ANG LADLAD VS.

COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

Facts:

Ang LadLad is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders.
It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to
moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and
contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the
Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule
65 of the ROC.

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It
also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:

WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;

Ruling:

COMELEC mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
 BIRAOGO V. TRUTH COMMISSION

G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010

Facts:

Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). PTC is a mere ad hoc
body formed under the Office of the President, which is tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman.

Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners filed a case alleging the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 for it violates the equal protection
clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. It does not apply equally to all members of
the same class such that the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its sole object makes
the PTC an “adventure in partisan hostility.

They argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass
acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior
administrations where the “same magnitude of controversies and anomalies” were reported to have
been committed against the Filipino people.

They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized
exceptions because first, “there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for
investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for
personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order
No. 1 to end corruption.”

Issue:

WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

Ruling:

Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
“concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not
a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being
unconstitutional.
 RIZALITO Y. DAVID v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POELLMANZARES

G.R. No. 221538. September 20, 2016

Facts:

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are
unknown. She was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo while still an infant. It was a certain
Edgardo Militar who found her outside the church who later turned her over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano
Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the infant was found on
September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.

Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more
popularly known as Susan Roces) filed a Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe. On May 13, 1974, the
Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the adoption. Senator Poe decided
to run as Senator in the 2013 Elections.

Rizalito David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed a Petition for Quo Warranto
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) assailing the election of Senator Poe for failing to "comply
with the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987 Constitution." The SET ruled that
Senator Poe is a natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as Senator.

Issue:

Whether or Not the 1987 Constitution exclude foundlings from entering public service?

Ruling:

NO. Article IV, Section 2 and Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional provisions on citizenship must not be
taken in isolation. They must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend the well-being of
children, to guarantee equal protection of the law and equal access to opportunities for public service,
and to respect human rights. They must also be read in conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for
requiring natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this presumption is validated by
contemporaneous construction that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.

Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an enumeration. Section 2 categorically
defines "natural-born citizens." This constitutional definition is further clarified in jurisprudence, which
delineates natural-born citizenship from naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil
Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written into the interpreted text, thus establishing its
contemporaneous intent.
 Abubakar v. People,

GR 202408, 27 June 2018

Facts:

The case was a Petitions for Review on Certiorari concerning alleged anomalies in the implementation of
infrastructure projects within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani were public officials of the Department of Public Works and Highways in
ARMM (DPWH-ARMM) when the offenses were allegedly committed. Abubakar held the position of
Director III, Administrative, Finance Management Service. Baraguir was the Director of the Bureau of
Construction, Materials and Equipment, and a member of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards
Committee, while Guiani was the DPWH-ARMM Regional Secretary.

Based on the report submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of the Ombudsman conducted a
preliminary investigation and found probable cause to indict the regional officials of DPWH-ARMM for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On July 31,
1998, 21 separate Informations were filed against Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and other officials of
DPWH-ARMM. The consolidated cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24983.

Abubakar, Guiani, Baraguir, and two (2) employees of DPWH-ARMM were charged in Criminal Case No.
24970 for allegedly awarding excessive mobilization fees to Arce Engineering Services.

Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and two (2) other officials of DPWH¬-ARMM were charged in Criminal Case
Nos. 24972, 24975 to 24980, and 24982 to 24983 for allegedly advancing P14,400,000.00 to several
contractors for sub-base aggregates

Lastly, Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and several other DPWH-ARMM officials were charged in Criminal
Case Nos. 24973, 24974, and 24981 for allegedly causing overpayment on several projects due to
bloated accomplishment reports.

Upon arraignment, Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and some of their co-accused entered a plea of not
guilty. Seven (7) of their co-accused remained at large while one (1) died prior to the scheduled
arraignment

Abubakar claimed that he was only implicated due to the presence of his signature in the disbursement
vouchers. He asserted that he examined the supporting documents and the certifications made by the
technical experts before affixing his signature.

