Guinther Kronenbitter and Paul
Lawrence for their helpful comments and advice on drafts of this
article.
The Open Universzty
135 Moltke to his wife, 7 Sept. 1914, Erinnertngen, p. 384.

A Reluctant Military Leader

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A Reluctant Military Leader?

Helmuth von Moltke and the

War in History 1999 6 (4) 417-46 0968-3445(99)WTH1860A © 1999 Amold

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Sarajevo: A Golden Opportunity

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40 Geiss, J/iikrisei, doc. 32 c, pp. 96f.

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Walden3ee to Kageneck, 11 July 1914, in Kronenbitter, 'Die Macht der Illusionen', p.

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5 Cited in J. von Crone, 'Zum Kriegsausbruch 1914', Die Dre4 Zeitschnftfitr

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surprise, Moltke also advocated a delay.72 Falkenhayn thought that

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Similarly, the Saxon military attache General von Leuckart reported

The Last Days of July: The Military Take-Over

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Falkenhayn diary, 30July 1914, BA-MA, W-10/50635.

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Falkenhayn diary, 31 July 1914, BA-MA, W-10/50635. See Afflerbach, Ealenhoyn, p.

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The Events of 1 August 1914

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112 See Ritter, Staatskumt ii, pp. 329ff.

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The Open Universzty

135 Moltke to his wife, 7 Sept. 1914, Erinnertngen, p. 384.

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