Issue:

Whether or not the right of petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar and Ulama S. Baraguir to the equal
protection of the laws was violated due to "selective prosecution"

Ruling:

No. The prosecution of offenses is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the fiscal. A claim of
"selective prosecution" may only prosper if there is extrinsic evidence of "clear showing of intentional
discrimination. The prosecution of one person to the exclusion of others who may be just as guilty does
not automatically entail a violation of the equal protection clause.
Selective prosecution is a concept that is foreign to this jurisdiction. A case for selective prosecution
arises when a prosecutor charges defendants based on "constitutionally prohibited standards such as
race, religion or other arbitrary classification." Essentially, a selective prosecution claim rests upon an
alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

Although "selective prosecution" has not been formally adopted in this jurisdiction, there are cases that
have been decided by this Court recognizing the possibility of defendants being unduly discriminated
against through the prosecutorial process. The burden lies on the defendant to show discriminatory
intent through extrinsic evidence.

JESUS C. GARCIA v. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, et al.

G.R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Facts:

Petitioner Jesus C. Garcia married Rosalie Jaype-Garcia in 2002. They had three children. Rosalie
describes her husband as dominant, controlling and demands absolute obedience from his wife and
children. Things turned worse when Jesus took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank,
Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Jesus' infidelity spawned a series of fights with
his wife and on one occasion, he also turned his ire on their daughter, who had seen the text messages
he sent to his paramour. Rosalie is determined to separate from her husband but she is afraid that he
would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Jesus had previously warned her
that if she goes on legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. Jesus is the President of the
three family businesses.

Rosalie filed a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City for the issuance of
Temporary Protection Order ("I PO) against her husband pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a
victim of physical abuse, emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity
on the part of Jesus, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. RTC
issued a TPO and a modified TPO in favor of Rosalie.

During the pendency of the civil case,Jesus filed before the Court of Appeals a petition challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 or An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
For Protective Measures For Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefore, and For Other Purposes for being
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses and undue delegation of judicial power.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. 9262 unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and
an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials?
RULING:

No. R.A. 9262 is not unconstitutional. First, R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women
all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences is the essence of true equality."

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children. As spelled out in its Declaration of Policy Section 2, the
State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State
also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security. Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts
to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights
of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

SPARK v. Quezon City

G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017

Facts:

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on
minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."

Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of

young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the
rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from over breadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty
and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process. In addition, petitioners assert that
the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators. They further argue that the
law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based
only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator. While petitioners recognize
that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from the operation of
the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with evening class, they contend
that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to
why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours.

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the
parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of
the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve
the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-
circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of
protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose
more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars informing the
parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.

Issue:

WON the primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances
are unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local
government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus,
NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the
Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision.

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in
the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what
conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of
enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are,
however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily,
the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness
analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from
an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular
conduct is prohibited or not prohibited.

It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."
 FRANCIS A. CHURCHILL and STEWART TAIT vs. JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. L-10572 December 21, 1915

Facts:

Plaintiffs put up a billboard on a private land located in Rizal Province “quite distance from the road and
strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter which is
filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community.” However, defendant Rafferty, Collector
of Internal Revenue, decided to remove the billboards after due investigation made upon the complaints
of the British and German Consuls.

Act No. 2339 authorized the then Collector of Internal Revenue to remove after due investigation, any
billboard exposed to the public view if it decides that it is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a
nuisance.

In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards
mentioned were and still are offensive to the sight."

The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies from
collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and
described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or
removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs and decrees the cancellation of
the bond given by the plaintiffs.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government?

HELD:

YES. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell or hearing, may be suppressed by the State
especially those situated in thickly populated districts. Aesthetics may be regulated by the police power
of the state, as long as it is justified by public interest and safety.

Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in
the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects,
everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power of the State.

Hence, the judgment of the CFI is reversed.

 BARANGAY SINDALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III

G.R. No. 150640 March 22, 2007

Facts:

On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay Sindalan,
San Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for
eminent domain against respondent’s spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the registered
owners of a parcel of land. Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents land into Barangay
Sindalans feeder road. Petitioner claimed that respondents property was the most practical and nearest
way to the municipal road.

Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the benefit
of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner deliberately omitted the
name of Davsan II Subdivision and, instead, stated that the expropriation was for the benefit of the
residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road being proposed to be built
across the respondents land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and those who would purchase
the lots of said subdivision. They also pointed out that under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, it is the
subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a feeder road to the subdivision residents.

Issue:

Whether or not the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public purpose.

Ruling:

NO.In general, eminent domain is defined as the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to
authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner’s consent, conditioned upon
payment of just compensation. It is acknowledged as an inherent political right, founded on a common
necessity and interest of appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the
great necessities of the whole community.

The more generally accepted view sees public use as public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that
anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the
productive power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the state, or which leads
to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor,
which contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. The number of
people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use, provided the use is exercisable in
common and is not limited to particular individuals.

The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking
an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher good which is
public use and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking
of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also constitute a gross
and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right to property as well.
 PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION vs. THE HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS as Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41

G.R. No. L-106528 December 21, 1993

Facts:

Philippine Columbian Association is a non-stock, non-profit domestic corporation and is engaged in the
business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its members. Petitioner's office and facilities
are located in the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent thereto, is a parcel of land consisting of 4,842.90
square meters owned by petitioner. Private respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel of
land, while respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr. and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of the City
of Manila. Petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private respondents. Judgment
was rendered against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay reasonable
compensation therefor.

On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC br. 41, Manila,
for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of the ejectment proceedings. Petitioner,
in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power
to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for public use and welfare; that the
expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the deposit of P2 million in the City of Manila
representing the provisional value of the land, was insufficient and was made under P.D. 1533, a law
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Petitioner’s motion was denied by the RTC and the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not the City of Manila has specific power to expropriate private property under the 1987
Constitution

Ruling:

YES, the City of Manila has specific power to expropriate private property.

The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general powers over its
territorial jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain.

General Powers. — The city may have a common seal and alter the same at pleasure, and may take
purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real and personal property for the general interest
of the city, condemn private property for public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued,
and prosecute and defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers hereinafter
conferred.

Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to undertake urban land reform, thus:

Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same
into home lots for sale on easy terms for city residents, giving first priority to the bona fide tenants or
occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low--salaried employees.
 EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY

G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987

Facts:

On January 15, 1979, the President, issued Proclamation No.1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of
the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of
1,193,669 sq. mtr, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation
included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned
and registered in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the
parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the
sale of the property.

The petitioner filed a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession
against the private respondent. Respondent judge issued the order of condemnation declaring the
petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment
of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also
issued a second order, subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain
and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.

Issue:

Whether P.D. No. 1533 is valid and constitutional in the issue of exclusive and mandatory mode of
determining just compensation.

Ruling:

NO.

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court
technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following
the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor.

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,
its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining
just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the
opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

Facts:

The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of retention granted by PD
27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating on intend to
cultivate the same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory limits but are occupied by tenants
who re actually cultivating such lands.

Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and
corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until such time as the respective rights of the
tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned the court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could not eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention.

Issue:

Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well-accepted principle of eminent domain by
divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation.

Ruling:

No.

EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full owners of the land
they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just compensation. The CARP Law, for its part,
conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on the receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP
bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either.
J.M. TUASON and CO., INC vs. THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION

G.R. No. L-21064 February 18, 1970

Back on this
 HEIRS OF DR. JOSE DELESTE v. LAND BANK

G.R. No. 169913, June 8, 2011

Facts:

The late Juan, a former governor, owned a 4-hectare farm in Nueva Ecija, tilled by Raymundo. As tiller,
he was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer. In 1980, henchmen of Juan evicted Raymundo from the
farm, threatening to kill them if they did not leave. Thus, Raymundo was left with no recourse but to
leave with his family. Upon learning of Juan’s death in 1993, Raymundo and his family returned to the
farm. He then filed with the Department of Agrariam Reform Adjudication Board a complaint that his
possession and cultivation of the farm be respected, against the estate of Juan, as well as payment of
harvest from 1980 to 1993. The estate filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Raymundo’s cause of
action has prescribed under the provisions of Republic Act 3844 since the dispossession took place in
1980 but the petition was filed only in 1995, way beyond the three-year period for filing such claims. On
the other hand, Raymundo argues that his possession should be deemed uninterrupted since his
departure was made due to threats to his life. Expectedly, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board ruled in favour of the estate. Raymundo was guilty of laches since he did not assert his claim
within a period of 14 years, according to the PARAB. When the case was appealed to the DARAB, the
latter reversed the PARAD decision., which however, was reinstated by the Court of Appeals, affirming
the PARAD decision. Raymundo thus filed his petition for review on certiorari. He posits that prescription
should have started when the intimidation ceased upon Juan’s death, not from 1980, when he was
forcibly evicted from the land. Further, the CA decision disregards the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

Issue:

WHETHER THE LAND THAT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AND PARTIALLY EXPROPRIATED BY A CITY
GOVERNMENT MAY STILL BE SUBJECT[ED] TO AGRARIAN REFORM.

Ruling:

The Court grants the Petition.

The Land Reform Code forges by operation of law, between the landowner and the farmer — be [he] a
leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant — a vinculum juris with certain vital consequences, such
as security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant’s right to continue in possession of the land he works
despite the expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and now, more
basically, the farmer’s pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates under Section 11 of the Code, as
well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge, under Section 12 of
the Code. To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants, Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844 provides that the
agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding.

HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL

 G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011

Facts:

Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 dated
December 16, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011 filed by private respondents.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the very
least, be considered as the date of "taking" as this was the only time that the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita were placed under compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain
obligations under the SDP. January 2, 2006, was the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the
DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01 recalling/revoking the approval of the Stock
Distribution Plan(DSP).

Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA) contends that if HLI or Tadeco is, at
all, entitled to just compensation, the "taking" should be reckoned as of November 21, 1989, the date
when the SDP was approved, and the amount of compensation should be PhP 40,000 per hectare as this
was the same value declared in 1989 by Tadeco to ensure that the FWBs will not control the majority
stockholdings in HLI.

Issue:

Whether or not in determining the just compensation, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP in view of the
fact that this is the time that the FWBS were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in
Hacienda Luisita.

Ruling:

We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP
per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered
to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject
of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the
SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued
under compulsory acquisition.

Jurisprudence held that "the ‘time of taking’ is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use
and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic." It should be noted,
however, that "taking" does not only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name of the
Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). "Taking" also
occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP
coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, HLI’s submitting its SDP for
approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by
CARP.

REPUBLIC v. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI

 GR No. 183446, Nov 13, 2012

Balik ko dre

APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

 G.R. No. 164195. April 5, 2011

Facts:

Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the government under Republic Act 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Government took petitioners’ lands on
December 9, 1996. Land Bank valued the properties at P165, 484.47 per hectare, but AFC-HPI rejected
the offer of that amount. Consequently, on instruction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
Land Bank deposited for AFC and HPI P26, 409,549.86 and P45, 481,706.76, respectively, or a total of
P71, 891,256.62.

Upon revaluation of the expropriated properties, Land Bank eventually made additional deposits,
placing the total amount paid at P411,769,168.32 (P71,891,256.62 + P339,877,911.70), an increase of
nearly five times. Both petitioners withdrew the amounts. Still, they filed separate complaints for just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it was dismissed, after three years, for
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a case with the RTC for the proper determination of just
compensation.

The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners fixing the valuation of petitioners’ properties at P103.33/sq.m with
12% interest plus attorney’s fees. Respondents appealed to the Third Division of the Supreme Court
where the RTC ruling was upheld. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Third Division deleted the
award of interest and attorney’s fees and entry of judgment was issued.

The just compensation of which was only settled on May 9, 2008. Petitioners filed a second motion for
reconsideration with respect to denial of award of legal interest and attorney’s fees and a motion to
refer the second motion to the Court En Banc and was granted accordingly, restoring in toto the ruling
of the RTC. Respondent filed their second motion for reconsideration as well for holding of oral
arguments with the Motion for Leave to intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-Intervention by
the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
showing that just compensation for expropriated agricultural property must be viewed in the context of
social justice.

Ruling:

Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
to give a lower market price per square meter for larger tracts of land, the Commission never intended
to give agricultural landowners less than just compensation in the expropriation of property for agrarian
reform purposes. Nothing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land reform and the right
of landowners to receive just compensation for the expropriation by the State of their properties. That
the petitioners are corporations that used to own large tracts of land should not be taken against them.
As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:
Social justice – or any justice for that matter – is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his
mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt
the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich
simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the
mandate of the law.
 Henry L. Sy v. Local Government of Quezon City

G.R. No. 202690

Facts:

The City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC in
order to acquire a parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of Sy which was intended to be
used as a site for a multi-purpose barangay hall, day-care center, playground and community activity
center for the benefit of the residents of Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City.

Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, was enacted the City deposited 15% of the fair market value of the subject
property based on its tax declaration.

During the preliminary conference Sy did not question the City's right to expropriate the subject
property. Thus, only the amount of just compensation remained at issue.

The RTC appointed commissioners to determine the proper amount of just compensation to be paid by
the City for the subject property. The RTC adopted the findings of Commissioners and thus, held that the
just... compensation for the subject property should be set at P5,500.00 per sq. m. it awarded six
percent (6%) legal interest, computed until full payment of just compensation.

Dissatisfied, Sy filed an appeal with the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling but modified the same,
ordering the City to pay Sy the amount of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees
equivalent to one percent (1%) of the total amount due.

Issue:

Whether the amount of just compensation as determined by the RTC as well as its grant of six percent
(6%) legal interest; and (c) awarded exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

Ruling:

The petition is partly meritorious.

Based on a judicious review of the records and application of jurisprudential rulings, the Court holds that
the correct rate of legal interest to be applied is twelve percent (12%) and not six percent (6%) per
annum, owing to the nature of the City’s obligation as an effective forbearance.

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between
one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he
was in before the taking occurred.
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENECIO EUSEBIO, JR

G.R. No. 160143 July 2, 2014

Facts:

Eusebio, Jr., owner of a 790.4-hectare parcel of land situated in Masbate, voluntarily offered to sell his
land to the government through the Department of Agrarian Reform for P19.5 million. DAR offered to
purchase the land for P3 million but it was rejected by respondent. Petitioner Land Bank made a
revaluation of the land but was rejected again by respondent. Meanwhile, LBP opened a trust account in
favor of Eusebio, and then the DAR immediately took physical possession of the property, had the TCT
cancelled in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, and distributed the property to the farmer-
beneficiaries. The parties then referred the determination of just compensation with the DARAB.

Respondent still finding the valuation unacceptable, filed before the RTC-Special Agrarian Court an
action for determination and payment of just compensation against DAR and LBP. During trial, separate
valuation reports were submitted, with the DAR and LBP using the guidelines/formula under RA 6657 in
their computation. In its judgment, the RTC-SAC brushed aside the valuations fixed by DAR and LBP, and
found instead as considerable just compensation the amount (P25 million) prayed for by respondent.
Both parties appealed, but CA affirmed the judgment in toto.

Issue:

Whether the RTC-SAC committed grave abuse of discretion in the determination of just compensation
for the property.

Ruling:

YES.

The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function that the Courts exercise within
the parameters of the law; the RTC-SAC’s valuation in this case is erroneous for having been rendered
outside the contemplation of the law.

In the exercise of the essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the RTC-SAC is not
granted unlimited discretion. It must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated factors and the
DAR formula (that reflects these factors) as they provide the uniform framework or structure by which
just compensation for property subject to agrarian reform should be determined.

A determination of just compensation based merely on “conscience” – a consideration entirely outside

the contemplation of the law – is the precise situation that we find in this case. To be clear, other than in
“conscience,” the RTC-SAC did not point to any particular consideration that impelled it to set the just
compensation at ₱25 million. In fact, a reading of the RTC-SAC’s decision reveals a marked absence of
any grounds by which it anchored its determination, more so of any explanation why it fixed the amount
of ₱25 million. This marked absence of basis, taken together with these other considerations, convinced
us that the RTC-SAC completely, even arbitrarily, relied on the amount that respondent prayed for in
their complaint in fixing the property’s just compensation. This blind reliance on respondent’s prayer
and the utter disregard of the prescribed factors and formula clearly amount to grave abuse of
discretion for having been taken outside the contemplation of the law.
 US v. Conde

G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922

I will back on this

 Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990

Facts:

In 1986, at the start of President Corazon Aquino’s administration, petitioner sent letters to the Office of
the President and to the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) seeking the reinstatement of its timber
license agreement (TLA No. 87), which was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine other concessions,
during the Marcos administration. It alleged that after the its TLA was cancelled without being given
the opportunity to be heard, its logging area was re-awarded to other logging concessionaires
without a formal award or license, as these entities were controlled or owned by relatives or
cronies of deposed President Marcos. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within
the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn
whenever public interest or welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in
view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983.It also
emphasized the fact that there was currently a total log ban being imposed on the subject areas. After
the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, but the petition was
denied on the ground that the appeal was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in
the MNR. Hence, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors.

Ruling:

The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established
doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have,
upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of
res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as
though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus
forbids there opening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within
their exclusive jurisdiction Petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law for attacking the validity
of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter to the newly
appointed Minister of the MNR requesting for reconsideration, these were already settled
matters as far as petitioner was concerned. More importantly, the assailed orders of the MNR disclose
public policy consideration, which effectively forestall judicial interference. Public respondents,
upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve
the country's natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber
license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the previous
dispensation. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under their special technical knowledge and training.
C & M TIMBER CORPORATION vs. HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA

G.R. No. 111088. June 13, 1997

I will back to you on this

 Republic of the Philippines vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, et al.

G.R. No. 149927 March 30, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation after having been granted permission to
prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in
discovering marble deposits of high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms
part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.

The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the
issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits.

License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly thereafter,
Respondent Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioner’s license stating that their license had illegally
been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public interest served
by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason was confirmed by the language
of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public interest would be served by reverting the parcel of
land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that land as part of the Biak-
na-Bato national park.

Issue:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.

Ruling:

Yes.

We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act
which inflicts punishment without judicial trial.” Its declaration that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is
certainly not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment within the
purview of the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.

Too, there is no merit in the argument that the proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is settled that an
ex post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which merely
restored the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by canceling respondents’ license, is
clearly not penal in character.

Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly
exercising legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of Article II of
Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until
a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. The grant of such power is also explicitly
recognized and provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA

G.R. No. 168584 October 15, 2007

Facts:

In 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 also known as the Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992 which created the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone (SBF) and the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA).

Pursuant to the law, several private respondents applied for and were granted Certificates of
Registration and Tax Exemption by the SBMA. Their respective certificates states that, The Company
shall be entitled to tax and duty-free importation of raw materials, capital equipment, and household
and personal items for use solely on the Subic Bay Freeport Zone.

Congress subsequently passed RA 9334 effective Jan. 1, 2005 which states that all importations of cigars,
cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the SBF, including those intended to be
transhipped to other free ports in the Philippines, shall be treated as ordinary importations subject to all
applicable taxes, duties and charges, including excise taxes.

On Feb. 3, 2005, former BIR Commissioner Payano, requested the Customs Commissioner Jereos to
immediately collect the excise tax due on imported alcohol and tobacco products brought to the Duty
Free Philippines (DFP) and Freeport zones.

On Feb. 7, 2005, SBMA issued a Memorandum directing the departments concerned to require
locators/importers in the SBF to pay the corresponding duties and taxes on their importations of cigars,
cigarettes, liquors and wines before said items are cleared and released from the Freeport. However,
certain SBF locators which were exclusively engaged in the transhipment of cigarette products for
foreign destinations were allowed by the SBMA to process their import documents subject to their
submission of an Undertaking with the Bureau of Customs.

On Feb. 15, 2005, private respondents wrote the offices of the Collector of Customs and the SBMA
Administrator requesting for a reconsideration of the directives in the imposition of duties and taxes on
cigars, cigarette.

Issue:

Whether or not, RA 9334 is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional provision on the
proscription against the impairment of obligations of contracts.

Ruling:

Tax exemption being a mere statutory privilege, may be modified or withdraw at will by the granting
authority. Taxation is subject to restrictions which rest on the discretion of the authority exercising it.

As a general rule, tax exemptions are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that
it is in fact covered by the exemption so claimed. In case of doubt, non-exemption is favored.
A tax exemption cannot be grounded upon the continued existence of a statute which precludes its
change or repeal. The rights granted under the Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption of private
respondents are not absolute and unconditional as to constitute rights in esse - those clearly founded on
or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.

Whatever right may have been acquired on the basis of the Certificates of Registration and Tax
Exemption must yield to the State's valid exercise of police power. The feared injurious effects of the
imposition of duties, charges and taxes on imported cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors
and wines on private respondents' businesses cannot possibly outweigh the dire consequences that the
non-collection of taxes, not to mention the unabated smuggling inside the SBF, would wreak on the
government.
 RODOLFO T. GANZON and GREGORIO L. LIRA vs. THE HONORABLE SANCHO Y. INSERTO

G.R. No. L-56450 July 25, 1983

Facts:

Petitioner sold a land to respondent. Respondent avers that the balance of the price would be secured
by a mortgage on that land. However a proviso in the deed of sale contained a warranty that petitioner
would guarantee that the occupants on the land would vacate within 120 days and since the warranty
was breached because the occupants were still there, the foreclosure would be illegal. Respondents
then came to trial court when petitioner tried to foreclose the mortgage. The trial court canceled the
mortgage and substituted it with surety bond upon stating that petitioner failed to comply with the
clearing of the occupants and since respondent now are willing to pay for the money promised by the
mortgage.

Issue:

Whether or not court may order substitution of mortgage with surety bond.

Ruling:

No. Court cannot substitute mortgage with surety bond.

A mortgage is but an accessory contract. "The consideration of the mortgage is the same consideration
of the principal contract without which it cannot exist as an independent contract. By Article 2126 of the
Civil Code, (Formerly Article 1876 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889.) a 'mortgage directly and
immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.' Sale or transfer cannot affect or
release the mortgage. A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance to
which is subject the purchased thing and which is at the disposal of the creditor 'in order that he, under
the terms of the contract, may recover the amount of his credit therefrom. For, a recorded real estate is
a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. Because the personality of the owner is
disregarded; the mortgage subsists notwithstanding changes of ownership; the last transferee is just as
much of a debtor as the first one; and this, independent of whether the transferee knows or not the
person of the mortgagee.
 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ

G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

Facts:

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also
authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994).

President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional
conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under
the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:

Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.

Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the
transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of
the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive.
The AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.
 FLORENCIO EUGENIO vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON

G.R. No. 109404 January 22, 1996

Facts:

May 10, 1972 - private respondent (Palmiano), on installment basis, purchased two lots in the E & S
Delta Village in Quezon City from petitioner (Eugenio). The Delta Village Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
filed a complaint of non-development (docketed as cases 2619 and 2620) to the National Housing
Authority (NHA). Acting on this, the NHA ordered petitioner to cease and desist from making further
sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by him.

And while these NHA Cases (Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620) were still pending, private respondent
(Palmiano) filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and
Adelina Relevo (he alleges that in spite of the NHA ruling petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said
spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was registered). Furthermore, private
respondent suspended his payments because of petitioner’s said failure to develop the village.
Respondent also prays for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for reconveyance of the
lot to him.

Issue:

Whether or not P.D. 957, “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree” has retroactive
effect.

Ruling:

P.D. 957, “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree” – protects the rights of
subdivision and condominium buyers by providing that the developers of these properties should fulfill
all the guarantees of facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development which
they have offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures,
prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisement.

Although, P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, such can be plainly inferred
from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the
situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy (From the Preamble:

“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators,
and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic
requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers), must be enforced.
 Goldenway Merchandising Corporation vs. Equitable PCI Bank

G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013

Facts:

On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation executed a Real Estate Mortgage in
favor of Equitable PCI Bank over three parcels of land. The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) loan granted to petitioner. Petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, so respondent
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13, 2000. Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was
issued to respondent on January 26, 2001. On February 16, 2001, the Certificate of Sale was registered.

In a letter dated March 8, 2001, petitioner’s counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by
tendering a check. However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no longer possible because the
certificate of sale had already been registered and consolidated in favor of respondent March 9, 2001.

Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages contending that the 1-year period of
redemption under Act 3135 should apply, and not the shorter redemption period under RA 8791 as
applying RA 8791 would result in the impairment of obligations of contracts and would violate the equal
protection clause under the constitution.

The RTC dismissed the action of the petitioner ruling that redemption was made belatedly and that
there was no redemption made at all. The CA affirmed the RTC, thus this petition for review.

Issue:

Whether or not the redemption period should be the 1-year period provided under Act 3135, and not
the shorter period under RA 8791 as the parties expressly agreed that foreclosure would be in
accordance with Act 3135.

Ruling:

No. The shorter period under RA 8791 should apply.

The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale.
In this case, the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon petitioner’s default
and the latter’s entire loan obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the
mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance with Act No.
3135, as amended.

Amending Act no. 3135 is Sec 47 of RA 8791, which stated an exception made in the case of juridical
persons which are allowed to exercise the right of redemption only “until, but not after, the registration
of the certificate of foreclosure sale” and in no case more than three (3) months after foreclosure,
whichever comes first.

The legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose
properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute,
and within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective.

Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the
police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State,
but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the
community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the
necessity.